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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 28.

Executive summary

  • In our most likely three-month scenario, Russia will continue to make further tactical gains, though without a major breakthrough that definitively alters the strategic balance in Moscow’s favour.
  • In our most likely 12-month scenario, there is a realistic possibility that the war will continue as a semi-stable attritional conflict that protracts through 2025. While growing international pressure to enter talks will possibly lead to some progress in early 2025, the enforcement of a stable ceasefire (not to mention a strategic settlement) will remain unlikely, particularly if Moscow judges that it can withstand any potential coercive attempts by the US to force its hand to end the war before it achieves its goals.
  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials have slightly recalibrated their official opposition to territorial concessions, acknowledging that Ukraine cannot retake certain occupied territories militarily, and that a diplomatic settlement is required. While this indicates growing willingness to entertain concessions in Kyiv, Russian officials have consistently emphasised that their war objectives are unchanged; they would require massive Ukrainian concessions before negotiations even begin.
  • Nevertheless, the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump in January 2025 will likely involve a flurry of diplomatic activity in early 2025 in a bid to set the conditions for peace and/or ceasefire negotiations. Members of the incoming Trump administration have posited various approaches to facilitating talks, including coercive strategies to force Moscow to the table. However, it remains unclear if the Kremlin is willing to entertain concessions while it perceives its military position on the ground as strengthening and Ukraine’s as weakening. The prospects of peace will therefore likely depend on Trump’s approach.
  • Other key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in January 2025 include: potential strategic strikes against Kyiv (and other Ukrainian cities) using ballistic missiles (including the Oreshnik system), energy outages across the country in the aftermath of high-intensity strikes and further indications as to the Trump administration’s strategy towards facilitating peace talks in 2025.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • KHARKIV: Ukraine launched an attack solely using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and first-person view (FPV) drones for the first time, reflecting continued innovation and efforts to offset growing personnel shortages with unmanned offensive capabilities
  • STRIKES: A large-scale strike on Kyiv on 20 December resulted in damage to a hotel and commercial buildings, but we assess that the hotel was not the intended target – the risk of collateral damage nevertheless remains high across Kyiv and wider Ukraine
  • GAS: Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on 20 December that Russian gas will no longer transit Ukraine as of 0700hrs (local time) on 1 January 2025
  • FORECAST: Officials cited by the FT claim that President-elect Donald Trump reportedly intends to maintain US military aid to Ukraine when he assumes the presidency in January 2025, indicating a possible strategy towards facilitating a long-term peace
  • BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 20 and 22 December indicates that Russian forces have continued to make grinding advances in central Toretsk. Footage from 20 December indicates advances along the south-western edge of the town, with Russian sources claiming an advance of over 500m. While we cannot confirm this, it remains plausible. Similarly, footage from 22 December confirmed advances in the centre of Toretsk as Russian forces continue to advance through various roads northwards.
  • DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian forces continued to advance south of Pokrovsk, while Ukrainian forces managed to retake lost positions south-west of the city. Geolocated footage from 22 December shows that Russian forces captured Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk). Meanwhile, earlier footage from 20 December indicates that Ukrainian forces regained positions in southern Pishchane (south-west of Pokrovsk). However, the footage suggests that Russian troops had advanced into Pishchane from the south.
  • DONETSK: Meanwhile, Russian forces have likely seized the settlement of Zorya (north-west of Kurakhove) as of 20 December. On 22 December, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces captured Sontsivka, north-east of Kurakhove. While these gains have yet to be visually confirmed, they are likely given the rate of Russian advances in the sector.
