NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 05.

05 Jan 25.  Ukraine’s forces are pushing forward in multiple directions in Russia’s southern Kursk region, even as its troops are struggling to hold the line elsewhere along the frontline. The Russian defence ministry on Sunday said its army had repelled two Ukrainian attacks, while pro-war bloggers confirmed that Kyiv’s forces were on the move in Kursk. The renewed push comes after Ukraine is estimated to have lost about half of the 1,200 sq km it captured in August in the Russian region. “Kursk region, good news, Russia is getting what it deserves,” Andriy Yermak, the head of Ukraine’s presidential administration, wrote on Telegram. Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine’s counter-disinformation centre, a government communications agency, wrote on Telegram that the Russian side was coming under attack from “several directions” and “experiencing great anxiety” from the “surprise” attack. Ukrainian authorities did not immediately state the aim of the new offensive inside Russia. But the operation will inevitably use up precious weapons and manpower, already in desperately low supply on its eastern front where Moscow’s troops have been rapidly advancing. Russia captured just under 4,200 sq km in 2024, the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think-tank, reported this week, adding that over half of the gains had been made from September to November. The vast majority of these gains were in the eastern Ukrainian Donetsk region, where settlements coming under Russian occupation have become a daily occurrence. Though western military analysts said Ukraine’s Kursk incursion gave the country a much-needed morale boost, its attempt to hold that territory — instead of capturing Russian soldiers and retreating — has aggravated manpower shortages. Ukraine’s chief general Oleksandr Syrskyi said in August that the hope was Russia would move troops from the east to defend its own territory. But it soon became apparent that Russia was determined to keep up its offensive in Donetsk region and would not be relocating its key combat units to Kursk. North Korea, a key Kremlin ally, has since sent thousands of its own troops to Kursk region to boost Russian troops in the area. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Saturday that hundreds of North Korean troops were killed in Kursk between Friday and Saturday. The Financial Times was unable to verify his claims. The advance on the eastern front came at a great human cost for Russia, however. Luke Pollard, UK’s deputy secretary of state for defence, told parliament last month that the number of Russian casualties had surpassed 750,000 since the war began. Russia has continued its daily bombardment of Ukrainian cities, towns and energy infrastructure behind the front lines, mostly using its now steady supply of Iranian-designed attack drones. The country has managed to avoid long blackouts, however, thanks to rapid repair efforts, electricity imports from Europe and a so far mild winter. Zelenskyy said that in the first three days of the new year, Russia had deployed more than 300 drones and 20 missiles. (Source: FT.com)

