Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Military And Security Developments
Apr 03.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
* OSKIL-KREMINNA: Since the start of 2025, Russian forces have gradually expanded their presence on the right (west) bank of the Zherebets River, establishing a solid bridgehead to launch more intense offensive operations, possibly towards Lyman
* STRIKES: A steady tempo of Russian long-range strikes has continued this week as both sides continue to accuse one another of violating the energy strikes moratorium
* CONSCRIPTION: President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that will conscript 160,000 men as part of the normal spring conscription drive; this does not constitute a partial mobilisation of reserves
* FORECAST: Belarus and Russia have been excluded from a raft of new tariffs announced by the US government on 2 April, though Ukraine now faces 10% tariffs
* BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage posted on 2 April indicates that Russian forces have likely captured the small settlement of Oleksandropil, which is located to the south-west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). The footage posted on 2 April showed Russian forces raising a flag in the settlement. In Toretsk, a Russian milblogger claimed on 2 April that Russian forces made further advances as part of efforts to close the cauldron on (encircle) Ukrainian forces in the Zabalka microdistrict. While we cannot confirm the veracity of this claim, we have previously assessed that Russian advances to the north of Toretsk form part of an effort to outflank Ukrainian forces in the city.
* DONETSK: Russian forces continue to maintain a high offensive tempo around Pokrovsk, with attacks to the east of the city likely indicating a shift in focus in the area. On 3 April, Viktor Tregubov, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Grouping of Forces, noted that Russian offensive operations are currently focused to the east of Pokrovsk, aiming to cross the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka road while shifting away from efforts to encircle Pokrovsk from the west. Russian forces are reportedly trying to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near the town. The operational shift eastward of Pokrovsk, particularly towards the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka road, is possibly aimed at setting conditions for advances to the southern approaches of the Ukrainian urban belt, stretching from Kostiantynivka to Sloviansk. This would potentially be the focus of a Russian larger spring offensive.
* DONETSK: Russian operations also continued to the south-west of Pokrovsk, resulting in confirmed gains; Ukrainian counter-attacks also resulted in localised gains. Geolocated footage from 1 April shows Russian forces recently advancing on the eastern outskirts of Bohdanivka and in western Lysivka, both located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops recently progressed south-east of Kotlyne, also located to the south-west of Pokrovsk.
* DONESTK: Further south, Russian forces are intensifying operations west of Kurakhove, particularly around Andriivka. DeepState, a Ukrainian OSINT group, reported earlier on 3 April that Russian troops had recently advanced in Andriivka. According to Tregubov, Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are likely active in the vicinity of the settlement of Rozlyv, located to the south-west of Andriivka and to the west of Kurakhove. Such efforts are likely aimed at reaching Dnipropetrovsk oblast’s administrative border.
* KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
* KURSK-SUMY: Russian forces have continued to push back Ukrainian forces in Belgorod, Kursk and Sumy oblasts in recent days. Geolocated footage posted on 1 April indicates that Russian forces likely recently advanced east of Oleshnya, which is located to the south-west of Sudzha (Kursk oblast). Additionally, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) posted footage on 31 March which was subsequently geolocated and indicated that Russian forces recently advanced in Gogolevka, located to the south-west of Sudzha (Kursk oblast). Elsewhere, geolocated footage posted on 28 March indicates that Russian forces have likely captured the settlement of Veselivka, which is located north of Sumy (Sumy oblast). Finally, geolocated footage posted on 31 March also indicates that Russian forces recently made gains in central Demidovka, which is located to the north-west of Belgorod (Belgorod oblast).
* OSKIL-KREMINNA: Since the start of 2025, Russian forces have gradually expanded their presence on the right (west) bank of the Zherebets River to the north-east of Lyman, establishing a solid bridgehead to launch more intense offensive operations. Recent Russian offensive operations likely indicate efforts to expand the Russian bridgehead north-east of Lyman. For instance, geolocated footage from 1 April indicates recent Russian advances north-west of Novolyubivka, located to the north-east of Lyman. The settlement is likely fully under Russian control. Furthermore, a Ukrainian military observer recently stated that Russian forces progressed towards the southern outskirts of Katerynivka, located to the north-west of Novolyubivka. These efforts are possibly aimed at setting conditions for the capture of Borova (Kharkiv oblast) and Lyman (Donetsk oblast).
* OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces may also use the bridgehead north-east of Lyman to complete the seizure of the remaining small portion of Luhansk Oblast still under Ukrainian control. Achieving this goal would provide Moscow with a significant political victory and leverage in future peace negotiations.
* SOUTHERN: In recent days, Russian forces have made advances in both western Donetsk oblast and western Zaporizhzhia oblast. Geolocated footage posted on 30 March indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Novosilka, which is located to the west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, geolocated footage posted on 2 April indicated that Russian forces have likely seized the settlement of Lobkove, which is located to the north-west of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast); they have likely advanced both to the east and west of the settlement.
* STRIKES: In recent days, Russia and Ukraine continued to exchange large-scale drone attacks, with Russian strikes occasionally supplemented by a limited number of missiles. Additionally, both sides have continued to accuse each other of breaching the moratorium for energy strikes. Russian sources allege that Kyiv is using Russia’s adherence to the moratorium to stockpile military equipment near energy infrastructure. These claims remain unconfirmed and could likely be aimed at creating pretexts for Russian forces to resume long-range attacks that systematically target such infrastructure.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* CONSCRIPTION: On 31 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that will conscript 160,000 men as part of the normal spring conscription drive. The decree affects men between the ages of 18 and 30, who will be subject to a 10-month conscription obligation. However, they will not be deployed to serve in the occupied territories or take part in the ongoing ‘special military operation’. Russia conducts regular conscription rounds every year in the spring and the autumn; it is not a mobilisation of reserves.
* CONSCRIPTION: That said, the number of conscripts is notably higher than in previous years; the figures stand at 134,500 in 2022, 147,000 in 2023, 150,000 in 2024 and now 160,000 in 2025. These figures will likely continue to increase as part of Russia’s plans to steadily expand the standing strength of its military and to expand its reserve pool. In the meantime, however, a second partial mobilisation of reserves remains unlikely in the short term, given that Moscow is continuing to attract significant recruits to serve at the frontline.
* RAMSTEIN: Unconfirmed reports indicate that US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth will not take part in the upcoming Ramstein format meeting in Brussels on 11 April; this would be the first time the US Defense Secretary has not attended. Defense News reported this on 2 April, citing unnamed official US sources. The Ramstein format has co-ordinated Ukraine’s partners to streamline military aid and had historically been chaired by the US. The upcoming summit will be chaired jointly by Germany and the UK. While it remains unconfirmed if Hegseth will attend, if he does not, it will likely further reflect the US’ diminished role in providing military aid to Ukraine amid the Trump administration’s efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement.
FORECAST
TARIFFS: Belarus and Russia have been excluded from a raft of new tariffs announced by the US government on 2 April, though Ukraine now faces 10% tariffs. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt confirmed on 2 April that Belarus and Russia are not on the tariff list given existing sanctions already ‘preclude any meaningful trade’ with the US. While US-Russian trade volumes are indeed very low (they dropped from USD 36 bn in 2021 to just USD 3.5 bn in 2024) the tariffs have notably affected states with significantly lower trade volumes.
In the meantime, Ukraine now faces a flat tariff rate of 10% on imports to the US. Ukraine’s First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on 3 April that Ukrainian exports to the US in 2024 amounted to USD 874 m and that Ukraine bought USD 3.4 bn worth of US goods over the same period. She described the new tariff situation as ‘difficult, but not critical’. We assess that tariffs will fall most heavily upon small and medium-sized enterprises and iron exporters.
