NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 12.

12 Jan 25.  US president-elect Donald Trump intends to push Ukraine to lower its age of conscription in an effort to stabilise the country’s front lines ahead of direct negotiations with Russia. (Source: FT.com)

 

12 Jan 25. Russian forces are heading towards Ukraine’s Dnipro region, bypassing an anticipated heavy urban battle in the eastern Donetsk area.  (Source: FT.com)

Jan 11.

11 Jan 25. Warsaw is backing Donald Trump’s demand for Nato countries to spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence even if it will take 10 years for the alliance’s laggards to reach the target, says the Polish defence minister. (Source: FT.com)

Jan 10.

• Military aid to Ukraine will likely decrease in near term, despite new weapons package. On 9 January, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced a new USD 500 million package in weapons and equipment for Ukraine. The package is set to include additional air defence missiles, air-to-ground munitions and equipment for F-16 fighter jets. The resources will be drawn from the Pentagon’s existing stockpiles, underscoring President Joe Biden’s intent to reinforce Kyiv’s armed forces before President-elect Donald Trump assumes office on 20 January. There is a realistic possibility that this package will be the last to be sent by Biden, despite the existence of a residual USD 4 billion of congressionally authorised funding (the issuance of which will be left to the Trump administration’s discretion). We assess that a significant decrease in military aid for Ukraine is highly likely in the near term as both Trump and most congressional Republicans do not view supporting Ukraine as crucial to advancing US interests. Instead, additional funding will likely be allocated to strengthening the US’ defence posture in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific regions, as well as bolstering security along the US’ southern border. (Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Jan 25. Russia Deploys First S-500 Air Defense Regiment, Enhancing Strategic Defense of the Kerch Bridge. Russia has deployed its first full regiment of the S-500 long-range air defense system. The announcement, made on December 18 by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff, highlighted the system’s cutting-edge features and its deployment to protect the strategic Kerch Bridge.  With a maximum range of 600 kilometers and an operational altitude of up to 200 kilometers, the S-500 system surpasses the capabilities of comparable U.S. systems, such as the Patriot and THAAD.  The S-500 is designed to counter a wide spectrum of threats, including stealth aircraft, hypersonic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and low-orbit satellites.  Unlike its predecessor, the S-400, which uses a four-missile configuration, the S-500 employs a leaner design with two missiles per launcher. These missiles are optimized for high-altitude, high-speed engagements and rely on direct kinetic strikes to destroy incoming threats, eliminating the need for traditional proximity-fused warheads.  This technological sophistication allows the S-500 to engage multiple targets simultaneously with a response time of three to four seconds. The Kerch Bridge is vital for the transport of military supplies and civilian goods between Russia and Crimea. It holds both practical and symbolic importance, serving as a key component of President Vladimir Putin’s assertion of control over Crimea since its annexation in 2014. Ukrainian military and political officials have long identified the bridge as a primary target in their efforts to disrupt Russian supply chains and diminish the Kremlin’s ability to project power in the region.  Recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in Crimea, including air defense systems, naval resources, and command centers, have increased the urgency for the Kremlin to bolster the bridge’s defenses. General Gerasimov characterized the deployment of the S-500 as a transformative step for Russia’s military strategy, describing the system as unparalleled in its ability to counter modern missile threats.  (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

Jan 09.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

* BAKHMUT: Russian forces are making steady progress in the frontline town of Toretsk, and are likely aiming to push the Ukrainians out to set conditions for future advances towards Kostiantynivka later in 2025

* AID: Washington D.C. has announced a new USD 500 million aid package for Ukraine, amid the last Ramstein-format meeting of the Biden administration

* BELARUS: Belarus has launched military exercises near the Ukrainian border which will run until the end of the month, but renewed offensive operations across the border remain highly unlikely

* FORECAST: US President-elect Donald Trump aims to end the war within 100 days of assuming the presidency, according to his nominee for special envoy for Ukraine and Russia

* BAKHMUT: Russian forces are making steady progress in northern and western Toretsk, with geolocated footage published on 6 January confirming that Russian forces have now reached the western outskirts of the city. Russian sources on 7 January claimed that their forces now control some 90% of the town, and while they certainly do control a majority of the town, this figure has not been visually confirmed. Nevertheless, if Russian forces can sustain the current rate of advance, Russian forces will likely attempt to push the Ukrainians out of the town in the coming month – but it remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces will withdraw to limit casualties or seek to hold on to the outskirts for as long as possible. Given Kyiv’s determination to defend other such settlements until the very end, it is likely that Ukrainian forces will continue contesting the town in the coming weeks.

* BAKHMUT: Notably, a spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting in Toretsk reported on 5 January that Russian forces have adjusted their assault tactics. Russian forces have in recent weeks increasingly been attacking in platoon-sized groups of up to 20 soldiers. Russian forces had previously primarily used smaller fireteams of around five soldiers during attacks. Russian sources have also reported that they are now attacking in multiple locations across the city, rather than focusing on one location at a time. These seeming shifts in tactics almost certainly seek to make greater use of Russia’s growing manpower advantage. While such tactics will likely increase their own casualty rate, if Russian forces can sustain this increased tempo in the coming weeks, the sustained pressure will likely force Ukrainian forces to steadily withdraw at a faster rate.

* BAKHMUT: However, given the current rate of Russian losses and the unknown quality of Ukrainian fall-back positions at the outskirts of Toretsk, it remains unclear when Russian forces will be able to push the Ukrainians out of the city entirely. Russian forces intensified assaults against Toretsk in June 2024, and while they are making faster progress now, this has been a long and hard-fought battle for the settlement. If and when they do push the Ukrainians out, however, Russian forces will likely seek to set conditions for future offensives later in 2025, specifically northwards along the T-0516 highway to Kostiantynivka – a major Ukrainian town and defensive point due west of Chasiv Yar. However, Russian forces are also likely to push westwards in a bid to mutually reinforce the assaults on Pokrovsk from the east, and shorten the frontline by intercepting the T-0514 highway, which runs north-east from Pokrovsk to Kostiantynivka (see DONETSK below).

* DONETSK: Russian forces continued to advance around Pokrovsk as part of their ongoing efforts to envelop the city. Geolocated footage from 7 January shows Russian advances within eastern Lysivka, north of Vovkove and north-west of Vozdvyzhenka, located south-east, south-west and north-west of Pokrovsk, respectively. On 8 January, Russian sources made unconfirmed claims that Russian forces interdicted the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway north-east of Pokrovsk. While this claim remains unverified, it likely indicates an effort by Russian forces to encircle Pokrovsk from the east, complementing their steady progress south of the city. Moreover, according to the Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState, the Russian command is transferring some units to Myrnohrad, north-east of Pokrovsk. This likely further indicates Russia’s intent to achieve progress east of Pokrovsk as part of its efforts to encircle the town. That said, such an endeavour is unlikely to come to fruition in the coming weeks, as is Russia’s broader effort to launch urban assault against the city.

* DONETSK: On 7 January, DeepState, confirmed that the majority of Kurakhove is under Russian control. On 6 January, Ukraine denied Russian official claims of the town’s capture, asserting that fighting was ongoing in the industrial zone, west of the city. However, DeepState reports that even if Ukraine retains several observation posts on the outskirts of the thermal power plant (in the industrial zone, west of the city), Russia remains in control of the majority of the city. The control of Kurakhove, a key logistics hub, is expected to facilitate Russian advances west of Donetsk oblast. Notably, Russian forces made confirmed marginal advances east of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).

* KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report

* KURSK: Russian forces have seemingly intensified offensive operations along the flanks of the Kursk salient as Ukraine’s own limited offensive operation earlier this week has slowed. Geolocated footage published on 6, 7 and 8 January indicate that Russian forces have made a number of advances to the north-west and south-east of the Kursk salient in recent days, including to the west of Malaya Loknya and south-east of Sudzha. These attacks could realistically have taken advantage of Ukrainian forces focusing resources on its own limited offensive effort earlier this week, which made some minor progress along the north-east flank towards Berdin. This Ukrainian offensive operation was limited in scope, however, and various Russian sources have appraised the attack as a reconnaissance-in-force operation or preparations for future attacks in the area.

