NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 19.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

* KURSK: Despite some tactical victories, North Korean forces are likely taking significant casualties in Kursk oblast due to the attritional nature of Russia’s current warfighting strategy

* STRIKES: New estimates suggest that North Korea’s production rate of ballistic missiles supplied to Russia is higher than expected; however, they will remain less capable than Russian-produced missiles

* ASSASSINATION: The incoming Trump administration’s Ukraine envoy has stated his disapproval regarding the Ukrainian assassination of a senior Russian general in Moscow

* FORECAST: President Zelensky has acknowledged that Ukraine lacks the strength to retake Crimea and Donbas militarily amid an ongoing recalibration of war objectives ahead of the incoming Trump administration’s efforts to begin negotiations in early 2025

* BAKHMUT: Russian forces continue to make slow, grinding advances in and around Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage published on 16 and 17 December indicates modest Russian advances along various streets in the centre of Toretsk, as well as to the south in the satellite town of Nelipivka. However, geolocated footage from 18 December indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a small-scale counter-attack in Nelipivka and succeeded in retaking positions in the north of the town. This reflects the dynamic nature of the fighting in this area. Although Russian forces generally retain the initiative and grinding momentum, Ukrainian forces do have limited capabilities to conduct localised counter-attacks to stall Russian advances and prevent larger breakthroughs.

* DONETSK: Earlier on 19 December, Nazar Voloshyn, spokesperson for the Khortytsia Group of Forces, reported that Russia has concentrated approximately 70,000 military personnel in the Pokrovsk direction and between 35,000 and 36,000 soldiers in the Kurakhove sector. Both sectors are currently among the most intense hotspots across the frontline. Voloshyn further explained that Russian offensives continue to primarily involve small assault groups instead of mechanised advances. Such assaults are typically supported by a small number of armoured vehicles or even sometimes just with pick-up vehicles and buggies. According to the spokesperson, assaults are launched from the flanks almost certainly to avoid highly attritional frontal assaults. However, Russian losses remain high; this will likely force the Russian command to use a significant part of its strategic reserves to maintain its current pressure and momentum.

* DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russia continued to make gains particularly south of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published from 17 December shows Russian advances in a north-westward direction, reaching the north-eastern outskirts of Novovasylivka (south-west of Pokrovsk). Additional footage from 18 December shows Russian forces progressing near the railway line north of Novyi Trud (south of Pokrovsk).

* DONETSK: On 18 December, Voloshyn reported that intense fighting is taking place in the south-eastern outskirts and in the southern part of Kurakhove. According to the spokesperson, some of the fortifications of Ukrainian positions have been destroyed. Volshyn’s statements underscore the increasingly critical situation for Ukrainian forces in the city, which have steadily been pushed back westwards. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had captured the settlement of Zelenivka south-west of Kurakhove. According to the Russian MoD, the capture of the settlement will facilitate the encirclement of Kurkhaove from the west. DeepState, an OSINT group with ties to the Ukrainian military, confirmed the capture of Zelenivka and said that Russian troops did not encounter any serious resistance in the settlement.

* KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report

* KURSK: On 17 December, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces have intensified their offensive operations in Kursk oblast, though he has since stated that Ukrainian defences continue to hold across the frontline. That said, Russian forces are making slow, grinding progress across the Kursk front. The Economist cited a Ukrainian artillery commander fighting in the area on 17 December who claimed that the Russians have been alternating between mechanised and infantry assaults while launching around 40 glide bomb attacks on Ukrainian positions every day. Geolocated footage from 16-17 December indicates that Russian forces (quite possibly including North Korean forces) advanced north of Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha) as well as east of Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).

* KURSK: Despite some tactical victories, North Korean forces are likely taking significant casualties in Kursk due to the attritional nature of Russia’s current warfighting strategy. US National Security Adviser John Kirby reported on 16 December that North Korean forces moved from the ‘second lines’ to the frontline in recent days and are taking losses. South Korean intelligence cited by the BBC earlier on 19 December subsequently estimated that at least 100 North Korean troops have been killed in Kursk oblast, with a further 1,000 injured. US officials have similarly stated that ‘a couple of hundred’ North Korean troops have been either killed or wounded this month. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) claimed on 17 December that it had intercepted radio communications that alleged North Korean forces had suffered at least 220 casualties over just a few days.

* KURSK: We cannot confirm the extent of North Korean losses in Kursk; however, mounting evidence and the nature of Russia’s highly attritional tactics mean such losses are almost inevitable if North Korean forces are engaging in frontal infantry assaults. That said, as previously assessed, such losses have likely been anticipated. Earlier South Korean intelligence indicated that the current 11,000 North Korean troop deployment is likely part of an overall 100,000 troop commitment, which will likely offset losses and enable troop rotations over the coming year.

* OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continue efforts to expand bridgeheads on the right (west) bank of the Oskil River as part of wider efforts to pressure Kupiansk from the north and south. Geolocated footage from 16 December shows Russian forces advancing east of Zahryzove (south-east of Kupiansk). Meanwhile, on 17 December, a Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces advanced to the right (west) bank of the Oskil River west of Masyutivka (north of Kupiansk) The Ukrainian observer also explained that Russia is trying to pressure Ukrainian forces near Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi direction (located south-east of Kupiansk) while attempting to expand tactical bridgeheads on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River. This comes amid increased efforts to cross the river to Zapadne (north of Kupiansk). Russia has reportedly made confirmed gains in southern Dvorchina (north of Kupiansk) as of 18 December.

* SOUTHERN: The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces currently defending Velyka Novosilka on the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border acknowledged that its forces had to withdraw from certain areas following recent Russian assaults. The spokesperson stated on 18 December that Ukrainian forces were unable to hold various unspecified positions following a recent Russian attack near Novyi Komar (a small village directly north of Velyka Novosilka). Russian and Ukrainian sources have also claimed that Russian forces have crossed the Mokri Yaly River to the south of Velyka Novosilka; while we cannot confirm this, it is likely an accurate claim. Depending on the extent of the Ukrainian withdrawal from Novyi Komar, it is likely that Russia’s closing encirclement of the town continues to tighten. Ukrainian positions to the south are also now under growing pressure.