While US President Donald Trump stated last week that he was ‘very angry’ at Russian President Vladimir Putin (amid growing frustration at Russian delaying tactics during ceasefire talks) Trump and Putin have indicated respective interest in boosting trade between the US and Russia. Excluding both Russia and its ally Belarus from this round of tariffs likely indicates that the US is prioritising efforts to improve economic ties in the short term in a bid to bring an end to the war.
Putin’s personal envoy for investment, Kirill Dmitriev, met US special envoy Steve Witkoff in Washington D.C. on 2 April. His visit notably came on the same day as Trump’s tariff announcements, and just days after Dmitriev confirmed on 31 March that Russian and US officials were engaged in discussions concerning joint rare earth mineral projects. However, if Russia continues to delay and refuses to accept a temporary ceasefire, this policy may shift. This could realistically result in additional sanctions (and tariffs) being placed on Russia (and Belarus), including indirectly on states that buy Russian oil. This could further affect large economies such as China and India. Trump publicly stated this week that he is not ruling out imposing secondary sanctions against Russia if Putin ‘doesn’t do his job’, likely referring to agreeing to a ceasefire.
Reuters reported on 1 April that senior Trump administration officials have been discussing the likelihood that the US will be unable to secure a peace deal in the coming months and are reportedly planning options to increase pressure on both Kyiv and Moscow to reach a deal. The Trump administration has previously stated a goal of reaching an Easter truce on or around 20 April. However, as we have consistently assessed, it remains highly unlikely that a full ceasefire on the ground will be reached in the short term; it is also likely that the Trump administration’s ‘deadlines’ will be continually pushed back for as long as the prevailing military and strategic conditions in Ukraine favour Russia, limiting Moscow’s appetite for even a temporary ceasefire. Trump has stated that he has set an unspecified ‘psychological’ deadline, but it remains unlikely that Russia will agree to a ceasefire while its troops are continuing to advance on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, the White House confirmed on 1 April that Trump will be visiting Saudi Arabia in May, which could realistically indicate a timeline for a high-profile Russia-US summit. While the itinerary is still yet to be confirmed, Saudi Arabia has emerged as the key location for peace negotiations between Ukraine, the US and Russia. It remains a realistic possibility that the visit will coincide with either an in-person meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin or otherwise high-level peace talks with Russian and/or Ukrainian delegations. In the meantime, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant confirmed on 3 April that a Ukrainian delegation will visit the US this week to continue negotiations over a minerals deal. This signing of such a deal could further dictate US policy towards ending the war.
Apr 02.
• Russia-US: Threat of sanctions is unlikely to alter Kremlin’s current decision-making posture. On 1 April, the Washington Times reported that a bipartisan group of US senators drafted a bill on new sanctions against Russia because of its lack of commitment to achieving progress on peace talks. The draft bill suggests imposing 500% tariffs on goods from countries that purchase Russian commodities, including hydrocarbons. The initiative comes after US President Donald Trump recently expressed frustration with the lack of progress on peace talks. We assess that the likelihood of this draft bill being enacted in the short term is moderately low as it would significantly impact the global economy. In the long term, the likelihood of such measures being adopted will likely increase. In the meantime, Washington DC will likely opt to impose sanctions directly on Russia and reinforce the enforcement of existing sanctions. That said, we assess that the Kremlin’s decision-making is unlikely to be influenced by threats of sanctions in the short to medium term as it remains focused on pursuing its military goals, believing it has the upper hand in the conflict.
• Kazakhstan: Increased sanctions compliance will raise likelihood of Russian economic retaliation. On 1 April, Reuters reported that the Russian authorities ordered the shutdown of two out of three moorings at the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, which handles Kazakhstan’s oil exports via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). This move would reportedly cut Kazakh oil exports by half, as the CPC transports 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. The measure follows reports that Kazakh banks have recently restricted financial transactions with Russia after the US recently tightened sanctions against Moscow. Kazakhstan has been a key hub for Russian sanctions evasion and further compliance with the Western sanctions regime would restrict Russia’s access to the global financial system. In 2022, Russia imposed similar restrictions on Kazakh oil exports after Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev refused to recognise Moscow’s annexation of Ukrainian regions. We assess that any further alignment with Western sanctions will significantly increase the risk of severe Russian economic retaliatory measures, including against Astana’s hydrocarbon exports. This could have a highly detrimental impact on Kazakhstan’s economy, which heavily relies on oil exports.
Mar 31.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• STRIKES: Both sides are accusing one another of violating the unclear terms of the moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure, underscoring the fragility of the agreement
• ELECTIONS: Reports indicate that the Ukrainian government is preparing to hold a presidential election as early as July, though this will likely be contingent upon a ceasefire (which remains unlikely)
• CEASEFIRE: US President Donald Trump is reportedly ‘very angry’ at Russian President Vladimir Putin and has threatened to impose new sanctions and tariffs on Russian oil (and nations that buy it) if Moscow does not agree to a ceasefire
• FORECAST: Reports have emerged in recent days detailing the terms of a reworked minerals and resources deal between Ukraine and the US which would grant the latter a significant control over Ukrainian resources
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 28, 29 and 30 March indicates that Russian forces have advanced in and around Toretsk. Russian forces advanced northwards in fields to the north of Toretsk; this formed part of an effort to encircle Ukrainian forces still fighting in the centre and north of the town. We previously assessed that Russian efforts to penetrate the outskirts of Toretsk to the north likely formed part of an ongoing Russian attempt to outflank the Ukrainians. In line with this development, a deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion fighting in Toretsk stated on 30 March that Russian forces have, in recent days, intensified their attacks and are attacking along Toretsk’s flanks.
• BAKHMUT: The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Grouping of Forces, Viktor Tregubov, stated on 31 March that Russian forces are currently attempting to infiltrate Toretsk via underground pipes, akin to the attempted attack against Sudzha in Kursk oblast. It remains likely that Russian forces are currently experimenting with different tactics in a bid to outflank the Ukrainians and to generate some momentum after months of ever-slowing rates of advance where Ukrainian counter-attacks have pushed the Russians back in recent months.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have made confirmed advances in the Pokrovsk sector; Ukrainian forces continue to launch localised counter-attacks likely to prevent further Russian progress. The majority of Russian advances have occurred to the south-west of Pokrovsk, near settlements such as Bohdanivka, Kotlyarivka, Shevchenko and Uspenivka. Geolocated footage from 28 March shows recent Ukrainian advances to the west of Shevchenko, likely indicating the contested nature of the settlement; it is likely the theatre for intense fighting. Russia seized Preobrazhenka and claimed the capture of the village of Zaporizhzhia on 30 March, a settlement located to the south-west of Pokrovsk (not to be confused with Zaporizhzhia city). However, it is likely that this settlement has already been under Russian control since the end of February. On 28 March, Viktor Tregubov, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Grouping of Forces, noted that the intensity of Russian operations reflects efforts to regain the same momentum as in January. Russian operations decreased in intensity in February as Moscow was prioritising efforts in the Kursk salient and likely resting and reconstituting forces in preparation for the upcoming spring offensives. Recently, however, Ukrainian military sources operating in the sector highlighted Russia has intensified infantry and mechanised assaults, resulting in elevated material losses.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian forces are continuing to steadily push the Ukrainians out of Kursk oblast and have regained control of the key border crossing point controlling the R200/H07 highway. Geolocated footage published on 27 March indicates that Russian forces have taken control of Gogolevka, located around four miles (6km) to the west of Sudzha, and located just two miles (3km) east of the international border where Russian forces have also now regained control of the R200/H07 highway border post. Additionally, geolocated footage from 28 March indicates Russian forces have advanced to the northern outskirts of Guyevo, a settlement located around seven miles (11km) to the south of Sudzha.
