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Military And Security Developments
Feb 02.
02 Feb 25. A Prague-led international effort to buy ammunition for Ukraine has come under threat by the opposition party of Andrej Babiš, who is slated to make a political comeback in elections later this year. The populist ANO party, which is leading in opinion polls ahead of the October vote, has pledged to put the ammunition initiative on hold if it returns to power. “We have to stop the current way,” said Karel Havlíček, deputy leader of ANO, referring to the initiative being led by the Czech government rather than Nato. Czech President Petr Pavel, a former Nato commander, last year announced that his government was coordinating purchases of artillery shells on international markets in order to help replenish Ukraine’s dwindling ammunition stockpiles and fight Russia’s invasion. But Havlíček expressed doubts about the quality and price of shells. “We have information from the military sector that the quality is not ideal and that it is just extremely expensive,” he said. Ukrainian officials and soldiers say the initiative helped plug an ammunition gap as their forces came under pressure from a renewed Russian offensive last year. There have been reports that a small portion of the shells were of poor quality and could not be used, but Kyiv was overall satisfied with the deliveries. (Source: FT.com)
Jan 30.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• BAKHMUT: Numerous Ukrainian and European military officials have reported that Russian forces have effectively taken Chasiv Yar – a key Ukrainian defensive point over which both sides have fought heavily for almost a year
• NEGOTIATIONS: Russian President Vladimir Putin ruled out speaking directly with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, to end the war, amid wider efforts to question the legitimacy of the latter’s presidency
• AID: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has instructed his government to identify domestic and European sources of funding for key projects while US foreign aid is frozen
• FORECAST: EU officials are reportedly debating whether to resume Russian pipeline gas purchases as part of a possible settlement to end the war in Ukraine
• OFFENSIVES: The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 28 January that Russian forces had intensified offensive operations in several places along the frontline simultaneously, with 193 clashes reported over the previous 24-hour period alone. Ukrainian forces are facing an increasingly difficult situation across the frontline, particularly in Donetsk oblast, where the majority of Russian attention is focussed. On 26 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Ground Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi replaced Andriy Hnatov as Commander of the Khortytsia Group of Forces – the force currently overseeing the most intense part of the frontline in Donetsk. Zelensky stated that the move will improve the co-ordination between military headquarters and the frontline. However, the reshuffle likely reflects the increasingly difficult decisions having to be made as Ukrainian forces steadily withdraw from a number of key defensive positions, including Velyka Novosilka and Chasiv Yar (both Donetsk).
• BAKHMUT: On 29 January, The Moscow Times cited numerous Ukrainian and European military officials who confirmed that Russian forces have effectively taken Chasiv Yar – a key Ukrainian defensive point over which both sides have fought heavily for almost a year. Neither side has officially confirmed the capture of the town, and we cannot independently confirm the report. Nevertheless, geolocated footage indicates Russian forces have continued to make advances in the town centre, as well as along its northern and southern flanks. It remains unclear if Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from the town in its entirety, or are contesting its outskirts.
• BAKHMUT: The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Luhansk Group of Forces fighting in Chasiv Yar reported on 27 January that Russian forces are increasing their use of various heavy equipment, including armoured fighting vehicles. He also reported that Russian forces have blown up sections of pipes along the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal (which runs to the east of Chasiv Yar) in order to create avenues through which armoured vehicles can drive. These reports similarly indicate an intensification of Russian operations in the area and a possible reduction in the threat posed by Ukrainian artillery and drones as Ukrainian forces slowly withdraw westwards.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, geolocated footage from 28 January also indicates that Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces advanced along the T-0504 road to the south of Chasiv Yar. The road is the key artery that connects Bakhmut with Ukrainian-controlled Kostiantynivka. Russian forces also continue to attack to the north of Chasiv Yar, with geolocated footage and maps provided by the Ukrainian General Staff on 29 January indicating advances near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, which is located over five miles (8km) to the north-east of Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage from 27 and 29 January indicates further Russian advances in northern Toretsk. Notably, footage from 27 January indicated Ukrainian advances in northern Toretsk, underscoring continued Ukrainian efforts to counter-attack and contest the outskirts of the settlement. The map published by the Ukrainian General Staff on 28 January also confirms that Russian forces are in complete control of Niu York, located to the west of Toretsk.
• BAKHMUT: If confirmed in the coming days, the seizure of Chasiv Yar would mark a notable victory for Russian forces, given its highly advantageous elevated position over the southern approaches to the Ukrainian urban belt running from Kostiantynivka to Sloviansk. If Russian forces consolidate control over the town, this will open up the next phase of their operations in the area, which will likely focus on driving west towards the much larger, and likely heavily fortified, city of Kostiantynivka. Given Russian forces are also consolidating control over Toretsk (located to the south) and are pushing along Pokrovsk’s eastern flanks (located to the south-west), they are likely preparing to approach Kostiantynivka from three directions over the coming months – potentially advancing along the T-0504 from Pokrovsk (from the south-west), as well as the T-0516 from Toretsk (from the south) and the T-0504 from Chasiv Yar (from the east). However, given the rate of Russian advances over the last year, this would possibly take a significant amount of time to accomplish.
• DONETSK: Intense fighting continues in the Pokrovsk sector, where the Russian command’s focus remains on bypassing the city and advancing westwards towards the Dnipropetrovsk oblast border. On 29 January, Nazar Voloshyn, the spokesperson for the Khortytsia Group of Forces, stated that Ukrainian forces are inflicting severe losses on Russian troops in the sector. That said, Russia continues to make confirmed gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on 27 January shows recent Russian advances along the Donetska Railway on the south-eastern outskirts of Udachne, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, both sides made confirmed gains in the sector of Kotlyne, located to the west of Pokrovsk; this likely underscores the intense fighting in the area.
• DONETSK: Further south, the deputy commander of a drone battalion of the Ukrainian National Guard reported on 30 January that Russia retains the offensive initiative in the Kurakhove sector. He also stated that current bad weather, particularly intense fog, is hindering Ukrainian First Person View (FPV) drone operators’ ability to counter Russian advances in the area with drone strikes. Notably, Russian forces recently captured Slovyanka, located to the north-west of Kurakhove; they advanced to the west of the captured settlement. Russian troops also made confirmed advances to the south of Dachne, located to the west of Kurakhove.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: A Ukrainian commander claimed on 27 January that North Korean forces are taking such heavy casualties in Kursk oblast (Russia) that they appear to have temporarily withdrawn from the frontline, though this cannot be confirmed. He claimed that they will likely return to frontline operations soon. Numerous Ukrainian sources have appraised the North Koreans’ performance on the battlefield as one in which they have showcased high levels of discipline. If North Korean forces are conducting a pause, they are likely making efforts to learn from recent experiences given their previous willingness to continue pressing an attack despite the extreme threats posed by Ukrainian drones and artillery to relatively ill-defended dismounted infantry assault units. Meanwhile, heavy fighting continues across the Kursk salient. Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 27 January that its forces had taken Nikolayevo-Darino, located to the north-west of Sudzha. While we cannot confirm if Ukrainian forces have withdrawn entirely from the village, Russian forces are likely advancing slowly in this direction.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russia continued offensive operations in the direction of Kupiansk as part of its aim to envelop the city. On 28 January, Russia’s MoD claimed that its forces had captured Dvorichna, located to the north-east of Kupiansk on the west bank of the Oskil River. However, Kharkiv Oblast Governor Oleh Syniehubov denied such claims, stating that fighting is ongoing in the settlement. According to Russian milbloggers, the capture of Dvorichna would allow Russian forces to advance towards Kyslivka and Zapadne, two settlements located to the west and north-west of Dvorichna. The trajectory of this offensive is part of Russia’s wider effort to envelop Kupiansk from the west and/or advance to the north-west to support Russian operations near Vovchansk in Kharkiv oblast. Despite conflicting reports on the status of Dvorchina, we assess that Russian forces will possibly be in control of the settlement in the near term. Meanwhile, to the south-east, Russian forces made gains to the north-west of Novosadove and Novolyubivka, two settlements located to the south-west of Svatove.