* KURSK: It remains unclear if Ukrainian forces intend to intensify offensive operations in this direction in the coming weeks, given stretched resources across the frontline. However, there are strategic and political reasons why the Ukrainian High Command would favour allocating scarce resources to such offensive operations: namely to illustrate to Western allies ahead of President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration that Ukraine retains the capabilities and determination to counter-attack and retain its key diplomatic bargaining chip in Kursk oblast. Additionally, the original Kursk offensive in 2024 illustrated that Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi is prepared to launch potentially risky offensive operations to achieve strategic-political objectives. With the potential for US-brokered peace talks in 2025, retaining control over territory in Kursk will likely remain a high priority for Kyiv to improve its negotiating position, which could realistically necessitate more risky military operations to keep control of the territory.

* OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces are reportedly 1.2 miles (2km) from the outskirts of Kupiansk and are continuously trying to reach the main Svatove-Kupiansk highway. This was reported on 9 January by Andriy Besedin, head of the Kupiansk City Military Administration. Besedin acknowledged the increasingly difficult situation, north-east of Kupiansk, around Dvorichna, where Russian forces are trying to gain a foothold. Notably, on 8 January, a Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces advanced south of Dvorichna and along the Dvorichna-Kupyansk highway towards Zapadne (south-west of Dvorichna and north-west of Kupiansk). On 7 January, the commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Kupiansk sector said that the bad weather had prevented both sides from using drones in the sector.

* OSKIL-KRENINNA: Meanwhile, Russian forces continued operations west of Svatove, making gains in the direction of Borova. Geolocated footage from 6 January shows Russian advances northwest of Lozova and north-east of Borova, following reduced company-sized mechanised assaults. Borova, located approximately 25 miles (40 km) west of Svatove and close to the Oskil River.

* SOUTHERN: On 8 January, Ukrainska Pravda cited numerous unnamed Ukrainian frontline commanders fighting near Velyka Novosilka as anticipating an impending Russian assault on the town from the south-west. According to the officers, Russian forces have been deploying assault groups to the south and south-west of Velyka Novosilka, from where an attempt to break through into the south-west of the town is likely to be made. However, two villages remain under Ukrainian control in this direction and currently guard the south-western outskirts of Velyka Novosilka itself, and as such these would need to be taken first. The officers did not specify when they expect the attack, but it is likely that Russian forces will attempt to further tighten the cauldron around the town, in a likely attempt to force a Ukrainian withdrawal – which likely includes taking the villages of Neskuchne and Vremivka.

* STRIKES: Early on 7 January, Ukraine intercepted 28 of the 38 Russian-launched drones (Shahed-136/131 and decoy types). Air defences were active over Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. Ten decoy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were reported lost, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures.

* STRIKES: Overnight on 7–8 January, Russia attacked Ukraine with 64 drones of Shahed-136/131 and decoy types. Ukrainian air defences shot down 41 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. An additional 22 drones were lost, likely due to Ukrainian EW measures.

* STRIKES: Early on 9 January, Ukrainian air defences intercepted 46 of the 70 Russian UAVs (Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones). Air defences were active over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. Another 24 drones were reportedly lost due to Ukrainian EW measures. Falling drone debris caused damage to residential buildings in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kyiv and Mykolaiv oblasts.

* STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russian authorities reported a Ukrainian drone attack involving 11 UAVs against Saratov and Engels, two cities in Russia’s Saratov oblast, on 8 January. Geolocated footage from a Russian online opposition outlet indicates that the target was the oil depot of the Kristall plant of Rosrezerv. The plant stores fuel for the Engels-2 airbase, a key base for Russian strategic bombers involved in long-range missile strikes against Ukraine. The strike will likely cause logistical issues for Russian strategic aircraft based at the airfield. Saratov oblast authorities reported a fire at an industrial enterprise but provided no further details. The attack was part of a broader strike involving 32 UAVs, targeting Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk and Volgograd oblasts as well as Krasnodar Krai.

* STRIKES: Ukrainian forces have also conducted high-precision strikes against Russian military command posts along the frontline over the past few days. On 8 January, Ukraine struck the command post of the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army of Russia in the city of Khartsyzsk in Donetsk oblast. Earlier, on 7 January, Ukraine reportedly hit the command post of the 810th Separate Marine Brigade near the settlement of Bila in Russia’s Kursk oblast, likely using a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* AID: US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced earlier on 9 January a new USD 500 million aid package for Ukraine. It will possibly be the last tranche of military assistance from the outgoing Biden administration before President-elect Trump takes office on 20 January. Austin specified that the latest round of support includes additional air defence missiles, more ammunition, air-to-ground munitions and other equipment to support Western-provided F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine’s arsenal. The outgoing defense secretary announced the support at a summit of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format), which may possibly be the last of its kind in its current form.

* AID: The primary focus of the 9 January Ramstein-format summit is to support Ukraine’s defence capabilities through 2027. Leaders of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group will reportedly need to endorse roadmaps for various Ukrainian security needs and objectives over the next two years. The aim of this is to coordinate and plan for support for Kyiv over the longer term, likely in part due to the uncertainty of continued open-ended US military assistance for Kyiv under Trump. For further analysis on US assistance for Ukraine, see Sibylline Special Report – 25 October 2024.

* BELARUS: On 8 January, Belarus launched military exercises in its Gomel oblast near the Ukrainian border. The drills will take place through to 31 January and focus on personnel management skills and training troops to perform unspecified tasks, among other things. Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service (DPSU) is monitoring the exercises, though it reported on 8 January that it has not observed any indications of Belarusian troops preparing to attack Ukraine. While already-heightened regional tensions between Belarus and Ukraine will likely be moderately elevated during the exercises, renewed offensive operations from Belarus are highly unlikely in the coming months.

* POLLING: Trust in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to fall, though the majority of Ukrainians maintain confidence in his work. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published on 7 January data from last month which indicates that Zelensky enjoys the trust of 52% of Ukrainians surveyed. Meanwhile, 39% of respondents stated that they do not trust him. At its peak in May 2022, Zelensky enjoyed the trust of 90% of Ukrainians, though this steadily fell as the war progressed and Russia continued to make further territorial gains.

* POLLING: While Zelensky’s approval rating remains positive, we assess that pressure for Ukraine to make concessions in possible talks to end the war over the coming months will likely decrease his popularity further in 2025. At the same time, decreasing popularity will also likely make it harder for Zelensky to manoeuvre certain contentious political and military issues – including potential changes to conscription rules and pressure to agree concessions to end the war. Although serious government instability is unlikely at present, a considerable decline in trust over the coming months will elevate associated risks, as well as possibly drive policy stagnation.

PEACE: US President-elect Donald Trump aims to end the war within 100 days of assuming the presidency, according to his nominee for special envoy for Ukraine and Russia. Keith Kellogg announced this on 8 January, adding that he believes Trump can accomplish his goal of resolving the conflict in the ‘near term’. Although Trump reportedly acknowledges the conflict is complex, a ‘quick end’ to the war which offers a temporary peace rather than a permanent solution will increase the risk of renewed Russian aggression in the coming years. Kellogg attempted to assuage concerns that Trump will offer a settlement in Russia’s favour to Ukraine’s detriment. According to him, Trump’s administration will endeavour to make sure that a settlement is ‘equitable’ and ‘fair’. Kellogg did not discuss any details of possible peace agreements being considered by the incoming administration, though we have previously assessed that several previously reported plans will unlikely be welcomed by Kyiv. Specifically, these are agreements which would involve possibly freezing the frontline, allowing Russia to retain Ukrainian lands it has taken, a moratorium on NATO membership and the creation of autonomous regions in Ukraine. Notably, on 7 January, Trump seemed to consider Russian concerns over Ukraine’s aspirations to become a NATO member. Trump implied that Kyiv’s goal to join the military alliance has long been a significant concern for Moscow. The incoming US president subsequently blamed the outgoing administration of President Joe Biden for encouraging Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership. Trump said that he could understand Russia’s feelings about having ‘somebody [NATO] right on their doorstep’. Although Ukrainian membership in NATO is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, Trump’s comments indicate that NATO membership for Ukraine is almost certainly a non-starter, despite Kyiv’s continued requests for membership (or at the least strong security guarantees involving the US). Meanwhile, Kellogg has reportedly postponed a visit to Kyiv until after Trump’s inauguration on 20 January. Reuters reported this on 6 January citing four unspecified people familiar with his trip, which was to take place early this month to gather opinions rather than set policy (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 19 December 2024). It is uncertain when his new official visit will happen, though it is possible that the scope of this trip will now change given it will occur after Trump takes office. However, we assess that neither Ukraine nor Russia is likely willing to end the war at present, without significant concessions from the other side – concessions which are highly unlikely in the short term. That said, visits by Kellogg to Kyiv and (possibly) Moscow in the coming months will aim to push the two sides towards beginning talks within the first 100 days of Trump’s second presidency.