• KURSK-SUMY: Meanwhile, Russian forces have continued to make slow advances across the international border in northern Sumy oblast (Ukraine). Senior Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) official and Akhmat Spetsnaz commander Apti Alaudinov reported on 29 March that Russian forces are advancing in multiple directions into Sumy oblast and are expanding their presence in northern Sumy to facilitate further advances. Russian forces are likely attempting to advance within Basivka, located two miles (3km) west of the international border, in a bid to advance southwards towards the H07 highway. Further south still, across the border into Belgorod oblast (Russia), geolocated footage from 28 and 29 March indicates that Ukrainian forces have made small advances along the border, including in eastern Popovka, located less than a kilometre from the border. That said, Russian sources claimed on 27 and 28 March that their forces have advanced to the border and are repelling Ukrainian attacks from Popovka.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces are continuing to concentrate assets along the Zaporizhzhia front after making some advances over the last two weeks. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on 28 March that Russian forces have amassed between 70,000-72,000 troops, as many as 320 tanks and up to 725 armoured vehicles in western Zaporizhzhia oblast. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on 29 March that Russian forces have increased their use of armoured vehicles during assaults in the southern direction, likely referring to recent attacks on the Zaporizhzhia front that have resulted in some advances.
• STRIKES: Russia and Ukraine have continued to accuse each other of violating the moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure. Following a Russian long-range strike overnight on 27–28 March, Ukraine’s state-owned gas operator Naftogaz reported damage to unspecified facilities. Ukrainian officials also stated that Moscow targeted oil and gas facilities in Poltava City (Poltava oblast) and other energy infrastructure. On 31 March, Andriy Yermak, the head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, claimed that Moscow has repeatedly violated the moratorium and continues to heavily target civilian infrastructure.
• STRIKES: Similarly, the Russian authorities accused Ukrainian forces of striking energy facilities including in Bryansk, Kursk and Saratov oblasts, in recent days. Russian sources claimed that Ukraine’s long-range attack on 27-28 March targeted the Saratov oil refinery and Engels Air Base, both in Saratov oblast. However, the Ukrainian authorities denied these claims, asserting that the strike was aimed at military equipment storage depots at the airbase. On 29 March, Russia claimed that Kyiv struck energy facilities in Belgorod oblast and the Sudzha gas metering station in Kursk oblast in March. On 28 March, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned that Russia would resume attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure if Kyiv failed to uphold the moratorium.
• STRIKES: We assess that Russia will likely use these claims to violate the moratorium, especially if it believes such attacks would be strategically beneficial to its war goals. While Russia has systematically targeted such facilities since the start of the war, we previously concluded that it likely agreed to the moratorium because this infrastructure no longer holds the same strategic value as it did earlier in the winter. Adherence to the moratorium will remain very fragile, especially due to the lack of trust from both sides.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russia continued to target various civilian infrastructure with long-range strikes that have reportedly become increasingly lethal. The strike launched overnight on 28-29 March included in all 172 drones and one ballistic missile. The missile reportedly struck Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) while the drone attacks reportedly caused damage to various civilian targets, particularly in Dnipro City (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). The Russian attack on 29 March hit a military hospital in Kharkiv.
• STRIKES: On 28 March, German news outlets reported that Russia has improved its drone strike tactics, resulting in greater success in bypassing Ukraine’s air defence systems. These tactics involve deploying drones that loiter several miles ahead of their targets at high altitudes before executing co-ordinated drone attacks while rapidly diving as they approach. The co-ordinated nature of these strikes maximises the lethality of the drone attacks and their high-altitude flight complicates counter-drone efforts by Ukrainian mobile fire units; such units find it challenging to engage unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) effectively. Such tactics are further enhanced by Russia’s capacity to launch increasingly larger drone offensives. We previously reported on Russia’s utilisation of such tactics in an attack against Odesa City (Odesa oblast) on 21 March.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• ELECTIONS: Reports emerged on 30 March that the Ukrainian government is preparing to hold a presidential election as early as July. According to unspecified Ukrainian government insiders, President Volodymyr Zelensky convened a meeting last week to instruct his administration to organise a vote after a full ceasefire is in place. The report claimed that the first confirmation of an impending election may realistically appear ahead of or on 5 May, the deadline for a parliamentary vote to extend martial law.
• ELECTIONS: While different insiders vary in their estimates on an exact timeline, Zelensky is reportedly aiming for a summer election. Ukrainian law requires at least 60 days for campaigning, meaning that the earliest possible time for an election would be the beginning of July. That said, others argue that election campaigns would have to last three months, which is the time the election authorities have reportedly told the parliament they require to draw up voter lists while the war is ongoing. All of these preparations will likely be contingent upon a ceasefire in any case.
• ELECTIONS: Elections cannot be held in Ukraine under martial law, which has been in force since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Kyiv will almost certainly have to consider various logistical and security challenges regarding polling as parts of the country are under Russian occupation and ms of Ukrainians are either displaced internally or have fled abroad. As such, while we cannot confirm the reports. We assess that the prospect of holding an election in summer is likely overly optimistic given the challenges inherent in reaching even partial ceasefires let alone a full cessation of hostilities.
• ELECTIONS: That said, if an election was held after reaching a full ceasefire, this would mean that a presidential ballot would likely be treated as a de facto referendum on a candidate’s plan for a wider peace settlement. A majority vote would likely be interpreted as a mandate for the newly elected president to proceed with their envisioned terms for peace. However, there is limited societal appetite for new elections in Ukraine at present; recent polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) confirms this. Overall, 77% of respondents believe elections should only be held after Ukraine receives security guarantees or after the war ends.
• ELECTIONS: On 27 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested Ukraine could be placed under a form of temporary administration to allow for new elections and the signing of documents on a peace treaty. The Russian president implied that this could happen under the auspices of the UN with the involvement of the US, possibly with European countries as well as Russia’s ‘partners’. Although the US has increased pressure on Ukraine to hold new elections in recent months, the White House has dismissed Putin’s proposal. Putin’s comments are likely part of Russia’s long-standing information operations to undermine the legitimacy of Ukraine’s parliament and the country’s president. This likely attempts to stall the peace process and create preconditions to possibly abandon the terms of any peace treaty in the future if Moscow cannot secure terms favourable to itself.
• CEASEFIRE: On 30 March, US President Donald Trump threatened to introduce secondary tariffs of 25% to 50% on Russian oil if he feels Moscow is impeding efforts to end the war in Ukraine. Trump added that buyers of Russian oil would be unable to do business in the US, though he did not offer any further details on this. Brazil, China, the EU, India and Turkey were among the biggest buyers of Russian oil products and crude oil in January based on information from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. Russia relies heavily on its hydrocarbon revenues to support its economy; we have repeatedly assessed that the Trump administration could leverage this and target Russia’s energy sector to coerce engagement in the peace process.
• CEASEFIRE: Although Trump has issued threats of tariffs and sanctions against Russia before, his recent comments likely reflect growing open annoyance at Russian efforts to delay the US attempts to reach a ceasefire. Despite the fact that Trump has criticised Ukrainian President Zelensky before and called him a dictator, Trump said on 30 March that he was ‘very angry’ with Russian President Putin criticising Zelensky’s legitimacy. The US president implied that such comments are not productive, which likely indicates that the Trump administration is becoming increasingly aware of Russian stalling tactics as Trump’s stated goal of reaching a ceasefire on Easter (20 April) approaches.