05 Jan.

Jan 02.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• OFFENSIVES: Russian forces have likely taken around 1,600 square miles (4,150 sq km) of Ukrainian territory in 2024; despite taking hundreds of thousands of casualties, they are likely able to offset their losses
• STRIKES: Over the festive period, Russia continued its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine; while it was comparatively less intense than the strikes at the end of 2023, two high-intensity strikes caused blackouts on 25 and 31 December 2024
• AID: The US Biden administration has announced a series of additional aid packages for Ukraine ahead of the inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump
• FORECAST: On 1 January, Ukraine stopped transiting Russian natural gas to Europe; while this is set to have only a limited impact on European energy security, Slovakia has threatened to cut off electricity exports to Ukraine in response
• OFFENSIVES: Russian forces will almost certainly continue offensive operations across Ukraine in early 2025 in a bid to improve Russia’s possible negotiating position if US-brokered talks begin this year. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed on 31 December 2024 that Russian forces took 1,609 square miles (4,168 sq km) of Ukrainian territory in 2024, with a particular acceleration of the rate of advance during the Autumn offensive between September and November 2024. While that rate of advance has slowed over December, Russian forces are still making gains at various points along the frontline; the focus remains Donetsk oblast. Nevertheless, Russian forces are continuing to suffer very high casualty rates.
• OFFENSIVES: Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed on 30 December that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024 (both killed and wounded). Syrskyi also stated that over the previous week (23-30 December 2024) Russian forces suffered an average of 1,700 casualties per day. While we cannot confirm these numbers, the Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev claimed on 24 December 2024 that 440,000 people signed military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 2024. If accurate, this would indicate that Russia is currently capable of offsetting losses even at the current high rates.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have managed to penetrate Chasiv Yar’s northern microdistrict, making some of the most significant (albeit still limited) advances in the settlement for months. Geolocated footage published on 27 December 2024 confirmed Russian advances from the north-east to Lermontova Street in the north of the town, though Russian sources claimed on 29 December 2024 that their forces have penetrated further west still. The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces, Viktor Trehubov, acknowledged on 30 December 2024 that Russian forces have crossed the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal (which runs along the eastern outskirts of the town) and are attacking Ukraine’s defences around the Refractory Plant in the centre of the settlement. The plant is a key defensive point for Ukrainian forces; they have managed to hold off the Russians in recent months. However, if Russian forces can capitalise on their advances in the north, they will be in a position to apply additional pressure on Ukraine’s northern flank.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have continued to slowly advance in gruelling urban fighting in the centre of Toretsk. Geolocated footage from 25, 27, 28 and 30 December 2024 confirms steady Russian advances through the town centre in northern and western Toretsk. Geolocated footage on 23 December 2024 also indicated that Russian forces have advanced north-west into central Shcherbynivka, a settlement that sits on the eastern bank of the Kryvyi Torets River west of Toretsk. This latest advance further supports the assessment that Russian forces have likely pushed the Ukrainians out of the southern district of Toretsk to the south-east, though this hasn’t been visually confirmed.
• DONETSK: Over the past week, Russian forces have continued to advance around Pokrovsk amid efforts to encircle the key city. On 2 January, Viktor Tregubov, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces, stated that Russian forces are refraining from launching frontal assaults on Pokrovsk due to the city’s fortifications. According to Tregubov, Russian forces do not intend to initiate urban fighting at this time. Instead, they are likely attempting to cut off the city’s ground lines of communication (GLOCs). DeepState, a Ukrainian OSINT group, indicate that over the past few days, Russian offensives have been particularly intense south of Pokrovsk, targeting the settlement of Novovasylivka. A Ukrainian military observer acknowledged on 31 December 2024 that Russian forces captured Novoyelyzavetivka (south-west of Pokrovsk). Overall, the situation in the Pokrovsk sector remains increasingly critical for Ukrainian forces. That said, the Russian capture of Pokrovsk remains unlikely in the coming weeks and it remains unclear if their attempts to encircle the town will be successful.
• DONETSK: Further south in Kurakhove, Russian forces have now gained effective control of the city; however, intense fighting is likely taking place on the western outskirts of the Kurakhivska Thermal Power Plant (TPP) just west of the city. A Ukrainian military observer noted on 2 January that Russian forces have begun advancing from the north, moving beyond the Kurakhove Reservoir and pushing further west of the city. The Kurakhivska TPP is located in Kurakhove’s industrial zone, which provides Ukrainian forces with strong defensive positions. However, Russian forces are concurrently attempting to close the encirclement of the remaining Ukrainian forces west of Kurakhove via Zelenivka and Shevchenko, two settlements located to the south-west and west of Kurakhove. It remains unclear if the Ukrainians intend to continue a slow fighting withdrawal west of Kurakhove, or will decide to withdraw to more defensible locations to the west along the H-15 highway.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Unnamed US officials cited by Bloomberg on 27 December 2024 assessed that should Russian forces intensify their offensive in Kursk oblast, Ukrainian forces may only be able to hold out until the spring, and then be forced to withdraw. The assessment acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are currently struggling with widespread personnel shortages; other separate Ukrainian military sources on the ground we have identified in recent weeks have also highlighted the growing exhaustion of Ukrainian troops in Kursk. The US officials quoted in Bloomberg’s assessment stated that Russia could intensify operations as soon as this month, but, thereafter, difficult decisions will likely be required. This will include an eventual order to withdraw from Kursk to avoid encirclement and/or heavy casualties. Nevertheless, the Russians and their allies are taking very high casualties themselves in Kursk.
• KURSK: John Kirby, the spokesperson for the US National Security Council, reported on 27 December 2024 that North Korean forces fighting in Kursk are engaging in ‘massed, dismounted assaults’ which had resulted in more than 1,000 killed or wounded over the previous week alone. President Volodymyr Zelensky also reported on 23 December 2024 that North Korean forces had already taken 3,000 casualties in Kursk oblast, though we cannot confirm this. Some Russian sources have in recent days reported a Ukrainian build-up of around 20,000 troops, which they anticipate could be deployed to reinforce Ukraine’s positions in Kursk or open up a new offensive. Given the extent of Ukrainian personnel shortages, a new Ukrainian offensive in Kursk or Belgorod oblast remains unlikely, though a localised counter-attack remains possible in an attempt to slow Russia’s efforts to retake Kursk oblast. In the meantime, there have been few notable developments across the Kursk axis over the last two weeks; Russian and Ukrainian forces took several small settlements but made no notable breakthroughs.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past week, Russian forces have concentrated their operations north-west of Kreminna, making some confirmed gains. Following advances around and within Terny (north-west of Kreminna), Russian sources have claimed that the settlement is under their control, though this remains visually unconfirmed. Similarly, Russian sources have recently made unverified claims that Ivanivka, also northwest of Kreminna, is under Russian control. Meanwhile, Russia has continued offensive operations in the Kupiansk sector, but without achieving any significant gains.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 23-25 December 2024 confirmed earlier reports that Russian forces had seized several villages located south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast) along the Mokri Yaly River valley. Russian forces now control Makarivka and Storozheve, a village located 2.5 miles (4km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka. These recent advances, together with the consolidation of positions to the north, confirm Russian forces’ current efforts to encircle Velyka Novosilka with the possible objective of forcing the Ukrainians to withdraw without having to conduct costly frontal infantry assaults into the town itself.
