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Military And Security Developments
Feb 08.
08 Feb 25. Ukrainian forces have advanced up to five kilometres behind Russian lines in a fresh assault on the Kursk border region, footage suggests. Kyiv’s troops launched a counter-attack against Russian forces in the region at the start of the year, with hundreds of soldiers and dozens of armoured vehicles advancing on enemy lines south-east of Sudzha. Now, geolocated combat footage has shown that Ukraine’s forces are operating further behind enemy lines than previously known. Ukraine first launched its surprise invasion of the Russian border region in August last year, seizing around 500 square miles of Russian territory. Moscow’s troops are thought to have taken about 57 per cent of the territory back, but Kyiv has carried out waves of attacks in an attempt to regain control of the region. The recent geolocated footage, captured by Russian drones, showed Ukrainian troops advancing across snow-covered countryside near Makhnovka and Cherkasskaya Konopelka. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
08 Feb 25. Ukraine’s air force said on Saturday it shot down 67 of 139 Russian drones launched overnight, while another 71 disappeared from radar without reaching their targets. (Source: Reuters)
Feb 07.
- Russia: Highly likely new bill will allow tit-for-tat financial asset seizures of Western businesses. On 7 February, Reuters reported that Russia is planning to pass legislation allowing the confiscation of frozen funds belonging to foreign companies and investors in Russia. The draft bill expands on a May 2024 presidential decree permitting the seizure of US property and securities as compensation for any losses incurred due to the confiscation of Russian assets in the US. The latest measure extends this policy to all countries deemed unfriendly. Western countries have been debating how to use approximately USD 300 billion in frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. The EU has already provided loans to Ukraine backed by these assets. The latest Russian measure will highly likely be approved. As such, the move is likely designed to deter any Western attempt to use Russia’s frozen assets to support Ukraine during negotiations in 2025. We assess that such a move is highly likely to prompt retaliatory actions by Moscow against the frozen financial assets of Western companies.
Feb 06.
• OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has reported that 45,100 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed during the war to date, with an additional 390,000 wounded
• STRIKES: Reuters has reported that North Korean missiles used by Russia have increased their accuracy, reflecting growing capabilities and military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang
• AID: The UK is expected to chair the next summit of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format) on 12 February instead of the US amid wider uncertainty around further US aid to Ukraine
• FORECAST: US President Donald Trump has said that he wants Ukraine to supply the US with ‘rare earths and other things’ in return for supporting the country during the war
• OFFENSIVES: On 4 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that 45,100 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed during the war to date, with an additional 390,000 wounded. Meanwhile, Zelensky claimed that up to 350,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in addition to 50-70,000 missing in action and 600-700,000 wounded. Russian forces are likely sustaining particularly high casualty rates at present. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that, during January 2025 alone, Russian forces sustained 48,670 casualties; this would make it the second-most costly month of the war to date for the Russians according to Ukrainian figures. We cannot confirm these casualty rates. However, it is likely that Ukrainian sources underplay their own casualties and overplay those of the Russians to an extent, just as Russian numbers will underplay (or entirely omit) their own casualties, while similarly exaggerating those of the Ukrainians.
• OFFENSIVES: Casualties also continue to rise for Ukrainian forces; in tandem with growing recruitment problems, this has led Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi to order 50,000 service personnel from various military branches to be transferred to the Ground Forces. The General Staff have indicated that such a large transfer is to enable the first full-scale rotation at the front since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. However, it remains unclear if such efforts will effectively mitigate growing manpower issues and boost morale at the front. In line with such efforts, Syrskyi also announced on 3 February that the Ukrainian Army will transition to a corps structure, building on the existing corps within the military (including the 9th, 10th and 11th corps) to improve command and control (C2) across the entire Ground Forces.
• BAKHMUT: The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Luhansk Group of Forces, Dmytro Zaporozhets, reported on 5 February that Russian assaults in and around Chasiv Yar have increased by 97% compared to December 2024. This significant intensification of operations has seemingly facilitated Russian advances over the last couple of weeks. Geolocated footage published in recent days indicates further advances in the town centre; however, we cannot confirm the extent of Russian control over the town at present.
• BAKHMUT: Additionally, a map published by the Ukrainian General Staff on 3 February confirms recent Russian advances to the southern outskirts of Bila Hora, a village located seven miles (11km) to the south of Chasiv Yar. This is notably on the west side of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal, which the Ukrainians had leveraged as a defensive barrier for months. If Russian forces are successfully advancing west in this area, they will likely be in a position to threaten Chasiv Yar’s southern flanks as well as further interdict ground lines of communication (GLOCs). This includes those supplying Chasiv Yar as well as those running south from Kostiantynivka towards Toretsk. In Toretsk itself, geolocated footage published on 4 February does indicate further Russian advances along the town’s outskirts as well as the consolidation and expansion of positions west of Niu York (located to the south-west of Toretsk).
• DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 5 February indicates recent Russian advances in southern Sribne, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. These advances likely suggest that the settlement is now under Russian control. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has meanwhile claimed that its forces have captured Baranivka, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk, though this remains visually unconfirmed. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have made recent confirmed gains east of Nadiivka, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk, indicating that Ukrainian forces continue to counter-attack in a bid to slow and spoil Russian advances in the area.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: On 6 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that Russia has sustained almost 40,000 casualties (including over 16,000 killed) during fighting in Kursk oblast over the last six months. Zelensky reports that Ukrainian forces have also taken 909 Russian soldiers prisoner during the same period.
• KURSK: South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported on 4 February that North Korean units had not been engaged in combat operations in Kursk oblast since mid-January. However, also on 4 February, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Kyrylo Budanov, denied reports of a North Korean withdrawal, though he acknowledged that the number of North Korean troops engaged in combat has decreased. While we cannot yet confirm this, we have previously assessed that North Korean forces are likely undertaking a tactical pause to reconstitute their forces following extremely high casualty rates and, most likely, reappraise their tactics and doctrinal approach to the modern (UAV-saturated) battlefield.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: The situation to the north of Kupiansk is becoming increasingly tense for Ukrainian forces due to recent Russian gains in the sector. On 5 February, a Ukrainian military observer confirmed previous Russian claims that Zapadne had fallen under Russian control. Zapadne is located to the north of Kupiansk and south-west of Dvorichna on the right (west) bank of the Oskil River. On the same day, the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces had seized Novomlynsk, located to the north-east of Kupiansk. We assess that these claims are likely accurate. These advances are part of Russia’s ongoing efforts to pressure Kupiansk from the north. In the short term, Russian forces will probably focus on expanding their bridgehead across the right (west) bank of the Oskil River in the Dvorichna area; this would allow Russian troops to advance south along the river and disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the west of Kupiansk.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Russian strikes over the past few days mostly included large numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In all, the attack on 5 February included two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. The Odesa oblast authorities reported that a missile from this attack struck a residential building in the region. Although Ukraine’s interception of UAVs remained typically high, drone hits were recorded in various regions.