• CEASEFIRE: Meanwhile, Trump said later on 30 March that he has given Putin a ‘psychological deadline’ to agree to a ceasefire, though he did not name a specific date. While 20 April is a possible deadline, this will highly likely be subject to change, as Trump and his officials have consistently adjusted their timelines since gaining office. Trump also said he does not want to apply secondary tariffs on Russia, which indicates that any economic punitive measures (such as tariffs and additional sanctions) will highly likely be a last resort.
FORECAST
MINERALS: Reports have emerged in recent days detailing the terms of a reworked minerals and resources deal between Ukraine and the US which would grant the latter significant control over Ukrainian resources. The initial deal collapsed in late February following a public dispute between Trump and Zelensky. The Trump administration has since sought to extract more advantageous terms for itself. For an analysis of the contents of the previous agreement, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 27 February 2025.
The New York Times claimed to have obtained the text of the new draft on 28 March, of which unspecified current and former Ukrainian officials had reportedly confirmed the authenticity. The new proposal reinstates Trump’s initial demand that Ukraine repay the US for military and financial aid following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to the Kiel Institute, the US allocated military and financial aid for Ukraine worth USD 110.73 bn between 24 January 2022 and 31 December 2024. Trump has repeatedly claimed that the US gave Ukraine over USD 300bn. Zelensky stated on 28 March that Kyiv would not recognise past US aid as loans. This is therefore likely to be a point of contention in Ukrainian-US efforts to construct a mutually beneficial deal. At the same time, given the transactional approach of the Trump administration towards aid for Ukraine, the US side is unlikely to remove the provision on repayments without other concessions.
As in earlier versions of the proposed deal, Ukraine would contribute half of its revenue from natural resource projects and related infrastructure (such as ports and pipelines) to a US-controlled investment fund. Profit from the fund would be reinvested in Ukrainian natural resource projects. However, the new proposal states that Washington DC would now claim all profit from the fund until Ukraine repays at least the equivalent of US aid received during the war with 4% annual interest. UKyiv will likely remain highly reluctant to sign the arrangement as elements of it would severely undermine Ukraine’s post-war recovery, given it would then be heavily indebted to the US.
Concurrently, the terms of the arrangement would possibly reduce the pool of investors willing to invest or operate in Ukraine. Under the new terms of the deal, the US would enjoy a ‘right of first offer’ on new projects and the power to veto sales of Ukrainian resources to third countries (including the EU). Notably, Ukraine would be prohibited from offering any investment projects to third parties with better financial or economic terms than those granted to the US. These provisions would highly likely undermine Ukraine’s economic relations with European partners, most specifically the EU, of which Ukraine aims to be a member. Zelensky has implied that Ukraine will not sign the agreement if it threatens the country’s accession prospects; it is possible that such terms would undermine the EU’s competition rules.
According to a report from Bloomberg on 29 March, Ukraine will ask for changes to the nearly 60-page draft deal. The outlet cited an unspecified insider who said that much work needs to be done before Ukraine sends its final proposals for amendments. The US did not push back against Ukrainian concerns raised during a reported video call on 28 March, especially concerning how certain terms conflict with Ukraine’s ambitions to join the EU.
That said, Ukraine’s negotiating position has weakened following the spat between Trump and Zelensky. Following that incident, the US suspended military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine before later resuming it. Trump has already accused Zelensky of wanting to withdraw from the minerals deal and warned of ‘big problems’ if he does so. This implies that future terms could be even less favourable to Ukraine or would carry other penalties. Although Trump did not offer specifics, Kyiv almost certainly acknowledges that aid and intelligence suspensions could happen again and be permanent in case no agreement is reached.
The latest agreement also omits any mention of security guarantees for Ukraine. However, the text of the previous framework agreement published in late February made a vague reference to security guarantees. It noted that the US government ‘supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees’. Kyiv had long pushed for the deal to be linked to ensuring Ukraine’s security. However, we assess that the Trump administration highly likely regards long-term US economic interest in Ukraine’s resources as a suitable security guarantee alone. Regardless, the absence of security guarantees combined with sweeping preferential terms for the US would highly likely sustain criticism and drive government instability in Ukraine and will likely not be ratified by the Ukrainian parliament as it currently stands.
Meanwhile, Moscow and Washington DC have begun talks on joint rare earth metals and other projects in Russia. The head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, Kirill Dmitriev, who also serves as the Kremlin’s special envoy on international economic and investment co-operation, disclosed this in remarks published earlier on 31 March. Russian engagement on this topic is indicative of Moscow’s efforts to ease its economic isolation by appealing to the Trump administration’s wishes to gain access to critical minerals and rare earths. Although unlikely in the short-to-medium term, the emergence of US companies working with Russia on rare earth projects would sustain reputational risks, especially if Moscow seeks to exploit resources in occupied territories in Ukraine. At the same time, compliance with sanctions regimes will remain another risk for entities to consider in addition to the hostile investment climate in Russia.
• Ukraine: Elections remain unlikely in coming months despite reported preparations. Reports emerged on 30 March that the Ukrainian government is preparing to hold a presidential election as early as July. According to unspecified Ukrainian government insiders, President Volodymyr Zelensky convened a meeting last week to instruct his administration to organise a vote after a full ceasefire is in place. The report claimed that the first confirmation of an impending election may realistically appear ahead of or on 5 May, the deadline for a parliamentary vote to extend martial law. Elections cannot be held in Ukraine under martial law, which has been in force since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Kyiv will almost certainly have to consider various logistical and security challenges regarding polling as parts of the country are under Russian occupation and ms of Ukrainians are either displaced internally or have fled abroad. As such, while we cannot confirm the reports, we assess that the prospect of holding an election in summer is likely overly optimistic given the challenges inherent in reaching even partial ceasefires let alone a full cessation of hostilities.
• Russia: Security incidents underscore persistent risk of attacks across Russia. On 29 March, a luxury limousine from Russia’s official presidential car fleet caught fire near the headquarters of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in Moscow, according to Western and Ukrainian media outlets. The incident was reportedly caused by an explosion, though the exact cause remains unknown. The vehicle is typically used by high-ranking Russian officials. While the cause of the explosion has yet to be determined, the incident will likely heighten concerns among top Russian officials regarding security threats from various actors, including the Ukrainian intelligence services (which have been linked to several high-profile assassinations and plots in Russia). Meanwhile, on 30 March, Russian law enforcement neutralised a suspect who had opened fire from a rooftop in the northern city of Murmansk (Murmansk oblast). The suspect was an employee of a state-funded fishing vessel rescue service; his motives remain unknown. No casualties were reported. We assess that these latest incidents likely underscore the deteriorating security environment across Russia. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Apr 25. Ukraine Lessons for SOF in Large Scale Combat Operations – Fires, Unmanned Systems, and Intelligence. The second instalment of a four-part essay examining lessons learned from Ukraine for SOF in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Authored by Erik Kramer & Paul Schneider.
PART II
III. Fires
Observations
Artillery at the beginning of the Russian Special Military Operation was the king of battle and most casualty producing weapons system until early 2024 when it was overtaken by UAS by a wide-margin. Both sides are using UAS for multiple roles substituting capabilities traditionally done by different occupational specialties or units. Clearing trenches, creating breach lanes, first person view (FPV) ambushes, close quarters battle to clear rooms, and AFU SOF operations outside of artillery support range, will utilize kinetic UAS in place of artillery. We have not observed SOF units utilizing mortars. The AFU is burning out 155mm artillery barrels at an alarming rate. Some observers state that it is due to the high use and others say it is because they are being fired at “max charge” to avoid counter battery fire.