Jan 08.

* Russia: Cyber attack highlights heightened security risks stemming from pro-Ukraine hacktivists. On 8 January, international news outlets confirmed that the pro-Ukraine hacktivist group ‘Ukrainian Cyber Alliance Group’ conducted a cyber attack on 7 January against the Russian internet service provider (ISP) ‘Nodex’. The attack followed a statement by the group on the same day, in which it claimed to have breached the ISP’s systems. The attack reportedly wiped large volumes of data from the provider’s servers and exfiltrated sensitive data, resulting in the temporary disruption of internet connectivity. While Nodex restored partial internet access for several customers on 8 January, a full system recovery is likely to take several months given that the attack also deleted back-up files. Pro-Ukraine hacktivist groups have consistently targeted Russian and Russia-based entities since the start of the war in Ukraine. We assess this incident points to the heightened security, information-theft and disruption risks stemming from pro-Ukraine hacktivist groups amid the ongoing war.

Jan 06.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

* KURSK: Ukrainian forces renewed offensive operations in Kursk oblast (Russia) on 5 January; this highly likely reflects Ukraine’s push to sustain Western aid and to improve its position ahead of possible peace negotiations

* STRIKES: We have observed a new pattern in Russian strikes, whereby two series of long-range strikes are launched in relatively quick succession; this is likely designed to saturate Ukrainian air defences

* AID: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that Ukraine has received less than half of the aid allocated by the US since Russia’s full-scale invasion

* FORECAST: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions for what Ukraine perceives to be a ‘just peace’, which includes the US’ involvement in any security guarantees

* BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage posted on 2 January indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured positions along a portion of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal, located to the south-east of Chasiv Yar. The development is notable insofar as it demonstrates that the territory in the vicinity of Chasiv Yar remains contested, despite recent Russian advances into the town’s northern microdistrict and the successful Russian crossing of the aforementioned canal in recent weeks.

* BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have continued to advance through intense urban combat in the centre of Toretsk. Geolocated footage posted on 3 and 4 January indicates that Russian forces have advanced along streets in northern, north-western, western and south-western Toretsk. Ukrainian National Guard spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk reported on 5 January that the fiercest fighting was taking place in Toretsk, as well as Pokrovsk (see DONETSK).

* DONETSK: Russian forces have maintained a high operational tempo amid continued efforts to encircle Porkovsk in recent days. On 6 January, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces captured Dachenske, located to the south of Pokrovsk. A Ukrainian military report stated that Russian forces advanced within 0.6 miles (approximately 1km) of Kotlyne (located to the south-west of Pokrovsk) and are attempting to block the T-04-06 Pokrovsk-Mezhove highway. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian military intelligence officer operating in the Ukrainian National Guard stated that despite heavy losses (around 400 casualties per day), Russia maintains a high offensive tempo. The intelligence officer further noted that Russian forces are conducting heavy artillery attacks and airstrikes against Pokrovsk and Myrnohorad (located to the east of Pokrovsk). Geolocated footage from 4 January shows recent Russian advances in central Lysivka (located to the south-east of Pokrovsk) and to the north-west of Vovkove (located to the south-west of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces have likely seized Vovkove. We continue to assess that Russia is unlikely to capture Pokrovsk in the coming weeks.

* DONETSK: The likely capture of the key logistics hub of Kurakhove underscores the continued deterioration of Ukraine’s operational situation in southern Donetsk. Earlier on 6 January, the Russian MoD claimed that its forces were in control of the town. It also stated that this development would allow Russian forces to accelerate the pace of their advances in Donetsk. However, Ukraine’s Khortystia group of forces reported that fighting is ongoing in the Kurakhove sector, where Ukrainian forces are attempting to repel Russian assault groups. Kurakhove has been the key operational target for Russian forces in recent months. DeepState, a Ukrainian OSINT group, recently reported that the town was almost fully under Russian control. We previously reported

that intense fighting was taking place in Kurakhove’s industrial zone, located in the western part of the town. If confirmed, the capture of Kurakhove would mark the first major town to be captured by Russian forces in 2025. It remains uncertain whether Russia will be able to exploit Kurakhove’s likely capture in the coming weeks given the high attrition rates.

* KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report

* KURSK: On 5 January, Ukrainian forces renewed offensive operations inside Kursk oblast (Russia) from within the existing Ukrainian salient. Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted mechanised assaults in the direction of Novosotnitsky (located to the north-east of Sudzha) and near Pushkarnoye (located to the east of Sudzha), enabled by frozen ground conditions; offensive operations also reportedly intensified near Leonidove. Geolocated footage posted on 5 January indicated Ukrainian forces possibly reached the southern part of Berdin. Russian milbloggers posted updated maps of the Kursk salient indicating that Ukrainian forces gained control of several small settlements to the north-east of Sudzha and to the south-west and east of Berdin. Russian milbloggers also widely reported that Russia launched counter-attacks.

* KURSK: Notably, the Ukrainian offensive was launched in the eastern area of the salient in Kursk, where the lines of control have remained broadly unchanged since August 2024. Given that Russian forces have slowly recaptured territory in the north and north-western areas of the Ukrainian salient, it is likely that Ukrainian forces are probing Russian defences for vulnerabilities in the east (though this will possibly expose Ukrainian forces in the north and north-east). The intent of the Ukrainian operation will ultimately depend on the number of troops committed, which remains unclear. We previously reported that Russian milboggers warned that Ukraine was amassing around 20,000 troops, whom they feared would be deployed to Kursk or in the direction of Belgorod oblast (Russia). However, it is more likely that Ukraine has launched a localised offensive in order to slow Russian progress in diminishing the Ukrainian salient.

* KURSK: While the extent of the Ukrainian operation remains unclear, Kyiv will likely continue to prioritise the Kursk salient in a bid to sustain Western support and improve Ukraine’s position ahead of possible peace negotiations. The offensive also comes just days ahead of a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein summit) – likely to be the last such summit before the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump on 20 January – where the primary focus will likely be on Ukrainian air defences and military aid. However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will also be keen to demonstrate Ukraine’s ability to maintain control of the Kursk salient, despite continued Russian progress in offensive operations elsewhere (primarily in the Donbas).

* OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Kupiansk sector, Ukrainian forces have repelled two mechanised assaults in recent days, with Russia continuing in its efforts to expand a bridgehead on the left (eastern) bank of the Oskil River. On 5 January, a Ukrainian military officer operating a drone unit in the Kupiansk sector reported that Russian forces conducted two mechanised assaults overnight on 2-3 January and on the morning of 4 January near the settlement of Zahryzove (Kharkiv oblast), located to the south of Kupiansk. Ukrainian drone operators reportedly destroyed 20 Russian armoured vehicles. The assault was likely part of Russia’s efforts to expand its foothold on the left bank of the Oskil River The development highlights the highly attritional nature of Russia’s assaults, which remain highly vulnerable to Ukrainian drone attacks.

* SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report

* STRIKES: In recent days, we have observed a new pattern in Russian strikes, whereby Russian forces launch two series of long-range attacks in relatively quick succession. This pattern typically involves a large-scale drone attack launched overnight, followed by either a combined missile strike or a lone drone attack the following day, typically from 1200hrs (local time). This likely reflects Moscow’s endeavour to saturate Ukrainian air defences with an initial series of attacks to create gaps for the subsequent attack. We previously observed such a strike pattern during an attack on 20 December 2024, which solely comprised ballistic missiles targeting Kyiv city. The attack was preceded by a combined strike overnight on 19-20 December 2024 that involved 65 drones and two missiles.

