NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 17.

17 Jan 25. Hitting Russia where it hurts. Russia has been on fire this week, after dozens of Ukrainian drones and western missiles hit military and industrial targets deep inside the country. Chemical plants, oil refineries, weapons factories and ammo depots were destroyed, some as far as 620 miles from Ukraine, in a bid to weaken Moscow’s ability to continue the war. A Russian official radar channel reassured citizens yesterday: ‘Flashes are visible in Engels from the oil depot. There is nothing to worry about!’ The word ‘explosion’ has been blacklisted by the Kremlin’s propaganda police since the ‘special military operation’ was forced back on to Russian soil.

‘Flashes’ have been seen across several Russian regions since Tuesday. At Russia’s Engels airbase in the Saratov region, ammunition depots storing glide bombs and cruise missiles – used for strikes on Ukraine – were hit. In the city of Engels, the Kombinat Kristall oil depot has been on fire for four days. The depot’s tanks contained scarce aviation fuel for Tu-160 bombers, the same aircraft Russia uses to devastate Ukrainian cities.

In the Voronezh region, another oil refinery depot was struck. Several tanks are still on fire. In Tula, Ukrainian forces targeted the Aleksino chemical plant, a vital producer of gunpowder and ammunition for the Russian military. Further attacks took place in the Bryansk region, where American-made ATACMS missiles struck a chemical plant, and in Tatarstan, where gas tanks at the Kazanorgsintez plant were set on fire. The list of targeted sites continues to grow.

As Donald Trump prepares to take office on Monday, fears are mounting in Ukraine that his presence in the White House could halt such strikes. Trump said last month it was ‘stupid’ for Joe Biden to let Ukraine use US weapons to hit areas deeper within Russia – and that he might reverse it. ‘We’re just escalating this war and making it worse,’ he said. But a third world war hasn’t erupted, and Kyiv has seized the opportunity to deliver significant blows to Russia’s war machine. Ukraine’s strikes have proved effective, from destroying Russian command centers and weapons to inflicting damage on the economy. Drone attacks and sanctions have driven Russian oil processing down to around 267 million metric tons last year – the lowest level since 2012.

Vladimir Putin’s threats to retaliate with the ‘Oreshnik’ medium-range ballistic missiles on ‘decision-making centres in Kyiv’ proved to be just that: threats. When his warnings failed to convince western leaders to revoke Ukraine’s access to long-range missiles, the Oreshnik narrative was quietly abandoned. It was just another Russian bluff that Kyiv and its allies didn’t buy into. Ukrainian strikes inside Russia are putting real pressure on Putin to end the war. If Trump believes in peace through strength – not by appeasing the enemy – he will back Ukraine to keep hitting Russia where it hurts. (Source: The Spectator)

 

