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Military And Security Developments
Mar 24.
24 Mar 25. U.S. and Russian officials began talks in Saudi Arabia on Monday aimed at making progress towards a broad ceasefire in Ukraine with Washington eyeing a Black Sea ceasefire deal before securing a wider agreement. The talks, which followed U.S. talks with Ukraine on Sunday, come as U.S. President Donald Trumpintensifies his drive to end the three-year-old conflict after he last week spoke to both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Russian President Vladimir Putin. A source briefed on the planning for the talks said the U.S. side was being led by Andrew Peek, a senior director at the White House National Security Council, and Michael Anton, a senior State Department official. The White House says the aim of the talks is to reach a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, allowing the free flow of shipping.
Mar 23.
23 Mar 25. Sweden Confirms Delivery of ASC 890 Aircraft to Ukraine to Strengthen Early Warning and Air Defense Network. According to information published on March 21, 2025, by the Delfi news website, the transfer of the Swedish ASC 890 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft to Ukraine is progressing as planned. This critical military assistance, first announced by the Swedish Ministry of Defense on May 29, 2024, marks a significant enhancement in Ukraine’s ability to monitor and control its airspace amid ongoing Russian invasion. The ASC 890 is an airborne early warning and control system developed by the Swedish Company Saab, built on the Saab 340 twin-engine turboprop aircraft platform. It is equipped with the Erieye radar, a powerful active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar mounted on top of the fuselage. This radar can detect and track both aerial and maritime targets simultaneously at ranges of up to 400 kilometers, even in challenging conditions such as jamming environments or mountainous terrain. Its advanced sensors allow it to maintain constant surveillance across vast areas, offering commanders real-time situational awareness. The primary mission of the ASC 890 is to serve as a command-and-control hub in the sky. It provides early warning of incoming threats such as aircraft, cruise missiles, or drones, and coordinates air defense responses by relaying information to fighter aircraft, ground-based air defense systems, and operational command centers. Additionally, it plays a critical role in airspace management, directing friendly aircraft during offensive and defensive operations, deconflicting movements, and supporting joint and combined arms coordination. In maritime settings, it can support naval task forces by tracking surface contacts and enhancing maritime domain awareness. Sweden’s decision to donate the ASC 890 aircraft demonstrates a deepening commitment to Ukraine’s defense. The aircraft is expected to significantly enhance Ukraine’s integrated air defense network by enabling better coordination between ground-based air defense systems, fighter aircraft, and command structures. As of March 2025, Ukrainian air force personnel are undergoing comprehensive training in Sweden to ensure operational readiness upon the aircraft’s arrival. (Source: Google/armyrecognition.com)
Mar 21.
Ukraine-US: Kyiv’s negotiating position on terms of new minerals deal is likely weakened. On 20 March, US President Donald Trump announced that the US will sign a minerals and natural resources deal with Ukraine ‘very shortly’. The deal collapsed in late February following a public dispute between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Reports from earlier on 21 March indicate that the Trump administration is seeking new advantageous terms, potentially including US ownership of other economic assets, such as Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. While we cannot confirm what new terms the Trump administration is seeking, Ukraine will highly likely feel more pressure to agree to any additional terms to keep the US on side. The suspension (and subsequent rapid reinstatement) of US military assistance and intelligence sharing to Ukraine in early March has likely compounded such concerns. This dynamic will likely reduce Kyiv’s ability to push for more advantageous terms in return, specifically those relating to security guarantees and/or increased military assistance.
Mar 20.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
* KURSK: Ukrainian forces launched a likely limited operation across the international border into Russia’s Belgorod oblast, though it remains unclear if Ukrainian forces intend to maintain these positions or if they possess the capacity to do so
* STRIKES: President Trump secured the nominal agreement of both Moscow and Kyiv to a temporary moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure; it remains unclear when it will be in place or if it will hold
* EUROPE: Germany has announced a new package of aid for Ukraine following a historic vote to exempt defence spending from debt rules; this could open up further German support for Ukraine
* FORECAST: US efforts to make progress in negotiations continue following high-profile calls between Trump and presidents Putin and Zelensky, but a major breakthrough remains highly unlikely
* BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 17 and 18 March indicates that Russian forces have made advances in the north-west of Chasiv Yar amid very slow overall progress in recent weeks. Meanwhile, further south, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have continued to advance in and around Toretsk, which remains heavily contested. Geolocated footage from 18 March indicates that Russian forces advanced in the fields to the north of the town. While it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to retain these positions, such operations, together with confirmed advances further to the east of the town, could aim at outflanking the Ukrainian defenders.
* DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have made gains south-west of Pokrovsk as part of their broader efforts to regain positions lost to Ukraine. Geolocated footage from 18 March shows recent Russian advances in southern Pishchane, which is located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces had previously achieved progress in this settlement following successful counter-attacks. The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the area noted that Russian troops have altered their offensive tactics by refraining from large, mechanised assaults. This change is likely a response to improved weather conditions, which have enhanced visibility and made Ukrainian drone strikes more effective against Russian armoured vehicles. Consequently, Russian operations are currently likely relying more on small infantry assaults. Meanwhile, further south, Kostyantynopil, a town located to the west of Kurakhove, remains highly contested, with both sides having made confirmed gains in various parts of the settlement recently.
* KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
* KURSK: President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 18 March that Russian forces are massing along the border of Kursk oblast and may be preparing new attacks in Kharkiv, Sumy or Zaporizhzhia oblasts. It remains unclear whether Russian forces will seek to continue pushing across the international border into Sumy oblast from Kursk, or whether they will reallocate forces to support other offensive operations elsewhere. It also remains unclear where North Korean forces will be redeployed, and whether they will be deployed inside Ukraine. In the meantime, Russian forces have made no further confirmed advances in Kursk oblast in recent days; it remains unclear where Ukrainian forces are attempting to establish their new defensive line.
* KURSK: Further south, Ukrainian forces launched a likely limited operation across the international border into Russia’s Belgorod oblast; however, it remains unclear if Ukrainian forces intend to or have the capacity to maintain these positions. Geolocated footage published on 18 and 19 March indicate that Ukrainian forces advanced across the border south of the village of Demidovka, which is located just over one mile (1.5km) to the east of the international border. On 18 March, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that its forces had successfully repelled a Ukrainian attack in the area. The scale of the attack remains unclear, but it was likely limited. Russian milbloggers reported on 18 March that the Ukrainians attacked with tanks, armoured vehicles and mine-clearing support. The Ukrainian attack was highly likely launched in a bid to distract Russian forces to the north attempting to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk oblast. By launching even small cross-border raids, Ukrainian forces are likely attempting to force Russian forces to screen the border and possibly delay (or undermine) their own counter-offensive operations against Sumy oblast (Ukraine).
* OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
* SOUTHERN: Russian forces have intensified assaults in western Zaporizhzhia oblast, making a number of confirmed gains over the last few days. Geolocated footage from 18 March indicates that Russian forces have advanced into the eastern part of Stepove, a village located around 23 miles (37km) south-east of Zaporizhzhia city. Footage from 17 March also indicated advances in Mali Shcherbaky and Shcherbaky, villages located northwest of Robotyne. Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Group of Forces Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on 17 March that Russian forces have become more active along the Zaporizhzhia front, with improving weather conditions supporting Russian assault operations. Voloshyn also noted that Russia’s use of first-person-view (FPV) drones on this front increased in March; Russia is currently using approximately 400-420 drones per day.
* SOUTHERN: It remains possible that the collapse of the Kursk salient will free up Russian forces to further intensify offensive operations on the southern axis in the coming months. Increasing attacks south of Zaporizhzhia city would also carry the added benefit of applying pressure on a city that Russia still demands that Ukraine hands over before any peace deal can be reached. Further east, meanwhile, Russian forces have also continued to make steady advances to the north and north-west of Velyka Novosilka along the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk oblast border region.
* STRIKES: Over the past few days, both sides continued to exchange large-scale, long-range strikes. Russian strikes typically involved a large number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), supplemented in some cases by small numbers of ballistic missiles. Ukraine also conducted large-scale drone strikes, with an attack from early 20 March involving in all 132 UAVs, according to the Russian authorities.
* STRIKES: On 18 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure following a call with US President Donald Trump. However, early on 19 March, Russia launched a large-scale drone attack supplemented by two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, damaging energy infrastructure in Sloviansk, a Ukrainian-controlled city in Donetsk oblast. The attack caused electricity shortages in parts of the city. It remains unclear whether the damage to the energy grid was intentional, as falling missile debris can often cause unintentional damage to such facilities.
* STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 19 March, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that President Putin did not order renewed strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure following a Ukrainian attack on an oil facility. The Ukrainian attack reportedly targeted a facility in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai, which subsequently caught fire. Peskov’s statement is highly likely intended to reinforce the perception that Russia is adhering to the US-proposed moratorium on energy strikes. However, it has to be emphasised that neither side (nor the US) has actually stated when the moratorium takes effect.
* STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced he agreed to the moratorium during a phone call with Trump on 19 March. It remains uncertain whether Zelensky has issued to order to implement the moratorium since the call. While Ukrainian strikes have recorded growing success in targeting Russian oil infrastructure, Russia’s substantial oil overproduction capacity allowed it to mitigate the impact on its oil output.
* STRIKES: Given the significant degradation of Ukraine’s energy grid, attacks on energy infrastructure possibly no longer hold the same strategic value for Moscow as they did earlier in the winter. Additionally, with the heating season gradually ending in Ukraine, attacks against energy infrastructure will likely have a diminished impact in any case. Instead, if an agreement holds, Russia will likely prioritise military targets, such as logistics hubs, depots and airfields, for the duration of the moratorium. For instance, a Russian ballistic missile in the 19 March attack struck railway infrastructure in Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Additionally, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported earlier on 20 March that its forces had struck military airfields and depots in undisclosed locations in Ukraine. A prominent Russian milblogger reported that the attack struck targets in Donetsk and Kirovohrad oblasts, including railway infrastructure. The recent reports of strikes on railway infrastructure possibly indicate a growing Russian focus on disrupting transport networks, especially those that are potentially utilised for the transit of Western military aid from Ukraine’s western regions to the frontline.
* STRIKES: While Russia has consistently targeted military facilities throughout the war, suspending energy strikes will likely allow Moscow to intensify its efforts on degrading Ukraine’s military capabilities via attacks on military infrastructure. Alternatively, adhering to the moratorium will likely allow Russia to rebuild its stockpiles of long-range missiles, which could be used for high-intensity combined strikes against critical infrastructure at a future point.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* EUROPE: The outgoing German government has agreed to release an additional EUR 3 billion (USD 3.3 billion) in military assistance for Ukraine, according to reports on 19 March. The aid package had been delayed due to resistance from the outgoing chancellor, Olaf Scholz. He had said such aid should be contingent on borrowing and not come out of the normal budget. However, incoming Chancellor Friederich Merz has pledged to increase support for Ukraine, with the German parliament making the unprecedented decision on 18 March to exempt defence spending from the country’s strict debt rules. Behind the US, Germany has been Ukraine’s largest military aid provider based on data from the Kiel Institute. The additional support underscores Berlin’s efforts to lead on European security amid concerns of a Transatlantic split and supporting Ukraine aid.
* EUROPE: Meanwhile, earlier on 20 March, the European Commission (EC) disbursed an additional EUR 1 billion (USD 1.1 billion) in macro-financial assistance to Ukraine to be repaid with the proceeds of frozen Russian assets. EC President Ursula von der Leyen implied that the funding is aimed at keeping Ukraine’s economy afloat and rebuilding critical infrastructure. This assistance will likely moderately ease some socio-economic health constraints for the Ukrainian government in the short term.
* POLITICS: Politico disclosed on 18 March that individuals engaged in recent backchannel negotiations with Ukrainian opposition figures aimed at holding early elections in Ukraine (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 6 March 2025). According to unspecified Ukrainian lawmakers and a Republican foreign policy expert, Trump’s son Donald Trump Jr, Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, US media personality Tucker Carlson and special envoy Steve Witkoff were involved. Witkoff is the only member of the group with an official US government role.
* POLITICS: While we cannot confirm their participation, Trump Jr and Carlson have previously made statements against Zelensky. Carlson, who interviewed Russian President Vladimir Putin last year, stated earlier this month that he was ‘definitely more sympathetic to Putin’ than Zelensky. The involvement of certain individuals who are opposed to Zelensky indicates that members of Trump’s inner circle likely want him to be removed from office and replaced by a figure with whom they believe it is easier to work.
* MINERALS: The White House disclosed on 19 March that it has moved beyond the previously negotiated minerals deal with Ukraine and that the US is instead focusing its attention on a long-term peace agreement. This implies that the upended minerals deal is now a subordinate concern and is unlikely to be signed in the near term. Although the agreement lacked explicit security guarantees for Ukraine, Kyiv will likely perceive that the absence of a deal and diverted US interest will possibly weaken its position in any possible negotiations to end the war. For further analysis on the minerals deal, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 3 March 2025.
* MINERALS: Meanwhile, the Trump administration has expressed interest in running or even owning Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. This is based on a statement from the White House on 19 March following a call between Trump and Zelensky. The readout states that US ownership of unspecified power plants would be the ‘best’ form of protection for such infrastructure. Zelensky clarified that he and Trump had only discussed the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) which is currently under Russian control. It remains unclear how the US seeks to acquire or run Ukrainian nuclear power plants, including the ZNPP, with the idea unlikely to come to fruition should peace negotiations progress.
FORECAST
CEASEFIRE: President Donald Trump has engaged with the presidents of Russia and Ukraine in recent days as part of efforts to end the war and make progress towards a ceasefire. On 18 March, Putin agreed to a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure following a call with Trump. Differences in the two sides’ readouts of the call mean that the exact parameters of the moratorium remain unclear, however. It also remains unclear when such a ceasefire would take place. The call between Putin and Trump failed to secure a broader 30-day ceasefire, to which Ukraine has already agreed without any pre-conditions. Putin mentioned that Russia had raised several concerns with regard to introducing a wider temporary halt in hostilities. These related to establishing effective monitoring of a possible ceasefire across the entire line of contact and ensuring that Ukraine is not able to rearm or mobilise during the ceasefire. Russia also emphasised that the complete cessation of military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine is necessary to prevent an escalation of the conflict and in efforts to end the war. These are likely Russia’s minimum demands for considering a temporary ceasefire and are unlikely to change in the near term given they align with Moscow’s likely broader objectives of a Ukraine with a weakened military. We previously forecast that a moratorium on energy strikes would be a possible option for the Kremlin in order to avoid alienating the Trump administration, while effectively delaying a more substantive ceasefire. Nevertheless, the White House attempted to portray the development as eventually paving the way towards a fully-fledged ceasefire. The Kremlin acknowledged that Trump and Putin agreed to begin negotiations concerning the ‘safety of navigation’ in the Black Sea, while the White House portrayed this issue as a ‘maritime ceasefire’. Russia will likely use lexical differences and technicalities as a means of stalling progress towards a substantive ceasefire as long as its forces continue to advance on the battlefield. The agreement on a limited moratorium reinforces our assessment that Moscow is highly unlikely to want to end the war in the short term or to offer any meaningful confidence-building measures or concessions to show otherwise. Meanwhile, Trump spoke with President Zelensky on 19 March, which the former described as a ‘very good’ telephone call. Trump said that much of the discussion was based on the call with Putin the day prior which allegedly aimed to align both countries in their ‘requests and needs’. Zelensky stated that mutually ending strikes on energy and other civilian infrastructure could represent the first step toward fully ending the war and ensuring security; he also confirmed Ukraine’s readiness for such a moratorium. Nevertheless, Zelensky reiterated that Kyiv will continue working to make a full 30-day ceasefire happen, likely to reinforce that it is not an impediment to peace. The US special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, stated his belief on 19 March that reaching a full ceasefire is possible ‘in a couple of weeks’. Witfkoff notably holds a much broader brief than his official title would suggest and he is seemingly one of the most senior US negotiators at present. Russian and US delegations will hold talks in Saudi Arabia on 24 March; Ukrainian and US officials are also expected to meet in the kingdom in the coming days. Such contacts will likely be aimed at working towards a full ceasefire as well as the Trump administration’s previously reported goal of securing a ceasefire by Easter Day (20 April). However, Witkoff’s assessment is likely optimistic; the Trump administration will likely keep pushing back its timeframes for ending the war over the coming months as negotiations protract. Russia is renewing its efforts to portray elements of Ukraine’s constitution as an obstacle to peace, likely as a stalling tactic during negotiations. On 19 March, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Sergei Shoigu, stated that the Ukrainian constitution prohibits any negotiations regarding changes in territory. Ukraine’s constitution lists the four Ukrainian regions Russia annexed in September 2022 (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) as parts of Ukraine as well as Sevastopol and Crimea (which Russia annexed in 2014). It also states that issues of altering Ukraine’s territorial composition are to be resolved via a referendum. Russia periodically raises issues with Ukraine’s constitution to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and its leadership. It is possible that Russia will seek constitutional changes (or push for workarounds) to extract more substantive concessions from Ukraine in negotiations. Related to the territory integrity issue, the Kremlin will likely craft an information operation to set conditions for Western recognition of Russia’s territorial claims over Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine. Russian media reported on 18 March that Putin stated at a private meeting with business representatives that Russia would not claim Odesa (Odesa oblast) and ‘other territories’ if Russian territorial claims were acknowledged during peace talks. While we cannot confirm this, we assess that Russia almost certainly wants to retain control over the Crimean peninsula as well as Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. By reportedly stating that Russia will not make any claims on Odesa city, the Kremlin will likely try to make its territorial demands appear more reasonable. That said, Putin has repeatedly proclaimed Odesa to be a Russian city, with Russia’s long-term territorial ambitions in Ukraine likely reaching beyond the territory it has already formally annexed.