* STRIKES: Overnight on 2-3 January, Russia launched 93 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones. Ukrainian forces shot down 60 UAVs in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. In all, 26 decoy drones were reported as lost, likely due to electronic warfare (EW) measures. Hits against residential and non-residential buildings were recorded in Chernihiv, Donetsk and Kyiv. Later, at approximately 1200hrs, Russia launched a second wave of long-range attacks, including five S-300 missiles, three Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, three Kh-59/69 missiles and 32 Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones.  Ukraine’s air force reported the interception of 13 drones; it also stated that 19 decoy drones were lost, likely due to EW measures. Ukraine also intercepted all Kh-59/69 missiles. Ballistic missiles reportedly hit Chernihiv city (Chernihiv), with explosions recorded on the outskirts of the city.

* STRIKES: Overnight on 3-4 January, Russia launched 81 UAVs, including Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones. Air defences intercepted 34 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. In all, 47 additional drones were reported as lost. However, the strikes reportedly caused damage to residential buildings in Chernihiv and Sumy. Later, at approximately 1200hrs on 4 January, Russia launched 30 Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones. As of 2000hrs, Ukraine intercepted 14 UAVs launched by Russia. Ukraine’s air force also reported 16 UAVs as lost, likely due to EW.

* STRIKES: Overnight on 4-5 January, Ukraine shot down 61 of 103 UAVs (Shahed-136/131 and decoy types) launched by Russia. Air defences were active over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. In all, 42 decoy drones were reported as lost by Ukraine’s air force. Hits against residential buildings were recorded in Kharkiv. The regional authorities reported that Shahed drones struck unspecified infrastructure facilities in Sumy.

* STRIKES: Meanwhile, Astra, a Russian online opposition media outlet, reported that early on 4 January, one of Russia’s largest commercial seaports, Ust-Luga (Leningrad oblast), was targeted by a Ukrainian drone attack. The strike took place approximately 932 miles (1,500km) from the Ukrainian border. Astra reported that most of the drones were intercepted over the terminal operated by Novotrans, a Russian transport and logistics company. The Russian regional authorities reported that four drones were intercepted via EW measures and firearms. In January 2024, a drone strike targeted Ust-Luga, which caused a fire at a gas-condensate plant operated by Novatek at the port. Ust-Luga is one of Russia’s main Baltic energy-export ports. Such attacks reflect Kyiv’s efforts and ability to co-ordinate attacks against strategic energy export hubs far from Ukraine.

* STRIKES: The Russian MoD reported the interception of 61 Ukrainian drones overnight on 4-5 January. The UAVs were reportedly shot down over Belgorod, Bryansk, Oryol, Rostov and Voronezh oblasts (all Russia). The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel claimed that the attack targeted a military airfield in the city of Millerovo (Rostov), which Ukrainian drones targeted multiple times in 2024.

* STRIKES: On 5 January, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces targeted more than 54,000 Russian targets with drones in December 2024. Syrskyi further noted that 49% of the targets were hit using kamikaze drones. He also explained that Ukraine has started operating fibre-optic first-person view (FPV) drones, with Russia having already increased and expanded the use of such UAVs, according to the official. Drones have proven to be a critical aspect of the Russo-Ukrainian war, with both sides demonstrating considerable innovation in capability and technology..

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* MOBILISATION: Reports emerged on 3 January that Ukrainian men in Poland have received false military summons. According to the Polish media outlet RMF24, the author of these notices is impersonating Poland’s Office for Foreigners, which has denied writing the letters. The documents claimed that the Polish authorities would conduct visits to the recipients’ places of residence between 17 and 31 December 2024 in order to bring the men to the relevant places for mobilisation for military service in Ukraine. They also threatened criminal liability and extradition in case of draft evasion.

* MOBILISATION: It is unclear who wrote these letters; it is also unknown how many Ukrainian men received them. Nevertheless, it is possible that Russian or pro-Russia networks distributed such letters to stir panic among the Ukrainian population residing in Poland. We assess that the distribution of similar letters in other countries that have accommodated Ukrainian refugees is a realistic possibility in the coming weeks and months.

* AID: According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine has received less than half of the USD 177 bn in military assistance allocated by the US since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Zelensky disclosed this claim on 5 January and implied that it may be linked to corruption or lobbying from US companies. However, he did not provide evidence to support his comments. While we cannot confirm this, Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov stated in February 2024 that half of weapons promised by Western allies were not delivered on time. Ultimately, Zelensky’s latest comments reaffirm our assessment that failure to deliver assistance to Ukraine will continue to constrain planning for military operations and contribute to weapons shortages.

* AID: Zelensky also detailed on 5 January that he previously suggested to US President-elect Trump that Kyiv could purchase weapons with frozen Russian assets. Zelensky did not comment on Trump’s reaction to his suggestion, though we have previously reported on the likelihood of the US cutting military aid to Ukraine after Trump’s inauguration. Such an arrangement would likely allow the further provision of US military assistance to Ukraine without the need to authorise additional tranches of aid. However, it is uncertain whether Trump’s administration would support this initiative, given Moscow would almost certainly perceive such a move as ‘escalatory’ (as well as the elevated risk of US assets in Russia being seized in retaliation).

FORECAST

PEACE: On 2 January, President Zelensky outlined the conditions Kyiv considers necessary for a ‘just peace’. These primarily concern Ukraine maintaining a strong/sizeable army, robust security guarantees and future membership in the EU and NATO. We have frequently reported that these conditions are what Ukraine deems as necessary to prevent renewed Russian aggression, with Kyiv unlikely to change its stance in the coming months.

Zelensky insisted that a just peace cannot be achieved if the Ukrainian army is confined to 40,000-50,000 personnel, adding that Russia wants Ukraine to have a smaller, disempowered fighting force. A draft peace treaty from 2022 demanded that Ukraine shrink its army to no more than 50,000 personnel, which is almost certainly what Zelensky was referring to. Russia listed the demilitarisation of Ukraine as one of its war objectives when it launched its full-scale invasion. We assess that Moscow has not abandoned this aim and is highly unlikely to do so in the coming months. Kyiv almost certainly recognises that a smaller, weaker army leaves Ukraine vulnerable to future Russian destabilisation and aggression.

The Ukrainian president also noted that security guarantees to support Ukraine in the post-war period must be strong and include the US’ participation. Zelensky repeated this on 5 January, adding that security guarantees without Washington DC are ‘not possible’. Ukraine has frequently insisted that NATO membership (which remains a highly unlikely prospect for the foreseeable future) is the optimal form of deterrence against renewed hostility from Russia in the future.

Zelensky’s insistence on US involvement in security guarantees therefore indicates that Kyiv likely perceives that European partners alone will prove insufficient in preventing renewed Russian aggression. The 2015 Minsk II agreement (brokered by France and Germany) which sought to end the war that began in 2014 between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces in the Donbas failed to prevent the full-scale invasion in 2022. The failure of the Minsk accords likely means that Kyiv will want to ensure that the US is an active participant in any possible security guarantees and that it upholds its obligations. However, Trump will likely seek to minimise the US’ long-term commitment to guaranteeing Ukraine’s security.

Meanwhile, nearly 40% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine will possibly have to relinquish some of its lands to achieve a quick peace and to preserve independence. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) reported this on 3 January; the share of Ukrainians acknowledging the possible need for territorial concessions was the highest since May 2022. However, most Ukrainians (51% versus 38%) are against making concessions to Russia even if this prolongs the war and threatens independence. Ukrainians in western and central Ukraine are more likely to oppose concessions than those closer to the frontlines in the southern and eastern regions (54% and 52% versus 50% and 43%, respectively)

Nevertheless, the share of Ukrainians ready to cede territory will likely increase ahead of the third anniversary of Moscow’s full-scale invasion (24 February) amid Russian gains on the battlefield and growing pressure for negotiations to begin. Despite a gradual change in opinion towards territorial concessions among Ukrainians, we assess this will almost certainly remain a sensitive and polarising issue. Ultimately, any territorial concessions will likely be unpopular within Ukrainian society. Meanwhile, Russia is highly unlikely to be willing to hand over territory over which it claims control (particularly Crimea) and will almost certainly seek to retain the Ukrainian lands it has seized since 24 February 2022.

Jan 03.