  • KHARKIV: On 20 December, the Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that Ukraine launched an attack solely using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and first-person view (FPV) drones for the first time. The attack took place on an unspecified date near Lyptsi, located due north of Kharkiv city. The attack reportedly involved dozens of UGVs equipped with machine guns, while they also laid and cleared mines during the operation. This marks the first time Ukrainian forces have launched an attack with solely unmanned systems, both on the ground and in the air, and reflects Ukraine’s continued innovation and development of unmanned systems. While such attacks are likely to remain few and limited in nature for the foreseeable future, the growing pressure on Ukraine’s personnel shortages will only increase the importance of unmanned attacks, particularly if the war drags on beyond 2025.
  • KURSK: Geolocated footage published on 18, 20 and 21 December has indicated limited Russian advances over the weekend north of Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha).
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past few days, Russian forces have made limited gains around Kupiansk amid continued efforts to reinforce their presence on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River. Geolocated footage from 22 December shows recent marginal Russian advances in south-eastern Dvorichna (north-east of Kupiansk). On 20 December, Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Dvorichna (north of Kupiansk) from the north and possibly hold limited positions in the forest on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River. The fact that Russian forces now occupy a bridgehead on the west bank of the river likely indicates Russia’s desire to take much larger swathes of Kharkiv oblast – despite the fact that Kharkiv oblast has not been officially annexed by Moscow (unlike Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts).
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces have maintained a high tempo of attacks along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border region, likely setting conditions for the encirclement or assault upon Velyka Novosilka. On 19 December, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that its forces had taken Novyi Komar, a small village directly north of Velyka Novosilka. This has been confirmed via geolocated footage and once again indicates that Russia’s closing encirclement around Velyka Novosilka continues to slowly tighten. Meanwhile, a spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting near Velyka Novosilka reported on 20 December that Russian forces are experimenting with drones attached to fibre optic cables, which are being used to attack Ukrainian positions and make them less vulnerable to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainians are similarly experimenting with such drones, reflecting the ever-evolving nature of the battlefield as both sides seek to maintain an advantage in the EW realm.
  • SOUTHERN: Further west, Ukrainian forces launched a limited counter-attack in western Zaporizhzhia oblast, succeeding in retaking a number of lost positions near the bank of the Dnipro River. Geolocated footage published on 22 December indicates Ukrainian forces advanced in central Kamianske, a frontline town that lies on the eastern bank of the old Kakhovka Reservoir. While we cannot confirm the extent of the Ukrainian counter-attack, it indicates Ukrainian willingness and capability to conduct limited counter-attacks when opportunities present themselves. A Russian counter-attack will likely be launched in response, but it remains unclear if the overall tempo of attacks in this direction will increase – given it has remained very quiet for months.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 19-20 December, Russia attacked Ukraine with 65 drones (Shahed-136/131 types along with unidentified drones). Later at 07:00 (local time) Russia launched a second strike, including five Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, targeting specifically Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv. The head of Kyiv’s Military Administration, Serhiy Popko, noted that the second strike also included Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, bringing the total to eight missiles. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 40 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kursk, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. 20 UAVs were reportedly lost due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. While all Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles were reportedly shot down, the Kinzhal missiles were likely not intercepted.
  • STRIKES: A ballistic missile from the first wave reportedly hit a building in Kryivi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Following the second wave of attacks, hits were recorded in the capital, with Ukrainian officials claiming that these were due to falling projectile debris. Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi said that the Russian attack damaged multiple embassies located in a single building, including the embassies of Albania, Argentina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Palestine and Portugal. Kyiv officials also reported damage from falling debris to warehouses and infrastructure in Kyiv. We assess that this does not represent a major shift in Russia’s targeting strategy towards embassies given it was debris, rather than a direct hit, that caused the damage.
