NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 26.

Jan 24.

Executive summary

* In our most likely three-month scenario, Russia will continue to make further tactical gains, though without a major breakthrough that definitively alters the strategic balance in Moscow’s favour. However, the likelihood of a temporary ceasefire or a major peace settlement in the next three months has increased following the inauguration of US President Donald Trump.

* In our most likely 12-month scenario, there is a realistic possibility that the war will continue through 2025 without a stable ceasefire or resolution. While growing international pressure to enter talks will possibly lead to some progress in early 2025, the enforcement of a stable ceasefire (not to mention a strategic settlement) will remain unlikely, particularly if Moscow judges that it can withstand any potential coercive attempts by the US to force its hand to end the war before it achieves its goals.

* Following the inauguration of President Trump, the new administration has reiterated its desire for a timely end to the war – though it has adjusted its expected timeline for peace. The administration now seeks to achieve some major progress in the next 100 days, though a stable settlement to end the war remains unlikely without both Kyiv and Moscow seriously adjusting their negotiating positions. An upcoming phone call between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will be a key test of Trump’s emerging negotiating strategy and Russia’s willingness to entertain a compromise deal.

* Next month marks the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (24 February). Around this date there will likely be an increased risk of long-range Russian missile strikes against Ukrainian cities. In the meantime, Russian forces will likely continue grinding forwards across the frontline. In particular, progress in Donetsk oblast (Ukraine) is likely to pressure Ukrainian forces to withdraw from a number of key towns.

* Other key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in the coming month include the upcoming Belarusian presidential election, which will increase the likelihood of inflammatory rhetoric and possible ‘provocations’ along the Belarus-Ukraine border – though the threat posed by Belarusian forces to Ukraine will remain very low; long-range Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities will possibly also intensify to coincide with the anniversary on 24 February.

Jan 23.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Christopher Cavoli, assessed that Russia does not currently have the military potential for a ‘massive’ breakthrough
• KURSK: Senior unnamed US officials have assessed that North Korea is likely to deploy additional reinforcements to Russia ‘within the next two months’ – likely referring to mid-March
• STRIKES: Over the past few days, Russian long-range attacks have included a large number of drones supplemented in some cases by a limited number of ballistic missiles
• FORECAST: US President Donald Trump urged Russia to ‘make a deal’ soon to end its war in Ukraine or face increased economic penalties, indicating his administration’s likely strategy to forcing Russia to begin negotiations
• OFFENSIVES: On 22 January, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Christopher Cavoli, assessed that Russia does not currently have the military potential for a ‘massive’ breakthrough along the frontline. Cavoli noted that robust Ukrainian defences and constant small offensive operations are exhausting Russian forces. He also assessed that force generation issues for Russia are causing ‘tension between the desire to attack and the lack of manpower on the part of the Russians’. It remains unclear how long Russian forces will be able to maintain their current tempo of offensive operations, though the overall casualty and recruitment rates mean they will likely be able to continue this tempo for the foreseeable future. However, it will likely struggle to generate additional forces to begin new offensives in lower-priority areas of the frontline.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 21-22 January indicates Russian forces have continued to advance steadily in central and northern Chasiv Yar, though fighting remains fierce. Russian sources continue to report that their forces have cleared the refractory plant in the town centre, though we do not have visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from the site entirely. It is likely that fighting is continuing in the area. The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Luhansk Group of Forces, Dymtro Zaporozhets, stated on 21 January that Russia is taking advantage of poor weather conditions to accumulate forces in the north of Chasiv Yar in order to support assaults around the refractory plant. Russian forces have frequently co-ordinated assaults during poor weather to limit the threat posed by Ukrainian drone coverage.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, geolocated footage published on 20 and 22 January indicates that Russia has made further advances in southern and northern Toretsk; Russian forces have taken control of various waste heaps along the northern border of the town. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian brigade commander fighting in the town reported on 22 January that his forces are defending ‘limited positions’ in Toretsk itself, with the aim of containing Russian forces within the town. However, further to the west, geolocated footage from 22 January indicates that Ukrainian forces have retaken limited positions in central Shcherbynivka, located to the west of Toretsk.
• DONETSK: Over the past few days, the Ukrainian General Staff reported on the high intensity of Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk area. Intense fighting is taking place around Kotlyne, which is located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on 20 January indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in southern Kotlyne while footage from 22 January shows that Russian forces advanced in the fields located to the north-east of the settlement. Further footage from 21 January shows that Russian troops recently captured Zelene and Novyi Trud, two settlements located to the south of Pokrovsk. However, on 23 January, Viktor Tregubov, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces, reported that intense fighting is continuing around these settlements. Meanwhile, on 21 January, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov visited Russian troops fighting near Pokrovsk. Gerasimov’s visit likely underscores that operations in the sector remain a top priority for the Russian command. We continue to assess that Russian forces are unlikely to engage in direct attacks against the city in the short term, but will continue in their efforts to encircle it from the west and east.
• DONETSK: While Pokrovsk is one of the main hotspots along the Donetsk frontline, Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Kurakhove sector, located further south. Geolocated footage from 21 January shows recent Russian advances to the west of Petropavlivka, which is located to the north-west of Kurakhove. Russian troops also made confirmed advances to the north-east of Rozdolne, located to the south-west of Kurakhove, while making limited advances in the fields to the south of Dachne, which is located directly to the west of Kurakhove.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: The New York Times reported on 22 January, citing a senior unnamed US official, that North Korea is likely to deploy additional reinforcements to Russia ‘within the next two months’ – likely referring to mid-March. The size of this contingent remains unknown. It is likely that they will undergo training inside Russia before deploying for combat operations in Kursk.
• KURSK: The BBC cited unnamed Western officials on 22 January as estimating that around 1,000 North Korean troops have been killed and around 3,000 have been wounded so far in Kursk oblast (of an estimated total deployment of 11,000-12,000 troops). We previously reported that South Korean intelligence estimated that initial 11,000-12,000-strong deployment was part of a much larger commitment that encompass additional reserves to offset losses and potentially increase the overall number in the field at any one time. It remains unclear how the North Korean deployment in Kursk will evolve, though given the high casualty rates, reserves will be necessary to sustain combat operations in the medium term.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: On 23 January, Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Viktor Tregubov acknowledged that there is a risk of an ‘operational encirclement’ in Velyka Novosilka, as Russian forces continue to advance slowly. Tregubov stated that the situation is ‘rather difficult’ in the area, though there is no complete encirclement at present. It remains unclear if and when Ukrainian forces will withdraw to prevent the encirclement and capture of their forces. Geolocated footage from 21 and 22 January indicates Russian advances in the eastern sector of the town, while other unconfirmed reports indicate several slow advances from the north as well.
• STRIKES: Over the past few days, Russian long-range attacks have included a large number of drones (Shahed-136/131 and decoy types), supplemented in some cases by a limited number of ballistic missiles, primarily Iskandr-M missiles. On 21 January, Russia launched 131 drones and four Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Similarly, overnight on 22-23 January, Russian forces launched 92 drones and four Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles. On 22 January, Russia’s strike included 99 drones. In total, Ukraine achieved a high interception rate of drones but was unable to shoot down the ballistic missiles. For further information on Ukraine’s interception of Russian projectiles, please see here for our new Ukraine Strikes Dashboard, which is updated fortnightly.
• STRIKES: Russian attacks over the past few days damaged various types of buildings and energy infrastructure across Ukraine. For instance, the attack on 23 January destroyed an energy facility in Zaporizhzhia oblast, leaving approximately 20,000 residents without energy. The attack also damaged various buildings in Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia), where several casualties were recorded. The strike involved drones followed by ballistic missiles, and fits into Russian striking patterns that utilise drones to saturate air defences and create optimal penetration conditions for subsequent missile strikes.
• STRIKES: On 23 January, Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, stated that North Korea is likely to transfer at least 150 KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) as well as artillery systems and shells to Russia this year. Budanov further disclosed that Pyongyang had supplied Russia with 20 M1989 Koksan self-propelled artillery systems and 120 M-1991 multiple launch rocket systems over the past three months. His statements highlight Pyongyang’s crucial role in supplying military equipment to Russia. The provision of ballistic missiles will facilitate Russia’s ability to continue its current tempo of long-range strikes.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, overnight on 20-21 January, Ukraine carried out a series of long-range strikes targeting Russian defence industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the attack targeted the Liskinskaya oil depot in Voronezh oblast (Russia), the Smolensk Aviation Plant in Smolensk oblast (Russia) and a Russian command post in occupied Donetsk oblast (Ukraine). The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported the interception of 55 Ukrainian drones in all. The Liskinskaya oil depot was reportedly targeted on 16 January, with various Russian sources noting that the site was still burning from this attack on the day of the latest strike.
• STRIKES: Andriy Kovalenko, the head of the Ukrainian Centre for Countering Disinformation, stated that the Smolensk Aviation Plant produces and modernises Su-25 aircraft and maintains aviation equipment. Meanwhile, a Russian opposition online outlet reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Lukoil’s Saratovorgsintez Chemical Plant in Saratov city overnight, which produces acrylonitrile, acetonitrile and sodium cyanide. The targeted strikes underscore Kyiv’s continued and expanding efforts to disrupt Russian military logistics and production seriously.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• ECONOMY: Economic problems are continuing to deepen in Russia, leading to claims that Russian President Vladimir Putin has grown increasingly concerned about Russia’s wartime economy. Reuters reported as much earlier on 23 January, citing five unnamed individuals familiar with the matter. Notably, two insiders claimed that economic concerns have fuelled opinions among parts of the Russian elite that a negotiated settlement to the war is desirable. According to one person reportedly familiar with the Kremlin’s thinking, Putin believes his key war goals have already been met – though this remains to be seen. These reportedly include control over land that connects mainland Russia to the annexed Crimean peninsula and the weakening of Ukraine’s military.
• ECONOMY: However, we have repeatedly assessed that such considerations constitute a lower priority for the Kremlin in contrast to the importance Western nations would typically place on economic stability and growth. Over a decade of economic difficulties and Western sanctions have not seriously impacted the Kremlin’s decision-making, and it therefore remains unlikely in our assessment that Putin would abandon his strategic and political goals purely due to economic concerns.
• ECONOMY: While Putin claimed during a meeting on 22 January that 2024 was quite successful for the Russian economy, claims (and accompanying data) portraying the Russian economy as robust despite Western sanctions and war pressure are highly likely aimed at appealing to domestic audiences and projecting an image of Russian resilience. Ultimately, economic woes alone are unlikely to influence Russia’s decision to end the war in the near term, especially in the absence of significant societal discontent and indicators of total economic collapse.