• Slovakia-Ukraine: Gas dispute will likely drive regional tensions; Slovakian retaliation is unlikely. On 2 January, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico accused Ukraine of ‘sabotage of Slovak public finances’ after the transit of Russian gas to Slovakia via Ukraine was halted on 31 December 2024. This was the result of the expiry of the Russia-Ukraine transit contract on 1 January. He also reiterated that his coalition will consider retaliation measures against Ukraine, including halting supplies of electricity and significantly lowering support for Ukrainian refugees in Slovakia. While this rhetoric will temporarily increase regional tensions, we assess that Slovakia is unlikely to implement such measures. The Slovakian government will likely seek to exploit these threats as leverage, requesting compensation for the lost transit fees and financial support for increased energy costs. That said, we assess that the country’s energy security remains stable. The government stated on 1 January that it had prepared in advance for the cessation of Russian gas transit through Ukraine and had secured sufficient gas reserves and alternative supplies for 2025.
• Moldova: Cessation of Russian gas to breakaway region will undermine socio-economic health. The head of the Economic Development Ministry in Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region, Sergei Obolonik, disclosed on 2 January that almost all enterprises in the territory had ceased operations following the cessation of Russian gas supplies. That said, Obolonik specified that entities involved in food production continue to work. An agreement allowing Russian gas to transit Ukraine expired on 1 January, upon which Transnistria was heavily dependent. According to the minister, the authorities will have a clearer understanding of how much energy households consume by 5 January. This will allow them to determine how much energy can be allocated for industrial needs. However, energy insecurity will likely continue to cause considerable business disruption over the coming weeks. As such, we assess that a prolonged complete or near-total industrial shutdown in Transnistria will likely deteriorate socio-economic health conditions. Over the longer term, this could realistically push residents of Transnistria to seek services and conduct business in Moldova, applying pressure on services and infrastructure. (Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Jan 25. Fact Sheet on Efforts of Ukraine Defense Contact Group National Armaments Directors. Following Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III directed Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) Dr. William LaPlante to regularly convene National Armaments Directors (NADs) under the auspices of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG).

Focused on accelerating capability deliveries to Ukraine by synchronizing international procurement, production, and sustainment efforts, the forum has convened fourteen (14) times to date since its first meeting on September 28, 2022. The group will meet for the fifteenth time on January 10, 2025. More than 40 nations and representatives from NATO and the European Union actively participate. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for European Integration Sergiy Boyev currently co-chairs the forum alongside USD(A&S) LaPlante.

The forum focuses on (1) requirements-based planning for production, and (2) tangible deliveries against increasing capacity and the commitments made by UDCG members to date. Major lines of effort include:

• Mapping global production capacity, and opportunities to increase throughput;
• Identifying production constraints and mitigations, including opportunities for co- production, joint ventures, and other mechanisms;
• Enabling the sustainment of equipment and reconstitution of Ukrainian forces; and
• Increasing opportunities for standardization, integration, and interchangeability.

Significant Achievements to Date

Through extensive collaboration across nations, UDCG NADs have enabled:

• Expansion of existing, or establishment of new, production capacity of critical munitions around the world.

o The United States has invested $5.5 billion to expand domestic production capacity of the following munitions or subcomponents (NOTE: entries reflect increases from 2022 to current production rates):

• 155mm Projectiles: 14,400 per month to 40,000 per month (178% increase)
• 155mm Propelling Charge:14,494 per month to 18,000 per month (24% increase)
• GMLRS: 833 per month to 1,167 per month (40% increase)
• Javelin: 175 per month to 200 per month (14% increase)
• AIM-9X: 116 per month to 137 per month (18% increase)
• PAC-3 MSE: 21 per month to 48.6 per month (116% increase)
• HIMARS: 5 per month to 8 per month (60% increase)
• M777 Tubes: 11 per month to 18 per month (64% increase)

o Examples of production expansion and munitions delivery efforts announced by UDCG members include, but are not limited to:

• France and Sweden will double capacity of ammunition and explosives loading by 2025, double capacity of modular charges by 2026, and increase powder production capacity ten-fold by 2026.
• Sites in Germany, Spain, Hungary, South Africa, and Australia plan to increase production up to 700,000 artillery shells and up to 10,000 tons of gunpowder per year by 2025; this includes a new gunpowder factory in Romania as part of a project developed with the European Commission and a new artillery ammunition facility in Germany.
• Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain will co-produce up to 1,000 Patriot GEM-T missiles in Germany.
• A consortium of 15 countries led by the Czech Republic have pledged €1.7 billion to source 500,000 artillery rounds from around the world by the end of 2024.
• Through the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), European defense industry is expected to increase annual ammunition shell production capacity to 2 million by the end of 2025. 31 projects cover five areas: explosives, powder, shells, missiles, and testing and reconditioning certification.
• Norway will invest more than NOK 1 billion to significantly expand artillery production for at least 15 years.
• Nordic other participating nations are increasing ammunition production through the NORDEFCO++ initiative to support Ukraine as well as to strengthen long-term capacity to ensure regional security of supply.
• The United Kingdom will spend £162 million to increase production of the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) and supply Ukraine with 650 LMMs.

o From 2023 to 2024, Ukraine increased its total domestic production of mortar and artillery ammunition—ranging from 60mm to 155mm calibers—from 1 million rounds to 2.5 million rounds annually (150% increase).

• Identification of gaps and mitigations for production of propellants and explosives.
• Delivery of VAMPIRE C-UAS systems and “FrankenSAM” iTEL and BUK systems.
• Donations of trucks and gun mounts for Mobile Fire Teams (MFT) to assist Ukraine in protecting its critical national infrastructure.
• Delivery of NASAMS units and munitions, and subsequent functionality upgrades to expand interceptor options.
• Delivery of AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense.
• Integration of thousands of air-to-ground munitions donations for employment from Ukraine’s current aircraft and donated F-16s.
• Co-development of Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM), a low-cost, long-range cruise missile for mass production (Denmark, Netherlands, United States).
• Open competition and advanced flight testing for one-way attack capabilities through Project ARTEMIS (United States) and Project BREAKSTOP (United Kingdom).
• Facilitation of Jumpstart Foreign Military Sales cases with allies and partners to provide funding for munitions purchases in lieu of donations.
• Delivery of 90 refurbished T-72s tanks (45 Dutch and 45 U.S.), and more than 100,000 T-72 spare parts; a forthcoming jointly-funded effort will expand spares and overhaul support to all major Soviet-era armored combat platforms via the NATO Support and Procurement Agency.
• Development of a common sustainment framework focusing on time-based, increased Ukrainian sustainment capability across spares, maintenance, training, and Ukrainian industrial support capacity.
• Delivery of seven commercial-grade 3D printers, post-processing equipment, and consumables to the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine (RDC-U), and procurement of seven additional polymer printers with associated support equipment and consumables.
• Establishment of tele-maintenance capabilities, and execution of an augmented reality demonstration to improve maintenance and repair training for Ukrainian personnel in the field.
• Translation of more than 1,600 technical repair and operations manuals.
• Facilitation of, and support to, partnerships with Ukrainian industry for co-production and co-sustainment activities.

o Examples of U.S.-Ukraine industry partnerships include:

• The Department of State established a team of subject matter experts to assist the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries to help build the resilience and effective oversight of Ukraine’s defense industry, address urgent military production needs, and complement the assistance provided through $2 billion in new Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to establish the Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program (UDEP). The expert team includes a Defense Production Liaison and a Defense Industry Partnerships and Policy Strategist (November 2024).
• Northrop Grumman signed an agreement with the Government of Ukraine to provide equipment and training to establish a medium-caliber ammunition production line (July 2024).
• Amentum signed a Memorandum of Intent to form a Joint Venture with Ukrainian Defense Industry (UDI) for cooperation in restoring and maintaining U.S.-donated armored vehicles (June 2024).
• D&M Holding Company constructed an ammunition factory in Ukraine and are currently expanding production pursuant to agreements with the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries and key companies (October 2023).

o Examples of international-Ukraine industry partnerships include:

• UDI began domestic production of CZ Bren 2 assault rifles following a series of agreements with the Colt CZ Group (Czech Republic) (December 2024, contracted July 2024).
• The Swedish government announced funding and industrial support for Ukrainian production of long-range missiles and UAS (November 2024).
• Through Task Force HIRST, the United Kingdom is coordinating with multiple industry partners to conduct maintenance, repair, and overhaul of capabilities within Ukraine.
• Nammo (Norway) announced that it will license production of 155mm rounds in Ukraine (August 2024).
• KNDS (France/Germany) is establishing a subsidiary in Ukraine to produce 155mm rounds and spare parts (June 2024).
• Rheinmetall (Germany) signed a Letter of Intent to establish a production facility for Lynx armored vehicles in Ukraine, building upon a Joint Venture between Rheinmetall and UDI to establish a maintenance center in-country for German-donated military equipment (June 2024).

