NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Mar 17. 

17 Mar 25. Trump says he will speak with Putin on Tuesday about ending war in Ukraine

Mar 15.

14 Mar 25. Zelenskiy says troops not surrounded in Kursk, Russia says it retakes two villages.

Mar 14.

14 Mar 25. Russia: Threats of escalating US sanctions are unlikely to alter Kremlin’s short-term decision making. On 13 March, the US did not renew an exemption that allows Russian banks to access US payment systems to conduct energy transactions. The move follows US President Donald Trump’s threats to escalate sanctions against Russia’s banking sector if it does not agree to a ceasefire and a peace agreement. Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed Russia’s willingness to agree to the US’ recent 30-day ceasefire proposal, but only on the condition that Ukraine does not mobilise or train its military forces or receive military aid. Such conditions are highly likely aimed at delaying the signing of a ceasefire, to which Moscow is highly unlikely to agree in good faith in the coming days. While the lapsed exemption will make it harder for countries to purchase Russian oil, we assess that US threats of further sanctions alone are unlikely to convince the Kremlin that a ceasefire is in its interests at present, given Russian forces are advancing on the battlefield amid the war in Ukraine.
(Source: Sibylline)

14 Mar 25. Russia will spare the lives of Ukrainian soldiers in its western Kursk region if Kyiv tells them to surrender, President Vladimir Putin said on Friday after U.S. President Donald Trump urged him to avoid a “horrible massacre” there. Ukraine denied its men were encircled, describing that as a Russian fabrication, but President Volodymyr Zelenskiy called the situation “very difficult”. Trump, in a social media post, said he had asked the Russian president to spare the lives of thousands of Ukrainians who he said were “completely surrounded” and vulnerable. “I have strongly requested to President Putin that their lives be spared. This would be a horrible massacre, one not seen since World War II,” he said. Putin, addressing his Security Council, said he had read Trump’s appeal. While accusing Ukrainian troops of carrying out crimes against civilians that he said amounted to “terrorism” – something Kyiv denies – Putin said he understood the call by Trump to take humanitarian considerations into account. (Source: Reuters)