FORECAST

PEACE: On 22 January, US President Donald Trump urged Russia to ‘make a deal’ soon to end its war in Ukraine or face increased economic penalties. Trump insisted that he would have ‘no other choice’ but to impose high taxes, tariffs and sanctions on any Russian goods sold to the US. However, Trump did not provide further details regarding the additional punitive measures Washington DC would enforce against Moscow.

Nevertheless, the comments indicate that the Trump administration will likely seek to use economic coercion to push Russia to the negotiating table. As Trump specifically noted Russia’s economic woes as the war approaches its fourth year, this is almost certainly something the US can leverage in the coming months. Aside from ramping up economic pressure on Moscow, Trump’s administration would possibly reward Russian participation in peace talks with the promise of slight sanctions relief. Alternatively, we have previously reported on the possibility of the Trump administration using Russian frozen assets to incentivise Moscow to negotiate (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 16 January 2025).

Although the Russian economy has weathered years of war and Western sanctions better than anticipated, it is nevertheless under increasing strain. Despite this, Russia will likely (at least at first) attempt to navigate any additional punitive measures and find ways to circumvent them, as it has done since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The likelihood of this scenario is also linked to Russia’s ability to continue making gains on the battlefield. However, the imposition of notable sanctions that significantly reduce Russian revenues would possibly shorten the timeline for an end to the war.

Meanwhile, the Russian deputy UN ambassador, Dmitry Polyanskiy, stated that Moscow will wait to see what Trump thinks a ‘deal’ to end the war in Ukraine entails. Polyanskiy stated on 22 January that it is not merely a question of ending the war, but rather addressing the root causes of what he described as the ‘Ukrainian crisis’. This likely indicates that Russia will only want to enter negotiations if it believes that the US will agree to some of its key demands to end the war, including on Ukrainian NATO membership. Despite Russia claiming in recent weeks that it is willing to engage with the Trump administration, we assess that Moscow is highly unlikely to be willing to act in good faith to end the war in the short term while it continues to advance on the battlefield, at least without major concessions from Ukraine and the West. Nevertheless, a temporary ceasefire remains a realistic possibility, even if it fails to resolve the drivers of the war itself.