Jan 16.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS 
• STRIKES: On 15 January, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike that targeted numerous energy sites in western Ukraine
• DEPLOYMENTS: Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys disclosed on 14 January that Vilnius has not ruled out sending troops to Ukraine at Kyiv’s request
• ASSETS: The outgoing Biden administration is making a last-ditch effort to convince European partners to back a scheme whereby frozen Russian assets would be used as future leverage in negotiations to end the war
• FORECAST: Preparations for US-brokered peace negotiations continue ahead of US President-elect Trump’s inauguration, with the Kremlin reportedly considering a series of demands that would limit Ukrainian military capabilities after the fighting
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 15 January indicates that Russian forces have advanced within the refractory plant in central Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast; the site has been heavily contested in recent weeks). In recent days, Russian sources have claimed that their forces have made further advances in the area, as well as large gains in the microdistrict to the north; we cannot confirm further advances at this time. Further south in Toretsk, Russian forces have continued to advance slowly; they are consolidating control over the northern outskirts of the town. Geolocated footage from 14 January indicates further Russian advances along the northern outskirts, though Ukrainian forces continue to defend various wasteheaps along the northern boundary.
• DONETSK: On 15 January, The New York Times reported that Ukraine allegedly blew up the No. 3 mine shaft in the settlement of Pishchane (located to the south-east of Pokrovsk) on 20 December 2024. The move was aimed at preventing Russian forces from advancing closer to Pokrovsk, located to the north-west of the facility. Russian troops have reportedly advanced to within one mile (1.6km) of the mine, raising concerns that they will possibly capture the facility and use its tunnels to outflank Ukrainian positions. Meanwhile, Ukraine has halted operations at the Pokrovsk coking coal mine, the largest coal mine in the area, due to increasing security threats stemming from creeping Russian advances in the Pokrovsk sector. Geolocated footage published on 13 January shows recent Russian advances to the west of Novoyelyzavetivka (located to the south-west of Pokrovsk).
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: On 14 January, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed its forces seized the village of Neskuchne, located to the south-west of Velyka Novosilka, confirming earlier claims. In recent days, Russian sources have also claimed that their forces have entered the outskirts of Vremivka, the next village to the north of Neskuchne (which directly adjoins south-western Velyka Novosilka). Geolocated footage from 12-13 January has also confirmed Russian advances directly to the north of Velyka Novosilka, with Russian forces having reached the eastern bank of the Mokri Yaly River, which runs north-to-south through Velyka Novosilka. These developments further indicate that efforts to envelop Velyka Novosilka are slowly taking shape, placing further pressure on the last remaining ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying the Ukrainian defence.
• STRIKES: On 14 January, Ukraine shot down 58 of 80 Russian drones, including Shahed-136/131 models and decoy drones. Ukrainian air defences were active over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. In addition, 21 decoy drones were reported as lost. Falling drone debris damaged residential buildings in Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Sumy and Zhytomyr.
• STRIKES: On 15 January, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike following two weeks of (predominantly) drone attacks. The assault included one Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missile, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, four Kalibr cruise missiles, 27 Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles, four Kh-59/69 missiles and 74 drones (Shahed and decoy types). Ukrainian air defences intercepted 77 of the 117 projectiles, including 23 Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles, three Kalibr cruise missiles, four Kh-59/69 missiles and 47 drones. Additionally, 27 unmanned aerial vehicles were reported as lost, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures.
• STRIKES: The 15 January attack primarily targeted energy production facilities in western Ukraine, prompting the authorities to implement power shutdowns in various regions. The Russian MoD stated that the attack was directed at energy facilities supplying Ukraine’s military-industrial complex. It further claimed that the attack was in retaliation for a drone strike against an infrastructure facility linked to the Turkish pipeline on 13 January and a massive drone and missile attack on 14 January, underscoring the risk of future tit-for-tat cycles of high-intensity strikes. The Ukrainian authorities reported damage to energy and critical infrastructure facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Lviv oblasts, as well as residential buildings in Kirovohrad. Temporary power shutdowns were implemented in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The Russian MoD also claimed the attack damaged the ground infrastructure at the largest underground gas storage facility in the city of Stryi (Lviv).
• STRIKES: On 16 January, Ukraine intercepted 34 of 55 Russian UAVs (Shahed-136/131 and decoys). The drones were shot down over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. In addition, 18 decoy drones were reported as lost. Ukrainian officials recorded hits on private houses in Kharkiv and Poltava and a farm in Chernihiv. Quoting pro-Russia partisan movements, RIA Novosti reported hits on a military airfield in the city of Pryluky (Chernihiv). The sources claimed that the attack damaged the runway, which has since been repaired and is now fully operational.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, overnight on 13-14 January, Ukraine conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the strike targeted Russian facilities located between 124 miles (200km) and 690 miles (1,110km) away. The Ukrainian military authorities reported hits on the Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels (Saratov oblast, Russia), which was previously struck earlier this year.
• STRIKES: The attack also targeted various defence production plants inside Russia. Quoting sources within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), a Ukrainian media outlet reported that the strike also targeted glide bomb and cruise missile storage facilities at the Engels-2 airbase, which services Russian strategic bombers used for long-range missile strikes. Other targeted defence facilities include the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Seltso (Bryansk oblast, Russia), which produces components for cruise missiles and artillery systems (as well as artillery ammunition). According to Andriy Kovalenko, the head of the Ukrainian Centre for Combatting Disinformation, Ukrainian forces also struck a microelectronics plant in Bryansk city (Bryansk), which produces microelectronics for missile systems, air defence systems, radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems and UAVs.
• STRIKES: The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the attack also targeted the Kazanorgsintez Chemical Plant in Kazan (Republic of Tatarstan, Russia). However, geolocated footage provided by a Russian online opposition media outlet suggests that the strike did not hit this facility but rather a Gazprom liquefied gas storage facility located 1.2 miles (2km) from the plant. The outlet also reported that the strike targeted a Transneft enterprise in Almetyevsk (Republic of Tatarstan), while the regional authorities stated that a UAV strike caused a fire at a gas tank on the outskirts of Kazan.
• STRIKES: According to the Russian authorities, Ukraine fired six US-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), six UK Storm Shadow missiles and at least 146 UAVs during the attack. Kyiv did not confirm the use of Western missiles, though it did mention launching missiles. This underscores Kyiv’s growing ability to conduct large-scale strikes against Russia. In Bryansk, the attack reportedly utilised drones to saturate Russian air defence systems, facilitating the penetration of missiles and replicating tactics employed by Russia. The reported hits also highlight the vulnerability of critical infrastructure that is crucial for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. This vulnerability likely stems from deficiencies and shortages within Russian air defence systems, limiting Moscow’s ability to protect critical facilities adequately. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian military authorities reported the destruction of air defence systems in Bryansk. Ukraine has regularly reported the destruction of such systems in the past, which is highly likely compounding Russia’s shortages of such systems.
• STRIKES: On the evening of 14 January, Ukraine conducted a drone attack against a distillery in Tambov oblast (Russia); several explosions were recorded around and within the facility. Previously, Ukrainian sources have alleged that distilleries are used to manufacture products deemed as strategic for the Russian government, such as fuel for military purposes and explosives. However, an independent Russian online media outlet hinted that the intended target was possibly a military training facility near the distillery.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• UK: Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer arrived in Kyiv earlier on 16 January to sign a 100-year partnership treaty between the UK and Ukraine. The treaty covers several areas for co-operation, including defence, energy and trade. It also aims to enhance military collaboration on maritime security in the Azov, Baltic and Black seas and to deter Russian aggression. Aside from military aspects, the accord cements the UK as a preferred partner for Ukraine’s energy sector, critical minerals strategy and green steel production. Its signing will possibly encourage further UK investment in Ukraine in the post-war years, which would aid Ukrainian revenues and socio-economic health conditions. The timing of the visit (just ahead of the 20 January inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump) also underscores the UK’s commitment to supporting Ukraine in the long term.
• DEPLOYMENTS: Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys disclosed on 14 January that Vilnius has not ruled out sending troops to Ukraine at Kyiv’s request. Budrys stated that Lithuania would consult its allies and partners about what any such deployment would look like. Separately, reports emerged on 15 January that France and the UK are discussing the possibility of sending soldiers to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force after a deal is reached to end the war. However, Prime Minister Starmer is reportedly not yet fully supportive of the initiative. According to an unspecified person familiar with the matter, there are challenges surrounding what London could and would be willing to support, as well as concerns over the threat to peacekeepers in Ukraine.
• DEPLOYMENTS: Ukraine’s Western allies will almost certainly need to consider the implications and logistics of a hypothetical deployment, depending on the outcome of any possible talks to end the war in the coming months. They will likely review different scenarios concerning the capacity of any such peacekeeping force and those locations where troops would realistically be stationed – particularly as Russia will almost certainly reject any NATO presence along any possible ceasefire line. Nevertheless, our assessment remains that the deployment of a coalition of willing states to Ukraine is a realistic possibility. However, a consensus among European allies remains unlikely in the short term. Nonetheless, the Baltic states, France and Poland will likely remain the strongest advocates for any such deployment in the coming months. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 December 2024.
• ASSETS: The outgoing Biden administration is making a last-ditch effort to convince European allies to back a plan whereby frozen Russian assets are used as future leverage in talks to end the war. According to reports on 14 January, Biden’s aides have been trying to persuade allies to support moving around USD 300 billion of assets into a new account that would be released only as part of a peace deal. Notably, the incoming Trump administration is generally supportive of the strategy; it believes that seized funds will possibly prompt Moscow to enter talks. However, various European countries are reportedly sceptical about the idea and have raised concerns about violating international law if banks confiscate the funds outright. As most of the money is still being held in European financial institutions, consensus on the issue is unlikely before Biden’s mandate ends.
• ASSETS: However, given the Trump administration’s reported support for the initiative, it is possible that it will reinvigorate efforts to convince European partners to agree. Russia has frequently denounced the freezing (and use) of its assets for Ukraine’s benefit. Given the ongoing economic costs of continuing the war, any opportunity for Russia to reclaim its frozen assets would possibly incentivise Moscow to participate in negotiations. That said, Western allies would almost certainly need to determine terms so that Moscow does not abandon any such talks or resort to renewed aggression against Ukraine once it has regained its seized assets.
FORECAST
PEACE: In an interview aired earlier on 16 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky assessed that he believes there is a chance to end the war this year with the help of European allies and the US. Zelensky emphasised Trump’s determination, adding that he is confident in Trump’s ability to pressure Russia into engaging in diplomacy to end the war.
However, advisers to the US president-elect now admit that Russia’s war in Ukraine will likely take months or even longer to resolve. While Trump had previously vowed to resolve the conflict within 24 hours of taking office, two unnamed Trump associates have stated that such promises were a combination of campaign rhetoric, as well as a lack of appreciation of ‘the intractability of the conflict’ and the time it takes to staff a new administration. We previously assessed that pledges to end the war so quickly were highly unlikely to materialise given the complex nature of the conflict.
Nevertheless, Trump’s administration will possibly make progress during the first few months of its tenure in preparing the ground for talks to end the war, rather than resolving the war entirely. Notably, Trump’s choice of secretary of state, Marco Rubio, stated on 15 January that bold diplomacy is required to end the war. Although Rubio did not elaborate, he emphasised the need for realistic expectations and that concessions will have to be made by both Ukraine and Russia. However, our assessment remains that any possible concessions will require time for either side to consider; even more time will be required for both sides to reach an agreement.
If negotiations do begin, Russia will reportedly demand during any talks with Trump that Ukraine drastically scale back its military ties with NATO and become a neutral state with a limited army. Bloomberg reported this on 15 January, citing unspecified people familiar with the matter. According to the report, Russian President Vladimir Putin is determined to make sure that Ukraine will never become a member of the military alliance. Furthermore, while the Kremlin accepts that individual NATO members may continue to send arms to Ukraine under bilateral security agreements, it has underscored that any such weapons should not be used against Russia nor to recapture territory. However, Russia would likely stipulate caps on the type and quantity of weapons Ukraine is allowed to receive so that its military capabilities remain limited.
At the same time, Russia also wants to maintain (at least) de facto control over the Ukrainian territory it holds, including Crimea. Moscow is nevertheless reportedly open to some territory swaps, though we assess these would most likely be lands that Russia has not annexed and/or considers to be of lesser strategic significance. Overall, the reported demands align with our ongoing assessment that Moscow wants a neutral Ukraine with a disempowered military that is therefore vulnerable to future renewed aggression and/or Russian territorial ambitions. In particular, this refers to Ukrainian cities and/or regions the Kremlin considers to be historically ‘Russian’, such as Kharkiv and Odesa.
Jan 13.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have seized the majority of the frontline town of Toretsk and are likely switching to clearing operations amid efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of the city limits
• KURSK: Russian and North Korean forces continue to advance across the Kursk salient despite Ukraine’s limited counter-attack last week
• TALKS: US President-elect Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin are expected to call ‘in the coming days and weeks’; however, the location of a possible in-person meeting is unclear
• FORECAST: The outgoing Biden administration has stated it believes Ukraine can prevail if the West unites to support it; however, the administration has also acknowledged that it has failed to disperse USD 4 bn in aid in time before Trump’s inauguration
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing a relatively high tempo of attacks in and around Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast), and have made some advances along the northern and southern flanks of the town. Geolocated footage published on 10 January indicates advances for Russian forces near Stuupochky, located around two miles (3km) south of Chasiv Yar. Meanwhile, Ukrainian sources reported on 11 January that Russian forces have consolidated control over Hryhorivka, a village around three miles (4.5km) north of Chasiv Yar; we assess this to be likely. Russian sources reported on 12 January that Moscow’s forces have made further advances in the northern Pivnichnyi microdistrict of the town, though this has yet to be confirmed.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces continue to advance in Toretsk (Donetsk oblast); the majority of the town is now under Russian control. Geolocated footage published on 10 January confirmed that Russian forces had advanced and had successfully reached the northern outskirts of the town. Various Russian sources have claimed this week that Moscow’s forces now effectively control Toretsk, with only isolated pockets of Ukrainian forces remaining. Russian forces are almost certainly in control of the majority of the town; geolocated footage from 12 January indicates further advances towards the Toretsk Mine Wasteheap along the northern edge of the town.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces are now likely consolidating control over Toretsk itself and setting conditions to expand the perimeter north along the T-0516 highway which runs north towards Kostiyantinivka (Donetsk oblast). Russian forces also advanced on 9 January in eastern Petrivka, located west of the northern outskirts of Toretsk. These advances will likely further allow Russian forces to consolidate their control over the area, though it does not appear that Ukrainian forces are conducting a large withdrawal from the area for the time being. As such, Russian forces will likely have to continue grinding forward with costly urban assaults to clear the remaining parts of the settlements in the coming weeks. Ukrainian forces will likely focus on delaying Russian advances for as long as possible.