  • STRIKES: Our analysis shows that buildings at the Toronto Business Centre and a nearby hotel were also damaged as a result of the second attack. We assess that this was highly likely caused by direct hits from Kinzhal ballistic missiles, which Ukrainian air defences likely failed to intercept. Russian sources indicated that the target of that specific attack was a command centre of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), located next to the damaged buildings. As such, we assess that the hotel and commercial sites which incurred damage were highly unlikely the intended targets. This attack was reportedly in retaliation for a Ukrainian strike on 18 December using US-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) against Russia’s Rostov oblast, targeting a chemical plant producing rocket fuel, explosives and ammunition components. However, the targeting of an SBU building in central Kyiv also likely reflects retaliation for the SBU’s assassination of a senior Russian general in Moscow on 17 December – reflecting the risks of further tit-for-tat retaliation.
  • STRIKES: The pattern of these strikes likely indicates that the first wave of attacks was aimed at overwhelming Ukraine’s air defences, particularly in Kyiv, to create or identify gaps for subsequent strikes. Ukraine’s Air Force refrained from reporting on the Kinzhal strikes, which were only mentioned by Serhiy Popko. This possibly reflects the efforts of Ukrainian military authorities to minimise the perceived threat of Russian strikes against the capital, which retains the densest air defence coverage in the country. The relative success of the attack against the apparent SBU building likely underscores Moscow’s varied and innovative strike tactics, which will continue to pose a significant challenge to Ukrainian air defences, even in the capital.
  • STRIKES: On 20 December, Ukrainska Pravda reported that the SBU has collected evidence proving that Russian Colonel-General Oleksiy Kim ordered a missile strike against a hotel in Kramatorsk (Donetsk oblast)) in August. The attack involved an Iskandr-M ballistic missile, killing a British security advisor for Reuters and injuring three journalists. The development likely indicates that the hotel was a deliberate target, though the motives for the attack remain unknown. That said, we assess that the attack is not indicative of a wider pattern of Russia striking hotels. For instance, the damaged hotel in Kyiv on 20 December was not the intended target of the Russian missile strike. Our analysis of the site indicates that the missile struck a nearby building’s roof during its terminal descent towards its target, which likely slightly shifted it off course, leading the missile to strike the street next to the SBU building, rather than the building itself. This led to a wider radius of damage to the nearby buildings, including the hotel. Nevertheless, we continue to assess that security threats to foreign staff (particularly journalists) residing in hotels near the frontline will remain elevated for the foreseeable future. More broadly, Russia’s likely intense strike campaign in the coming weeks will elevate security risks in major urban centres, increasing bystander risks, particularly from misfires and falling debris.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 20-21 December Russia launched an S-400 missile and 113 of various types, including Shahed-136/131 drones. 57 UAVs were shot down over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 56 additional drones were reported lost, likely due to Ukrainian EW measures. Falling drones reportedly damaged residential buildings in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 21-22 December, Ukraine intercepted 52 of 103 drones (Shahed-136/131 and unidentified types). Air defences were reportedly active in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 44 UAVS were disabled by Ukrainian EW measures. Damage against residential buildings and private enterprises was recorded in Chernihiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts.
  • STRIKES: Early on 23 December Ukrainian forces intercepted 47 of the 72 drones launched by Russia. Air defences were active over Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. 25 drones were reportedly lost due to Ukrainian EW measures. In Khmelnytskyi and Kyiv oblasts private enterprises and residential buildings were damaged.
  • STRIKES: During the festive period, we assess that the likelihood of Russia conducting a high-intensity combined strike remains high, as was the case last December and in early January. Such attacks would likely include large missile barrages combined with massive drone attacks. There is a realistic possibility that Moscow will deploy a limited number of Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), especially given the Kremlin’s repeated threats of using such projectiles in retaliatory strikes. These attacks would likely target large urban centres, including Kyiv, elevating the risk to bystanders and threats to life. Such attacks would also highly likely target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, sustaining the risk of rolling blackouts.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, early on 21 December, at least seven Ukrainian drones reportedly hit buildings in Kazan’s city centre (Republic of Tatarstan). A Russian online opposition outlet claimed that Ukraine was likely targeting a gunpowder production facility, an airfield, a military base, or a helicopter production facility near Kazan. On 22 Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed to retaliate against the attack – although as we have stated, the overall risk of high-intensity strikes remains high in any case in the coming days and weeks.