* Ukraine: Cyber operation points to sustained elevated security, espionage risks for defence sector. On 18 March, Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) reported that the threat cluster ‘UAC-0200’ has targeted Ukrainian military and defence entities in an ongoing cyber espionage operation since at least June 2024. The threat actors reportedly send spear phishing messages via the messaging platform Signal to trick victims into opening a malicious PDF file. The file then executes a malware loader and, afterwards, a remote access trojan (‘Dark Crystal RAT’). In February, UAC-0200 also changed the themes of its phishing messages to capitalise on current topics of interest. Additionally, the modus operandi, targets and tools used in this operation indicate that UAC-0200 is likely affiliated with the Russian government. The group likely uses Dark Crystal to maintain access to compromised systems and to exfiltrate tactical information. Consequently, we assess this operation underscores the sustained elevated security and cyber espionage risks facing the Ukrainian defence sector. For more information on Russia’s evolving cyber strategy in Ukraine
Mar 19.
* Russia-Ukraine: Moscow’s desire for substantive ceasefire remains low despite limited moratorium. On 18 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure following a call with US President Donald Trump. Differences in the two sides’ readouts of the call mean that the exact parameters of the moratorium remain unclear. However, according to the Kremlin’s version of events, Putin ‘immediately gave the Russian military the corresponding order’. Nevertheless, the call failed to secure a broader 30-day ceasefire, to which Ukraine has already agreed without any pre-conditions. The White House stated that the moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure will pave the way towards a fully-fledged ceasefire. We previously forecast that a moratorium on energy strikes would be a possible option for the Kremlin in order to avoid alienating the Trump administration, while effectively delaying a more substantive ceasefire. Russia has already significantly degraded Ukraine’s energy infrastructure over the last six months; therefore, such a halt would merely allow Russian forces to rebuild their missile stocks and/or to strike military targets instead. Ultimately, the developments reinforce our assessment that Moscow is highly unlikely to want to end the war in the short term; it will likely continue to try to delay substantive talks as long as its forces continue to advance on the battlefield.
Mar 17.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
* KURSK: Ukraine’s General Staff acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Sudzha, though reports of a large-scale encirclement are highly unlikely to be accurate
* COALITION: UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has presented plans to send approximately 10,000 peacekeeping troops to Ukraine as part of the emerging ‘coalition of the willing’
* SANCTIONS: A senior Ukrainian sanctions official has suggested that Western punitive measures against Russia could eventually be lifted, indicating a further shift in Ukraine’s position amid ceasefire talks
* FORECAST: US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin are expected to speak on 18 March amid efforts by Washington DC to secure a temporary ceasefire
* BAKHMUT: Russian and Ukrainian forces have continued to advance in and around Toretsk, underscoring the highly contested nature of the town. Geolocated footage published on 14 March indicated Russian advances in the north and south-west of Toretsk; Ukrainian advances have also broadly taken place in the north of the town. Ukrainian Spokesperson for the Luhansk Group of Forces Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on 15 March that Russian forces are concentrating their efforts for attacks against the Toretska and Tsentralna mining areas in the north and centre of the town, respectively.
* DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have made confirmed gains in the Pokrovsk area amid reports of a renewed intensification of their operations in the area. Geolocated footage from 14 March shows recent Russian advances along Tsentralna Street in eastern Pishchane and also along Lysohirska Street in western Shevchenko; both are located to the south of Pokrovsk. In recent weeks, Ukrainian forces have succeeded in advancing within and around these settlements as Russia continues to focus its efforts on operations in the Kursk salient. However, on 14 March, Ukrainian Spokesperson for the Khortytsia Group of Forces Viktor Trehubov reported a recent re-intensification of Russian operational efforts in Pokrovsk, as well as attempts to advance in areas to the south-west of the city. However, on 16 March, Trehubov claimed that Ukrainian forces had stabilised the situation.
* KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
* KURSK: On 16 March, Ukraine’s General Staff published an updated map of the battlefield which confirms that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Sudzha; this comes days after Russian forces likely captured the key town. In addition, Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov stated earlier on 17 March that Ukrainian forces had ‘redeployed to more advantageous defensive lines’ in Kursk oblast (Russia) – a de facto recognition of the withdrawal. The current location of the line of contact is unclear, though it remains likely that Ukrainian forces are still operating near the international border inside Kursk – though this remains unconfirmed. Russian forces are confirmed to have taken Goncharovka, a satellite town to the west of Sudzha (the latter being the main logistical centre of the salient). Meanwhile, Russian sources claim that their forces have pushed the Ukrainian forces back to the border along the H-07 route (P200), though this remains unconfirmed.
* KURSK: Umerov stated that claims of thousands of Ukrainian personnel being surrounded are false; we assess that Umerov’s statements are correct. Despite claims by US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin that such an encirclement has taken place, there is little evidence to indicate that Russian forces have captured large numbers of withdrawing Ukrainians. While Russian forces are likely continuing their efforts to penetrate further inside Sumy oblast (Ukraine) from the international border to the west of the Kursk salient, there has been no further indication that they have reached the key H-07 highway that supplies the remaining Ukrainian forces in Kursk. Control over this highway would likely be necessary in order to cut off the remaining Ukrainian forces in Kursk. While smaller-scale encirclements are still possible inside Kursk itself, and even though numerous reports from soldiers on the ground point to a difficult and hasty retreat, there is currently no evidence of a mass capture of thousands of Ukrainian personnel.
* OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
* SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 15 March indicates that Russian forces advanced to the south of the village of Vesele (Donetsk oblast), located around six miles (10km) to the north of Velyka Novosilka. This likely reflects Russia’s continued efforts to make slow but steady gains northwards along the Mokri Yaly River valley.
* STRIKES: In recent days, Russia has conducted daily large-scale drone attacks, except for an attack on 14 March, which involved only 27 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The attack on 15 March included two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and a total of 178 drones. A direct missile strike was recorded in Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Meanwhile, Ukraine also launched large-scale UAV attacks, deploying 177 drones earlier on 17 March, according to the Russian authorities.
* STRIKES: A prominent Italian news outlet reported on 14 March that, in recent weeks, Ukraine has been urging France and Italy to provide additional Aster-30 missiles for SAMP-T anti-aircraft batteries. According to the publication, Ukraine’s stockpiles of these missiles are nearly exhausted. However, reports indicate that Italian reserves are also at critical levels, making it unlikely that Rome will be able to supply Ukraine with additional missiles.
* STRIKES: On 14 March, Ukrainian Defence Minister Umerov met his Italian counterpart and representatives from defence companies that produce these missiles – namely MBDA Italy, MBDA France and Thales (France) – in order to discuss their provision. Reports suggest that it takes around two years to produce a single Aster missile. Therefore, any directive from Paris and Rome to rebuild stockpiles is unlikely to bolster Ukraine’s air defence systems in the short-to-medium term.