Mar 13.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• KURSK: President Putin visits Kursk oblast as Ukrainian forces withdraw towards the international border after withdrawing from the significant town of Sudzha (Donetsk oblast)
• STRIKES: The resumption of US military aid to Ukraine has decreased the risks of major and rapid air defence shortages in Ukraine in the coming weeks
• COALITION: The UK and France are leading discussions between 37 countries reportedly interested in participating in a ‘coalition of the willing’ designed to enforce a possible peace settlement in Ukraine
• FORECAST: Ukraine has agreed to a US proposal for an immediate interim 30-day ceasefire; it has secured a resumption of US military and intelligence support as a result. However, despite Putin’s ostensible approval of the proposal, a stable ceasefire remains unlikely
• BAKHMUT: Heavy fighting continues in Toretsk, which remains heavily contested amid confirmed advances for both Russian and Ukrainian forces in recent days. Geolocated footage published on 11 and 12 March indicates that Russian forces have advanced in the north and west of the city while Ukrainian forces have simultaneously advanced in the south. Additionally, a deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion fighting in Toretsk reported on 11 March that Russian forces had resumed infantry assaults in the town after months of reduced activity. Together with wider unconfirmed (but credible) reports that Russian forces have redeployed reinforcements to the area, this could realistically indicate the beginning of Russia’s renewed effort to consolidate control over Toretsk to set conditions for future advances towards Kostiantynivka.
• BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, to the east of Siversk, located at the north-eastern part of the Bakhmut axis, geolocated footage from 11 March indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Verkhnokamyanske during a battalion-sized mechanised assault. That said, overall Russian progress in this sector remains very slow.
• DONETSK: Russia’s current focus on counter-offensive operations in the Kursk salient is likely creating opportunities for successful Ukrainian counter-attacks in the Pokrovsk sector. In recent days, Ukrainian forces have launched successful offensives near Psichane, Udachne, Shevchenko and to the south of Koltlyne, all situated to the south and south-west of Pokrovsk. Notably, geolocated footage from 10 March confirms Ukrainian advances in central Shevchenko and eastern Udachne. Additionally, Ukraine recently made confirmed gains to the north-east of Pokrovsk, located to the west of Vodyane Druhe. The latest Ukrainian counter-attacks are unlikely to result in a major breakthrough, however.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Russian forces are continuing to fold up the Ukrainian Kursk salient, forcing the Ukrainians to withdraw towards the international border after withdrawing from the main town of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on 12 March indicated that Russian forces seized Sudzha, the largest town in the Kursk salient that had up until now served as the key logistics and command point for Ukrainian forces in the region. Russian forces are likely now conducting clearing operations in the town. That said, geolocated footage from 11-12 March also indicates that Russian forces are also pushing west towards the international border. Nevertheless, it remains unclear if Ukrainian forces will be pushed out of Kursk entirely. Ukrainian sources cited by Ukrainska Pravda fighting in the area claimed on 12 March that their forces are withdrawing closer to the border but are not withdrawing beyond it. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on 12 March that Ukrainian forces would hold the defence in Kursk oblast ‘as long as reasonable and necessary’.
• KURSK: Russian President Vladimir Putin visited a military command post in Kursk oblast; this is only the second time Putin has visited the frontline since the start of the full-scale invasion. He also wore military fatigues, which is highly unusual given that he wore a suit during his previous visit to frontline positions in 2023. This likely reflects Putin’s desire to share the success of the military operations but could realistically also indicate that he is willing to continue fighting even amid proposals for a 30-day ceasefire (see FORECAST below). During a televised meeting with Putin, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov stated that Russia has retaken 86% of the territory originally captured by Ukraine in Kursk oblast. While we cannot confirm this, it is clear that Ukrainian forces are withdrawing and that the vast majority of the salient is now under Russian control.
• KURSK: Geolocated footage from 11 March also indicates that Russian forces have advanced across the international border inside Sumy oblast, west of the town of Basivka. We cannot confirm whether Russian forces are in control of the town, as Russian sources have claimed. However, Russian forces are clearly attempting to interdict the main H-07 highway to the south, which remains the only real withdrawal route out of Kursk oblast. During his visit to the region on 12 March, Putin also ordered Gerasimov to ‘think in the future about creating a security zone’. This is highly likely a reference to earlier Russian plans to establish a so-called sanitary zone along the international border (see the bright red dashed line in Figure 1 above). The order could, therefore, indicate Russian plans to exploit the collapse of the Kursk salient to conduct a wider counter-offensive inside Sumy oblast (as we had previously assessed as a possibility).
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have made limited gains across the Oskil-Kreminna line in recent days. Geolocated footage from 12 March shows recent Russian advances in northern Bohuslavka located to the north-east of Borova. The footage likely shows that Zahryzove, immediately to north-east of Bohuslavka, is under Russian control.
• SOUTHERN: On 12 March, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Command, Vladyslav Voloshyn, reported that Russian forces have stepped up their assaults across the southern axis in Zaporizhzhia oblast. While Voloshyn assessed that these operations are not part of a strategic offensive, smaller tactical assaults aim to improve Russian forces’ position relative to the line of contact. On 11 March, for example, geolocated footage confirmed that Russian forces are now operating in the centre of Pyatykhatky, a village located around 24 miles (38km) to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). More broadly, over recent weeks, Russian forces have made modest gains at various points along the Zaporizhzhia frontline but are unlikely to deploy large concentrations of forces given Russia’s priority objectives likely remain in Donetsk oblast to the east. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 12 March also indicates that Russian forces advanced to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast).
• STRIKES: Over the past few days, Russia has launched daily large-scale drone attacks, supplemented by a limited number of Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Ukrainian forces continued to record a very low interception rate of ballistic missiles, managing to intercept only one missile on 11 March.
• STRIKES: The resumption of US military aid to Ukraine (see FORECAST below) has decreased the risks of major and rapid air defence shortages in Ukraine in the coming weeks. However, it still remains unclear to what extent the Trump administration is willing to transfer additional Patriot air defence interceptors, among other air defence systems, to Ukraine over the medium term. As such, Ukraine’s air defence network will remain under significant pressure, with the growing frequency of ballistic missile attacks likely to continue to degrade Ukraine’s energy security.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile earlier on 11 March, Ukraine conducted a massive strike involving in all 337 drones against various regions across Russia, including against the capital Moscow. This was the largest drone attack by Ukraine against Russia since the start of the war. Among these, 91 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were launched against Moscow oblast and the capital itself. This was also the largest UAV attack against the capital to date. It resulted in the suspension of flight operations at all four of the city’s airports; falling drone debris reportedly damaged residential buildings in Moscow’s outskirts.
• STRIKES: The strike package occurred on the same day as a meeting between Ukrainian and US delegations in Saudi Arabia. The Ukrainian authorities later indicated that the attack aimed to pressure the Kremlin into agreeing to a ceasefire. However, we assess that the strike and future similar attacks are unlikely to affect the Kremlin’s decision-making regarding the course of the war. It will highly likely trigger Russian retaliatory long-range strikes in the coming days and weeks.
• STRIKES: The rapid depletion of missiles provided by the West has limited the effectiveness of Ukraine’s long-range attacks, likely aiding Russian operations in the Kursk oblast. On 13 March, the Associated Press reported that Ukraine has run out of US-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), citing Ukrainian and US officials. The reports indicated that Washington DC had only supplied 40 ATACMS, all of which Ukraine fully used by January.
• STRIKES: We have noted the absence of Ukrainian strikes using these missiles and the Anglo-French Storm Shadow missiles against Russia in recent months. Instead, recent Ukrainian long-range attacks have relied solely on UAVs. We assess that the US decision to resume military aid is unlikely to lead to new deliveries of such systems in the near future. Previously, US President Donald Trump opposed Kyiv’s use of US missiles against Russian territory.
• STRIKES: Ukraine has used Western-provided missiles to target military logistical nodes, equipment depots and troop concentrations in areas close to the frontlines, including in Russia’s Kursk oblast. These attacks have likely been effective in creating logistical challenges for Russian operations. However, the cessation of such strikes due to the depletion of missile stocks has likely reduced logistical issues for Russian (and North Korean) forces and possibly facilitated preparations for Moscow’s current counter-offensive efforts in the Kursk salient.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• COALITION: UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron are reportedly leading discussions between 37 countries to participate in enforcing a peace settlement in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on the matter on 12 March without fully specifying which states are willing to be in this ‘coalition of the willing’. However, the outlet specified that the initiative expands further than just European states, including unnamed Asian and Commonwealth countries.
• COALITION: According to unspecified British officials, each country was asked what they would be willing to provide to the proposed ‘reassurance force’. Those that had ruled out sending troops to Ukraine have been asked if they would be willing to station forces in neighbouring European countries and what other contributions they would be willing to make. This includes sending aircraft, minehunters, ships and tanks as well as intelligence sharing. This approach aims to ensure that allies of Ukraine would be able to contribute what they feel is realistic and within their risk threshold if they are reluctant to send troops for a peacekeeping mission.
• COALITION: That said, Russia will highly likely remain opposed to the presence of any NATO member forces in Ukraine as any part of a peace deal. On 12 March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia would not accept peacekeeping troops from any country of the military alliance on Ukrainian territory ‘under any conditions’. For further analysis on the possibility of peacekeeping operations in Ukraine, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 3 March 2025.
• For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2025 and beyond, please see Sibylline Strategic Risk Forecast – 25 February 2025 and Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast – 28 February 2025.