As such, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on 22 January that Trump aims to end the war in a way that ensures the conflict does not restart in the coming years. Rubio emphasised the importance of finding a sustainable end to the war, though he did not provide further information as to how the Trump administration intends to do this. Ultimately, such comments reflect our assessment that a ‘quick’ end to the war, namely unilateral Ukrainian concessions (such as territorial concessions and/or Kyiv renouncing its goals to join NATO), are unlikely to resolve the conflict for good. Similarly, ensuring effective deterrence against Russian aggression will highly likely remain an integral means of preventing another invasion of Ukraine, including after a possible ceasefire in 2025.

Notably, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has insisted that US troops must participate in a peacekeeping mission for any such mission to be effective. In an interview with Bloomberg on 22 January, Zelensky doubted the ability of European peacekeepers alone to provide sufficient military support. Zelensky also implied that he wants to obtain security guarantees from Trump before engaging in negotiations with Russia. However, in December 2024, Trump reportedly stated his opposition to the involvement of US troops in a peacekeeping mission (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 16 December 2024). We assess that Trump’s opinion on the matter is highly unlikely to shift in the coming months. Rather, Trump will likely want to reduce the US’ long-term commitments to ensuring Ukrainian security.

Jan 20.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have seemingly begun their frontal assault on Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast) after weeks of steadily trying to encircle the town; it remains unclear if Ukrainian forces will withdraw or protract its defence
• STRIKES: Russian forces have launched a series of long-range drone and ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine this week, including against the capital Kyiv
• UK: A recently signed 100-year partnership agreement between the UK and Ukraine allows for the possible establishment of British military bases in Ukraine; however, this is unlikely in the short term
• FORECAST: Following Donald Trump’s inauguration as the next US president, a flurry of diplomatic announcements is likely in the coming weeks; the incoming administration is prioritising a phone call between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have made some notable progress in Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast), with geolocated footage from 19 January indicating advances in the northern micro districts of the town. Russian forces have advanced westwards along Tolstoho Street in the north-western part of the town, indicating a much wider Russian presence in the north of Chasiv Yar. To the south, in the centre of the town, Russian forces have also made some progress. Geolocated footage from 18 January also indicated further Russian advances in the refractory plant as well as south along Dniprovska Street further into the centre of the town. Russian sources now claim their forces have seized the entirety of the refractory plant; however, geolocated footage from 18 January also indicated that a Ukrainian counter-attack (at least temporarily) pushed Russian forces back, meaning it likely remains contested.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have continued to expand their control over the majority of Toretsk, pushing Ukrainian forces steadily along the northern outskirts of the town. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on 17 January that, while Russian forces have seized the majority of buildings in Toretsk, Ukrainian forces continue to hold various positions around the town with the aim of exhausting Russian attacks. As such, parts of northern Toretsk likely remain contested at the moment, though Russian forces are slowly but surely pushing north. Further to the south-west, geolocated footage from 19 January indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a limited counter-attack and successfully retook some positions in southern Shcherbynivka (a town located to the west of Toretsk).
• DONETSK: In the Pokrovsk sector, the Russian command is consolidating its military forces as part of its ongoing efforts to accelerate the encirclement of the town. On 18 January, a Ukrainian military observer noted that Russia had consolidated elements of four brigades and three regiments between Dachenske and Novotroitske to the south and south-west of Pokrovsk. The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit in the Pokrovsk area also reported that Russia is accumulating forces to advance to the west of Pokrovsk as part of its endeavours to encircle the city. That said, the commander also noted that Russian forces are not aiming to progress directly towards the town at the moment.
• DONETSK: According to several Russian milbloggers, Russian military forces have also re-transferred elements of units initially operating in the Kurakhove area. Such efforts underscore Moscow’s ongoing focus on the encirclement of Pokrovsk. However, though Russian forces will likely continue achieving gains in the sector, it remains uncertain whether they retain the capability to rapidly encircle Pokrovsk. Ukrainian defensive operations, particularly through drone strikes, have inflicted severe losses on armoured vehicles in the sector, significantly slowing down Russian mechanised assaults. Geolocated footage published on 17 January indicates that Russian forces recently captured Yasenove. The footage also shows Russian advances along the south (left) bank of the Solona River to the north of Uspenivka. Yasenove and Uspenivka are located to the south-west of Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: Further to the south, Russian forces continued to make gains in the Kurakhove sector. Geolocated footage from 17 January shows recent Russian advances north-east of Sukhi Yaly, located to the south-west of Kurakhove. The advances specifically occurred along the northern bank of the Sukhi Yaly River, though Ukrainian defences continue to slow Russian advances and efforts to close the pocket of Ukrainian forces around Dachne which is located around three miles (5km) to the west of Kurakhove.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 17 January that their forces have retaken 63.2% of the territory originally seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk oblast. While we cannot confirm the precise amount of territory, Russian forces have likely pushed the Ukrainians back and taken over half of the territory originally seized. Meanwhile, Russian attacks and Ukrainian counter-attacks have continued across the Kursk salient in recent days with Russian forces making slow but steady advances. Geolocated footage from 17, 18 and 19 January indicates incremental advances by Russian forces to the north-west and south-east of Sudzha.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Kupiansk sector, Russian forces made confirmed gains to the south-east and north-east of the city. Geolocated footage from 17 January shows Russian forces’ recent advances to the south-west of Stepova, located to the south-west of Kupiansk. The advances specifically took place along the Svatove-Kupiansk highway. On 19 January, the Ukrainian General Staff reported recent Russian attacks near Stroivka, which is located to the north-east of Kupiansk along the Russia-Ukraine international border. The General Staff’s comments likely confirm recent Russian claims of advances to the north of Topoli (to the south-east of Stroivka).
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 18 and 19 January indicates that Russian forces have captured Ivanivka and Terny, both located to the north-west of Kreminna. The footage also shows Russian forces progressing to the south of Terny and to the west of Ivanivka, which is notably on the west (right) bank of the Zherebets River. Russian forces also made confirmed advances as of 17 January east of Zeleny Hai, which is located to the north-east of Borova. Borova is approximately 25 miles (40km) to the west of Svatove and close to the Oskil River.
• SOUTHERN: On 18 January, Russian forces seemingly began their frontal assault on Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast) after weeks of steadily trying to encircle the town. Before the frontal assault into the town itself, geolocated footage confirmed that Russian forces seized the satellite village of Vremivka on 17 January which is located to the south-west of the town’s outskirts. This was likely a preferred precondition for the assault on Velyka Novosilka itself, given that the seizure of Vremivka now means that the town is surrounded on three sides with only a narrow escape route to the west remaining under Ukrainian control (albeit under Russian fire control). Russian forces have now advanced in a cemetery in the eastern part of Velyka Novosilka itself, the first part of the town proper to be seized. Geolocated footage from 19 January further indicated slow but steady Russian advances in the eastern sectors of the town.
• SOUTHERN: The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade defending Velyka Novosilka reported on 17 January that the Russians currently have a three-to-one personnel advantage in the area; this is the normal minimal advantage any attacker would likely seek to have before launching serious offensive operations. Russian forces will now likely attempt to press the attack from the north, east and south, likely in a bid to force the Ukrainians to withdraw and limit the need for a protracted, and highly costly urban assault. The Khortytsia Group of Forces acknowledged on 19 January that Russian forces are currently taking advantage of poor weather conditions to launch their assaults; this will likely limit the ability of Ukrainian drones to interdict and disrupt Russian assaults. It remains unclear if and when the Ukrainians will withdraw from the town, but, given the slow, grinding nature of other Russian urban assaults, the Ukrainians could realistically extend the town’s defence in the coming weeks.
• STRIKES: On 17 January, Russia launched 50 drones (Shahed 136/131 and decoy types) and two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. In all, Ukraine intercepted 33 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Drones reportedly hit enterprises in Odesa oblast; falling UAVs reportedly damaged various buildings in Cherkasy, Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts. Nine drones were reported lost and one flew into and then out of Romania’s airspace. The Ukrainian regional authorities reported that the ballistic missile strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). The authorities in Odesa oblast reported that the attack targeted regional port infrastructure in Izmail district.
• STRIKES: On 18 January, Russia launched a similar strike including 39 UAVs (Shahed and decoy drones) and four Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles. In all, 24 drones were intercepted over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts; 14 decoy drones were reported lost. Two ballistic missiles were reportedly downed over the capital Kyiv, damaging various buildings in the city’s Shevchenkivskyi district (including the Lukyanivska metro station). Ballistic missiles also damaged an enterprise and houses in Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The authorities in Kharkiv oblast reported that an Iskandr-M ballistic missile damaged various buildings in Vysoki, just south-west of Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast).
• STRIKES: Following the 18 January strike, Ukrainian analyst and aviation expert Kostyantyn Kryvolap stated that Ukraine’s Air Force failed to detect the launch of the ballistic missiles targeting Kyiv. According to Kryvolap, this is likely because Russia hit Kyiv with a North Korean KN-15 intermediate-range ballistic missile that can be launched from a distance of 746 to 1,243 miles (1,200km to 2,000km). Ukrainian air defence systems and radar forces can only detect projectiles launched within a 310-mile (500km) radius. The development likely indicates that Russia’s use of IRBMs, such as the KN-15 or even the Oreshnik ballistic missile, will remain a challenge for Ukraine; only Western air defence systems, such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), are able to counter these threats. Ukraine does not possess THAAD systems.