• STRIKES: Citing unnamed Ukrainian sources, Reuters reported on 6 February that North Korean missiles used by Russia have increased their accuracy. A Ukrainian source stated that, over the past few weeks, in all, 20 North Korean ballistic missiles (likely a variant of the KN-23 short-range ballistic missile system) successfully struck targets across Ukraine. This development highly likely indicates that North Korea is using the Ukrainian battlefield to test its missile technology, and/or is receiving technological assistance from Russian missile designers. However, forensic analysis of missile debris remains inconclusive regarding the reasons for the missiles’ improved accuracy. Possible explanations include improvements to the projectiles’ navigation systems or the introduction of steering mechanisms to enhance manoeuvrability. Earlier this year, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that Pyongyang would supply Moscow with additional ballistic missiles. This, along with continued improvements in missile technology, will pose significant challenges to Ukraine’s interception capabilities, which are already under chronic strain.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, overnight on 4-5 February, Ukraine successfully carried out a drone strike on the Albashneft oil depot in Novominskaya (Krasnodar Krai, Russia). The attack caused a fire at the facility, which, according to Ukrainian sources, supplies the Russian military. Earlier on 6 February, Ukraine reportedly targeted the Primorsko-Akhtarsk airfield in Krasnodar Krai. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, the facility serves as a key launch site for Russian Shahed-type drones and functions as a storage, training and maintenance hub for aircraft operating in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• AID: The UK is expected to chair the next summit of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format) on 12 February instead of the US. While it is unclear what the focus of the upcoming meeting will be, the fact that the meeting will likely be held under London’s chairmanship indicates that the US (under President Donald Trump) will likely be less involved in the initiative, not least at a leadership level. However, the shift will possibly encourage European partners to lead future Ramstein-format summits and co-ordinate Ukraine aid more broadly without significant US involvement over the coming months.
• AID: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed on 5 February that Kyiv continues to receive military aid from the but that there are no discussions currently on new future support. Zelensky was referring to assistance from the previous administration under former president Joe Biden, which had pursued a policy of open-ended military support for Ukraine. That said, a Reuters investigation on 3 February found that decisions on key weapons shipments in the final year of the Biden administration were stalled because of internal debates over escalation risks and concerns over US stockpiles. While we cannot confirm the report, we have previously assessed that delays of Western aid in 2024 likely constrained Ukrainian military operations and limited Ukraine’s room for manoeuvre in terms of operational planning last year.
• AID: Reports emerged on 3 February that US shipments of weapons recently paused briefly before resuming on 1-2 February; deliveries restarted after the White House withdrew from its initial assessment to stop all aid to Ukraine. Although it is unclear how long shipments of US aid were frozen for, if true, the development underscores how officials within Trump’s administration remain uncertain over the extent of support the US should give Ukraine. We assess that internal debates on the matter will possibly cause additional delays or pauses over the coming days and weeks as the Trump administration recalibrates its Ukraine policy. For further analysis on how the US may tie utilising Ukraine’s natural resources in exchange for aid, see the FORECAST below.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: US President Donald Trump said on 3 February that he wants Ukraine to supply the US with ‘rare earths and other things’ in return for supporting the country in its war against Russia. His comments reflect the possibility of continued US support for Ukraine becoming transactional under the Trump administration.
Ukraine possesses deposits of 22 of the 34 minerals which the EU has identified as ‘critical’. Additionally, Ukraine has rare earth elements including cerium, erbium, lanthanum and yttrium. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), Ukraine is a key potential supplier of various materials, such as apatite, graphite, lithium, manganese and titanium. However, some estimates conclude that around 53% of Ukraine’s mineral resources are contained in the four regions Russia annexed in September 2022 (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts). Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk oblast (which borders Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) is home to an estimated USD 3.5 trillion (GBP 2.8 trillion) in mineral resources.
Zelensky indicated on 4 February that he is open to the proposal, adding that an element of his victory plan proposed economic co-operation with international supporters. The fourth point of the framework concerns harnessing Ukraine’s strategic economic potential and inviting partners to protect the country’s critical resources, as well as encouraging investment in this regard. Reports late last year indicated that Ukraine delayed signing a critical minerals agreement with the US twice so Trump could claim credit for it rather than his predecessor Biden (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 16 December 2024). An agreement that would see the US benefit from Ukrainian natural resources would possibly appeal to Ukraine-sceptic Republicans and other supporters that are sceptical over the long-term costs of supporting Ukraine.
Ukraine will highly likely want to secure longer-term security guarantees before agreeing to such an arrangement. An unspecified insider in Zelensky’s office insisted on 3 February that Ukrainian security must be guaranteed so that Russia does not occupy mineral-rich Ukrainian lands. Zelensky has described Ukrainian deposits of critical resources to be a key Russian war objective, which aligns with our assessment. We assess that a lack of access to these materials undermines Ukraine’s ability to develop its domestic industry, attract foreign investment, and sustain itself economically post-war (given high reconstruction costs).
Zelensky announced on 5 February that Ukraine is prepared to engage in negotiations to end the war, though he emphasised that the US and Europe must also participate. Zelensky’s insistence on European partners being present is highly likely aimed at ensuring another party is willing to advocate for terms more aligned to Kyiv’s conditions to end the war. Despite Russia sending signals of its readiness to negotiate, the Kremlin stated on 3 February that it is too early to discuss potential four-way peace talks as Zelensky has proposed. Our assessment remains that neither side is likely ready to agree to major concessions that would realistically end the war in a timely fashion. Russia’s recent comments are likely aimed at further delaying the beginning of negotiations.
Nevertheless, Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov confirmed on 5 February that Russian officials have been in contact with the Trump administration. Peskov detailed that the two sides have contact between certain agencies, adding that dialogue has recently intensified. However, he did not specify whether such discussions were focused on efforts to end the war directly. Nevertheless, intensified contact between the US and Russia is highly likely one of the first steps aimed at laying the ground for peace negotiations to begin in the coming months.
Trump officials will possibly present a plan to end the war during the Munich Security Conference on 14-16 February in Germany, according to a recent Bloomberg report. Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, is expected to showcase the plan if it is delivered. Aspects of the plan allegedly include potentially freezing the conflict and the territory Russian forces occupy while giving Ukraine security guarantees to deter Russia from attacking again. Although details of the plan remain unconfirmed, Ukraine will highly likely perceive that freezing the conflict without wider security guarantees will create conditions which would allow Russia to rearm and launch a renewed attack against Ukraine in the future. As such, the strength of any accompanying security guarantees will be crucial in deterring future Russian military operations.
Feb 05.