• DONETSK: Russian forces continue to avoid frontal urban assaults in Pokrovsk, instead focusing on bypassing the city from the south and west to reach Donetsk’s administrative borders with Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Citing Ukrainian military officials, Ukrainska Pravda reported on 11 January that Russian forces are currently advancing toward the settlements of Kotlyne and Udachne. Both settlements are located along the Mezhova-Pokrovsk highway, south-west of Pokrovsk. Russian forces are currently less than 1.2 miles (2km) from these settlements. This likely indicates that Russian forces have entirely interdicted the Mezhova-Pokrovsk highway, a key logistical artery for Ukrainian forces, linking Pokrovsk to Dnipropetrovsk oblast; this is notably a region that Russia has not officially ‘annexed’. Russian forces are reportedly 4 miles (6.5km) from Donetsk’s border with Dnipropetrovsk.
• DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 11 January shows that Russian forces have recently advanced on Novovasylivka (south-west of Pokrovsk). Footage from 9 January shows Russian advances to the north-east and in western Solone (south-west of Pokrovsk). A Ukrainian intelligence officer operating in the area reported that Russian forces have stepped up their use of armoured vehicles to transport troops and support infantry assaults. Concurrently, on 11 January, the spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade in the Pokrovsk area said that the Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and have redeployed new forces in the area.
• DONETSK: The trajectory of Russian operations in the area reflects Moscow’s endeavour to avoid highly attritional urban fighting in Pokrovsk. Instead, the Russian command will focus concurrently on cutting Pokrovsk off from supply arteries, while also pursuing the encirclement of the town, as we previously assessed. However, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to close an encirclement of the town, given that this would be a significant operation and multiple attempts to conduct similar encirclements over the last three years have failed. As a result, Russian forces could realistically deem it necessary to shift to frontal urban assaults to take the city, given Russia’s limited manoeuvre capabilities.
• DONETSK: Further south, Russian forces continued to make gains around Kurakhove. Geolocated footage from 11 January indicates that Yantarne (south-west of Kurakhove) has recently fallen to Russian forces. Earlier footage from 9 January shows Russian advances to the north-east of Slovyanka (north-west of Kurakhove). On 10 January, Viktor Trehubov, spokesperson for the Khortytsia group of forces, stated that Ukrainian troops are still holding defensive positions at the Kurakhove thermal power plant (TTP) in the west of the town in a bid to prevent advances toward Dachne (directly west of Kurakhove).
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Russian forces have committed significant forces to advance along Ukraine’s north-western flanks; a large battalion-sized mechanised assault resulted in notable advances. Geolocated footage published on 9 January indicates that the attack resulted in Russian forces seizing the villages of Aleksandriya and Leonidovo, as well as advancing north and west of Vikotorovka, all located north-west of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya. Ukrainian forces engaged in repulsing the attack claimed that Russian forces deployed 50 vehicles including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) during the assault. However, they also claim to have inflicted heavy losses on the Russians; we cannot yet verify this claim. Since that attack, geolocated footage published on 10 January has indicated further Russian advances across the Kursk salient, including east of Sudzha. This indicates that Russian forces are attacking across the full stretch of the Kursk frontline.
• KURSK: Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continue to counter-attack across the Kursk salient and have made some limited advances in recent days. However, following the limited counter-attack launched on 5 January and reported upon last week, Ukrainian forces have advanced very little. Ukrainian attempts to regain the tactical initiative east of Sudzha have resulted in only marginal gains over the last week while Russian and North Korean forces have intensified their assaults.
• KURSK: The Washington Post reported on 11 January that North Korean forces are operating in fairly large groups backed by Russian artillery and drone support but are taking heavy casualties. North Korean forces are reportedly ignoring Ukrainian drone attacks and continuing to advance despite incurring heavy casualties as a result. One Ukrainian soldier fighting in the area claimed that North Korean forces had launched an assault in December 2024, outnumbering the Ukrainians six-to-one and that, after eight hours of fighting, ammunition shortages forced the Ukrainians to withdraw. For further analysis regarding North Korean forces operating in Kursk, see NORTH KOREA below.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: On 10 and 11 January, numerous Russian sources claimed that their forces had taken the village of Neskuchne, located due south-west of Velyka Novosilka, Russia’s key tactical objective along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border region. We previously reported apparent Russian preparations for an assault against Velyka Novosilka’s south-western flank. While we cannot yet confirm whether the satellite village has been taken, Russian forces are clearly tightening the cauldron around the town. Russian forces are likely still setting conditions for the eventual assault on Velyka Novosilka itself. Similar to the rationale behind the operations south of Pokrovsk, the Russian High Command likely wants to avoid the need for costly, frontal urban assaults if possible.
• STRIKES: Over the past few days, Russian strikes primarily included drone attacks of variable size; Ukraine continued to enjoy a high interception rate. On 10 January, Ukrainian forces intercepted 33 of the 72 drones launched by Russia. Air defences were active over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. 34 decoy drones were reported lost, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW); one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flew on to Russia. The attack included Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones. Hits against various buildings were recorded in the north of Chernihiv oblast. Falling drone debris damaged a building and several vehicles in Kyiv oblast.
• STRIKES: Early on 11 January, Russia attacked Ukraine with 74 drones (Shahed-136/131 and decoy types). Ukrainian air defences intercepted 47 drones; 27 decoy drones were reported lost. Air defences were active over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Falling drone debris caused damage to various budlings in seven oblasts, according to Ukraine’s Air Force.
• STRIKES: On 12 January, Ukraine was targeted by 94 Russian UAVs, 60 of which were intercepted, while 34 were reported lost. The attack included Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones. Air defences were active in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Falling drone debris damaged residential buildings in Kharkiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 12-13 January, Russia launched 110 UAVSs (Shahed and decoy drones). Ukrainian air defences intercepted 78 drones over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 31 additional drones were reported lost. Falling drones damaged various types of buildings in Kyiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukrainian state-owned energy operator reported that the attack caused power outages In Zhytomyr oblast.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 9-10 January Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage facility in Russia’s Rostov oblast. This was reported by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU). The attack was reportedly conducted with drones and Ukrainian Neptun cruise missiles. According to SBU sources, Ukrainian forces used drones to overwhelm Russian air defences in the sector and to create favourable striking conditions for missiles.
• STRIKES: Astra, an online Russian opposition outlet, reported a drone attack on 11 January against the Taneko oil refinery in Nizhnekamsk located in the Republic of Tatarstan (Russia). The head of Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation, Andriy Kovalenko, confirmed the attack. Kovalenko explained that the refinery, one of Russia’s largest oil-refining facilities, plays a crucial role in supplying fuel to Russian military forces. The strike follows a similar attack against the oil depot of the Kristall plant of Rosrezerv (Saratov oblast) on 8 January. The attack caused a fire at the Kristall plant lasting several days which destroyed an estimated 800,000 tonnes of jet fuel supplied for Russia’s Engels-2 military airbase. The latest attacks highlight Ukraine’s ongoing efforts to disrupt Russian military frontline operations by targeting military logistics targets, such as oil depots.
• STRIKES: Earlier on 13 January, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) accused Ukraine of launching a large-scale drone attack against infrastructure linked to the TurkStream gas pipeline on 11 January. The Russian MoD claimed that all drones were intercepted. The attack allegedly targeted a gas compressor station in southern Russia that services the pipeline which transports Russian gas to Europe via Turkey. Notably, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjártó condemned the attack, claiming it threatened Hungary’s energy sovereignty. The Russian MoD’s statements come shortly after Ukraine halted the transit of Russian gas via its territory. If confirmed, the attack will highly likely spark tensions with European countries receiving gas via the pipeline, such as Hungary and Slovakia, two countries that typically hold anti-Ukraine positions.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• AID: On 12 January, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius denied reports that Chancellor Olaf Scholz blocked a proposal for additional military assistance for Ukraine worth EUR 3 bn (USD 3.06 bn). Pistorius insisted that there is ‘no blockade’ and that his ministry had prepared a new aid package for Ukraine, adding that a decision to approve it must now follow. The minister also implied that such a decision could realistically come quickly. According to initial reports about Scholz blocking the aid, the package includes additional artillery ammunition, IRIS-T air defence batteries, additional Patriot missiles and howitzers.
• AID: Ultimately, the passage of further German aid under Scholz is possible ahead of the 23 February federal election despite reports stating otherwise. Friederich Merz of the centre-right Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) alliance will likely become Germany’s next chancellor. However, we assess that continued military aid from Berlin will likely continue. Merz will likely adopt a more hawkish stance on Moscow than Scholz. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 18 November 2024.
• TALKS: US President-elect Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin are expected to call ‘in the coming days and weeks’. Trump’s incoming national security advisor Mike Waltz disclosed this on 12 January and added that preparations for the talks are underway. Waltz did not specify whether Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would participate in the initial dialogue. The Kremlin stated on 10 January that Putin is open to meeting Trump, noting that no conditions are required for this to happen.
• TALKS: A possible dialogue between the two leaders in the coming weeks would mark a significant shift in US policy. The outgoing Biden administration has pursued a strategy of not engaging in talks to end the war with Russia without Ukraine’s involvement, instead opting for open-ended military support for Ukraine. As such, direct discussions between Putin and Trump will aim to serve as the first step towards encouraging (or coercing) Moscow to participate in negotiations to end the war in the coming months. However, current (and outgoing) US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stated on 10 December 2024 that he believes neither side is currently ready for negotiations to end the conflict. This aligns with our current assessment; even if formal communication channels do open, both sides still have a significant way to go before they can reach a compromise deal that could realistically end the war.
• TALKS: Although Putin will unlikely enter talks in good faith at present, he likely hopes to influence the Trump administration’s position and to press for terms to end the war which are closer aligned to Moscow’s conditions. While it is currently uncertain what peace terms the US will push for under Trump, these possibly include Ukrainian territorial concessions and an agreement that Ukraine will not join NATO. It remains unlikely that this will be sufficient for Russia to agree to end the war in the short term, given Moscow has consistently stated that its maximalist objectives have not changed. A more coercive approach to force Moscow to end the war may therefore be required later in 2025 if Trump is determined to deliver on his commitment to rapidly end the conflict.
• TALKS: It ultimately remains uncertain which state(s) could serve as a mediator or host for in-person contacts between Putin and Trump in the coming months. Serbian President Aleksandr Vučić has offered his country as a possible destination while Switzerland has also expressed interest in hosting the high-level meeting. Russia will almost certainly insist on a ‘friendly’ or ‘neutral’ country hosting any possible talks. However, Ukraine will likely seek to balance this over the coming months by having its European allies either mediate or host a possible Trump-Zelensky summit.
• NORTH KOREA: Zelensky announced on 12 January that he is prepared to hand over two captured North Korean soldiers to the North Korean authorities in exchange for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Russia. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian president stated that there may be other options available for North Korean soldiers who do not wish to return. He added that those who want to bring peace closer by sharing the truth about the war would be given the opportunity to do so. Ultimately, the comments indicate Ukraine’s interest in using North Korean soldiers as a bargaining tool to return its own POWs.
• NORTH KOREA: Moreover, Zelensky’s remarks are likely an attempt to exert pressure on Moscow and North Korea about the risk of North Korean soldiers sharing information and/or defecting. South Korea assesses that, as of earlier on 13 January, around 300 North Korean soldiers have been killed, with 2,700 wounded. Seoul has attributed the casualties to North Korean soldiers’ lack of understanding of modern warfare; South Korean intelligence also believes that North Korea has urged its soldiers to kill themselves to avoid capture. While we cannot verify the figures, the high casualty rates are possibly (at least in part) related to inexperience dealing with the high saturation of drones on the modern battlefield. Gruelling battlefield conditions and low morale will possibly encourage North Korean soldiers to seek capture by Ukraine to defect.
• NORTH KOREA: However, Ukrainian reports also indicate that North Korean troops are showing significant resilience during battle and have continued attacks even under extreme pressure and casualty rates. The fact that the first confirmed North Korean soldiers have only just now been captured after weeks of fighting in Kursk also suggests that many troops at risk of being caught have indeed killed themselves to avoid capture. If accurate, this would point to high levels of discipline.
FORECAST
US: Outgoing US President Joe Biden stated his belief on 10 January that there is a ‘real chance’ that Ukraine can prevail as long as Western Europe remains united in its support. This comes ahead of Trump’s inauguration on 20 January and a possible significant reduction of US military support for Ukraine during his second presidency.
Biden stated there is a ‘significant number’ of Democrats and Republicans in Congress who think the US should maintain aid for Ukraine. However, without a significant shift in Trump’s strategy towards backing Ukraine, we assess that divisions concerning whether to continue support for Ukraine (mostly driven by Ukraine-sceptic Republicans) will likely drive policy deadlock and impede the passage of further support measures. The Biden administration has also acknowledged that it failed to utilise around USD 4 bn of approved funds to aid Ukraine in time. Should Trump’s administration decide to use these funds, we assess that it would most likely be used as a mechanism to facilitate peace talks by providing Ukraine assistance to encourage Russia to enter negotiations.
Meanwhile, Biden claimed that the cost of Russia maintaining the war is ‘incredibly high’, particularly in terms of casualties. However, the president implied that the economic toll of the war was also significant for Moscow. In this regard, Biden referred to recent US sanctions targeting Russian oil and gas aimed at undermining revenues to fund the war effort (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 13 January 2025). The UK similarly sanctioned Russia’s Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, which reportedly produce over 1 m barrels of oil per day between them. This equates to roughly USD 23 bn a year at current prices.
The latest sanctions show the Biden administration’s efforts to escalate Western sanctions against Russia before Trump assumes the presidency. For example, in November 2024, the US sanctioned Russia’s Gazprombank, one of the main channels for Russian oil and gas payments. Given Trump is due to be inaugurated in a matter of days, additional large-scale sanctions targeting Russia are now unlikely. However, smaller, more symbolic punitive measures targeting entities or individuals are possible. It is also possible that Biden administration officials will reiterate calls on allies for co-ordination on sanctions as well as renew requests for other jurisdictions to comply with US measures against Russia.
*Russia: Escalating Western sanctions will further curb oil export revenues; drive global oil prices. On 10 January, the US sanctioned the Russian oil producers Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, as well as 183 oil tankers. Many of these tankers have been shipping oil to Russia’s key oil importers, namely China and India. Bloomberg reported that following the measures, three sanctioned tankers approaching Chinese ports stopped and drifted, likely indicating that the vessels were denied port entry. On 7 January, China’s Shandong Port GROUP banned US-sanctioned tankers from entering its ports ahead of the latest restrictive measures. In recent months, Western sanctions have increasingly targeted Russia’s antiquated oil tanker fleet to curb Moscow’s ability to evade the price cap on seaborne oil exports. The growing reluctance of Chinese and Indian ports to accept US-sanctioned oil tankers is likely aimed at pressuring Russia into adhering to the price cap, further reducing its seaborne oil export revenues. At the same time, we assess that the situation will likely prompt China and India to seek alternative oil sources (which would ultimately drive oil prices up).
*Moldova: Energy insecurity will continue to drive operational disruption, socio-economic health risks. On 12 January, the authorities in Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region reduced the duration of rolling blackouts to three hours as they attempt to navigate the termination of gas supplies from Russia. The Transnistrian authorities nevertheless noted that rolling blackouts would take place on 13 January across different cities and districts for five hours, specifically from 0800hrs to 1300hrs (local time). Despite a reduction in the duration of rolling blackouts from eight hours earlier last week, energy security will almost certainly remain strained over the coming days and weeks. On 10 January, the Transnistrian authorities extended the state of emergency they first introduced in December 2024 for another month. The breakaway region claims to have enough gas to meet domestic needs until the end of the month, though we assess that supplies will almost certainly be used conservatively. This will continue to drive significant operational disruption risks for entities in the breakaway region, and also contribute to strained socio-economic health conditions for residents therein. (Source: Sibylline)

