NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Mar 28.

Mar 27.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

* KURSK: President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his assessment that Russian forces are preparing for a new spring offensive in Kharkiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts

* STRIKES: The US-proposed 30-day moratorium on energy strikes to which Russia and Ukraine agreed on 25 March continues to face considerable challenges due to a lack of clear outlines and ongoing mistrust between Kyiv and Moscow

* COALITION: The latest European conference on the emergent ‘coalition of the willing’ took place in France, in the capital Paris, on 27 March, amid ongoing uncertainty over the willingness and capability to deploy a peace ‘reassurance’ force

* FORECAST: Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a ceasefire in the Black Sea following talks with US delegations in recent days; however Russian preconditions and discrepancies in the interpretation of what has been agreed will likely undermine its enforcement

* BAKHMUT: Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have continued to advance in and around the highly contested town of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) in recent days. Geolocated footage published on 24 and 25 March indicates that Russian forces have broken through the north-western outskirts of the town and are attempting to advance westwards along the O0524 highway that runs to Shcherbynivka, a town to the west of Toretsk from which Ukrainian forces have steadily pushed the Russians in recent months. Meanwhile, footage from 25 and 26 March indicate Ukrainian advances in the north and centre of the town, underscoring the highly dynamic nature of fighting in the area.

* DONETSK: While Russian and Ukrainian forces recorded marginal advances near Pokrovsk over the past week, neither side have made confirmed territorial gains over the past 48 hours. Geolocated footage posted on 24 March indicates that Russian forces recently made gains in south-west Uspenivka which is located south-west of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, geolocated footage posted on 23 March indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in north-east Vodyane Druhe and south-west Nadiia, which are located to the east and south-west of Pokrovsk, respectively. However, though there is no indication that the intensity of fighting has decreased in the Pokrovsk direction, there have been no significant territorial gains by either side since 24 March.

* KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report

* KURSK: On 26 March President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his assessment that Russian forces are preparing for a new spring offensive, in Kharkiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Zelensky confirmed that Ukrainian intelligence sees ‘preparations’ for the upcoming offensive. While we cannot confirm this, it aligns with our assessment that Russian forces are likely preparing for an intensification of offensive operations in the coming weeks. In the meantime, Russian forces are advancing very slowly inside Kursk oblast (Russia) and across the international border in north Sumy oblast (Ukraine). Geolocated footage from 24 March confirmed Russian advances in Zhuravka (Sumy oblast), while footage from 26 March indicates Russian advances east of Oleshnya, located to the south-west of Sudzha (Kursk oblast).

* KURSK: Geolocated footage published on 24 and 26 March indicates minor Ukrainian advances over the international border in Belgorod oblast (Russia). Ukrainian forces have seemingly advanced into the centre of Demidovka, located around one mile (1.6km) to the north-east of the international border. Some Russian sources also reported on 24 March that Ukrainian forces advanced further to the west, to the south-west of the village of Popovka. However, we cannot confirm the extent of Ukrainian advances here. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have stepped up long-range strikes in Belgorod oblast, likely in a bid to complicate Russian logistics and command and control (C2) in the area. On 24 March, Ukrainian forces reported that they had such a Russian command post in western Belgorod oblast; however, we cannot confirm the extent of the damage.

* OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report

* SOUTHERN: In recent days, Russian forces have made territorial gains in both south-west Donetsk oblast and western Zaporizhzhia oblast. Geolocated footage posted on 24 and 26 March indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Vilne Pole, which is located to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Further to the west, geolocated footage posted on 24 and 25 March indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Lobkove and in Stepove, which are both located north-west of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Additional geolocated footage posted on 25 March indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0812 highway in western Stepove, which is also located north-west of Robotyne. These advances are a further sign that Russia is slowly picking up the pace of offensive operations along the southern axis, including to the south of Zaporizhzhia city as weather conditions improve.

* STRIKES: Overnight on 24-25 March, Russian forces launched in all 139 Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones and one Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missile at Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 78 drones were intercepted while 34 of the decoy drones were ‘lost in location’, possibly due to electronic warfare (EW) measures and caused no damage. On 25-26 March, Russia fired a further 117 Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones at Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad and Sumy oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that 56 Shahed-136/131 drones were shot down while 48 decoy drones failed to reach a target and caused no damage.

* STRIKES: On 26-27 March, Russian forces fired an Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missile alongside in all 86 Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones at Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. This reflects a pattern in recent days of strikes (overwhelmingly using drones) targeting Ukraine’s northern, eastern, central and southern oblasts; no strikes were reported by the Ukrainian Air Force in Ukraine’s western oblasts.

* STRIKES: Ukraine’s General Staff claimed on 26 March that a strike on Russia’s Engels-2 military airfield in Saratov oblast on 20 March destroyed in all 96 air-launched cruise missiles, including multiple Kh-101 cruise missiles. According to UK Defence Intelligence (DI), the substantial loss of missiles will likely disrupt operations from the airfield in the short term; Russia will likely focus on dispersing aviation assets, improving defences and replenishing stocks to avoid further high-impact strikes. The UK DI further assessed that this was Ukraine’s most successful strike against a Russian munitions depot in 2025. While we cannot confirm the impact of the 20 March strike, we assess that such strikes will likely result in a continuation of recent Russian strike tactics, relying heavily on large quantities of drones and lower use of cruise missiles.

