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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 13.

  • Europe-Asia: New spyware variants elevate surveillance, information theft risks from Russian group. On 11 December, the cyber security firm Lookout reported that the Russian advanced persistent threat (APT) group ‘Gamaredon’ is using two spyware variants (‘BoneSpy’ and ‘PlainGnome’) in an ongoing surveillance operation. The campaign targets Android mobile users, likely distributing the spyware via targeted social engineering tactics. Both variants collect sensitive data from compromised systems including call logs, contact lists, device location, images, messages and audio recordings of phone calls. PlainGnome displays limited obfuscation and detection evasion techniques, suggesting that it might still be in its development phase. We assess this campaign points to an expansion of Gamaredon’s tactics as this is the first time the group has been observed using mobile spyware. Additionally, the malware primarily targets ex-Soviet countries that have supported Ukraine in the ongoing war and/or have deteriorating political relations with Russia. As such, we assess this elevates surveillance and information theft risks to the region in the medium term.
  • Ukraine: Russian high-intensity strikes will sustain elevated energy security risks in coming months. Earlier on 13 December, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike, primarily targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The attack involved 94 missiles of various types, including ballistic and cruise missiles and 193 drones. The Ukrainian authorities reported the interception of 81 missiles and 80 drones, while 105 drones were reported lost due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures. The extent of the damage is still being assessed; that said, energy operators have announced prolonged emergency power cuts nationwide. According to energy officials quoted by Reuters, the latest attack targeted power substations and included more strikes against gas infrastructure than in previous attacks. This attack follows Moscow’s threat of retaliation after Ukraine’s recent use of Western-provided missiles against Rostov oblast overnight on 10-11 December. Two similar high-intensity strikes occurred in November, reflecting an intensification of such attacks during the winter (as we anticipated). We assess that further high-intensity strikes are likely in the coming weeks and months and will sustain elevated energy security risks.