  • STRIKES: On 22 December, Russian Oryol oblast authorities reported a drone attack against oil infrastructure in the village of Stalevyi Kon. The facility had already been targeted by a drone attack on 14 December. Russia’s MoD reported the interception of 42 drones, 20 of which were targeting the Oryol region, with the remainder shot down over Bryansk, Kursk and Rostov oblasts, as well as Krasnodar Krai. In Rostov oblast, authorities reported that UAVs were shot down near Taganrog and Novoshakhtinsk, which also hosts the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery. The refinery, the largest in southern Russia, was previously hit on 19 December forcing authorities to halt operations.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • GAS: Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on 20 December that Russian gas will no longer transit Ukraine as of 0700hrs (local time) on 1 January 2025. We have repeatedly assessed that Kyiv was highly unlikely to renew the agreement. This is despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently suggesting a different arrangement of non-payment for Moscow until after the war (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 20 December 2024).
  • GAS: Meanwhile, Reuters reported on 20 December that Russia and Ukraine failed to agree on a deal brokered by Azerbaijan to continue gas exports to Europe via Ukraine. According to a senior insider at Azerbaijan’s state-owed oil and gas company SOCAR, SOCAR had served as a mediator in negotiations for almost a year at the request of the EU and Kyiv. Despite meetings between senior managers and senior representatives of Ukrainian energy companies twice this year, the two sides could not agree. While the highly likely cessation of the transit deal will almost certainly increase gas price volatility in Europe, the ability to source alternative supplies will mitigate against the risk of significant energy insecurity and shortages.
  • GAS: On 22 December, Slovakia’s Russia-friendly prime minister, Robert Fico, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Fico described the meeting as a response to Ukraine’s position on terminating the gas transit agreement. Given Slovakia’s heavy reliance on Russian gas, it will likely be the most vulnerable European country to a cessation of gas flows via Ukraine. As such, the meeting underscores how the highly likely termination of the transit agreement will further drive regional tensions with Ukraine and its Russia-friendly neighbours (Hungary and Slovakia).
  • NORTH KOREA: South Korean intelligence assessed on 23 December that North Korea appears to be preparing to deploy additional troops and military equipment to Russia. No further details were provided about how many personnel could be deployed to Russia, though the military assistance may possibly include kamikaze drones. Notably, a Ukrainian army officer leading a government unit for countering Russian disinformation claimed that 60% of the artillery and mortar shells Russia uses in Ukraine now come from North Korea. Meanwhile, North Korean missiles allegedly make up almost a third of Russia’s ballistic missiles used to attack Ukraine this year. We cannot confirm this, however.
  • NORTH KOREA: North Korea has also shipped some 20,000 containers of munitions to Russia, according to South Korean and US officials. While we cannot verify these developments, they underscore the burgeoning defence ties between the two countries. These will highly likely continue to develop, with Western sanctions unlikely to deter the two countries given they are heavily sanctioned already. For further analysis on Russo-North Korean relations, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 29 July 2024.
  • NORTH KOREA: Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) disclosed on 22 December that Russia is trying to conceal the presence of North Korean troops by giving them false documentation. The SSO shared photos of military documents which state that killed North Korean soldiers hail from Russia’s Tuva Republic in the Far East and were given names to match. Notably, the North Korean soldiers’ signatures are written in Korean rather than Russian. Despite Russian efforts to conceal the presence of North Korean personnel, language barriers, differing customs and Ukraine finding wounded or deceased personnel will almost certainly continue to expose their identities and the growing extent of North Korean involvement as a belligerent in the war.