* STRIKES: On 17 December, Russia attacked Ukraine with 31 Shahed-136/131 and unidentified drones. Ukrainian air defences shot down 20 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Cherkasy, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ten additional drones failed to reach their targets due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures. No drone hits were recorded.

* STRIKES: Overnight on 17-18 December, Ukraine intercepted 51 of the 81 drones (Shahed-136/131 types and unidentified UAVs) launched by Russia. Air defences were active in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that, on the evening of 18 December, a Russian missile strike hit Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) causing power outages and damaging a hospital. The Sumy oblast authorities reported that a missile struck the city of Romny on the evening of 18 December.

* STRIKES: Earlier on 19 December, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, one Kh-59/69 missile and 85 UAVs, including Shahed-136/131 and unidentified drones. Ukrainian air defences shot down 45 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. 40 UAVs, identified by Ukraine as decoy drones, were reportedly lost. Missile attacks reportedly damaged buildings in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts. No drone hits were recorded.

* STRIKES: On 18 December, Jonah Leff, the executive director at the independent Conflict Armament Research (CAR) group, told the UN Security Council that North Korea’s production rate of ballistic missiles supplied to Russia is higher than expected. Such missiles are of the KN-23 type. Ukraine enjoys a relatively higher interception rate of such ballistic missiles in contrast to more capable Russian-made Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. This is likely due to the outdated technology of the KN-23 projectile, which has resulted in low accuracy. That said, the projectile is still able to inflict severe damage when it does penetrate air defences. Furthermore, the steady supply of these missiles allows Russia to maintain an elevated tempo of high-intensity strikes, involving a diverse strike mix, which continues to challenge Ukraine’s air defence capabilities.

* STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 18 December, Ukrainian forces struck a chemical plant in Kamensky Chemical Plant in Rostov oblast. The plant produces rocket fuel, explosives and ammunition components and disposes of spent rocket systems.

* STRIKES: Early on 19 December, Ukraine’s Naval Forces and Security Service (SBU) reportedly co-ordinated a strike against the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery in Russia’s Rostov oblast. The facility reportedly processes up to 7.5 million tons of oil per year. Concurrently, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that pro-Ukrainian partisans destroyed several fuel tankers by arson in Russia’s Siberian city of Novosibirsk (Novosibirsk oblast). Attacks against oil facilities in Russian regions or Russian-occupied Ukrainian regions aim to disrupt fuel supplies to the frontlines.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* AID: The administration of outgoing US President Joe Biden assesses that Ukraine will have enough US-provided military assistance to last until the end of 2025. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller announced this on 18 December, referencing the resources that the US has already given Ukraine and what the former intends to dispatch before the end of Biden’s term. Miller did not provide further specifics about weapon types or upon what evidence this assessment is based. While we cannot confirm his comments, if accurate, they signal the outgoing administration’s efforts to enable Ukraine to sustain the war effort over the coming months. This is likely in anticipation of a potential reduction or suspension of US assistance to Ukraine when President-elect Donald Trump assumes the presidency in January 2025.

* AID: NATO has reportedly taken over co-ordinating Western military aid to Ukraine from the US as planned, according to an unnamed person familiar with the matter. Reports emerged on 17 December that the headquarters of the military alliance’s new Ukraine mission, named NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), is now operational at a US base in Germany’s Wiesbaden (Hesse state). The handover is almost certainly aimed at ensuring the continuation of military assistance and training to Ukraine. However, unspecified diplomats acknowledge that it may have a limited impact.

* ASSASSINATION: President-elect Trump’s nominee for Ukraine peace envoy, Keith Kellogg, has criticised the assassination of a senior Russian general for which Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) claimed responsibility. The chief of Russia’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops (RKhBZ), Igor Kirillov, was killed on 17 December alongside his assistant in the capital Moscow (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 17 December 2024). On 18 December, Kellogg implied that the assassination did not abide by the rules of warfare and was possibly an overstep.

* ASSASSINATION: We have previously assessed that the US has acted as a tempering influence on Ukraine’s bolder ‘special operations’ in Russia. However, Kellogg’s comments signal that the incoming Trump administration will highly likely want to contain Ukraine, disincentivising it from taking any actions which it considers to pose escalation risks; Trump has already confirmed his opposition to long-range strikes inside Russia using Western-provided weapons. Trump’s administration will highly likely condemn any future Ukraine-orchestrated assassination operations (both successful and unsuccessful) of high-profile figures in Russia, which will drive tensions with Ukraine. For further analysis on Ukrainian assassinations, see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 24 October 2023.

* PEACEKEEPING: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed on 18 December that Ukraine is discussing ‘ideas with European leaders’ on the potential deployment of peacekeeping troops to the country. Zelensky did not provide further specifics, including which countries were involved, though he noted that some leaders are already conveying ‘positive responses’ to the possibility of such a deployment. Nevertheless, France is likely to be among the powers leading discussions on this proposal.

* PEACEKEEPING: Earlier on 18 December, Swedish Defence Minister Pål Jonson did not rule out the possibility of Sweden participating in a peacekeeping mission to monitor a ceasefire. As international pressure grows for peace talks to start in 2025, more European countries will likely voice their stances on taking part in enforcing a possible ceasefire in Ukraine. As a result, a coalition of willing states will likely form; however, there is unlikely to be a consensus amongst European states in the short term. For further analysis on the prospect of a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 December 2024.

* For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2024 and beyond, please see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast – 28 November 2024.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: President Zelensky admitted on 16 December that the Ukrainian military lacks the strength to recapture Russian-annexed Crimea and occupied regions in Donbas. However, Zelensky emphasised that Ukraine cannot give up its territories under Russian control, adding that the Ukrainian constitution forbids such action. According to him, Ukraine can only rely on diplomatic pressure from the international community to force Russia to negotiate.

Zelensky’s comments mirror similar statements in recent weeks acknowledging the diminishing likelihood of Ukraine being able to regain its lands under Russian control, at least by force. When asked if Zelensky would negotiate with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, he stated that the state the country is in when it negotiates matters most. While Zelensky said that he does not believe Ukraine is currently in a weak position, he said the country is not in a strong one either. Ultimately, the remarks align with our assessment that Ukraine is recognising the need to adjust its stated war objectives to build a domestic base for negotiations. Nevertheless, Zelensky will continue efforts to bolster its position ahead of any possible peace talks in 2025 to create conditions for more favourable terms in negotiations.