• Russia: Western sanctions are generating growing supply disruption for seaborne oil exports. On 4 January, Bloomberg noted that recent US sanctions against Russian oil have been causing bottlenecks to Russian seaborne oil exports. Russian oil exports have not significantly decreased; loading volumes remain broadly stable. However, US sanctions on 10 January (which targeted 183 of Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers) have led to an increasing number of destination ports denying entry to these oil tankers, even in key markets for Russian oil (such as China). This has caused Russian oil terminals to increasingly rely on a limited number of non-sanctioned tankers to replace the sanctioned vessels, leading to congestion at oil terminals and an increase in shipping costs. The latest US sanctions are part of the West’s broader effort to strengthen enforcement of the price cap on Russian seaborne oil exports. By increasing delays and refusals of cargo deliveries, such measures are generating growing supply disruption problems for Moscow’s seaborne oil exports. We assess that this will exert additional pressure on the country’s crucial oil revenues, though its impacts on global oil prices will likely remain limited in the short term.
Feb 03.
• Ukraine: Cyber operation raises security, information theft risks posed by zero-day vulnerability. On 4 February, the cyber security company Trend Micro reported that unnamed threat actors exploited a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-0411) to target small-scale government organisations and private businesses in Ukraine until at least September 2024. The campaign started with spear phishing emails impersonating a Ukrainian government branch to trick potential victims into opening a malicious attachment. The attachment resembled a legitimate Windows document and exploited CVE-2025-0411 to bypass Microsoft security mechanisms and deploy the ‘SmokeLoader’ loader malware. SmokeLoader can extract sensitive information and credentials from web browsers, elevating security and information theft risks. We assess there is a possibility that the campaign may have been conducted by actors linked to Russia given the significance of the targeted sectors and ongoing tensions amid the war in Ukraine. However, the objective of the campaign is currently unclear. The vulnerability was patched in November 2024, highlighting the importance of timely patch management policies to prevent future exploitation.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continued to advance in the Kupiansk sector, expanding their salient north of the city as part of a long-term effort to push Ukrainian forces from the left (east) bank of the Oskil River
• STRIKES: On 1 February, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike against Ukraine, involving 165 projectiles and multiple ballistic missiles; further such high-intensity strikes are likely in the run-up to the anniversary of the invasion
• TALKS: US President Donald Trump has said that his administration has scheduled talks with Russia, Ukraine and unspecified ‘various parties’, amid wider preparations to begin negotiations later in 2025
• FORECAST: US President Donald Trump’s Ukraine envoy has stated that the US wants Ukraine to hold fresh presidential elections as part of the negotiation process, which will only accelerate the ‘return of politics’ to Ukraine amid martial law
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 29 and 31 January indicate further Russian advances in the centre and to the south of Chasiv Yar. Meanwhile, a map published by the Ukrainian General Staff on 2 February confirms that Russian forces have also advanced south of Orkihovo-Vasylivka, a village located around five miles (8km) to the north-east of Chasiv Yar. Further Russian forces have continued to claim of much more extensive gains in the town’s north and centre, but this has yet to be confirmed. As such, it remains likely that the town remains contested, with Ukrainian forces likely retaining positions at various points across the settlement, including near the Refractory Plant in the north.
• BAKHMUT: Further south in Toretsk, geolocated footage from 30 and 31 January confirms slight Russian advances at the northern edge of the town, though Ukrainian counter-attacks continue to slow Russia’s consolidation of the settlement. To the west, it is now confirmed that Russian forces have managed to consolidate control over the pocket that separates Toretsk and Shcherbynivka (located to the west of Toretsk). This will likely allow Russian forces to apply additional pressure to Shcherbynivka itself, though Ukrainian forces are continuing to launch counter-attacks. Geolocated footage from 2 February indicates that Ukrainian forces managed to advance in southern Shcherbynivka from the west. The frequency of such Ukrainian counter-attacks in the area will likely continue to slow Russia’s ability to consolidate control over Toretsk and its satellite settlements.
• DONETSK: In the Pokrovsk sector, Russian forces continue to launch highly attritional offensive operations, while active Ukrainian defensive efforts are inflicting severe losses on the Russians. On 3 February, Viktor Trehubov, spokesperson for the Khortytsia Group of Forces, reported that the intensity of Russian assaults in the Pokrovsk sector has slightly decreased due to Ukrainian defensive operations. Trehubov also claimed that Ukrainian strikes on military logistical targets have contributed to the relative slowdown of operations. On 2 February, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that 15,000 Russian soldiers were neutralised by Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk sector in January alone. Although such figures cannot be corroborated, it is clear that the highly attritional nature of Russian assaults is generating significant losses. That said, Russian forces continued to advance in the sector, making gains on the northern outskirts of Nadiivka, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk as of 31 January.
• DONETSK: Further south, Russian forces are continuing efforts to close the remaining Ukrainian pocket located to the west of the recently captured Kurakhove. Geolocated footage from 30 January shows recent advances in the fields north of Sukhi Yaly, located to the south-west of Kurakhove. Russian troops have continued to progress around Dachne; on 31 January, Russian sources claimed that half of the settlement is under Russian control. Dachne is located directly to the south-west of Kurakhove. Russia made confirmed advances as of 31 January south of Rozlyv, which is also located to the south-west of Kurakhove. Overall, Russian operations are likely aimed at closing or collapsing the Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove. This would free up Russian forces for offensive operations on other parts of the frontline.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continued to advance in the Kupiansk sector, expanding their salient north of the city as part of a long-term effort to push Ukrainian forces from the left (east) bank of the Oskil River. As of 31 January, Russian forces advanced north of Dvorichna, which is located to the north of Kupiansk on the left bank of the river. Russian troops also made gains in the southern outskirts of Zapadne, located to the south-west of Dvorichna and approximately 12.4 miles (20 km) to the north of Kupiansk.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 3 February, Vitaly Ganchev, the head of the Russian Kharkiv oblast occupation administration, reported that Russian forces had occupied the road connecting Dvorichna and Kupiansk. According to Ganchev, Zapadne is already under Russian control. Over the past few days, Russian sources have also claimed that Dvorichna has fallen to Russian control; however, these claims remain visually unconfirmed. If confirmed, such gains will likely facilitate Russian advances towards Kupiansk. Meanwhile, further to the south-east, geolocated footage from 31 January shows recent Russian advances east of Yampolivka, located to the north-east of Lyman.
• SOUTHERN: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on 1 February confirming that Russian forces are now in control of the entirety of Velyka Novosilka. Other maps from 2 February and geolocated footage furthermore indicates that Russian forces are slowly consolidating control of the surrounding area, and have made advances to the south-west and north-east of the town.
• STRIKES: On 1 February, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike against Ukraine, involving 165 projectiles. The attack included seven Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, seven Iskandr-K cruise missiles, eight Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, eight Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles, ten Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles, two Kh-31P guided missiles and 123 drones (Shahed and decoy drones). Ukraine’s Air Force reported the interception of 56 Shahed and decoy drones; 61 drones were recorded as lost. The Air Force also said that countermeasures prevented an unspecified large number of Russian missiles from reaching their targets.