 

17 Jan 25. Ukrainian Drone Operators are Stumbling onto Enemy Drone Feeds. There are so many drones in the skies above Ukraine that drone operators occasionally stumble onto enemy drone feeds and pick up unexpected intel. Neither side can be sure, though, when it will luck into this — or when the other side will. Drones, including cheap first-person-view ones, are being used more in Russia’s war against Ukraine than in any other conflict in history. They are being used to attack troops and vehicles, complicating battlefield maneuvers, and they’re so prolific that ground troops often struggle to sort out which ones are theirs. Ukrainian drone operators told Business Insider that extensive drone warfare had resulted in unintentional feed switching. When this occurs, operators on one side of the battlefield can see the feed of the other side’s drone — typically airborne devices that can target soldiers directly or identify enemy positions that will then be targeted. A drone operator in Ukraine said being able to see Russian drone feeds was “useful because you see where the enemy drone that wants to destroy you is flying.” That gives the unit a chance to take defensive action. Samuel Bendett, a drone expert at the Center for Naval Analyses, described it as the wartime version of a common civilian occurrence: When you drive in your car and have your radio at a certain frequency, your radio can flip between different stations that use the same frequency.

Fight for the Spectrum

Jackie, a US veteran fighting in Ukraine, said “two fights” were being waged by drones in Ukraine. “There’s one that you can see on video,” he said. “And there’s one that’s completely invisible.” That invisible fight takes place in the electromagnetic spectrum.

The electromagnetic spectrum can get “full” and “crowded,” he said. When there are enough drones in an area, he continued, operators have “a lot of the feeds between those drones transferring, basically switching between operators without intent.”

When that situation happens, it means “the drone guy would just suddenly see some other drone’s feed,” Jackie said. So when enough drones are in the sky, everyone is “constantly switching feeds between some other drone that they’re not flying.”

Bendett said it was possible to do this deliberately if you know the frequency your adversary is operating on, but most of the time, he said, it’s accidental.

He said this sort of thing happens “because technologies for both sides are similar, and there’s only so many operating frequencies you can hop on to actually pilot your drones.”

Advantages and disadvantages

As neither side has dominated the electromagnetic spectrum through electronic warfare, both sides are experiencing all the advantages and disadvantages of these developments. Sometimes Ukraine is collecting intel, and sometimes it’s Russia.

The feed can help operators helplessly realize an attack is incoming, and “it also can be very informative for drone crews, experienced ones, to kind of determine the tactic of the adversary, how far the drone flies, how fast it flies, what’s the drone route, what the drone is looking for, and so on and so forth,” Bendett said.

But it’s a hard thing to plan for given the chaotic nature of these occurrences.

Jackie shared that Ukraine had attempted to “play games with the signals,” but Gregory Falco, an autonomous systems and cybersecurity expert at Cornell University, said it’s “probably not predictable when you’d be able to get these capabilities.” It’s more about seizing the advantage when the opportunity arises.

Falco said it would be difficult to tell whether the enemy has access to a feed because “you don’t have absolute certainty of where your band is at a given time and where you’re projecting.”

There are questions about whether this could be taken further, though, going from accidental insight to deliberately pirated drones. Right now, that’s more theory than practice.

Whether any Ukrainian or Russian operators could actually get control of the other side’s drone, rather than just being able to see through its eyes, probably depends on the drone, Falco said.

He said the spectral bands used to see drone feeds are probably different from the ones that control it. And the bands used to receive signals — that let the operator see what the drone can see — are typically less protected than the ones that send the signals, which is how operators tell drones what to do.

He said the feed switching was “bound to happen” with so many drones in the sky and with different types of electronic warfare in play.

Solutions, Falco said, could involve something like added encryptions for drone feeds. But given the fast-moving, chaotic, and desperate nature of a lot of the fighting and the fact that drone operators can go through multiple drones a day, it may not be worth it. And if that’s the case, this kind of thing will keep happening.

He said it was the type of thing civilians would frequently see if there were less regulation. “If we didn’t have rules,” and if the likes of the United Nations body that allocates the radio spectrum didn’t exist, “and companies didn’t bother playing by the rules, then this would be a normal occurrence,” Falco said.

Then, he added, it would just be “a total shit show of hearing and seeing everything that you’re not supposed to see.”