Zelensky stated on 19 December that Ukraine will not agree to reduce the size of its army even if it were to receive an invitation to join NATO (which remains a highly unlikely prospect). Zelensky said Western guarantees to provide Ukraine with military and financial aid are not enough to ensure that Russia will not attack again. According to him, it is beneficial to have a strong, large army. An early peace proposal tabled by Russia during the opening phases of the invasion, which effectively amounted to Ukraine’s capitulation, demanded that the size of Ukraine’s army be reduced significantly, namely to 50,000 personnel (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 7 November 2024).

One of Russia’s stated war objectives is to ‘demilitarise’ Ukraine, which has almost certainly remained unchanged throughout the full-scale invasion. Whether Russia can realistically achieve that objective, however, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Russia highly likely wants a disempowered Ukraine that cannot adequately protect itself, ensuring that it remains vulnerable to future military coercion and destabilisation. Although Ukraine believes that membership in NATO is the ultimate deterrent against a future Russian invasion, it has emphasised the importance of bolstering its domestic defence capabilities throughout the war. Ukraine is therefore highly unlikely to willingly reduce troop numbers or take other actions at the expense of its security over the long term.

Trump’s Ukraine peace envoy Keith Kellogg is due to visit Ukraine in early January before the US President-elect’s inauguration. Kellogg reiterated on 18 December that the engagement will be more in the pursuit of gathering information than setting policy since the trip would happen ahead of Trump’s inauguration. It remains unclear, however, if and when Kellogg intends to visit Russia. Nevertheless, the expected visit underscores the incoming Trump administration’s eagerness to begin steps towards facilitating negotiations early in 2025. However, despite an expected flurry of diplomatic activity in January, it remains unlikely that both sides will come in good faith to the negotiation table immediately; this could force the Trump administration to ramp up coercive measures to force one or both sides to the table.

President Putin claimed earlier on 19 December that Russia is ready to negotiate and make ‘compromises’ with Ukraine. Putin reiterated typical rhetoric that it Ukraine has refused to negotiate and that it needs to be ready for negotiations and concessions. Putin did not specify what ‘compromises’ Moscow would be willing to make, though we assess that these are almost certainly minimal. Russia is highly unlikely to shift its stance on Ukrainian membership in NATO or willingly rescind territory (especially Crimea).

Moscow’s idea of compromise most likely consists of Ukraine having to make significantly greater concessions, both in terms of quantity and conditions that are harder to accept (such as recognising Russian control over certain regions). It remains unclear if Moscow will genuinely enter talks in early 2025 given that Putin and various other senior Russian figures have in recent days reiterated that Russia will only agree to enter into negotiations if and when Ukraine withdraws from the entirety of the annexed regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts; this includes territory Russia does not currently occupy. This would almost certainly be unacceptable to Ukraine under current political and military conditions.

Dec 17.

• Global: Exploitation of red team techniques highlights heightened security risks from Russian actors. On 17 December, the cyber security firm Trend Micro reported that the Russian state-sponsored group ‘Earth Koshchei’ (also known as ‘APT29’) conducted a cyber espionage operation in October exploiting legitimate red team techniques. The campaign primarily targeted military and government entities in Australia, Europe, Japan, Ukraine and the US using spear phishing emails to distribute rogue remote desktop protocol (RDP) configuration files. Earth Koshchei likely then used the rogue RDP to obtain partial control over infected machines, facilitating data theft and malware installation. Rogue RDP is an access vector used in red team engagements, underscoring the ongoing security risks associated with legitimate tools and techniques being co-opted by threat actors for malicious activity. Earth Koshchei registered more than 200 domains prior to the attack, highlighting the premediated nature of this campaign. Similarly, the group is known to adapt and innovate its tactics quickly, which we assess further underscores the increased medium-to-long term security and espionage risks.
• Energy security is unlikely to worsen despite challenges replacing Russo-Ukrainian gas deal. On 16 December, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal reiterated that Ukraine does not plan to extend its gas transit deal with Russia in 2025. However, Shmyhal stated that Ukraine is willing to reach a deal whereby non-Russian gas continues to transit through the country in order to ensure continued supplies to the EU via this route. It is possible that Russan gas will be replaced with Azeri gas via an arrangement that involves EU traders buying gas from Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan is highly unlikely to be able to replace Russian volumes fully in the near term, rendering this solution incomplete. Nevertheless, we assess that European traders will be able to source alternative liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies to avoid a supply crisis (even in the event that no deal is reached to source Azeri gas). If transit via Ukraine ceases entirely, energy prices in Europe will highly likely increase, driving costs for energy-intensive businesses in particular. However, prices will remain far below the levels seen during the 2022 energy crisis.
• Russia-Ukraine: Senior general’s assassination will drive rhetoric, is unlikely to elevate CBRN threats. Earlier on 17 December, the chief of Russia’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops (RKhBZ), Igor Kirillov, was assassinated in Moscow (Russia). According to Russia’s Investigative Committee (SKR), an explosive device hidden in an electric scooter detonated outside a residential building, killing Kirillov and his assistant. An unspecified Ukrainian law enforcement official has claimed that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) is responsible for the ‘special operation’. On 16 December, the SBU charged the general in absentia for his role in the ‘mass use of banned chemical weapons’ against Ukrainian forces. We have assessed in recent months that Ukraine possesses both the capability and will to assassinate persons of interest in Russia, with Kirillov’s assassination the highest profile such incident to date. In the coming days, Russian officials and media will likely increase mis- and dis-information operations concerning chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats, as well as nuclear rhetoric against Ukraine and the West. However, we assess that Kirillov’s assassination is unlikely to increase genuine CBRN escalation threats.