Dec 12.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • STRIKES: A likely Russian drone strike damaging an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) vehicle is unlikely to indicate a new Russian campaign to target UN officials in Ukraine
  • STRIKES: US officials have warned that Russia might launch its new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) for a second time – likely in response to a recent Ukrainian strike against the Taganrog military airfield (Rostov oblast)
  • AID: Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko assessed that Ukraine has enough funds and ammunition to continue fighting until at least mid-2025, even if US military support ceases
  • FORECAST: French President Emmanuel Macron and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk are possibly discussing scenarios involving sending European troops to Ukraine for peacekeeping purposes once a ceasefire is reached
  • BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 10 December indicates that the Russians have continued to make incremental gains in central Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), including along several key thoroughfares. The overall rate of Russian advances has remained slow in recent weeks; however, the attacking Russians are likely facing heavy losses while conducting highly costly frontal assaults into heavily defended positions.
  • DONETSK: The Pokrovsk sector remains a hotspot for intense fighting, with Russian forces continuing to make incremental gains. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi acknowledged on 11 December the increasingly critical operational situation in the sector. Syrskyi stated that the situation requires Ukraine’s military leadership to take ‘non-standard decisions to increase the resilience of [defences] and more effectively destroy the [Russians]’. While he did not specify what such decisions would entail, Syrskyi emphasised the necessity of boosting ammunition deliveries to the frontline. Syrskyi also acknowledged that Ukrainian troops are outnumbered by Russian forces in the area, which retain an artillery advantage and are capable of launching up to 30 assaults per day. Concurrently, Nazar Voloshyn, spokesperson for the Khortytsia group of forces, confirmed that Russian forces had destroyed two unspecified Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk.
  • DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian forces advanced south and south-west of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage from 10 December shows recent Russian advances south of Pokrovsk, in western Novyi Trud and along the E50 highway south of Dachenske. Russian forces are now approximately 3.7 miles (6km) south of Pokrovsk, narrowing the small pocket west of the E50 highway and south of the Novyi Trud-Dachenske line. Russian forces will likely continue operations to close this pocket to secure a stronger operational position to advance on Shevchenko  (south-west of Pokrovsk). Additionally, Russian troops have advanced westward across Myru Street in northern Novotroitske, south-west of Pokrovsk, as of 10 December.
  • DONETSK: Further south, Kurakhove continues to be the locus of intense fighting; 49 clashes were reported over the past 24 hours, according to Ukraine’s General Staff. Geolocated footage from 10 December indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south-west of Dalne, south of Kurakhove. Additional footage from the same day shows Russian forces making progress in central Kurakhove and capturing the Kurakhove grain elevator.
  • DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian forces achieved gains to the north and north-west of Vuhledar. Geolocated footage posted on 11 December shows Russian advances along Peremohy Street in Veselyi Hai (north of Vuhledar). Footage from 10 December indicates Russian advances in south-eastern Kostyantynopolske and within eastern Uspenivka, both located north-west of Vuhledar. At the same time, Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions in western Romanivka (north-east of Vuhledar).
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK: On 11 December, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had taken the town of Darino, located around 11 miles (18km) north-west of Sudzha on the western flank of Ukraine’s salient in Kursk oblast. While this remains unconfirmed, various Russian sources earlier this week claimed it had been taken; heavy fighting in the area means Russian advances at the very least are likely in the area. Fighting has continued along other sections of the Kursk frontline, with unconfirmed reports that Russia has seized the village of Plekhovo, located around six miles (10km) south of Suzdha on the south-eastern flank of the Kursk salient.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continue to advance in the sector amid wider efforts to establish a foothold on the right (west) bank of the Oskil River. A Ukrainian battalion commander reported on 9 December that Russia had captured two settlements west of Pershotravneve, Svatove, and Vyshneve and is attempting to secure a bridgehead in this area across the Oskil River. Russian military authorities stated on 11 December that their forces aim to establish a foothold on the right bank of the Oskil River by the end of the year. However, previous attempts to do so in recent weeks were repelled, likely due to personnel constraints and active Ukrainian defensive operations in the sector.
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces have made progress south of Velyka Novosilka near the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border and are now approaching the city’s flanks from two directions. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting near Velyka Novosilka reported on 9 December that Russian forces are prioritising attacking the city from the south. As such, they report that the Russians have reduced the intensity of attacks around Novyi Komar to the north (where Ukrainian forces launched a localised counter-attack last week that pushed the Russians back). Russian forces have highly likely taken the village of Blahodatne, located less than two miles (3km) south of Velyka Novosilka on the eastern bank of the Mokri Yaly River. Various Russian sources have claimed that their forces have moved further north still and have penetrated the southern defences of the city; however, this remains unconfirmed.
  • SOUTHERN: Further west along the Zaporizhzhia oblast frontline, geolocated footage from 10 December confirmed that Russian forces have made minor advances north of Robotyne, where the line has remained static for months. Russian forces have advanced modestly northwards along the T-05-14 highway that runs north to Orikhiv; however, there is no indication that this advance reflects a breakthrough or otherwise major advance through Ukrainian defences.
  • SUMY: Russian claims that their forces crossed the international border into Sumy oblast on 10 December have been denied by Ukrainian officials; there is currently no evidence that such an attack or attempt to cross the border was made.
  • STRIKES: On 10 December, the Kharkiv regional authorities reported that three Iskandr-M ballistic missiles struck central Zlatopil and the outskirts of the settlement. On the same day, the Zaporizhzhia oblast authorities reported that an unidentified Russian missile struck a clinic and nearby buildings in Zaporizhzhia City.
  • STRIKES: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that a drone hit and severely damaged one of its vehicles on the road to the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Later, the US ambassador to Ukraine, Bridget Brink, condemned the attack stating the drone was launched by Russia. We assess that Russia was likely responsible for the strike, though it remains unclear whether the attack was deliberate. Over the past few months, we have reported a growing number of Russian drones reported as lost by Ukraine likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare measures. As such, it is possible that the incident was caused by a lost drone. Nevertheless, we assess that the latest incident does not necessarily indicate a shift towards intensifying strikes against foreign staff. That said, the incident highlights the elevated security threats for foreign staff operating close to the frontlines. On 11 December, Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 missiles in Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk oblast; Ukrainian air defence intercepted both projectiles.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, overnight on 10-11 December, Ukraine’s General Staff reported that its forces struck the loading point of the Druzhba oil pipeline in Bryansk oblast. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, the pipeline receives, stores and distributes diesel fuel for tankers and cargo trains and supplies fuel to Russian forces. Russia’s MoD reported the interception of 14 UAVs over Bryansk oblast and the local authorities reported damage to an unspecified industrial facility. The strike underscores Ukraine’s continued efforts to disrupt Russian military logistics and fuel supplies to the frontline. Over the past few months, such attacks have likely increased logistical hurdles for Russian forces.
  • STRIKES: Separately, the Russian MoD reported that Ukraine launched six Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) at the Taganrog military airfield in Rostov oblast. While we cannot confirm whether this was an ATACMS strike, the Russian MoD claimed that Russian Pantsir air defences intercepted two missiles while electronic warfare measures disabled the remaining four. Falling fragments reportedly damaged two buildings near the airfield, according to the MoD’s statements.
  • STRIKES: Unnamed US officials quoted by the Associated Press (AP) on 11 December assessed that Russia might launch its new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) for a second time, likely in response to the latest strike against Taganrog. Russia first launched this missile on 21 November, ostensibly in retaliation for Ukraine’s initial use of Western-provided missiles inside Russia. The initial strike caused limited damage as the projectile likely lacked an effective conventional warhead. We assess that Russia will likely retaliate against the ATACMS strike with the launch of one or a limited number of Oreshnik missiles in the coming days; Moscow has previously threatened to strike ‘decision-making centres’ in the capital Kyiv. A Russian retaliatory strike would likely involve the launch of an intense missile barrage akin to recent strikes on 28 and 17 November.
  • STRIKES: The leader of Russia’s Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, reported the interception of a drone targeting police barracks in the republic’s capital Grozny, early on 12 December. The building reportedly belongs to a police special forces unit, which had already been targeted earlier this month. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported the interception of 16 Ukrainian UAVs over Chechnya, annexed Crimea and North Ossetia.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • AID: Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko assessed on 11 December that Ukraine has enough funds and ammunition to continue fighting until at least mid-2025, even if US military support stops. Marchenko said Kyiv is allocating necessary funds from its budget to purchase necessary military equipment next year and that US weapons continue to flow in the meantime. Nevertheless, the minister acknowledged that the prospect of the incoming administration of US President-elect Donald Trump stopping or halting aid does pose a challenge. Marchenko’s comments align with our assessment that Ukraine will highly likely continue fighting for as long as it feasibly can should the US reduce or stop military aid to Ukraine next year.
  • AID: Meanwhile, US lawmakers have called for an intelligence assessment of security risks if Washington DC stops providing weapons to Kyiv. Reports on the matter emerged on 11 December, with the assessment also expected to outline the impact of the US maintaining or withdrawing permission on the use of Western-provided long-range missiles to strike into Russia. While the assessment will highly likely seek to influence the incoming Trump administration’s thinking, whether the incoming president’s intelligence chiefs will agree and act in accordance with its findings is less unclear.
  • AID: The House of Representatives passed the 2025 US defence budget without a provision to extend a lend-lease act for Ukraine. Ukraine’s ambassador to the US, Oksana Markarova, announced this earlier on 12 December, adding that the Ukrainian embassy had actively advocated for its continuation. Markarova noted that the bill also did not include funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) in 2025. Markarova explained that this is because USD 300 m was provided for this in the previous budget.
  • AID: The US passed the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act in May 2022, though it expired in September 2023. The programme allowed the US president to loan or lease arms to Ukraine bypassing congressional action; however, its use was deprioritised because of alternate streams for assistance. Ukrainian and US officials had referred to the act as a ‘backup’ option for aid, with the decision not to extend it ultimately reducing the available channels for assisting Ukraine. The (currently) Democrat-controlled Senate will vote on the defence bill next week. However, despite the potential for policy stagnation as a result of disagreements on elements of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), we assess that the measure will still likely pass. For further analysis regarding how the US gives Ukraine military assistance, see Sibylline Special Report – 25 October 2024.
  • APPROPRIATIONS: Russia’s Foreign Ministry (MID) reiterated warnings on 11 December that Moscow is capable of seizing Western assets as Ukraine’s allies use frozen Russian assets to aid Kyiv. The MID stated that Russia possesses sufficient capabilities and leverage to retaliate by confiscating Western assets under its jurisdiction. According to the ministry, seized assets will be used to build up industrial potential and for infrastructure projects in Russian regions.
  • APPROPRIATIONS: The US Treasury Department announced on 10 December that it had transferred its USD 20 bn portion of a USD 50 bn G7 loan for Ukraine. We have consistently warned of the risk of tit-for-tat Russian appropriations, with the latest comments aimed at deterring any further use of Russia’s frozen assets for Ukraine’s benefit.
  • SANCTIONS: On 11 December, EU ambassadors agreed on a 15th sanctions package against Russia. The latest punitive measures target Russia’s so-called shadow fleet that it uses to transport Russian oil and circumvent international sanctions. EU foreign ministers will likely formally adopt the package on 16 December. Overall, it will target close to 30 entities, over 50 individuals and 45 tankers. As Russia transports approximately 80% of its seaborne oil exports via its shadow fleet, the latest sanctions reflect continuing Western efforts to stop Russia from circumventing the G7 oil price cap. Nevertheless, Russia is estimated to have around 600 vessels in its shadow fleet, meaning that it will still highly likely be able to bypass said price cap.