• STRIKES: Despite Ukraine’s defensive efforts, several hits were recorded across the country on 1 February. A Kh-22 missile struck a building in Poltava City (Poltava oblast), killing 14 people. A ballistic missile reportedly damaged the city centre of Odesa (Odesa oblast). The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also reported that the attack struck an area near where Norwegian diplomats were staying in Odesa City. Meanwhile, drones reportedly caused damage to various buildings in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts.
• STRIKES: The latest attack is the first high-intensity combined strike in weeks. Russia typically launches such strikes on a semi-regular basis, partly dictated by Moscow’s management of its long-range missile stocks. We assess that Russia will likely intensify these strikes around key dates, such as the third anniversary of its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February.
• STRIKES: On 31 January, 2 February and 3 February, Russian strikes consisted solely of large-scale drone attacks. Although Ukraine continued to achieve a relatively high interception rate, with a significant number of drones recorded as lost, the attacks still inflicted damage on various sites across Ukraine.
• STRIKES: On 1 February, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) used a drone to destroy a Ukrainian naval drone in the Black Sea. According to Russian milbloggers, the BSF deployed a Kronshtadt Orion missile-capable drone, launched from an unspecified vessel. This is the first documented instance of Russia using a naval asset to launch drones capable of neutralising Ukrainian naval drones. Since the start of the war, Ukrainian naval drone attacks have proven highly effective in degrading Russian naval capabilities and presence in the Black Sea. If Russia significantly expands this capability, it will likely challenge Ukraine’s naval drone strategy in the Black Sea.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continued its long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and defence industrial facilities. Overnight on 30-31 January, Ukraine reportedly struck the Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka Oil Refinery in Volgograd City (Volgograd oblast). The facility is the sixth-largest oil refinery in Russia.
• STRIKES: Russia’s MoD reported the interception of 70 Ukrainian drones on 3 February over Astrakhan, Belgorod, Kursk, Rostov, Volgograd and Voronezh oblasts. In Volgograd oblast, regional authorities reported that falling drones damaged an unspecified refinery. There is a realistic possibility that the attack again damaged the Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka Oil Refinery, especially since Ukraine has been able to attack similar facilities twice in the past few weeks.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• TALKS: US President Donald Trump said on 2 February that his administration has scheduled talks with Russia, Ukraine and unspecified ‘various parties’. Trump did not provide any further details, such as who would be represent each side or when they could possibly take place. Neither Kyiv nor Moscow has officially reported any progress on contact with the Trump administration about negotiations. As such, we cannot confirm whether Trump has indeed made progress towards the possible beginning of talks to end the war. Nevertheless, it is a realistic possibility that Trump is referring to lower-level preliminary discussions with Russian and Ukrainian representatives in the coming weeks, rather than high-level meetings with the presidents of both countries.
• TALKS: Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasised on 30 January that both Russia and Ukraine will have to make concessions for peace to be achieved. Rubio stated that the war will end with neither side reaching their ‘maximalist’ goals, though he did not specify what he believes these to be. Nevertheless, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg, reiterated Rubio’s comments on 2 February about the need for both sides to make compromises if they hope to end the war. Kellogg claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has already indicated that he will ease his position on territory, adding that Russian President Vladimir Putin will also have to soften his stance on different issues.
• TALKS: It is unclear whether Kellogg was referring to private conversations with Zelensky or inferences from previous comments Zelensky has made about territorial concessions. Nevertheless, the remarks from senior Trump officials indicate that the US will highly likely push for both Ukraine and Russia to make difficult compromises, rather than pushing Kyiv to agree to all of Moscow’s demands. That said, the decision to enter negotiations and make concessions ultimately falls to Russia and Ukraine. Both sides (though more likely Russia given its advantage on the battlefield) will likely remain focused on achieving their objectives militarily rather than through diplomacy over the coming weeks.
• TALKS: NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated on 1 February that he has ‘secret’ ideas about potential peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine that will ensure the former never tries to invade again. Rutte offered limited details, though he emphasised the importance of ensuring Ukraine is in the best possible position ahead of any negotiations, including continued military support such as weapons and training. Ultimately, steps from Western partners to improve Kyiv’s position ahead of any possible negotiations in the coming months will also likely be with the long-term aim of deterring Russia from launching a renewed invasion in the future.
FORECAST
POLITICS: Trump’s special envoy for Russia and Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, has disclosed that the US wants Ukraine to hold elections possibly by the end of the year. Reuters reported on the matter on 1 February, citing comments both from Kellogg and unnamed US officials. Notably, the outlet claimed that Kellogg and other White House officials have discussed in recent days the possibility of pushing Kyiv to agree to elections as part of an initial ceasefire truce with Moscow. The Kremlin has recently increased its efforts to cast Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate leader of Ukraine. Moscow is therefore likely to support calls for an election (whether before or after a ceasefire) amid its wider efforts to destabilise Zelensky’s administration.
At the same time, the US is considering another option whereby if Ukraine were to hold a presidential election, the winner could be responsible for negotiating a longer-term peace agreement with Russia. This could possibly mean that a presidential election would be treated as a de facto referendum on a peace agreement and enforcing its terms (such as making concessions on NATO membership and/or territory). However, this idea would significantly elevate government stability risks and possibly jeopardise fragile steps towards ending the war, especially if there is limited public support for its terms or the president enforcing them. Meanwhile, if a hardline Ukrainian nationalist figure won the presidential race, this individual could realistically reject the terms of a longer peace agreement and vow to fight for the total restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Under martial law (which has been in place since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in February 2022), Ukraine cannot hold elections. Despite growing pressure from international partners, especially the US, we assess that presidential and parliamentary elections will unlikely take place in the coming months – especially before any potential ceasefire is agreed. Firstly, Kyiv will almost certainly raise issues surrounding the logistics of holding votes during wartime, particularly when Russia occupies parts of the country and the threats posed by long-range strikes. Secondly, Ukrainian officials would highly likely be concerned of Russian influence operations and efforts to destabilise the elections in favour of candidates and/or political parties which are considered friendly or sympathetic towards Russian interests.
Ultimately, one of Russia’s goals in Ukraine highly likely remains the installation of a Moscow-friendly leadership, or at least one that is neutral in its foreign policy objectives. While Russia’s full-scale invasion has highly likely ended almost all Russia-friendly sentiment among Ukraine’s population, Moscow could realistically support or recognise parties or presidential candidates who are West-sceptic or at the very least unsatisfied with Zelensky’s leadership. These would most likely be figures who claim that the West ‘betrayed’ Ukraine or did not offer enough support for Kyiv to win the war. Russian influence operations in this regard would almost certainly be aimed at shaping Kyiv’s foreign policy trajectory, more specifically causing relations between Ukraine and its largest supporters (the EU, NATO and the US) to break down.