Dec 16.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• KURSK: Russia has highly likely committed North Korean units to offensive infantry operations for the first time; the first wave of casualties underscores issues posed by the language barrier
• STRIKES: Early on 13 December, Russia launched one of the largest high-intensity combined strikes of the war to date, scoring several hits against key pieces of energy infrastructure
• STRIKES: US President-elect Donald Trump has expressed that he ‘very vehemently’ disagrees with Ukraine launching long-range strikes using US-provided weapons deep into Russia
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces launched a relatively large mechanised assault south of Siversk (Donetsk oblast) in recent days; while it seemingly resulted in only limited advances, the planning and co-ordination of the assault was better than previous such attacks. Geolocated footage published on 15 December indicates Russian forces advanced north of Vesele, located around six miles (10km) south of Siversk. The mechanised assault reportedly amounted to around a battalion of personnel and equipment, involving over 400 troops and 30 armoured vehicles. Losses remain unclear at this time; however, despite the relatively well-organised assault, Ukrainian artillery and close combat units contained the attack and ceded only limited positions. This represents a notable intensification of attacks in the Siversk direction. That said, despite the improved Russian command and control (C2), Ukrainian defences continue to hold in the area.
• BAKHMUT: Elsewhere along the Bakhmut axis, Russian forces have continued to make slow but steady progress in Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), where their forces are grinding through the city centre. Geolocated footage from 13 and 14 December indicates Russian advances along several key roads in the city centre. Meanwhile, further north around Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast), geolocated footage published on 13 December indicates that Russian forces have draped large nets over the O-0508 highway that connects Bakhmut (Donetsk oblast) to Chasiv Yar to protect their forces against Ukrainian drones. This is the latest indication of continued Russian innovation in countering UAVs (which remain a potent threat to Russian forces across the frontline).
• DONETSK: Russian forces have continued to make grinding gains towards Pokrovsk from the south over the past few days. Geolocated footage from 12 December shows that Russian forces captured Pushkine (south of Pokrovsk) and have advanced in southern Lysivka (south-east of Pokrovsk). Additional footage posted on 13 December shows recent Russian advances in southern Novotroitske (south-west of Pokrovsk). On 15 December, the UK Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that Russia captured the settlement of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), located at the intersection of two routes leading into Pokrovsk. Amid this steady Russian advance, on 14 December it was reported that General Oleksandr Lutsenko, the commander of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk Group of Forces, was replaced with General Oleksandr Tarnavskiy. Lutsenko faced heavy criticism for failing to counter Russia’s grinding advances towards Pokrovsk; this development likely reflects the tense situation at the front.
• DONETSK: Further south, Russian forces continued to make creeping gains within Kurakhove while launching mechanised assaults on the city’s flank. DeepState, a Ukrainian OSINT group with ties to the Ukrainian military, reported on 14 December that Russian forces continue to advance into Kurakhove, gradually occupying more of the city centre. As of 14 December, Russian forces advanced to the Kurakhove City Council building along Mechnikova Street in western Kurakhove. On 12 December, the spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove sector explained that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized mechanised assault on Kurakhove’s flank. The spokesperson noted that Russian troops are constantly adapting their tactics in this sector, attacking in armoured columns in some areas and small infantry groups on foot, motorcycles or all-terrain vehicles in others. He further explained that such attacks are often launched during foggy conditions; these are almost certainly aimed at undermining Ukraine’s ability to use reconnaissance drones.
• DONETSK: On 14 December, DeepState confirmed that Russian forces advanced into Uspenivka, located north-west of Vuhledar. Geolocated footage from 13 shows Russian advances into Haniivka (north-west of Vuhledar) and that Russian troops have likely captured remaining Ukrainian positions within and around the settlements of, Hannivka, Romanivka, Trudove and Veselyi Hai, located along the Haniivka-Uspenivka pocket. DeepState noted an intensification of Russian offensives along this pocket. The capture of the pocket will likely enable further advances westward from Kurakhove, towards Dachne and to Zelenivka (north-west of Vulhedar) from Uspenivka. However, it remains unclear if any notable concentration of Ukrainian forces was captured.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: On 14 December, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that North Korean troops have been committed to infantry assault operations in Kursk oblast for the first time and have already sustained notable casualties. Up until now, North Korean forces in Kursk have seemingly been deployed in support roles, with no evidence of their engagement in frontline offensive operations. However, mounting evidence indicates that North Korean forces have now been deployed in such operations. In particular, Russian sources claimed on 12-13 December that North Korean special forces participated in seizing Plekhovo (located south of Sudzha) during an operation on 6 December, reportedly advancing less than a mile (2km) through a minefield.
• KURSK: Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported on 14 December that North Korean forces fired upon Chechen Akhmat forces in an apparent friendly fire incident, killing at least eight Chechen personnel. Such friendly fire incidents were likely to take place due to language barrier concerns and existing command and control (C2) and basic unit communication issues between Russian units. Additionally, the GUR reported earlier on 16 December that North Korean forces are replenishing losses with fresh personnel, specifically from the 94th Separate Brigade of the North Korean Army. If accurate, these latest reports could reflect issues with effectively integrating North Korean-majority units; these issues could realistically further exacerbate the likely already high casualty rates.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Ukraine has reportedly regained some positions south of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast), while Russian forces are likely preparing to conduct intensified assault operations in the Lyman direction. On 15 December, DeepState reported that Ukrainian forces had dislodged Russian forces from the Kolesnykivskyi forest, located south of Kupiansk. Meanwhile, on 13 December, the spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction said that the Russian command is accumulating forces in preparation for intensified infantry assaults in the area in the coming weeks. Russian forces are reportedly conducting small infantry attacks to identify the weaknesses of Ukrainian defensive lines in the sector.
• SOUTHERN: Russian sources have claimed their forces have made various advances along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border region; that said, there has been little confirmation of these reports. Russian forces continue to push hard at the flanks of their main objective in the sector, Velyka Novosilka. Fighting has possibly resumed for control over the small, but well-positioned village of Novyi Komar, which Russian forces withdrew from earlier this month. The village is situated north of Velyka Novosilka; consolidation of the settlement will be necessary if Russian forces seek to close the cauldron around the main city to the south.