FORECAST

PEACE: On 12 December, French President Emmanuel Macron and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk are expected to discuss the possibility of sending European troops for peacekeeping purposes to Ukraine once a ceasefire is reached. Unspecified sources familiar with the matter shared the details of the meeting in Poland, in the capital Warsaw, with Bloomberg. The hypothetical peacekeeping mission would aim to deter a renewed Russian invasion.

Any possible proposal to send a peacekeeping mission is likely in the very early stages as the report offers limited details surrounding logistics. Ahead of the talks, however, Tusk stated that there are currently no such preparations and called an end to ‘speculation’ on the issue. Nevertheless, if such an option was being discussed, it remains unclear how many and where exactly any peacekeepers would be deployed, and whether such an operation would enforce a demilitarised zone. A demilitarised zone akin to the Korean peninsula remains unlikely in the short to medium term for various reasons including the sheer length of the zone over 750 miles (1,200km) and the need for a massive international military commitment to enforce it, something the US under Donald Trump is highly unlikely to agree to. Irrespective of where such a French-Polish force would deploy, for such a force to be sufficiently large to deter Russia, it would likely have to be a multiple-brigade strength commitment, plus reserves for troop rotations.

The presence of NATO member state peacekeepers would provide a form of accountability for recording any possible ceasefire violations or indications of Russian intentions to reinvade (such as military buildups on the border). However, Moscow would highly likely oppose such an arrangement given it would facilitate NATO deployments even closer to Russia’s borders, the prospect of which was one of the primary reasons and Russian justifications for the invasion of Ukraine in the first place. Meanwhile, Kyiv continues to maintain that NATO membership, which remains a highly unlikely prospect for the foreseeable future, is the ultimate form of deterrence and would likely regard a peacekeeping mission as a supplementary measure.

Nevertheless, the development likely reflects French and Polish efforts to develop European contingencies and security leadership ahead of Trump’s inauguration as US president in January 2025. Macron stated in February that sending Western troops to Ukraine ‘could not be ruled out’, prompting backlash from within NATO (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 29 February 2024). Notably, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna assessed in November that European leaders should be prepared to send military forces to Ukraine to uphold any possible Trump-brokered peace deal. As such, a coalition of willing European countries could realistically emerge, possibly led by Poland and France; however, such a deployment would likely need support from other allies given capability requirements and to effectively deter further Russian operations.

Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated on 11 December that Moscow is not prepared to make concessions to end the war. She also insisted that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s peace ‘proposals’, which effectively amount to Ukraine’s capitulation, need to be implemented. Notably, in an interview aired on 11 December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke against legally recognising Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories as part of Russia. According to Zelensky, if Kyiv were to do this, it would give the impression that Ukraine has ‘forgiven’ Russia. However, he noted that Ukraine must achieve its goals, which are a stable and secure peace through diplomatic means. Ultimately, while neither Russia nor Ukraine will want to make concessions to end the conflict, hard compromises (particularly concerning territory) will highly likely be needed to reach a ceasefire (if not a peace treaty) to end the ten-year Russo-Ukrainian war.

Dec 11.

  • Gazprombank sanctions dispute is unlikely to undermine regional energy security. On 11 December, caretaker Bulgarian Energy Minister Vladimir Malinov stated that Bulgaria might stop the transit of Russian gas to Serbia if the Russian-owned Gazprom does not find a way to pay Bulgaria’s state-owned operator Bulgatransgaz. Bulgaria allows the transit of Russian gas through the ‘Balkan stream’ pipe, which runs between Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary as an extension of the TurkStream pipe. Gazprom has reserved almost the entire capacity of the Balkan Stream pipeline until 2039. The dispute comes after the US announced the imposition of sanctions on Gazprombank and its subsidiaries on 21 November. Gazprom uses Gazprombank for all transactions concerning the supply or transit of Russian natural gas. The next payment to Bulgartransgaz is due on 20 December. To bypass the sanctions, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree allowing foreign companies to pay for gas through intermediaries. However, intermediary banks will possibly also be subjected to sanctions. In the (unlikely) event that no solution is reached, we assess that energy security risks will increase in Hungary and Serbia, as will regional tensions between these countries and Bulgaria.
  • Russia-US: Likely US sanctions will further restrict oil export revenues, drive global oil price volatility. On 11 December, Bloomberg reported that US President Joe Biden is planning to impose new sanctions against Russia’s oil exports before the end of his term. Although details of such measures have yet to be disclosed, the sanctions will possibly resemble the highly restrictive US sanctions imposed against Iranian oil exports. We assess that such restrictions are likely. They would form part of Biden’s effort to ramp up pressure on Moscow before the end of his presidency. The US, along with its EU allies, has already imposed a price cap on Russian seaborne oil exports and taken measures to reinforce the move. Escalating Western sanctions since the start of the war in Ukraine have severely restricted Russia’s overall exports, further increasing its reliance on oil export revenues. As such, further US sanctions would highly likely restrict crucial oil revenues for Russia. However, any sanctions akin to those imposed against Iran’s oil exports would also drive global oil price volatility, given Russia’s position as a leading oil exporter.