* STRIKES: The US-proposed 30-day moratorium on energy strikes to which Russia and Ukraine agreed on 25 March continues to face considerable challenges due to a lack of clear outlines and ongoing mistrust between Kyiv and Moscow. On 26 March, Ukraine’s Energy Ministry told European Pravda that the list of energy facilities to not be struck during the moratorium, agreed to by the US and Russia, differs from the list agreed to by the US and Ukraine. For instance, oil and gas facilities feature on the list of targets Ukraine is supposed to refrain from striking, but these reportedly do not feature on Russia’s list. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky also stated on 26 March that there are currently no technical teams in place to monitor Russia’s adherence to the moratorium. Meanwhile, Ukraine denied an allegation made by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak that Ukraine had conducted strikes on energy facilities since the moratorium; Novak provided no evidence for his claim. It therefore remains unclear if the moratorium will hold, given the current confusion and lack of an effective monitoring or implementation mechanism to avoid violations.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 

* COALITION: Leaders from 31 countries gathered in France, in the capital Paris, on 27 March to co-ordinate military aid for Ukraine and discuss their potential role in case of a peace deal with Russia. It marked the third summit as part of British and French efforts to form a so-called coalition of the willing amid concerns about the long-term commitment of the US to Ukrainian and (more broadly) European security. That said, Reuters reported on 26 March that European efforts to create security arrangements for Ukraine are changing focus away from sending troops due to political and logistical constraints.

* COALITION: In this vein, on 27 March, French President Emmanuel Macron shared details of what he described as a possible ‘reassurance force’ in Ukraine. Macron disclosed that the concept is still in its planning phase, though he said it would not be deployed to the contact line. Instead, it would be sent to ‘strategic areas’. According to him, the force would not be a substitute for peacekeeping troops maintaining a ceasefire. We assess that Macron’s statements reflect persistent European concerns about taking a leading role in ensuring a ceasefire in Ukraine without significant US support as well as issues surrounding the practical capabilities available for such deployments.

* COALITION: We have previously assessed that the deployment of a sizeable NATO-member peacekeeping force to Ukraine was unlikely as part of a peace agreement given Russia’s highly likely opposition. Any sizeable deployment of Western troops inside Ukraine will likely reflect the absence of a peace deal, rather than act as part of an agreement to end the war with Russia. That said, deployments of tripwire forces in NATO countries neighbouring Ukraine could realistically be a more feasible option for more cautious states. For further analysis regarding the possibility of peacekeeping operations in Ukraine, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 3 March 2025.

* DEAL: US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent disclosed on 26 March that Ukraine may sign the deal on economic resources and minerals next week, though this remains far from certain. Bessent stated that the US had handed Kyiv a completed document which the Ukrainian side is currently reviewing. However, no further details were disclosed about the content of the agreement. The US is reportedly seeking new advantageous terms, including the possible ownership of Ukrainian nuclear power plants. While we cannot confirm what terms the US wants or to which extent Ukraine will agree, Russia has ruled out the transfer of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) back to Ukrainian control or any other state. We assess that Russia will also likely contest points of the economic agreement, particularly if it considers it has a claim to certain assets in regions occupied or claimed by Russia.

* POLLING: Recent polling indicates that the majority of Ukrainians are in favour of continuing the war even if the US fully stopped its military support. According to the survey from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published on 25 March, 82% of Ukrainians supported Ukraine continuing to fight with European assistance to achieve an acceptable, though possibly not entirely fair, peace. Meanwhile, 8% of respondents said it would be in Ukraine’s best interests to negotiate with Russia and agree to its demands; 10% were unsure. The results imply that the possibility of US military assistance to Ukraine stopping entirely is unlikely to deter Ukrainians from wanting to continue the war to achieve more favourable peace terms. While popular opinion on this issue will influence Kyiv to an extent, it could also realistically reduce the effectiveness of US efforts to leverage the suspension of military aid to push Ukraine to accept unfavourable terms to end the war in the coming months.