* STRIKES: SAMP-T systems are reportedly less effective than the US-made Patriot system in countering Russian ballistic missiles. Reports indicate that the system experiences serious problems identifying Russian-launched missiles, especially during such strikes. That said, growing strains on Patriot missile stockpiles have likely led Kyiv to rely increasingly on SAMP-T and other air defence systems. We assess that Ukraine is likely experiencing strains on its stockpiles of various interceptors, regardless of the system. The coming months are highly likely to prove increasingly challenging for Ukraine’s air defence coverage; Russia is highly likely to exploit gaps in Ukraine’s air defence and to launch highly lethal strikes.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* COALITION: On 15 March, UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer presented plans to send approximately 10,000 peacekeeping troops to Ukraine as part of the emerging ‘coalition of the willing’. Reports indicate that France and the UK, which have been leading discussions on the possibility of peacekeepers in Ukraine, would provide most of the troops. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky assessed in February that between 100,000 and 150,000 European troops would be needed for a peacekeeping mission, though it ultimately remains highly unlikely that Ukraine’s European partners would be willing (or able) to commit such a force. Nevertheless, questions remain as to whether a small deployment of 10,000 troops would deter Russia from renewed aggression, particularly if it cannot (due to a Russian veto or otherwise) deploy directly inside Ukraine. By contrast, Ukrainian military intelligence believes that approximately 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine and Kursk oblast.
* COALITION: Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko reiterated earlier on 17 March Moscow’s opposition to NATO countries participating in peacekeeping operations in Ukraine. However, Grushko raised the possibility of unarmed observers as part of a civilian mission that would be tasked with monitoring any potential ceasefire. However, Russia would highly likely want participant countries to be states that it considers to be friendly or at least neutral. A civilian mission is also unlikely to be able to prevent renewed Russian aggression.
* SANCTIONS: A senior Ukrainian sanctions official has suggested that Western punitive measures against Russia could eventually be lifted if this helps to deliver security and justice for Ukraine. In an interview published earlier on 17 March, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian government’s commissioner for sanctions, stated that an easing of Russia’s economic isolation must take place under the right conditions. Vlasiuk implied that sanctions and other forms of economic pressure are aimed at pushing Moscow to cease fighting and to commit to a lasting peace rather than merely acting as a form of punishment. Nevertheless, Vlasiuk stated it is too early to discuss what punitive measures could be lifted.
* SANCTIONS: The statements possibly mark the first time that Kyiv has overtly indicated its openness to sanctions relief against Russia. We have repeatedly assessed that sanctions are a tool that the West (most specifically the US) can utilise to coerce or encourage Russia into taking steps towards ending the war. Notably, the G7 issued a statement on 14 March disclosing that it has discussed imposing additional sanctions, caps on oil prices and further support for Ukraine if Russia does not agree to a ceasefire.
* SANCTIONS: On 12 March, the US let an exemption lapse that allows Russian banks to access US payment systems to conduct energy transactions. Several major Russian financial institutions were previously exempt, including Alfa-Bank, the Central Bank of Russia, Sberbank and VTB Bank. This will therefore make it harder for other countries to purchase Russian oil, which will in turn likely undermine Russia’s ability to benefit from its hydrocarbon revenues. Ultimately, the US will likely seek to target Russia’s energy sector for this reason so as to force Moscow to sign a peace treaty in the coming weeks and months. However, threats of additional sanctions are unlikely to push Russia to halt hostilities in the near term, given it is already heavily sanctioned. Moscow is highly likely to be willing to endure new economic restrictions if it believes it can achieve its objectives in Ukraine in the short-to-medium term.
* AVIATION: The CEO of Lviv Danylo Halytskyi International Airport (LWO, Lviv oblast) shared an optimistic assessment on 15 March, claiming that the airport will possibly resume aviation operations by the late spring. Tetyana Romanovska stated that flights will possibly resume in April or May, though she also mentioned the summer as a potential timeframe. According to Romanovska, up to seven airlines have expressed their willingness to begin operating from Lviv within a month of the airport reopening. These include Air Baltic, Austrian Airlines, LOT, Lufthansa, SkyUp, Turkish Airlines and Wizz Air. Ukraine’s airspace has been closed since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
* AVIATION: We assess that the airports most likely to reopen are those located furthest from the frontline, as well as those at the lowest risk of being targeted in Russian long-range attacks. As such, LWO would likely be one of the first air travel hubs to relaunch in Ukraine. However, we assess that statements that operations will resume this spring are overly optimistic. Ukraine is still an active warzone, and Russia has the capability (and will) to launch long-range strikes at targets across Lviv. As such, and without a firm and stable ceasefire, air travel will remain high risk, even if commercial flights were only to resume at LWO (which is unlikely in the short term).
FORECAST
CEASEFIRE: US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin are expected to speak on 18 March amid efforts by Washington DC to secure a temporary ceasefire. While the likely aim of the conversation will be to encourage the Kremlin to accept a suspension of hostilities, an agreement on a stable ceasefire following the negotiations is unlikely in the short term without serious concessions favourable to Moscow. For further analysis on the US-proposed ceasefire (which Ukraine has already expressed its willingness to enact). Trump disclosed on 16 March that concessions concerning territory and power plants would be key topics of conversation, adding that discussions are already ongoing about ‘dividing up certain assets’. According to Trump, these matters have already been discussed thoroughly with both Ukraine and Russia. Nevertheless, the prospect of Putin and Trump engaging in discussions concerning the ceding of Ukrainian lands will likely cause friction with Ukraine and its European partners, increasing concerns about a US-Russia deal that undermines Ukrainian interests. Kyiv will likely perceive that such talks should not take place without its participation and that they are premature (considering the first obstacle to overcome amid the peace process will be agreeing to a temporary ceasefire). US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasised on 16 March that the US has different phases in its plan to end the war in Ukraine. Rubio stated that ‘Plan A’ aims to stop the fighting to allow for ‘Plan B’, which focuses on finding a way to end the war permanently, but which also respects all parties’ needs. He emphasised that there can be no progression vis-à-vis this stage without achieving the first step – though Moscow has set out further conditions before a ceasefire can be agreed. Rubio’s comments likely signal that the US hopes to use any temporary ceasefire to lay the groundwork for a lasting strategic settlement to end the war. Ukraine has outlined its red lines for any peace deal with Russia, though Ukrainian officials remain sceptical about Moscow’s readiness for peace. According to reports on 16 March, Ukrainian conditions include the return of thousands of Ukrainian children and civilians to Ukraine. The other conditions include no further territory being ceded to Russia (including in the regions Russia partially occupies), as well as international security guarantees in case Russia violates any ceasefire deal. Ukrainian officials stated that Kyiv has come to terms with the current frontlines freezing. That said, rescinding any additional land would be a non-starter, meaning that Ukraine would oppose handing over the remainder of the Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia (such as Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) that are not fully under Russian control. US National Security Adviser Mike Waltz suggested on 16 March that a future settlement will possibly entail territorial concessions in exchange for unspecified security guarantees. Waltz also cast doubt on Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO, the prospect of which he stated is ‘incredibly unlikely’. As Kyiv likely regards membership in the military alliance to be the ultimate security guarantee, losing both territory and the opportunity to join NATO would almost certainly require alternative (and firm) guarantees in order for any agreement to be acceptable to Kyiv (and the Ukrainian population). Almost half of Ukrainians (47.1%) would find it ‘completely unacceptable’ to cede territory and give up on NATO membership in order to end the war. This is according to polling by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published on 11 March. Meanwhile, 38.1% of respondents stated this would be difficult but ‘generally acceptable’, while 8.2% would agree to these terms with ease. Ultimately, this shows societal divisions over what costs are acceptable for Ukraine to end the war. Perceptions that Kyiv is having to make more sacrifices than Russia would likely heighten government instability and polarisation over the coming months (should negotiations to end the war eventually take shape). However, public (and government) willingness to make further concessions will likely increase over time, particularly if the US increases pressure on Kyiv to end the war sooner rather than later. Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko stated that Moscow will demand ‘ironclad’ security guarantees from the US and NATO in the event of any agreement to end the war. In an interview published via pro-Kremlin media earlier on 17 March, Grushko stated that these would possibly include ensuring Ukraine’s neutral status and a guarantee that it will not join the military alliance. These provisions align with Russia’s long-standing war aims and objectives prior to the full-scale invasion. In December 2021, Russia demanded that NATO deny Ukraine membership. We assess that Russia will highly likely continue to espouse that these terms are necessary for peace; it will also highly likely request that Ukraine’s military is scaled down in size (and that its capabilities are weakened). However, we assess it remains unclear how far Moscow is willing to compromise in the medium term.