Dec 09.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • DONESTK: Russian forces have intensified offensive operations towards Pokrovsk, advancing north-west from their current position in a likely bid to begin an encirclement
  • STRIKES: The US embassy in Kyiv has issued a warning of an increased threat from Russian missile and drone strikes; this aligns with our assessment that such risks will remain elevated throughout the winter
  • STRIKES: President Putin stated that Russia could deploy Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to Belarus by mid-2025, though this would not seriously alter Russia’s long-range capability or increase the threat to Ukraine
  • FORECAST: Ukrainian President Zelensky met with US President-elect Trump in Paris, though Trump has not provided any further details on his preferred diplomatic strategy to end the war in 2025
  • BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 5-6 December indicates Russian forces have continued to expand their control in central Toretsk, pushing westwards along key streets in the town centre. Geolocated footage has also confirmed other Russian advances in the southern district of Toretsk, which Russian sources claim is now totally under Russian control. While we cannot confirm this, it is likely that the vast majority of the southern district is under Russian control.
  • DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have seemingly adjusted their offensive focus; they have pivoted north to increase their attacks against the southern flanks of Pokrovsk itself – after prioritising shortening the line to the south over the last month. On 6 December, Russian forces advanced to the north-west from their base in Selydove to seize the village of Novopustynka, located under six miles (10km) to the south-west of Pokrovsk. This followed reports by the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) regarding the capture of two villages to the north-west of Selydove (Petrivka and Pustynka). Russian sources have also claimed wider advances in the area, including the seizure of the much larger village of Novotroitske to the west, which sits along the T-0515 highway that connects Pokrovsk to Andriivka (located to the west of Korakhove). While this remains unconfirmed, it is clear that Russian forces have stepped up their attacks in this direction, together with an intensification of assaults further to the east near Myrnohrad (located due east of Pokrovsk). Geolocated footage published on 8 December also confirmed Russian advances to the south-east of Dachenske – a village directly to the south of Pokrovsk.
  • DONETSK: Ukrainian forces are likely heavily defending positions to the south of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad; this is likely why Russian forces are pushing to the north-west – possibly in a bid to encircle Pokrovsk from the west to force a Ukrainian withdrawal, without the need for a costly frontal assault. The targeting of key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in and out of Pokrovsk will aim to undermine its defence and increase the likelihood of an eventual Ukrainian withdrawal.
  • DONETSK: However, it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to encircle Pokrovsk, given the significant resources this would require and the increased vulnerability of these forces to Ukrainian drones while advancing in open terrain devoid of leaf cover. We have previously reported on likely Russian debates around prioritising frontal urban assaults over the winter in a bid to limit exposure to Ukrainian drones. However, if an opportunity to close a cauldron around Pokrovsk presents itself, it is highly likely that this would be Russia’s preferred course of action. Much will depend on the strength of Ukraine’s defences along Pokrovsk’s flanks and whether Russian forces can make further steady advances in the coming weeks. If they can free up their forces from the south, this would also increase the likelihood of Russian advances towards Pokrovsk this winter.
  • DONETSK: Despite the intensification of attacks towards Pokrovsk, Russian forces continue to advance further to the south around Kurakhove – where Russian forces are steadily closing the Ukrainian pocket of resistance. Geolocated footage from 6 December indicates Russian forces have seized Novodmytrivka, which is located five miles (8km) to the north of the Kurakhove Reservoir; they have also likely taken the village of Stari Terny, located at the north-western edge of the reservoir. Additionally, Russian sources claimed on 5 December that their forces had advanced to the south of Stari Terny and interdicted the H-15 highway to the west of the Kurakhove Reservoir. This has not been confirmed since, though if (or when) the Russians do so, this will significantly increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending the remnants of Kurakhove to the east.
  • DONETSK: Pressure also continues to increase along the southern flanks of the Ukrainian salient, with Russian forces seeking to encircle a pocket of Ukrainian forces defending various settlements along the Sukhi Yaly River. Russian forces continue to make slow but steady advances at various points to the south of Kurakhove, including through the seizure of Romanivka and by advancing to the outskirts of Uspenivka – both located around five miles (8km) to the south of Kurakhove town itself along the Sukhi Yaly River. These recent advances are threatening to encircle a Ukrainian pocket; as such, there remains a realistic possibility that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from villages including Hannivka and Uspenivka in the coming days.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK: Geolocated footage from 7 December indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in central Pogrebki, located 11 miles (18km) to the north of Sudzha. Earlier, geolocated footage from 4 December indicated that Ukrainian forces advanced into central Darino, located to the south-east of Korenevo. Meanwhile, Russian forces have continued to launch assaults across the salient, making incremental gains in various locations.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 7 December indicates that Russian forces succeeded in advancing westwards along a bridge across the Oskil River, though they have not managed to secure a beachhead on the western bank of the river. Russian forces advanced to the west of Kruhlyakivka towards its sister town of Senkove across the bridge, though it remains unclear whether they will make a determined attempt to secure a beachhead in the coming weeks. Russian forces have yet to consolidate their control fully over the eastern bank of the river to the north, though they have been making slow and steady progress in recent weeks.
  • SOUTHERN: In recent days, Ukrainian forces conducted a successful limited counter-attack against Russian forces to the north-east of Velyka Novosilka, which will likely (temporarily) ease pressure, delaying the imminent encirclement of the town from the north and east. Russian sources reported on 6 December that their forces had withdrawn from Novyi Komar, located directly to the north of Velyka Novosilka. This came after Ukrainian forces retook the nearby village of Rozdolne on 3 December. Nevertheless, the Russian MoD claimed on 8 December that its forces had seized Blahodatne along the Yakri Maly River valley to the south of Velyka Novosilka – though this remains unconfirmed.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 5-6 December, Russian forces launched an attack involving 53 Shahed-136/131 and other unspecified drones (likely including decoys) across Ukraine. Ukraine’s air force reportedly shot down 32 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. An additional 16 drones were reportedly lost and failed to reach their target – likely due to a combination of electronic warfare (EW) interference and poor weather. Two additional drones left Ukraine and entered Belarusian airspace.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 6-7 December, Russian forces launched a small attack, including 14 Shahed-136/131 drones and an unidentified missile. Ukraine’s air force reported that seven UAVs were shot down, with a further six lost; one drone returned to Russian airspace. The UAVs were shot down over Cherkasy, Kyiv, Odesa, Vinnytsia and Zhotomyr oblasts.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 7-8 December, Russian forces launched 74 Shahed-136/131 and other unspecified drones (likely including decoys) across Ukraine. Ukraine’s air force reported that 28 UAVs were shot down, while a further 46 were lost. Air defences were active over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Civilian residences were reportedly damaged by falling debris in Kamyanske (Dnipropetrovsk).