FORECAST

CEASEFIRE: On 25 March, Russia and Ukraine agreed to a ceasefire in the Black Sea following talks with US delegations in recent days. Despite this development, a broader temporary ceasefire on the ground remains less likely in the coming weeks. Partial ceasefires, such as in the Black Sea and against energy infrastructure, form part of the US strategy to build confidence and work towards a pause in fighting.  The White House released two statements for each side, both of which contain certain differences. Both mentioned that Russia and Ukraine agreed to eliminate the use of force, ensure safe navigation and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea. After Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in July 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said it would deem all ships travelling to Ukrainian ports as potential carriers of military cargo. Ukraine then issued a similar tit-for-tat threat. This underscores the particular vulnerability of this aspect of the agreement to remain open to interpretation. For further analysis, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 17 August 2023.  Ukraine has stated that any Russian maritime movement outside of the eastern part of the Black Sea will violate the terms of the ceasefire and that Ukraine would be empowered to defend itself. Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov did not provide specific parameters as to what Kyiv would consider to cross these red lines. No such mention of restrictions on the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s movements in the western Black Sea have been made by the Russian side. This lack of clarity will increase the risk of accidental confrontation and/or the possibility of Russia deliberately seeking to test Ukraine’s boundaries, should it wish to renege on the deal. We assess that Ukraine’s issuing of specific terms for Russia underscores that Ukrainian confidence in Russian compliance with ceasefire arrangements is very limited. Moscow has conditioned compliance with the Black Sea ceasefire upon various sanctions relief for certain entities related to agricultural exports. This includes Rosselkhozbank (Russian Agricultural Bank) and other unnamed financial institutions involved in ensuring international food trade. The Kremlin has called for their reconnection to the EU-based SWIFT international payment system. Russia has also demanded the removal of restrictions imposed on companies producing and exporting food and fertilisers and trade finance operations as well as restrictions prohibiting insurance companies from working with cargoes carrying Russian foodstuff and fertilisers. We assess that Russia highly likely hopes to extract significant economic concessions by issuing relatively broad demands and use this as the first-stage precedent for wider sanctions relief in the future. The press release on talks with Russian representatives implies that the US is willing to consider sanctions relief to encourage Russian participation in the ceasefire agreements. According to the readout, the US will ‘help restore Russia’s access to the world market’ for agricultural and fertiliser exports. It also mentioned efforts to lower maritime insurance costs and enhance Russia’s access to ports and payment systems for related transactions. Although the West has not directly sanctioned Russian agriculture, Moscow had raised grievances with Western punitive measures before withdrawing from the BSGI in July 2023. Despite US willingness to evaluate Russia’s terms for the ceasefire, Europe will also have a voice in reconnecting sanctioned entities to SWIFT in particular; this process remains highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has acknowledged that other actors must have a say in the matter, namely Europe. On 26 March, Rubio stated that some of the sanctions were imposed by the EU; the bloc cut Rosselkhozbank from SWIFT in June 2022. Nevertheless, the European Commission has stated its position that Russia’s ‘unconditional withdrawal’ from Ukraine is one of the main preconditions for changing or lifting EU sanctions, meaning it is highly unlikely to agree to an easing of sanctions in the near term. European reluctance to ease sanctions will highly likely provide Russia additional grounds to portray Europe as an impediment to peace, potentially exacerbating the already-apparent Transatlantic split. In turn, this could lead to Russia and/or the US wanting to minimise Europe’s position in advocating for favourable terms for Ukraine in peace negotiations.  Disagreements over sanctions relief against Russia and the US determination to reach a ceasefire will increase the possibility of the emergence of a two-track sanctions regime between European states and the US. Completing approaches to sanctions would likely undermine the enforceability of punitive measures and make it easier for Russia to circumvent sanctions, which it has already shown it can do. At the same time, a two-track sanctions regime will highly likely increase compliance risks for Western firms. This could realistically elevate the risk of firms unwittingly violating punitive measures enforced by Europe, even if the US has lifted its own sanctions on a given Russian sector or entity. If the Black Sea ceasefire enters into force in the coming weeks, a slight improvement in security for maritime shipping is likely, though the deal will remain highly vulnerable to violations and collapse. The White House readouts did not specify how it would ensure compliance with the ceasefire and whether there would be observers, though Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has suggested that Turkey could be an observer, just as it was during the previous BSGI. The participation of observers would better ensure that the two sides would adhere to its terms and likely reduce the likelihood of commercial vessels being exposed to renewed hostilities and possible intrusive inspections.   Amid the confusion and new Russian demands, recent comments from US President Donald Trump imply that he is aware that Russia is seeking to delay the peace process. Trump acknowledged on 25 March that the Russians could be ‘dragging their feet’, but stated his belief that he thinks Moscow wants to see an end to the war. The comments likely signal growing frustration that the path to a ceasefire is taking longer than Trump and his administration had anticipated. This could realistically encourage the US to increase pressure on Russia to commit to partial ceasefires in the coming weeks, with sanctions or Ukraine assistance remaining key levers that the Trump administration could realistically use.

 Mar 26.

* Russia-Ukraine-US: Russian adoption of maritime ceasefire will be volatile, hinges on sanctions relief. On 25 March, Russia and Ukraine agreed to a ceasefire in the Black Sea following talks with US delegations in recent days. The White House released two statements for each side. Both mentioned that Russia and Ukraine agreed to eliminate the use of force, ensure safe navigation and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea. The press release on talks with Russian representatives notes that the US will ‘help restore Russia’s access to the world market’ for agricultural and fertiliser exports. It also mentioned granting Russia lower maritime insurance costs and enhancing Russia’s access to ports and payment systems for related transactions. The Kremlin has conditioned the ceasefire on sanctions being lifted on specific entities. While the specifics remain unclear, if this includes certain export banks’ access to EU-based SWIFT, it would likely require European approval as well, which remains unclear. We assess that, if the ceasefire holds in the coming weeks, a slight improvement in security for maritime shipping is likely; that said the deal will remain highly vulnerable to violations and collapse.