• STRIKES: On 19 January Russia launched 61 drones, including Shahed and decoy types. In all, Ukraine intercepted 43 drones across various regions; 15 decoy UAVS were reported lost. Air defences were active over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts.
• STRIKES: Early on 20 January, Russia launched a large-scale drone attack, with 141 UAVs, alongside a single Iskandr-M ballistic missile. In all, Ukraine intercepted 93 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy and Vinnytsia oblasts. 47 decoy drones were reported lost. The Ukrainian regional authorities reported that the missile attack struck residential buildings and unspecified infrastructure in Sumy oblast. Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that the strikes hit military airfields and drone assembly and storage facilities.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continued to carry out its increasingly effective strike campaign against Russian oil and military infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported a successful strike on 18 January against an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo (Kaluga oblast). The Russian regional authorities reported that the drone strike caused a fire at an unspecified industrial facility in the area. The General Staff also reported a similar successful long-range attack on the same day against a state-owned oil depot in Tula oblast. Similarly, the Russian authorities reported that a drone attack hit an unspecified facility in the region.
• STRIKES: Early on 20 January, Ukrainian drones attacked the Kazan Aviation Plant located in Kazan (Republic of Tatarstan), according to Astra, a Russian opposition media outlet. The Tatar authorities confirmed the drone attack against an industrial enterprise in the region. The Kazan Aviation Plant belongs to Tupolev PJSC, one of Russia’s largest enterprises in the aviation industry. It produces strategic bombers (such as the Tu-160) and also civilian airliners.
• STRIKES: Ukraine’s long-range campaign has proven to have an increasingly detrimental impact on Russia’s defence stocks and oil output. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed on 19 January that attacks against ammunition depots resulted in Russia’s ammunition usage being cut by nearly half; that said we cannot yet confirm this development. Similarly, he claimed that Russian seaborne oil product exports decreased by almost 10% in 2024, in part due to Ukrainian drone attacks against major oil refineries.
• STRIKES: US support has been crucial for the expansion of Ukraine’s drone capabilities, which are essential to Kyiv’s long-range strike campaign. On 17 January, The New York Times revealed that US President Joe Biden’s administration had declassified details about the nature of US aid to the Ukrainian military drone industry on 16 January. The US assistance involved providing significant technical and financial support to the country’s drone programme, particularly after Ukraine’s counter-offensive efforts in 2022 and 2023.
• STRIKES: In response to the challenges faced by Ukraine during Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, the US increased its support for Ukraine’s drone industry. This support included boosting ties between American technology companies and Ukrainian drone makers, financial investment and additional technical expertise. For instance, the US defence company Shield AI recently opened an office in Ukraine to train Ukrainian military personnel on the operation of unmanned vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) vehicles. The US has also almost certainly benefited from these arrangements by integrating lessons learned from Ukrainian drone warfare. Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities have allowed Kyiv to increasingly challenge Russia’s initial military advantage in this field.
• STRIKES: Concurrently, Kyiv is working on developing its range of air defence systems. This was reported by Syrskyi on 19 January, who said that such domestically produced systems aim to address chronic air defence shortages and match Western-made systems. According to the official, these air defence systems particularly aim to counter IRBM missiles such as the Oreshnik missile. Syrskyi’s claims underscore Kyiv’s ongoing efforts to minimise the country’s reliance on Western equipment. Such efforts are reflected in the ambitious defence investment programme which amounts to USD 35 bn in 2025 according to Defence Minister Rustem Umerov. However, the development and subsequent mass production of such equipment in the coming year remains unlikely. In the longer term, we assess that the success of Ukraine’s ambitions to expand its defence production and improve its own resilience will depend on the extent of Western long-term support and Ukraine’s own socio-economic health.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• ASSASSINATION: Earlier on 20 January, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported that it had thwarted an assassination plot against the country’s deputy health minister, Serhiy Dubrov. The SBU said that it had arrested two unnamed individuals who were caught when they tried to transfer money to purchase firearms for the would-be assassination. According to the agency, the individuals from Kyiv oblast had studied Dubrov’s daily routine and travel routes for months in preparation. They had also frequented a private shooting range to practice.
• ASSASSINATION: The SBU did not state whether there was Russian or pro-Russia involvement. Although the agency did not specify whether the would-be assassins were linked to Russia, such a link remains a realistic possibility despite Ukrainian efforts to root out Russian and/or pro-Russia networks within the country. We assess that if there is a Russian motive behind the assassination plot, this likely reflects Russian attempts to destabilise the Ukrainian government ahead of any possible negotiations in 2025. As such, Ukrainian agencies will likely identify and thwart such attempts over the coming months.
• UK: A recently signed 100-year partnership agreement between the UK and Ukraine allows for the possible establishment of British military bases in Ukraine. London shared details of the arrangement on 17 January (for further analysis see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 16 January 2025). It states that the two sides ‘will explore options for deploying and maintaining defence infrastructure in Ukraine including logistics depots, military bases, reserve military equipment storage facilities and war reserve stockpiles’. The agreement notes that these facilities could be used ‘in the event of a significant military threat’, likely implying a renewed Russian invasion.
• UK: While details concerning this element of the partnership treaty remain vague, it likely reflects London’s ambitions to cement its position as a key security partner for Kyiv over the longer term. British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer said on 16 January that the UK will play its ‘full part’ in a potential peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. However, he warned against acting prematurely on the matter. As such, this provision could realistically indicate potential wider preparations from one of Kyiv’s Western allies on security guarantees and a possible Western military presence in western Ukraine in the post-war period.
• UK: The agreement also stipulates that the UK will provide Ukraine with annual military assistance of no less than GBP 3 bn (over USD 3.6 bn) a year until 2031 and/or for as long as needed. In the near term, the UK also pledged on 16 January to transfer 15 new British-designed Gravehawk air defence systems to Ukraine by the end of this year. According to the British government, two prototypes of the air defence capability were tested in Ukraine in September 2024, though no further details were provided on this. The development likely reflects the UK’s intentions to strengthen its position as a key military supplier to Ukraine as well as bolster the latter’s air defence networks against Russian long-range strikes amid wider efforts to begin preparing wider security guarantee agreements that could facilitate an end to the war.
• US: Later on 20 January, Donald Trump will be inaugurated as the next US president. Trump will possibly use the inauguration ceremony to set out his domestic and foreign policy objectives for his second term in office. We assess that the incoming Trump administration will highly likely seek to advance efforts to end the Russo-Ukrainian War over the course of the next few days and weeks.  Trump has reportedly directed his aides to arrange a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the days after he is sworn in. CNN reported this on 16 January, referencing unspecified sources familiar with the matter. According to those sources, one goal of the conversation is to discuss an in-person meeting in the coming months aimed at ending the conflict. While we cannot confirm the veracity of this report, we assess that it is highly likely credible given incoming Trump administration officials have, in recent months, frequently emphasised his aim to end the war quickly and openness to direct dialogue with Moscow. Such direct communication between the two presidents will mark a significant change in policy from that of the outgoing Biden administration; the latter had ruled out direct peace talks with Russia without Kyiv’s approval. However, an unnamed source familiar with Trump’s thinking disclosed that he believes direct engagement with Putin is needed to find a solution to the conflict. Outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken assessed on 16 January that the incoming Trump administration will be in a position to broker a ‘good’ and ‘strong’ peace deal provided that Ukraine wants this. However, he stressed that any possible deal must include effective deterrence to prevent a renewed Russian invasion; we have also repeatedly emphasised the importance of this point.  Although Putin is prepared to talk with Trump, this does not mean Moscow is willing to end the war in the near term, especially not on terms that do not grant significant concessions to Moscow. This principally concerns territory and Ukrainian ambitions for NATO membership. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government must also decide when it believes is the right time to take steps towards negotiations with Russia. We have previously assessed the possibility of Trump’s administration using the provision (or suspension) of military aid as an incentive to push Kyiv and Moscow to engage in peace talks (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 28 November 2024). That said, any possible engagement between Putin and Trump over the coming weeks and months will likely serve as the first attempted steps towards ending the war through dialogue rather than through military means. Just over half of US citizens (51%) believe that their government is spending too much money on military aid to Ukraine; this opinion is more prevalent (67%) among Republican or Republican-leaning individuals. This is according to an Ipsos poll published on 18 January which found that 17% of US citizens (regardless of their political affiliation) believe the US does not help Ukraine enough. While it remains uncertain how Trump’s administration will navigate military aid for Ukraine, we have frequently assessed that a significant reduction in such assistance is likely if Kyiv resists entering into talks. A lack of support for Ukraine among Republicans will likely encourage Trump’s administration to reduce aid. Nevertheless, we continue to assess that an alternative strategy contingent on threatening to (or actually ramping up) military aid to Ukraine remains a realistic strategy in a bid to coerce Moscow to the negotiating table if the Kremlin rejects efforts to end the war.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