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 8-9 December, Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 37 Shahed-136/131 drones (as well as others of unknown type). Ukraine’s air force reported that air defences successfully shot down both Kh-59/69 missiles as well as 18 UAVs. Air defences were active in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Ternopil, Sumy and Vinnytsia oblasts. Various unspecified private enterprises were reportedly damaged by falling debris from UAVs in Vinnytsia.
  • STRIKES: On 8 December, the US embassy in Kyiv issued a warning to US citizens in the country due to ‘increased threats from Russian missiles and drones targeting Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure’. This aligns with our assessment that over the winter, there will be a higher threat of drone and high-intensity missile attacks against energy infrastructure in particular. Russian forces have highly likely built sufficient stockpiles of long-range cruise and ballistic missiles to conduct semi-regular, high-intensity attacks across Ukraine in the coming weeks. The capital Kyiv continues to have the densest air defence network, moderately limiting the risk in comparison to other, less well-defended cities, though the risks of collateral damage and missiles successfully penetrating Ukrainian air defences remain high.
  • STRIKES: A Washington Post report published on 5 December claimed that Western sanctions are forcing Russia to purchase poorer quality steering motors for its long-range drones; this is undermining the effectiveness of its Shahed-136/131 drones and increasing their failure rate over Ukraine. Soldiers cited by the report claimed that poor quality steering motors are resulting in Shahed drones spinning out of control after making sharp turns. This is notable as we have previously reported on the increased failure rates reported by Ukraine’s air force in recent months – likely a combination of growing Ukrainian EW capabilities, poor winter weather and manoeuvre issues exacerbated by low-quality components purchased from China. If accurate, the reports indicate that sanctions are having a tangible (if still ultimately limited) impact on the capabilities of Russian Shahed drones. However, given the significant expansion of Russia’s drone production capabilities over the last six months, the increased failure rates will likely be offset by the sheer number of drones being launched across Ukraine on an almost daily basis.
  • STRIKES: On 6 December, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia could deploy Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to Belarus by mid-2025 as part of increasing military integration efforts. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka requested the deployment during a meeting in Minsk (Belarus) after the signing of new security guarantees under the so-called Union State that envisages an eventual unification of Belarus and Russia. Lukashenka also requested that Belarus retain influence over how the missile is used; while Moscow will possibly pay lip service to this ask, it remains almost certain that Russia, not Belarus, will retain ultimate authority over the missiles.
  • STRIKES: The Oreshnik is a ‘new’ experimental variant of the RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICMB), which was deployed for the first time against Dnipro on 21 November. The Kremlin has sought to present the Oreshnik as a new major strategic capability; while its use of multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads was unprecedented, the likely limitations of the conventional payload for the missiles and its imperfect accuracy will limit its effectiveness on the battlefield or against strategic targets in Ukraine’s rear. The deployment of Oreshnik missiles to Ukraine would extend the system’s effective range, though it can likely already reach targets across the whole European continent; its deployment to Belarus would therefore have a negligible impact on the capabilities of the system.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • AID: On 7 December, the US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package for Ukraine worth USD 988m. The support will include ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), as well as UAVs and equipment and spare parts to maintain and/or repair artillery systems, tanks and armoured vehicles. Furthermore, reports emerged on 6 December that the White House has drawn up a strategy to provide Ukraine an ‘avalanche’ of military assistance before US President-elect Donald Trump takes office.
  • AID: Under this plan, National Security Council spokesperson Jake Sullivan outlined how the US has committed to providing Kyiv with hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds, as well as thousands of rockets and hundreds of armoured vehicles by mid-January 2025. While the assistance is unlikely to alter the course of the war in Ukraine’s favour significantly, it aims to strengthen Ukraine’s military capabilities ahead of potential peace negotiations in early 2025. Nevertheless, Trump suggested on 8 December that Kyiv should prepare for a reduction in US assistance under his presidency. We have frequently assessed that this is the most likely scenario in the context of Trump’s second term.
  • AID: Meanwhile, European military aid continues to flow to Ukraine; Zelensky stated on 7 December that Ukraine has received the second batch of F-16 fighter jets from Denmark. Zelensky did not disclose how many had arrived. Nevertheless, the development underscores continued European commitments to providing Ukraine military assistance despite the prospect of significantly reduced US support once Trump is inaugurated. However, we assess that Europe is unlikely to be able to fill the void left by the US. For scenarios on Trump’s Ukraine policy and its impact on Europe, see Sibylline Special Report – 25 October 2024.
  • CASUALTIES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 8 December that around 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Zelensky detailed that there have also been around 370,000 reported injuries, but noted this figure included soldiers who had been wounded more than once and that some injuries were minor. This contrasts with Zelensky’s estimates that almost 198,000 Russian soldiers have been killed and a further 550,000 wounded. While we cannot verify the figures for either side, Zelensky’s comments mark a rare admission about Ukrainian casualties given Kyiv and Moscow do not typically disclose such information publicly.
  • CASUALTIES: US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reported on 7 December that Russia has suffered at least 700,000 casualties since February 2022, 48,000 troops fewer than what Zelensky claimed. This reflects the difficulties involved in ascertaining accurate figures. Ukraine is also likely to inflate Russian casualty rates for domestic purposes. Russian casualties have nevertheless been extremely high – and have continued to climb to record rates in recent months. Some recent estimates indicate that Russia suffered around 53 casualties for each square kilometre of Ukrainian territory taken during offensive operations between September and November this year.
  • APPROPRIATIONS: Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on 6 December that Kyiv will receive the first USD 50 bn disbursement from Russian frozen assets in 2025. Shmyhal did not provide any further specifics about timelines for receiving the funds. Nevertheless, the funding will likely modestly improve budgetary constraints for Kyiv, alleviating socio-economic health risks. It will also possibly allow Ukraine more flexibility to allocate money for defence purposes given the likelihood of US military assistance halting or reducing once Trump assumes office in January 2025. However, the transfer of frozen assets will also highly likely increase the risk of tit-for-tat Russian appropriations of Western assets in Russia.
  • ENERGY: Ukraine’s three operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) have largely restored their electricity production capacity after significantly reducing their output last week as a precaution due to renewed attacks against the country’s energy grid. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, made the announcement on 6 December in relation to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs. This development will likely modestly improve energy security risks over the short term, possibly reducing the risk of prolonged blackouts. However, Russian strikes will almost certainly continue to drive energy insecurity throughout the course of the conflict; further emergency reductions in power output are likely.