(Source: UAS VISION/Business Insider)

 

16 Jan 25. Gravehawk: UK to provide Ukraine with new air defence system – here’s what we know. Ukraine will be provided with a brand new mobile air defence system by the UK following an announcement made by the Prime Minister during his first visit to the country.
Gravehawk is a UK-designed air defence system and, according to the Ministry of Defence, has been rapidly developed to meet Ukraine’s battlefield needs.
The announcement comes after both nations signed a 100-year agreement which will lead to closer military collaborations on maritime security.
Little is known about the Gravehawk system which is being billed as “innovative” by the Ministry of Defence.
However, it is said to be the size of a shipping container and is capable of retrofitting air-to-air missiles for ground-based air defence, meaning it can use Ukrainian missiles already in possession of its armed forces.
Little else is known about the weapons system, and no images have been revealed to show exactly what Gravehawk looks like.
Russia has carried out repeated attacks against Ukraine from the air and Gravehawk will boost the country’s air defences, the MOD said.
Two prototypes of the air defence capability system were tested in Ukraine in September, and a further 15 will soon be donated.
The system has been jointly funded by the UK and Denmark.
Defence Secretary John Healey said: “We are stepping up UK support for Ukraine throughout 2025.
“Our plan will increase Ukraine’s military capability, expand our training offer, strengthen defence-industrial ties and dial up the pressure on Putin.
“This new package of support will help strengthen Ukraine’s position on the battlefield or at any negotiating table.”
In his first visit to Ukraine since becoming PM, Sir Keir Starmer said: “Ukraine’s security is our security. We must continue to do everything possible to ensure Ukraine is in the strongest position – that is why the UK is going further than ever before, ramping up military and humanitarian support.
“The British people have never wavered in their support for Ukraine, and today, UK firms are stepping up to support Ukraine’s military capabilities.
“We will always stand shoulder to shoulder with the people of Ukraine.” (Source: forces.net)

 

16 Jan 25. What is Gravehawk, Ukraine’s secretive new air defence system?
Apparently developed by the UK for Ukraine, the Gravehawk is described as a mobile missile-based air defence system.
Hidden in the weeds of the UK’s latest military assistance package to Ukraine was the mention of a new air defence system, dubbed Gravehawk, that was previously unknown to defence observers, in what appears to be part of Kyiv’s move to harness rapid defence innovation in its ongoing war against Russia.
Announced during the visit of UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer to the war-torn country on 16 January, Gravehawk was described as a UK designed “mobile air defence system” the size of a shipping container and able to “retrofit” air-to-air missiles into a ground-based air defence role.
This means the Ukrainian Armed Forces can use missiles already in its inventory, removing the risk of delivery delays of pledged munitions.
“With Ukraine under constant Russian bombardment, the Gravehawk system will boost Ukraine’s air defences, allowing them to defend their cities, troops and critical infrastructure,” the UK Government said.
Two prototypes of the air defence capability system were apparently tested in Ukraine in September 2024, and a further 15 system will be delivered in 2025.
However, little else is known of the system, including the type of launcher system used, the timeline for development work, the costs involved, or whether additional Gravehawk units will be delivered in 2026 and beyond.
The UK Ministry of Defence declined to comment when approach for comment by Army Technology, citing operational security.
The announcement was part of a wider £4.5bn ($5.5bn) boost for Ukraine in 2025 will see the UK will procure “hundreds more air defence systems, drones and essential equipment support to sustain Ukrainian forces on the front line”, according to the government release. The Gravehawk system itself was funded jointly by the UK and Denmark.
Ukraine embracing defence innovation
The implications of the announcement point towards a need to rapidly develop a launcher system that can use existing air-to-air missile in Ukraine’s inventory. Since mid-2024 and over the winter months, Russia has embarked on a broad campaign of air strikes using one-way attack munitions against Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure.
As a result, Ukraine’s air defence network has been stretched significantly in a bid to maintain key power and utilities during the cold and dark months.
Nato countries have provided a range of air defence systems to Ukraine, including the advanced Patriot and IRIS-T capabilities. The mention of Gravehawk being a “mobile air defence launcher” could also indicate a need for tactical battlefield mobility.
Ukraine has received stocks of the US-origin AIM-9X short-range air-to-air missile, which can be adapted for ground launch, although no mention was made in the UK release in any US involvement in Gravehawk. The AIM-9X is the munition used in the NASAMS medium-range air defence system, also provided to Ukraine by Nato forces.
Other missiles known to be stocked by Ukraine include the Soviet-era R-27 medium range and R-60 and R-73 short range air-to-air missiles, as well as the US origin AIM-120 AMRAAM, AIM-7, and AIM-9 missiles. It is also thought that Ukraine could be operating the UK ASRAAM short-range air-to-air missile, commonly used by the UK Royal Air Force.
Ukraine has form for utilising rapid system development, or adapting munitions from their original use, against Russian forces. The UK’s Brimstone missile, an air-to-ground missile, was adapted by Ukraine to be fired from trucks in a surface-attack role, and which could have been the inspiration for the UK’s own Project Wolfram programme.
Ukrainian industry is also rapidly developing uncrewed capabilities across the warfighting domains, as witnessed by Army Technology in Lviv in 2024.
In addition, its use of uncrewed surface vessels as maritime one-way attack platforms caused sigificant damage to Russia’s Black Sea fleet.
(Source: army-technology.com)

 

16 Jan 25. Ukraine and Norway’s Kongsberg to enhance air defence cooperation. Ukraine and Norwegian defence company Kongsberg are planning to integrate Ukrainian air defence solutions into the NASAMS platform. This development was discussed during a meeting between Ukraine’s Defence Minister Rustem Umerov and Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace CEO Eirik Lie. Minister Umerov highlighted the growing partnership with Kongsberg, which, alongside American company Raytheon, supplies NASAMS air defence systems to Ukraine. These systems have been instrumental in protecting Ukrainian cities from aerial attacks during the ongoing conflict. The discussions focused on improving the effectiveness of NASAMS by incorporating domestic Ukrainian air defence capabilities. Both parties also explored anti-drone systems and the potential for localising their production in Ukraine. Additionally, the development of naval capabilities for Ukraine’s Defence Forces was a key topic of discussion. This aligns with broader efforts to enhance the country’s defensive infrastructure across multiple domains.
(Source: Google/Ministry of Defence of Ukraine/https://defence-industry.eu/)

16 Jan 25. Fanatical North Korean troops sustain 3,000 casualties in Ukraine war. North Korean troops have sustained 27% combat losses in Ukraine war, as UK announces 100-year partnership with Kyiv. It has emerged that North Korean military forces dispatched by Pyongyang to aid its ally Russia in the Ukraine war have sustained significant casualties, with thousands killed or wounded since being deployed in late-2024. The controversial commitment of North Korean forces into the Ukraine-Russia war in aid of Moscow was a significant escalation, bringing an Asia-Pacific nation into Europe’s first state-on-state conflict for generations. Determining the exact number of military casualties is difficult, but it is assessed that of the 11,000 North Korean troops sent to aid Russia, up to 3,000 have been killed or wounded in combat, or more than 27% of the committed force.
In addition, the fanatical ideology of the North Korean troops has seen them fighting to the death, even when surrender could have been an option. This approach has been likened to suicide tactics, although it could be a case of North Korean forces determining not to be captured, which would be perceived negatively in Pyongyang.
North Korean troops are centred on operations in Russia’s Kursk region, a portion of which was seized by Ukrainian forces in the second half of 2024 in a bid to counter gains by Russian forces in the east of Ukraine.
Although Ukraine achieved initial success, capturing around 900km2 of Russian territory, counterattacks by Russian and subsequent North Korean forces, have forced them back. It is thought that Ukraine holds less than half, some 420km2, of the initial territory seized, with a reduction of 60km2 in the past week alone.
North Korean losses, though severe, pale in comparison to those sustained by Russia since February 2022, with between 700,000 to 800,000 Russian personnel killed or wounded. It is unclear how many military losses Ukraine has sustained, though it is likely to be in the hundreds of thousands.
Russian forces continue advances in eastern Ukraine
Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to make progress along the frontline in the east of Ukraine, recently capturing Kurakhove, and making further advances along the front around the towns of Chasiv Yar (10km west of Bakhmut), Pokrovsk, Cherovets, and Velyka Novosilka. It is thought that Russian forces are just 3km from the centre of Velyka Novosilka, and threatening to cut the town’s main supply route.
Throughout the second half of 2024 and into 2025, Russia has sought to press its manpower advantage in Ukraine, potentially in a bid to acquire as much territory as possible should US President-elect Donald Trump seek to force a peace agreement between the warring parties.
Russia is also continuing with a steady aerial campaign using one-way attack munitions, such as the Shahed drone provided by Iran, with around 1,000 platforms used so far in January alone. At current rates, it is estimated that Moscow could more up to 2,000 drones into Ukraine or Ukrainian-held territory by the end of the month.
In December 2024, Russian forces launched 1,700 one-way attack munitions in strikes against Ukrainian critical national infrastructure, although Ukraine is able to repair damaged power and utility sites, currently thought to be running at around 70% capacity.
UK agrees 100-year treaty with Ukraine
Elsewhere, and the UK has agreed a new UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership deal to bolster cooperation in a range of areas, including military and national security.
On 16 January, coinciding with a visit to Ukraine by UK Prime Minister Keir Stamer, the UK government stated the treaty will “bolster military collaborations on maritime security” through a new framework to strengthen the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Azov Sea, in a bid to deter “Russia aggression”.
Spanning nine pillars, the treaty is intended to “harness the innovation, strength and resilience that Ukraine has shown in its defence against Russia’s illegal and barbaric invasion; and foster it to support long-term security and growth for both… countries”.
“The power of our long-term friendships cannot be underestimated. Supporting Ukraine to defend itself from Russia’s barbaric invasion and rebuild a prosperous, sovereign future, is vital to this government’s foundation of security and our Plan for Change,” Starmer stated.
The treaty and political declaration, which form the ‘100 Year Partnership’, will be set before the UK parliament in the coming weeks. Areas such as energy, critical minerals, and steel, among others, are also part of the agreement.
The UK Government stated the 100 Year Partnership was a “major step in supporting Ukraine’s long-term security, ensuring they are never again vulnerable to the kind of brutality inflicted on it by Russia”.
Continuing, the agreement also committed the UK to stand “shoulder-to-shoulder” with “a sovereign Ukraine” for the next century.
“Ukraine has a highly trained military, and a thriving technology sector that is rapidly designing and deploying state of the art battle-ready equipment: a security partnership with Ukraine will make Britain stronger,” the UK Government stated in the 16 January release.
(Source: army-technology.com)