FORECAST

US: President-elect Donald Trump reportedly intends to maintain US military aid to Ukraine when he assumes the presidency in January 2025. The British newspaper the Financial Times (FT) reported this on 20 December citing three unspecified insiders familiar with the matter. We have assessed in recent months that US military assistance to Ukraine would likely be significantly reduced or possibly completely cut under Trump’s second term. While we cannot confirm the veracity of the report, if true, it would mark a shift in the Trump administration’s public statements on its Ukraine policy up until now.

According to the people familiar with the matter, Trump believes that supplying weapons to Ukraine after a ceasefire would ensure a ‘peace through strength’ outcome. It is unclear whether Trump’s administration will provide aid to Ukraine in the period before a ceasefire is reached. Aside from this, the report offered limited details about how US-provided assistance will look like under Trump, such as what weapons Washington DC will send, as well as the frequency and size of any aid packages. We have previously reported on the Trump administration’s opposition to Ukrainian long-range strikes inside Russia using US-provided weapons (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 16 December 2024).

Increased military assistance from the US to Ukraine under Trump remains a viable possibility in a bid to support Ukraine’s military to transition into a credible conventional deterrent to prevent further Russian invasions over the long term. Such support could nevertheless be conditional upon a ceasefire being reached. Nevertheless, military aid after a ceasefire would possibly focus on ammunition, air defences and other equipment, rather than advanced weapons which Russia may consider a form of escalation (such as certain long-range missile systems). The report stated that Trump wants an immediate end to the conflict, but the arming of Ukraine thereafter reflects one possible course of action for Trump to turn a ceasefire into a longer-lasting peace which effectively contains and deters further Russian military action in Ukraine – as we have previously assessed will likely prove necessary to increase the likelihood of a ceasefire holding.

While the report possibly signals the Trump’s approach to building a longer-term peace in Ukraine, the president-elect remains unchanged on his opposition to inviting Ukraine to join NATO. According to the FT, Trump still believes that Kyiv should ‘never be given membership’. Ukraine considers joining the alliance to be essential for safeguarding against a renewed Russian invasion. However, Trump is highly unlikely to change his mind on this issue in the coming months.

Meanwhile, Trump will reportedly demand NATO member states increase defence spending to 5% of their GDP. Only 23 of the military alliance’s 32 members meet the current 2% spending target. According to one person familiar with the matter, Trump would settle for 3.5% and that he is planning to link higher defence spending to the offer of more favourable trading terms with the US. As such, this confirms our assessment that Trump is highly unlikely to withdraw from NATO. Rather, his administration will aim to encourage other states which are not meeting targets to contribute more to alleviate pressure from the US.

Trump claimed on 22 December that Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to meet with him ‘as soon as possible’. Notably, the Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov disclosed earlier on 23 December that there are currently no plans for Putin to meet with Trump before the latter’s inauguration. We assess that Russia highly likely has no genuine plans to negotiate in good faith in the short term, with this unlikely to change in the near term while it continues to advance on the frontline. However, a meeting between Trump and Putin remains plausible in the coming months as part of the incoming Trump administration’s efforts to mediate a peace deal.

Dec 20.

  • Ukraine: Attempt to leverage Russian gas transit for future peace talks will moderately drive tensions. On 19 December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed that Ukraine could continue to allow the transit of Russian piped gas to European buyers on the condition that Moscow would only receive the payments after the end of the war. Ukraine previously stated that it would not extend its gas transit contract with Russia in 2025, sparking tensions with European buyers of Russian gas via Ukraine (such as Hungary and Slovakia). Zelensky’s latest announcements likely underscore efforts to use the transit of gas via its territory as a bargaining chip in future negotiations with Moscow. We assess that the likelihood of such talks starting in 2025 has increased with the re-election of US President-elect Donald Trump. An extension of the gas transit deal will likely reduce energy security risks for the concerned countries; however, Moscow is unlikely to agree to Ukraine’s condition. We assess that it remains highly uncertain whether an extension of the gas transit contract will proceed (even under the previously stated conditions) sustaining regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

29 Dec 24. Azerbaijan president says crashed plane was shot at from Russia.

  • Summary
  • Companies
  • Azerbaijan says plane was accidentally shot at from Russia
  • Aliyev says plane was jammed electronically
  • He says some in Russia tried to cover up the causes
  • Putin apologised to Aliyev for incident in Russian airspace
  • Pilots lauded for handling of crashed Azerbaijan plane

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said on Sunday that a passenger plane that crashed last week, killing 38 people, had been damaged by accidental shooting from the ground in Russia, adding that some in Russia had lied about the cause of the disaster. Russian President Vladimir Putin apologised on Saturday to Aliyev for Wednesday’s “tragic incident” in Russian airspace involving Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243 after Russian air defences engaged Ukrainian attack drones. A Kremlin statement did not say Russia had shot down the plane, only noting a criminal case had been opened.