FORECAST

US: On 7 December, President Zelensky met with President-elect Trump in Paris (France). The meeting, which was hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron, marked their first in-person discussion since Trump’s victory in the US presidential election in November. A notice published by Zelensky’s office stated that the Ukrainian president’s stance remains consistent, that peace must be just for all and that it should ensure Russia can never launch a renewed attack against the country. On 8 December, Trump conveyed his position that there should be an immediate ceasefire and that negotiations to end the war should begin. He also claimed that Zelensky and Ukraine ‘would like to make a deal and stop the madness’. Trump’s comments differ from the official reports on what was said during the meeting by Ukrainian officials, given Zelensky did not explicitly state any desire to negotiate directly with Russia. However, we assess that it remains highly likely that Zelensky is willing to enter negotiations if sufficient security guarantees are on the table to prevent a ceasefire from freezing the conflict and simply allowing Russia to reconstitute its armed forces, without resolving the issue. It remains unclear if any such security guarantees will be offered. On 8 December, Trump disclosed further details on his talks with Zelensky to the New York Post, adding that he is formulating a concept of how to end the war. However, he offered no insight into what his strategy to resolving the conflict would look like. Trump claimed that Zelensky wants peace, though they reportedly did not discuss the details needed to get achieve this aim. Nevertheless, we have previously reported that a Trump administration-led peace plan would possibly involve territorial concessions and Ukraine dropping its ambitions to join NATO. Trump has yet to address or detail the steps needed to reach a peace agreement, though his recent comments reflect the incoming administration’s clear determination to bring an end to the war. Nevertheless, Zelensky stated on 8 December that the war cannot be ended ‘simply with a piece of paper and a few signatures’. Ultimately, the strength of a peace agreement will be determined by how long it can hold. Ukraine perceives that NATO membership is the strongest way to ensure its longevity – though as we have previously assessed, NATO membership for Ukraine is almost certainly not going to happen for the foreseeable future. Lastly, Trump urged Russian President Vladimir Putin on 8 December to take action towards a ceasefire agreement and stated that China could help with the process. Despite the Kremlin stating its willingness to enter talks to end the war, we assess that Russia is highly unlikely to consider negotiations at present (despite the aforementioned high losses), as it is making gains across the frontline. Without major concessions that approximate Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine, Moscow will likely seek to take further land to improve its negotiating position before it feels pressured to enter talks that would require a compromise. Also, Ukraine and the West have urged China to use its close relations with Moscow to help end the war. Although China maintains its self-declared neutrality on the war, its burgeoning ties with Russia and efforts to challenge a US-dominated world order likely mean that it would align most closely with Moscow on how to end hostilities. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Dec 24. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs as part of the surge of security assistance the President directed to put Ukraine in the best possible position. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s seventy-second tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This PDA package, which has an estimated value of $500m, will provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent needs, including: air defense capabilities; munitions for rocket systems and artillery; and anti-tank weapons.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

  • Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) munitions;
  • Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
  • 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
  • High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
  • Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS);
  • Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs);
  • High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);
  • Light tactical vehicles;
  • Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) protective equipment;
  • Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
  • Tube-launched, Optically guided, Wire-tracked (TOW) missiles;
  • Small arms ammunition;
  • Demolitions equipment and munitions; and
  • Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.

The United States will continue to work together with some 50 Allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and its associated Capability Coalitions to meet Ukraine’s urgently needed battlefield requirements and defend against Russian aggression. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

11 Dec 24. In Ukraine, long guns become desperate defenses against small drones. The Russian and Ukrainian militaries are moving to transform their soldiers’ rifles into weapons capable of countering exploding drones, experimenting with different ammunition types to determine the best shot, according to experts and reports posted on social media sites. The renewed push to transform soldier weapons into desperate defenses of last resort against explodable first-person view drones represents a more systematic approach to a problem that has cost countless lives on the battlefield.

“FPV drones have become much more effective via technical improvements and pilot skills, as well as many tactical EW and jamming systems don’t work effectively or as intended all the time – this forces soldiers to develop methods to shoot down drones in the last 100 meters of their flight,” Sam Bendett, advisor at the Washington-based Center for Naval Analyses, said.

The effectiveness of using small arms to counter these types of drones remains uncertain at best, depending largely on luck and drone pilot skill, Bendett noted.

Russian Telegram channels recently published footage showing Russian soldiers making DIY anti-drone ammunition by using the pellets taken from buckshot rounds and repurposing them to be used in normal 5.45x39mm rounds used in assault rifles.

Even if a shot goes on target, pellet size and drone construction determine a successful intercept.

“Larger pellets offer more mass but the energy is delivered over a bigger surface area – the larger the pellet, the less density you have in the air, this is known as ‘pattern,’” said Paul Bradley, a ballistics expert at Hexagon Ammunition, a company owned by Beretta Holding. “A dense, wide pattern increases hit probability but smaller pellets reduce terminal effect.”

In early November, the German military-news website Hartpunkt reported about a document from the Ukrainian Special Forces Command that examined Russian troops’ use of 12-gauge shotguns to counter small drones.

According to the analysis, the threat associated with FPV drones is deemed so grave that it recommended placing a dedicated shooter at the back of every military vehicle near the frontlines in case electronic warfare systems fail to disable the flying explosives.

It also reported that Russian troops track the departure points of Ukrainian drones and place ambushes with several of their drone shooters to attempt to hit them.

According to Bradley, hobbyist quadcopter drones, like those made by Chinese maker DJI, tend to have a body made out of thin plastic as well as rigid but flimsy propellers in order to keep their weight down. That makes them “very easy” to damage with widely available 12g sporting rounds, he added.

In contrast, first-person view drones are generally built with thick carbon fiber frames and softer plastic propellers more resistant to impact, reflecting their heritage as machines designed for high-speed racing. Sporting ammunition typically cannot damage FPV sufficiently at almost any range, according to Bradley.

“Drones require more energy on target when they are in the air,” he explained. “When they are hit they simply move as they have very little inertia – the movement robs the pellets of kinetic energy, rather like punching something in zero gravity, less energy is transferred to target as it is used up moving it backward.”

The Ukrainian Third Assault Brigade demonstrated these challenges as part of an experimental shooting conducted earlier this month, simulating an FPV drone attack to test which kind of bullet is most effective. Soldiers compared shooting standard cartridges and specific anti-drone ammunition using different types of guns, including shotguns.

In the majority of cases, not only was the FPV not downed, but even when it was damaged, the system kept flying as the shot was too weak. In the one instance where the target was hit with an anti-drone charge, it crashed and caught fire near the shooter, barely missing him.

Some of the short-range drone defense tactics that have emanated from Ukraine have caught the attention of Western gun and ammunition companies.

Among them is the Swedish cartridge manufacturer Norma, also part of Beretta Holding, which has developed and tested its Anti-Drone Long Effective Range (AD-LER) against FPVs. In testing, the munition managed to “catastrophically down” six out of seven drones deployed at up to 50 meters away, according to Bradley, who said he observed the trials. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

 

12 Dec 24. Ukraine Strikes Russian Aviation Facility with US-Supplied ATACMS. Ukraine launched a targeted missile strike on Wednesday hitting a military facility in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, located within Russian territory. The strike reportedly utilized U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). The attack damaged a key industrial site, which local Russian officials identified as a boiler plant, disrupting heating supply to multiple residential buildings in Taganrog.  Taganrog Mayor Svetlana Kambulova said 27 apartment buildings had temporarily lost heating services as a result of the strike. Videos posted on social media captured explosions at approximately 3:30 a.m. local time, with loud detonations and fire visible across the city, which sits roughly 100 miles from the front lines of the war. According to Russia’s Ministry of Defense, Ukraine fired six ATACMS missiles during the attack. Two of which were intercepted by Pantsir air defense systems, while the remaining four were allegedly diverted using electronic warfare technology. Russia’s Defense Ministry described the recent incident as an attack on its “military airfield” and declared that Ukraine’s use of Western long-range precision weapons would not go unanswered. A U.S. official suggested that Russia could retaliate by launching another experimental intermediate-range hypersonic missile, known as the Oreshnik into Ukraine. On Tuesday, Ukrainian forces also struck the Druzhba oil pipeline near the city of Bryansk, approximately 60 miles from the Ukrainian border. According to Ukraine’s General Staff, the pipeline was used as a fuel loading and distribution hub to supply Russian military forces. Ukrainian officials claimed the attack caused a massive fire at the facility. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