• STRIKES: Early on 13 December, Russia launched one of the largest high-intensity combined strikes of the war to date, primarily targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The attack involved 94 missiles of various types, including ballistic and cruise missiles and 193 drones (namely Shahed-136/131 types along with unidentified drones). The strike mix included four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, one North Korean KN-23 ballistic missile, 55 Kh-10 and Kh-55SM cruise missiles, 24 Kalibr cruise missiles, 7 Iskandr-K cruise missiles and one Kh-59/69 missile. The Ukrainian authorities reported the interception of 81 Kh-101, Kh55SM, Kalibr and Iskandr-K cruise missiles and 80 drones. 105 drones were reported lost, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures.
• STRIKES: The Ukrainian authorities confirmed damage to energy facilities in Chernihiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Lviv, Ternopil and Vinnytsia oblasts, underscoring the 13 December strike’s relative effectiveness at hitting targets. The Ukrainian energy operator DTEK reported severe damage to some of its thermal power plants (TTPs). Hits against various other infrastructure assets were also recorded in Kirovohrad and Ternopil oblasts. According to energy officials quoted by Reuters, the latest attack targeted power substations and included more strikes against gas infrastructure than in previous attacks. This attack follows Moscow’s threat of retaliation after Ukraine’s recent use of Western-provided missiles against Rostov oblast overnight on 10-11 December. Two similar high-intensity strikes occurred in November, reflecting an intensification of such attacks during the winter (as we anticipated). We assess that further high-intensity strikes are likely in the coming weeks and months and will sustain elevated energy security risks.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 13-14 December, Russia launched a large-scale drone attack, involving 132 Shahed-136/131 and unidentified drones. Ukraine intercepted 58 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Vinnytsia oblasts. 72 additional UAVs failed to reach their targets due to Ukrainian active electronic warfare (EW) measures.
• STRIKES: Early on 16 December, Ukraine intercepted 27 of the 49 drones, including Shahed-136/131 and unidentified types, launched by Russia. Air defences were active over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi and Sumy oblasts. 19 additional UAVs were reportedly lost likely due to Ukrainian EW measures.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, overnight on 13-14 December, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an oil depot in Russia’s Oryol oblast near Oryol city. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the depot supplies products to the Russian military forces. Footage shows that the attack caused a fire at the facility.
• STRIKES: On 14 December, Ukraine orchestrated a combined strikes and sabotage operation damaging a fuel supply railway line and a freight train in occupied Zaporizhzhia. The railway line runs from occupied Crimea to Zaporizhzhia oblast. The operation involved a sabotage mission to detonate railway tracks near the village of Oleksyivka in Bilmak district (Zaporizhzhia oblast), derailing a freight train carrying fuel tanks. The attack included the launch of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) rockets against the locomotive of the train. The operation was orchestrated by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), military intelligence (GUR), special forces units and drone units. It resulted in the destruction of the locomotive and 40 fuel tankers, as well as critical damage to the railway line supplying the Russian frontlines.
• STRIKES: An unnamed SBU source told the Kyiv Independent that the SBU orchestrated a successful drone strike on 16 December against a Russian ammunition depot near the occupied village of Markyne in Donetsk oblast. The source said the depot housed thousands of ammunition rounds for armoured personnel carriers and tanks, as well as anti-tank guided missiles, mines, grenades and millions of rounds of ammunition of various calibres. The latest attacks took place in occupied regions where Russia is intensifying its offensive operations. As such, they reflect Ukraine’s ongoing strategy to target Russian military logistics to undermine Russian advances.
• STRIKES: On 16 December, Ukrainska Pravda reported that Ukraine possesses 100 of its new Peklo missile-drone hybrid weapons. The projectile has a reported range of 430 miles (700km) and a speed of 430 mph (700km/h). These UAVs are equipped with a jet engine and an advanced guidance system. Officials have reported that Ukraine has already deployed this new system. The development of this capability is part of Ukraine’s efforts to offset its disadvantage in conventional missiles, an area where Russia maintains superiority. While 70% of the Peklo missile-drone components are domestically produced, the import of the remaining components continues to suffer from supply-chain bottlenecks. Such bottlenecks will remain the main impediment concerning the mass production of these projectiles.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• STRIKES: US President-elect Donald Trump has expressed that he ‘very vehemently’ disagrees with Ukraine launching long-range strikes using US-provided weapons deep into Russia. On 12 December, Time magazine shared excerpts of an interview with Trump from late last November. Trump assessed that US approval for such attacks into Russia escalates the war.
• STRIKES: Trump’s disapproval of long-range Ukrainian strikes into Russia indicates that he will likely strip such authorisation in his next term (as we have previously assessed). However, the president-elect then disclosed that he would use US support for Ukraine as leverage against Moscow when negotiating to end the war. This suggests that a decision to strip such authorisation would not necessarily be an immediate decision, rather it could be used as a bargaining chip over the coming months to incentivise Russia to enter negotiations.
• SYRIA: Russia reportedly believes it has an ‘informal understanding’ with the Syrian rebel group that ousted former president Bashar al-Assad, allowing it to stay at military bases in Syria. Bloomberg reported this on 12 December citing an unspecified Russian insider familiar with the matter who acknowledged that the situation could still change due to instability in Syria. While we cannot confirm the report, the Kremlin disclosed earlier on 16 December that there are no final decisions on the matter; it remains possible that any agreement made with the paramount authority in Damascus is only ‘temporary’ in nature.
• SYRIA: The Khmeimim Air Base and the Tartus naval base (Latakia and Tartus governates) are key installations supporting Russian operations and power projection across Africa and the Middle East. The naval base is of strategic importance for Moscow as it is Russia’s only repair and replenishment hub in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, conflicting reports have emerged over recent days suggesting that Russia appears to be withdrawing its military assets from Syria. Over the past week, we have monitored an uptick in strategic lift flights to and from Khmeimim and the deployment of various sealift capabilities from the Baltic Fleet; this could realistically indicate preparations for a withdrawal. While Moscow’s approach to Syria remains highly cautious, the duration of any potential arrangement remains unclear and is likely to precipitate contingency planning for Russian forces if they are forced to make a rapid withdrawal.
• TRUCE: The Kremlin disclosed on 12 December that Russian President Vladimir Putin supported Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s call for a Christmas ceasefire and an exchange of prisoners of war (POWs). Orbán claimed that Ukraine had rejected the proposal after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky criticised him for undermining Western unity by calling Putin on 11 December.
• TRUCE: Ukrainian presidential aide Dmytro Lytvyn said on 12 December that Hungary had not discussed anything with Ukraine, nor informed the latter about the call between Orbán and Putin. Lytvyn also disclosed that Ukraine has been negotiating with Russia for two weeks about conducting a large-scale prisoner exchange at the end of the year. Irrespectively, Russia will almost certainly use Ukraine’s alleged ‘refusal’ of a Christmas truce to push the narrative that Ukraine is responsible for more broadly undermining any steps towards a ceasefire and peace. It remains our assessment that a meaningful Christmas truce in the run-up to Orthodox or Catholic Christmas remains highly unlikely.