 

16 Jan 25. Sergey Mironov: “The Entry of NATO Forces into Ukraine Under Any Pretext Will Lead to a Direct War With Russia.” Any involvement of NATO military units in the conflict in Ukraine, even under the guise of “peacekeepers” or “defending Kiev,” will lead to war with Russia, said Sergey Mironov, chairman of the party and leader of the “A Just Russia—Patriots—For Truth” faction in the State Duma.
Earlier, the media reported that NATO could create a defensive cordon around Kiev in the event of a Russian offensive so that the Ukrainian military could be deployed to other sectors of the front.
“No matter how Zelensky’s curators try to save his regime, all this leads only to one thing—Russia’s victory. Either without NATO’s direct involvement in the conflict (as it is now) or as a result of a military clash between the Alliance and a nuclear power, Russia,” the politician says.
Such a clash will be inevitable, he added, since the presence of NATO military in Ukraine is unacceptable to Russia, which Moscow has been openly talking about for many years.“It was NATO’s expansion into Ukraine that became one of the main causes of the conflict, and as a result, Russia was forced to launch a special military operation. To resolve it, it is necessary to eliminate its root cause, but Washington and Brussels stubbornly refuse to put an end to the war. Instead, they openly urge the NATO member states to get ready for war with Russia. This is crazy!” said the Russian MP.
“While the NATO servicemen are involved in combat operations in Ukraine in an unofficial, private capacity, we are taking them out in this role. If the deployment of troops begins, there will be a war. Those who want to play peacemakers and ‘defenders’ of Kiev run the risk of not just going back home in coffins. They risk being buried in Ukrainian land forever, because there will simply be nowhere to send these coffins. That’s what the authors of such plans in the West should keep in mind,” Sergey Mironov concluded.

 

15 Jan 25. UK and France in talks over sending peacekeeping troops to Ukraine. Deployment of Western soldiers could help underpin post-war settlement between Kyiv and Moscow. Sir Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron are discussing sending British and French soldiers to Ukraine as a peacekeeping force after any potential deal to end the war, The Telegraph understands. The French president is championing the idea and has already talked about it with Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, and Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister.
Press spokesmen for Downing Street and the Elysee Palace did not dispute that Sir Keir and Mr Macron discussed the possibility during their meeting at Chequers last week.
Details of the conversations are being kept under wraps by officials in London and Paris. However, multiple well-placed UK government sources have stressed Sir Keir is not yet fully signed up.
One Whitehall source told The Telegraph: “There are challenges over what we could support, what would we want to support, and the broader question about the threat that those troops may be under and whether that is escalatory.”
The proposal comes as European leaders scramble to work out how to continue supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty as president-elect Donald Trump pushes for Kyiv to strike a peace deal with Russia.
Mr Trump enters the White House on Monday. He has rowed back on his campaign promise to end the conflict on “day one” as US president but aims to do so in the first six months of his administration.
Sir Keir has long been expected to visit Ukraine in the early new year, in what would be seen as a symbolic show of support for Mr Zelensky as US backing wavers.
Publicly, the UK Government’s position is that Western allies should give Mr Zelensky as much support as possible, with the Ukrainians deciding when and if to hold peace talks.
In private, ministers and officials are expecting Mr Trump to force Ukraine and Russia to get around the negotiating table, with attempts now underway to map out what would happen next.
One idea now increasingly being talked about, not just in public debate but behind closed doors in Westminster, is whether Western troops may need to guarantee any peace terms.
The thinking revolves around the idea that Russia could keep Ukrainian land it has captured as part of a peace deal – though much uncertainty about that prospect remains.
Should that happen, European leaders have been thinking about what can be done to make sure the remaining territory of Ukraine is protected from any future Russian attacks. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

15 Jan 25. President Joe Biden’s administration is seeking to “Trump-proof” its sanctions against Russia by giving Congress the ability to block any attempts to weaken measures against core parts of Moscow’s war machine. Under measures announced by the US Treasury on Wednesday, around 100 entities from the finance, energy and defence sectors are to be relisted under an unusual sanctions law which requires that Congress be given 30 days to consider any delistings. The list of affected entities runs from military bodies such as the Tactical Missiles Corporation, which makes weapons, through to the Moscow Exchange, a major financial exchange. The new authority will give legislators an opportunity to head off any attempts by the new White House to reverse the Biden administration’s efforts to weaken Russia’s military-industrial efforts. If both houses of Congress pass a “measure of disapproval”, delistings can be blocked. European allies are also poring through the raft of Biden-era sanctions and trade measures to assess the potential impact of Donald Trump rolling them back. The new legal basis for these listings will also reduce the discretion for the new administration to avoid enforcing existing measures by introducing “mandatory” secondary sanctions for companies that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for or on behalf of any of these entities. “Today’s actions frustrate the Kremlin’s ability to circumvent our sanctions and get access to the goods they need to build weapons for their war of choice in Ukraine,” said deputy Treasury secretary Wally Adeyemo. “Today’s expansion of mandatory secondary sanctions will reduce Russia’s access to revenue and goods.” A senior US Treasury official said that they were “trying to send a signal to . . . the whole ecosystem around circumvention” not to risk dealing with anyone on the sanctions lists. The legislation, “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” or CAATSA, was passed in 2017 after concerns about Russian electoral interference in the US and Europe. The Treasury on Wednesday also announced new sanctions on a Kyrgyz bank, Keremet Bank. It said the bank was “strongly linked to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian government” and “intended to create a sanctions evasion hub for Russia to pay for imports and receive payment for exports”. The new listings also cover a person and 15 additional entities that have been setting up “regional clearing platforms” in Russia and China to facilitate cross-border payments for sanctioned goods. The platforms are said to be facilitating “non-cash mutual settlement”. (Source: FT.com)

 

15 Jan 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine showcases laser-enabled targeting drone. Ukraine has revealed a new laser-enabled drone capable of targeting enemies from more than three miles away. The drone, equipped with advanced infrared detection and laser targeting systems, was showcased in new footage.
Recently revealed footage captures the ACS-3 drone, also known as the Raybird-3, identifying a house occupied by Russian troops from an altitude of 7,900 feet. The drone operator uses the laser system to designate the target, followed by a precise strike that causes a controlled explosion.
Military observer Yigal Levin, who shared the footage, explained the process:
“Using infrared detection, the location of the enemy was identified – a heated house with personnel. The laser target designator provided precise guidance, thanks to which the target was destroyed, and the defeat was confirmed.”
Levin described the drone’s laser targeting capabilities as enabling “surgical” strikes, even in challenging terrain.
The ACS-3 drone can remain airborne for up to 28 hours, making it a powerful tool for long-endurance reconnaissance and precision strikes. Its laser system, named Tryzub (Ukrainian for “Trident”), can also target aerial threats at the speed of light. Last month, Ukraine’s drone forces commander, Vadym Sukharevskyi, stated the laser could shoot down aircraft flying at altitudes of over 6,500 feet.
The unveiling comes amid other high-profile Ukrainian operations, including a sabotage mission that targeted a Russian military cargo train just 60 miles from Moscow. Footage from the Voskresensk rail depot shows a dramatic explosion, destroying freight carriages used for Russian military logistics.
Ukraine’s GUR military intelligence agency confirmed responsibility for the attack, stating:
“There was an explosion that destroyed the carriages of a freight train at the Voskresensk railway station, Moscow region. The aggressor state used them [the freight wagons] to provide logistics for the Russian occupation army [in Ukraine].”
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-showcases-laser-enabled-targeting-drone/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

 

15 Jan 25. Russia plans to sow chaos with attacks on air transport in Poland and elsewhere, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has warned. His comments are the latest indication of what security experts charge is a campaign of sabotage and intimidation inspired by Moscow that began last year. “The latest information can confirm the validity of fears that Russia was planning acts of terrorism in the air not only against Poland,” Tusk told a news conference alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Warsaw on Wednesday. Moscow has denied involvement in a number of mysterious explosions and breakages that have bedevilled western leaders over the past year. Experts warn the evidence suggests that Russia was behind explosions at logistics depots in Europe last summer, which may have been a dry run in terror attacks on cargo flights to the US. The explosions occurred in depots in Britain, Germany and Poland in July. Tusk did not mention them specifically. In April, two German-Russian nationals were arrested in Bavaria for allegedly plotting to attack military and logistics sites in Germany on behalf of Russia. The same month, two men were charged with having started a fire at a warehouse in the UK containing aid shipments for Ukraine. English prosecutors accused them of working for the Russian government. (Source: FT.com)

 