11 Dec 24. Cuashub.com said today that Russia accuses Ukraine of deploying long-range kamikaze drones. On December 2, 2024, Russian media accused Ukraine of deploying the advanced “Lord” long-range kamikaze drone in deep strikes on Russian positions, sharing images of the remains of one of these drones on social media. If verified, the deployment represents a significant leap in Ukraine’s military capabilities, reshaping the dynamics of the ongoing conflict. For some time now drone warfare has dominated the fight in Ukraine, with Ukrainian drone units now said to be responsible for 80 percent of Russian losses. The “Lord” drone, reportedly developed by Swiss-based aerospace startup Destinus, combines long-range precision with multi-role adaptability. The drone is said to have a range between 750 km and over 2,000 km, enabling strikes far behind enemy lines. The drone’s extended range makes it a potent addition to Ukraine’s arsenal, reducing reliance on long-range missiles which have required western authorisation to use. The Lord drone’s alleged Swiss origins add a layer of complexity to the conflict. Developed by Destinus, a company founded by Mikhail Kokorich – a Russian dissident – its production raises questions about neutrality and arms supply restrictions. Switzerland’s strict neutrality laws prohibit arms exports to conflict zones. However, Destinus operates in multiple European countries, including Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands. Russia has condemned the alleged deployment of the Lord drone, viewing it as a major escalation. The drone’s long range and radar-evading capabilities pose a serious threat to critical military and logistical hubs deep within Russian territory. The timing is significant, as it follows Ukraine’s recent successes in targeting Russian S-400 air defense systems in Simferopol and Kursk Oblast. The Lord’s deployment signals Ukraine’s intent to target deeper into Russian defenses, exploiting vulnerabilities far from the frontlines. While Ukraine has invested in high-tech, long-range drones like the Lord, Russia has focused on cost-effective solutions such as the Shturm-ST and Shahed series drones it has deployed since the war began. https://cuashub.com/en/content/russia-accuses-ukraine-of-deploying-long-range-kamikaze-drones/https://cuashub.com/en/content/russia-accuses-ukraine-of-deploying-long-range-kamikaze-drones/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

 

03 Dec 24. US to provide further counter-drone systems to Ukraine. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) announced on December 2 additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defence needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s seventy-first tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.

This Presidential Drawdown Authority package, which has an estimated value of USD725m, will provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent needs, including air defence capabilities.

The air defence capabilities included in this package are:

  • Three Patriot air defense batteries and munitions
  • 12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions
  • HAWK air defence systems and munitions
  • AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defence
  • More than 3,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles
  • Avenger air defence systems
  • VAMPIRE Counter-Uncrewed Aerial Systems (C-UAS) and munitions
  • C-UAS gun trucks and ammunition
  • Mobile C-UAS laser-guided rocket systems
  • Other unspecified C-UAS equipment
  • Anti-aircraft guns and ammunition
  • Air defence systems components
  • Equipment to integrate Western launchers, missiles, and radars with Ukraine’s systems
  • Equipment to support and sustain Ukraine’s existing air defence capabilities
  • 21 air surveillance radars

In addition, DoD will be providing a number of UAS and two radar systems for UAS as well as numerous systems and components for ground and maritime operations. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

08 Dec 24. Donald Trump on Sunday pushed Russian leader Vladimir Putin to act to reach an immediate ceasefire with Ukraine, describing it as part of his active efforts as president-elect to end the war despite being weeks from taking office.

“Zelenskyy and Ukraine would like to make a deal and stop the madness,” Trump wrote on social media, referring to Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

In a television interview that aired Sunday, Trump also said he would be open to reducing military aid to Ukraine and pulling the United States out of NATO. Those are two threats that have alarmed Ukraine, NATO allies and many in the U.S. national security community.

Asked on NBC’s “Meet the Press” if he were actively working to end the nearly 3-year-old Ukraine war, Trump said, “I am.”

He refused to say if he had spoken to Putin since winning election in November. “I don’t want to say anything about that, because I don’t want to do anything that could impede the negotiation,” Trump said.

Trump’s call for an immediate ceasefire went beyond the public policy stands taken by the Biden administration and Ukraine and drew a cautious response from Zelenskyy. It also marks Trump wading unusually deeply into efforts before his Jan. 20 inauguration to resolve one of the major global crises facing the lame-duck Biden administration.

Trump made his proposal after a weekend meeting in Paris with French and Ukrainian leaders in Paris, where many world leaders gathered to celebrate the restoration of Notre Dame cathedral after a devastating fire. None of the advisers traveling with him appeared to have expertise on Ukraine.

Kyiv would like to close a deal, Trump wrote on his social media platform Truth Social. “There should be an immediate ceasefire and negotiations should begin.”

“I know Vladimir well. This is his time to act. China can help. The World is waiting!” Trump added. He was referring to mediation efforts by China that many in the West have seen as favoring Russia. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/AP)

 

09 Dec 24. Volodymyr Zelensky has confirmed that more than 400,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed or injured during the war with Russia. He admitted the previously top-secret casualty numbers a few hours after Donald Trump released the data as evidence that the war between Ukraine and Russia needed to stop. Mr Zelensky has previously insisted that Ukrainian casualty figures are strictly confidential and could not be released because they may undermine public morale.

“Since the start of the full-scale war, Ukraine has lost 43,000 soldiers killed in action on the battlefield. There have been 370,000 cases of medical assistance for the wounded,” Mr Zelensky said on X. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

06 Dec 24. Zelensky hands over first ‘Hell’ cruise missile able to strike deep into Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has officially handed over the first batch of Peklo (Hell) domestically developed and built long-range cruise missiles to the country’s armed forces. The president announced the development from his official X (formerly Twitter) account on 6 December, saying that the missile that puts Moscow within range is now being geared up for full-scale production and operational use.  “The ‘Peklo’ (Hell) drone-missile – our Ukrainian weapon with proven combat effectiveness. Today, the first batch was delivered to our defence forces. The mission now is to scale up production and deployment,” he said. Zelensky did not disclose performance specifications for the turbojet-powered cruise missile, but Ukrainian media with links to the defence forces noted it can fly 700 km at a speed of 700 km/h. For more information on Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle developments, please see Summa Defence partners with Ukrainian firms for ‘industrial-scale’ UAV production. (Source: Janes)

 

07 Dec 24. Biden Administration Announces New Security Assistance Package for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a significant new security assistance package to ensure Ukraine has the tools it needs to prevail in its fight against Russian aggression. This security assistance package commits an additional $988m in support through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) that will provide Ukraine with munitions for rocket systems and Unmanned Aerial Systems. This package also includes support for maintenance and repair programs to help Ukraine reconstitute its forces and build and sustain combat power.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

  • Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
  • Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS); and
  • Equipment, components, and spare parts to maintain, repair, and overhaul artillery systems, tanks, and armored vehicles.