The war in Ukraine is one of the first traditional LSCO of the 21st century. As such, tanks and armored personnel carriers are an integral part of the fight. Even though the Russians have lost over 9000 tanks (over 20,000 armored vehicles),tanks are still a threat; even the much older models such as the T64. Often both sides use armor as a mobile artillery platform instead of integrated with infantry assaults. The AFU was very successful against Russian armor at the beginning of the war thanks to the widespread use of man portable anti-tank systems such as the British NLAW, French-German MILAN, and U.S. Javelin. Their prevalence proved critical in stopping the Russian push to Kyiv in February 2022. SOF units, operating on ATVs and using these systems, were able to decimate Russian armored convoys restricted by terrain and lack of navigation systems.
Close air support, for the most part, is nonexistent in the Ukraine war due to the constant threat from air defense systems. That is not to say that U.S. forces will not have the capability to call in close air support, but it does mean that it can be taken for granted and the air domain will be constantly contested. In a near peer fight, the U.S. might find itself facing parity where neither side is dominant. SOF will have to develop ways to have reliable indirect fires and close air support. In Afghanistan, when there was an aircraft shortage due to the worsening Iraq war, SOF relied on artillery and highly portable 60mm mortar systems.
Recommendations
USSOF has mentioned above, cannot assume that it will have reliable air support. SOF will have to develop work arounds such as artillery, mortars, UAS, or innovations with ground unmanned systems with mounted mortar tubes. USSOF will have to work even closer with its Air Force brethren to ensure air power is where it is needed, even in a parity situation. Current Air Force doctrine overcomes this challenge through “pulsed AirPower,” which is the concentration of airpower in time and space to create windows of opportunity for the rest of the force.” But it will take planning and will not always “be on call.” Artillery will potentially be the main source of fires. And Rocket Assisted Projectiles (RAP) rounds become a critical asset. Army Special Forces detachments should plan to deploy with 60mm mortar tubes and attend courses like the Mortar Leader Course. UAS and mortars are both a viable substitute for artillery and even CAS.
SOF should also focus on call for fire training as well as instruction on the capabilities and constraints of U.S. artillery systems. AT systems such as the Javelin, should become standard in resupply bundles for U.S. SOF. Additional training on these systems as well as the British and French systems should be commonplace.
IV. Unmanned Systems
We use the acronyms-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Unmanned Ground Systems (UGV), and Unmanned Surface (or Subsurface) Vehicles (USV) throughout this essay.
Observations
Almost every SOF operation in Ukraine includes the use of unmanned systems. As a matter of fact, unmanned systems are the main effort in most direct actions missions; especially missions inside Russia in the occupied areas. That is a sea of change compared to the past where operators were the main effort and unmanned systems were used in a supporting role.
In 2023 the AFU conducted the first assault with no artillery support, substituting various UASs, especially FPVs to suppress enemy positions. Then in December of 2024, in the Kharkiv region the AFU conducted a highly experimental, first of its kind all-drone assault on a heavily fortified Russian position. It was not a “swarm attack”, but instead they deployed dozens of drones conducting a variety of missions to include: reconnaissance, ground-based kamikaze drones, and quadcopter drones with ability to drop various munitions. The two-hour assault was very effective, using surprise and mass to overwhelm the defenders who could not effectively address the large number of drones coming from different air and ground approaches. A future with the possibility of all drone ground warfare is not just science fiction anymore. Also this last example demonstrates that mass and surprise still matter. Furthermore, the best counter UAS technology in the world can be overwhelmed with enough mass.
UAS have taken such a prominent role, that the AFU started an entire branch of the military solely dedicated to UAS. Ukrainian President Voldymyr Zelensky established the Unmanned Systems Forces in February 2024. This measure is especially critical given the short amount of time to train and deploy forces during protracted LSCO. An FPV/UAS operator can be trained in only a few days and can inflict significantly more casualties with significantly less risk than an infantryman or SOF operator that can often take months or years to produce and at great expense (of note, UAS operators and units are considered high value targets by both sides so must be protected). The use of AI for targeting and enemy identification shortens these training times.
Another significant reason for the rapid adoption and utility of UAS is that SOF and conventional units are having to cover significantly larger swaths of territory. On average, an AFU conventional brigade has to cover anywhere from approximately a 30 to 70 kilometer front. This vulnerability makes kill chains significantly more challenging, limits effective range of organic weapons systems, and limits a unit in contact’s ability to engage moving targets. UAVs, especially FPVs offer a precision guided munition with either no need for a complex kill chain, or just a single handoff of a target from another drone that the unit is using in conjunction with the FPV. This “Pocket Precision Guided Munition (PGM)” can also target specific vulnerabilities in enemy armor and defensive positions in a precise manner that artillery or mortars cannot replicate.
Unmanned systems, which include air, ground, and naval (surface or subsurface) represent a revolution in military affairs that are and will affect almost every aspect of combat operations. For SOF they represent a force multiplier especially since formations tend to be smaller and lack the firepower that a conventional infantry possesses.
Ukrainian SOF rely on small, disposable UAS for immediate reconnaissance or kinetic operations. The use of UAS and USV have achieved a strategic victory in the Black Sea. With only 11 ships in the entire Ukrainian Navy, SOF (includes HUR, SBU, etc. units), Ukraine has managed to defeat the Russian Black Sea Fleet and reopen the shipping corridors for grain.
On the other end of the unmanned fight, both the Ukrainians and the Russians have become the world experts on countering UAS, but it is a constant cat and mouse game with UAS frequencies changing often to counter the other side’s mitigation systems and wire-guided drones proliferating at an accelerating rate. Both sides use a combination of electronic warfare systems designed to stop UAS as well as kinetic systems and passive measures. This layered approach is the only way to counter UAS.
Unmanned systems technology is evolving rapidly, and a piece of equipment that can stop UAS today, will be obsolete tomorrow. Both sides in the Ukraine War are now fielding UAS that are tethered to the operator with a fiber optic cable with a range that can extend from 10 to 40 kilometers. That renders all cUAS that focus on cutting or interrupting the signal connection obsolete and has resulted in extensive use of nets to protect key supply routes far behind the front lines. Ukraine is developing counters as of the publication of this paper such as balloons.
Recommendations
USSOF already incorporates unmanned systems in their operations, but more in a supporting effort. They should, when feasible, plan operations where unmanned systems are the main effort when conducting almost any type of operation. The loss of unmanned systems is acceptable and lowers the risk to the lives of operators when you replace a human kinetic attack with that of a drone.
SOF due the small size of its units, high risk missions, as well as lack of organic firepower should fully embrace unmanned systems. UAS are already an integral part of operations (USSOF unfortunately will be playing catch up with the technology). SOF also needs to focus on ground unmanned systems (UGV). Ukraine is investing more and more resources on these emerging systems. USSOF should eye these systems for the following missions: demining, breaching obstacles, reconnaissance, resupply, casualty evacuation, and kinetic operations. Just like Legos building blocks, operators need to have access to Commercial Off The Shelf systems that are easily modifiable for iterative development on the battlefield, not outdated drones built through slow procurement mechanisms and programs of record. One of the main goals of UGV research should be to develop a UGV that can conduct all of the missions mentioned above. The same goes for unmanned surface and subsurface (USV) for waterborne operations.
Counter UAS plans should be included in every step of the operation. USSOF will be just as vulnerable to UAS as conventional forces and in some cases, more exposed if not operating from fixed positions. It takes a layered approach to countering UAS and needs to include active, kinetic, and passive mitigation methods.