• SOUTHERN: A map published by the Ukrainian General Staff on 29 January indicates that Russian forces have continued to advance to the north-east and south-west of Velyka Novosilka, though Ukrainian sources continue to claim they retain a foothold in the western outskirts of the town itself. The map indicates Russian forces advanced to the north of Rozdolne (located to the north-east of Velyka Novosilka), as well as to the south-east of Novodarivka (located to the south-west) and near Olhivske (also located to the south-west).
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russian strikes have primarily consisted of drone attacks of varying scale. These attacks have continued to include a large number of decoy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which were typically reported as lost. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s interception rate has remained relatively high. Direct hits and falling debris have continued to cause damage to a range of infrastructure. For instance, the 29 January attack damaged port infrastructure in Odesa oblast (Ukraine). The current lull in missile strikes likely indicates Moscow’s ongoing efforts to replenish its stockpiles of cruise and ballistic missiles. High-intensity combined strikes are likely to resume in the coming weeks at a semi-regular pace, alongside frequent drone attacks.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continued its drone campaign against oil infrastructure and defence facilities inside Russia. On 29 January, Russia’s MoD reported that Russian air defences intercepted 104 Ukrainian-launched UAVs targeting Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Nizhny Novgorod, Kursk, Rostov, Smolensk and Tver oblasts (all Russia). The attack prompted the Russian authorities to halt flight operations temporarily at both Kazan International Airport (KZN, Republic of Tatarstan) and St Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport (LED, Leningrad oblast).
• STRIKES: In Smolensk, the regional authorities claimed that one UAV was allegedly shot down near a nuclear energy facility, which was undamaged. We assess that Ukrainian forces are highly unlikely to target Russian nuclear energy facilities deliberately. Instead, Ukrainian strikes typically focus on targeting production plants and oil facilities used for military purposes. Notably, an unnamed Ukrainian military source, quoted by Ukrainska Pravda, revealed the attack also hit the Andreapol oil pumping station and a missile arsenal in Tver. The Andreapol oil pumping station is part of the oil export route via the Baltic Sea port of Ust-Luga and is connected to the Baltic Pipeline System-2. Ukrainian forces also reportedly struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo (Nizhny Novgorod).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: On 28 January, Russian President Vladimir Putin ruled out speaking directly with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, to end the war. Putin questioned Zelensky’s legitimacy as a leader since his presidential term expired in May 2024, even though martial law prohibits the holding of elections in Ukraine during wartime. The Russian president nevertheless stated that he would appoint people to speak with Zelensky if he does want to participate in negotiations. Such comments are highly likely aimed at suggesting that the Ukrainian side is undermining the (potential) road to peace and discrediting Zelensky’s earlier peace proposals; this is also possibly a tactic to stall the beginning of any such peace talks. In the longer term, however, Moscow will possibly use Zelensky’s ‘illegitimacy’ to justify reneging on or violating any peace / ceasefire deal.
• AID: NATO is on track to send Ukraine over USD 40 billion in support in 2025. The alliance’s deputy secretary general, Radmila Šekerinska, disclosed the news on 29 January, though no further details were provided as to what the support includes. Nevertheless, the provision of such assistance underscores efforts from Ukraine’s partners to maintain stable and sustained military support given the likelihood of US aid diminishing in the coming months.
• AID: Meanwhile, reports emerged on 28 January that the US facilitated the transfer of around 90 Patriot air defence interceptors from storage in Israel to Poland this week for delivery to Ukraine. While we cannot confirm this development, Ukraine has consistently asked its partners for help in bolstering its air defences for better protection against Russian long-range strikes. Despite the possible transfer, Ukrainian air defence interceptor shortages will highly likely continue, which Russia will likely seek to exploit in the coming months.
• AID: President Zelensky disclosed on 29 January that he has instructed his government to identify domestic and European sources of funding for key projects while US foreign aid is frozen. This includes funding sources related to energy infrastructure, as well as support for military veterans, border checkpoints, health and cyber security. A Ukrainian parliamentary committee has also confirmed the launch of consultations with European partners related to a temporary replacement of US funding. However, it ultimately remains unclear if or when European partners could step in to support Ukrainian projects given the likely extra budgetary pressures this would entail. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 27 January 2025.
• AID: Mykhailo Podolyak, the Ukrainian presidential advisor, assessed on 29 January that the US will possibly resume funding humanitarian projects in Ukraine once it completes the necessary audits. While there is a realistic possibility that the US will continue to fund humanitarian work in Ukraine to some extent, we assess that the scope of what it is willing to fund will likely be limited. This would likely include projects designed to keep core Ukrainian infrastructure running, such as energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a waiver on 28 January for life-saving humanitarian assistance. This is defined as core life-saving medicine, medical services, food supplies, shelter and subsistence assistance. Ultimately, this will likely help with the provision of certain medical assistance and humanitarian support in Ukraine.
FORECAST
ENERGY: EU officials are reportedly debating whether to resume Russian pipeline gas purchases as part of a potential settlement to end the war in Ukraine. The Financial Times (FT) cited unspecified insiders familiar with the matter earlier on 30 January. While we cannot confirm the report, we assess that Russian gas supplies to the EU are unlikely to resume in the coming months, not least given conflicting stances within the bloc on the matter.
Several unnamed German and Hungarian officials are reportedly advocating the purchase of Russian gas, while unspecified Eastern European countries (likely to include Poland) oppose the matter. Those in favour of reinstating Russian gas flows to Europe argue that such a move would lower high energy prices. Yet aside from causing internal friction between European allies, this would likely increase regional tensions with the US. Notably, President Donald Trump has threatened the EU with tariffs unless it buys more liquified natural gas (LNG) from the US – which an influx of much cheaper Russian gas would directly undermine.
Nevertheless, the report indicates how the West can possibly use energy and sanctions relief to encourage Russia to enter negotiations and maintain a ceasefire. A resumption of Russian gas supplies to EU countries would significantly bolster Russian revenues. According to the European Council, the share of Russian pipeline gas imported by the EU fell from over 40% in 2021 to around 8% in 2023. That said, a resumption of Russian gas purchases would almost certainly once again increase dependency on Moscow, which would in turn increase the risk of energy weaponisation over the coming years.
If Russian gas purchases reach the same levels as those prior to Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia would likely be undeterred in launching renewed aggression against Ukraine, as it was in 2022. European reliance on Russian energy supplies would likely lead Moscow to infer that genuine long-term diversification is unlikely and that the European market will re-open for Moscow as and when the timing is right, irrespective of Russian military actions. This would reinforce Moscow’s logic that time is on its side and that Russia can outlast European resolve concerning sanctions and energy.
Meanwhile, reports emerged on 29 January that the EU will not ban Russian LNG until the bloc secures alternatives. Unnamed EU diplomats stated that the European Commission (EC) did not propose a ban on Russian LNG in its latest sanctions package against Moscow because member states raised concerns about first sourcing alternatives, including from the US. Russian LNG is one of Europe’s last major energy dependencies vis-à-vis Moscow. The continent imported record amounts of Russian LNG in 2024 – some 17.8 million tonnes (over 2 million tonnes more than in 2023). Lastly, the EU will likely delay publishing its roadmap on phasing out Russian fossil fuels by a month, according to a report on 27 January by Bloomberg. The EC will possibly present the plan on 26 March. The EU has set itself a goal to end Russian gas imports by 2027. Nevertheless, the latest reports concerning the possibility of resuming Russian pipeline imports and delays in targeting LNG will possibly undermine the prospects of reaching this target and minimising dependency on Russian supplies in the longer term.