At present, the desire for elections during wartime among the Ukrainian population is limited. Polling from September 2024 by the Razumkov Centre indicates that over half of Ukrainians (56%) are against holding elections (either presidential or parliamentary) before the war ends. In contrast, 28% of respondents support the holding of elections during the war. Irrespective of this, the return of politics to Ukraine is arguably already under way, with growing political infighting likely to emerge over the coming months, most likely as negotiations progress and discussions about post-war Ukraine take shape.
Reports emerged on 30 January that a parliamentary committee has recommended that lawmakers support the suspension of former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko from participating in parliament sessions for six months. The ruling Servant of the People party is reportedly in favour of this, and reflects the intensification of politics and infighting within Ukrainian society. Meanwhile, the National Association of Ukrainian Defence Industries (NAUDI) has urged Zelensky to intervene to restore the work of the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA). According to NAUDI, the DPA has not financed a single contract yet despite the Finance Ministry allocating UAH 19 bn (USD 454,501) for the purchase of weapons and ammunition in early January. Notably, the Washington Post reported on 2 February that the work of the DPA has been frozen for the past week over disagreements concerning who should lead it. Ultimately, infighting (particularly in the defence sector) will possibly undermine Western support for Ukraine in the coming days and weeks, and reflects the intensification of political disagreements within Ukrainian state institutions. Nevertheless, Russia will highly likely want to exploit the revival of politics in Ukraine over the coming months; we assess that shaping operations are possibly already underway in this regard. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on 1 February that it had suppressed a group which had attempted to set up protest movements to destabilise Ukraine on Russia’s orders. The SBU said it had detained five people connected to this scheme, which encouraged Ukrainians to rebel against the government, evade mobilisation and encourage soldiers to desert. While the prospects of Russian intelligence instigating a large-scale anti-government movement remains unlikely in the next six months, we assess that Russia will likely attempt to exacerbate political divisions and infighting during negotiations, which will sustain espionage and low-level unrest risks. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Feb 25. Ukraine’s New Drone Bomber Flies 1,200 Miles with a 550-Pound Bomb – and Returns to Base. Ukraine’s latest unmanned aerial vehicle can fly 1,200 miles, drop a 550-pound (250 Kg) bomb and return to base, making it potentially the most powerful reusable drone in the Russia-Ukraine war.
The Ukrainian military’s unmanned systems branch confirmed the rumored development on Friday. “We see that the actions of the Unmanned Systems Forces are attracting attention from both domestic and international media,” the branch stated.
The branch command
“confirms the use of a long-range UAV, capable of carrying a 250-kilogram air bomb and reaching up to 2,000 kilometers with the possibility of return. This is a unique development that changes the rules of the game on the battlefield.”
It’s unclear what airframe the Unmanned Systems Forces uses as basis for the far-flying, multi-use drone, but the scant photographic evidence points to a modified civilian sport plane. Ukrainian drone regiments have long operated propeller-driven Aeroprakt A-22 sport planes fitted with remote controls and an underbelly bomb rack.
But the A-22s have only ever been caught on video conducting one-way missions, slamming into their targets like slow cruise missiles. The new Ukrainian drone can drop its bomb and then fly back to base, meaning it can fly a few or many missions until it wears out, crashes or gets shot down.
In making its longest-range drones reusable, the drone branch could multiply the number and pace of deep strikes it conducts against targets inside Russia, which have lately included bomber bases and oil facilities. The strikes have raised the cost of Russian bomber sorties targeting Ukrainian cities, and depressed oil production in a country that utterly relies on energy exports for state revenue.
In the three years since Russia widened its war on Ukraine, Kyiv’s engineers have developed a startling array of increasingly far-flying drones. Recent strikes on Russian targets more than 1,000 miles from the front line may have hinted at the emergence of the reusable bomber drone that the Unmanned Systems Forces announced on Friday.
Controlling a drone in mid air, usually through a combination of pre-set GPS-based navigation and direct human control via satellite radio, is fairly straightforward. Landing a drone is hard, however. Smaller models can cut their engines, pop a parachute and float down to the ground. Bigger models must be eased onto a runway.
The world’s leading drone militaries have developed sophisticated automatic landing systems. It’s not clear the Ukrainians are investing the time and money to install these boutique systems in their own relatively inexpensive strike drones, which might cost just a few hundred thousand dollars apiece.
The alternative, long ago mastered by the U.S. Air Force’s Predator and Reaper drone crews, is for a human pilot to take control of an incoming drone in the last few minutes before it reaches its base—and, peering through the drone’s forward-facing camera, guide the machine to a landing. Just like playing a flight simulator. (Source: UAS VISION/Forbes)
06 Feb 25. Ukraine receives first Mirage 2000 fighter jets from France. Ukraine received the first Mirage 2000 fighter jets promised by France on Thursday, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu said, giving the country its second type of Western aircraft in addition to F-16 jets handed over by allies last year.
The Mirage 2000 jets arrived with Ukrainian pilots on board, after several months of training in France, Lecornu said in a post on X. “They will now participate in defending the skies of Ukraine.”
The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine posted an image of a Mirage 2000 taking off in Ukrainian livery and the text “Already in Ukraine.”
A major advantage of flying Western jets is their ability to interface with NATO ordnance such as the Scalp/Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles and guided bombs, as well as older air-to-air missiles that many of Ukraine’s allies have in stock. The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway delivered F-16s to Ukraine last year, with the Dutch planning to hand over another batch in 2025.
French President Macron had announced the plan to delivery French Mirage 2000 jets to Ukraine in June, without providing details at the time. France was planning to deliver a total of six Mirage 2000-5 to Ukraine, according to a budget document published in October on behalf of the National Assembly’s defense committee.
The first delivery to Ukraine would be a batch of three aircraft, armed with MBDA’s Mica air-to-air missiles and Scalp cruise missiles as well as Safran’s AASM Hammer guided bombs, French daily La Tribune reported in October. The aircraft is equipped with two 30 mm canons as well as nine hard points.
The Mirage 2000-5 is an air-superiority version, and the jets for Ukraine were being upgraded with new equipment for air-to-ground combat and defense against electronic warfare, Lecornu said in October. The Mirage 2000 D in use with the French Air Force is a ground-attack version.
The Mirage 2000 first flew in 1978, and an air-defense version entered the French forces in 1984. Dassault Aviation says it has produced 600 of the aircraft, with nearly half of them exported to eight countries including Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, Greece and Taiwan.
The jet has a combat mass of 9.5 tons and a maximum take-off weight of 17.5 tons, a maximum speed of more than Mach 2.2 and can remain on station for 2 hours 40 minutes at a distance of 150 nautical miles from its departure base, according to Dassault Aviation.
France has been gradually replacing its Mirage fleet with Dassault Aviation’s Rafale, with the country planning to retire the Mirage 2000-5 from its forces in 2029 and the Mirage 2000 D in 2035.