FORECAST

CEASEFIRE: On 11 March, Ukraine expressed its readiness to accept a US proposal for an immediate interim 30-day ceasefire if Russia reciprocated. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed later on 11 March that the proposal concerns not only long-range strikes and hostilities in the Black Sea but also fighting along the entire frontline, notably beyond an earlier UK-French-proposed partial ceasefire agreement. Zelensky outlined that the different parties could use the temporary pause to draft a broader peace deal and security guarantees. While the comments show Kyiv’s readiness to halt fighting and work towards ending the war, the ceasefire is subject to Russia first accepting its terms and implementing it. Additionally, the US agreed to resume military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine ‘immediately’ following talks with Ukrainian officials. Poland confirmed on 12 March that deliveries of US weapons to Ukraine have resumed and are flowing at their previous level. For further analysis on the impact of military aid and intelligence suspensions, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 6 March 2025.  On 13 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia is in favour of a ceasefire, but he did not confirm under what conditions Russia would agree to suspend fighting. Russia is highly likely to perceive that the timing is not beneficial for a ceasefire, meaning efforts to delay an agreement are likely. Putin underscored that a ceasefire must resolve the ‘root causes’ of the war and that issues around the enforcement of a ceasefire must be ‘painstakingly studied’. He also stated that negotiations with the US must now take place. Putin has previously stated that Russia is in favour of a peaceful settlement to end the war, but he is unlikely to welcome a proposed freeze in the fighting given recent Russian successes in pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk oblast (Russia). For as long as Russian forces are advancing, Russia is unlikely to see an advantage in a ceasefire. Nevertheless, Putin is likely attempting to retain the goodwill of the US in attempting to illustrate Moscow’s willingness to entertain US proposals. Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk oblast in August 2024 had partly been launched to provide Kyiv leverage in negotiations when discussing possible territorial concessions. Russia’s minimal short-term objective will, therefore, likely be to fully expel Ukrainian forces from the region before considering whether to implement a ceasefire. Steve Witkoff, the US special envoy for the Middle East, will likely attempt to encourage the Kremlin to agree to the ceasefire during his visit to Russia, though a major breakthrough is unlikely in the coming days. Witkoff, a de facto personal envoy of US President Donald Trump, is due in Moscow later on 13 March for discussions with Putin. Nevertheless, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov stated on 13 March that a ceasefire would only offer temporary respite to Ukrainian forces, heavily suggesting that Moscow would not accept under current conditions. That said, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has noted that if Russia says no, it would then be clear which side impedes peace. Moscow highly likely acknowledges that it will have to navigate the situation carefully to avoid losing favour with the Trump administration and any possible repercussions for being unwilling to accept the ceasefire, such as sanctions. In a bid to avoid alienating the White House and extract further concessions, Moscow will likely deliberately stall implementing any ceasefire. Stalling tactics will likely include, but are not be limited to, making additional demands, prolonging negotiations over small or strategically complex details, and accusing Ukraine of carrying out or attempting significant provocations (possibly including false-flag assassination attempts or sabotage). It is possible that Russia is already initiating such information operations to discredit the viability of a ceasefire and to portray Ukraine as the impediment to peace. For example, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed earlier on 13 March that it had prevented a spate of attacks against military and civil servants. The FSB also alleged that the Ukrainian special services planned to send explosive devices in parcels by mail.   The likelihood of a stable ceasefire being implemented in the near term is low; if a ceasefire is enacted, it would highly likely be fragile and vulnerable to alleged (or actual) violations. The likelihood of Russian false-flag operations will increase if a ceasefire is agreed in the short term. Zelensky has previously outlined to the US over 20 occasions when Russia had broken ceasefires since the war began in 2014.  White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt declined to answer on 12 March whether or not the US has enforcement measures in case Russia violates a future ceasefire. While this is something that Washington DC could realistically resolve before a halt of hostilities, a lack of enforcement measures would increase the likelihood of Russia violating the ceasefire or claiming Ukraine broke it. Aside from this, the US will highly likely need to consider how best to deter Moscow from wanting to break the ceasefire. It remains our assessment that a ceasefire that does not result in a comprehensive strategic settlement with credible deterrence in place will only serve to freeze the conflict, whereafter Russian forces will have an opportunity to reconstitute and invade once again at a future date. Reuters reported on 13 March that Russia has presented the US with a list of demands for a deal to end the war. It remains unknown what exactly Moscow demanded or whether it specified willingness to engage in ceasefire talks prior to their acceptance. The demands are reportedly similar to what Moscow has previously presented to Kyiv, NATO and Washington DC. Kremlin officials over the last six months have consistently stated that Ukraine’s withdrawal from the entire four oblasts which Russia has annexed (which would include the large cities of Zaporizhzhia and Sloviansk in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts, respectively) remains a pre-requisite to any ceasefire. Such demands are highly unlikely to be acceptable to Kyiv; they reaffirm our assessment that Russia still retains maximalist war objectives in Ukraine and is unlikely to agree to a ceasefire in good faith in the short term.

Mar 12.

• Russia-Ukraine: US-proposed ceasefire is unlikely in near term despite Ukrainian willingness. On 11 March, the US agreed to resume military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine ‘immediately’ following talks with Ukrainian officials. Additionally, Ukraine expressed its readiness to accept a US proposal for an immediate interim 30-day ceasefire. Steve Witkoff, the US’ special envoy for the Middle East, will likely attempt to encourage the Kremlin to agree in the coming days during his likely visit to Russia. Nevertheless, reports claim that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to welcome a proposed freeze in the fighting, particularly given recent Russian successes in pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk oblast (Russia). Moscow would reportedly need to negotiate the terms of a ceasefire and obtain several guarantees. While Ukraine has expressed its readiness for a ceasefire so as to show that it is serious about peace, we assess that Russia will likely deliberately stall in agreeing to any such deal. Ultimately, the likelihood of a stable ceasefire being reached in the near term is low. Even if one is enacted, it would highly likely be fragile and vulnerable to alleged (or actual) violation.

Mar 11.

• Russia-Ukraine: Drone attack will highly likely trigger Russian retaliatory strikes. Earlier on 11 March, Ukraine conducted a massive strike involving 337 drones against various regions across Russia; this marks the largest drone attack by Ukraine against Russia since the start of the war. Among these, 91 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were launched against Moscow oblast and the capital itself. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin stated that this was the largest drone attack targeting the capital to date, resulting in the suspension of flight operations at all four of the city’s airports. At least two people were killed in Moscow oblast; there was also damage to residential buildings due to falling drone debris in the suburbs of the capital. The Ukrainian authorities later indicated that the attack aimed to pressure the Kremlin into agreeing to a ceasefire. The strike package occurred on the same day as a meeting between Ukrainian and US delegations in Saudi Arabia, where discussions will take place regarding potential peace terms with Russia. We assess that the attack is highly likely to trigger Russian retaliatory long-range strikes; Moscow is unlikely to agree to a ceasefire in the short term.