This is the Biden Administration’s twenty-second USAI package. The United States will continue to work together with some 50 Allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and its associated capability coalitions to provide the support Ukraine needs to win the war.

(Source: U.S. DoD)

 

07 Dec 24.  DOD Announces $988m Ukraine Security Assistance Package. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III announced today nearly $1bn in additional security assistance to help Ukraine bolster its combat power amid Russia’s continued aggression.

The $988m package of new equipment, provisioned under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, includes unmanned aerial systems, rocket munitions and support for maintenance and repair programs.

It marks the 22nd USAI package issued by the Biden administration, bringing the total of U.S. security assistance for Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 to more than $62 bn.

Austin announced the new package during his address at the Reagan National Defense Forum hosted by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute in Simi Valley, California, where he underscored the imperative for the United States and its global network of allies to continue to stand resolute in helping Ukraine defend itself.

The secretary added that the U.S. has consistently made its choice to stand with Ukraine clear.

Since April 2022, Austin has continued to rally the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a global network of some 50 partners committed to Ukraine’s near-term battlefield needs and its long-term ability to deter future aggression.

“I’ve convened the contact group 24 times now,” Austin said.  “Its other members have committed more than $57bn in direct security assistance to Ukraine.

He added that, as a percentage of gross domestic product, more than a dozen UDCG members now provide more security assistance to Ukraine than the U.S. does.

“And together, we have helped Ukraine survive an all-out assault by the largest military in Europe,” he said.

Russia, the secretary said, has paid a “staggering price” for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression.

Austin noted that Russia has suffered at least 700,000 casualties and squandered more than $200bn since its invasion of Ukraine.

And Putin’s aggression has only served to further unite and strengthen NATO, Austin said, adding that “we continue to be crystal clear that Putin’s war was not the result of NATO enlargement but the cause of NATO enlargement.”

He said Russia’s assault on Ukraine has served as a warning to the rest of the world not to let unprovoked aggression go unchecked.

“As I said in Kyiv in October, we are seeing ‘a sneak preview of a world built by tyrants and thugs — a chaotic world, violent world carved into spheres of influence; a world where bullies trample their smaller neighbors; and a world where aggressors force free people to live in fear,'” Austin said.

“So, we can continue to stand up to the Kremlin, or we can let Putin have his way — and condemn our children and grandchildren to live in a world of chaos and conflict,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

07 Dec 24. Top Russian and U.S. Military Leaders Hold Rare Call to Discuss Security Issues. General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, reportedly  contacted General Charles Q. Brown, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 27. The call, initiated at Russia’s request, focused on Russian naval drills in the Mediterranean and broader global and regional security issues, including the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

General Gerasimov provided advance notice of a live-fire naval exercise in the eastern Mediterranean involving hypersonic and cruise missile tests. The drills, which lasted three days, featured two Russian frigates launching Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles, a submarine firing Kalibr cruise missiles, and an Onyx missile launched from a ground-based system.

The Russian Ministry of Defense stated that the purpose of the notification was to “prevent possible incidents” given the proximity of U.S. and NATO naval forces in the area. The Pentagon confirmed the call, describing it as a deconfliction effort typical before significant military activities to avoid miscalculations that could escalate tensions.

The call also touched on the war in Ukraine, a topic that has seen significantly reduced dialogue between Moscow and Washington since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. During the conversation, Gerasimov reportedly clarified that Russia’s recent Oreshnik missile strike on Ukraine’s Dnipro region was pre-planned and unrelated to U.S. decisions allowing Ukraine to use longer-range missiles.

While specifics of the Ukraine discussion remain classified, the Pentagon characterized the conversation as professional and focused on reducing the risk of miscalculation. It was the first contact between the two generals since Brown assumed his role in October 2023.

The call represents a rare moment of direct military dialogue between the U.S. and Russia, which have sharply curtailed communications since the escalation of hostilities in Ukraine. Historically, such exchanges have been used to prevent accidental confrontations, as was common during the Cold War. However, unlike those periods, current communications have been sporadic and largely focused on immediate deconfliction rather than broader strategic discussions.

The Pentagon disclosed that Gerasimov requested the call remain unannounced at the time it occurred. The reason for this request remains unclear, though it reflects the sensitivity of U.S.-Russia communications amid their adversarial relationship. The call was only acknowledged days later, on November 30, after the drills concluded. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

06 Dec 24. Estonia launches defence industry support program to aid Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI) has announced a new support measure to provide targeted assistance to Ukraine’s defence forces. The program invites Estonian-registered companies to offer products or services designed for use in crises and wartime.

This initiative is part of Estonia’s broader commitment to Ukraine, which includes direct military aid, personnel training, and leadership in the IT coalition supporting Ukraine. “We have committed to supporting Ukraine in its fight against the aggressor with at least 0.25% of our GDP. Additionally, we aim to procure aid from Estonia’s defence industry,” stated Hanno Pevkur, Estonia’s Minister of Defence.

The program prioritises products or services already developed, marketed, and specifically suited for military use. Eligible items must be manufactured in Estonia, with at least 30% of their production sourced locally. The initiative aims to bolster Ukraine’s defence capabilities while fostering Estonia’s own defence industry.

“Our support for Ukraine is based on their military needs and Estonia’s capabilities. Our goal is to help Ukraine win the war while simultaneously fostering the development of Estonia’s defence industry,” said Katri Raudsepp, Deputy Director General of the ECDI.

According to Kalev Koidumäe, Executive Director of the Estonian Defence and Aerospace Industry Association, the measure will accelerate innovation within Estonia’s defence sector. “Today, unmanned platforms, surveillance systems, and other equipment developed and manufactured by Estonian defence industry companies are already in use by Ukraine’s armed forces and security structures. These tools have proven to be reliable and effective on the battlefield,” he said.

Applications will be reviewed by a committee comprising representatives from key Estonian ministries and agencies. Full eligibility criteria for the program will be detailed on the ECDI website, ensuring transparency and accessibility for all potential participants. (Source: Google/https://defence-industry.eu/)

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