NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 07.

07 Dec 24. Biden Administration Announces New Security Assistance Package for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a significant new security assistance package to ensure Ukraine has the tools it needs to prevail in its fight against Russian aggression. This security assistance package commits an additional $988m in support through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) that will provide Ukraine with munitions for rocket systems and Unmanned Aerial Systems. This package also includes support for maintenance and repair programs to help Ukraine reconstitute its forces and build and sustain combat power.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS); and
Equipment, components, and spare parts to maintain, repair, and overhaul artillery systems, tanks, and armored vehicles.

This is the Biden Administration’s twenty-second USAI package. The United States will continue to work together with some 50 Allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and its associated capability coalitions to provide the support Ukraine needs to win the war.

(Source: U.S. DoD)

07 Dec 24. DOD Announces $988m Ukraine Security Assistance Package. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III announced today nearly $1 billion in additional security assistance to help Ukraine bolster its combat power amid Russia’s continued aggression.

The $988m package of new equipment, provisioned under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, includes unmanned aerial systems, rocket munitions and support for maintenance and repair programs.

It marks the 22nd USAI package issued by the Biden administration, bringing the total of U.S. security assistance for Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 to more than $62 billion.

Austin announced the new package during his address at the Reagan National Defense Forum hosted by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute in Simi Valley, California, where he underscored the imperative for the United States and its global network of allies to continue to stand resolute in helping Ukraine defend itself.

The secretary added that the U.S. has consistently made its choice to stand with Ukraine clear.

Since April 2022, Austin has continued to rally the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a global network of some 50 partners committed to Ukraine’s near-term battlefield needs and its long-term ability to deter future aggression.

“I’ve convened the contact group 24 times now,” Austin said. “Its other members have committed more than $57 billion in direct security assistance to Ukraine.

He added that, as a percentage of gross domestic product, more than a dozen UDCG members now provide more security assistance to Ukraine than the U.S. does.

“And together, we have helped Ukraine survive an all-out assault by the largest military in Europe,” he said.

Russia, the secretary said, has paid a “staggering price” for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression.

Austin noted that Russia has suffered at least 700,000 casualties and squandered more than $200 billion since its invasion of Ukraine.

And Putin’s aggression has only served to further unite and strengthen NATO, Austin said, adding that “we continue to be crystal clear that Putin’s war was not the result of NATO enlargement but the cause of NATO enlargement.”

He said Russia’s assault on Ukraine has served as a warning to the rest of the world not to let unprovoked aggression go unchecked.

“As I said in Kyiv in October, we are seeing ‘a sneak preview of a world built by tyrants and thugs — a chaotic world, violent world carved into spheres of influence; a world where bullies trample their smaller neighbors; and a world where aggressors force free people to live in fear,'” Austin said.

“So, we can continue to stand up to the Kremlin, or we can let Putin have his way — and condemn our children and grandchildren to live in a world of chaos and conflict,” he said.

(Source: U.S. DoD)