Mar 10.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• STRIKES: Overnight on 6-7 March, Russia launched one of its largest high-intensity combined missile and drone strikes in recent months; further such strikes are likely in the coming weeks
• PEACE: On 11 March, Ukrainian and US officials are expected to meet in Saudi Arabia for talks aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, amid a wider effort by Kyiv to repair relations with Washington DC and reinstate military aid and intelligence sharing
• STARLINK: Senior White House advisor Elon Musk stated that the Starlink satellite system will ‘never’ turn off its terminals in Ukraine, nor would taking such action be used as a bargaining chip
• FORECAST: The Ukrainian Kursk salient is currently collapsing following a series of highly successful Russian attacks that are threatening to cut off Ukrainian forces
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 6 March indicates that Russian forces advanced along a railway line in western Chasiv Yar during a reduced battalion-sized mechanised assault. Dmytro Zaporozhets, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Luhansk Group of Forces, stated on 7 March that Russian forces attacked from two directions; reports indicate that 25 armoured vehicles took part – of which Ukrainian forces claim to have destroyed 16. The attack reportedly resulted in a ‘jam’ of Russian armoured vehicles that attempted to cross the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal in the east of Chasiv Yar in a column. While the assault was broadly repelled, Russian forces did advance to the western outskirts of the north-western sector of the town.
• BAKHMUT: Toretsk remains highly contested, with both Russian and Ukrainian forces making gains in the town in recent days. Geolocated footage published on 7 and 9 March indicates that Russian forces have advanced along Voronezka Street in the west of the town. Meanwhile, footage from 8 and 9 March indicates Ukrainian advances along Druzhby Street in the town centre, as well as along Budivelnykiv Street in the south; they have also retaken the Avanhard Stadium (also in the town centre). While Ukrainian forces continue to counter-attack, Zaporozhets reported on 10 March that Russian forces are redeploying units from the Kurakhove/Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) direction to Toretsk. While we cannot confirm this, Zaporozhets’ statement aligns with our long-standing assessment that such a redeployment of Russian forces is likely. Given the wider issues facing Ukrainian forces in Kursk oblast (Russia, see below), it remains possible that Russian forces will intensify assaults in Toretsk in a bid to push Ukrainian forces back towards Kostiyanivka in the coming weeks.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Ukrainian forces have continued launching counter-attacks around Pokrovsk, achieving confirmed gains. Geolocated footage from 8 March confirmed recent Ukrainian advances along Polova Street in south-eastern Lysivka, located to the south-east of Pokrovsk, as well as further south of the settlement. Russian military bloggers noted that Ukrainian troops are counter-attacking in several areas to the south and south-west of Pokrovsk. Viktor Trehubov, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces, reported on 7 March that Russian forces were forced to retreat in several areas due to Ukrainian counter-attacks and issues with Russian communications and logistics.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian strikes, particularly those involving drones, are likely to be severely restricting Russian operations in the Pokrovsk sector. A Russian milblogger claimed on 7 March that Ukraine has fire control over Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area. Ukraine’s recent successes have heavily relied on the extensive use of first-person view (FPV) drones to target Russian military logistics and equipment, which is severely hindering Russian movements. That said, Russian forces managed recently to advance to the south-west of Pokrovsk (in south-eastern Udachne), in addition to the south of Preobrazhenka and Zaporizhzhia. The current situation possibly reflects a wider Russian tactical pause and reallocation of resources towards Toretsk (see above).
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, further south, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed to have captured Kostyantynopil, which is located to the west of Kurakhove. Geolocated footage from 9 March shows Russian troops operating in central and south-western parts of the settlement. However, on 10 March, DeepState, a Ukrainian OSINT group, denied the Russian MoD’s claims, stating that the settlement remains under Ukrainian control. We assess that Kostyantynopil is therefore likely still being contested, though Russian forces will likely succeed in seizing the settlement in the short term.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: For analysis on the situation in Kursk, please see our FORECAST below
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 8 March indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the north-west of Robotyne along the Zaporizhzhia frontline. The rate of Russian attacks along the southern frontline has steadily, if still modestly, increased over the last two months, but with only limited advances so far.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 6-7 March, Russia launched one of its largest high-intensity combined missile and drone strikes in recent months. The attack included 194 drones (Shahed-136/131 and decoy types) and 67 missiles. Specifically, it comprised 35 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, eight Kalibr cruise missiles, eight Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, four S-300 air defence missiles and three Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 34 missiles and 100 drones but were unable to shoot down the ballistic missiles. The attack primarily targeted gas production facilities across Ukraine, which have faced frequent long-range attacks in recent months.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 7-8 March, Russia launched a large drone attack accompanied by two Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles and one Iskander-K cruise missile. Similarly, this attack damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Strikes over the ensuing days consisted solely of drones.
• STRIKES: Further high-intensity Russian missile strikes are likely in the coming weeks. Russia likely intends to force Ukraine to expend its ever-diminishing stocks of Patriot air defence interceptors following the US’ suspension of military aid. To exploit this potential window, Russia will possibly massively intensify its long-range attacks in a bid to saturate Ukraine’s air defence system, which would require the Ukrainian authorities to make difficult decisions about where to allocate scarce air defence assets.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, earlier on 10 March, Ukraine reportedly launched a drone attack against the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Samara oblast (Russia). The Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery is reportedly the largest oil refining facility in the region and produces jet fuel for Russian military aircraft.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• PEACE: On 11 March, Ukrainian and US officials are expected to meet in Saudi Arabia for talks aimed at ending the war in Ukraine (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 10 March 2025). Reports indicate that the Ukrainian side intends to propose a partial ceasefire for long-range drone and missile strikes, as well as combat operations in the Black Sea. Such a proposal would be put forward with the hope that the US reverses its decision to freeze intelligence sharing and military aid. While the reported plan to propose a partial ceasefire is aimed at showing Kyiv’s willingness to end the war, the US side will highly likely require further steps to resolve recent disagreements between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump and to reinstate military support.
• PEACE: NBC reported on 9 March that Trump has signalled to his aides that a signed minerals deal would be insufficient to restart aid deliveries and intelligence sharing. Trump also wants to see a change in Zelensky’s attitude towards peace talks, including a willingness to make concessions, such as ceding territory to Russia. He also wants Zelensky to make progress towards possible elections in Ukraine and to step down as president. While we cannot confirm this, similar reports have circulated in German media that Trump wants to force Zelensky to resign by leveraging the threat of no new US weapons for Kyiv. Ultimately, the reports underscore the US’ efforts to intensify pressure to force Ukraine to make progress to end the war.
• STARLINK: On 9 March, senior White House advisor Elon Musk stated that the Starlink satellite system will ‘never’ turn off its terminals in Ukraine, nor would taking such action be used as a bargaining chip. However, the comments follow Musk’s claims that denying access to Starlink would threaten a collapse of Ukrainian lines, as well as a disagreement on social media with the Polish government over the continued provision of access to Ukrainian forces. Starlink is heavily integrated into Ukraine’s military communications, as well as its command and control. While Musk’s remarks possibly indicate a red line for the Trump administration regarding which forms of support it would not cut off for Ukraine, such comments are unlikely to assuage the concerns of Ukraine and its partners. For further analysis on the US suspension of military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 6 March 2025.
• SANCTIONS: Trump disclosed on 7 March that he is ‘strongly considering’ imposing sweeping sanctions against Russia until a ceasefire and strategic settlement to end the war are reached. Trump specifically threatened large-scale sanctions against Russia’s financial sector, as well as tariffs. Russia is already the most-sanctioned state in the world, and sanctions have until now had a negligible influence on the Kremlin’s decision-making and foreign policy. As such, these threats are unlikely to alter Moscow’s thinking significantly to bring about a faster end to the war in the near term. Nevertheless, Russia’s deteriorating socio-economic health will possibly serve as a contributing factor to end the war in the medium term amid wider war objectives that the Kremlin considers to be more important (and worth further economic pain).
• SANCTIONS: Nevertheless, the Trump administration continues to demonstrate its willingness to use sanctions as a form of coercion (or incentivisation) for Russia. Reports emerged on 7 March that the US is studying the ways in which it can possibly ease sanctions on Russia’s energy sector should Moscow agree to end the war. Notably, the White House has reportedly asked the US Treasury Department to explore options for easing energy sanctions ahead of expected talks between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. While we cannot confirm the reports, the US would likely start with sanctions relief on less strategic entities and individuals given the significance of Russia’s hydrocarbon revenues. Ultimately, the Trump administration will likely want to feel confident that a durable peace has been reached before offering significant sanctions relief for Russia’s energy sector.
• ASSETS: UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy has stated that he intends to unlock approximately GBP 2.3 bn (USD 2.97 bn) worth of frozen funds from the sale of Chelsea Football Club by the Russian bnaire Roman Abramovich. The Financial Times (FT) shared Lammy’s comments on 9 March, with the outlet noting that the funds have sat in a bank account of a dedicated trust for the past two years. Talks are ongoing about how exactly the money should be utilised. Unspecified people familiar with the matter also disclosed that court proceedings to resolve the issue are possible.
• ASSETS: Legal complexities and differing options as to how to use the money will likely continue to delay the provision of the funds for Ukraine’s benefit. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal disclosed on 7 March that Kyiv has received an initial tranche of funds worth about USD1bn from London that were secured by the proceeds of frozen Russian assets. Ultimately, the use of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit will likely prompt Russian retaliation against Western (specifically UK) assets inside Russia in the coming months.
• ASSETS: On 6 March, European Central Bank (ECB) President Christine Lagarde stated that she expects any decision made by Western countries on how to use frozen Russian assets will consider international law. The ECB has long raised concerns about how appropriating frozen Russian assets could undermine investors’ future willingness to hold assets in euros (EUR). Aside from considering investor confidence, European states and the ECB almost certainly want to avoid the prospect of Moscow launching arduous and lengthy legal cases against the use of frozen Russian assets.