Mar 24.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

* STRIKES: Russian forces likely experimented with new drone tactics during an attack against Odesa, which saw drones nose-diving from high altitudes (making interception potentially much more difficult)

* ELECTION: The US’ special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, stated that Ukraine has agreed to hold a presidential election, though there are no details of when and under what conditions

* SABOTAGE: Arrests across Ukraine in recent days underscore the ongoing risk of Russian espionage and sabotage plots, even during curfews and martial law

* FORECAST: US officials are meeting Russian and Ukrainian counterparts in Saudi Arabia amid efforts to agree on a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea and to make wider progress towards peace

* BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 20 and 22 March indicates that Russian forces have made minor advances in the north of Toretsk. This comes amid reported efforts by these same forces to interdict Ukraine’s ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in and out of the settlement. Russian sources reported on 20 March that their forces are attempting to target Ukrainian logistics in a bid to complicate Ukraine’s ability to supply its forces in Toretsk, as well as possible future attempts to withdraw. Further north, geolocated footage published on 21 March confirmed that Russian forces have made minor progress to the west of Bilohorivka, a village located on the Luhansk-Donetsk oblast border around seven miles (12km) to the north-east of Siversk.

* DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have made gains in the direction of Pokrovsk, though Ukrainian forces continue to contest the territory heavily to the south-west of the town. Geolocated footage posted on 20 March indicates Russian forces have advanced in south-west Tarasivka, located to the east of Pokrovsk. Additional geolocated footage posted on 20, 21 and 22 March indicates that Russian forces have also advanced in eastern, northern and north-western Shevchenko, located to the south of Pokrovsk. Further geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces recently seized the settlement of Vodyane Druhe (located to the east of Pokrovsk) and that they advanced south of Sribne, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. Despite the momentum seemingly tilting back in Russia’s favour following recent Ukrainian counter attacks, geolocated footage posted on 22 March indicates that Ukrainian forces also recently made gains in south-west Nadiivka (also located to the south-west of Pokrovsk).

* KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report

* KURSK: The rate of Russian advances in Kursk oblast (Russia) and across the international border inside Sumy oblast (Ukraine) remains slow, with little confirmed progress made in recent days. Russian sources have nevertheless claimed various advances into Sumy, including into the northern outskirts of the village of Volodymyrivka, located around 17 miles (28km) to the west of Sudzha. However, this remains unconfirmed. Meanwhile, further south, Ukrainian forces have continued to launch limited attacks across the international border into Belgorod oblast (Russia), making various small and confirmed advances in recent days. According to Russian sources, Ukrainian forces are using a large number of fibre optic drones during their operations; the Russian military command is reportedly redeploying reserve units to defend the area against further attacks.

* OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage posted on 23 March by Ukraine’s Third Assault Brigade indicates that Ukrainian forces recently seized the settlement of Nadiya, located to the east of Borova (Luhansk oblast). Additionally, earlier on 24 March, the deputy commander of Ukraine’s Achilles unmanned systems regiment, Oles Maliarevych, reported that Ukrainian forces have captured part of the settlement of Dvorichna, located to the north of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). The settlement is a key Ukrainian logistical hub (and target for Russian forces). Geolocated footage posted on 21 March indicates that Russian forces advanced in south Dvorichna. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also carried out successful counter-attacks near Synkivka, located to the north-east of Kupiansk, and that the southern portion of the settlement is now a contested grey zone.

* SOUTHERN: Ukrainian milblogger Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on 20 March that Russian attacks around Velyka Novosilka have slowed notably in recent days. We have similarly confirmed no Russian advances in the region in recent days, which possibly indicates that Russian forces are reprioritising support to other offensive axes in Donetsk oblast or further west in Zaporizhzhia oblast. Meanwhile, Russian attacks in this direction have continued to intensify, with geolocated footage from 22 March indicating Russian advances south of Stepove, which is located to the north-west of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia). Notably, however, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Grouping of Forces, Vladyslav Voloshyn, claimed on 21 March that Russian forces are attempting to advance to within artillery range of the southern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia city. While we cannot confirm this claim, it aligns with our previous assessment that Russian forces are likely attempting to increase pressure in the direction of Zaporizhzhia city to underscore their ‘claims’ to the region.

* STRIKES: According to a prominent Ukrainian military observer, Russian forces displayed a new tactic when conducting a large-scale drone attack against Odesa (Odesa oblast) on 20 March. The drones reportedly approached the city from altitudes of over 2,000m before nose-diving sharply. The observer noted that approaching from this altitude makes intercepting drones with regular small firearms ‘almost impossible’, but that systems such as the (German-supplied) Gepard anti-aircraft gun are capable of doing so. He also claimed that drones operating from such altitudes and moving at high speeds have reduced accuracy. Nevertheless, numerous civilian sites were hit during the drone attack, including a shopping centre.