Jan 29.
• Ukraine: Abuse of power case highlights persistent irregularities in military procurement. On 28 January, Radio Free Europe revealed that Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) had initiated criminal proceedings against Defence Minister Rustem Umerov. The case was opened on charges of abuse of power after Umerov refused to extend the contract of the head of the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA), Marina Bezrukova. This decision was made despite the DPA’s supervisory board unanimously voting in favour of renewing Bezrukova’s tenure. Umerov was able to overrule the board’s decision due to recent changes to the agency’s charter and also dismissed two members of the DPA’s supervisory board. Anti-corruption activists and lawmakers have described these changes, along with Umerov’s decisions, as unlawful. The case highlights increasing infighting within the defence ministry over Ukraine’s military procurement, which is under heightened scrutiny due to scandals involving malfunctioning military equipment and irregularities in procurement contracts. We assess that Umerov’s investigation, along with other corruption cases linked to the defence ministry, will likely fuel discontent among the public and/or the military; however, it is unlikely to increase the risk of protests significantly.
Jan 27.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• SOUTHERN: The Russian MoD has claimed that their forces have taken the entire town of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast); however, Ukrainian forces claim that fighting is still ongoing
• STRIKES: Ukraine has continued its increasingly successful strike campaign against Russia’s oil refineries; a number of large-scale attacks this week will likely impact Russian logistics
• CONCESSIONS: Recent polling indicates that over half of Ukrainians (50.6%) support working with other countries to find a compromise to end hostilities
• FORECAST: Reports emerged in Ukrainian media on 26 January that the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has been told to stop all projects and spending in Ukraine; however, exemptions are possible in the coming days
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 24 January indicates Russian forces made advances to the south of Chasiv Yar; Russian sources have made wider claims of further advances within Chasiv Yar itself, but these remain unconfirmed. Fighting remains intense in and around the town; Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces claimed on 25 January that its forces recently damaged and destroyed eight Russian infantry fighting vehicles (BMDs) in Chasiv Yar. While we cannot confirm this, it would reflect the wider trend of high losses for attacking Russian forces, even those conducted by relatively well-equipped forces such as the airborne (VDV) units. Meanwhile, further south in Toretsk, heavy fighting also continues. However, Russian forces have made little confirmed advances in recent days. Nevertheless, they are likely conducting further clearing operations to consolidate control over the town while focusing on pushing the last remnants of the Ukrainian defence from the northern periphery of the settlement.
• DONETSK: In the Pokrovsk sector, Russian forces continued to make advances as part of ongoing efforts to flank the city and cut it off from key supply routes. Geolocated footage from 25 January indicates recent Russian advances to the east of Sukhyi Yar, located to the south-east of Pokrovsk. Russian forces also made marginal advances in the area to the north of Kotlyne (to the west of Pokrovsk) as of 25 January. We previously assessed that intense fighting is likely to take place in the Kotlyne sector.
• DONETSK: Further south, Russian forces also continued to advance to the west and north-west of Kurakhove. Geolocated footage from 25 January shows recent marginal advances up to the north-eastern outskirts of Andriivka. Andriivka is located around 12.4 miles (20km) to the west of Kurakhove. Russian forces also made recent, though limited, gains in the eastern outskirts of Dachne, immediately to the west of Kurakhove. However, Ukrainian forces are still successfully defending the Dachne pocket which otherwise still remains vulnerable to being cut off by Russian forces attacking from the south-west and north-east near Andriivka. Closing this pocket is likely the key priority for Russian forces fighting in the area; however, it remains unclear when and if Ukrainian forces will choose to withdraw to prevent their forces being encircled.
• KHARKIV: A Ukrainian brigade fighting on the Kharkiv frontline reported on 24 January that their forces successfully repelled a battalion-sized Russian mechanised assault on an unspecified date. The attack reportedly consisted of over 30 armoured vehicles and included more modern tanks, including refurbished T-80s. The Russians had reportedly been preparing the assault for a month; while we cannot confirm the precise nature of the attack, Russian forces have made very few confirmed gains in the Kharkiv direction for many months.
• KURSK: President Volodymyr Zelensky reaffirmed on 26 January that Ukrainian forces are maintaining a ‘buffer zone’ in Kursk oblast to protect Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts from Russian attacks. This operation almost certainly intends to pin Russian (and North Korean) forces in the region, preventing them from repositioning to support offensive operations inside Ukraine. Overall, Russian efforts to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Kursk are progressing very slowly; only marginal advances were reported over the last week. Ukrainian forces are meanwhile counter-attacking at multiple locations, indicating that they retain sufficient capability to conduct a tactical active defence. That said, pressure from Russian and North Korean forces remains high.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupiansk area; however, they did not make any confirmed gains over the past few days. According to a commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the sector, Russian offensives aim to envelop Kupiansk and Kupiansk-Vuzhlovyi (immediately to the south of Kupiansk) from the north and south. A Ukrainian observer explained that Russian forces are currently trying to expand their bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River, near Dvorchinna, located to the north of Kupiansk. According to the Ukrainian source, such efforts could result in expanding the Russian salient north of Kupiansk as part of the broader goal to envelop the city. That said, we assess that direct attacks against the Kupiansk remain unlikely in the short term.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Meanwhile, in the Borova sector (to the west of Svatove and close to the Oskil River), Russian forces made confirmed gains. Geolocated footage from 26 January shows recent Russian advances in eastern Tverdokhlibove (Luhansk oblast), located to the south-east of Borova (Kharkiv oblast). Such advances likely indicate that Novoyehorivka (located immediately to the east of Tverdokhlibove) has fallen under Russian control.
• SOUTHERN: On 26 January, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that their forces have taken the entire town of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast); however, Ukrainian forces claim that fighting is still ongoing in parts of the town. Ukraine’s 110th Mechanised Brigade, which is fighting in the area, acknowledged that their forces have ‘partially withdrawn’ from the town but also claimed fighting continues. The Brigade also reported that its troops had avoided encirclement by partially withdrawing after the Russians had surrounded the town on three sides. It also assessed that the Mokri Yaly River (to the town’s west) remains an obstacle to further Russian advances. This likely indicates that the retreating Ukrainian forces will use the river as a natural defensive barrier to slow further Russian advances to the west of the town, should Russian forces attempt to do so.
• SOUTHERN: While we cannot confirm whether Ukrainian forces remain in Velyka Novosilka itself, geolocated footage published on 26 and 27 January indicates that Russian forces have taken control of the town centre and are likely pushing west. Russian forces are likely conducting clearing operations with only the north-west of the town likely remaining contested. It also remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces intend to counter-attack in a bid to stall the Russian advance and prevent them from consolidating control over the town in the short term. The seizure of Velyka Novosilka would be Russia’s most significant gain of 2025 and could realistically allow Russia’s High Command to reallocate forces to support other major offensive priorities to the north, including towards Pokrovsk or Kostyantynivka (both Donestsk oblast).