• SOUTHERN: Further west, geolocated footage published on 28 December 2024 confirmed that Russian forces have advanced in central Kamianske (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), effectively reversing most of the gains of a recent Ukrainian counter-attack in the area. Kamianske is a frontline town that lies on the eastern bank of the old Kakhovka Reservoir. Ukrainian forces launched the initial attack around 22 December 2024; these developments underscore that, while this section of the frontline has remained quiet over the past year, sporadic attacks do take place.
• STRIKES: Over the festive period, Russia continued its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine, though it was comparatively less intense than the strikes at the end of 2023. Russian long-range attacks included frequent small-scale drone strikes and two high-intensity combined strikes on 25 December and 31 December 2024.
• STRIKES: The 25 December 2024 attack involved 184 drones and missiles primarily targeting fuel facilities and Ukraine’s energy grid. The attack included two North Korean-supplied KN-23 ballistic missiles, ten S-300/S-400 anti-aircraft guided missiles, 12 Kalibr cruise missiles, 50 Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles, four Kh-59/69 missiles and 106 drones of various types, including Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukraine’s Air Force reported the interception of 59 missiles and 54 drones; while 52 other drones were reported lost, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures.
• STRIKES: Russian projectiles successfully hit Ukraine’s energy grid, causing energy blackouts across the country, including in the capital Kyiv. Notably, in Kharkiv oblast, around half a million Ukrainians were left without heating, while Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast) recorded several explosions. Russia’s MoD confirmed that its forces conducted a massive strike against critical energy facilities that support the work of Ukraine’s military-industrial complex. We previously assessed that high-intensity strikes, involving large-scale missile barrages targeting energy facilities, were highly likely during the festive period. These attacks are part of Russia’s ongoing effort to undermine Ukraine’s energy security and its military-industrial capabilities to continue fighting this attritional war.
• STRIKES: Russia launched a second high-intensity combined strike overnight on 30 to 31 December 2024. The attack involved six Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, one Kh-47M2 ballistic missile, six Kh-69 missiles, eight Kh-22 cruise missiles and 40 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Ukrainian air defences intercepted the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missile, five Kh-69 missiles and 16 UAVs. 24 UAVs identified by Ukraine as decoy drones were reported lost likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures. Russian ballistic missiles reportedly struck targets in Kyiv and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: On New Year’s Day, Russia launched a large-scale UAV strike, involving 111 Shahed-136/131 and other types of drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted 63 drones over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that 46 drones identified as decoy UAVs were lost likely due to EW measures. Explosions were recorded in the capital Kyiv, where two floors of a residential building in the city centre were partially destroyed. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) confirmed that one of its buildings (located in Kyiv’s Pechersk district) was damaged by falling debris.
• STRIKES: Russia’s expanding drone production will continue to allow Moscow to launch intense drone attacks against Ukraine. Quoting Ukrainian intelligence sources, CNN reported on 27 December 2024 that Russia’s Shahed-136/131 drone production facility in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone produced 5,760 UAVs between January and September 2024. This is twice the number of drones the plant produced in 2024. The plant has reportedly already fulfilled an agreement to produce 6,000 drones for the Russian military by September 2025. The Alabuga Plant also produces low-tech decoy drones, which Russia has been increasingly including in its strikes since August 2024. The expansion of Russia’s drone production is reflected in the significant increase in the number of UAVs used in Russia’s long-range strikes since the second half of 2024. Although Ukraine’s interception rate of drones remains high, Russia will continue to rely on UAVs to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences to create optimal striking conditions for its more lethal and accurate missiles.
• STRIKES: Ukraine also continued to carry out long-range strikes against Russia, particularly targeting oil infrastructure and military targets. For instance, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that on 28 December 2024, a Ukrainian strike hit a Shahed-136/131 drone storage depot in Russia’s Oryol oblast. A Russian online opposition media outlet claimed that the attack was carried out with at least three UK-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles. If the use of Storm Shadow missiles is confirmed, the attack would mark the first time Kyiv has used such projectiles against Russia’s Oryol oblast.
• STRIKES: Russia’s MoD reported that overnight on 30-31 December 2024 its air defences intercepted 68 Ukrainian drones over Russia’s Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Smolensk and Tver oblasts, as well as Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea. The regional authorities reported that falling drone debris struck an oil depot in Smolensk oblast. Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that overnight a Ukrainian Magura V5 maritime drone, equipped with missiles, successfully shot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter over the Black Sea. The GUR stated that a second Russian helicopter was damaged but managed to fly back to an airfield. The naval drone reportedly used R-73 Sea Dragon missiles in the strike. This is the first time in history that a naval drone has successfully destroyed an aerial target, thus underscoring Kyiv’s expanding drone capabilities. In June 2024, the GUR reported that the maritime drones had been modified to operate anti-aircraft missiles. Magura maritime drones have been crucial for Ukraine’s efforts to push Russia’s Black Sea Fleet back. The drone’s ability to strike aerial targets will now also increasingly threaten maritime aviation assets over the Black Sea, further limiting Russia’s room for manoeuvre in what has become a highly successful Ukrainian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.
• STRIKES: Decreasing stockpiles of Western long-range missiles will undermine Kyiv’s ability to conduct highly effective long-range strikes against targets crucial to Russia’s offensive efforts. On 27 December 2024, the New York Times (NYT) reported that Kyiv is limiting the use of longer-range missiles provided by the UK and the US due to depleting stockpiles. US President-elect Donald Trump has expressed his opposition to Ukraine’s use of such missiles against Russian territory. Trump’s re-election will therefore significantly reduce the likelihood of Washington DC resupplying Ukraine with additional missiles. Meanwhile, the UK recently stated it has a limited number of missiles available to provide to Ukraine. In November, the US unofficially allowed Ukraine to use Western missiles against Russian territory. These missiles include the US-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and British Storm Shadows. While their use has not proven to be a strategic game-changer, they have allowed Kyiv to degrade Russian military logistics, thereby complicating Moscow’s offensive operations along the frontline, particularly in Kursk oblast.