Working Groups

Efforts of the NADs under the auspices of the UDCG are organized across four Working Groups aligned to functional areas: Innovation, Production, Sustainment, and Ukraine Defense Industrial Base Support.

The intersection of the NAD Working Groups and the UDCG Capability Coalitions is complementary, not duplicative. The NADs are uniquely positioned to operationalize ministerial- level guidance produced via the Capability Coalitions by providing subject matter expertise in procurement, production, and sustainment. Specific, long-term requirements identified by Capability Coalitions will guide the NADs’ deliberate prioritization and resourcing of corresponding industrial base and sustainment investments. This “require-deliver-sustain” partnership between the Capability Coalitions and NAD Working Groups closes gaps between requirements and capability deliveries, maximizes the effectiveness of investments by UDCG members while avoiding duplication of effort.

• Innovation Working Group: Increases the speed from idea to fielded capability, focusing on anticipating adversarial advancements and maturing emerging technologies accordingly for operational use. Current efforts include:

o Lower cost missiles

o Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) detect, track, and engage capabilities

o Countermeasures for guided bombs

o Laser solutions

o One-way attack drone capability experimentation

• Production Working Group: Accelerates and drives production efforts for critical weapons systems by supporting opportunities for co-production, facilitating funding opportunities, identifying production constraints and best practices for mitigation, and enabling replenishment contracts. Current efforts include:

o Source needs and opportunities for production increases or acceleration of 155mm artillery and TNT, among other critical programs and subcomponents

o Application of lessons learned from multinational production consortia to air defense interceptors

• Sustainment Working Group: Supports Ukraine’s weapon system availability by addressing cross-cutting sustainment issues in key enabling areas such as spare parts provisioning and ordering, operational maintenance and depot-level training, sustainment capacity across the Ukrainian and partner industrial bases, and supporting Ukraine’s ability to maintain donated platforms. Current efforts include:

o Resourcing critical Ukraine sustainment requirements in support of combat reconstitution

o Pooling and joint provision of spares

o Maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) of legacy and western equipment, including expanding sustainment support for Soviet-era armored combat vehicles

o Supporting current weapon systems with a common sustainment package support framework (spares, technical data, training, maintenance devices, etc.)

• Ukraine Industrial Base Support Working Group: Coordinates efforts to advance a robust Ukrainian industrial base that provides materiel for urgent needs, contributing to Ukraine’s long-term security and economic resilience. Current efforts include:

o Facilitating partnerships supporting co-production or co-sustainment between Ukrainian industry and U.S. or international companies, including working with the Department of State to reduce timelines to receive necessary export licensing

o Identifying and promoting collaborative funding mechanisms to channel pooled resources directly to priority Ukrainian defense industrial base project

o Identifying and troubleshooting policy and regulatory issues impeding industrial cooperation with Ukraine

(Source: U.S. DoD)

 

09 Jan 25. 30,000 new drones for Ukraine in boost to European security.
It comes as a further £190m for the UK-administered International Fund for Ukraine was announced following further pledges from allies
30,000 drones will be sent to Ukraine after £45m worth of contracts were placed by the international Drone Capability Coalition, co-led by the UK and Latvia as the UK steps up leadership supporting Ukraine in 2025.
Defence Secretary John Healey announced this milestone alongside Latvian Defence Minister Andris Spr?ds at the Ukraine Defence Contact Group held at Ramstein Air Base today [Thursday 9 January].
Healey arrived last night for talks with the US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin at the US Air Base.
The Drone Capability Coalition supports Ukraine with uncrewed surveillance and attack capabilities. Funding for the new 30,000 drones comes from UK, Denmark, Netherlands, Latvia and Sweden.
These state-of-the-art, first-person view drones will help Ukraine fight against Russian aggression, allowing Ukraine’s Armed Forces to manoeuvre past Russian air defences to target enemy positions and armoured vehicles.
Today’s announcement follows the UK’s £7.5m investment for the Drone Capability Coalition’s Common Fund, set out in November, and brings the UK’s total investment in the fund to £15m to date. So far, the fund has raised around £73 m from the UK and partners.
As well as this, the Defence Secretary confirmed that the UK-administered International Fund for Ukraine now stands at over £1.3bn, of which the UK has contributed £500m.
He also outlined the Ministry of Defence’s plan for Ukraine’s Defence in 2025 to more than 50 allies and partners gathered for the meeting. John Healey discussed the plan with Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov in Kyiv in December.
Defence Secretary John Healey MP said: “The fierce courage of the Ukrainian people continues to inspire the world, and this meeting of more than 50 nations sends a clear message to Putin about the international community’s unwavering support for Ukraine. I am proud of the UK’s leadership in supporting Ukraine. From heading coalitions which are delivering essential equipment alongside allies, to training recruits, we’re standing strong with Ukraine against Putin’s aggression. Our commitment to provide £3 bn a year of military aid for as long as it takes will ensure Ukraine can defend themselves and is essential to protect the security of the UK – because the defence of the UK starts in Ukraine.”
In a further sign of the strength of international support for Ukraine’s efforts to repel Russia’s illegal invasion, more than £190 m of extra funding has been committed to the UK-administered International Fund for Ukraine by allies and partners, with Portugal and Germany contributing for the first time.
The fund uses financial contributions from international partners to rapidly procure priority military equipment for Ukraine. The new contributions include:
* £67m from Denmark for capabilities including drones, air defence systems and training equipment
* £59m from Norway for specialist capabilities including drones and maritime training
* £43m from Portugal for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drones
* £20m from Sweden to fund the repair of Archer self-propelled artillery systems and maritime training
* £4m from Germany for maritime training
* £1m from Iceland to fund coastal radars
Since taking office in July, the government has stepped up international leadership supporting Ukraine and demonstrated its ironclad support, committing to £3 bn of military support to Ukraine every year for as long as it takes. In October, an extra £2.26 bn was announced, using the profits from seized Russian assets.
The meeting of allies and partners at Ramstein follows the Defence Secretary’s visit to Kyiv last month, where he met with his counterpart Rustem Umerov, to discuss the priority areas for UK defence support and announced a new £225m package, including £186m from the International Fund for Ukraine, of military support.
The government is clear that the UK’s defence starts in Ukraine, and that providing military support is essential to promote both the UK’s national security and stability in Europe.
As part of the Plan for Ukraine’s Defence in 2025, the UK’s continued leadership on the war in Ukraine throughout 2025 will see an increase to Ukraine’s military capability; will build on the success of Operation Interflex by enhancing the training offered to Ukraine; will strengthen defence industrial cooperation; will increase cooperation with our allies to support Ukraine; and will increase pressure on Russia.
(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

09 Jan 25. Austin Challenges Contact Group to Keep Supporting Ukraine. At the conclusion of the 25th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, the last such meeting for Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, the outgoing secretary challenged group members to maintain the level of support to Ukraine they have built over the past three years.

Today, at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Austin concluded the last meeting of the group he spearheaded the development of in April 2022. As part of his departure, he asked the nearly 50 members nations who participate in providing support to Ukraine in its fight against Russia, to keep up that support and not falter in their commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty.

“In my final hours at Ramstein as secretary of defense, I mourn for every Ukrainian man, woman and child killed in Putin’s murderous war, and I salute the Ukrainian troops who are fighting so bravely for their country and for their freedom,” Austin said. “And this coalition has had their backs for nearly three hard years of war, and we must not stop now. So, I’m leaving this contact group, not with a farewell, but with a challenge: The coalition to support Ukraine must not flinch. It must not falter, and it must not fail. Ukraine survival is on the line, but so is all of our security.”

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many nations stepped up to provide support, by delivering weapons and munitions. But Austin said he knew at the time that in order for Ukraine to succeed in preserving its sovereignty, that support must be coordinated.