FORECAST

PEACE: The incoming Trump administration is seeking a ‘permanent end’ to the war in Ukraine, according to the president-elect’s nominee for national security advisor. Mike Waltz stated this on 15 December during an interview with CBS News, emphasising that Trump’s team wants to restore stability and not just pause the conflict temporarily.

Waltz did not provide details of what specific steps the future Trump administration thinks would ensure that the conflict does not reignite in the future. His remarks indicate that Trump officials are cognisant of the risks to which a temporary ceasefire would leave Ukraine vulnerable to renewed Russian aggression in the future. Ukraine has raised similar concerns over this prospect and has consistently advocated for a durable, sustainable and just peace.

However, this does not mean that Ukraine and the incoming Trump administration share similar views on how to ensure Russia does not invade again. Ukraine believes Ukrainian NATO membership (which remains highly unlikely for the foreseeable future) as well as strong US military assistance will be the most effective forms of deterrence. Notably, Waltz stated that a policy of open-ended military support to Ukraine, specifically offering Kyiv a ‘blank cheque’, is not a suitable strategy. According to him, this threatens to turn the conflict into a ‘forever war’.

Meanwhile, Trump’s nominated special representative for Russia and Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, stated on 13 December that the administration is drawing up plans to listen to the positions of parties of the war. Kellogg did not provide specifics concerning timelines. However, he acknowledged that any diplomatic tours would just be to hear different perspectives as officials involved in the matter are not yet authorised to negotiate on behalf of the US. Kellogg mentioned, however, that the outcome of these discussions would be presented to Trump for him to act upon.

Kellogg’s comments indicate the Trump administration’s determination to begin, as well as facilitate, steps towards the end of the war in early 2025. US efforts to listen to different perspectives of the war would mark a significant shift in policy from the administration of incumbent US President Joe Biden. Biden’s administration has (at least publicly) pursued a policy of not engaging in negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine’s involvement.

Nevertheless, Andriy Yermak, the head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, said on 12 December that Ukraine is not yet ready for talks with Moscow. Yermak stated that Ukraine lacks weapons and an invitation to join NATO, as well as clear guarantees to deter renewed Russian aggression. Ukraine will highly likely maintain its desire to strengthen its position before any possible negotiations with Moscow to better its chances of a more favourable settlement. Despite the Trump administration’s eagerness to get both sides to negotiate, Ukraine and Russia are the actors who will play the ultimate role in deciding whether to initiate peace talks.

Reports emerged on 13 December that Trump told Zelensky and French President Emmanuel Macron at a recent meeting in France, in the capital Paris, that he is in favour of European troops monitoring a Ukraine ceasefire. According to unnamed officials familiar with the matter, Trump said Europe should shoulder the main responsibility of defending and supporting Ukraine. Trump did not rule out US support for any arrangement, though he emphasised that US troops would not be involved. While we cannot confirm the veracity of the report, it is certainly plausible and likely aligns with Trump’s stated opinion that European countries should take greater responsibility for European security and Ukraine. For further analysis on European soldiers monitoring a ceasefire agreement, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 December 2024.

Notably, Ukraine has reportedly delayed signing a critical minerals co-operation agreement with the US so Trump can reportedly claim credit for it (rather than President Biden) after taking office. Limited details were provided concerning the agreement, though reports on the matter from 14 December note that Ukraine postponed signing it twice. While we cannot confirm this, Ukrainian officials may have sought to offer Trump a deal that could be seen as an early victory for his administration to improve bilateral relations before he assumes office in January 2025. Further efforts to build a strong relationship between Ukraine and the incoming administration are highly likely ahead of any potential negotiations which begin in 2025.

• Russia: Use of antiquated tankers, poor maritime conduct will threaten repeat Black Sea oil spills. On 15 December, two Russian oil tankers sustained serious damage during a heavy storm in the Kerch Strait near Russian-occupied Crimea. The two vessels were reportedly carrying almost 9,000 tonnes of fuel oil at the time. About 3,000 tonnes of fuel oil may realistically have entered the Black Sea, though the tankers are no longer believed to be leaking fuel. Greenpeace Ukraine assessed that the incident has the potential to cause ‘significant environmental impacts’. According to the spokesperson for the Ukrainian navy, the tankers were ‘quite old’ and unsuitable for being at sea in such stormy conditions. Although the Russian authorities have launched investigations into the incident, the usage of outdated oil tankers and poor maritime conduct will likely threaten similar incidents over the long term. We assess that this will elevate threats to marine life and the environment within the Black Sea region. (Source: Sibylline)

 

18 Dec 24. EU chief diplomat Kaja Kallas has told the Financial Times that western leaders must stop pushing Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy towards peace talks with Russia. (Source: FT.com)

 

18 Dec 24. Defense Official Outlines Continued Support for Ukraine. The Defense Department is committed to helping Ukraine prevail amid Russia’s ongoing war of aggression and will continue sending key capabilities to meet Ukraine’s battlefield needs in the weeks to come, a senior defense official said Monday. The department is on track to allocate the remaining $1.2bn in Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds approved by Congress to procure new capabilities by the end of the calendar year, the official said. The U.S. will also continue sending Ukraine much needed equipment and munitions from DOD inventories by leveraging $5.6 billion in remaining presidential drawdown authority through the end of the Biden administration.

“The U.S. Department of Defense remains committed to putting Ukraine in the strongest possible position on the battlefield, including through significant security assistance,” the official said during a call with reporters.

Earlier this month, DOD announced a $988m package of new equipment provisioned under USAI that included unmanned aerial systems, rocket munitions and support for maintenance and repair programs. It marked the 22nd USAI package issued under the Biden administration.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III has also continued to rally the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a global network of some 50 partners committed to Ukraine’s near-term battlefield needs and its long-term ability to deter future aggression.