* STRIKES: Overnight on 21-22 March, Russian forces launched 179 Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones at Kharkiv, Kyiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Ukraine’s air force claimed that it intercepted 100 of the drones, while another 63 failed to reach their target, likely partly due to electronic warfare (EW) measures.

* STRIKES: Several residential buildings were struck and at least three people were killed by Russian drones targeting the capital Kyiv overnight on 22-23 March. Buildings were struck in the capital’s Desnianskyi, Dniprovskyi, Holosiivskyi, Podilskyi and Shevchenkivskyi districts. The attack was part of a wider strike overnight on 22-23 March in which Russia launched 147 Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones at Chernihiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Sumy and Odesa oblasts. According to Ukraine’s air force, 97 drones were intercepted while 25 were ‘lost in location’ and failed to reach their target.

* STRIKES: Overnight on 23-24 March, Russian forces launched 99 Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones at Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Ukraine’s air force reportedly intercepted 57 Shahed-136/131 drones, while 36 decoy drones failed to reach their target.

* In our Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios in which we hypothesise the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility that a fragile ceasefire will fail to stop the fighting entirely.

* The Trump administration is aiming to broker a ceasefire by Easter (20 April). However, even if this is achieved, which remains unlikely, the absence of a strategic settlement to end the war once and for all means that a ceasefire will likely only act as a temporary pause in the war; Russia will likely attempt to reconstitute its forces to prepare for the next phase of the 11-year-long conflict.

* Several high-level US-brokered talks took place in Saudi Arabia this month; they resulted in a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure and a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea. In the meantime, Ukrainian forces have effectively been pushed out of Kursk oblast (Russia) following a successful Russian counter-offensive operation in March; this means that Ukraine has lost a key territorial bargaining chip at a moment when negotiations are beginning to intensify.

* Further high-level negotiations are set to take place in the coming month, with the US hoping to enforce partial ceasefires ahead of 20 April. While both sides have nominally agreed to a moratorium on energy strikes and a ceasefire in the Black Sea, it remains unclear if these will hold. Yet even if they do hold, Russian and Ukrainian forces will possibly merely pivot to striking military and industrial sites, which will likely sustain pressure on Ukraine’s already weakening air defence network.

Other key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in April include the improving spring weather, which will likely facilitate renewed Russian offensive operations and an intensification of glide bomb attacks – which would possibly target Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia cities. In addition, further statements by senior US negotiators over the possibility of recognising Russian-annexed and occupied territories in Ukraine would mark a notable shift in US policy towards Russia.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 

* ELECTION: The US’ special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, stated in an interview aired on 21 March that Ukraine has agreed to hold a presidential election. Witkoff, who has been a key figure in engaging with Russia as part of the Trump administration’s efforts to end the war, did not specify when this vote could be held, or under what conditions. Holding elections during martial law is prohibited per the Ukrainian constitution, with such conditions unlikely to be lifted for the foreseeable future. Ukraine’s parliament passed a resolution in late February affirming Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s legitimacy and that elections are not possible until after the war ends. Nevertheless, US pressure on Ukraine to hold a presidential election will likely increase in the coming weeks and months as peace talks take shape. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 3 February 2025.

* DECREE: Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on 20 March ordering Ukrainians residing in Russia and Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine to leave by 10 September or ‘regulate their legal status’. The decree is almost certainly aimed at pressuring Ukrainians who have until now refused Russian passports or citizenship offered as part of Moscow’s efforts to ‘Russify’ the occupied regions. The timing is also notable considering unspecified Ukrainian officials recently listed the return of thousands of Ukrainian children deported to Russia (and the return of civilians detained by Russia) as key demands for any peace deal.

* DECREE: US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on 23 March that the topics of prisoner exchanges and abducted Ukrainian children would likely be discussed at peace talks in Saudi Arabia (see FORECAST below). Waltz stated these issues would serve as ‘confidence building’ measures for negotiations. Nevertheless, apparent Russian efforts to assimilate Ukrainians forcibly in Russian-occupied regions will highly likely continue to undermine any attempts to build on critically low levels of trust.

* SABOTAGE: Arrests across Ukraine in recent days underscore the ongoing risk of Russian espionage and sabotage plots. On 21 March, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported that a 14-year-old schoolgirl was detained in Ternopil (Ternopil oblast) for being involved in a plot to detonate an IED near a police building. Russian special agents reportedly scouted the girl through Telegram channels, where she was looking for ways to make money quickly.

* SABOTAGE: Meanwhile, the security agencies in Kyiv detained a 19-year-old who attempted to set fire to an unspecified financial institution at the behest of Russian special services. Ukrainian law enforcement agencies will likely remain competent at thwarting such Russian plots over the medium-to-long term. Nevertheless, the recent incidents reflect how Russian agents are looking to recruit young people to carry out attacks, likely through promises of lucrative compensation, sustaining the risk of attacks across the country, even during martial law.