Russian Cyber Strategy
Key points
* Russian state-sponsored groups will possibly conduct destructive and/or disruptive cyber operations against Ukrainian critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the short term to support kinetic action across Ukraine.
* Military operations in Ukraine will likely continue in some form over the coming months. Russia will highly likely incorporate cyber espionage and surveillance operations against Ukraine and European countries into its longer-term strategy to collect intelligence and bolster its security posture.
* Russia will also likely conduct influence operations against Ukraine and European countries in the long term to spread pro-Russia propaganda, raise levels of socio-political polarisation and undermine adversarial governments. It will also highly likely seek to influence election outcomes in Moldova’s upcoming elections in September via influence cyber operations.
* France and the UK will likely become primary targets for Russian cyber espionage and influence operations in the long term since both countries are leading European efforts to support Ukraine.
Context
In H1 2023, Russian cyber operations against Ukraine increased by 123% compared to H2 2022; this was followed by a 19% rise in H1 2024 compared to H2 2023. These significant figures highlight the consistent adoption of cyber attacks by Russia in the war in Ukraine despite an overall decrease in intensity. The later stages of the war have also displayed a more tactical use of cyber operations by Russian state-sponsored groups, underscoring Moscow’s ability to integrate and adapt cyber tactics to shifting strategic objectives. Earlier in March, the Russian forces intensified their counter-offensive operations across the Kursk salient, significantly threatening Ukraine’s prospects of maintaining its presence in the region. If Russia remains confident that it can achieve its goals through military action despite the resumption of US aid to Ukraine, it is unlikely to agree to the US ceasefire proposal made on 11 March. As such, we assess that Moscow will likely continue to supplement short-term kinetic efforts with cyber operations if fighting continues as well as longer-term destabilisation efforts against Ukraine and its Western partners.
Forecast
There is a realistic possibility that Russia will leverage cyber operations to aid the intensification of kinetic action, elevating security and disruption risks over the coming weeks
Russia’s grey zone strategy in the war in Ukraine has encompassed both cyber espionage and disruptive cyber attacks against Ukrainian and Ukraine-based organisations. Russian state-sponsored groups have targeted Ukrainian CNI on several occasions during the early phase of the war, often causing large-scale disruption to key services. In April 2024, the state-sponsored group ‘Sandworm’ (also known as ‘APT44’) disrupted the information and communication systems of 20 Ukrainian energy, heating and water organisations. The attack tightly followed an intensification of Russian physical attacks on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, highlighting Moscow’s consistent use of cyber operations to supplement kinetic action. This has significantly damaged CNI in Ukraine, likely in a bid to increase war fatigue and undermine support for the Ukrainian government. It also forced Kyiv to increase intermittent shutdowns of its energy supply in 2024, as Russian strikes continue to severely restrict Ukraine’s domestic power generation capabilities.
Russian state-sponsored actors have started to shift towards prioritising cyber espionage operations to gather tactical and strategic intelligence. This trend persists as of March 2025, likely due to the extensive planning and effort required by destructive and disruptive cyber attacks. However, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that Russia will supplement the intensification of its military operations in Ukraine with destructive cyber attacks in the coming weeks.
In February, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth also stated that the US would pause offensive cyber operations against Russia. We assess this will likely strengthen Russia’s cyber resources and capabilities in the short term, possibly elevating the likelihood that Moscow will leverage destructive and disruptive cyber operations to supplement kinetic action in Ukraine. Simultaneously, the impact of any potential cyber attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure will likely be limited due to the extensive degradation of said infrastructure caused by previous Russian cyber and kinetic activity.
Russia’s cyber strategy regarding Ukraine has also extended to Ukraine’s telecommunications infrastructure; it aims to disrupt communication, spread disinformation and undermine recruitment efforts. In December 2023, Sandworm conducted a large-scale disruptive cyber attack against Ukraine’s largest telecommunication provider (Kyivstar). The attack reportedly deleted almost all data from thousands of compromised servers, disrupting air raid sirens, cellular network and internet services and some financial services for several days. This showcases Moscow’s intent and capability to disrupt Ukraine-wide key communication services in the earlier stages of the war.
In September 2024, the Russian state-sponsored group ‘UAC-0184’ reportedly exploited messaging applications (such as Signal and WhatsApp) to infiltrate devices belonging to high-value Ukrainian military and government targets. This highlights a shift towards more targeted operations in the later stages of the war to compromise strategic entities involved in the war effort. We assess that Moscow will likely continue to infiltrate high-value targets in the short term to collect tactical intelligence, possibly also conducting disruptive cyber operations to undermine military communication.
On 10 March, Elon Musk, tech magnate and senior White House advisor, claimed that the Starlink satellite system will ‘never’ turn off its terminals in Ukraine and that such a deactivation would not be used as a bargaining chip. However, if relations between Ukraine and the US worsen significantly, a temporary interruption remains a realistic possibility given the prior suspension of intelligence-sharing services. A short pause of Starlink services would force Ukraine to use less secure communication methods, making it more vulnerable to Russian interception. As such, there is a realistic possibility that Russia will seek to capitalise on the potential suspension of Starlink services via disruptive cyber operations to further degrade military communication on the battlefield. Russia will likely continue cyber operations irrespective of a ceasefire in Ukraine, raising cyber espionage, disinformation and surveillance risks across EuropeSince the full-scale invasion, Russian state-sponsored cyber groups have consistently targeted Ukraine, Europe and other countries typically aligned with Ukraine. In December 2024, the Russian state-sponsored group ‘Earth Koshchei’ (also known as ‘APT29’) reportedly conducted a cyber espionage operation against military and government entities in Australia, Europe, Japan, Ukraine and the US. In the same month, the Russian advanced persistent threat (APT) group ‘Gamaredon’ used two new spyware variants in a likely ongoing surveillance operation aimed at collecting sensitive data from compromised systems. The campaign primarily targeted countries in Central Asia and Europe that have supported Ukraine in the war and/or have deteriorating political relations with Russia. This further highlights the security and espionage risks facing political and military supporters of Ukraine. We assess that Russia will highly likely continue to conduct cyber espionage operations against Ukraine and the rest of Europe, regardless of a potential ceasefire. Russia will likely primarily target government, defence and military sectors given Europe’s renewed commitment to enhancing its defences. It will also likely prioritise targets in France and the UK as both countries appear to be leading European efforts to support Ukraine. In the long term, it is also a realistic possibility that Russian state-sponsored groups might increase cyber espionage operations against the US regardless of whether the US continues to pause offensive cyber operations against Russia. For instance, Russia will possibly enhance detection evasion in cyber operations against US-based organisations in a bid to obfuscate their origins while continuing to collect strategic information. Additionally, in February, reports emerged that the Belarus-aligned threat group ‘Ghostwriter’ had targeted Belarusian activists and Ukrainian government entities, in a cyber operation since at least the end of 2024. Belarusian and Russian state-sponsored groups have previously co-operated in cyber operations given the proximity and friendly relations between the two countries. As such, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that both Belarusian and/or Russian-nexus groups will target any pro-Ukraine activists in future cyber surveillance operations. Russian state-sponsored groups have also consistently targeted Ukraine and other perceived adversaries in cyber influence operations (IOs) throughout 2024. For instance, ‘UNC5812’ conducted an influence operation against Ukrainian military recruits in October 2024 to spread anti-mobilisation narratives. Similar operations are likely in the coming months to continue undermining Ukraine’s recruitment efforts.
Russian influence operations will likely continue to target elections across Europe, driving polarisation risks
Russian actors targeted several presidential elections in 2024; for instance, in December 2024, the first round of the Romanian presidential elections was annulled citing concerns regarding Russian interference. In keeping with this trend, we assess that Russia will highly likely conduct dis- and misinformation campaigns and possibly disruptive operations against Moldova and election infrastructure ahead of the parliamentary elections in September. Russia will highly likely seek to promote candidates from pro-Russia parties to undermine Moldova’s attempts to join the EU and expand Russia’s sphere of influence. We also assess that Russia will likely continue conducting IOs against Ukraine, Europe and the US to spread pro-Russia propaganda, undermine adversarial governments and increase societal polarisation. France and the UK will also likely become long-term priority targets for Russian cyber influence operations. In France, any operations will likely exploit domestic tensions, particularly if a potential motion of no-confidence succeeds in dissolving the government and leads to a snap election in July. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Mar 25. Ukraine strikes Russian strategic bomber airfield, triggering huge blast.