15 Jan 25. Zelensky Orders Suspension of New Brigade Formations, Report Says. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has ordered an end to the creation of new combat brigades, directing that all newly mobilized troops reinforce existing units instead, journalist Yurii Butusov reported, citing his own sources.
“Three days ago, at a meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff, after hearing a report, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelensky decided to stop sending replenishment of personnel to form new brigades in the Defense Forces,” Butusov said.
The journalist explained that the decision was made after the 155th Mechanized Brigade, formed in May 2024, faced severe challenges, including poor leadership, desertions, and a lack of resources.
The 155th Brigade was intended to strengthen Ukraine’s forces with advanced weapons like Leopard 2 tanks and Caesar howitzers. However, the brigade struggled during its training and deployment.
Reports indicate that out of 5,800 troops, around 1,700 went absent without leave, and critical shortages of equipment, such as reconnaissance drones, limited its effectiveness. When deployed to the eastern city of Pokrovsk, the brigade reportedly suffered heavy losses and operational setbacks.
Military officials and journalists criticized the decision to form new brigades while existing units were under-resourced.
Zelensky’s new policy aims to solve these issues by redirecting resources to replenish experienced combat brigades, many of which are operating with severe infantry shortages. These veteran units will now receive fresh recruits, ensuring that their experienced command structures and specialized personnel are supported. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

15 Jan 25. Ukraine’s Massive Missile Attack Targets Key Military and Industrial Sites in Russia. Ukrainian drones conducted a massive overnight strike deep within Russian territory, targeting industrial sites, chemical plants and ammunition depots, according to reports.
A source in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told the Kyiv Independent that chemical plants, refineries, and a weapons depot at the Engels Air Base were successfully targeted.
The Engels Air Base houses Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, including the Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers. These aircraft have been instrumental in Russian cruise missile attacks on Ukraine.
According to Saratov Governor Roman Busargin, two industrial facilities in Engels also sustained damage from a drone strike. He did not provide additional details but according to Ukraine’s General Staff, the Kristal oil facility in Engels, which burned for five days following a previous strike on January 8, was successfully targeted once again.
The strike in Engels prompted authorities to shift schools to remote learning and impose temporary flight restrictions in several nearby regions, including Kazan, Penza, and Ulyanovsk.
Ukrainian drones also reportedly hit multiple regions, including Bryansk, Saratov, Tula, and Tatarstan. The Bryansk Chemical Plant, which produces munitions components, was among the damaged sites, according to Ukraine’s General Staff. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

15 Jan 25. Russian Troops Test New ‘Trump’ Transport Drone. As reported by Russian Weapons on January 9, 2025, the Russian military-industrial complex has developed a tactical transport unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) called the TraMP, an acronym for “transport aviation multipurpose platform.”
Informally referred to as Trump by the Russians, the UAV has entered the ground testing phase, with its first flight scheduled for April 2025. The UAV is intended to support logistical operations and other tasks in various operational environments.
Current testing of the Trump UAV focuses on its control systems and mechanisms, with engineers conducting a series of ground runs without takeoff to confirm calculated parameters. (Picture source: Telegram/Russian Weapons)
The Trump UAV is capable of transporting up to 250 kilograms of cargo over distances exceeding 600 kilometers. Current testing focuses on its control systems and mechanisms, with engineers conducting a series of ground runs without takeoff to confirm calculated parameters. The UAV features a cargo compartment with a capacity of 2,650 liters, allowing it to deliver large payloads, including parachute-dropped cargo. The compartment’s downward-opening flaps also enable the suspension of a shock payload.
Key design aspects of the Trump UAV include a modular structure allowing field replacement of components such as the wing, engine, and chassis. The reinforced chassis with large-diameter tires is designed for takeoff and landing on short and poorly prepared airstrips. Additional features include a built-in cargo and aircraft rescue system, aimed at improving operational flexibility.
The UAV has a cruising speed of 195 kilometers per hour and a ceiling altitude of 3,000 meters. It is designed to serve multiple roles, including logistics support in hard-to-reach areas, acting as a communications repeater, and carrying small-sized FPV drones. According to military expert Yevgeny Damantsev, the vehicle is undergoing rigorous testing to ensure functionality and reliability.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with capacities comparable to the Russian TraMP/Trump drone, capable of carrying up to 250 kilograms over 600 kilometers, are being developed globally. For instance, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are working on the Joint Tactical Autonomous Aerial Resupply System (JTAARS), targeting cargo capacities between 136 and 636 kilograms. Similarly, Airbus has tested a sub-scale demonstrator for a multi-mission UAV designed for cargo transport and other functions.
In the conflict in Ukraine, the Trump UAV could serve Russian forces by improving logistics capabilities, particularly in areas with limited infrastructure or difficult access. Its ability to deliver supplies and equipment efficiently, including precision parachute drops, may address challenges in resupply missions and support operational flexibility. The name “Trump” for the UAV appears to reference Donald Trump, the future U.S. president.
The specific rationale behind this naming has not been explicitly detailed, but it may relate to his perceived positions on Russia. During his earlier presidency, U.S.-Russia relations faced significant challenges, and Russian officials have expressed measured expectations regarding his possible future policies. (Source: UAS VISION/Army Recognition)

 

15 Jan 25. UK moves against Russian CBRN weapons in Ukraine.
The UK government coordinated counter-CBRN measures in its security assistance to Ukraine’s Armed Forces, says senior MoD official.
Following intermittent reports in 2024 citing evidence that Russian forces have used chemical weapons in Ukraine, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has assured its continued support to protecting Ukraine’s forces.
In a parliamentary written response on 14 January 2025, the UK Armed Forces Minister, Luke Pollard, stated that the MoD “continues to assess and monitor the evolving threat picture in Ukraine.” Particularly when it comes to coordinating countermeasures against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats.
The Minister pointed out that British security assistance to Ukraine included respirators and decontamination kits, most recently in December 2024 as part of a package of support jointly financed by partners in the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
CBRN cases in 2024
In July 2024, experts from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) conducted a Technical Assistance Visit in Ukraine upon the country’s request to deliver non-military detection and protection equipment and train Ukraine’s State Emergency Service.
However, it is worth noting that despite accusing one another of using chemical weapons at the time, last July, the OPCW found that “the information provided to the Organisation so far by both sides… is insufficiently substantiated.”
Nearly three months later, in October, Russian forces are said to have admitted using hazardous chemical weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine, with widespread use of Riot Control Agents and multiple reports of the use of chloropicrin – a choking agent that causes severe irritation to the eyes, skin, and lungs which was first used during the First World War.
At that time, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs justified its use of CBRN threats by baselessly accusing Ukrainian armed formations of using chlorine, ammonia, ammonium nitrate, and sulfuric acid against Russian military units.
Nevertheless, the Kremlin has a deep history of using chemical weapons against enemies of the rogue state, such as their use of Novichok on the streets of Salisbury in 2018.
The CBRN threat is just one of many dubious methods of war that Russia’s forces are using against Ukraine. Other lethal and indiscriminate methods include planting vast swathes of mines and hybrid strikes combining one-way-attack drones and many missile types.
Allied Capability Coalitions are forming to prevent such methods of war, notably the Lithuanian-led demining group to uncover more than 174,000 square kilometres, or 28% of Ukraine’s territory.
Others include the Drone Capability Coalition, co-led by Latvia and the UK, to support Ukraine’s manufacture of uncrewed systems and secure a reliable supply chain for the emerging military technology.
Currently, there is no Capability Coalition when it comes to countering Russian CBRN threats. Though, this may be due to the difficulty of proving its use against Ukrainian troops.
Government and defence organisations have grouped counter-CBRN equipment with their medical supplies in security packages. But if the Russian government decides to resort to tactical nuclear weapons, which is unlikely, but not improbable – as its use of an IRBM indicates – then a coalition effort in the CBRN space specifically may be worthwhile.
(Source: army-technology.com)

 

15 Jan 25. Ukraine Tests German-Made Interceptor Drone. Brave1, a defense-tech collaboration platform established by the Ukrainian government, has announced successful trials of an advanced interceptor drone developed by German manufacturer TYTAN Technologies.
The UAV, designed to counter enemy drones and reconnaissance systems, was tested by Ukrainian operators who evaluated its potential for addressing the challenges of modern warfare.
The TYTAN-developed drone is engineered to intercept Iranian-design Shahed drones and enemy reconnaissance UAVs. Capable of reaching speeds of up to 300 km/h and covering a range of 20 kilometers, it is designed for high-speed engagements. The manufacturer also plans to enhance the drone with an automatic targeting system powered by machine vision technology, further increasing its precision and effectiveness.
Representatives from Ukraine’s Security and Defense Forces attended the trials and expressed strong support for the drone’s capabilities.
“This technology addresses critical needs on the battlefield, offering solutions for countering persistent aerial threats,” a defense official commented during the trials.
Ukrainian operators directly controlled the UAV during the testing process, allowing them to assess its relevance and adaptability to the ongoing conflict. Feedback from the trials will inform further developments and customizations to better suit operational requirements.
Brave1 is actively fostering partnerships between international manufacturers and Ukrainian developers to create comprehensive defense solutions.
“We are working to match the manufacturer with Ukrainian developers of complementary solutions,” Brave1 representatives stated. “This partnership will benefit both the German side and domestic innovators.”
The platform also emphasized its commitment to building strategic alliances with global developers whose technologies can strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities. This trial is part of ongoing efforts to integrate cutting-edge innovations into Ukraine’s defense strategy as it continues to face evolving threats. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog)

 