FORECAST

KURSK: The Ukrainian Kursk salient is currently collapsing after a series of highly successful Russian attacks that are threatening to cut off Ukrainian forces in the region. Russian forces intensified counter-offensive operations across the Kursk salient last week, with geolocated footage from 8 March indicating they had taken numerous settlements, including Lebedevka, which is located less than six miles (9km) to the north-west of Sudzha. Footage from 9 March also confirmed that Russian forces then took Malaya Loknya – an important town located nine miles (14km) to the north of Sudzha – before marching on Sudzha itself. Sudzha is the largest town that Ukrainian forces managed to seize during the Kursk campaign, and has been the logistical centre of gravity for Ukrainian operations across the region. It remains unclear if Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Sudzha, though fighting was clearly taking place in the town as of 9 March. Russian forces have struck a number of key bridges across the Kursk salient in recent days, almost certainly in a bid to cut off Ukrainian forces and prevent them from conducting an orderly withdrawal. Several bridges inside Kursk have reportedly been dropped or heavily damaged; this will complicate Ukrainian forces’ ability to withdraw – though there is currently no confirmed evidence of any encirclements. Nevertheless, geolocated footage published on 8 March also confirmed that Russian forces have crossed the international border to the west of Sudzha, and have seized the border settlement of Novenke (Sumy oblast, Ukraine). We previously reported on apparent Russian raids in the area, which were likely reconnaissance operations designed to probe Ukrainian defences and identify any potential weak spots. If Russian forces are able to continue advancing in the area, this will place even more pressure on the already extremely vulnerable remaining GLOCs used to facilitate a potential Ukrainian withdrawal. It is unclear whether Ukrainian forces will be able to stabilise the front in the coming days. It remains unclear if (and how rapidly) Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Kursk, though the Russian MoD has announced a ‘counter-offensive’ in Sumy; this suggests that Russian forces will attempt to capitalise on the situation to launch a major operation across the international border. The MoD reported that the ‘counter-offensive’ had begun on 9 March, confirming the seizure of Novenke. Ukrainian officials have nevertheless denied claims of a ‘massive breakthrough’ by Russian forces across the international border, though Ukrainian border guards warned on 10 March that Russian forces are attempting to establish a foothold in the region. We cannot confirm the strength of Russian forces currently operating inside Sumy, though their likely objective is to cut off the H-07 highway that runs north-east into Kursk to prevent or undermine Ukrainian reinforcements arriving to stabilise the front. Ultimately, if the Ukrainian withdrawal from Kursk proves disorderly, or if Russian forces succeed in encircling large numbers of Ukrainian troops, the opportunities for a Russian counter-offensive striking deeper inside Sumy would increase. Ukrainian military sources reporting from the frontline indicate that the improved performance of North Korean forces and extensive use of fibre-optic drones have likely contributed to Russia’s rapid advances. North Korean forces are reportedly fighting in Sudzha, and in a much more coherent manner than before (reinforcing our assessment that North Korean forces are internalising lessons learned). Numerous reports have also indicated that Russian forces are using an extensive number of fibre-optic drones during the assaults, which are highly resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. However, the issue of intelligence is likely to have played an (at least) equally large role. The timing of the collapse of the Kursk salient, just days after the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, likely underscores the importance of US assistance to sustain Ukrainian military operations. The extent to which US intelligence sharing was stopped or limited remains unclear, and while we cannot confirm a direct link between this and the collapse of the Kursk salient, it has highly likely contributed to the issues facing Ukrainian forces. Russian forces have been attempting to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk for over seven months; despite committing 12,000 North Korean troops, they have struggled to dislodge the Ukrainian foothold. The fact that Russian forces have managed to unhinge the Ukrainian defence so rapidly (reportedly by taking advantage of an unsuccessful Ukrainian force rotation) and succeeded in advancing relatively quickly strongly indicates that the loss of US intelligence sharing has played a vital role. Nevertheless, Trump stated on 9 March that the US has ‘just about’ ended its suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine – though this has yet to be confirmed. An end to the suspension would likely allow Ukrainian forces to organise their defences more efficiently and stabilise the frontline. However, the collapse of the frontline has severely undermined Ukraine’s ability to hold on to territory in Kursk that it can then use as a potential bargaining chip; if US intelligence is further withheld, we assess that additional Russian breakthroughs elsewhere would become increasing likely.