The operating cost of a French Mirage 2000 is estimated to be around €17,000 per flying hour, according to a French senate report in October. A 2022 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found operating costs for the F-16 of $26,927 per flying hour in 2020.
Separately, Lecornu said parliament gave final approval to the French 2025 budget, with spending on defense increasing to €50.5 billion, an increase of €3.3bn from last year. Major deliveries to the armed forces this year will include 14 Rafale jets, as well as 308 vehicles in the Scorpion program and lots of Aster air-defense missiles.
“Essential for our rearmament, this increased budget will enable us to continue modernizing our nuclear deterrent, improve the pay of our servicemen and women, and place the first orders for the new-generation aircraft carrier,” Lecornu said in a post on X. (Source: Defense News)
06 Feb 25. Ukraine sees marked improvement in accuracy of Russia’s North Korean missiles.
• Summary
• Russia has used dozens of North Korean ballistic missiles in the war
• Improved performance has implications beyond Ukraine theatre
• Experts say Russia may be helping Pyongyang with technology
North Korean ballistic missiles fired at Ukraine by Russian forces since late December have been far more precise than salvos of the weapons launched over the past year, two senior Ukrainian sources told Reuters.
At a time when Moscow’s burgeoning ties with Pyongyang are causing alarm from Washington to Seoul, the increase in accuracy – to within 50-100m of the intended target – suggests North Korea is successfully using the battlefield to test its missile technology, the sources said.
A military source, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive information, described a marked improvement in the precision in all the more than 20 North Korean ballistic missiles that hit Ukraine over the past several weeks. (Source: Reuters)
Russia Uses the Muravey Cart as a Mobile Drone Launch Platform
On the battlefield, russian occupation forces are utilizing the Muravey, a radio-controlled cart developed by the Hermes Design Bureau (part of a research and production association). Originally designed for cargo transport, the platform is now being used as a mobile launch pad for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in difficult-to-access areas.
While the concept itself is not particularly innovative, its application remains notable—the platform delivers drones in standby mode to a launch position, from where reconnaissance UAVs can be deployed.
Previously, the Hermes Design Bureau claimed to have developed a control station capable of putting drone swarms into sleep mode. This system was reportedly designed to manage an unlimited number of UAVs and activate them simultaneously for transport.
According to the manufacturer, the Muravey cart is equipped with Hermes anti-jamming communication systems.
The robotic platform is controlled remotely from a ground station. In terms of technical specifications, it measures 80 × 90 cm, weighs 27 kg, and can transport up to 25 kg of cargo at speeds of up to 9 km/h across rough terrain. (Source: UAS VISION/Defense Express)
05 Feb 25. Ukraine will deploy Gimli – a new line of logistical UGVs.
The UGV will conduct logistical tasks, from troop evacuation and extraction to transporting ammunition and resources, as well as mobile fire support. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence announced it has codified and adopted a new line of uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs), known as ‘Gimli’, on 4 February 2025.
Depending on the configuration, the robot can also be used as a mobile combat module in its own right when fixed with a weapons payload, conducting fire support against enemy targets.
Gimli UGVs are compact, making them easy to transport. The system comes with a silent electric motor; and with a full charge, the battery lasts for several hours of continuous operation. These robots can operate in the day and at night.
Ukraine’s Main Directorate for Support and Life Cycle of Weapons and Military Equipment agency did not reveal the company that built, developed, or designed the system.
UGVs on the rise
Over the next decade, GlobalData expects the combat segment to dominate the global UGV market; the segment accounts for a 42.1% market share.
This is followed by the logistics segment which registers a 26% share, then Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance segment with a 19% share, among other types.
However, uncrewed systems are now largely modular, meaning users are able to reconfigure uncrewed systems fairly easily – Gimli is one such case.
Learning from the high intensity warfare in Ukraine, the US Army’s Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) programme envisions the development of three separate armed UGVs that could be employed as scouts or escorts for crewed vehicles and mobile land forces.
Past UGV platforms, however, were mainly tailored for explosive ordinance disposal operations due to the limited autonomy and mobility technologies available. Though, this type has now fallen to a market share of 13%.
(Source: army-technology.com)
06 Feb 25. Fibre-Optic Cables Make Ukrainian Drone Safe from Electronic Warfare. Radio signals from standard remote-controlled drones can be interfered with but this one-use ‘wire’ drone can evade enemy interference. Ukraine has started using a drone that can evade enemy jammers.
Standard remote-controlled drones are vulnerable to electronic warfare as their radio signals can get jammed by interfering transmitters.
But a ‘wire’ drone, which comes with a spool of 10 km-long fibre optic cable that unravels during flight, is being used for strikes.
“The main problem in this direction is electronic warfare. And as far as I know, Russians are the most successful in electronic warfare,” a drone technician named Umer told SVT in an interview.
This drone can provide a secure connection between the operator and the drone, but its known drawback is its limited range.
Russia first started using such wire-controlled drones to avoid Ukraine’s electronic warfare, partnering with Chinese factories, according to Ukrainska Pravda, an online Ukrainian media.
Ukrainian companies are reportedly developing their own models and components to fill the market gap within months, according to the local media.
‘Very Efficient’
Umer says the drone is “very efficient” and safe from electronic warfare unless it’s physically destroyed by cutting the cable or shooting the drone down.
“As you see, the technology is super straight, super simple,” he said.
The wire drone can be sent to a target a little over a mile (1.6 km) away from its base, but it can only be used once.
Software engineer Umer works in Sumy Oblast, close to the Ukraine-Russia border, testing different types of drones and modifying them to make them even more effective.
Umer’s family are Tartars who fled Crimea twice – first in 1783 and again in 2014 when Putin occupied Crimea.
“I have my own purpose to be here… because my people suffered a lot from Russians from 1783. Because we were deported. My grandmother, all of my relatives, of course, but we survived. And finally, we came back to Crimea in 1992,” he said. (Source: UAS VISION/euro news)
05 Feb 25. Armed Forces of Ukraine deploy laser weaponry for air defence operations. Ukraine has confirmed the operational use of laser weaponry to defend its territory against aerial threats. Colonel Vadym Sucharevskyi, Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces, stated that these systems have been developed by the country’s defence industry.
The primary role of these laser systems is to counter airborne targets, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Shahed drones. However, no details have been disclosed regarding the effectiveness, technical specifications, or specific type of laser weaponry in use.
Laser-based weaponry is intended as a response to large-scale Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian territory. A key advantage of these systems is their low cost per shot, which could provide a favourable cost-effectiveness ratio against more expensive aerial threats.
In December 2024, Colonel Sucharevskyi previously reported that Ukraine possessed laser weaponry, specifically mentioning the “Tryzub” system. This system was described as capable of engaging aerial targets at distances exceeding two kilometres.
It remains unclear whether the Tryzub system is the result of independent development by Ukraine’s defence industry or if it incorporates expertise from international partners. (Source: Google/DIE)
05 Feb 25. Donald Trump’s administration is expected to present a long-awaited plan to end the war in Ukraine at the Munich Security Conference next week.