• STRIKES: Amid these issues, Ukraine continues to develop long-range missiles as part of its efforts to reduce its reliance on Western missiles. On 23 December 2024, the Economist reported that Ukraine’s new Trembita cruise missile is in the final stages of its development stages. According to the report, Kyiv is set to mass-produce the projectile in the near future. The cost of the missile (with its warhead) is approximately USD 15,000, which is significantly lower than Western missiles. For instance, the British-made Storm Shadow costs USD 1 million. The Trembita missile is expected to have a range of 124 miles (200km) and a speed of 249mph (400kph). We assess that Ukraine’s ability to ramp up its domestic production of cheap missiles will ultimately be crucial to offset its reliance on Western equipment and provide a more sustainable source of arms given the attritional nature of the war.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• AID: The US continued to announce new assistance to Ukraine in late December 2024 ahead of President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration on 20 January. On 30 December 2024, Washington DC dispatched USD 3.4 billion in additional budget aid to Kyiv. The funding brings the total of US budget aid to Ukraine to just over USD 30 billion since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Kyiv uses most of the funds to keep the government running by paying state employees. Separately, outgoing US President Joe Biden announced new security assistance for Ukraine on 30 December 2024 worth nearly USD 2.5 billion. According to the US State Department, the new aid includes additional air defence munitions, Javelin and AT-4 anti-armour systems and other capabilities.
• AID: Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on 30 December 2024 that the US will provide Ukraine with USD 15 billion using the future revenue of frozen Russian assets. Shmyhal did not provide further details about when Kyiv will receive the funds, though they comprise part of Washington DC’s USD 20 billion contribution to a G7 initiative to leverage frozen Russian assets. The funds will be used to help with social and humanitarian expenditure, which will likely moderately aid with budgetary pressures and Ukraine’s challenging socio-economic health landscape. Nevertheless, we continue to assess that the use of frozen Russian assets will highly likely elevate the risk of retaliatory Russian seizures of Western assets.
• PEACEKEEPING: An opposition candidate likely to become the next chancellor of Germany following federal elections in February has stated that German peacekeepers may consider joining a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine only with Russia’s consent. Friederich Merz of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) alliance said on 28 December 2024 that Germany’s participation in peacekeeping operations requires a clear mandate under international law. Merz’ comments indicate that Germany is unlikely to participate in any hypothetical peacekeeping mission given Russia is highly unlikely to agree to NATO troops being deployed in Ukraine.
• PEACEKEEPING: Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on 29 December 2024 that Moscow is unsatisfied with reported proposals from the incoming Trump administration concerning the end of the war. Lavrov specifically referenced halting Ukraine’s membership in NATO for 20 years, as well as the presence of European peacekeepers in Ukraine. Lavrov also emphasised that ensuring Ukraine’s ‘non-aligned’ military status remains one of Russia’s war objectives. Ultimately, Moscow would highly likely perceive the presence of NATO peacekeepers in Ukraine as undermining Russian security, with Russia’s war goals likely to remain reducing Ukraine’s military capability and preventing membership in and co-operation with NATO.
ENERGY: On 1 January, Ukraine stopped transiting Russian natural gas to Europe. Kyiv had frequently warned that it would take such action, raising concerns in neighbouring Slovakia and Hungary about energy insecurity given their continued purchase of Russian gas imports. Nevertheless, we have repeatedly assessed that a termination of gas flows is unlikely to significantly undermine European energy security. However, our assessment acknowledged that Slovakia would likely be the country most vulnerable to the cessation of the transit agreement. For further analysis, see Sibylline Sanctions Watch – 30 December 2024.
* Russia-friendly Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico threatened on 27 December 2024 that his government would possibly halt electricity supplies if Ukraine stopped transit. Fico implied that Slovakia could take such measures when Ukraine experiences grid outages; his comments are almost certainly a last-ditch attempt to push Kyiv to reconsider extending the agreement. This remains unlikely. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated on 31 December 2024 that Ukraine could import electricity from neighbouring Romania and Poland if Slovakia proceeded with its threat. As Ukraine has other viable sources of electricity available, this would likely mitigate the impact of shortages should Slovakia unilaterally halt imports. An unspecified senior Polish official disclosed on 29 December 2024 that the Polish authorities are ready to increase electricity imports to Ukraine if Slovakia follows through on Fico’s warning. The official stated that the Polish government is prepared to increase domestic power production to compensate for any imbalances in Ukraine’s energy system. However, the official offered limited details concerning precise figures. Halushchenko also emphasised that cutting off electricity to Ukraine would primarily harm Slovakia’s own economy as Kyiv pays for what it receives. According to him, halting exports could cost Bratislava ‘hundreds of millions’ in US dollars. As such, the economic repercussions and any possible penalties from the EU will likely mean that Slovakia refrains from stopping electricity supplies to Ukraine. At the same time, Slovakia continues to receive Russian oil through a pipeline transiting Ukraine; these are supplies which Kyiv could realistically halt in a tit-for-tat move. Between January and April 2024, 60% of Slovakia’s oil originated from Russia, meaning that Slovakia would likely want to avoid actions which jeopardise its access to Russian oil. Nevertheless, gas transmission tariffs for Ukrainian domestic consumers quadrupled on 1 January to offset the impact of lost revenue after the expiration of the gas transit agreement. Gas transmission tariffs have increased to about UAH 502 (USD 11.95) for 1,000 cubic metres from UAH 124 (USD 2.95). Approximately 85% of the revenue of Ukraine’s gas transport operator came from transporting Russian gas in 2024; Kyiv will lose up to USD 1 billion a year in transit fees. This will likely further strain the already-pressured Ukrainian economy. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Jan 25.  Ukraine Deploys Dual-Wield Shotgun “Winchester” Drones to Counter Russian UAVs. Ukrainian forces have introduced another innovative FPV drone variation in their ongoing defense against Russian military advancements: drones equipped with shotgun-like barrels. The new unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), referred to as “Winchester drones,” looks to have been designed specifically to hunt and destroy Russian drones in mid-air. The Foundation for Assistance to Defenders of Ukraine, which has spearheaded the development and fundraising for these drones, shared footage of their operation on social media. In the videos, Ukrainian drones can be seen engaging Russian UAVs over battlefields, firing precise shotgun blasts that send the opposing drones crashing to the ground. The dual-barrel shotgun design appears to leverage wide pellet dispersion, a feature that increases the likelihood of hitting small, nimble airborne targets. The Foundation stated, “For the first time on video – drones-winchesters shoot down other drones with a shot.” The shotgun-like barrel system, despite its lack of stopping power compared to rifle rounds, looks well-suited for this purpose due to their broader pellet spread. The drones are believed to employ a recoilless firing system, with a counterweight mechanism that balances the force of the shotgun discharge, preventing destabilization of the UAV. Some mil blogger Telegram accounts have also suggested that Ukraine’s shotgun-equipped drones may utilize AI-driven target acquisition and engagement systems. The statements speculate that the drones intercept enemy FPVs using automated guidance likely achieved through electro-initiation of the powder charge once the target is captured in the frame.Russian forces have previously developed similar systems. A Russian journalist, Alexander Kots, previously shared images of drones equipped with shotgun-like pellet weapons, which also employed a counterweight balance recoilless design, though they have not been recorded in military use. The military-systems publication The Armourers Bench, has previously reported on this design in detail. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