14 Jan 25. Are Ukrainian and Russian electronic jamming-resistant drones unstoppable? In the evolving landscape of modern warfare, both Ukraine and Russia are deploying fibre-optic-controlled drones that are impervious to electronic interference – but can the current anti-drone techniques be enough to stop them?
The first-person view (FPV) drones are next-level and are controlled by a fibre-optic cable rather than a radio signal and they also feed back crystal-clear imagery.
Russia is using them in the thousands, so what – if anything – can be done to halt them?
• Wounded Ukrainian veterans taking the fight to Russia with FPV drones
• Ukraine turns Soviet-era two-seat trainer into hunter-killer of Russian drones
• Russia’s new fibre-optic drones dodging Ukraine’s jamming equipment
Drone expert Professor Peter Lee from the University of Portsmouth told BFBS Forces News that the “principle of a fibre-optic drone is quite simple… take a standard FPV drone and attach a reel of fibre-optic cable to the body”.
“It doesn’t provide power – that still comes from batteries,” he explained.
“But it can be used to control the drone and feed back high-quality video signals, doing away with any of the radio emissions that make a UAV detectable and making the drone impervious to electronic jamming.
“The weight of the fibre-optic conductor does reduce the flight time and weapons payload slightly, but these drones can still fly more than 20km into the enemy’s lines and stay airborne for around 20 minutes.”
Prof Lee added: “Interrupting the signal is very difficult because it’s not broadcast, so how do you tap into a fibre-optic cable? It’s technically very difficult.
“The other option is to break that connector, and that is really the only option.”
Russia was the first to introduce fibre-optic FPV drones, using them for reconnaissance and attacks on Ukrainian forces.
Watch: Ukraine puts drone on a leash to sidestep Russian jamming
A 1.5kg reel of fibre-optic cable is enough to provide a drone with 10km of range, with larger reels providing an even greater range.
Ukraine is deploying its own version of these drones and there are reports it is also developing sound detectors that can identify incoming uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs).
In December, the British Army successfully trialled a radio frequency-directed energy weapon.
This device uses high-frequency radio waves to damage critical components inside drones.
Long-term, lasers are another possible answer – the Royal Navy is fitting the Dragonfire laser system to its ships from 2027.
But for now, finding a way to cut the fibre-optic cable seems to be the only realistic solution. (Source: joint-forces.com)

 

14 Jan 25. Ukraine’s Shchedryk Reconnaissance Drone. Ukraine has unveiled its domestically-built Shchedryk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed to monitor movements of hostile troops.
Approved for military use on December 25, the drone is equipped with a control station and silent electric motors, making it ideal for covert operations.
Its design also includes enhanced resistance to electronic warfare, addressing the significant threat posed by Russian jammers on the battlefield.
The Shchedryk can reach speeds of up to 150 kilometers (93 miles) per hour, a maximum range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), and an altitude of up to 4 kilometers (2.5 miles).
“The capabilities of the aerial vehicle and its optical equipment allow it to operate from an altitude that is difficult to reach for most enemy air defense systems,”
Deputy Defense Minister Dmytro Klimenkov explained.
Over 200,000 Drones Delivered to Frontline
The approval of the Shchedryk comes as Ukraine accelerates its production of indigenous UAVs to gain a tactical edge against Russian forces.
Umerov disclosed that over 200,000 domestically-produced drones have already been delivered to frontline units for combat and reconnaissance missions.
But the broader goal, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, is to increase production to up to four m drones annually by 2025, surpassing the initial target of one m.
In October, Ukraine’s Digital Transformation Ministry confirmed contracts for 1.8 m UAVs for 2025 as part of the country’s strategy to build an “Army of Drones.” (Source: UAS VISION/The Defense Post)

 

13 Jan 25. Biden leaves $4bn in potential Ukraine funding unspent.
The funding has been left for the incoming Donald Trump, although his continuation of US policy to Ukraine is uncertain. The outgoing US administration has left $4bn in president drawdown authority (PDA) funding unspent before handover to returning President-elect Donald Trump, providing a final $500m military assistance package, comprising mainly of munitions and aircraft spares.
It had been anticipated that outgoing President Joe Biden would seek to use the final days of his term in office to provide large-scale package to Ukraine, which has been the recipient of $65.9bn in US funding since Russia’s invasion of its neighbour in February 2022.
A US Department of Defense (DoD) spokesperson, in a 10 January press briefing, confirmed $4bn in PDA funding would be left unspent when the current administration leaves office on 20 January.
“The next administration will get the opportunity to use [the funding] for Ukraine,” the spokesperson said.
Military equipment provided by the US to Ukraine, funded through mechanisms such as the PDA, include more than 2,000 armoured personnel carriers, dozens of Abrams M1A1 and T-72A tanks, and hundreds of artillery systems and guided rocket launchers.
Will Trump continue US support for Ukraine?
The return of President Trump to office in the coming days has created uncertainty over the continued provision of PDA funding and military equipment to Ukraine, which is reliant of external support as it continues to fight against Russian forces, nearly three years after Moscow’s large-scale invasion.
President-elect Trump has pledged to end the Ukraine-Russia war, stating prior to his election victory in 2024 that he would stop the conflict inside 24 hours of assuming office. However, in 2025 Trump has shifted position, apparently accepting that finding common ground between the two sides who have lost hundreds of thousands of military casualties could take some time.
In an interview with Fox News on 11 January Keith Kellogg, retired US Army general and Trump’s selection for the role of special peace envoy, said a peace deal could be agreed within “100 days”.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, who enjoyed relatively good relations with Trump during the president-elect’s first term, could also be looking for a way to end the war, as long as terms are favourable. This could include the formal occupation of lands annexed from Ukraine since 2022 and certainly see Ukraine ceding the Crimean Peninsula to Russia, which was seized by Moscow in 2014.
Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a brief meeting with Trump during a visit to the US in 2024, but relations with the incoming US administration will not be anywhere near as cordial as they have been under President Biden.
Any loss in Ukraine funding would have to be met with an increase from its European backers, with countries such as France, Germany, and the UK providing tens of bns of dollars.
Trump is also a vocal critic of Nato, an alliance that Ukraine has aspirations to join, and has recently mooted the potential seizure of Greenland, which is an autonomous territory of Nato member Denmark.
US puts Russia’s war casualties at 700,000
Determining combat casualties on both sides of the Ukraine-Russia war is difficult to determine, with no independent verification possible. Ukraine is moving to digitise its own recording of combat operations, although this is still unable to be independently assessed.
However, the US DoD provided its own updated figures on 10 January, stating that Russia had suffered “more than 700,000 casualties”, a number that aligns relatively closely with Ukraine’s own claims. Earlier in January, Kyiv stated Russian casualties had crossed the 800,000 mark.
It is unknown how many combat casualties Ukraine has sustained in nearly three years of combat since Russia’s large-scale invasion, with the figure held at state secret level.
However, given the attritional nature of operations, with conditions reminiscent of trench combat seen during World War 1, it is likely that Ukraine has also suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

13 Jan 25. Ukraine eyes frozen Russian assets to fund Italian air defence systems. Both parties concurred on the importance of pursuing joint industrial ventures. Ukraine Deputy Minister of Defence brigadier general Anatolii Klochko has engaged in discussions with delegates from the Italian Defence Industry Agency.
The dialogue centred on the prospect of using funds from frozen Russian assets to acquire Italian air defence systems and ammunition.
Klochko acknowledged Italy’s support since the beginning of the conflict with Russia.
He said: “We are interested, among other topics, in ammunition of various calibres and air defence systems.
“However, it is important to understand the cost and the timeframe within which they can be delivered to the Defence Forces of Ukraine.”
The Ukrain team, including members from the Ministry of Strategic Industry and the Armed Forces’ General Staff, also reviewed the offerings of Italian defence companies.
Marcello Mele of the Italian Ministry of Defence outlined the agency’s primary functions and proposed frameworks for collaboration.
The Italian representatives confirmed their commitment to assisting Ukraine and ensuring the EU budget is effectively used to enhance Ukraine’s industrial capacity.
Both parties concurred on the importance of pursuing joint industrial ventures and committed to sustained collaboration towards this objective.
In addition, the European Commission has released the first €3bn of its €18.1bn Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) loan to Ukraine, to be repaid using frozen Russian assets in the EU.
This is part of the G7-led ERA initiative, which aims to raise €45bn in total support for Ukraine.
The €18.1 bn loan, to be disbursed in 2025, is expected to help Ukraine meet its military, budget, and reconstruction needs, ensuring macroeconomic stability and rebuilding critical infrastructure damaged by Russia, including energy, water, and transport systems.
It will also support military expenses and allow Ukraine to prioritise defence infrastructure amid ongoing aggression.
Previously, Italy, in partnership with France, delivered SAMP/T system to Ukraine in 2023 and was expected to deliver a second one by late September 2024.
In addition, Italy pledged continued military support to Ukraine through 2025, as confirmed by a government decree in December 2024.
Earlier in January 2025, it was announced that the UK and Latvia-led International Drone Capability Coalition is sending 30,000 uncrewed aerial systems to Ukraine.
Other members of the coalition include the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, France, Estonia and more. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

13 Jan 25. V-BAT Drone System Field Tested in Ukraine. Ukrainian military news portal Militarnyi reports that Ukrainian defense forces have received and successfully deployed Shield AI MQ-35A V-BAT unmanned aerial vehicles supplied by the United States. Shield AI, the manufacturer, has released a photo showing the drone alongside Ukrainian military personnel, marking one of the first documented instances of the V-BAT system in Ukrainian service. According to the company, the V-BAT has already completed its first autonomous reconnaissance mission on the Ukrainian front. The V-BAT demonstrated resilience against electronic warfare, showcasing autonomy in the toughest conditions and completing the first successful long-endurance, long-duration ISR and targeting mission while GPS and comms were jammed.
The V-BAT drone weighs 56.5 kg, including up to 11 kg of payload capacity, and can maintain flight for up to 10 hours. The system’s reconnaissance capabilities are powered by an advanced electro-optical station, featuring sensitive MWIR thermal imaging sensors and artificial intelligence for target detection and recognition.
A key feature of the Shield AI MQ-35A V-BAT is its ability to perform vertical takeoff and landing on a 4×4 meter platform. (Source: UAS VISION/Shield AI; Euromaiden)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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