“I opened our hastily arranged first meeting by urging some 40 countries to build a common understanding of the situation in Ukraine,” he said. “Today, this … group provides more than a common understanding, it provides a common cause. And today, some 50 countries of conscience are coordinating closely with Ukraine to send vital, consistent and cutting-edge security assistance. And that has helped turn Ukraine’s struggle into one of the great military success stories of our time.”

With the support of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, Austin said, Ukraine has been getting the weapons and supplies it needs to defend itself from continued Russian aggression. At the same time, he said, America and partner nations who are providing support to Ukraine have made sure to maintain their own readiness as well.

The secretary highlighted the stark difference between how Ukraine equipped itself at the start of the Russian invasion, with how it is equipped now.

“Ukraine has started to fly fourth generation fighter jets,” he said. “It now fields advanced Western air defense capabilities, and it produces and operates state of the art unmanned systems. All of this positions Ukraine to defeat Russian aggression today and to deter Russian aggression tomorrow. And so our work has changed the course of history.”

Altogether, Austin said, the UDCG members have contributed more than $126 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. That includes tanks, air defense systems, combat vehicles, munitions, F-16 aircraft and training for pilots.

In providing that equipment, Austin said, the United States and other UDCG member nations have also increased support to their own defense industrial bases.

“The Ukraine crisis exposed some shortcomings in our defense industrial base,” he said. “We’ve still got a lot more work to do. But we have galvanized our own defense industry, investing nearly $70 billion at home to produce capabilities for Ukraine and replenish our own stocks.”

At his last meeting of the group he created, Austin said the group has accomplished a lot. But Russia still remains in Ukraine, and the work is not yet concluded.

“We have come so far over the past … 25 meetings of this contact group and the structure of this coalition is built to succeed, built to adapt, and built to last,” he said.

When the contact group stood up, Austin said, he said the group’s creation reflected a galvanized world, and that Russia’s war was both reckless and lawless. The secretary said he still believes those things.

“I will always be proud that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group has held high the torch of security and freedom, and so I will keep saying it: free people must refuse to replace an open order of rules and rights with a violent world of force and fear.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

10 Jan 25. Zelenskiy says meeting of allies pledges $2bn in aid. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said the latest in a series of meetings with Kyiv’s Western allies in Germany had resulted in pledges of an additional $2bn in military assistance to help it fight the war against Russia. Zelenskiy, speaking to My-Ukraina television channel after Thursday’s meeting, gave few details of the assistance, but that 34 countries had pledged support in different aspects of the 34-month-old war.

“We had a very good meeting, a very good result. There was $2 billion in additional packages of support to Ukraine,” he said in a video posted on the television channel’s Telegram account.

The aid covered air defence, information technology, demining, naval forces, air forces and artillery.

“And all this will strengthen Ukraine,” Zelenskiy said. The president gave no details on which countries had made the pledges. (Source: Reuters)

 

09 Jan 25. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance support to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs as part of the surge of security assistance the President directed to put Ukraine in the best possible position. This includes the approval of a Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package, which has an estimated value of $500m, to provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent needs, including: missiles for air defense; air-to-ground munitions; and equipment to support Ukraine’s use of F-16s.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

* AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense;

* Air-to-ground munitions;

* Support equipment for F-16s;

* Armored bridging systems;

* Secure communications equipment;

* Small arms and ammunition; and

* Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.

This is the Biden Administration’s seventy-fourth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. The United States continues to work together with some 50 Allies and partners that Secretary Austin will convene tomorrow as part of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and its associated Capability Coalitions to provide the support Ukraine needs to prevail in its fight against Russian aggression. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

09 Jan 25. US president-elect Donald Trump has pushed back his campaign pledge to end the war in Ukraine in “24 hours” to several months,   (Source: FT.com)

 

09 Jan 25. Joint Statement of the Coalition Leadership Group. Fulfilling our July 12, 2024, commitment to convene within six months “to review and approve roadmaps prepared by the leaders of the Capability Coalitions — each a Compact Signatory — on future force development through 2027,” we, the Co-Lead Nations of the eight Capability Coalitions, have been working with Ukraine to develop respective roadmaps to streamline security assistance efforts for Ukraine within each capability area, support the development of a credible defense and deterrence capability, as well as facilitate Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO. We hereby endorse the eight roadmaps developed by the Capability Coalitions. These roadmaps are a substantial step forward in our countries’ support for Ukraine, inform the Capability Coalitions’ continuing work, as well as send an important demand signal to defense industry. With an eye to these capability targets for 2027, our countries plan to work closely with Ukraine to identify how to meet these benchmarks, balancing both Ukraine’s wartime and future force requirements, through our respective national donations, procurements, investments, and efforts to expand defense industrial base capacity, including by leveraging Ukraine’s domestic defense industry production and sustainment capabilities. Coalitions also plan to continually refine and integrate these detailed plans to support urgent and long-term needs, as Ukraine defends against and deters future Russian aggression. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

08 Jan 25. US warns North Korea becoming better prepared for war, fighting against Ukraine.

* Summary

* US says North Korea gaining experience fighting in Russia against Ukraine

* North Korea says Monday’s missile test part of plan to enhance self-defense

* South Korea says North Korean troops ‘slaves to Kim Jong Un’

The United States warned on Wednesday that North Korea is benefiting from its troops fighting alongside Russia against Ukraine, gaining experience that makes Pyongyang “more capable of waging war against its neighbors.”

Russia has forged closer diplomatic and military ties with North Korea since Moscow invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

More than 12,000 North Korean troops are in Russia and last month began fighting against Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region, Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Dorothy Camille Shea told the United Nations Security Council.

“The DPRK is significantly benefiting from receiving Russian military equipment, technology and experience, rendering it more capable of waging war against its neighbors,” Shea told the 15-member council, which met over what Pyongyang said was a test of a new intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile on Monday.

“In turn, the DPRK will likely be eager to leverage these improvements to promote weapons sales and military training contracts globally,” she said, using the acronym for North Korea’s formal name – the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  (Source: Reuters)

 

07 Jan 25. Austin to Convene Ukraine Coalition Group to Map Country’s Future Defense Needs, Objectives. Two senior defense officials told the media this morning that Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III intends to gather the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s eight capabilities coalition leaders during the upcoming 25th meeting of the UDCG at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, in order to map out Ukraine’s defense capabilities in support of building a credible deterrent force through 2027.

The UDCG, which Austin founded in response to Russia’s unprovoked Feb. 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine, is a coalition of some 50 nations that meet regularly to discuss Ukraine’s security needs.

Within the overall UDCG, exists a coalition leadership group comprising eight capability coalitions. Each coalition represents one aspect of Ukraine’s military capabilities and is co-led by at least two separate NATO nations.

“The leaders of these coalitions will need to endorse roadmaps that articulate Ukraine’s air force, armor, artillery, de-mining, drone, integrated air and missile defense, information technology and maritime security needs and objectives through 2027. These roadmaps are intended to enable donors to plan for and support Ukraine sustainably into the future,” one of the defense officials explained.

When asked whether there was concern about the path forward for the UDCG should American support for the group decrease once the new administration takes over Jan. 20, the officials stressed that the multilateral manner in which the UDCG and its coalitions have been constructed will help to bolster the group’s future resiliency.

“We are very confident that the multilateral nature, which was absolutely baked in from the start by Secretary Austin his absolute commitment to multilateral work also his knowledge and respect for the capabilities of those European countries … meant that we were able to do more together with those aid capability coalitions than we could have alone,” one of the officials said.

“What the future is of those coalitions … is one of the reasons why the coalition leadership group will meet at the ministerial level to lay a sound foundation for the future of those coalitions,” the official continued.

“I can’t speak for what the incoming administration will decide about its role , but I’m very confident of European commitment … ability … experience and extraordinary belief in the mission, and confident that those capability coalitions will continue one way or another,” the official added.

Further emphasizing the first official’s viewpoint, the second senior official pointed out that, though the 25th UDCG will be Austin’s last, the Defense Department is not “sunsetting” the group, and the group’s work will continue.

“Because of the multilateral work, because of the capability coalitions and all that we have done, will endure in some capacity going forward, I believe, regardless of exactly how the next team does or doesn’t pursue it,” the official said.