FORECAST

CEASEFIRE: On 23 March, Ukrainian and US delegations met in Saudi Arabia ahead of similar US-Russia talks on 24 March, as part of the Trump administration’s efforts to secure a ceasefire and an eventual end to the Russo-Ukrainian war. Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov, who led the Ukrainian delegation, stated that his team included energy experts and military representatives. Umerov also stated that the agenda of the talks was to discuss protecting energy facilities and critical infrastructure. President Zelensky called these discussions ‘constructive’ and ‘beneficial’, though he acknowledged that they were more ‘technical’ in nature. A Ukrainian presidential advisor, Serhiiy Leshchenko, specified that these talks concerned a mutual pause in long-range strikes against port infrastructure. Senior Russian and US officials are holding talks in Saudi Arabia on 24 March on a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea. It remains unclear precisely what a maritime ceasefire would entail (or whether any such agreement would hold). A previous nominal agreement by both sides to enforce a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure remains fragile and is yet to enter into force formally. While an end to the war remains unlikely in the short term, talks on Black Sea security will possibly mitigate against risks facing maritime shipping, including several of the protocols of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI, which collapsed in 2023). While this would possibly aim to protect grain and fertiliser exports, we assess it remains unclear whether Russia would demand sanctions relief on agricultural exports to facilitate a deal (as they previously demanded in order to keep the original grain deal afloat). The latest talks form part of the US’ strategy to build confidence through temporary and partial ceasefires, which it argues will facilitate more substantive peace talks to end the war definitively. Reports in Ukrainian media indicate that Ukrainian and US delegations will hold another round of talks after Russia-US negotiations on 24 March. According to unnamed insiders familiar with the talks, the Ukrainian side expects the US will manage to reach interim agreements with Russian representatives during their discussions, though expectations from Russia are low. Another round of Ukraine-US talks would likely be aimed at ironing out any points of contention that could render any possible ceasefire agreement more vulnerable to collapse. However, in the absence of an agreement halting strikes against port infrastructure and entities in the Black Sea, there is a realistic possibility that Russia will intensify such attacks over the coming days. Nevertheless, the US is still hoping for a broad ceasefire by 20 April (Easter Day). However, according to people familiar with the matter, the White House recognises that this timeline will possibly slip given the divisions within the positions of both Kyiv and Moscow. Our assessment remains that this is likely an overly optimistic deadline for a wider cessation of hostilities, with partial ceasefires being more realistic (albeit still difficult to achieve). Reports emerged earlier on 24 March citing an unspecified Russian diplomat that Russia currently has the advantage and plans to make the most of it. This reaffirms our assessment that Moscow is unlikely to infer much benefit in ceasing hostilities at present, without significant concessions. The Trump administration likely regards an Easter truce as symbolically significant given Easter this year aligns with both the Orthodox and non-Orthodox churches. However, Russia rejected an (Orthodox) Easter truce in April 2022. As such, even if a truce were to be set for the Easter period, it would still be at risk of violation by both sides. US special envoy Witkoff reiterated on 21 March that the ultimate goal of current talks is a 30-day ceasefire, during which the different sides would aim to discuss a permanent ceasefire. According to Witkoff, they are not ‘far away’ from this scenario. Nevertheless, during an interview with US media personality Tucker Carlson, Witkoff reiterated numerous long-standing Kremlin narratives and peace talk positions. Witkoff stated his opinion that the largest issue in the conflict concerns territory, specifically Crimea (annexed by Russia in 2014) and the four Ukrainian regions Russia annexed in September 2022: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Witkoff mentioned so-called ‘referendums’ which Russia held in the territories prior to their annexation, which he claimed resulted in an ‘overwhelming majority’ of people stating that they want to exist under Russian rule. Ukraine, Western leaders and the UN condemned the voting as an illegitimate precursor to illegal annexation. Much of the pre-war population had fled, and Ukrainian officials stated those who remained were forced into voting, including through armed groups entering homes and staff being threatened with the termination of their employment if they did not participate. Witkoff also described Russian-annexed Ukrainian regions as ‘Russian speaking’, though language usage does not necessarily correlate to being pro-Moscow, as the Kremlin seeks to present. President Volodymyr Zelensky, for example, is a native Russian speaker. Ultimately, the Kremlin will highly likely continue to peddle narratives of linguistic and cultural connections in an attempt to justify its claims to various Ukrainian regions; Ukraine’s alleged suppression of Russian minorities will remain one of the ‘root causes’ that Russia claims caused the war. Russia will almost certainly hope that such comments reflect tacit US sympathy for Moscow’s territorial claims against Ukraine, paving the way for potential recognition during future rounds of peace talks. While it remains unclear what form the US position will take, the talks in Saudi Arabia are likely to consider territory as well as temporary ceasefires.