• Ukraine-US: Pressure on Ukraine for concessions to end war is highly likely in upcoming talks. On 11 March, Ukrainian and US officials are expected to meet in Saudi Arabia for talks aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. The US delegation will reportedly use the meeting in part to determine whether the Ukrainian side is willing to make concessions to Russia to end the conflict. According to an unspecified US official familiar with the upcoming talks, the US side will also be watching for signs that Kyiv is serious regarding the improvement of ties with the administration of US President Donald Trump. Ukrainian officials will likely seek to demonstrate a willingness to engage with the US and resolve recent disagreements in a bid to push for a restoration of intelligence sharing and military aid. If Ukraine does not agree to major concessions (namely concerning security guarantees and territory), US pressure on Kyiv will likely increase still further. We assess that this will sustain US-Ukraine tensions and threaten to deepen the nascent political divisions over Ukraine’s future. (Source: Sibylline)

14 Mar 25. Vladimir Putin has told Donald Trump he backs the “idea” of a ceasefire in Ukraine, but he would only agree to one on his own terms. The Russian president knocked back the US proposal for an immediate 30-day pause in the fighting on Thursday, saying he had “serious questions” about how it would be implemented that he needed to discuss with Mr Trump. Speaking at a press conference in Moscow, Putin said he wanted any deal to “lead to long-term peace” and “eliminate the original causes of this crisis”, suggesting he was unwilling to relent on his evisceration of the Ukrainian state. “The idea [of a ceasefire] itself is correct, and we certainly support it,” the Russian leader said, “but there are nuances that we need to discuss”. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

13 Mar 25. Putin says he supports US proposal for 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine.  Russian President Vladimir Putin said Thursday that he agrees in principle with a U.S. proposal for a 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine, but the terms need to be worked out, and he emphasized that it should pave the way to lasting peace.

“So the idea itself is correct, and we certainly support it,” Putin told a news conference in Moscow. “But there are issues that we need to discuss, and I think that we need to discuss it with our American colleagues and partners.”

He noted the need to develop a mechanism to control possible breaches of the truce. Another issue, he said, is whether Ukraine could use the 30-day ceasefire to rearm.

“We agree with the proposals to halt the fighting, but we proceed from the assumption that the ceasefire should lead to lasting peace and remove the root causes of the crisis,” Putin said.

Putin made the remarks just hours after the arrival of Trump’s envoy in Moscow for talks on the 30-day ceasefire that Ukraine has accepted.

The diplomatic effort coincided with a Russian claim that its troops have driven the Ukrainian army out of a key town in Russia’s Kursk border region, where Moscow has been trying for seven months to dislodge Ukrainian troops from their foothold.

Putin said it appeared that the U.S. persuaded Ukraine to accept a ceasefire and that Ukraine is interested because of the battlefield situation, particularly in Kursk.

Referring to the Ukrainian troops in Kursk, he said: “Will all those who are there come out without a fight?”

Putin thanked U.S. President Donald Trump “for paying so much attention to the settlement in Ukraine.”

He also thanked the leaders of China, India, Brazil and South Africa for their “noble mission to end the fighting,” a statement that signaled those countries’ potential involvement in a ceasefire deal.

Russia has said it will not accept peacekeepers from any NATO members to monitor a prospective truce. Putin’s foreign affairs adviser said Putin planned to meet with Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, later Thursday. The Russian Defense Ministry’s claim that it recaptured the town of Sudzha, a Ukrainian operational hub in Kursk, came hours after Putin visited his commanders in Kursk. The claim could not be independently verified. Ukrainian officials made no immediate comment. (Source: Defense News)

13 Mar 25. Ukraine’s Defense Forces to Receive 200,000 Unmanned Systems per Month in 2025. In 2025, the supply of unmanned systems to Ukraine’s Defense Forces reached approximately 200,000 units per month, with a significant increase in the delivery of FPV drones, according to First Deputy Minister of Defense Ivan Havryliuk.

“If we look at unmanned systems, especially FPV drones used in combat, we started the first quarter of 2024 with a supply of 20,000 units per month. Currently, this figure has risen to 200,000 per month and continues to grow,” the official stated.

The deputy minister clarified that this supply is not limited to FPV drones but includes the full range of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including those received through international assistance. Havryliuk also highlighted efforts to introduce ground-based robotic systems for logistics, mining and demining operations, and casualty evacuation. The exposure of soldiers in open and high-risk areas has driven the implementation of these technologies to reduce combat vulnerability. In October 2024, the Ministry of Defense announced that, in coordination with the Ministry of Digital Transformation, it had procured 1.6m UAVs of various types, with a total investment exceeding 114bn hryvnias (~USD 2.73bn). Of these, 1.28m units had already been delivered, while an additional 366,940 drones were scheduled for delivery by the end of the year. By 2025, the Ministry of Defense had already contracted 155,205 UAVs, valued at USD 770m. At the end of 2024, Defense Minister Rustem Umierov reported that 96.2% of the drones used by Ukraine’s Defense Forces were domestically produced. Specifically, more than 1.5 m FPV drones had been manufactured. In January 2025, Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin announced the delivery of over 30,000 bomber drones to Ukraine’s Defense Forces throughout 2024. In October 2024, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated at the Second International Defense Industries Forum that Ukraine had already developed the capacity to produce up to 4 m drones per year. A month later, he announced that in 2025, at least 30,000 long-range drones were projected for production. (Source: UAS VISION/Aviacionline)

12 Mar 25. Russia lays out demands for talks with US on Ukraine, sources say.

• Summary
• Russia’s demands similar to earlier terms presented to US, say sources
• Demands include no NATO membership for Kyiv, no foreign troops in Ukraine
• Unclear if Putin will engage seriously in peace talks
• Biden administration discussed demands prior to Ukraine invasion

Russia has presented the U.S. with a list of demands for a deal to end its war against Ukraine and reset relations with Washington, according to two people familiar with the matter. It is not clear what exactly Moscow included on its list or whether it is willing to engage in peace talks with Kyiv prior to their acceptance. Russian and American officials discussed the terms during in-person and virtual conversations over the last three weeks, the people said. (Source: Reuters)

11 Mar 25. UK debated providing Typhoon fighters to Ukraine “multiple times.” Decision could be a missed opportunity to secure a future customer at a time when the Eurofighter consortium urgently needs new orders. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) assessed the merits of providing Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 1 air superiority fighters to Ukraine “multiple times”, before the decision was taken to retain the fleet despite their impending withdrawal from UK service. Throughout the UK’s support of Ukraine, in which it has provided bns of pounds of military and financial aid, the prospect of donating the 30 remaining Tranche 1 Typhoons operated by the Royal Air Force (RAF) was mooted on multiple occasions, both in public parliamentary sessions as well as privately. However, despite the planned withdrawal of the aircraft from the RAF later in 2025, thus being no part of the long-term planning for the service, MoD and government officials determined not to provide Ukraine with the fighters. Instead, Ukraine will receive 61 US-designed F-16 fighters, provided by European Nato members. In a 11 March parliamentary written response, UK Armed Forces Minister Luke Pollard confirmed that discussions on the provision of Typhoon Tranche 1 to Ukraine had taken place.

“The Ministry of Defence has assessed the relative merits and downsides of donating Typhoon Tranche 1 jets to Ukraine multiple times,” Pollard stated.