Thirteen members of the contact group are leading eight separate capability coalitions designed to drive Ukraine’s long-term force development. Those coalitions focus on critical capabilities ranging from air defense to artillery.

The secretary will convene the 25th meeting of UDCG alongside Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov in the new year where the capability coalitions will lay out their roadmaps toward “efficient and sustainable support for Ukraine,” the defense official said.

These allies and partners have also continued to meet Ukraine’s immediate battlefield needs, committing more than $59 billion in security assistance.

As a percentage of gross domestic product, more than a dozen allies and partners now provide more security assistance to Ukraine than the U.S. does.

“Our allies and partners have stepped up in a big way to first help Ukraine defend itself against Russian air strikes with everything from air defense systems to equipment to protect Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure,” the official said.

Ukraine is also working to defend key territory in the Donetsk region as Russia continues to maneuver toward the strategic Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk.

“This appears to remain Russia’s main effort, and they continue to make incremental progress toward Pokrovsk,” a senior military official told reporters on Monday’s call. “In general, most of their maneuver has been toward this city on some fairly open terrain, and the Ukrainians have been ceding some of that terrain and falling back to more defensible positions.”

The official noted that while Russia has made significant progress over the long term, their progress has been slow day to day.

“As Ukrainians get to more defensible positions, we think they’ll be able to shore up the defenses and last for some amount of time defending Pokrovsk, depending on how events on the battlefield play out,” the senior military official said.

Ukraine is also working to defend territory in the Kursk border region, where Russia has launched a counteroffensive employing North Korean troops to fill out its ranks. Approximately 12,000 North Korean troops have deployed to the region. The senior military official said yesterday that those troops have been used on the front lines and have suffered several hundred casualties, according to recent estimates. The official added while the Russian counteroffensive has caused Ukraine to cede some territory in Kursk, Ukrainian defenses “appear to be holding at this time.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

 

19 Dec 24. British troops could be sent to Ukraine to train soldiers. John Healey said Britain must help Ukraine ‘motivate and mobile more recruits’ and pledges £225m support package. The Defence Secretary has opened the door to British troops being sent to Ukraine to help train the country’s soldiers. John Healey said Britain needs to “make the training a better fit for what the Ukrainians need” during a visit to Kyiv. He told The Times: “We [need to] make it easier for the Ukrainians to access and we [need to] work with the Ukrainians to help them motivate and mobilise more recruits.” When asked if this meant extending training of Ukrainian recruits inside the UK to Ukraine itself, he said: “We will look wherever we can to respond to what the Ukrainians want. They are the ones fighting.” Last year, Grant Shapps, the former defence secretary, expressed his support for such a move in an interview with the Sunday Telegraph. Mr Healey is believed to be the first Government figure to float the same proposal. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

18 Dec 24. Zelensky admits Ukraine cannot retake Crimea and Donbas. Only diplomatic pressure from the West can force Russia out, says Ukrainian president as North Korean troops suffer ‘hundreds’ of casualties in Kursk. President Zelensky has admitted that Ukraine’s armed forces are unable to drive out Russian troops from Crimea and other occupied territories in Ukraine. Although he said that Ukraine would never recognise Russian rule, Zelensky said that only diplomatic pressure could force Moscow to withdraw its occupying army.

“We cannot give up our territories. The Ukrainian constitution forbids us to do so. De facto, these territories are now controlled by the Russians. We do not have the strength to recover them,” he told the French newspaper Le Parisien.

“We can only count on diplomatic pressure from the international community to force Putin to sit down at the negotiating table.”

Russia annexed the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea in 2014 and controls about 80 per cent of the Donbas, an industrial area that includes the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It has also seized parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, although it does not control the main cities in either area. The Kremlin says that all five regions belong to Russia.

A much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive that was launched last year failed to dislodge Russian forces, despite being backed by fresh supplies of western weapons. (Source: The Times)

 

18 Dec 24. Russia says it detains suspect over the murder of top general in Moscow. Russia said on Wednesday it had detained a citizen of Uzbekistan who had confessed to planting and detonating a bomb which killed Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov in Moscow a day earlier on the instructions of Ukraine’s security service. Kirillov, who was chief of Russia’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops, was killed outside his apartment building along with his assistant when a bomb hidden in an electric scooter went off. (Source: Reuters)

 

17 Dec 24. Ukraine says it uncovered 12 agents spying for Russia on F-16s, air defences. Ukraine’s SBU security service said on Tuesday it had uncovered 12 agents spying for Russia to identify the locations of F-16 fighter jets and air defence systems across Ukraine.

It detained the alleged organiser and four key accomplices on suspicion of treason and sharing information about the location of Ukrainian military, according to a statement on the Telegram messaging app.

The network members worked separately to track down military airfields and air defence locations across five regions in Ukraine’s south and northeast, as well as the addresses of companies working on electronic warfare. (Source: Google/Reuters)

 

16 Dec 24. Ukraine possesses a laser weapon capable of shooting down airborne targets at an altitude of more than 2 kilometres (1.2 miles), the country’s drone forces commander said on Monday. The military official, Vadym Sukharevskyi, did not provide any more details in his first official remarks about the existence of the weapon. Reuters was unable to verify his statement.

“Today we can already shoot down aircraft at an altitude of over 2 km with this laser,” he was quoted as saying by the Interfax-Ukraine news agency.

Sukharevskyi said the laser was named the Tryzub – the Ukrainian word for a “trident”, which is a symbol used on the national coat of arms – suggesting it was domestically produced. In April, former British Defence Minister Grant Shapps said that Britain’s DragonFire laser, which is expected to go into service in 2027, could potentially be used in Ukraine to counter Russian drones. (Source: Reuters)

 

17 Dec 24. Russia to boost its ballistic arsenal with new missiles and testing, commander says.

• Summary
• Russia develops new intercontinental ballistic missile system
• Russia plans maximum-range test launches of ballistic missiles
• Russia may increase intensity of missile testing
• Moscow, Washington warn each other ahead of ICBM tests

Russia is boosting its ballistic arsenal with new strategic missile systems, plans maximum-range launches and may increase testing in response to growing external threats, a senior Russian military commander said on Monday.