02 Jan 25. Russia says it struck Ukrainian energy facilities. Russia said on Thursday it had attacked energy facilities in Ukraine that support Kyiv’s military-industrial complex.
The Russian Defence Ministry said that over the last 24 hours it had used its air force, drones, missiles and artillery to target energy facilities, military airfields and Ukrainian military personnel across multiple locations.
Reuters could not independently confirm the extent of the attacks or the damage they inflicted.
Russia regularly reports such strikes, describing recent ones as retaliation for Kyiv’s use of Western-supplied missiles to strike deep into Russian territory
The ministry also reported that Russian troops had downed a Ukrainian Su-27 fighter jet, 97 drones and six U.S.-supplied HIMARS missiles overnight. (Source: Reuters)

 

31 Dec 24. Ukraine begins licensed assembly of Colt CZ Bren 2 assault rifle. Ukroboronprom displayed a Bren 2, the second of three generations of the Bren series of assault rifles chambered in 5.56×45 mm calibre as the agreement was announced on 13 December. While the weapon displayed has a full length 357 mm barrel in a 5.56×45 mm chambering, the Bren 2 assault rifle is available in a variety of barrel lengths, configurations, and calibres; 5.56×45 mm, 7.62×51 mm, and 7.62×39 mm.
On 20 December Ceska Zbrojovka A S (part of Colt CZ Group) told Janes that the Ukraine assembly “is progressing successfully, and the CZ Bren 2 has become an integral part of Ukraine’s armed forces”. This agreement follows a technology transfer contract of 16 July to prepare CZ Bren 2 production inside Ukraine. Unlike many of the legacy AK-M assault rifles already in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), the Bren 2 has a monolithic upper receiver and a series of NATO-standard accessory rails allowing for modern optical and electro-optical sighting devices to be securely fitted. The Bren 2’s modularity allows troops to be issued assault rifles for either NATO standard 5.56 mm or 7.62 mm ammunition, or more commonly domestically produced 7.62×39 mm.
The rifle can be assembled in a wide variety of configurations from a full length 7.62×51 mm battle rifle to a short-barrelled telescoped stock 7.62×39 mm personal defence weapon (PDW). (Source: Janes)

 