• STRIKES: Over the past few days, Russia’s strike campaign has primarily involved daily large-scale drone attacks. On 25 January, Russia’s attack included, in all, two Kh-59/Kh-69 missiles in addition to its typical drone strikes. Ukraine achieved a relatively high interception rate of drones and shot down the two missiles launched on 25 January. However, direct hits and falling debris caused damage to various infrastructure facilities and buildings across the country.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continued its increasingly successful strike campaign against Russia’s oil refineries. On 24 and 26 January, Ukrainian forces struck Russia’s Ryazan Oil Refinery (Ryazan oblast) twice. The 24 January attack was part of a large-scale Ukrainian drone operation involving, in all, 121 drones, according to Russian sources. Local residents reported around 50 explosions near the Ryazan Oil Refinery, one of the largest oil refining facilities in Russia. As a result of the attack, fires erupted at the facility. It remains difficult to determine whether the 26 January attack resulted in a direct hit or to distinguish the damage it caused from that inflicted by the 24 January attack. The facility plays a crucial role in supplying fuel to military-industrial complexes. In addition to highlighting Ukraine’s growing long-range drone capabilities, the trend of attacks against the Ryazan Oil Refinery in quick succession underscores the persistent vulnerability of Russia’s strategic infrastructure, likely due to chronic air defence shortages.
• STRIKES: The large-scale Ukrainian drone attack on 24 January targeted various Russian regions, including Bryansk oblast, where drones reportedly damaged the Kremniy El microchip plant. The plant’s press service reported that the attack disrupted the facility’s power supply and assembly lines, causing a halt in operations. Kremniy El is one of Russia’s largest microelectronics manufacturers, supplying 94% of its production to the Russian MoD. The plant has been targeted at least twice since the start of the war.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko stated on 24 January that one of Moscow’s key demands to end the war is ensuring Ukraine does not join NATO. Grushko also described a declaration that Ukraine and Georgia would join the military alliance from a NATO summit in Romania, in the capital Bucharest, in 2008 as ‘catastrophic’ for European security. According to him, a failure on NATO’s part to revoke this declaration will create ambiguity, which Moscow said is unacceptable when considering the need to achieve a viable and sustainable end to the war.
• NEGOTIATIONS: In response, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated on 23 January that Russia does not have a say in which countries decide to join the military bloc. Russia cited NATO expansion as a ‘justification’ for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; it also demanded that the alliance rule out Ukraine’s accession in December 2021. As such, Russia’s objective of ensuring Ukraine does not join NATO has not changed. We also assess that Moscow is highly unlikely to change its stance on the matter over the course of any possible negotiations to end the war in the coming months. A compromise over Ukraine’s NATO membership is therefore a likely prerequisite for a peace treaty. Although Ukraine will highly unlikely join NATO in the foreseeable future, Kyiv will almost certainly continue to believe membership is the best form of deterrence against renewed Russian aggression.
• NEGOTIATIONS: The Kremlin press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, reiterated on 24 January that Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready for dialogue with his US counterpart, President Donald Trump. Despite Peskov’s statement that Moscow is waiting for signals from Washington DC, an alleged readiness for dialogue does not necessarily mean a willingness to take concrete steps towards resolving the conflict. Meanwhile, Trump claimed on 23 January that Ukraine wants to ‘settle’ the war now, stating that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky should not have allowed the war to happen. Trump alleged that the US could have made a deal to halt the full-scale invasion ‘easily’ without specifying how. While such comments assigning mutual blame for the conflict to Ukraine will likely drive concerns within the Zelensky administration, Zelensky has stated his support for Trump and his government’s belief that the US president is in a position to facilitate a just peace for Ukraine.
• CONCESSIONS: Recent polling indicates that over half of Ukrainians (50.6%) support working with other countries to find a compromise to end the war. Ukrainian media shared details of the survey, which was conducted in December 2024 by the political sociology company Socis, earlier on 27 January. The share of Ukrainians in favour of freezing hostilities along the current frontline increased from 8.2% in February 2024 to 19.5% in December 2024. Over the same period, the share of Ukrainians willing to continue the war to push Russia fully out of Ukraine (including the Russian-annexed peninsula of Crimea) has fallen from 33.5% to 14.7%.
• CONCESSIONS: Despite the increase in support for finding a resolution to the conflict, the Ukrainian authorities are reportedly concerned about how a failure to obtain robust security guarantees will elevate domestic unrest and government stability risks. Such risks will highly likely increase if Ukraine is pushed to make unpopular concessions for the sake of ending the war (namely ceding territory and agreeing to halt its aspirations to join NATO). Thus, it remains a realistic possibility that the Ukrainian government will call for a referendum on enacting the terms of any peace agreement if elements of it are likely to cause backlash in Ukrainian society. For further analysis, see Sibylline Special Report – 25 October 2024.
FORECAST
AID: Reports emerged in Ukrainian media on 26 January that the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has been told to stop all projects and spending in Ukraine. USAID’s presence in Ukraine supports humanitarian work, including providing medical services, reconstructing schools and repairing the country’s energy system. The reports come after the US State Department froze nearly all existing foreign assistance globally on 24 January after US President Donald Trump issued an executive order to pause such aid for 90 days.
Senior US diplomats in the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs requested a full waiver to exclude USAID operations in Ukraine. However, USAID employees in Ukraine currently lack clear guidance on how to halt projects and whether there are some exceptions. Nevertheless, the agency’s staff in Ukraine reported ‘positive signals’ from the US on 25 January about whether the request for an exemption would be approved in whole or partially. However, we are unable to confirm these claims or whether USAID in Ukraine will be granted waivers to continue operating some (or all) of its projects.
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, USAID has provided Ukraine USD 2.6 bn in humanitarian aid, USD 5 bn in development assistance and more than USD 30 bn in direct budget support. As such, the halt in USAID’s operations in Ukraine will likely increase budgetary pressure for Ukraine and undermine already-strained socio-economic health conditions. It will also possibly increase pressure on non-USAID-supported infrastructure (possibly including medical facilities). Despite the freeze order, US military assistance to Ukraine is not affected. President Zelensky confirmed this on 25 January, meaning that a drastic reduction in Ukraine’s fighting capabilities and/or weapons shortages in the short term is unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Jan 25. Ukraine Approves Locally-Produced Poseidon UAV for Frontline Use. Ukraine is to expand its use of Poseidon vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) uncrewed air vehicles (UAVs), following a new approval by the nation’s defence ministry.
On 22 January, Kyiv announced that it had “codified and adopted the domestically-produced Poseidon UAV system for deployment within the units of the defence forces”.
Developed by Cyprus-based company Swarmly as the H10 Poseidon, the VTOL type already has been operated by Ukraine’s armed forces since the Russian invasion of February 2022.
The Poseidon H10 MkIII was initially contracted for testing in May 2022. During its trials, the drone demonstrated several advanced features that set it apart from many previously deployed systems. These included resistance to electronic warfare, the ability to autonomously evade threats and return to base, stable flight performance even in adverse weather, and reliable operation over extended distances. This system is designed to execute a wide range of missions, from advanced reconnaissance to providing tactical support for infantry, artillery, and intelligence units.
The Poseidon H10 MkIII integrates sophisticated technology to maximize its operational effectiveness. It features a day camera with a 20x synthetic zoom and stabilization for precise imaging, as well as a thermal imaging camera with a 4x zoom for enhanced performance in low-visibility conditions. These features enable detailed monitoring and data collection regardless of the time of day or weather. The UAV operates at altitudes of up to 5,000 meters and can reach a maximum speed of 150 km/h, with an operational range of 150 km. The system is designed for versatility, functioning reliably in extreme temperatures ranging from -40°C to +60°C.
Each Poseidon H10 MkIII system consists of three drones and two control stations, ensuring uninterrupted operations even in the event of a drone loss. To facilitate rapid deployment, the system includes transport cases that securely store all components, making it suitable for various field conditions. Operators undergo rigorous training at the 190th Training Center, where they master the use of the drone before deployment. This comprehensive preparation ensures that operators can maximize the system’s potential in real-world operations.