The blueprint would reportedly be presented to allies by Keith Kellogg, the president’s special representative for Ukraine, in the first step towards ending the conflict.
The proposal, which is expected to be delivered during the conference in Germany, would come a week before the war reaches its three year mark.
It includes potentially freezing the conflict and the territory occupied by Russian forces while assuring Ukraine with security guarantees to ensure that Moscow cannot attack again.
“I’ll meet with America’s allies who are ready to work with us,” Mr Kellogg said, appearing to confirm plans to attend the Munich gathering.
Tariff threats
The US president has threatened Vladimir Putin with a fresh round of tariffs and sanctions unless he stops “this ridiculous war”.
Mr Trump said he was “doing a favour” for Putin by offering him the chance to negotiate over peace, but would punish Russia if it did not come to the table. Mr Trump has repeatedly promised to bring a swift end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
05 Feb 25. Ukraine trials kamikaze UAVs with autonomous targeting. Ukraine has conducted testing on fixed-wing kamikaze uncrewed aerial systems equipped with machine vision for autonomous target acquisition.
The Brave1 cluster, a government of Ukraine platform designed to develop ideas and products for the defence of Ukraine, announced the testing of artificial intelligence-powered kamikaze drones earlier this week.
AFU Innovation Management Department, with the support of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Colonel Andrii Lebedenko, conducted the tests with support from Ukrainian manufacturers.
“The drones were tasked with covering 15 kilometres from the launch point and, in the final phase of flight, independently homing in on a designated target, which was protected by electronic warfare systems,” Brave1 said in a statement released earlier this week.
“Thanks to machine vision, they do not require external communication after the operator locks onto the target, making them resistant to enemy electronic warfare countermeasures.
“The tests were attended by representatives of Ukraine’s Security and Defense Forces, as well as foundations that provide the army with cutting-edge technologies. (Source: Defence Connect)
05 Feb 25. U.S., DOD’s Commitment to Israel Includes Munitions Previously Withheld. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu today at the Pentagon for a discussion following last night’s meeting between the prime minister and President Donald J. Trump at the White House.
“We’re honored to stand alongside you and stare down many of the same threats that you do, and under President Trump’s leadership, just like you, we are totally committed to achieving peace through strength,” Hegseth told Netanyahu.
He noted that the relationship between the U.S. and Israel is longstanding, and he expects it to continue and grow as the U.S. steps up its commitment to the country.
“We are going to continue to grow our defense industrial base,”Hegseth said. “We’ve supplied munitions that were previously not supplied that are useful in eradicating radical enemies, and we are committed to continuing to do so.”
The U.S. authorized the release of 2,000-pound bombs to Israel, Jan. 25, 2025, a munition that had previously been held back. The president told reporters at the time that those weapons had been paid for and that Israel had been waiting “a long time” for their delivery.
Hegseth also highlighted the mission given to him by the president, which is to achieve peace for the United States by building a stronger military.
“I hope you’ve noticed here at the Defense Department, under President Trump, we are laser-focused on reviving the warrior ethos, on rebuilding America’s military and reestablishing deterrence, which is something you … have done in your neighborhood in impressive, aggressive and important ways,” Hegseth said.
Peace through strength is a concept Israel shares with the United States, Netanyahu said.
“The only way to get peace, and enduring peace, is by being very, very strong,” he said. “And with our alliance and your support, including the decision … of supplying Israel the much-needed tools for our defense, we are a lot stronger than we’ve ever been.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
04 Feb 25. Bomb Blast in Moscow Kills Pro-Putin Paramilitary Leader Wanted by Ukraine. A bomb that exploded in the lobby of a luxury residential complex in Moscow killed Armen Sarkisyan, a pro-Kremlin paramilitary leader in eastern Ukraine. Russian media reported that the bomb detonated early Monday just as Sarkisyan, along with his bodyguards, entered the lobby of the Scarlet Sails residential complex.
According to reports, Sarkisyan, who was injured after the blast, was brought to a Moscow hospital but later succumbed to his injuries. His bodyguard was also killed in the attack, while three others were injured.
Video footage released by law enforcement officials showed extensive damage to the lobby, including shattered glass and a blown-out entrance door.
Also known by the nickname “Armen Gorlovsky,” Sarkisyan was the founder of the Arbat Battalion, an irregular pro-Russian militia group fighting against Ukraine. He also served as the head of the boxing federation in Russian-occupied Donetsk.
Russian authorities described the incident as a targeted and “well-planned” assassination. Kommersant, a Russian business daily, reported that the bomb was likely planted in a couch at the entrance of the building and detonated remotely when Sarkisyan entered the lobby.
No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, but suspicion has fallen on Ukrainian intelligence services, given Sarkisyan’s history of involvement in pro-Russian operations in eastern Ukraine.
Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) had previously charged Sarkisyan in absentia for participating in illegal armed formations and recruiting prisoners to fight against Ukrainian forces. The SBU described him as a “criminal mastermind” with ties to former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who fled to Russia following the 2014 Maidan uprising.
The Arbat Battalion, which Sarkisyan founded in 2022, was composed largely of ethnic Armenians and former Wagner Group fighters, according to the Institute for the Study of War.
The battalion played a role in several key battles during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and was seen as an effort to counterbalance the influence of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was killed in a plane crash in 2023 after an attempted mutiny against Russian leadership.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian special services were investigating the bombing but declined to provide further details.
The attack on Sarkisyan follows a series of high-profile assassinations targeting Russian military officers and officials linked to the war in Ukraine. In December, Ukraine claimed responsibility for the killing of Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, head of Russia’s chemical, biological, and radiological weapons unit, who died in a bomb blast in Moscow. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
03 Feb 25. President Donald Trump on Monday said he wanted a deal granting the US access to Ukraine’s rare earths resources in exchange for continued military and economic aid. (Source: FT.com)
05 Feb 25. Ukraine’s military to roll out units of robotic vehicles. Ukraine’s military will create robotic vehicle units to deploy at the front, the defence minister said on Wednesday, as Kyiv and Moscow vie to gain a technological advantage over their enemy after nearly three years of vicious fighting. The ministry published a photograph of a robotic vehicle with a gun mounted on it as it made the announcement on the Telegram messenger. Unmanned vehicles – in particular aerial ones – have become a key type of weapon in the war since Russia invaded in 2022. With both sides deploying tens of thousands of drones each month in the air, a race is now on to replace as many soldiers on the ground as possible with Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs), officials say, with Ukrainian manpower reserves running short.
“The Ministry of Defence is launching a project that will scale up the use of unmanned ground systems in the military,” a statement from Defence Minister Rustem Umerov published by the defence ministry said.