31 Dec 24. Russian Military Reports Widespread Defects in Chinese Electronic Warfare Systems. Russian military units and pro-Russian Telegram bloggers raised concerns over severe quality issues in Chinese-manufactured electronic warfare (EW) systems. The complaints detail a variety of manufacturing flaws that have hampered the effectiveness of these systems, which are essential for disrupting enemy communications and protecting Russian forces’ operations.
According to a Telegram post from a Russian military blogger, inspections of one type of jammer revealed systemic problems in both design and construction. The device’s power supply units, which were labeled to deliver 25 amps, reportedly produced only 5 amps. Cooling systems were inadequate, with gaps in the casing allowing excessive heat buildup. This issue was reportedly exacerbated by high summer temperatures in Ukraine, with dried thermal paste shrinking and failing to effectively conduct heat.
Additional defects included misaligned drill holes that made assembly difficult, poorly soldered wiring, and residual aluminum shavings inside the components, creating a heightened risk of short circuits. Antennas on some devices were installed in configurations that caused mutual damage during use. The power amplifiers in certain jammers were found to have short circuits, rendering the equipment unusable.
Half of the delivered systems, including models referred to as “Daisy” FPV jammers and the “Groza” (Storm), were reportedly defective upon arrival. Russian technicians noted that many of these devices required complete disassembly and reconstruction before they could function. The reassembly process often involved replacing faulty antennas, adding new cooling mechanisms, and securing loose wiring.(Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

31 Dec 24. Ukraine’s Naval Drone Achieves Historic Aerial Kill, Downs Mi-8 Helicopter with Air-to-Air Missile. Ukraine claims to have downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter using a naval drone equipped with an adapted air-to-air missile. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the engagement, which took place near Cape Tarkhankut in Russian-occupied Crimea. If verified, this marks the first successful use of an unmanned surface vessel (USV) to destroy an aircraft.
The incident reportedly involved a Magura V5 USV operated by Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR). Armed with R-73 air-to-air missiles retrofitted for surface launch and nicknamed “Sea Dragon” in this application, the USV engaged two Russian Mi-8 helicopters. Video evidence released by Ukraine’s MoD shows one of the helicopters deploying flares in an attempt to evade the heat-seeking missile before being struck and crashing into the Black Sea. A second helicopter was reportedly damaged but managed to return to base. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

30 Dec 24. Ukraine’s defence industry receives €150m support from European nations. The countries Denmark, France, and Lithuania have contributed €111m, €29m and €10m, respectively. Denmark, France, and Lithuania have collectively contributed more than €150m ($156.36m) to support Ukraine’s defence industry. Denmark’s contribution, amounting to €111m, is part of a cooperation agreement with Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence and Ministry for Strategic Industries. France has provided a €29m grant to enhance Ukraine’s security and defence capabilities. Additionally, Lithuania has pledged €10m to develop the Ukrainian defence sector. This aligned with a Memorandum of Understanding between Lithuania’s Ministry of National Defence, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, and Ukraine’s Ministry for Strategic Industries.
Ukraine Defence Minister Rustem Umerov said: “These funds will primarily be allocated to the production of missiles, deep-strike drones, and artillery systems.”
Previously in November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced plans to boost production of long-range drones and missiles as part of Ukraine’s resilience plan.
In a speech to parliament, he said the drones would offset artillery shortages, with a goal of producing 30,000 drones next year and establishing a new technology centre.
This month, the US Department of Defence also announced a $988m security assistance package for Ukraine through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which includes munitions for rocket systems and unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
The aid is intended to strengthen Ukraine’s defences amidst the ongoing conflict with Russia, which has resulted in significant human and material losses. Western allies have been providing financial support and military equipment to Kyiv since the escalation of the conflict going on between Ukraine and Russia, during which Russia has suffered more than 700,000 casualties. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