The drone is particularly effective during counteroffensive operations, where timely intelligence and precise targeting are critical. By offering extended surveillance and real-time data transmission, the Poseidon H10 MkIII allows ground forces to anticipate and neutralize threats with greater efficiency. Its advanced counter-electronic warfare systems further enhance its resilience in contested airspace, making it a reliable tool for modern military engagements.
The introduction of the Poseidon H10 MkIII underscores Ukraine’s commitment to developing locally sourced defense technology, reducing reliance on foreign suppliers while bolstering its defense industrial base. This approach aligns with the broader objective of achieving technological independence and ensuring sustainable support for the military’s evolving needs. Furthermore, the use of domestically produced systems like the Poseidon contributes to operational self-reliance, a crucial factor in sustaining long-term conflict readiness.
“The operational altitude of these drones exceeds the reach of many enemy air defence systems,” notes deputy defence minister Dmytro Klimenkov, with the air vehicle also equipped with unspecified “advanced navigation technology”.
Meanwhile, Kyiv has approved funding of UAH2.5 billion ($60 million) which will be provided directly to its combat units each month.
“These funds will be distributed among brigades of the armed forces to procure drones,” the defence ministry says.
An initial allocation of UAH2.1 billion was made last December, “enabling the rapid fulfilment of our brigades’ needs and enhancing the diversification of centralised command”, it states.“We have analysed this experience and decided to scale up the initiative,” says defence minister Rustem Umerov. “Commanders of the units will have the flexibility to use these funds to acquire the drones that are the most effective for carrying out mission requirements.”
Kyiv is already set to receive some 30,000 new surveillance and attack drones via a multinational initiative between NATO members Denmark, Latvia, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Other alliance nations, including Canada, Norway and Portugal, also are providing funds to enable Ukraine’s defence industry to boost domestic output of UAVs. (Source: UAS VISION/Army Recognition; FlightGlobal)
31 Jan 25. Ukrainian Forces Detect and Intercept Russian Fiber-Optic Drone Using Mobile Radar. Robert Brovdi, the commander of Ukraine’s 414th Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Strike Battalion, known as “Magyar’s Birds,” released a video on his Telegram channel demonstrating the successful interception of a Russian fiber-optic-controlled first-person view (FPV) drone. While Brovdi praised the radar system’s capabilities and role in the interception, he did not specify the exact type of radar in use.
The “Magyar’s Birds” brigade has reportedly acquired advanced detection technology capable of identifying fiber-optic drones. According to Brovdi, the unit is now equipped with mobile radar stations designed to detect drones at significant distances.
Fiber-optic drones have emerged as a major but also practical technological breakthrough in drone warfare, as they are impervious to electronic warfare (EW) measures like jamming. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have increasingly adopted fiber-optic systems, with Ukraine striving to scale up its production to match Russia’s capabilities. The intercepted Russian drone is believed to be the “Vandal” (or “Prince Vandal of Novgorod”), a fiber-optic-controlled UAV that Ukrainian forces have previously recovered.
The 414th brigade recently unveiled its own fiber-optic FPV drone model capable of operating at distances of up to 41 kilometers. The fiber-optic connection ensures a secure, interference-free link between the drone and its operator while also providing higher-resolution footage compared to conventional radio-controlled drones. Reports indicate that Ukraine is ramping up production, with an estimated 1,000 units currently in development.
(Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
30 Jan 25. Sweden to provide Ukraine with $1.2bn military aid package. Sweden will provide Ukraine with 13.5bn kronor (US$1.23bn) in funding and equipment in its biggest military aid package yet, the government said on Thursday.
The Nordic country will double the amount of Stridsbåt 90 combat boats it’s donating from Swedish armed forces stocks to 32 boats, Minister for Defence Pål Jonson said in a post on X. Other equipment will include 1,500 TOW anti-tank missiles and 200 AT4 anti-tank weapons, with total donations from stocks amounting to about $294m, or around 25% of the aid package.
Sweden will provide about 5.9bn kronor to buy newly produced defense equipment for Ukraine from Swedish and international manufacturers, the government said in a statement. That financing can be directed to priority needs such as artillery, long-range strike capabilities and drones, according to Jonson.
“A short delivery time is important,” the minister said.
The latest aid package, Stockholm’s 18th, brings Sweden’s military support for Ukraine to about 61.9bn kronor, the government said. The country has been one of the top donors of military aid to Ukraine, ranking sixth in terms of the absolute level of material support provided, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy’s Ukraine Support Tracker.
Another $71m will go to repair and maintenance of equipment already donated by Sweden. The Swedes have previously provided Ukraine with gear including Leopard 2 battle tanks, CV90 combat vehicles and Archer self-propelled howitzers.
The country will provide about $250m towards different international funds, and allocate $178m for the Danish model of ordering weapons from Ukraine’s defense industry, according to Jonson.
“This also builds sustainability and resilience within Ukraine,” he said.
The intention is to allocate about 1bn kronor to the production of Ukrainian long-range missiles and long-range drones, according to the government. (Source: Defense News)
31 Jan 25. Russia closes in on key Ukrainian city, seeking gateway for future advances.
• Russian forces sweep around the south of strategic city
• Pokrovsk, a key road and rail hub, risks being cut off
• Ukrainian military officers say their forces are outnumbered
• Battle for Pokrovsk comes as both sides position for peace talks
Russian forces are slowly tightening the noose around the eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub whose main supply lines are under threat nearly three years after Moscow invaded its neighbour.
While Ukraine is stubbornly defending the city, its encirclement or fall could put Russia in a strong position to mount attacks in several directions in the east and increase pressure on Kyiv at a critical juncture in the war.
Inside Pokrovsk, life is bleak. According to the regional governor, 7,000 residents remain out of a pre-war population of 60,000. The last post office recently closed – mail will now be delivered by armoured truck.