In a clear warning that Russia will respond if it deems its security is threatened, Sergei Karakayev, the commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, said the country plans maximum-range test launches as part of testing new systems.

“In terms of range, there is no place where our missiles cannot reach,” Russia’s RIA state news agency cited Karakayev as telling the Krasnaya Zvezda, the Russian defence ministry’s official newspaper, in an interview.

He added that Russia may increase the intensity of tests of its advanced missile weapons if external threats grow.

Confirming for the first time publicly that Russia is developing a new intercontinental ballistic missile system, the Osina, Karakayev said the introduction into combat of Osina and a number of new missile systems is a priority. (Source: Reuters)

 

17 Dec 24. Top Russian general accused by Kyiv of chemical weapons crimes is killed by bomb in Moscow.

• Summary
• Bomb kills senior Russian general in Moscow
• General was head of nuclear protection forces
• Another man was killed in the bomb
• Bomb was hidden in electric scooter

A top Russian general accused by Ukraine of being responsible for the use of chemical weapons against Ukrainian troops has been assassinated in Moscow using a bomb hidden in an electric scooter, Russian investigators said on Tuesday.

Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, who was chief of Russia’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops, was killed outside an apartment building on Ryazansky Prospekt along with his assistant, Russia’s Investigative Committee, which probes serious crimes, said in a statement.

Photographs posted on Russian Telegram channels showed a shattered entrance to a building littered with rubble and two bodies lying in the blood-stained snow.

Reuters footage from the scene showed a police cordon. Investigators said they had opened a criminal case into the murder of two servicemen. Law enforcement sources told Russian media it was likely to be upgraded into a terrorism case.

Russia denies Ukrainian allegations it uses chemical weapons on the battlefield and Kirillov, who was married with two sons, was himself sometimes shown on state TV accusing Ukraine of violating nuclear safety protocols. (Source: Reuters)

 

16 Dec 24. Vladimir Putin has said Russia may lift its self-imposed restrictions on developing short- and medium-range missiles and would keep its non-strategic nuclear forces on constant combat alert.  (Source: FT.com)

 

13 Dec 24. US announces laser-guided systems among further C-UAS support for Ukraine. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package yesterday to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defence needs as part of the surge of security assistance President Biden has directed to put Ukraine in the best possible position. This represents the 72nd tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021, and has an estimated value of USD500 m. The December 12 package includes additional VAMPIRE counter-uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) and munition, C-UAS gun trucks and ammunition, mobile C-UAS laser-guided rocket systems and other unspecified C-UAS equipment. Equipment to integrate Western launchers, missiles, and radars with Ukraine’s systems; equipment to support and sustain Ukraine’s existing air defence capabilities; and 21 air surveillance radars are also included as well as various UAS, ground defence and other capabilities. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

16 Dec 24. EU adopts new sanctions against Russia over war in Ukraine.  EU countries have adopted the bloc’s 15th package of sanctions against Russia. (Source: FT.com)

 

12 Dec 24. The Lithuanian Army is helping Ukraine’s armed forces defend their homeland by training the next generation of Ukrainian Army Squad Leaders. Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) are the backbone of modern armies, and NATO Allies are helping ensure that Ukraine’s NCOs are strong, confident and ready to lead their troops in defence of their country. The Lithuanian Army is helping Ukraine’s armed forces defend their homeland by training the next generation of Ukrainian Army Non-Commissioned Officers. NCOs are the ‘middle management’ of Allied militaries, often charged with making quick decisions without waiting for explicit direction. This makes armies tactically agile and capable of responding to situations as they develop.

NATO trainers have focused on fostering a strong, confident NCO corps in the Ukrainian Army since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. After Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, these NCOs became the cornerstone of a flexible defence, allowing Ukraine to successfully resist Russian advances on several axes.

During a recent eight-week course, Lithuanian train(Source: Reuters)

ers worked with prospective Ukrainian squad leaders teaching them about the fundamentals of squad leadership. Lithuania has also trained Ukrainian mechanics on how to maintain the M113 armoured personnel carrier and the PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers.

This NATO Multimedia B-roll footage, filmed in late November, includes shots of Ukrainian soldiers in trenches firing weapons plus interviews with Lithuanian instructors and anonymous Ukrainian personnel. (Source: forces.net)

 

13 Dec 24. Ukraine’s military leadership has fired the commander who oversaw its operations in the eastern Donetsk region, where Kyiv’s defences are buckling as Russia pushes towards a key logistics hub.  (Source: FT.com)

 

13 Dec 24. Sergey Mironov: “Trump is trying to find a way out of the conflict in Ukraine for the US, realizing that the war is lost.” The “peaceful” initiatives of US President-elect Donald Trump on Ukraine reflect the desire not to solve, but to freeze the conflict, saving face for American politicians and earnings for US business, says Sergey Mironov, leader of the party and faction “A Just Russia—Patriots—For Truth” in the State Duma.

“Trump’s statements seem contradictory only at first glance. But they fit perfectly into his concept: to continue the conflict with Russia with someone else’s hands and to benefit from this for the US military-industrial complex and the economy as a whole. At the same time, not to bring matters to a direct conflict with Russia, provoking it with American missile strikes—a war with a nuclear power is definitely not part of the plans of the president-elect. However, Trump cannot give in to our demands and, in fact, admit America’s defeat. Hence the calls for an immediate ceasefire (without fulfilling Russia’s key demands) and proposals for the deployment of peacekeepers, and European, not American ones. Neither, of course, suits us.

Trump understands that the West has lost the war in Ukraine and that Russia is ready to take extreme measures in this confrontation, since for us it is a matter of survival. In turn, the West is not ready for this.

The diplomacy of the US president, who has not yet assumed office, is an attempt to find a way out of this war for the United States in advance, shifting problems to the Europeans. But in this rush, Trump misses the key point: if the issue of ending the conflict is considered outside the context of security guarantees for Russia, then the fighting will not stop, and Russia will receive these guarantees on the battlefield, destroying the main threat to us—the neo-Nazi regime in Ukraine and its leaders,” Sergei Mironov added.

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