31 Dec 24. Russian gas flows through Ukraine are set to stop on Wednesday when a transit deal between the two countries expires in the wake of Moscow’s full-scale invasion. The pipeline was one of the last two routes still carrying Russian gas to Europe nearly three years into the full-scale war. EU countries will lose about 5 per cent of gas imports in the middle of winter. While traders had long expected flows to stop, the end of the pipeline route through Ukraine will affect Europe’s gas balance at a time when demand for heating is high. Slovakia is the country most affected. “While one would assume that losing those volumes [is] priced in, a strong upward price response initially isn’t out of the question,” said Aldo Spanjer, senior commodities strategist at BNP Paribas. The deal to allow Russian gas to pass through Ukraine was agreed at the end of 2019, signed a day before the previous 10-year contract between the national gas companies was set to expire. At the time, the European Commission strongly promoted the deal. After Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, the commission encouraged member states to seek alternative supplies as the bloc moved to wean itself off Russian fossil fuel imports. The Moscow-friendly governments of Hungary and Slovakia have resisted that shift and have sought to extend the deal beyond January 1. The Ukrainian government had telegraphed months in advance that it was unwilling to negotiate an extension to the deal, as it wanted to deprive the Kremlin of its income from gas exports. Ending the flows would result in a $6.5bn loss for Russia, unless it could redirect them, according to the Brussels-based think-tank, Bruegel. But it would also be a financial blow to Ukraine, which earned about $1bn a year in gas transit fees, though only about a fifth of that was gross profits. Analysts have suggested that Ukraine’s vast gas pipeline infrastructure could face increasing Russian attack, if there was no Russian gas flowing through it. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico visited Moscow on December 22 to discuss the gas transit contract. He blasted Ukraine’s intransigence on the deal, asking whether the country had “the right to damage the economic national interests of an [EU] member state”. Fico said on Facebook shortly before the deal’s expiry that “other gas transit options than Russian gas were presented to Ukrainian partners, but these were also rejected by the Ukrainian president”. The Slovak prime minister has also threatened to cut off back-up electricity supplies from Slovakia to Ukraine as retaliation. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has likewise sought to find a workaround to allow Russian gas imports via Ukraine. His government has also turned to the last remaining pipeline shipping Russian gas via Turkey and to neighbouring Romania to complement supplies. Austria, which still imported Russian gas throughout 2024, has shifted to alternative sources such as liquid natural gas imports. Its energy company OMV in mid-December terminated its long-term contract with Russia’s Gazprom because of a legal dispute. The cut-off of gas will also have a significant impact on neighbouring Moldova, which in mid-December introduced a state of emergency in the energy sector because of the uncertainty around Russian gas transit. The halt to Russian gas flows through Ukraine is likely to increase European demand for pricier LNG, for which Asia is also competing. EU officials have been adamant that the bloc can live without Russian pipeline supplies, even if it means accepting more expensive shipped gas from elsewhere. The Turkey pipeline still transporting Russian gas to Europe contributes about 5 per cent of the EU’s imports. The US recently imposed sanctions on Gazprombank, the main conduit for Russian energy payments. But to mitigate the impact of sanctions, Russian President Vladimir Putin in early December dropped a requirement for foreign buyers of Russian gas to pay through the bank. Countries such as Turkey and Hungary have also said they have received US exemptions from the sanctions. Recommended EU business regulation Qatar will ‘stop’ EU gas sales if fined under due diligence law “The sanctions had previously added an extra layer of uncertainty over the fate of Europe’s remaining Russian gas supply as we enter the new year, helping to keep gas prices volatile,” said Natasha Fielding, head of European gas pricing at Argus Media, a pricing agency. The US waiver meant that “buyers of Russian gas delivered through the Turkish Stream pipeline could breathe a sigh of relief”, she said. Traders are not ruling out an increase in Russian gas flows into Europe in the future. European companies that are reeling from high gas and energy prices, forcing them to cut back production, would return to buying Russian gas, which was inherently cheaper than LNG, one senior trader said. “At some stage there will be a peace agreement . . . People will want to end the war, therefore they have to sign a peace agreement. One of the things Russia will get is its ability to resupply” Europe with gas, the trader said. While European governments may impose restrictions to prevent the continent from once again becoming over-reliant on Russian gas, the trader said, “you would expect to see some Russian gas back in Europe, because fundamentally, geography has not changed”. (Source: FT.com)

 

30 Dec 24. DOD Announces Additional Aid for Ukraine, Assesses 1,000 North Korean Casualties in Russia’s Kursk Region. The Defense Department today announced it will be providing close to $2.5bn in additional new security assistance support to Ukraine intended to reaffirm the department’s commitment to supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression.
The latest aid package includes a $1.25bn presidential drawdown authority package, as well as $1.22bn in additional funds through the Ukrainian Security Assistance Initiative, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told members of the media this morning.
“Together, these packages deliver critical capabilities such as air defense systems, munitions for artillery and rocket systems, anti-tank weapons, unmanned aerial systems and more,” Singh said.
She added that the aid packages mark the current administration’s 73rd drawdown package and the 23rd package provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development.
” our continued efforts with our over 50 allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to ensure Ukraine has what it needs to be successful on the battlefield and to defend its sovereignty,” Singh said.
Founded under the direction of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III in response to Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, the UDCG is a coalition of some 50 nations that meet regularly to discuss Ukraine’s security needs.
Austin intends to convene the 25th meeting of the UDCG alongside Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov in the new year where the capability coalitions will lay out their roadmaps toward “efficient and sustainable support for Ukraine,” a senior defense official said earlier this month.
When asked as to whether Austin intends to brief whomever the next administration’s incoming defense secretary is regarding the value of assistance the UDCG provides to Ukraine, Singh said that — while she can’t speak for the incoming secretary and whether that person might request a conversation on the UDCG — there are many people working within DOD who understand the importance of the group.
“The UDCG continues to be a convening forum to work with allies and partners in finding and providing Ukraine with what it needs, and working together as multiple countries literally come around the table,” Singh said.
Also, during the briefing, Singh remarked that DOD concurs with a recent White House assessment of how many North Korean casualties there have been as a result of fighting against Ukraine in Russia’s Kursk region.
“The White House recently announced that approximately 1,000 soldiers have either been killed or wounded in the Kursk region. That’s our assessment as well,” Singh said.
She added that the assaults the North Korean soldiers are launching in the region are not proving significantly effective, and that the North Koreans are taking on a “significant amount” of casualties. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

30 Dec 24. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance support to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs as part of the surge of security assistance the President directed to put Ukraine in the best possible position. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package, which has an estimated value of $1.25bn, to provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent needs, including: missiles for air defense; munitions for rocket systems and artillery; and anti-tank weapons.
In addition, DoD announced an approximately $1.22bn Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) package to provide Ukraine with additional air defense, air-to-ground, Unmanned Aerial Systems, and other capabilities to fight Russian aggression.
The capabilities in this announcement include:
• Munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS);
• HAWK air defense munitions;
• Stinger missiles;
• Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) munitions;
• Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
• Air-to-ground munitions;
• High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
• Unmanned Aerials Systems (UAS);
• Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
• Tube-launched, Optically guided, Wire-tracked (TOW) missiles;
• Small arms and ammunition and grenades;
• Demolitions equipment and munitions;
• Secure communications equipment;
• Commercial satellite imagery services;
• Medical equipment;
• Clothing and individual equipment; and
• Spare parts, maintenance and sustainment support, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.
This is the Biden Administration’s twenty-third USAI package and seventy-third tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.
The United States continues to work together with some 50 Allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and its associated Capability Coalitions to provide the support Ukraine needs to prevail in its fight against Russian aggression. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