* Summary
* Ukrainian drones strike bomber base, Kyiv says
* Russia has nuclear-capable bombers there
* Ten people injured in Ukrainian attack
* Verified videos show major blast
Ukraine struck a major Russian strategic bomber airfield on Thursday with drones, triggering a huge blast and fire about 700 km (435 miles) from the front lines of the war, Russian and Ukrainian officials said.Videos verified by Reuters showed a huge blast spreading out from the airfield, wrecking nearby cottages. Russia’s defence ministry said air defences had shot down 132 Ukrainian drones over Russian regions. The base in Engels, which dates back to Soviet times, hosts Russia’s Tupolev Tu-160 nuclear-capable heavy strategic bombers, known unofficially as White Swans. (Source: Google/Reuters)
20 Mar 25. Free Cyber Security to Reach Ukrainian Drones & Unmanned Systems. Periphery is donating its military-grade threat management expertise and software for IoT devices to support the drones and unmanned systems in the Ukrainian war effort. Drones have transformed the battlefield in Ukraine. Periphery, a specialist in military-grade threat management for IoT devices, is donating its expertise and software to support the country. Unmanned systems like drones, as relatively cheap and effective tools, have driven a shift from kinetic to cyber warfare. In October 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the country was now capable of manufacturing up to four million drones annually. In January 2025, it was estimated that 100 types of drones are in use in Ukraine, ranging from toy-sized systems to larger models with wingspans of almost 20 meters. Consequently, the country has become an innovation centre for drone technology. Periphery’s embedded AI-driven technology was developed specifically for IoT devices, such as drones, by a team of former military and defense security engineers. These systems are often vulnerable to cyber attacks, especially when operating in dynamic environments. Periphery’s technology constantly monitors, understands, and adapts to new and emerging threats to future-proof devices. It will harden ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) drones against cyber attacks while in use, as well as protecting critical infrastructure from recovered drones which have potentially been compromised.
Commenting on the initiative, Toby Wilmington, Cofounder and CEO of Periphery, commented, “As former NATO operators, we stand with Ukraine and are giving them cutting edge technology to protect critical assets and provide a digital barrier to defend against cyber attacks. “Our technology will focus on providing digital walls, drawbridges and gates to guard Ukraine’s unmanned systems, so they can continue to focus on their innovation which has catalysed a step change in drone technology. We call on others, especially in Europe, to do the same. ”
Samuel Burrell, Partner at Expeditions Fund, added, “As a former Royal Marine turned mission-driven investor, I was fully supportive when Toby called me with the idea of donating Periphery’s technology to Ukraine. “At Expeditions we back companies that don’t just push the boundaries of technology but apply it when and where it matters most. That time is right now. I’m confident that their technology will be a game-changer for Ukrainian forces.”
Periphery is an easy to embed military-grade threat management system for IoT manufacturers that constantly monitors, understands, and adapts to new threats, future-proofing your devices. The embedded security solution is easy to install at the point of manufacture for any architecture and maintain with Periphery software. (Source: https://www.defenseadvancement.com/)
20 Mar 25. Russia said to have suffered largest loss since WW2, with up to quarter of a million dead. The war in Ukraine has caused Russia’s armed forces to suffer their largest losses since the Second World War, according to the Ministry of Defence. In an intelligence update on X, the MOD said Moscow’s forces had probably sustained roughly 900,000 casualties – which counts both those killed and wounded. Of this figure, the post stated it was likely that up to a quarter of a million had been killed. On the MOD’s page, it says the use of the word “likely” equates to a probability of between 55% and 75%.
“Russian President Putin and the Russian military leadership highly likely prioritise their conflict objectives over the lives of Russian soldiers,” the post said.
The use of the term “highly likely” shows a probability of 80%-90%.
“They are almost certainly prepared to tolerate continuously high casualty rates so long as this war does not negatively affect public or elite support for the war, and those losses can be replaced,” the post read.
It also outlined that it was “highly likely” that Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders value the lives of ethnic minorities less. Russian recruitment efforts consequently focused disproportionately on these areas, it pointed out.
“Slavic Russians from urban centres such as Moscow and St Petersburg have contributed disproportionately fewer service personnel than their poorer, ethnic minority compatriots,” it read.
This comes as President Putin failed to agree to the US-proposed ceasefire, even though Ukraine did. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, stating he would support the 30-day ceasefire, said Russia had launched more than 40 drone strikes, including in the capital and Kyiv’s surrounding areas. (Source: forces.net)
20 Mar 25. Russia Claims Pantsir-S1 and Jet Down 7 of its Own Drones. The Russian military claims to have neutralized seven of its own drones mid-flight over Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region, following an order from President Vladimir Putin to halt attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This directive apparently came shortly after a phone call between Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump, according to a statement from Russia’s Ministry of Defense. The drones, originally targeting energy facilities linked to Ukraine’s military-industrial complex, were downed by Russian air defenses—six by Pantsir missile systems and one by a fighter jet. While the exact timing of the Putin-Trump conversation remains unspecified, the Kremlin described it as a detailed exchange focused on reducing hostilities, raising questions about whether this marks a shift in Russia’s military strategy or a temporary gesture tied to broader negotiations. The Russian Defense Ministry framed the neutralization of the drones as a direct response to Putin’s command, emphasizing that the targets were energy sites in Mykolaiv, a southern region critical to Ukraine’s industrial output. Ukrainian officials have yet to confirm the specifics of the intended targets, but the area has been a frequent focus of Russian strikes aimed at disrupting power supplies and military logistics. The ministry’s statement noted that the decision to shoot down the drones came after they were already airborne, suggesting a rapid shift in orders that caught operational units off guard. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov later reinforced this narrative, telling reporters that Putin’s directive was “immediately implemented” and that information about the cessation of energy strikes was “widely available.” Peskov declined to elaborate on the details of the Trump-Putin call, leaving room for speculation about its influence on the Kremlin’s actions. The Russian statement alleges that this decision followed negotiations between Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump, though there is no confirmation of this. Ukraine’s General Staff, Air Force, and other official sources have not confirmed the Russian claims. Military sources have also not verified that Russian forces shot down their own Shahed-type loitering munitions. Ukraine’s military reported that the actual scale of the attack was far greater. In the early hours of March 19, Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, four S-300 surface-to-air missiles, and an unprecedented 145 Shahed-type attack drones and various decoy UAVs. Ukrainian air defenses successfully intercepted 72 of the drones, but many still penetrated deep into Ukrainian airspace, with 45 targeting the Kyiv region alone. The attack was launched from multiple locations, including Bryansk, Oryol, Shatalovo, Kursk, Millerovo, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk in Russia. The Ukrainian government reported widespread damage to energy facilities, transportation networks, and hospitals, further crippling civilian infrastructure. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog; MILITARNYI; Bulgarian Military)
20 Mar 25. HIMARS Strike Destroys Three North Korean Koksan Artillery Systems in Russia’s Kursk Region. Aerial reconnaissance units of the 14th Separate Regiment of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, in coordination with a rocket artillery unit, targeted three North Korean M1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled guns (SPG) In Russia’s Kursk region. According to the unit, the artillery systems—supplied to the Russian army as military aid from North Korea—were hidden in the woods. To further conceal and protect them from drones, Russian forces had installed protective grills on the vehicles. After being identified by Ukrainian drones, the SPGs were struck by an M142 HIMARS, which fired high-explosive and cluster munitions. This marks the second confirmed strike on Koksan SPGs during the Russia-Ukraine war. The first was destroyed by operators of the 412th “Nemesis” Regiment of the Unmanned Systems Forces in February 2025 in Luhansk. The M1978 Koksan is North Korea’s longest-range towed artillery system, equipped with a 170mm gun capable of firing up to 60 km. Originally designed to target Seoul from north of the Demilitarized Zone, Russian forces are now using it in Ukraine to compensate for artillery losses. Reports indicate that since late 2023, North Korea has sent approximately 120 Koksan systems to Russia, along with anti-tank missile vehicles, rocket launchers, and air defense systems. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
19 Mar 25. In Ukraine, long guns become desperate defenses against small drones. The Russian and Ukrainian militaries are moving to transform their soldiers’ rifles into weapons capable of countering exploding drones, experimenting with different ammunition types to determine the best shot, according to experts and reports posted on social media sites. The renewed push to transform soldier weapons into desperate defenses of last resort against explodable first-person view drones represents a more systematic approach to a problem that has cost countless lives on the battlefield.