“Our plane was shot down by accident,” Aliyev said on state television on Sunday, adding that the plane had come under some sort of electronic jamming and had then been shot at while it was approaching the southern Russian city of Grozny. The pilots, who died in the crash, have been lauded in Azerbaijan for a landing that allowed 29 people to survive. (Source: Reuters)

 

28 Dec 24. Poland aims to complete a border wall and seal off its border with Belarus by next summer, in order to stop an influx of migrants Warsaw describes as Russia’s hybrid war.   (Source: FT.com)

 

25 Dec 24. North Korea’s ‘Unusual’ Type 73 Machine Gun In the Hands of Russian Soldiers. Recent photographs and reports suggest that Russian forces have begun deploying North Korean Type 73 machine guns, a Cold War-era weapon, as part of their ongoing war efforts in Ukraine.  The Type 73 machine gun, first adopted by North Korea in 1973, combines design features from Soviet and Czech firearms.  The weapon uses the Russian 7.62x54mmR cartridge and integrates elements from the Soviet PK machine gun and the Czechoslovak Vz. 52/57. It features a dual-feed system, allowing it to use both top-mounted box magazines and belt-fed ammunition.  Unusually for a machine gun of its class, the Type 73 includes a fluted barrel and a muzzle device enabling the firing of rifle grenades. The weapon has appeared in conflicts in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The images of Type 73 machine guns, which surfaced on Russian social media on November 7, were reportedly taken in Russia’s Kursk region. While the exact origin of these weapons remains unclear, they are believed to have been supplied by North Korea. Some reports suggest they were brought by North Korean troops to support Russia’s war efforts while other accounts stated the guns might have been part of a broader arms shipment from North Korea, which has previously provided Russia with artillery rounds, short-range ballistic missiles, and anti-tank weaponry. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

25 Dec 24. Ukrainian Forces Discover Notebook Detailing North Korean Drone Countermeasures. The Ukrainian military has revealed a handwritten notebook allegedly recovered from the body of a North Korean soldier, offering insights into tactics used by North Korean troops to counter Ukrainian drones. The note, detailed in a Telegram post by Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces, describes a three-person strategy involving “human bait” to lure drones into a vulnerable position for destruction. The notebook, reportedly authored by a soldier identified as Jong Kyong Hong, includes diagrams and written instructions on counter-drone tactics. It details a method wherein one individual serves as stationary bait to lure drones closer, while two others position themselves to shoot the unmanned devices. Ukrainian officials labeled this approach as using “living human bait.” Additional entries in the notebook suggest measures for avoiding artillery strikes, including dispersing into smaller units and utilizing craters for cover. The Ukrainian military is investigating whether these tactics originated from North Korean training or were taught by Russian forces. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service described them as “ill-equipped and inexperienced,” with many failing to adapt to the open-field warfare and sophisticated drone operations employed by Ukraine. South Korean intelligence estimates that at least 1,100 North Korean soldiers have been killed in Kursk, with Ukrainian sources suggesting over 3,000 North Korean casualties, including wounded. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky criticized North Korea’s involvement, calling their participation in the conflict “senseless” and accusing Russian forces of exploiting them as expendable manpower. North Korean troops, reportedly numbering up to 12,000 in Russia, have faced significant difficulties in combating Ukrainian drone operators. According to Federico Borsari, a resident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, North Korean soldiers lacked proper counter-drone equipment and camouflage, making them vulnerable targets. Many were identified and killed through Ukraine’s use of thermal imaging technology. Russian soldiers have reportedly expressed frustration over North Korean troops, referring to them as a “burden” due to their lack of familiarity with modern military technology. Ukrainian intelligence suggests that North Korea has begun implementing measures to mitigate these weaknesses, including the establishment of additional observation posts for drone detection and tactical adjustments to minimize casualties. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