USSOCOM has been at the forefront of cUAS and tested and initially fielded some of the main systems that U.S. Army conventional forces are using now. They have fielded the wearable Bal Chatri (means birds of prey trap in Hindi) counter UAS detection and mitigation system along with the SmartShooter system that fits on top of an assault rifle. As mentioned, countering unmanned systems requires a layered approach and the technology is constantly changing; such as the already mentioned tethered drones. USSOCOM must take a very proactive approach to counter unmanned systems and realize that their current systems are quickly becoming obsolete. We equate the counter UAS fight to the ever-evolving counter IED fight in Afghanistan and Iraq. Low tech methods of mitigation must be employed such as: shotguns with birdshot; passive measures such as plastic netting that would be used typically for construction or covering fruit trees to protect key lines of communication; camouflage netting; overhead cover; masking anything with a heat signature (such as generators); and working in underground bunkers or in basements when possible.We recommend that USSOCOM field a mobile team whose job is to obtain, test, and field within weeks (not months or years) new counter unmanned systems from around the world as well as garnering best practices. As a former U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group alumni, my old organization was on the cutting edge of developing and fielding UAS and cUAS and in this author’s opinion, it was extremely short-sight to disband this unique unit with unique capabilities). Unmanned ground systems and subsurface drones are the next wave of unmanned systems as well as systems that operate completely autonomously using AI and swarms. The mantra for unmanned systems should be: expendable, adaptable, easy to use, easy to mass produce. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
03 Apr 25. Russia Laser Rifle Downs Drones at 500 Meters. A new development in military technology emerged this week when Russia showcased a laser rifle designed to counter small drones, specifically first-person view [FPV] models, at a defense conference near St. Petersburg. The weapon, which operates at a range of 500 meters, uses focused ytterbium laser emission to disable drones by targeting their bodies, propellers, engines, or batteries.
Presented at the Pan-Russian Conference on the Protection of Civilian Facilities Against Unmanned Aerial Systems, the unveiling has drawn attention from defense analysts and sparked discussions about the future of anti-drone warfare.
The event, attended by military officials and industry experts, highlighted Russia’s ongoing efforts to adapt to drones’ evolving role in modern conflicts. While details about the rifle’s deployment remain limited, its introduction signals a potential shift in how nations address the growing threat of unmanned aerial systems.
According to statements from the conference reported by TASS, the state-run Russian news agency, the weapon uses a concentrated beam of energy to inflict physical damage on its targets, rendering them inoperable within seconds. The technology relies on ytterbium, a rare-earth element known for its use in high-powered lasers, to generate the necessary intensity.
Russian officials have not disclosed whether the rifle is a prototype or ready for immediate use, but its public display suggests confidence in its capabilities. The conference setting, focused on protecting civilian infrastructure from drone threats, underscores the weapon’s intended purpose.
Defense experts note that the 500-meter range, while modest compared to some anti-aircraft systems, could make the rifle a practical tool for ground troops facing close-range aerial threats. The Russian laser rifle offers a directed-energy alternative that doesn’t depend on projectiles. If successful, it could provide a reusable, precise option for troops, though its effectiveness in diverse conditions—such as adverse weather or against multiple drones—remains untested in public view.
Comments from attendees at the St. Petersburg conference shed light on the rifle’s potential. A military engineer, quoted by TASS, described the weapon as a “game-changer” for infantry units facing drone harassment. “The speed at which it neutralizes a target is remarkable,” the engineer said, emphasizing the seconds-long engagement time.
However, no independent verification of these claims has surfaced, and Western analysts caution that promotional displays often exaggerate capabilities.
A U.S. defense official, speaking anonymously to Reuters, noted that while the technology is feasible, its real-world performance would depend on factors like power supply, cooling systems, and durability under combat stress. Portable lasers require significant energy, and scaling that down to a rifle-sized package poses engineering challenges. (Source: UAS VISION/BulgarianMilitary.com0
03 Apr 25. Russia to Team Okhotnik Stealth Drone with Su-57 Fighter Jet. Citing recent information from Yuri Koptev, Managing Director of Russian State Defense Company, ROSTEC, the Russian defense aerospace industry continues to make significant strides in developing advanced unmanned aerial capabilities with the S-70 Okhotnik-B, a large strategic stealth drone engineered to operate in direct coordination with the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter jet. This innovative manned-unmanned teaming concept is set to redefine Russia’s aerial warfare doctrine, with a strong emphasis on integrating autonomous systems into traditional combat formations. Developed by Sukhoi in partnership with Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG, the S-70 Okhotnik-B — which translates to “Hunter” — embodies a stealthy flying-wing design similar to the American B-2 Spirit. It incorporates advanced composite materials and radar-absorbent coatings to reduce its radar cross-section and enhance survivability in contested environments. The drone is approximately 20 tons in weight and spans nearly 20 meters in wingspan. It is powered by an AL-31F turbofan engine, providing it with subsonic cruising speeds of up to 1,000 km/h and an operational ceiling of around 12,000 meters. With a combat radius of approximately 4,000 km, the Okhotnik can engage in deep-strike missions or long-endurance surveillance without the need for aerial refueling. One of the defining features of the Okhotnik-B is its ability to carry munitions internally. This internal weapon bay allows it to remain stealthy while being armed with a range of precision-guided bombs and missiles. Its sensor suite includes advanced electro-optical systems, synthetic aperture radar, and signals intelligence capabilities, enabling it to execute reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and precision strike missions. These capabilities make it not only a valuable strike asset but also a critical node in a networked battlespace. What sets the Okhotnik-B drone apart is its interoperability with the Su-57 multirole stealth fighter. The concept of pairing a manned fighter with multiple unmanned wingmen significantly expands the combat effectiveness of Russia’s air force. The Su-57 can act as a command node, directing the drones to scout ahead, conduct electronic jamming, or engage targets in high-threat areas without endangering the pilot. This pairing allows Russian forces to project power deeper into contested zones while reducing risk to manned assets. According to reports, a two-seat variant of the Su-57 is being developed specifically to command and control up to four Okhotnik drones simultaneously. This capability enables highly coordinated operations involving swarming tactics, saturation strikes, and real-time intelligence sharing. By using the drones as decoys, jammers, or strike elements, the Su-57 pilot can maintain a safe standoff distance while shaping the battlespace. The Okhotnik program has already achieved several operational milestones. The first flight took place in August 2019, with a landmark joint flight with the Su-57 occurring shortly thereafter in September 2019. Subsequent testing has included simulated missile engagements and advanced fire-control assessments. However, the program has faced setbacks, including a high-profile incident in October 2024, when a Russian Su-57 reportedly downed its own Okhotnik drone over Ukraine to prevent the sensitive technology from falling into enemy hands. Despite this, Ukrainian forces were said to have recovered parts of the drone, potentially allowing Western analysts to study its systems. The deployment of unmanned wingmen alongside fighter aircraft is not unique to Russia. Other nations, particularly the United States and China, are also pursuing similar concepts. The U.S. has been developing loyal wingman drones such as the Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat (formerly known as the Airpower Teaming System), designed to support F-35 and F-22 fighters. These drones aim to conduct autonomous missions, act as force multipliers, and reduce pilot workload in high-intensity operations. China has also showcased its FH-97A loyal wingman drone at airshows, signaling interest in similar capabilities. The advantages of such systems are manifold. They enable force multiplication, allow human pilots to stay out of high-risk zones, and offer increased flexibility in mission planning. Drones can be equipped with specialized payloads — such as electronic warfare modules, decoys, or long-range missiles — tailored for specific operational roles. Additionally, the use of AI-assisted control systems promises faster reaction times and reduced decision-making burdens on manned aircraft pilots. Russia’s S-70 Okhotnik-B represents a significant leap toward integrating unmanned systems into its tactical and strategic air forces. While the program is still undergoing refinement and testing, its eventual integration with the Su-57 points to a future where coordinated manned-unmanned operations become the norm. If successful, the Okhotnik could serve as a model for future UCAV development globally, offering insight into the evolving nature of air power in the 21st century. (Source: UAS VISION/Army Recognition)
03 Apr 25. RUSI. “If Europe wished to deter war, it must demonstrate that it is developing the capacity to wage it…The current fragmented approach to defence production leaves Europe vulnerable to supply chain disruptions and delays in scaling production during crises.”