Instead, Pollard said the UK is supporting the Ukrainian F-16 acquisition by providing basic flying and English language training for technicians and pilots that will operate the US-designed fighter. To date, 24 Ukrainian pilots have graduated from the Fast Jet Lead-in training under RAF guidance. The decision to not provide Ukraine with the 30 first-generation Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft appears at odds with the equipment donation strategy for platforms operating in other domains, with MoD stocks of multiple types of armoured vehicles given to Ukraine. Similarly, small numbers of Sea King helicopters were also given to Kyiv, despite the type not being operated by Ukrainian military nor complementing a wider provision of the design by Nato forces. Providing earlier Tranche 1 Typhoons to Ukraine could also have served to secure a prospective future export customer for the newer Tranche 3 variants in the years ahead. Airbus has publicly stated the Eurofighter programme needs additional orders if it is to stay viable through to the 2040s, with European partners Germany, Spain, and Italy all acquiring or having new aircraft delivered in 2024. Only the UK failed to similarly support the programme last year. The UK has yet to determine if it will acquire additional Tranche 3 Eurofighters, as it debates whether to further invest into the US-led F-35 programme instead. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

12 Mar 25. Saab and Radionix sign MoU for sensors and defence electronics. Saab and the Ukrainian defence company Radionix have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding the intention to form a strategic collaboration relating to sensors and defence electronics, aiming to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities. The collaboration aims to focus on areas within sensors and defence electronics development and maintenance across all domains, leveraging the strengths of both companies.  With its strong technology offer and proven track record of international collaboration, Radionix brings valuable know-how in areas such as radar and optical targeting equipment and is a central part of Ukraine’s defence industrial base. Saab will contribute with its solid defence industry experience and expertise in these technology areas.

“We look forward to this collaboration with Radionix, leveraging both companies’ expertise. This agreement underscores Saab’s strong commitment to supporting Ukraine’s defence capability and defence industry” says Anders Carp, Deputy CEO of Saab.

12 Mar 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine launches largest drone attack on Russia to date. Ukraine launched at least 337 drones into Russia on Tuesday in what the Russian Ministry of Defense has called the largest drone assault since the start of the war. If confirmed, the attack surpasses Russia’s previous record of 267 drones launched against Ukraine on February 23. The strike occurred just before scheduled negotiations between US and Ukrainian delegations in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, raising speculation that Kyiv intended the attack as a strategic show of force ahead of the discussions. Ukrainian officials have yet to comment on Russia’s claims. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the Kursk region was a primary target, with 126 Ukrainian drones aimed at the area. Kursk has been under Ukrainian control since Kyiv launched its first cross-border offensive into Russia in August 2024. However, Ukraine has been losing ground in the region over the past week, setbacks that experts attribute in part to the US decision to halt intelligence sharing with Kyiv. The Moscow region also came under heavy assault, with Russian officials reporting 91 drones downed there. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin stated that more than 70 drones were intercepted before reaching the Russian capital. The attack comes amid shifting dynamics in US-Ukraine relations. The Trump administration has been pressuring Kyiv to halt strikes inside Russia, advocating instead for a cease-fire focused on air and naval engagements. National Security Adviser Mike Waltz announced on Wednesday that the US had cut off intelligence sharing with Ukraine in an effort to deter further incursions into Russian territory. Despite US diplomatic efforts, Russian President Vladimir Putin has given no indication that he is open to a cease-fire in any domain. As the conflict continues, Ukraine’s latest drone offensive signals its intent to sustain military pressure on Russia, even as diplomatic discussions unfold. The extent of the damage and casualties from the attack remain unclear, and further responses from both Moscow and Kyiv are expected in the coming days. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-launches-largest-drone-attack-on-russia-to-date/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

11 Mar 25. US to resume security support to Ukraine as Kyiv says it is ready to accept ceasefire proposal. US resumes intelligence sharing, security assistance for Kyiv.

• Rubio says he will present offer to Moscow, ball in Russia’s court
• Ukraine, US agree to conclude minerals deal as soon as possible
• Ukraine conducted major overnight drone attack on Russia

The United States agreed on Tuesday to resume military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine after Kyiv said it was ready to support Washington’s proposal for a 30-day ceasefire with Russia, the countries said in a joint statement. After more than eight hours of talks with Ukrainian officials in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. would now take the offer to Russia, and the ball is in Moscow’s court. (Source: Reuters)

11 Mar 25. Ukraine is ready to accept a US proposal for an immediate 30-day ceasefire in its war with Russia as long as Moscow does the same, Kyiv and Washington said on Tuesday. The ceasefire could be extended if both parties agreed, according to a joint statement that capped several hours of talks between US and Ukrainian officials in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Washington said it will also immediately restore military assistance and end its suspension of intelligence-sharing, which Kyiv feared would hamper its ability to detect and hit targets beyond the battlefield. The ceasefire would go beyond the partial truce suggested by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the days preceding the crucial meeting with US officials in Jeddah, and which was only supposed to apply to long-range drone and missiles strikes as well as military activities in the Black Sea. (Source: FT.com)

10 Mar 25. Ukraine to sharply raise purchases of home produced FPV drones in 2025. Ukraine plans to purchase around 4.5 m first-person view (FPV) drones in 2025, Kyiv’s defence ministry said on Monday, more than doubling last year’s rate as its war with Russia grows increasingly hi-tech. Both sides have come to rely on cheaper and more effective alternatives to conventional artillery, and Ukrainian officials have said the majority of Russian troops and vehicles are now hit by drones. In a statement, Hlib Kanevsky, director of the ministry’s procurement policy department, said Ukraine last year had purchased more than 1.5m such drones – 96% of them from Ukrainian manufacturers and suppliers.

“This year, the figures will be even higher, because the capabilities of the domestic defence industry in 2025 are approximately 4.5m FPV drones,” he said. “And the Ministry of Defence plans to purchase them all.”