Since the UDCG’s founding in April 2022, the U.S., its allies and partners have committed more than $126bn in security assistance to Ukraine. The 25th UDCG is scheduled to take place on Thursday.  (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

06 Jan 25. Russian forces ‘seize key Ukrainian town.’ Moscow says troops have ‘liberated’ logistics hub of Kurakhove after weeks of fighting. Russia has claimed to have captured the key logistics hub of Kurakhove in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region on Monday. Moscow’s defence ministry said units of its Southern group of troops had “liberated” the industrial town, which had held on for weeks after intense Russian attacks. The ministry added: “Over the course of ten years, the Kyiv regime has turned it into a powerful fortified area with a developed network of long-term fire points and underground communications.” The city sits on a major highway connecting the Russian-occupied city of Donetsk to the Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia, a significant regional capital. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

06 Jan 25. Ukraine MoD to conduct review of Land Forces Command. It is said to be crucial for an unbiased assessment of affairs, which directly influences frontline conditions. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) of Ukraine has launched a detailed inspection of the Land Forces Command at the request of the Ground Forces commander major general Mykhailo Drapatyi.   The inspection, sanctioned by Defence Minister Rustem Umerov, is being conducted by the Main Inspectorate to assess the organisational structure, management processes, and legislative adherence within the Land Forces.  This scrutiny is said to be crucial for an unbiased assessment of the state of affairs, which directly influences frontline conditions, Rustem Umerov said in Facebook post.   It is required for the Commander of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, noted Umerov.  The inspection’s objectives include improving management efficiency, promoting process transparency, and fortifying the capabilities of Ukraine’s primary military branch.

Umerov said: “Victory requires in-depth analysis of experience and an honest understanding of mistakes. This is especially relevant to the Ukrainian Land Forces, the largest and most strategically significant branch of the Armed Forces, responsible for mobilisation, training, staffing, and the combat effectiveness of units.  The state of affairs within the Land Forces directly impacts the situation at the front. Therefore, I fully support the need for the new commander of the Ukrainian Land Forces, major general Mykhailo Drapatyi, to have a comprehensive understanding of current conditions.”

Ukraine MoD Main Inspectorate Deputy Inspector General Viktor Romaniuk said: “Based on the results of the inspection, changes will be implemented in the command structure and personnel policy within the Land Forces Command, management processes will be optimised, and the combat readiness of units will be enhanced with new approaches to training.”

This development follows the US Department of Defense’s confirmation of a $2.5bn security assistance package.  The package includes two components: $1.25bn from presidential drawdown authority and $1.22bn through the Ukrainian Security Assistance Initiative, according to Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh in a recent briefing.  Additionally, Ukraine has received €150m in aid from Denmark, France, and Lithuania to enhance its defence posture. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

06 Jan 25. Ukraine to update war data via app, claiming 800,000 Russian casualties. Ihe Army+ app is increasingly being used to collect and organise Ukraine war data. Ukraine’s military units will be able to update their casualty rates inflicted on Russian forces via the Army+ app, officially launched in late-2024, as the country’s Ministry of Defence issued a new claim stating its units had inflicted nearly 800,000 military casualties on Russia since February 2022. Announced on 3 January, Ukrainian military units will shift to submit daily reports on Russian losses via the Army+ app, a software development that is increasingly being used as a nexus for the management of data surrounding the near three-year-old war. The move, adopted during a government cabinet session, will see daily updates sent to the app, with confirmation of losses from the DELTA combat systems able to be attached to reports.

“The implementation of losses reporting in the Army+ app marks a significant step toward enhancing the efficiency of Ukraine’s Defence Forces,” stated Rustem Umerov, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine.

“This project will enable the generation of more objective and transparent statistics on confirmed enemy losses, as well as allow for monitoring the performance of commanders and military units based on clear criteria,” Umerov added.

Kateryna Chernohorenko, Deputy Minister of Defence for Digital Development, who announced an expansion of Army+ into recruitment and retention in September 2024 and has driven the development of military apps, said the move would enable the creation of a “comprehensive” combat dashboard.

“Commanders will submit daily reports, with all data aggregated in a single repository. This will enable tracking individual units’ performance,” Chernohorenko stated.

The Ukrainian MoD said the digitised Russian casualty claims would “serve as a source for analysing the effectiveness of various type of weapons and ammunition”, which would help “better understand which weapons must be prioritized for production and supply”. Ukraine claims nearly 800,000 Russian casualties Shifting to data-driven decision making could drive efficiencies across the Ukrainian military, which sustained a series of tactical defeats in 2024 with the loss of the towns of Avdiivka, Vuhledar, Selydove, and Kurakhove in 2024. Newly released figures from Ukraine released on 6 January claimed its forces had inflicted another 1,550 Russian casualties overnight, with the total now standing at about 798 040 since 2022. This compares with about 509,860 on 2 June 2024, indicating Russian casualties in the second half of the year would have exceeded 250,000 killed and injured in combat. It is impossible to independently verify Ukraine’s claims of Russian casualties, which are traditionally inflated by each side during war. The United States stated in March 2024 that Russia had sustained “at least 315,000” personnel killed or wounded. In terms of equipment, Ukraine claims to have destroyed 9,700 tanks, 20,174 armoured fighting vehicles, 21,665 artillery systems, 1,258 multiple launch rocket systems, 1,034 anti-aircraft systems, 369 fixed-wing aircraft, 331 helicopters, 21,625 tactical UAVs, 3,006 cruise missiles, 28 warships, one submarine, and 33,056 other vehicles and fuel tanks, in fighting since February 2022. Even given the likely inflated claims, Russian losses are far and way the most costly conflict it has been involved in for generations. Ukraine’s own losses are a state secret, although it is likely that its combat casualties will be in excess of 100,000 since the outbreak of large-scale operations. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

03 Jan 25. Russia suffering 102 casualties for every square km as losses continue to mount. More than a hundred Russian troops were killed or injured for every square kilometre of Ukraine they seized last year, according to Ukrainian commanders. Reports say casualty rates last month reached more than 1,700 a day – the highest rate of the war. You only have to scan social media to find evidence of just how many Russian troops are dying in Ukraine. Across platforms like Telegram, dozens of gruesome videos emerge each day showing soldiers being killed by drones, artillery and in gun battles. The UK Ministry of Defence said last month that it expects Russian casualties in Ukraine to reach a m within the next six months. What began as a special military operation that would be over quickly has stretched to more than 1,000 days of war and, according to Ukraine, nearly 800,000 casualties for Russia. Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, has revealed how costly Kyiv believes Vladimir Putin’s invasion has become. He stated that in exchange for 4,168 sq km of conquered land across Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in 2024, Russia took 427,000 casualties – that’s equal to 102 casualties for every square kilometre taken.  (Source: forces.net)

 

03 Jan 25. Ukraine’s French-Trained 155th Brigade Faces Challenges with AWOL Troops and Training Shortcomings. The Ukrainian 155th Separate Mechanized Brigade, a newly formed military unit equipped with Western weaponry and trained in France, has suffered severe setbacks while defending Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast. The brigade, envisioned as a modernized force, has been plagued by widespread desertions, leadership issues, and heavy losses in its first deployment against advancing Russian forces. Formed to bolster Ukraine’s defenses, the 155th Brigade was equipped with advanced German Leopard 2 tanks and French Caesar howitzers. However, during its nine months of training in France, Poland, and western Ukraine, roughly 1,700 of its 5,800 soldiers went absent without leave (AWOL). Even as of November, reports indicated that nearly 500 troops remained unaccounted for. A Ukrainian officer involved in the training described the program as inadequate. “I don’t know what I’m supposed to do,” the officer told RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service. The brigade’s commander was replaced in late 2024 following reports of disorganization. Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies are now investigating the large-scale desertions, which have significantly weakened the unit. Ukrainian war correspondent Yuriy Butusov criticized the brigade’s creation as a political decision rather than a military necessity, stating, “The leadership played with the 155th without systematically preparing it.” Pokrovsk, a stronghold in Donetsk Oblast, has become a major target for Russian forces. Two Russian field armies, with 70,000 troops and dozens of regiments, are advancing on the city as part of a prolonged offensive. The 155th Brigade, deployed as part of Ukraine’s defense, was expected to bolster the line but instead struggled under the intense pressure. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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