* Russia-Ukraine-US: Talks will increase likelihood of modest improvement to Black Sea security. On 24 March, senior Russian and US officials are due to hold talks in Saudi Arabia on a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea. This comes shortly after separate US-Ukraine talks took place at the same venue on 23 March. It remains unclear precisely what a maritime ceasefire would entail (or whether any such agreement would hold). A previous nominal agreement by both sides to enforce a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure remains fragile. The latest talks form part of the US’ strategy to build confidence through temporary and partial ceasefires, which it argues will facilitate more substantive peace talks to end the war definitively. While an end to the war remains unlikely in the short term, talks on Black Sea security will possibly mitigate against the risks facing maritime shipping, including several of the protocols of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which collapsed in 2023. While this would possibly aim to protect grain and fertiliser exports, we assess it remains unclear whether Russia would demand sanctions relief on agricultural exports to facilitate a deal.

* Armenia-Azerbaijan: Need for constitutional changes will likely delay signing of peace treaty. On 21 March, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced plans to hold a referendum on adopting a new constitution in 2027. At the same time, Pashinyan disclosed that there are discussions within his administration that the vote should be held alongside parliamentary elections scheduled for 2026. Armenia and Azerbaijan recently finalised the terms of a long-awaited peace treaty. However, Baku will not sign the document until Yerevan amends what Azerbaijan describes as territorial claims against Azerbaijan in the Armenian constitution. Polling released earlier in March by the consulting company MPG shows that almost 60% of Armenians oppose constitutional changes, while 18.4% support ‘some’ amendments. Pashinyan’s proposed timelines for a referendum and the likelihood of Armenians voting against the changes reaffirm our assessment that the signing of a peace agreement is unlikely in the short-to-medium term. In turn, this will sustain regional tensions, though the risk of renewed armed conflict will remain low in the coming weeks and months.

* Iran-US: Direct talks remain possible in 2025 despite belligerent statements. During an interview on 23 March, US special envoy Steve Witkoff suggested that US outreach to Iran for nuclear talks reflects an attempt to avoid direct military action. On the same day, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Tehran would soon reply to US President Donald Trump’s previous letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in which Trump established a two-month deadline for reaching a new nuclear deal. However, Araghchi warned that prospective talks are impossible unless the US changes its maximum pressure policy. Despite belligerent statements from both sides in recent weeks, we assess that direct talks between Washington DC and Tehran remain a realistic possibility in 2025. However, Trump’s maximum pressure policy is likely to continue in the coming months, sustaining the risk of further sanctions on the Iranian energy sector, as well as sanctions on Iran’s regional trade partners, such as Iraq (which would likely impact the energy, banking and transport sectors, elevating energy and socio-economic health risks). (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Mar 25. Ukraine is quietly invading Russia again. Kyiv’s forces are moving forward and steadily capturing ground in Belgorod, despite Kremlin claims that the attack has been thwarted. As dawn broke over the western Russian region of Belgorod, a growing thrum could be heard near its heavily fortified border with Ukraine. The sound came from a column of tanks and fighting vehicles storming across muddy fields, carving a path through minefields and lines of dragon’s teeth barricades. It was the start of a new incursion into Russian territory. That was last week and, despite the Kremlin’s claims that the attack was thwarted, a relatively small collection of Ukraine’s forces are moving forward and steadily capturing ground. The battle plan has been closely guarded, and it is still unclear whether the Belgorod incursion was intended as a brief raid or a longer-term operation. There is currently fierce fighting in the villages of Demidovka, Prilesye and Popovka, according to the Institute for the Study of War, a US think-tank. Ukraine has also been carrying out a series of precision air strikes, targeting command posts, bridges, helicopters and depots. There are several reasons why Ukraine may have acted so decisively for more war at a time when it is also pleading for peace. Belgorod borders Ukraine’s Sumy, Kharkiv and Luhansk regions and is regularly used by Russian forces to launch attacks on Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky has said only that his military was taking “strategic steps” to counter a potential Russian offensive from Sumy, where there has been a troop build-up. The sudden rush of soldiers across the border could help protect Ukraine against a Russian offensive in Sumy by diverting those forces. Crucially, Belgorod is also next to Kursk, where the last Ukrainian troops are holding on to a sliver of high ground, trying to cling on to Kyiv’s big military gamble that it hoped would provide a bargaining chip during ceasefire negotiations. The new incursion could help relieve pressure on Ukraine’s last remaining troops in Kursk and protect their right flank from a Russian attack. However, unlike in Kursk, when Kyiv’s forces caught Russia by surprise and rapidly seized hundreds of miles of territory, the Ukrainian gains have been slower and staggered. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

27 Mar 25. Ukraine’s Tryzub Laser Weapon Successfully Downs Russian Shaheds. Laser technology is now being used to target and destroy Russian drones, including Shahed UAVs. This places Ukraine among a select group of nations deploying next-generation defense technology.

“We can now shoot down aircraft at altitudes of more than 2 kilometers (1.2 miles),” said Vadym Sukharevskyi, Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces. In a recent interview with Radio Svoboda, he revealed that Ukraine has become one of the few countries capable of using laser technology in combat. Ukraine is currently testing a domestically developed laser weapon called Tryzub, named after the country’s trident symbol. The Tryzub laser is a directed energy weapon (DEW), comparable to other advanced systems like the US LaWS and the UK DragonFire. It has demonstrated an effective range of over 2 kilometers.