This is the view expressed in a new RUSI research report, Winning the Industrial War – Comparing Russia, Europe and Ukraine 2022-24 by Oleksandr V. Danylyuk and Dr Jack Watling, which says Europe’s fragmented defence industry is ill-equipped and unprepared to scale production rapidly in response to a prolonged or high-intensity conflict.
Despite recent defence spending increases by some European NATO states, the lack of multinational coordination, regulatory hurdles, and an overemphasis on high-end systems rather than expanding manufacturing capacity have left European Alliance members vulnerable to supply chain disruptions and production bottlenecks. The research endeavours to answer why Russia has been able to increase production while spending comparatively little on defence.
The report says that a modest increase in expenditure across NATO could have had a significant impact on Russian calculations had the investments demonstrably translated into increased industrial capacity and tangible military outputs. However, the lack of a coherent strategy has meant defence budget increases have not resulted in an equivalent rise in defence industrial output, undermining its ability to project strength and deter aggression.
The report highlights that “relatively modest increases in investment have not stimulated a proportional increase in defence manufacture,” underscoring a critical gap between budget inputs and tangible military outputs. The research makes a series of actionable recommendations to urgently address deficiencies.
Key Findings
The research identifies several structural and operational deficiencies in Europe’s defence industrial base that undermines its ability to respond effectively to security challenges.
The findings include:
* Fragmented Defence Production Across Europe: “Each country is too small to be self-sufficient, but there is no multinational coordination of the defence industry. Member states have opposed the EU playing such a role, and NATO lacks authorities and information.”
* Limited Capacity to Scale Production in Times of Crisis: “Investment has overwhelmingly focused on products rather than fundamentals in the supply chain, such that investment has driven competition in the higher tiers of the supply chain and increased cost, rather than expanded output.”
* Regulatory and Bureaucratic Barriers Slow Expansion: “Planning laws and other processes have also increased cost and reduced the speed at which defence enterprises can expand.”
* Inadequate Testing and Evaluation Infrastructure: “Restrictions on access to testing and evaluation facilities have led to large numbers of systems being produced that do not meet requirements.”
* Lack of Coordination: “As competitors, European defence enterprises tend to be very secretive about their capacity with both other governments and other companies. The result is that there is neither efficiency nor the data and authorities anywhere to rationalise the process.”
Russia’s contrasting model, and lessons from Ukraine
The report contrasts Europe’s decentralised and competition-based approach with Russia’s more command-based industrial structure and its strategy of part mobilising its relatively smaller economy to sustain an extended war effort. It notes “Russia has made massive investments in the defence industries, going well beyond the funds allocated to defence within the state budget”. While Russia’s approach has come at a significant cost to other sectors, including education and healthcare, it has enabled the country to significantly expand and modernise its defence-industrial sector.
The report also draws attention to Ukraine’s ability to rapidly develop and test equipment under battlefield conditions, which has accelerated research and development for both Ukrainian and European defence enterprises. The research says that “the freedom to test equipment under battlefield conditions as well as easy access to training areas has enabled rapid R&D [research and development],” pointing to a model that could be replicated in other parts of Europe.
Policy Recommendations
To address gaps and to strengthen Europe’s defence industrial sector for future conflicts, the report proposes a series of recommendations focused at enhancing multinational coordination, streamlining regulatory processes, and improving supply chain resilience.
These include:
* Improving Collaboration and Transparency: “If Europe wishes to safeguard its security and deter future threats, it must move beyond fragmented approaches and establish a coordinated, multinational framework for defence production and supply chain management.”
* Prioritising Investment in Supply Chain Resilience: “Coherence of multinational supply chains is in the interests of all European NATO members if they need to transition to war.”
* Accelerating Regulatory Reforms: “Planning laws and other processes have increased cost and reduced the speed at which defence enterprises can expand.”
* Expanding Testing and Evaluation Facilities: “Freedom to test equipment under battlefield conditions as well as easy access to training areas has enabled rapid R&D for both Ukrainian and European defence enterprises.”
Conclusion
As geopolitical tensions intensify, the need for a more resilient and responsive defence industrial base has never been greater. Yet without urgent reforms, Europe’s fragmented defence production will continue to leave NATO members vulnerable to supply chain disruptions and production delays.
To ensure deterrence remains credible and Europe’s security is safeguarded, policymakers must take decisive action to align higher budgetary inputs with tangible defence outputs. A coherent and coordinated defence industrial strategy is essential to maintaining Europe’s strategic advantage.
The RUSI research emphasises that Europe cannot afford to repeat past mistakes and that without urgent reforms, risks being unprepared to meet the demands of future conflicts.
Oleksandr V. Danylyuk closely cooperated for many years with the Ukrainian government structures in the defence, security and intelligence sectors. In 2014, he was the Chief Advisor to the Minister of Defence of Ukraine. He subsequently served as a Special Advisor to the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and for many years was also a member of the Parliamentary Working Group on Countering Hybrid Threats. For the past few years, he has been the coordinator of the Ukraine–NATO platform for the early detection and countering of hybrid threats.
Dr Jack Watling is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute. He works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation, assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts. His PhD examined the evolution of Britain’s policy responses to civil war in the early 20th century. Jack has worked extensively on Ukraine, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, Rwanda and further afield. Jack is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington DC. Originally a journalist, Jack was shortlisted for the European Press Prize Distinguished Writing Award in 2016 and won the Breakaway Award at the International Media Awards in 2017.
02 Apr 25. Ukrainian military begins testing on 20 km fibre-optic FPV drones. Ukraine has begun testing long-range fibre-optic controlled drones to gain a military advantage against Russian forces.
The tests, conducted by Ukrainian defence initiative Brave1, trialled more than 15 first-person view unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with 20-kilometre range fibre-optic technology. Seven manufacturers of fibre-optic controlled unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) also participated in the event. The systems were designed to navigate a course over 20 kilometres, avoid obstacles and simulate targeted strikes. Fibre-optic-enabled systems have traditionally been limited to five to 10 kilometers.
In addition, the systems are expected to prove effective in immunity to electronic warfare, being less detectable by radio emissions, being clearer in video transmission at extended distances and having fewer limitations from the radio horizon.
“Fibre optics is a game-changer in communication and electronic warfare. It provides a stable connection that is impervious to enemy jamming,” said Captain Oleksandr Yabchanka, commander of the robotic systems service of the Da Vinci Wolves battalion.
“We are very interested in integrating fibre optics so our UGVs can operate at greater distances and help us destroy the enemy even more effectively.”
The Ukrainian military will continue working on scaling and improving drone systems, as well as developing countermeasures against enemy fibre-optic technologies, according to Brave1.
The tests were reportedly overseen by Deputy Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Brigadier General Andrii Lebedenko and the Armed Forces of Ukraine Innovation Management Directorate. (Source: Defence Connect)
31 Mar 25. Sweden pledges $1.6bn in new Ukraine aid, including air defense. Sweden announced additional military aid for Ukraine to the tune of 16bn Swedish kronor ($1.6bn), in response to a Ukrainian request for capabilities in air defense, artillery, satellite communications and the maritime domain. The new military aid package, Sweden’s biggest yet, brings support for Ukraine’s defense to 29.5bn kronor this year, the government said on Monday. The Nordic country said it has provided 80bn kronor of military aid to Ukraine since 2022.