“FPV drones have become much more effective via technical improvements and pilot skills, as well as many tactical EW and jamming systems don’t work effectively or as intended all the time – this forces soldiers to develop methods to shoot down drones in the last 100 meters of their flight,” Sam Bendett, advisor at the Washington-based Center for Naval Analyses, said.
The effectiveness of using small arms to counter these types of drones remains uncertain at best, depending largely on luck and drone pilot skill, Bendett noted.
Russian Telegram channels recently published footage showing Russian soldiers making DIY anti-drone ammunition by using the pellets taken from buckshot rounds and repurposing them to be used in normal 5.45x39mm rounds used in assault rifles.
Even if a shot goes on target, pellet size and drone construction determine a successful intercept.
“Larger pellets offer more mass but the energy is delivered over a bigger surface area – the larger the pellet, the less density you have in the air, this is known as ‘pattern,’” said Paul Bradley, a ballistics expert at Hexagon Ammunition, a company owned by Beretta Holding. “A dense, wide pattern increases hit probability but smaller pellets reduce terminal effect.”
In early November, the German military-news website Hartpunkt reported about a document from the Ukrainian Special Forces Command that examined Russian troops’ use of 12-gauge shotguns to counter small drones. According to the analysis, the threat associated with FPV drones is deemed so grave that it recommended placing a dedicated shooter at the back of every military vehicle near the frontlines in case electronic warfare systems fail to disable the flying explosives. It also reported that Russian troops track the departure points of Ukrainian drones and place ambushes with several of their drone shooters to attempt to hit them. According to Bradley, hobbyist quadcopter drones, like those made by Chinese maker DJI, tend to have a body made out of thin plastic as well as rigid but flimsy propellers in order to keep their weight down. That makes them “very easy” to damage with widely available 12g sporting rounds, he added. In contrast, first-person view drones are generally built with thick carbon fiber frames and softer plastic propellers more resistant to impact, reflecting their heritage as machines designed for high-speed racing. Sporting ammunition typically cannot damage FPV sufficiently at almost any range, according to Bradley.
“Drones require more energy on target when they are in the air,” he explained. “When they are hit they simply move as they have very little inertia – the movement robs the pellets of kinetic energy, rather like punching something in zero gravity, less energy is transferred to target as it is used up moving it backward.”
The Ukrainian Third Assault Brigade demonstrated these challenges as part of an experimental shooting conducted earlier this month, simulating an FPV drone attack to test which kind of bullet is most effective. Soldiers compared shooting standard cartridges and specific anti-drone ammunition using different types of guns, including shotguns.
In the majority of cases, not only was the FPV not downed, but even when it was damaged, the system kept flying as the shot was too weak. In the one instance where the target was hit with an anti-drone charge, it crashed and caught fire near the shooter, barely missing him. Some of the short-range drone defense tactics that have emanated from Ukraine have caught the attention of Western gun and ammunition companies. Among them is the Swedish cartridge manufacturer Norma, also part of Beretta Holding, which has developed and tested its Anti-Drone Long Effective Range (AD-LER) against FPVs. In testing, the munition managed to “catastrophically down” six out of seven drones deployed at up to 50 meters away, according to Bradley, who said he observed the trials. (Source: Defense News)
19 Mar 25. Ukraine claims to have fielded a drone-killing laser weapon. Ukraine claims to be one of the first countries to have successfully developed a laser anti-aircraft weapon, according to a high-ranking military official. The secretive device has reportedly been employed on the battlefield against low-flying targets, likely unmanned aerial vehicles like the Iranian-made Shahed drones. It was first revealed in an interview with a Ukrainian news outlet by Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi, the commander of the unmanned systems forces within the Ukrainian military. The device is known as “Tryzub,” or trident in English, referencing the Ukrainian national symbol, which is superimposed in yellow on a blue background in the country’s now world-famous coat of arms. Information on the new system is scarce and jealously guarded. It was first publicly mentioned by Sukharevskyi in mid-December when he revealed the weapon’s existence and some key parameters at a defense industry conference in Kyiv, as reported by the Ukrainian Interfax news agency. Asked about it again by Radio Free Europe in February of this year, he confirmed that the weapon was operationally deployed. Speaking in the context of battlefield innovations to counter the threat of Shahed and similar drones and loitering munitions, he said that: “I repeat – laser technologies are already striking objects at a certain height.” No pictures of the Tryzub have been released yet and it was not possible to independently verify the Ukrainian military’s claims. Nor have there been any indications as to where it was deployed or exactly what or how many targets it has engaged. A spokesperson for Brave1, the Ukrainian government’s “united coordinational platform for defense tech,” said that it was “unable to provide any comments regarding the Tryzub weapons system or its development” in response to an inquiry. It is unclear to what extent the Ukrainian laser weapon may still be in an experimental phase. Although the military has claimed that it succeeded in shooting down enemy “aircraft,” it is entirely possible that there may be just a single system and its mobility may be limited. Laser weapons can be rather bulky due to their need for power generation and cooling infrastructure. This is a big part of why many of the systems developed around the world are ship-based. However, experts said that a laser weapon system with the specifications that Ukraine reportedly has may be made to fit onto a truck bed. Comparable weapons, such as the South Korean Skylight, which entered regular production last year and has a similar range of two to three kilometers, is housed in a container with a volume of 81 cubic meters and generates approximately 700°C heat during ten- to twenty-second impulses. It entered service in December 2024. Despite the technological challenges, many major players have toyed with the idea of developing similar weapons, and some have dabbled in research and design. The promised advantages primarily focus on the ability to defending against large numbers of low-cost attack aircraft, including drone swarms, at low cost. In fielding such a system, Ukraine would join an elite club of significant military-industrial powers that have developed laser weapons and an even smaller group that has deployed them. It comes as part of broader Ukrainian efforts to reshape the battlefield through innovation. The Unmanned Systems Forces, which appear to be involved in the operation and possibly the development of Tryzub, considering its commander’s role in announcing the system’s existence, was only established in 2024. It has also been involved in Ukrainian innovations of drone-swarming technologies that reportedly enhanced their ability to strike deep within enemy territory. Lessons learned from Russia’s war against Ukraine may have hastened the development of laser weapons in other parts of the world. A month before South Korea’s laser weapon entered service, Japan revealed its own truck-based 10-kilowatt laser, which had been in development for more than four years.
Ukraine’s opponent, Russia, has also invested in laser technologies. In 2019, its Peresvet system was officially announced as having been deployed with five strategic missile divisions around the country. This weapon, however, is primarily meant to blind satellites in space rather than destroy drones much closer to Earth. Russia’s deputy prime minister in 2022 claimed that a new laser weapon, named Zadira, was deployed in Ukraine capable of destroying targets up to five kilometers away within five seconds, much more akin to the Tryzub that Ukraine now claims to have developed. The U.S. and Ukraine at the time said there was no indication such a system was actually in use by Russian forces. Germany, Israel and the United States all also have near-operational, land-based laser weapons systems, while other countries like Turkey and Australia are also indigenously working on them. There has been some speculation whether the Ukrainian laser might be a derivative of the British DragonFire system. Significant amounts of the British “lethal aid” for Ukraine remain classified “for both operational and commercial reasons,” as the defense ministry has stated. The U.K. government had teased its intention of sending its laser system to Ukraine in April 2024, before backtracking a month later and stating that it would not be included in the government’s 2024 aid package, UK Defence Journal reported. Leo Docherty, the British armed forces minister at the time, noted that the system was not yet ready, with the expected date for completion being 2027, a deadline that had been moved forward from 2033. Docherty’s statement left the door open for potentially sending the weapon to Ukraine once the development phase was complete.
Defense News reached out to the companies cooperating on the DragonFire system. MBDA, which leads the project, declined to comment, while Leonardo said that “there is no connection between Tryzub and the Dragonfire system.” Qinetiq did not respond to the request. It is entirely possible that Tryzub is indeed an indigenous Ukrainian development. The country has a significant military-industrial base rooted in its significance to the Soviet military complex, important parts of which were based in the now-independent country. Combined with what is commercially available in the laser realm, crafty local engineers might have been able to build a Tryzub-like weapon, industry experts said, adding that the few publicly released parameters seem plausible.
“Laser directed-energy systems, in a military context, are predominantly at the proof of concept stage,” an industry insider, who asked to remain unnamed to discuss sensitive technologies, said. “These could, in theory, be fielded as an initial operating capability.”