24 Jan 25. Hungary threatens to disrupt Russia sanctions unless Ukraine reopens gas transit.  (Source: FT.com)

 

23 Jan 25. Thousands of tanks destroyed, with T-80 bearing the brunt of Russian losses in Ukraine. Russia has lost thousands of tanks in Ukraine – with one piece of armour in particular bearing the brunt of the destruction. The T-80 was designed in the 1970s and has been upgraded several times, but more than 1,000 are believed to have been destroyed in the conflict. At the start of 2024, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a leading authority on global security, political risk and military conflict, put the figure at 3,000 – the equivalent of Russia’s entire pre-war stock of working tanks.

How many have they lost?

The open-source investigative project Oryx has visually confirmed 3,673 losses and the figure is now believed to be somewhere between 3,000 and 8,000.  One main battle tank in particular has taken huge losses – the Soviet-era T-80. By December 2024, at least 1,035 of them were confirmed as destroyed, damaged, abandoned or captured. Originally derived from the T-64, it was the world’s first mass-produced tank with a gas turbine engine – the GTD 1000. Designed to be fast, quiet and highly mobile – it can travel at 40mph off-road.  Somewhere between 7,000 and 10,000 T-80s were produced between 1975 and 2001, including several variants such as the T-80B and the T-80U, which was fitted with reactive armour and a bigger 1,250 horsepower gas turbine engine.  Russia used them in Chechnya, but they suffered heavy losses, where 18 of the 84 T-80s involved in the Battle of Grozny were lost.