28 Dec 24. Next year, the UK will offer 180 more Ukrainian soldiers training in mental health first aid for combat.

  • 100 Ukrainian commanders received mental health training in 2024
  • Specialist skills to build morale and resilience in Ukrainian forces
  • Bespoke course designed by both UK and Ukrainian experts

The UK will train 180 Ukrainian soldiers to be combat mental resilience practitioners on the frontlines in 2025 – nearly double the 100 who were successfully trained this year.  The Combat Stress Signposting Course (CSSC) has been delivered by British Army specialists to Ukrainian soldiers within positions of command as part of Operation Interflex, the UK-led international training programme for Ukrainian recruits.   As combat mental resilience practitioners– officially termed control stress operators– the Ukrainian commanders will be responsible for helping their soldiers manage the stresses of combat as they defend their nation from Russia’s illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion.  So far, more than 51,000 Ukrainian troops have been trained in the UK under Operation Interflex.  Following a rise in recruits reporting trauma exposure and mental health struggles, the CSSC was initiated on the request of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Moral and Psychological Support department.   Developed with input from Ukrainian military psychologists alongside specialist mental resilience and mental health practitioners from UK Defence, the five-week course equips soldiers with battle shock management techniques for before and during combat, as well as trauma risk management and signposting for clinical support following the fight.

Minister of Armed Forces Luke Pollard said: “The Ukrainian people are fighting with huge courage to defend their country, and it is our duty to put them in the strongest possible position.  With hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers receiving mental health first aid training before returning to the frontlines, resilience can be spread throughout the ranks of those fighting Russia’s illegal invasion.  The UK will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine throughout 2025 as we have done this year.”

Upon completion of the course, the newly equipped Ukrainian Control Stress Operators will have the power to train and support hundreds of their fellow soldiers on the frontlines, ensuring the initial lessons taught by British instructors continue to be spread far beyond the UK.

An example of the battle shock management techniques being taught by British soldiers includes iCover; a six-step technique that can be delivered to a person in acute stress to get them back to a functioning state in less than a minute, as well as mindfulness grounding exercises that help a soldier override their fear or stress in the heat of battle.

Operation Interflex, conducted by the UK Armed Forces and 12 partner nations, has trained 51,000 Ukrainians in essential frontline combat skills since it was established in the summer of 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion. The training has been extended through to at least the end of 2025, with an enhanced training programme to ensure the Ukrainian forces are equipped with vital battlefield skills.   During a visit to Kyiv on 19 December, the Defence Secretary announced a new £225M military package with a mix of funding from the UK-administered International Fund for Ukraine and the UK’s own funding.  The UK’s continued leadership on the war in Ukraine throughout 2025 will see an increase to Ukraine’s military capability: with new maritime drones and boats, air defence systems and counter-drone systems.  (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

20 Dec 24. Russia barrages Kyiv with missiles after Putin proposes ‘high-tech duel.’ Russia fired a volley of ballistic missiles at Kyiv early on Friday morning, with projectiles hitting several districts of the Ukrainian capital. Residents of Kyiv were woken by air raid sirens at 6.40 am local time after the Russian army fired several missiles believed to be of the Iskander-M variety and the North Korean KN-23 model. Local authorities said that office buildings, a gasp pipeline and several cars were damaged in the attack, with one person reported dead and several more injured. The Kyiv Post reported that eight loud blasts were heard in the city as the missiles struck at around 7am. The Russian military has said that the strikes targeted military infrastructure and that they came in response to a Ukrainian attack on the Rostov region. The attack comes a day after Vladimir Putin challenged the West to an “experiment” in which Russia would fire its modern Oreshnik missile at Kyiv to prove that Western air defence systems were incapable of intercepting it. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

19 Dec 24.  Security guarantees solely from European countries, without US involvement, will not be “sufficient” to ensure the long-term protection of Ukraine from any further Russian aggression. (Source: FT.com)

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