(Source: Google/Reuters)
05 Feb 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine strikes Russian energy for the third time in 5 days. A Ukrainian long-range drone strike has hit a major oil refinery in Russia’s Volgograd region, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This marks the second attack on the facility within three days and the third on Russian energy in five days. The refinery, one of Russia’s top ten in terms of processing capacity, handles nearly 6 percent of the country’s crude oil production. The strike is part of Ukraine’s continued effort to target Russian energy infrastructure as the war approaches its third anniversary. Russian authorities confirmed that a fire broke out at the refinery during the attack but provided few additional details. A Ukrainian official, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed responsibility for the strike but declined to elaborate on operational specifics. This follows a previous attack on the same facility on Friday, as part of a sustained attempt to damage Russia’s capacity to continue funding the invasion of Ukraine..
Ukraine’s expanding drone capabilities
Ukraine has significantly advanced its drone technology, enabling it to launch precision strikes on key Russian assets from hundreds of miles away. With a growing domestic arms industry, Ukrainian forces have developed drones capable of carrying substantial payloads over extended distances, allowing them to disrupt Russian infrastructure critical to military logistics.
The latest strike highlights Ukraine’s intensifying strategy of targeting oil refineries and other energy facilities to degrade Russia’s economic and logistical capabilities. Similar long-range drone operations have also struck natural gas processing plants and other industrial sites in recent months.
Impact on Russian infrastructure
Russia’s air defense systems have struggled to counter Ukraine’s drone operations. In response to recent waves of drone attacks, Russian military forces claim to have intercepted and destroyed dozens of incoming UAVs across multiple regions. However, Ukraine’s ability to repeatedly penetrate Russian airspace and strike at such critical assets suggests a growing vulnerability in Moscow’s defensive measures.
The Volgograd refinery attack follows a separate Ukrainian strike on the Nizhny Novgorod oil refinery in Kstovo, approximately 520 miles from the front line, which resulted in significant damage. While Ukraine has not publicly acknowledged all details of these operations, the repeated targeting of energy infrastructure indicates a deliberate attempt to weaken Russia’s war effort by disrupting fuel supplies.
For Ukraine, long-range drone strikes serve as a cost-effective means of offsetting Russia’s conventional military superiority in a battle of “engagement economics”.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-strikes-russian-energy-for-the-third-time-in-5-days/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
03 Feb 25. Former Tory MP joins Ukrainian army. Jack Lopresti says he is willing to fight on the front line despite legal implications. A former Conservative MP said he was willing to fight on the front line in Ukraine after travelling to the country to join its army.
Jack Lopresti, 55, decided to sign up for the Ukrainian armed forces in November last year after losing his seat of Filton and Bradley Stoke.
He is part of the Ukrainian International Legion, a unit of the Ukrainian ground forces made up of foreign volunteers.
It is technically illegal for British citizens to enlist in the legion, because of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, but the law has not been enforced since the Spanish Civil War.
Mr Lopresti, a former deputy chairman of the Conservative Party and parliamentary chairman of Conservative Friends of Ukraine, arrived in the country on Jan 15 and is based in Kyiv.
His work does not currently involve face-to-face combat, but Mr Lopresti said he would be willing to fight on the front line if that was needed.
The former veteran told The Telegraph: “I am a soldier. If I’m asked and needed to do any particular task, I will do it to the best of my ability. It would be very strange for me to serve in the Ukrainian military and not say this. I am here and I will do my best.”
He added: “I want to support the wonderful, gallant Ukrainian people in their endeavour to remain a separate nation. This is for Europe, this is for freedom and if Putin won, the ramifications for the world would be catastrophic.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)
31 Jan 25. Russia’s new Black Sea base could force Georgia into Ukraine war, WJS warns. Satellite images show Russia building a naval base in breakaway Abkhazia after losing one-third of its Black Sea fleet to Ukrainian attacks.
Russia is constructing a new naval base in Ochamchira, Abkhazia, raising concerns that Georgia could be pulled into the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the Wall Street Journal reports.
The development comes as Russia seeks to protect its naval assets following significant losses to its Black Sea fleet. According to reports, Ukraine has damaged or destroyed approximately one-third of Russia’s naval forces in the region since the 2022 invasion. The new base location offers greater security for Russian vessels, being further from Ukrainian strike capabilities than existing facilities.
The new base in Abkhazia, a breakaway region internationally recognized as part of Georgia but controlled by Russian-backed separatists, puts Tbilisi in a precarious position: any Ukrainian strikes on Russian naval assets there could effectively force Georgia into the war.
“Ukraine recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, and should it decide to strike, this will eventually mean that Georgia would be dragged into this conflict,” Security analyst Natia Siskuriy from RUSI explains.
Beyond military implications, the base threatens to disrupt a crucial emerging trade route between Asia and Europe. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, over 85% of land-based trade between Europe and China went through Russia. With that northern route now disrupted by sanctions, attention has turned to the Middle Corridor running through Georgia.
The World Bank projects this route could handle 11 m tonnes of cargo by 2030, up from under 3 m tonnes in 2023. Georgia’s planned deep-sea port in Anaklia is key to this expansion, but Siskuriy warns that the Russian base just an hour away “will eventually kill the Anaklia project.”
Satellite imagery reveals ongoing modifications to the Ochamchira port, including widened access points to accommodate larger vessels. While modest in size, experts note the facility could support ships carrying cruise missiles, enhancing Russia’s military presence in the Black Sea region. (Source: News Now)
05 Feb 25. Sergey Mironov: “Trump’s Rare Earth Deal with Ukraine Will Worsen the Conflict and Make It More Difficult to Achieve Peace”
The US attempt to gain access to Ukraine’s rare earth metals will lead to an even greater escalation of the conflict, said Sergey Mironov, leader of the «A Just Russia–Patriots–For Truth» party and faction in the State Duma. He commented on US President Donald Trump’s statement that the United States wants guarantees for rare earth metals in Ukraine.
“Trump’s plan is simple and straightforward: Ukraine begins to supply the US economy with valuable minerals in exchange for weapons and other assistance. Of course, at prices that benefit the United States,” explained Sergey Mironov. “No surprise that the corrupt Zelensky immediately supported the proposal, which would allow him to retain power and money. Moreover, he is ready to send the remnants of the Ukrainian troops overseas to serve the West. Actually, these are the few things in Ukraine that the dictator can still sell—people and resources.”
The Russian MP noted that Trump’s proposal is in line with the policy of his predecessor, Joe Biden, and only contributes to the escalation of the conflict.
“The plan is doomed to fail. Firstly, most of the rare earth deposits are already under Russian control, while the other part requires serious investments. If the Kiev regime decides to transfer them to the West in exchange for weapons, then such enterprises will become legitimate targets for the Russian military,” Sergey Mironov explained. “But the main obstacle is that Russia will never agree to freeze the conflict and will not conduct any negotiations with the illegitimate Ukrainian government. The Ukrainian people will decide for themselves what to do with the subsoil when they are liberated from the Bandera dictatorship.”
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