On either side of the city, Russian troops are within artillery and drone range of a crucial highway that runs east to west along the entirety of Ukraine, and most cars now take detours along backroads into Pokrovsk (Source: Reuters)
28 Jan 25. Western officials and anti-corruption groups have warned that a dispute between Ukraine’s defence minister and its weapons procurement chief could disrupt arms supplies and undermine US confidence in Kyiv. The conflict erupted last Friday, when Ukrainian defence minister Rustem Umerov sacked Maryna Bezrukova, director of the country’s defence procurement agency, over an “unsatisfactory” job performance and failure to deliver arms and ammunition to the troops on the frontline. The move came at a precarious moment for Ukraine as it nears the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion amid doubts about how long President Donald Trump will maintain US military and financial support for the country. Bezrukova, who denied the claims, defied Umerov’s dismissal, asserting that the agency’s independent supervisory board had voted to extend her contract for another year on Monday. She also argued that Umerov had no legal authority to reverse this decision. The row has sparked an outcry from Ukrainian lawmakers and anti-corruption activists, as well as western diplomats, who warned that any sign of dysfunction could play into Russian hands and reinforce concerns within Trump’s circle about corruption in Ukraine’s military supply chain. In a statement on Monday, ambassadors representing the G7 nations in Ukraine urged Kyiv to resolve the dispute “expeditiously and focus on keeping defence procurement going”. “Consistency with good governance principles and Nato recommendations is important to maintain the trust of the public and international partners,” the group said. The row is unfolding as Kyiv’s troops have come under intense pressure on the battlefield following Moscow’s significant territorial gains over the past year — the largest since the initial weeks of the 2022 invasion. “This is the worst possible time for Kyiv to turn back the clock on a defence reform success story,” wrote analysts at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a non-partisan policy think-tank. “Ukraine needs additional funding for weapons and cynical opponents in Moscow and in certain quarters of Washington are looking for reasons to cast doubt upon the integrity of Ukrainian defence governance.” Most western diplomats and analysts in Ukraine have backed Bezrukova. Among them are those who once advocated for Umerov’s appointment as defence minister in 2023, following a procurement corruption scandal that embroiled his predecessor. But now many in Kyiv view Umerov’s actions as an attempt to undermine the very anti-corruption efforts he was meant to champion. A top lawmaker from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s ruling party has said Umerov’s move risks undoing significant progress in fighting corruption within the defence sector. Anastasia Radina, the ruling party MP who also chairs the Ukrainian parliament’s committee on anti-corruption policy, also called on Umerov to resign. “The ministry of defence of a country at war must be led by someone for whom legality, transparency, and accountability are not empty words,” she said. (Source: FT.com)
29 Jan 25. Ukrainian SOF Shows Off Modded DShKM-TK Heavy Machine Gun. A recent image shared by the Telegram channel Ukrainian Special Military showcases a Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) operator armed with a DShKM-TK, a 12.7mm heavy machine gun modified for increased mobility. The post, captioned “Our subscriber, a soldier of one of the units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine with a 12.7-mm large-caliber DShKM-TK machine gun. Winter 2025,” highlights a unique adaptation of the Soviet-designed DShK, specifically tailored for modern combat requirements. The DShKM-TK, or “tactical kit,” represents a significant departure from the standard DShK configuration. Modifications include the addition of a bipod for ground stability, a custom buttstock to improve shoulder-fired control, and a redesigned trigger mechanism for improved ergonomics in a mobile role. A key feature of the design is a large muzzle brake-compensator, which reduces the weapon’s significant recoil, allowing for greater control during semi-portable operation. These enhancements enable the DShKM-TK to be deployed in prone or crouched firing positions, a capability not typically associated with a weapon of this class. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
28 Jan 25. Russians Advance Into Final Major Ukrainian Stronghold in Donetsk Oblast. Russian troops have reportedly captured the town of Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast. The town, situated at the juncture of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, is Ukraine’s final major stronghold in the southern Donbas region. Russia’s Defense Ministry has announced the capture of Velyka Novosilka, a town that was home to approximately 5,000 residents before the war, following a prolonged battle. The claim has not been independently verified. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that its troops had raised a Russian flag in the center of Velyka Novosilka and divided the town in two, effectively isolating Ukrainian forces.
Ukraine’s 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade did not confirm the capture but reported that its forces had withdrawn from certain areas to avoid encirclement due to shortages in equipment and manpower.
According to the brigade, Ukrainian troops continue to hold positions in the town’s northwestern areas and the fighting continues near the village, about 15 kilometers east of the neighboring Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
The brigade said although Russian forces are expected to capture the village soon, advancing their offensive further will be challenging as the Mokri Yaly River poses a significant obstacle, and Russian troops may find themselves in a vulnerable “fire pocket.”
“Any movement is suppressed by shells and drones,” said the brigade.
A source cited by Kyiv Independent said Russia is anticipated to complete the capture within “days.” If successful, it would mark Russia’s first significant victory of the year.
The recent Russian advancement comes as both Russia and Ukraine vie for strategic positioning ahead of possible ceasefire negotiations brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump. Last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called for a large international peacekeeping force—at least 200,000 troops—to enforce any future ceasefire with Russia. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
28 Jan 25. North Korean cannons designed to flatten Seoul head to front line in Ukraine. Pyongyang is to double the number of artillery systems it sends to Kursk, says Kyiv military intelligence chief.
North Korea is preparing to send Russia more than 100 artillery systems – originally designed to flatten Seoul – to be used in its war against Ukraine. The 170mm M1989 Koksan howitzers, among the longest-range artillery systems in the world, are known as “juche cannons”, and were built to pound the South Korean capital in the event of a conflict.
Kyrylo Budano, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, said that Pyongyang was gearing up to double the number of artillery systems it has sent to the border region of Kursk.
The fresh deliveries come amid reports that North Korean soldiers have been withdrawn from sections of the front line to rebuild and regroup, while more troops are expected to be deployed soon.
Lt Gen Budanov said that over the past three months, Kim Jong-un had already given Moscow at least 120 North Korean-made M1989 Koksans, as well as another 120 of its M1991 multiple-launch rocket systems.
Speaking to defence outlet The Warzone, he said Pyongyang was preparing to send another tranche of at least the same amount, with open source analysts suggesting some were already on route.
The M1989 Koksan is a 40-ton self-propelled gun that first appeared during a military parade in 1989. The term “juche” is used in North Korean propaganda to describe its state ideology of freedom and self-reliance.
Using standard shells, the cannons can strike targets over 25 miles away. Gen Budanov said North Korean troops were training their Russian counterparts to use them and they had begun firing them in combat.
In late December, footage showed a train transporting a convoy of at least 10 M1989 Koksans to Russia, their 25ft-long barrels on full display, with little to no camouflage hiding them from enemy strikes.
(Source: Daily Telegraph)
24 Jan 27. North Korean troops are pulled from Russian frontline amid heavy losses. North Korean troops, deployed to fight in Russia’s Kursk region since November, have now been pulled back from the frontline, according to new reports.
President Volodymyr Zelensky recently said that more than a third of the 11,000 soldiers North Korea provided to Moscow have been killed or injured.
The North Korean forces were sent to assist Russia, fighting in the Kursk region, in its efforts to expel Ukrainian troops from a pocket of territory seized by Kyiv last summer.
Of the 4,000 DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) soldiers who have become casualties, around 1,000 are reported to have been killed.
Video footage circulating on social media has shown North Korean troops launching assaults across open ground, often without artillery or air support.
Hundreds have been killed by Ukrainian kamikaze drones.
In an interview with Sky News, the commander of a Ukrainian Special Forces unit said the DPRK soldiers had been pulled back, possibly to regroup and adapt their tactics.
The commander described the North Korean troops as appearing to be brainwashed, charging forward despite facing heavy Ukrainian fire.
Many reportedly chose to take their own lives rather than face capture, detonating grenades in suicide attacks.
Ukrainian forces who encountered the North Koreans found that they were aged between 25 and 40 and often carried fake Russian identity papers.
The DPRK soldiers were also reportedly without food or water.
According to the Ukrainian commander, radio intercepts suggest that the North Koreans’ retreat may only be temporary, as Pyongyang prepares to send reinforcements.
February will mark three years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. (Source: forces.net)
24 Jan 25. Why Ukraine’s all-drone, multi-domain attack could be a ‘seminal’ moment in warfare. A December operation exclusively featured weaponized uncrewed ground vehicles and FPV attack drones and did not feature any crewed platforms or boots on the ground, according to a speaker at the International Armoured Vehicle conference. Ukraine successfully pulled off an all-drone, multi-domain attack on Russian positions near Kharkiv in December, an official speaking at the International Armoured Vehicle (IAV) conference disclosed this week, in what they are calling the first-ever such operation.
Addressing delegates under the Chatham House Rule at Defence iQ’s IAV event here, the official described how the operation exclusively featured weaponized uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) and first person view (FPV) attack drones and did not feature any crewed platforms or boots on the ground.
UGVs conducted the full spectrum of mission sets including surveillance, mine clearance and direct fire, supported by uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), the official stated before explaining how the “tactical air-land operation” represented the first instance of an “uncrewed battle fought by one side” in the ongoing war.
Reflecting on the attack, which appeared at the time as merely a “footnote in daily reporting,” the official went on to describe it as a “seminal moment in the changing character of conflict.”