30 Dec 24. Russia Rejects Donald Trump’s Ukraine Peace Plan.
Russia has rejected parts of Donald Trump’s proposed Ukraine peace plan, according to comments given in an interview by Moscow’s foreign minister to the state news agency Tass.
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov said that Moscow is “not satisfied” with elements of the president-elect’s peace plan that were revealed in an interview with Time magazine and other leaks, namely delaying Ukraine’s ascent to NATO by 20 years and deploying a contingent of EU and U.K. peacekeepers in Ukraine.
Newsweek reached out to the Trump transition team for comment via email outside of business hours and to the Russian government for comment via email.
Russia’s rejection of Trump’s peace proposals is significant because it means that the incoming administration will have to revamp its strategy when it comes to negotiating peace between Kyiv and Moscow. As both sides have now rejected parts of the president-elect’s proposal, in order to facilitate negotiations, Trump will have to come up with an entirely new strategy.
What To Know
Trump has previously said on numerous occasions that he would end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours” and his advisers have reportedly been coming up with a peace plan that would involve freezing all conflict at the front lines and creating a demilitarized zone.
Keith Kellogg, the president-elect’s nominee to serve as special envoy to Ukraine and Russia, has said that the nearly three-year war between the two countries will be “resolved in the next few months.”
During his recent interview with Time magazine Trump said that he will not abandon Kyiv and that he believes the war would not have broken out if he was president.
Russia had previously said that it was “ready to study Trump’s proposals on Ukraine” but specified that “studying” did not mean “agreeing.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has previously rejected the idea of freezing the conflict to begin negotiations to end the war. He told the French outlet Le Parisien that Trump “knows about my desire not to rush things at the expense of Ukraine” and said that Ukraine would not give up its territories or its independence.
What People Are Saying
During his interview with Tass, Lavrov said: “Judging by numerous leaks and Donald Trump’s own interview with Time magazine on December 12, he is talking about ‘freezing’ hostilities along the line of engagement and transferring further responsibility for confronting Russia to the Europeans.”
Russia is “certainly not satisfied with the proposals made by representatives of the president-elect’s team to postpone Ukraine’s membership in NATO for 20 years and to deploy a peacekeeping contingent of ‘UK and European forces’ in Ukraine,” Lavrov said.
In posts on X, formerly known as Twitter, Tymofiy Mylovanov, the president of the Kyiv School of Economics, wrote: “Everyone’s fixated on securing peace in Ukraine now, but that’s the wrong frame. The issue isn’t about a peace deal; it’s about achieving stability so that: 1. The conflict doesn’t escalate or renew. 2. Ukraine can sustain itself. 3. Russia becomes less aggressive globally.
“The U.S.’s interest in this stability appears to be secondary. And this is a mistake. The President-elect has made commitments to achieve a quick peace deal. Not a durable, but quick deal. This limits room to maneuver. From my perspective, the administration’s approach appears to be somewhat disconnected from ground realities, where Russia is advancing and Ukraine needs support to stop these advances. Furthermore, as long as Russia advances, it has limited incentives to agree to a peace deal.”
Former Russian deputy minister of energy Vladimir Milov, who is now an opposition politician, previously told Newsweek: “There may be a Russia-Ukraine peace deal in 2025 due to several factors—pressure from the incoming Trump administration, extreme resource exhaustion on both sides of the war—but any ceasefire agreement is likely to be premature, and, therefore, fragile and prone to future collapse.”
“The fundamental cause of the war—Russia’s aggressive imperialistic ambition to subjugate Ukraine and eliminate its sovereignty—will not disappear after any ceasefire,” he said. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Newsweek)

 

31 Dec 24. Ukraine Appoints First Military Ombudsman. President Volodymyr Zelensky on Monday appointed Olha Reshetylova as Ukraine’s first military ombudsman. The position was created to provide soldiers and their families with a formal mechanism to report rights violations and to improve accountability within the armed forces.
Reshetylova’s appointment comes after growing calls for military accountability following allegations of abuse within Ukraine’s 211th Pontoon Bridge Brigade. Reports included mistreatment of subordinates, such as tying soldiers to wooden crosses, leading to public backlash and demands for reform. The ombudsman will be responsible for investigating complaints, offering legal assistance, conducting inspections, and addressing rights violations.
Reshetylova will also collaborate with Ukraine’s Defense Ministry and civil society organizations to draft legislation that defines the powers and operational framework of the role.
Reshetylova co-founded the Media Initiative for Human Rights, which investigates war crimes and promotes government reforms, and she has been actively involved in supporting Ukraine’s military through civilian-led initiatives. Zelensky praised her as a capable and experienced leader, emphasizing her dedication to human rights and institutional reform. The ombudsman’s office is expected to begin operations in early 2025. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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