The country has radically restructured its defense R&D and acquisition procedures, which has dramatically boosted innovation and responsiveness, a January report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank showed. In the first nine months of 2024 alone, over 600 domestically developed new weapon systems were approved by the Ukrainian government. And Ukraine’s February defense expo showcasing domestic military developments, Defense Tech 2025, promised a special focus on lasers and anti-Shahed weapons in its promotional materials – descriptions that fit the Tryzub – alongside other cutting-edge technologies like swarming drones, lethal autonomous weapons and sea drones. Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces did not respond to a request for comment on this topic. (Source: Defense News)
18 Mar 25. Russia advances in southern Ukraine, Defence Ministry says. Russian forces were on Monday advancing in southern Ukraine and had pierced part of the Ukrainian lines less than 50 km (30 miles) southeast of the city of Zaporizhzhia, according to Russian officials and pro-Russian military bloggers.
Reuters could not independently verify the assertions.
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Russia’s Defence Ministry said in a statement that its forces had taken the village of Stepove in the Zaporizhzhia region, pushing through Ukrainian lines.
Ukraine’s military made no acknowledgement that Stepove was in Russian hands.
A late evening military bulletin said Ukrainian forces had repelled attacks near Stepove and the nearby village of Lobkove, and three battles were still going on in the vicinity.
Yuri Podolyaka, one of the most influential pro-Russian military bloggers, said Russian forces had also smashed their way into the nearby village of Maly Shcherbaky.
“Our units have broken through the first line of defence in the Zaporizhzhia direction,” Podolyaka said. (Source: Reuters)
18 Mar 25. Ukraine conflict: Sweden supplies more Archer SPHs and ARTHUR radars to Kyiv. Sweden will supply Ukraine with 18 more Archer self-propelled howitzers (SPHs) and five ARTillery HUnting Radar (ARTHUR) weapon-locating radars, the Swedish government and Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) have announced. The FMV announced on its website on 14 March that it had signed an agreement with BAE Systems Bofors for deliveries of the ARTHURs starting in 2025 and for the Archers beginning in 2026. The Swedish government said in a press release on 13 March that it would also provide financial support to Ukraine’s defence industry through a Danish initiative that could be used to procure 155 mm artillery shells or Ukrainian-built Bohdana SPHs. In addition, Sweden will participate in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s artillery coalition, which aims to co-ordinate support for developing and strengthening Ukraine’s artillery capacity and to increase interoperability with NATO. The artillery support package is worth approximately SEK3bn (USD297m).(Source: Janes)
19 Mar 25. US suspends some efforts to counter Russian sabotage as Trump moves closer to Putin.
* Summary
* Biden administration had established working groups to monitor escalating Russian hybrid war efforts
* Under Trump, NSC has stopped holding regular meetings with European officials on Russian sabotage, sources say
* Trump’s embrace of Moscow stirs fears of Ukraine truce favorable to Russia among current, former officials
Several U.S. national security agencies have halted work on a coordinated effort to counter Russian sabotage, disinformation and cyberattacks, easing pressure on Moscow as the Trump Administration pushes Russia to end its war in Ukraine.
Former President Joe Biden last year ordered his national security team to establish working groups to monitor the issue amid warnings from U.S. intelligence that Russia was escalating a shadow war against Western nations. (Source: Reuters)
18 Mar 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine tests drone armed with shotgun for aerial combat. Ukrainian drone manufacturer Sky Defenders has tested a new variant of a fixed-wing UAS equipped with a shotgun. A video of the test flight was published on the company’s TikTok page, showcasing the drone’s capabilities. The UAS, launched via a ground-based catapult, features a nose-mounted shotgun fitted with a sighting scope for precision targeting during flight. A rotating digital camera, mounted on top of the drone, aids in target acquisition and is reportedly the same model used on the ZigZag interceptor drone. To maintain speed and support an increased payload, engines are positioned on each wing console. The use of weaponized drones has been an ongoing tactic for Ukrainian forces. UAV operators from the 30th Mechanized Brigade have previously mounted a double-barreled rifle on a quadcopter drone to intercept Russian reconnaissance UAS. According to the brigade’s press service, as of January 15, 2025, 20 enemy drones have been destroyed using this method. Beyond counter-drone operations, armed UAS have also been deployed against ground targets. The “Queen of Hornets” drone, developed by the BULAVA unit, has been fitted with an AK-74 rifle for infantry engagement. The same platform has also been modified to carry a Bulspike-AP grenade launcher. The Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to experiment with integrating small arms onto multicopter drones. Previous adaptations include mounting a 7.62 mm PKM machine gun and a Bullspike anti-tank grenade launcher onto a DJI Agras T30 drone, further expanding the role of UAS in combat operations. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-tests-drone-armed-with-shotgun-for-aerial-combat/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
18 Mar 25. Donald Trump is considering recognising Crimea as Russian territory as part of a deal to end the war in Ukraine. The potential move comes ahead of Mr Trump’s call with Vladimir Putin later today, where the two leaders will discuss a 30-day ceasefire proposal, sources told Semafor. Speaking to reporters on Air Force One on Sunday, Mr Trump hinted that negotiators had already discussed “dividing up assets” and said he would discuss “land and power plants” with Putin. Crimea was invaded by Russia in February 2014 before it was annexed, though the international order has largely rejected Moscow’s claim over the territory. US officials have warned Ukraine it must be ready to make concessions to achieve peace, which could include giving up land. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
17 Mar 25. UK and EU to ramp up pressure on Russia and boost defence initiatives. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas will meet the Foreign and Defence Secretaries in London to discuss coordinating cooperation on Ukraine
* EU foreign affairs chief arrives in London for talks with Foreign and Defence Secretaries as joint efforts intensify to curb Russia’s economy
* UK-EU foreign policy consultations will focus on united support for Ukraine, countering Russian hybrid threats and working to step up collective defence spending
* Talks will underline need for a secure and prosperous Europe and UK – a foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change.
As part of the UK’s commitment to strengthen ties with Europe and work together to secure the region’s future, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, will arrive in London today (Tuesday 18 March) for discussions with the Foreign and Defence Secretaries on ways to dial up pressure on Russia and deliver just and lasting peace in Ukraine. The talks, part of a new era of UK-EU relations, will coordinate cooperation on Ukraine, and discuss efforts to increase economic pressure and ensure Russia pays for the damage it is causing to Ukraine – as well as stepping up action against hybrid threats, like cyberattacks, election interference and rampant Russian disinformation. As part of the Government’s commitment to increase defence spending and keep the British people safe and secure for generations to come, the Foreign Secretary and the High Representative will review efforts to boost European defence spending, including through innovative initiatives, and bolstering wider military readiness in support of NATO.
Foreign Secretary David Lammy said: “A strong and secure Britain is a foundation of our Plan for Change. This cannot be achieved without strengthening our shared European security and coming together with our partners to ensure a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. More than three years on since Putin’s illegal full-scale invasion, we are facing a once-in-a-generation moment for our continent. It’s vital we upgrade our partnership with the EU and work together to bring an end to this war and deliver security of all of our citizens. The UK and EU – along with other international partners – have already jointly imposed sanctions on Russia, depriving its economy of $450 bn since February 2022. Both have also worked together to train Ukrainian soldiers through the UK’s Operation INTERFLEX and the EU’s Military Advisory Mission to Ukraine, which between them have trained over 120,000 soldiers.”
The Chief of the Defence Staff will also host Kallas for a briefing from The Commander INTERFLEX and the EU’s Liaison Officer for the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine. Discussions will focus on around how to build on the success of Operation INTERFLEX by enhancing the training offered to Ukraine
Defence Secretary John Healey said: “This Government is stepping up on European security; deepening our defence relationship with our EU and NATO allies is vital during this critical period. European security starts in Ukraine. The UK and EU are united in our resolve to back Ukraine with the military firepower they need to stand up to Russia’s illegal invasion and secure a lasting peace. The talks build on the UK’s increased engagement with the EU, after the Prime Minister joined European Council meetings in February and earlier this month, and EU Presidents von der Leyen and Costa attended the Leaders’ Meeting on Ukraine in London.”
Ahead of the first UK-EU Summit on 19 May and the UK-hosted Berlin Process Summit later this year, discussions are expected to also include other areas of cooperation such as stability in the Western Balkans, where both the UK and EU play a leading role in maintaining peace and security. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
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