Warning “Ukraine faces today what [NATO] could face tomorrow,” the speaker went onto describe how Ukraine’s military continues to place a premium on attritable technologies to create combat mass,” before adding: “Ukraine has made the most of turning industrial disadvantage into a furnace of innovation.”
The December attack was confirmed by the National Guard of Ukraine, with a spokesperson at the time describing how “dozens” of uncrewed equipment had been used to conduct an assault near Lyptsi, equipped with machine guns and munitions.
Exact types of UGVs and FPV drones used during the attack were not disclosed but a defense source informed Breaking Defense that ground vehicles included the 4×4 ‘Ratel S’ which was developed through the Ukraine Government’s Brave1 Defence Innovation Forum.
Many operations are experiencing some degree of data automation or AI enablement, and the usability of that data is key to decision making.
From Breaking Defense
Ukraine has been trying to use drones in as many mission sets as possible, Paul Clayton, director of industrial partnerships at UGV manufacturer Milrem Robotics, told Breaking Defense at the show.
Clayton described a visit in July to Ukraine, where the military showed off how UGVs were being employed for “first strike” missions with “10 or more UGVs on an objective and achieving victory because they overwhelmed an enemy, getting inside their OODA loop.”
“If [Russian forces] destroyed one [UGV], another will come in,” he added before suggesting UGVs are being specifically used to disrupt or destroy command and control nodes.
But Clayton also warned of limitations facing UGVs in Ukraine.
“The winter-mud season critically impacts tactical, operational and even strategic operations. Mud severely limits off road mobility, rendering wheeled vehicles virtually interoperable and hampering tracked vehicles under extreme conditions.
Additionally, Clayton described how UGVs were vulnerable to the enemy’s advanced EW and jamming capabilities.
“These pose significant challenges to [uncrewed] operations including their control and effectiveness,” he stated before also suggesting UGVs must use fortified positions to take cover during missions.
“Drone-operating frequencies are constantly shifting. Intelligence and EW teams must remain vigilant to detect and counteract newly adopted enemy frequencies. A decline in jammer effectiveness must be swiftly identified and addressed,” he added.
Since 2022, a total of 15 THeMIS UGVs, produced by Milrem, have been used by the Ukrainians for cargo, casualty evacuation and demand. But Clayton suggested “additional orders are coming” for anti-tank, indirect fire and direct fire capabilities, as well as intelligence-gathering, communications relay and engineering.
The executive said it’s his aspiration to have more than 200 UGVs operating in Ukraine by the end of the year, fulfilling a variety of intelligence-gathering and combat roles. (Source: glstrade.com/Breaking Defense.com)
27 Jan 25. Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency contests “direct control” by MoD. The DPA alleges “illegal interference” in its military procurement operations by the country Ministry of Defence.
Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) has accused the country’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) of applying “direct pressure” in the appointment of key positions in the agency, claiming it as an attempt to “revert defence procurement to direct control”.
Earlier, on 23 January 2025, the agency’s Supervisory Board had concluded an agreement to extend the term of current director Maryna Bezrukova by a further 12 months.
In a scathing statement published on 26 January, the DPA said that only its Supervisory Board – created in December 2024 – had authority to extend or terminate the director’s contract, in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the agency’s charter.
“The DPA Supervisory Board maintains legal authority, despite [Defense Minister Rustem Umerov] announcement about withdrawing two state representatives who demonstrated independent positions,” the DPA statement read.
“The premature announcement of a supposed new agency director represents direct pressure on the Supervisory Board and an attempt to replace independent corporate governance with direct control.”
Continuing, the DPA said the move represented an “unprecedented violation” of previous agreements with the Ukrainian MoD.
“We regret that the agency’s commitment to public transparency about military supplies, within the limits of public information, is viewed by the minister as individual ‘PR’ rather than institutional obligation to citizens,” the DPA wrote.
The DPA added any “illegal interference” with independent supervisory bodies “undermines institutional capacity and risks negatively impacting both international support for Ukraine and stable military equipment supply to the front.”
What is the background to the DPA/MoD clash?
Earlier in January 2025, the DPA’s Supervisory Board said it was considering engaging the International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN) to conduct an independent audit of its operations, in a bid to promote “transparency” and align defence procurement with international standards.
“The findings and recommendations from this audit will form the foundation to establish a center of excellence for Ukraine’s military procurement, which represents another significant step toward Ukraine’s NATO membership,” the DPA said.
Further, the board submitted a recommendation to Umerov to extend the contract of Bezrukova by a further year, stating a need to “ensure stability and efficiency” of procurement during wartime conditions.
“The leadership of the Defense Procurement Agency has expressed full support for the Supervisory Board’s initiatives and confirmed their readiness to cooperate with international auditors to enhance the transparency and efficiency of processes,” the DPA added.
2024 saw breakout year for Ukrainian defence companies
Providing a breakdown of defence procurement highlight in 2024, the DPA recently revealed that the preceding 12 months saw weapons and equipment contracts worth $4.51bn (Hrv189bn) agreed, with $1.15bn scheduled for delivery in the first quarter of 2025, and the remainder set for longer-term delivery.
The DPA added it had reduced average procurement prices for 155mm artillery rounds by 15%, 152mm artillery rounds by 23%, and 125mm artillery rounds by 16%, during 2024. The agency holds 50 direct contracts with arms manufacturers across 13 countries, such as Rheinmetall and KNDS France, though many agreements remain confidential.
However, the DPA said 2024 also saw a significant shift to see Ukrainian manufacturers becoming the primary suppliers of weapons, accounting for over 60% of total contract value. According to the DPA, Ukrainian defence companies produce 90% of DPA contracted UAVs, 100% of drone ammunition, and 60% of mortar rounds.
Of the 236 defence equipment suppliers that the DPA has contracted, 155 entities are Ukrainian.
In terms of international imports, the DPA has also sought to engage the commercial market in areas such as drone procurement through the Prozorro online procurement system, which was used to acquire tens of thousands of Mavic drone from Chinese company DJI.
“Our team’s work has already transformed the defense procurement landscape in Ukraine,” wrote DPA director Maryna Bezrukova. “In 2025 we will again initiate numerous regulatory and legislative changes to simplify manufacturers’ operations and significantly accelerate weapons delivery to the front.” (Source: army-technology.com)
28 Jan 25. US sending Patriot missiles from Israel to Ukraine, Axios reports. The United States transferred some 90 Patriot air defense interceptors from Israel to Poland this week to then deliver them to Ukraine, Axios reported on Tuesday, citing three sources with knowledge of the operation.
“We have seen the reports but have nothing to provide at this time,” a Pentagon spokesperson said in response to the report.
A spokesperson for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office confirmed to Axios that a Patriot system had been returned to the U.S., adding “it is not known to us whether it was delivered to Ukraine.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Tuesday he had spoken with Netanyahu. They discussed the Middle East, bilateral ties and U.S. President Donald Trump, who took office last week, Zelenskiy said on social media. The post made no mention of the missiles.
(Source: Google/Reuters)
27 Jan 25. Upgraded Ukrainian Leopard 1A5 Tank Endures Dozen Hits from Russian Drones Before Being Disabled. This equipment is part of the Very High Readiness Joint Taskforce of the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF is a technologically advanced, multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces components that are rapidly deployable. (NATO photo by Junior Specialist (OR-2) Synne Nilsson, NOR-A).
A Ukrainian Leopard 1A5 tank, upgraded with additional protection, endured at least eight direct hits from Russian first-person-view (FPV) drones and potentially three more before being disabled, according to Ukrainian sources.
A video published by the Ukrainian Militarnyi news outlet demonstrates the effectiveness of the modifications made to the Cold War-era tank by Ukrainian engineers.