DEW weapons use concentrated energy—like lasers or microwaves—to target and damage objects by heating or disrupting them. They travel at the speed of light, allowing them to hit fast-moving threats like drones almost instantly. This enables precise attacks without the need for physical projectiles. Though still in development, Ukrainian specialists are working to enhance and scale up the laser’s capabilities. (Source: UAS VISION/United 24 Media)

 

26 Mar 25. UK is absolutely committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine: UK Statement to the OSCE. Politico-Military Counsellor, Ankur Narayan, commends Ukraine as the party of peace for proposing a full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire – and urges Russia to agree to this without further delay. Thank you, Mr Chair. Our Helsinki Final Act commitments include sovereignty, territorial integrity and the non-violability of borders. As per the first line of the Helsinki Final Act, these principles are designed to protect “true and lasting peace” in our region. This is why we remain unwavering in our support for Ukraine defending its territorial integrity, its right to exist, its sovereignty, and its independence.   We welcome the progress President Trump has made towards a ceasefire in Ukraine and in negotiations with Russia and Ukraine. We are in close contact with US and Ukraine following the conclusion of talks in Riyadh yesterday. President Zelenskyy has already shown Ukraine is the party of peace by proposing a full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire.  We hope that President Putin will agree to this without further delay.   Any lasting peace must ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty and security – in line with the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter. With robust security arrangements to ensure Russia is never able to invade again. The UK will play its full part – and is already taking a leading role, alongside France, to build a coalition of the willing to support Ukraine’s future security.   Over the last week, Russia has continued to launch brutal attacks that cause daily suffering for innocent Ukrainians. The drone strike on Kyiv on March 23rd exemplifies another horrific assault, tragically killing a 5-year-old girl and severely injuring ten others. A Russian missile strike on Sumy in northeastern Ukraine injured 88 people, including 17 children. In Donetsk, Russian shelling over the past three days across the eastern Oblast province has resulted in the deaths of seven civilians. We must emphasise the need for accountability for these actions and renew our commitment to collaborating towards achieving enduring peace.  Mr Chair, we are absolutely committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and are engaging with key allies in support of this effort. A just and lasting peace is vital for Ukraine and for wider Euro-Atlantic and international security and prosperity. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

26 Mar 25. Russia launched an overnight drone attack on a Ukrainian port providing access to the Black Sea hours after partially agreeing to a maritime ceasefire. The Trump administration reached separate deals on Tuesday with Ukraine and Russia to pause their attacks on ships in the Black Sea and energy targets, but it is still unclear when and how the truce will be implemented. The mayor of Mykolaiv, a major port in southern Ukraine, said there were emergency power outages in the city after the Russian drone strike. Moscow also accused Kyiv of breaking the tentative agreement, saying it shot down two Ukrainian drones over the waters of the Black Sea, but it was not clear what the targets were. Volodymyr Zelensky said last night the Black Sea ceasefire would come into effect “immediately”, but the Kremlin said it would be conditional on lifting sanctions. The Ukrainian leader called it the latest example of Putin’s “manipulation” tactics. Russian drones also targeted the central Ukrainian city of Kryvyi Rih, Mr Zelensky’s hometown, in what officials called the war’s biggest attack on the city causing “massive destruction”. “Apparently, this is how the occupiers ‘want peace’,” Oleksandr Vilkul, the head of the city’s military administration said. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

26 Mar 25. Russia, Ukraine agree to sea, energy truce; Washington seeks easing of sanctions. 

* Summary

* US says both sides agree to maritime, energy ceasefires

* Russia says Washington must ‘order’ Zelenskiy to comply

* Kremlin says deal requires lifting of some sanctions

* Zelenskiy says there is no such requirement

* Trump cites progress despite ‘tremendous animosity’

The United States reached separate deals on Tuesday with Ukraine and Russia to pause their attacks at sea and against energy targets, with Washington agreeing to push to lift some sanctions against Moscow.

While it was not clear when or how the Black Sea maritime security deals would start, the agreements are the first formal commitments by the two warring sides since President Donald Trump’s inauguration. Trump is pushing for an end to the war in Ukraine and a rapid rapprochement with Moscow that has alarmed Kyiv and European countries. (Source: Reuters)

 

25 Mar 25. Russia is demanding more Ukrainian territory than it currently holds at the peace talks with the US in Saudi Arabia, it has been reported.  The Moscow delegation is seeking to gain complete control of four Ukrainian regions – Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson – people familiar with the Kremlin’s thinking told The Moscow Times. Russia does not fully control any of these regions, yet the government sources said the Kremlin hopes Washington will pressure Kyiv to withdraw all its troops from the partially-occupied territories. Their high-level talks on Monday ended after 12 hours, with the Kremlin warning it was “just beginning” and that “difficult negotiations” lay ahead. The US, meanwhile, was optimistic that the summit could help achieve a “full-on” ceasefire. A statement from both parties is expected this morning. Further talks between Kyiv and Washington are due to take place today in Riyadh after Ukraine accused Russia of making “hollow statements about peace” while bombing its cities. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

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