“We are stepping up the support and we are increasing it in strength and scope, and there are strong reasons to do this in light of the very serious situation in Ukraine,” Minister for Defence Pål Jonson said at a press briefing in Stockholm on Monday. “Russia has the initiative in the war, and we need to support Ukraine to break that trend right now.”
The Swedish government has proposed to provide 40 bn kronor in aid in Ukraine in 2025, partially by moving funds earmarked for 2026 to this year.
“Today’s message again is that more people have to do more,” Jonson said. “Now it is a time for all European countries to really increase support for Ukraine.”
The Swedish Defence Material Administration will use about 9.2 bn kronor of the new aid to buy equipment for donation to Ukraine, taking into account industry’s ability to produce the requested material with short delivery times. Sweden said Ukraine needs ammunition, air defense systems, marine equipment, satellite communication systems, infantry equipment and armored vehicles.
Conditions are in place for the Swedish defense industry to quickly deliver relevant equipment for Ukraine’s defense, Jonson said. The support package will include artillery systems, air-defense systems and small combat vessels, according to the minister. Sweden will provide around 500m kronor of aid from its own stocks, including machine guns and small-caliber munitions. The government will channel more than 5bn kronor of aid via various funds and capability coalitions buying equipment for Ukraine, as well as increased collaboration to provide support for Ukraine’s defense industry through the so-called Danish model. Around 70% of the new aid can be delivered in 2025, according to a presentation by Jonson. Meanwhile, the Netherlands said it will provide €500m ($541m) in aid to finance a drone project in Ukraine, in a separate statement on Monday. The drone financing is part of €2 bn in accelerated support planned for 2025, which also includes air defense, munition and maritime equipment, the Dutch government said. (Source: Defense News)
31 Mar 25. ‘Pissed off’ at Putin, Trump threatens tariffs on Russian oil if Moscow blocks Ukraine deal. U.S. President Donald Trump said on Sunday he was “pissed off” at Russian President Vladimir Putin and will impose secondary tariffs of 25% to 50% on buyers of Russian oil if he feels Moscow is blocking his efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
Trump told NBC News he was very angry after Putin last week criticized the credibility of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s leadership, the television network reported, citing a telephone interview early on Sunday. (Source: Reuters)
28 Mar 25. TEKEVER has announced that its AR3 drone platform has successfully completed over 10,000 operational flight hours in Ukraine, supporting critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in real-world combat scenarios. The milestone underscores the AR3’s combat-proven reliability, versatility, and technical maturity, following extensive deployment in one of the most demanding operational environments in the world today. Designed and manufactured in Europe, the AR3 has undergone more than 100 design iterations, shaped by constant feedback from front-line operations and real-time mission requirements.
“The AR3 has demonstrated its value in the most extreme conditions imaginable,” said Ricardo Mendes, CEO of TEKEVER. “Surpassing 10,000 flight hours in Ukraine is not just a number — it’s proof of the trust that armed forces place in our technology to deliver real-time intelligence when lives are on the line. We’re proud to be part of a mission that contributes to greater situational awareness, operational efficiency, and ultimately, the protection of lives.”
“At TEKEVER, we believe that innovation must be driven by real operational needs. Every flight, every mission, every lesson learned from Ukraine has been fed directly into the evolution of our platform,” Mendes added.
The AR3 is a tactical UAS designed for both land and maritime ISR operations. With its extended endurance, modular payload architecture, and fully autonomous operation capabilities, it has become a key tool for defence and security forces across Europe and beyond. (Source: ASD Network)
31 Mar 25. Ukrainian Resistance Targets Russian Intelligence Operatives, Military Base in Occupied Mariupol. In recent days, Ukrainian resistance groups have intensified their sabotage campaign in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, targeting Russian operatives and a military base stocked with combat vehicles and ammunition. According to Mariupol’s city council, Ukrainian partisans carried out a car bomb attack in the Prymorskyi District on March 27, seriously injuring a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer.
This followed a similar bombing on February 28, when a vehicle carrying an FSB officer was detonated in the same district, injuring the officer. The Mariupol Resistance group claimed responsibility for the attacks.
On March 23, Ukrainian partisans set fire to a Russian military base on Verkhni Adzhakhy Street, destroying multiple vehicles and ammunition.
The Mariupol Resistance group said that they used photos shared by local bloggers to pinpoint the base’s location before launching the attack. The operation, which took place on the city’s right bank, was confirmed by both the Mariupol City Council and Petro Andriushchenko, advisor to the mayor of Mariupol. Mariupol, a vital Ukrainian port city on the Sea of Azov, fell to Russian forces in 2022 after a brutal siege. Its strategic significance stems from its status as a key industrial hub and its potential role in establishing a land corridor between Russia and annexed Crimea. The siege left much of the city in ruins, with estimates indicating that up to 90% of residential buildings were damaged or destroyed.
Despite Russia maintaining control over Mariupol since 2022, local resistance groups—including Mariupol Resistance and ATESH—continue to carry out sabotage missions. In response, Russian forces ramped up security, conducting mass arrests, document checks, and increasing patrols throughout the city. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
28 Mar 25. Ukraine opens up combat drone units to receive Gen Z recruits. With conscription set for citizens aged between 25-60, Ukraine has been seeking ways to attract young adults to its military.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has expanded the number of brigades available for new Gen Z-age volunteers to join under the ‘Contract 18-24’ programme to include attack drone units, as Ukraine seeks to fill the ranks of combat-facing personnel.
With conscription into Ukraine’s military currently applicable for Ukraine citizens aged 25-60, the Contract 18-24 is designed to incentivise younger adults into military service through a range of financial benefits.
This includes a contract worth Hrv1m ($24,900), with Hrv200,000 paid immediately upon signing and the remaining Hrv800,000 disbursed in two instalments. The Ukrainian MoD states that volunteers under the Contract 18-24 deal will receive service pay of up to Hrv120,000 per month, along with additional payments for combat missions. Ukraine has been looking at ways to improve recruitment into its armed forces, with conscription only impacting citizens aged 25-60. Credit: hurricanehank via Shutterstock
The total amount can reach up to Hrv2m per year. In addition, those enrolled on Contract 18-24 will be eligible for a zero-interest mortgage, state-funded education and training, free medical care, and the right to travel abroad after one year of service.
Volunteering through the scheme also provides a 12-month exemption from mobilisation following the completion of the contract. mWith the average monthly salary in Ukraine of approximately $500 and the Contract 18-24 deal offering a standing pay of around $2,900 as well as the bonuses, the financial incentives for non-conscript age citizens is considerable. However, the risks are significant, with a combined casualty count in the Ukraine-Russia war of more than one m either killed or wounded in action since February 2022.
Drone units to accept Contract 18-24 personnel
Announced on 26 March, the expansion of units open to recruits under the Contract 18-24 now enables recruits to sign a deal with a unit from the Ukrainian Land Forces, Naval Force, Air Assault Forces, or the Unmanned Systems Forces.
The newly available units comprise the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade; 24th Separate Mechanized Brigade; 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade; 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade; 128th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade; 36th Separate Marine Brigade; 39th Separate Coast Guard Brigade of the 30th Marine Corps; 25th Separate Airborne Brigade; 80th Separate Air Assault Brigade; and the 59th Separate Assault Brigade.
These join the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, the 95th Separate Air Assault Brigade, the 38th Separate Marine Brigade, the 28th Separate Mechanized Brigade, the 10th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade, and the 92nd Separate Assault Brigade, in being open for Contract 18-24 recruits. Applications can be made online, or via the Reserve+ app, expanded in 2024 in a bid to drive military recruitment and conscription. (Source: army-technology.com)
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–