The tank, originally positioned in a wooded area, was first targeted by Russian drones that struck its frontal armor three times and hit its left side and rear twice. The crew managed to move the tank to a road to escape further attacks but stopped for unknown reasons.
At that point, three additional drones struck the engine compartment, though the vehicle continued to move. It was finally immobilized after two more strikes, reportedly causing a fire.
Ukrainian reports suggest the crew likely escaped during the intervals between the attacks, as most of the strikes targeted areas away from the crew compartments.
The Leopard 1A5, developed in the 1960s, is known for its mobility and firepower but has thin base armor, with its thickest point being 70 millimeters. Recognizing this vulnerability, Ukrainian engineers enhanced the tanks with additional protective features after they were delivered by a German-Danish-Dutch consortium in late 2023. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
27 Jan 25. The EU will extend its existing sanctions against Russia after Hungary withdrew its threat to block the rollover, according to people briefed on the decision. Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s Russia-friendly prime minister, had said Budapest would not agree to prolong the EU’s economic sanctions until US President Donald Trump took office. Orbán said he would insist that the EU followed suit if Trump eased Washington’s own sanctions on Moscow. But Trump last week said he could increase sanctions against Russia if the country did not reach an agreement to end the war against Ukraine “soon”. Hungary’s foreign minister Péter Szijjártó agreed to a routine six-month extension at a meeting on Monday, three officials said. (Source: FT.com)
24 Jan 25. North Korea is preparing to send additional troops to Russia, despite their role as “human bait” on the battlefield, a report has warned. The despotic regime is understood to be “accelerating follow-up measures and preparation for an additional dispatch of troops”, South Korea’s joint chiefs of staff said in a memo on Friday.
Military observers and Ukrainian commanders have said that North Korean soldiers have not been trained in modern warfare and are being used as cannon fodder by their Russian allies.
The diary of one soldier, recovered in December 2024, explained how Pyongyang’s troops are being used to break cover and attract the attention of Ukrainian drones, while other soldiers lie in wait to shoot them down.
“When the bait stands still, the drone will stop and it will be shot down,” the soldier explained, using stick-figure illustrations.
Plans to increase North Korea’s military presence signal a further strengthening of relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, which has already sent some 11,000 soldiers to Russia since October 2024.
North Korean soldiers have reportedly suffered heavy losses fighting against Ukraine. South Korean intelligence agencies have claimed that some 300 have been killed, while 2,700 have already been injured in just four months of fighting.
North Korea’s entry into the war was decried as an escalation by Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, at the time.
Mr Zelensky said in a video on X in November 2024: “The first battles with North Korean soldiers mark a new page of instability in the world.”
While Pyongyang and Moscow continue to deny North Korea’s involvement in the war, earlier this month, two North Korean soldiers were captured alive for the first time by Ukrainian paratroopers operating in Russia’s Kursk region.
In interview footage released by Ukraine, one of the soldiers claimed that they were initially only told that they were being sent to Russia for training. Ukraine reported that one of the soldiers was also issued fake Russian military ID. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
24 Jan 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian counter-drone defenses tested by Russian ‘imitation drones.’ Russian forces have continued the ongoing aerial assault on Ukraine, straining the nation’s counter-UAS defenses once again. From the evening of January 21 through the early hours of January 22, the Ukrainians defended against 99 attack UAS, including “Shahed” drones and various types of imitation drones designed to confuse and overwhelm air defenses.
The attack originated from multiple launch points, including Chauda in occupied Crimea, and regions within Russia such as Millerovo, Bryansk, Kursk, Orel, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk. Despite the scale of the offensive, Ukraine’s comprehensive counter-UAS defenses effectively neutralized most of the drones.
Ukraine’s Air Force and Defense Forces, employing a combination of anti-aircraft missile systems, electronic warfare units and mobile fire groups, confirmed the destruction of 65 Shahed drones and other UAS across ten regions. An additional 30 enemy simulator drones were disrupted or destroyed without inflicting damage.
While no casualties have been reported, the attack reportedly caused damage to institutions, industrial facilities, farm buildings and private residences in various regions. Emergency services are actively working to clear debris and assist affected civilians.
This latest attack demonstrates the Ukrainian’s effectiveness in counter-drone operations and mitigating the impact of Russian drone warfare. However, the Ukrainian government continues to emphasize the importance of international support in bolstering its defensive capabilities to outmatch the production capabilities of the Russians.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-counter-drone-defenses-tested-by-russian-imitation-drones/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
24 Jan 25. Sergey Mironov on Settlement in Ukraine: “The Ball Is in Trump’s Court” A quick end to the conflict in Ukraine depends on US President Donald Trump and his willingness to stop supporting the Kiev regime, said Sergey Mironov, leader of “A Just Russia — Patriots — For Truth”. “There is no point in agitating Russia for peace, let alone blackmailing it; Russia is already fighting for peace. Now Trump has to make his choice,” the politician asserted.
“Trump criticizes Zelensky for fighting against a bigger country and a much more powerful army. But even the United States, which is effectively waging war against Russia in Ukraine, risks provoking a global conflict with a nuclear power. Biden, whom Trump loves to criticize, spoke directly about these risks,” Sergey Mironov recalled. “Well, let Trump be consistent and not repeat his predecessor’s mistakes. Or better yet, let him put Biden on trial for inciting and sponsoring the war and the war crimes of the Ukronazis!”
The US president is trying to appear above the fray, but the choice he urges Russia and Ukraine to make is ultimately his own, the Russian MP added.
“The puppet Zelensky and his junta will cling to the war’s continuation at all costs—for them, it is an endless source of income and survival. European officials, choking on Russophobia, are ready to pay for this even at the price of Europe’s decline, which we are already witnessing. But without US support, all these efforts would have been impossible, just as it is impossible to continue them without the aid of the United States and its NATO satellites,” Sergey Mironov noted.
“We cannot allow the two most powerful nations to wage war against each other. We must eliminate the terrorist neo-Nazi regime in Ukraine. We are working on it. And Trump, if he truly wants peace, should choose the right side in this conflict. The ball is in his court,” he concluded.
(Source: Sergey Mironov)
24 Jan 25. Ukraine’s Delta battlespace management system may be used in NATO joint planning. NATO sees multidomain testing opportunities for a Ukrainian battlespace management system called Delta, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has told Janes.
“While Delta has not been adopted/adapted by NATO, it could potentially be used for planning joint military operations of different scales and complexity,” said Danielle Moser, US Navy Lieutenant Commander and Public Affairs Officer for ACT, on 17 January.
Data standards
Delta has achieved increased interoperability with NATO systems as its multidomain situational awareness (SA) toolset is based on NATO standards and specifications, said Lt Cdr Moser. Delta has also been tested in ACT-led events such as the annual Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise (CWIX), which Ukraine took part in over the course of five years. During the first three years, Ukraine’s team tested one interoperability standard, and in 2023 they tested four standards.
In June 2024 representatives from Ukraine’s Centre of Innovations and Defence Technologies Development, which is under its Ministry of Defence (MoD), tested Delta for five different interoperability standards at CWIX. The integrated multidomain SA toolset and cloud-based data software is able to send a full operational picture in two standards – NATO Vector Graphics (NVG) Data Format and Multilateral Interoperability Programme (MIP) format – Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth Boiko, Ukrainian Army, capability lead for the Centre of Innovations and Defence Technologies Development, Ukraine’s MoD, told Janes in an interview on 14 January.
The MIP specification consists of a common data model for the exchange of battlespace information between command-and-control (C2) systems. Both standards are the ‘common language’ between C2 systems. (Source: Janes)
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