And in Ukraine, they’ve not done much better

The T-80 guzzles fuel and only has a 300-mile range. Its weapon systems also aren’t a match for the Western tanks Ukraine has been gifted.  Russian tanks, including the T-72, T-80 and T-90, also use a carousel autoloader and store their ammunition inside the turret.

So if they’re hit by a drone or anti-tank missile in the right spot, the so-called “turret toss” is often the result, where a catastrophic explosion violently knocks a tank’s turret off its chassis and into the air. The turret toss is the reason Russian tank crews are said to have nicknamed the T-80 the “steel coffin”. Online, video has surfaced which it is claimed shows Russian forces retrieving damaged tanks from the battlefield – a sign the Kremlin is struggling to replace what it’s losing.

Russian mil-bloggers say Moscow has now deployed 90% of all the T-80s it had available. They’re either sent to the frontline or to a factory at Omsk in Siberia, where they are upgraded to the latest variant, the T-80BVM.

Why more of the T-80 BVM?

Satellite imagery of the plant taken last year showed T-80s parked up, ready to be converted. In April last year, Russia resumed production of the GTD 1,250 gas turbine engines used in the T-80BVM.  Soon afterwards, the head of Russia’s largest tank manufacturer announced it was also resuming round-the-clock production of the T-80 BVM at the Omsk factory – this was taken as a sign Moscow was in the conflict for the long haul. One reason Moscow wants more of the BVM model is its ability to fire depleted Uranium rounds, and the US has supplied Ukraine with these to use in the M1 Abrams it’s given to Kyiv.  Russia’s former defence minister Sergei Shoigu, who is a long-time ally of Vladimir Putin, was filmed touring the site promising to increase production to 2,000 tanks a year.  The BVM model has reactive armour, anti-drone and anti-missile protection grids, and an upgraded fire control system.

So how many tanks does Russia have left?

Finding a precise answer is pretty much impossible.  Estimates vary widely, but it’s thought Russia had around 6,000 tanks in storage, going all the way back to T-54s and T-55s.  Reports say a factory like Omsk can refurbish or upgrade around 350 tanks a month, but the quality of the production is falling because of sanctions.

What’s also unclear is how many T-80s are left.

Oryx estimates that half of the T-80Us that have been lost were abandoned by their crews, possibly because of a lack of fuel, rather than being destroyed by Ukrainian fire.  While Russia’s losses have been astronomical, Moscow has deep reserves. It’s also adapted its tactics, launching dismounted infantry assaults rather than using massed armour. And with Russia making slow grinding gains, the tally of tank losses doesn’t necessarily tell the full story.  (Source: forces.net)

 

23 Jan 25. Ukraine may soon deploy drone carriers. The view from a Ukrainian Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) drone as it closes in on a Russian warship. Such USVs can now launch aerial drones, and may soon deploy flying ‘mothership’ drones which carry smaller drones into combat. Drones carrying drones may be the future of robotic warfare – and the Ukrainian military is leading the way. Last month the Ukrainian navy launched a complex raid targeting former oil platforms Russian troops had occupied in the Black Sea. There have been many such platform raids in the 35 months since Russia widened its war on Ukraine, but the December operation was special. It marked the debut of a new kind of satellite-controlled unmanned surface vehicle, or USV, in Ukrainian service. This new USV carried tiny first-person-view unmanned aerial vehicles, each clutching a few pounds of explosives. The USVs launched their UAVs – at least four apiece – and the UAVs rammed into Russian surveillance equipment on the platforms, as well as a few Russian troops installing the equipment. The Ukrainian navy and intelligence directorate have deployed USVs since early in Russia’s wider war. Along with ground-launched cruise missiles, the 18-foot drone boats are the Ukrainians’ main maritime strike weapons. Motoring hundreds of miles under remote control with explosives packed in their bows, the USVs are essentially manoeuvrable, wavetop torpedoes. In earlier raids on Russia’s Crimean anchorages, these explosives-laden USVs sank a corvette, a landing ship, a patrol boat and a tugboat. They also damaged the pillars of the strategic Kerch bridge connecting Russian-occupied Crimea to Russia proper.  But until December, the drone boats had never deployed drones of their own. A month after the platform raid, on January 6 and 8, USV drone-carriers struck again, targeting Russian air-defence vehicles and other targets arrayed along the coast just north of Crimea. At least three Russian vehicles burned out. For a navy with practically no large warships – the few that were in service prior to Putin’s wider war didn’t last long once the Russians invaded – the UAV-equipped USVs solve a vexing problem. The Ukrainian navy is acquiring new ships in the United Kingdom and Turkey, but can’t bring them into the Black Sea until hostilities are over, as Turkey has closed the Bosporus strait to warships of both sides. A USV costs just $250,000. Losing one – or a lot – isn’t a catastrophe. And to be clear: most of the drone boats the Ukrainians deploy never make it past Russian defences. But it only takes a few of the USVs, slipping past Russian patrol boats and helicopters, to inflict serious damage on Russian warships. After nearly three years of relentless Ukrainian attacks, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has lost a third of its pre-war ships. Sensing an opportunity, the Ukrainians began adding remote-controlled weapons to the USVs, including guns for warding off patrol boats and anti-aircraft missiles for fending off helicopters. On or just before New Year’s Eve, a Ukrainian USV shot down a Russian helicopter for the first time. The initial weapons fits were defensive. Now the USVs are getting offensive weapons in the form of one-way attack drones. The FPV drones, each weighing just a few pounds and ranging five miles or so, lend the robotic boats their first land-attack capability.  It’s an impressive development requiring rugged, waterproof hardware, robust satellite communications and teams of skilled operators separately controlling the boats and their drones. Incredibly, the current combination – a drone boat packing FPV drones – may be just the start.  Ukrainian land forces already possess large drone “motherships” that can deploy smaller FPV drones in mid-air, thus extending the range of the one-way attack drones by 10 miles or more. If the Ukrainians can fly mothership drones from the USVs, they could extend the range of the drone boats’ ground attacks.  And yes, that would be a drone launching from a drone launched from a drone. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

23 Jan 25. NATO chief Rutte says Europe will pay for US arms for Ukraine.

• Summary
• Companies
• Nato chief speaking at World Economic Forum in Davos
• Europe needs to invest in defence, ramp up arms production, Rutte says
• Comments follow criticism from US President Donald Trump
• Trump says Europeans need to do more to support Ukraine

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Thursday urged the United States to keep supplying Ukraine with weapons to fight Russia’s invasion and said he was sure Europe was ready to pay the bill.

Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the NATO chief said Europe must invest more in defence, ramp up arms production and take a bigger share of spending on Ukraine aid.

His comments came after U.S. President Donald Trump said earlier this week that the European Union should be doing more to support Ukraine.

“On Ukraine, we need the U.S. also to stay involved,” Rutte said.

“If this new Trump administration is willing to keep on supplying Ukraine from its defence industrial base, the bill will be paid by the Europeans, I’m absolutely convinced of this, we have to be willing to do that,” he added.

He said Trump was right to say Europe should be paying more to help Ukraine win the war as “it is a worldwide conflict, yes, but still Ukraine is closer to Europe than to the U.S.” (Source: Reuters)

 

22 Jan 25. Donald Trump has warned Vladimir Putin that the US is ready to punish Russia with a barrage of new trade restrictions if it fails to reach an agreement soon to end the war in Ukraine. (Source: FT.com)

 

22 Jan 25. Ukraine to hand combat units $60 m  monthly for new drones.  Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence will provide its combat units with 2.5bn hryvnia (US$60m ) of direct funding per month to procure their own drones, in a move to allow commanders in the field to buy the equipment they need rather than rely on centralized purchasing. The ministry already provided 2.1bn hryvia directly to combat units in December for buying drones, and decided to scale up the initiative based on that experience, officials said in a Jan. 22 statement. Allowing troops to buy unmanned aerial vehicles directly allowed for rapid fulfillment of service members’ needs while increasing diversification, the ministry said.

“Commanders of the units will have the flexibility to use these funds to acquire the drones that are the most effective for carrying out mission requirements at the front,” Minister of Defence Rustem Umerov said in the statement. “This marks another step towards building a highly flexible system to ensure the military has everything necessary for Ukraine’s defense.”

Ukraine has been a crucible for drone innovation as it fights off Russia’s invasion, with troops using unmanned systems for everything from intelligence gathering to strike operations, as decoys or for laying mines. Western militaries are closely studying the new ways UAVs are being used on the Ukrainian battlefield – including air-to-air drone combat, use of artificial intelligence, fiber-optic controls, bomber drones and more – to see what lessons to apply to their own forces. The funds to buy drones will be distributed among the brigades of the armed forces after Ukraine’s Cabinet of ministers backed the proposal by the ministry, the MoD said.

Drones can be made more profitably in Ukraine than anywhere else in Europe, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said earlier in January. The country raised its drone manufacturing capacity to 4 m  units a year, the president said at a defense industry forum in October, compared with production of about 300,000 drones in 2023. Domestic production accounted for more than 96% of the drones used by the armed forces, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said last month. The Ministry of Defence, together with Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation, had contracted 1.6 m  UAVs of various types in the first 10 months of 2024, with 1.3 m  drones delivered, it said in October. (Source: Defense News)

 

22 Jan 25. Ukraine’s New Shotgun-Armed Drones Hunt Russian Soldiers. Ukraine has started arming its drones with shotguns to shoot down Russian drones and kill soldiers. In video footage posted online by pro-Ukraine bloggers, a drone armed with two shotguns flies across a battlefield. The drone fixes on at least three Russian drones carrying grenades, one after the other, and shoots. Each of the Russian drones crashes to the ground. Next, the drone then spots a single Russian soldier walking along a road. It swoops down and fires, but misses. The drone swings around, pulls back up and dives for a second strike. This time, the soldier falls to the ground. Online, pro-Ukraine commentators celebrated the success of the shotgun-armed drone.

“This is amazing,” said Sergej Sumlenny, founder of the European Resilience Initiative Center think tank. “This is the first case of a firearm-armed first-person view drone I see which really makes sense.”

The drone footage was reportedly filmed near the city of Kupyansk, in Ukraine’s northwestern Kharkiv region, which Russian forces are trying to capture. Analysts said that this was the first time that Ukraine has armed its increasingly sophisticated drone fleet with guns. Usually, first-person battlefield drones are either used in kamikaze single-use attacks or drop a grenade on their target. Cheap first-person view drones have become a vital weapon during the conflict in Ukraine. They are used widely for surveillance and attack missions. The so-called Winchester shotgun-armed drones now give Ukraine increased flexibility and another form of attack. Winchester is a US shotgun manufacturer established in the 19th century, named after its founder.

Ukraine Continuing to Develop ‘War Technology’

Defense Express, a Ukrainian online military news website, said that the country was considering rolling out shotgun-armed drones across the battlefield.

“It is likely that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are working on scaling up this method of countering Russian drones,” it reported. (Source: UAS VISION/yahoo!news)

 

20 Jan 25. Ukraine detains two generals accused of negligence in defending against Russian offensive. Ukraine’s State Investigation Bureau (DBR) said on Monday it had detained two generals and a colonel suspected of negligence in failing to adequately defend against a Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region last year. The DBR said in a statement on Telegram the detained officers were the former chief commander of the Kharkiv frontline, a former commander of a brigade and a former commander of an infantry battalion. It did not give their names. Russia launched an assault across the border in May 2024 into Ukraine’s northern region of Kharkiv, advancing by several kilometres in the first few days. The attack alarmed Ukraine, causing President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to cancel scheduled foreign trips and fire several military commanders as he dealt with the unfolding crisis. Ukraine’s military was eventually able to halt the Russian advance about 25 kilometres away from the edge of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city, which Russia had unsuccessfully attempted to capture at the start of its invasion in 2022 before pulling back. The DBR said it had co-operated with Ukraine’s domestic intelligence service in the case, and had been assisted by the defence ministry and the military command. (Source: Reuters)

 