The ministry would allocate the equivalent of more than $2.6bn for the plan, he said. (Source: Reuters)

10 Mar 25. Ukraine would need to accept Russian control of some territory as part of a peace deal, the US’s top diplomat said on Monday on the eve of talks between Washington and Kyiv in Saudi Arabia. Secretary of state Marco Rubio told journalists on his way to high-level talks in Jeddah that “the Russians can’t conquer all of Ukraine, and obviously it’ll be very difficult for Ukraine in any reasonable time period to sort of force the Russians back all the way to where they were in 2014”. Rubio’s comments, which allude to Ukraine’s borders before Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, eight years before Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, highlight how the Trump administration has taken a far tougher stance with Kyiv than Joe Biden’s government. Tuesday’s talks in Saudi Arabia come at a pivotal moment, about 10 days after a public spat in the White House between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Donald Trump over the origins of Russia’s invasion and the future of US aid as Washington tries to broker an end to the conflict. Trump has since cut off military aid and intelligence sharing to Kyiv, but Zelenskyy has made some overtures to the White House over the past week, including a pledge to sign a deal giving the US access to Ukraine’s critical minerals, causing some of the friction to ease. Zelenskyy said on Telegram on Monday evening that “the Ukrainian position at the meeting will be absolutely constructive”. He added that he had spoken with Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, about “the steps and conditions that could end the war and make peace reliable and lasting”. Speaking to reporters on his flight to Saudi Arabia on Monday, Rubio said he hoped military aid could be restored. “I think the notion of the pause in aid, broadly, is something I hope we can resolve. Obviously what happens tomorrow will be key to that,” he said. Officials briefed on preparations for the negotiations in Saudi Arabia said Kyiv was set to propose a partial ceasefire with Russia for long-range drone and missile strikes and combat operations in the Black Sea, in the hope that the talks’ progress would lead Washington to reverse its decision to freeze intelligence sharing and weaponry supplies. Trump has faced criticism domestically and internationally for putting too much pressure on Ukraine to make concessions and giving an advantage to Russia in the talks over a peace deal that Washington is running on parallel tracks. Russian and Ukrainian officials have not launched direct negotiations. (Source: FT.com)

10 Mar 25.  Sir Keir Starmer will on Saturday convene a meeting of leaders from countries willing to help secure any ceasefire deal in Ukraine, as military planning for a peacekeeping operation intensifies. The UK prime minister will host a “virtual meeting” of what he called “a coalition of the willing” — a group of mainly European and Commonwealth countries willing to help secure a peace deal between Kyiv and Moscow. Downing Street on Monday said the exact participants had yet to be confirmed. British officials last week said that “about 20” countries were holding talks about how they might support Ukraine if fighting stops. The meeting will come at the end of a week of intense diplomacy, which will see Ukraine and the US hold bilateral talks in Saudi Arabia on a deal for mineral rights in Ukraine and a ceasefire. In France, President Emmanuel Macron has also convened talks with army chiefs from European countries on Tuesday, and a meeting of defence ministers from the UK, Italy, Germany and Poland. Britain and France have offered to deploy what they call a “reassurance force” of troops inside Ukraine intended to deter Russia from renewing its attacks. The force would help protect cities and key sites like power plants or industry. British officials have conceded that not all countries in the “coalition of the willing” are prepared to put boots on the ground. But they said all nations were prepared to help in some way, for example in providing logistical or “backfilling” for UK or French troops currently deployed in other theatres. Starmer has struggled to find countries to commit firmly to a military operation inside Ukraine, with many waiting first to see the shape of any peace deal and whether the US will support it. Poland, for example, has offered logistics support despite ruling out putting troops on the ground. Norway’s foreign minister Espen Barth Eide told the BBC on Sunday the country would be “happy to contribute in one way or the other”, but was unable to commit to specific support. Italy has declined to participate while Germany and Spain have said it is too early to say. Ireland, Luxembourg and Belgium have said they can imagine taking part if necessary. While most participants are European countries, Canada has offered to help and Starmer also hopes that Anthony Albanese, Australia’s prime minister, will join the effort. The two leaders spoke at the weekend and Downing Street said Starmer “welcomed Prime Minister Albanese’s commitment to consider contributing to a coalition of the willing for Ukraine”. Senior military officials from the group will meet in Paris on Tuesday to discuss practicalities for a peace operation, with Britain represented by chief of defence staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin. Starmer has said the peacekeeping force could only be successful if the US provides a military backstop, including air cover and surveillance. US President Donald Trump has so far refused to offer such support. British officials said they believed there was a “chicken and egg” situation, where European capitals wait for Trump to offer US military cover for a peace force while Trump waits to see if the Europeans — and potentially Canada and Australia — are willing to run a serious operation in Ukraine. Trump has ratcheted up the pressure on Kyiv to agree a ceasefire since an Oval Office bust up with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, including cutting off military and intelligence support to Ukraine. (Source: FT.com)

10 Mar 25. Russian Special Forces Used an Abandoned Gas Pipeline to Launch an Attack on Ukranians in the Kursk Region. Ukrainian troops successfully repelled an attack by Russian special forces who used a gas pipeline to infiltrate the outskirts of Sudzha in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, Ukraine’s General Staff reported on Saturday. Ukrainian military sources and Russian pro-Kremlin war bloggers said the Russian special forces traveled approximately 9 miles inside the gas pipeline—formerly used to transport gas to Europe—before emerging near Sudzha. Anton Gerashchenko, current official advisor and a former deputy minister at the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs said Russian operatives spent days inside the pipeline and some have suffocated to death or got methane poisoning from residual gas in the pipe. As they launched a rear assault on Ukrainian units near Sudzha, the Russian forces were targeted by Ukrainian rocket, artillery, and drone strikes.

“The enemy has suffered significant losses in Sudzha,” the general staff reported.

Ukraine’s General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces had repelled 44 Russian attacks in Kursk Oblast over the past day.  Meanwhile, Russian Defense Ministry statements claimed that its troops had captured multiple villages north and northwest of Sudzha, bringing them within approximately 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) of the town’s center.  Pro-Russian sources, including a blogger known as “Two Majors,” reported that heavy fighting was underway inside Sudzha following the Russian special forces’ pipeline maneuver. Several reports claim that Ukraine’s position in Kursk has worsened after the U.S. paused its intelligence aid to the country. According to a Time Magazine report citing five senior Western and Ukrainian officials, the decision of the U.S. to stop intelligence aid resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers in recent days.  According to the Institute of the Study of War (ISW), a complete cessation of US intelligence sharing would “severely undermine” Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian offensive operations. Based on geolocated footage published by ISW, Russian forces are dismantling the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast after several days of intensified activity in the region. According to ISW, Russian forces have already captured Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha), Malaya Loknya (just south of Novaya Sorochina), and Lebedevka (south of Malaya Loknya), along with the fields between these settlements. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

05 Mar 25. New Ukrainian Wild Hornets C-UAS interceptor “has a 200 km/h maximum speed.” Tim Zitter, a Lifecycle Manager with Belgian Defence, has written a Linkedin post which describes and shows footage of the latest interceptor missiles from Ukraine’s Dyki Shershni (Wild Hornets) group. The counter UAS interceptor features, according to the post:

• Maximum Speed – 200 km/h, making it a rapid-response asset in battlefield conditions.
• Operational Altitude – 5 km, allowing it to engage enemy UAVs and other aerial threats at significant heights
• Climb Rate – 1 km in just 23 seconds, ensuring swift interception capabilities against fast-moving targets.

For more information: https://www.linkedin.com/in/tim-de-zitter/https://dykishershni.com/en.html (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

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