20 Jan 25. Ukrainian Special Operators Are Using Advanced American ENVG-B Night Vision Tech. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) reportedly used cutting-edge Enhanced Night Vision Goggle-Binoculars (ENVG-B) to defeat a planned Russian counterattack near the village of Bolshoye Soldatskoye in the Kursk region.  A Euromaidan report stated that during the recent battle, Russian officers deployed North Korean forces in large formations of 20 to 100 soldiers, particularly during night assaults, believing the cover of darkness would help them break through Ukrainian positions. However, Ukraine, equipped with advanced ENVG-B night vision goggles, was able to spot enemy movements with exceptional clarity even in total darkness, fog, and snowstorms. By marking enemy silhouettes, the technology allegedly gave Ukrainian forces a decisive advantage, which allowed them to neutralize significant portions of the North Korean forces before they could reach Ukrainian positions. The ENVG-B is a dual-imaging system that combines white phosphor and thermal vision. The system connects wirelessly with weapons, projecting targeting information directly into the goggles.  Weighing between 1.5 pounds (objective) and 2.5 pounds (threshold), the ENVG-B system is both lightweight and durable. It boasts an operational battery life of over 7.5 hours, with a target of reaching 15 hours, ensuring dependable performance during extended missions. The ENVG-B enables users to overlay real-time data, delivering enhanced situational awareness similar to heads-up displays in video games. This cutting-edge feature enhances precision targeting, accelerates engagement, and improves operational safety. The ENVG-B is developed by American technology company L3Harris. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

20 Jan 25. Transformation Under Fire – An Analysis of Ukraine’s Security Sector Since 1991. The report examines the transformation of Ukraine’s security sector, mainly its military and paramilitary forces, after 1991. In addition, it zooms in on current challenges surrounding veteran reintegration in detailing broader considerations for Ukraine’s future security sector. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, significantly escalating the lower-intensity conflict ongoing in the country’s east since February 2014. The resilience Ukraine displayed during the first months of the invasion surprised many: Kyiv had been expected to fall within days. To understand why Ukraine was able to defend its territory against overwhelming material odds, it is instructive to look back at the development of Ukraine’s security sector. Since 1991, Ukraine’s security sector has undergone a profound transformation in response to transitions, crises and, finally, full-fledged armed conflict. This report, which was finalised as the third year of full-scale Russian aggression draws to a close, discusses the changes to Ukraine’s security sector since its independence from the Soviet Union, specifically examining military and paramilitary forces. This report details the challenges associated with transforming part of the former Soviet Union’s security apparatus in the framework of a wider transition process. It therefore emphasises the prioritisation of internal over external security threats during the period 1991–2014, which resulted in the deterioration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s capabilities. Subsequently, it details some of the transformations and reforms implemented in Ukraine’s security sector in response to the multi-level crises in 2014, including the ‘Revolution of Dignity,’ Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s aggression in the Donbas. During the subsequent period, reforms focused heavily on increasing the effectiveness of military and paramilitary forces. Moreover, the report outlines the emergence of irregular armed groups, widely known as the volunteer battalions, and their later integration into the formal security sector. In combination, the transformations achieved during this time greatly contributed to Ukraine’s resilience against the full-scale invasion in 2022. It then examines how the lessons learned from lower-intensity conflict in the Donbas, as well as the specific characteristics of the current war, have shaped the Ukrainian security sector since 2022. This includes a broad involvement of different military and paramilitary formations in defence, ranging from the armed forces to border guards, and the strengthening of the territorial-defence system. The report also details the reforms implemented to achieve closer Euro-Atlantic reintegration, including current efforts to transform Ukraine’s law-enforcement sector, as well as increasing cooperation with NATO.

Lastly, the report draws on one specific element of security-sector transformation, namely the reintegration of war veterans in a post-conflict scenario, to illustrate the wider economic, security and institutional considerations for Ukraine’s future security sector. In this regard, it touches on the current shortcomings in the debate around veteran reintegration and outlines the risks that failing to adequately plan for the reintegration of former fighters, as part of a broader transformation of the security sector, bears for Ukraine’s internal and external security. The report therefore calls for more strategic planning and leadership in designing Ukraine’s future security sector.

 

20 Jan 25. Germany sends more UAVs to Ukraine. The German government has sent 739 more strike and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Ukraine, it said in a 14 January update to its overall rolling aid programme. According to the press release by the German Federal Government, the supply includes 600 HF-1 strike UAVs, 50 Vector reconnaissance UAVs with spare parts, 46 RQ-35 Heidrun reconnaissance UAVs, and 43 Songbird reconnaissance UAVs. Helsing’s HF-1 strike UAV can operate in contested electromagnetic environments and be produced en masse. It is also easily transportable, according to information provided by the company. The strike drone was produced in co-operation with Ukrainian companies. The electronics and artificial intelligence (AI) components of the UAV were developed in Helsing facilities while the airframe was produced in Ukraine. The UAV was certified by the Ukrainian government as “resistant to global positioning system (GPS) jamming”, said Helsing. In early December 2024 the company announced on its social media pages that it had created a software called Altra, which uses AI to map terrain without global navigation satellite services (GNSS) co-ordinates. At the time, Helsing also said that it plans to equip the HF-1 and HX-2 models with the new software. (Source: Janes)

 

17 Jan 25. Ukraine Has an Armored Toyota Land Cruiser 70 Series for Special Operations Use. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MODU) approved the “Djura,” an armored vehicle based on the Toyota Land Cruiser 70 chassis, for military operations in August 2024. The vehicle was developed by Ukrainian defense contractor NVO “Praktyka” and has recently gained attention after being reported on by Road & Track. The Djura features a PSZA-4 level armored capsule, providing protection equivalent to NATO’s STANAG 4569 Level 1 standards. This level of armor ensures resistance against 5.45mm rounds and the detonation of multiple grenades. The vehicle is equipped with a turret-mounted 7.62mm machine gun for offensive operations. Powering the Djura is a 4.5-liter turbodiesel V8 engine, delivering 200 horsepower and 317 lb-ft of torque. It offers flexibility in transmission configurations, with options for automatic, semi-automatic, and manual gearboxes to meet various operational demands. The Djura is designed for tasks such as casualty evacuation, supply drops, and special operations. Its lightweight design and off-road capabilities allow it to operate in terrain where heavier vehicles may encounter difficulties. The Directorate General for Armament and Military Equipment Life Cycle Support certified the Djura in August after an expedited ten-day process. The vehicle’s inclusion in Ukraine’s military fleet was noted for its quick turnaround, addressing the need for adaptable assets in ongoing conflicts. This is not the first Toyota-based armored vehicle used in Ukraine. In December 2022, the Titan-S, a 4×4 APC developed by UAE-based Inkas Vehicles LLC, was observed in use and posted on Russian social platform VK. Built on a Toyota Land Cruiser 79 Series OEM chassis, the Titan-S featured an open turret mount, bulletproof windows, and compatibility with remote-controlled weapon systems. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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