Dec 06.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to make advances along the flanks of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast); a notable advance to the north cut off a major logistics route and closing the tightening cauldron around the town
AID: The speaker of the US Republican-controlled House of Representatives has confirmed that he does not plan to put a request for an additional USD 24 billion in assistance for Ukraine to a vote
MOBILISATION: The US stated that Ukraine has ‘hard decisions’ to make regarding expanding conscription to sustain the war effort; however, Ukrainian officials continue to deny plans to begin conscripting 18-year-olds
FORECAST: Senior Ukrainian officials are holding talks with the incoming Trump administration in a likely bid to set conditions for favourable peace talks in 2025; however, possible security guarantees remain unlcear
BAKHMUT: Russian forces recently advanced in central Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast), amid efforts to take advantage of the current poor weather conditions to shield advances from Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones. Russian forces have, over the last week, advanced into central Chasiv Yar, taking the south side of the refractory plant. The overall amount of territory taken within the town remains fairly moderate. That said, this represents one of the most significant advances in recent months, given the fairly stable Ukrainian defences at the edge of the town itself. Russian forces are seemingly attacking in small numbers at dusk and during poor weather to limit their exposure to Ukrainian drones.
BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have also made some advances in central Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), where gruelling urban fighting and Ukrainian defences continue to limit Russia’s ability to make more rapid progress. Geolocated footage published on 2 December indicates Russian advances in the southern district of the town advancing to the Tsentralna Mine. Russian sources on 3 December indicated the Ukrainians were counter-attacking in the area; however, it remains likely that Russia has retained control of its recent advances. The overall tempo of Russian attacks in and around Toretsk remains high, with the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Luhansk Group of Forces, Anastasiya Bobobnikova, claiming on 2 December that Russian forces suffered over 500 casualties during one week of assaults against Toretsk alone.
DONETSK: Russian forces continued to advance south of Pokrovsk amid an increase in the tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk sector. Geolocated footage from 2 December shows recent Russian advances south-east of Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk). Over the past few days, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Pokrovsk remains one of the most intense hotspots; 41 Russian attacks were recorded in the past 24 hours alone.
DONETSK: Similarly, fighting remains intense in the Kurakhove sector further south, where Russian forces have claimed further gains. Over the past 24 hours, the Ukrainian General Staff recorded 41 Russian assaults in the area. Meanwhile, the Russian authorities claimed the capture of Stari Terny (north of Kurakhove) on 4 December. They also reported advances in western Kurakhove and ongoing fighting in the southern parts of the city. However, such claims remain unconfirmed.
KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
KURSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Ukrainian forces have reportedly reduced the Russian presence on the right (west) bank of the Oskil River in the Kupiansk sector. On December 4, a Ukrainian military observer noted that Ukrainian operations successfully eliminated Russia’s bridgehead across the Oskil River at Novomlynsk (north of Kupiansk and on the western bank of the Oskil River). This is likely corroborated by geolocated footage from 3 December, showing Ukrainian forces in control of Novomlynsk. Also on 3 December, the Ukrainian General Staff said that Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes had cleared the area of Russian troops. The report also indicated that Ukrainian forces have successfully reduced Russia’s bridgehead near Masyutivka (south-east of Dvorichna and north of Kupiansk). These events underscore that Russian troops likely lacked the capacity to exploit the bridgeheads over the Oskil River effectively and confirm that Ukrainian forces retain capabilities to launch limited counter-attacks to contain Russian advances.
SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to make advances along the flanks of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast); a notable advance to the north cut off a major ground line of communication (GLOC) into the town. Geolocated footage from 3 December indicates Russian forces have advanced into the northern parts of Novyi Komar, a village located just over two miles (3km) to the north of Velyka Novosilka. Crucially, by advancing into the village, Russian forces have crossed and taken control of part of the T-0518 highway that connects Velyka Novosilka to Ukrainian forces defending Kurakhove along the Vovcha River Valley to the north. Russian forces now claim to have fire control over all roads leading in and out of the town, and this likely remains the case. Russian sources have been reporting in recent days that their forces are improving their positions along Velyka Novosilka’s northern and southern flanks and disrupting Ukrainian GLOCs ahead of a large assault on the town itself. Russian operations over the last week would support this, as they likely set conditions for the encirclement of the town.
SOUTHERN: The emerging Russian cauldron around Velyka Novosilka is beginning to tighten; further Russian advances to the north and south-west could trigger a Ukrainian withdrawal from the town in a bid to avoid encirclement. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on 3 December that its forces had taken Novodarivka, a village located around nine miles (15km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka. While we cannot confirm this, Russian forces continue to apply pressure on the town’s southern flank; geolocated footage from 4 December also confirms Russian advances along the Mokri Yaly River valley to the south of Velyka Novosilka.
STRIKES: Overnight on 2-3 December, Ukraine was targeted by 28 Russian-launched Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 22 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. The Ukrainian authorities reported damage to energy infrastructure in Ternopil City (Ternopil oblast), causing localised blackouts. Falling drone debris damaged residential buildings in Kyiv oblast.
STRIKES: On 4 December, Russia launched one Kh-59/69 missile and 50 Shahed-136/131 drones and unidentified UAVs. Ukrainian forces shot down 29 UAVs over Chernihiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv, Sumy and Ternopil oblasts. 18 were reportedly lost, possibly due to EW measures; one flew on to Russian-occupied territories.
STRIKES: Early on 5 December, Russian forces struck Dnipropetrovsk oblast with two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles and launched 44 Shahed-136/131 drones along with unidentified UAVs across the country. Ukrainian air defences shot down 30 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 12 UAVs were reportedly lost, possibly due to EW measures; one drone flew into Belarus.
STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 4 December, Ukrainian forces launched a drone attack against Russia’s Ryazan oblast and the Republic of Chechnya (Russia). Russia’s MoD reported the destruction of 35 UAVs over Ryazan. Russian sources claimed that the drones struck the Russian Dyagilevo Air Base near Ryazan City and the Chechen ‘Kadyrov’ Spetsnaz Police Regiment’s barracks in the Chechen capital Grozny. The Dyagilevo airbase reportedly hosts the 3rd Centre for Combat Training with Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS, Tu-134UBL, An-26 and Il-78 tanker aircraft. The airbase was reportedly previously struck in July.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: The speaker of the US Republican-controlled House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, confirmed on 4 December that he does not plan to put a request for an additional USD 24 billion in assistance for Ukraine to a vote. Reports indicated that around USD 16 billion was earmarked for replenishing US military stocks while the remaining sum would be for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has insisted that the outgoing administration of President Joe Biden intends to use all remaining funds of the USD 61bn aid package for Ukraine by the time its term ends.
AID: However, efforts to rapidly equip Ukraine are driving concerns that the US military could become strained as a result, particularly given mounting shortages of air defence interceptors and certain artillery shells. According to one unnamed source on 4 December, these will be difficult to replace quickly, incurring risks of diminishing US military readiness for other potential conflict zones in the Middle East and Asia. While we cannot confirm the report, it indicates that the US must consider other competing geopolitical priorities in the race to arm Ukraine.
AID: Reports emerged on 3 December that NATO expects the Ramstein format defence group (which co-ordinates assistance for Ukraine) will continue when US President-elect Donald Trump assumes office. One unnamed official familiar with the matter stated that they expect it will continue to operate in the coming months and even years. Separately, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated on 4 December that the military alliance must provide whatever air defence it can give to Ukraine so that the country can protect its infrastructure. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on 3 December that Ukraine seeks at least 20 air defence systems to protect critical infrastructure from Russian long-range strikes. Ultimately, enhancing Ukrainian air defences will almost certainly remain a priority throughout the ongoing conflict.
CASUALTIES: A Russian deputy defence minister disclosed that 48,000 relatives of Russian troops have submitted appeals to track and identify missing soldiers through DNA samples. Anna Tsivilyova, a relative of Russian President Vladimir Putin, likely revealed the confidential figure accidentally in late November. Russia’s parliamentary defence committee chairman, Andrei Kartapolov, subsequently cautioned officials against publicly discussing such figures. Tsivilyova sought to downplay the disclosure of such numbers, adding that the figure reflects appeals, not statistics, claiming that many of the soldiers will be found. Russia has refrained from releasing official statistics about its casualties in Ukraine; the figure therefore provides an insight into how many men may be missing in action.
CASUALTIES: The UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported on 5 December that November marked a new high in average daily Russian casualties. The DI based its assessment on figures from the Ukrainian General Staff which reported that the average rate of losses per day was 1,523. According to the DI, Russian forces suffered 2,030 losses in a single day on 28 November, the first time that daily Russian troop losses surpassed 2,000. It assessed that the high rate of casualties is likely reflective of the tempo of Russian operations and offensives. That said, the Ukrainian General Staff likely does inflate Russian losses; as such, we cannot confirm these numbers.
CASUALTIES: Russia has reportedly stationed North Korean soldiers at observation posts and checkpoints in Kursk oblast, rather than deploying them in direct combat roles. The Ukrainian National Resistance Centre reported this on 4 December, adding that their deployment to such positions has freed up Russian troops to be sent to the frontlines instead. While we cannot confirm this report, a decision to keep North Korean soldiers removed from fighting possibly indicates that they are not being used as an expendable force amid efforts to limit North Korean losses (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 31 October 2024).
MOBILISATION: Blinken assessed on 4 December that Ukraine has ‘hard decisions’ to make concerning further mobilisation to sustain the war effort. Blinken characterised these as necessary, adding that manpower is needed to defend against Russian aggression despite Western financial and military support to help Ukraine fight. Blinken did not provide any further comments about what Ukraine could realistically do to bolster manpower in the coming months; that said, Washington recently called on Ukraine to reduce conscription ages from 25 to 18.
MOBILISATION: Dmytro Lytvyn, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, stated on 4 December that there are no plans to mobilise men as young as 18. We previously assessed that this was unlikely to happen due to such a move being politically unpopular and demographically challenging (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 28 November 2024). Zelensky still enjoys the trust of nearly six out of ten Ukrainians as per polling released in mid-October from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). However, this is significantly lower than his 90% approval rating in the early phase of the full-scale invasion, meaning that fading trust likely offers him limited room to considerably lower the draft age.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: On 4 December, Andriy Yermak, a Ukrainian presidential aide, met with Keith Kellogg (Trump’s proposed special envoy for Russia and Ukraine) as well as the incoming national security adviser, Mike Waltz. An unspecified official involved in the transition for Trump’s incoming administration and several people familiar with the matter disclosed such details to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). For further analysis on Kellogg’s approach to ending the war, please see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 28 November 2024.

The development reflects Ukrainian efforts to work with Trump’s incoming administration to improve the likelihood of them advocating for favourable conditions in any future peace talks. The WSJ claimed that Ukraine plans to communicate its readiness for peace but it also noted comments from an unspecified individual familiar with the matter that it must be a ‘sustainable peace’. According to them, an unstable or temporary peace does not serve Ukrainian or US interests. Ukrainian efforts to engage with incoming Trump officials are almost certainly aimed at preventing a rushed peace agreement which benefits Russia but leaves Ukraine vulnerable to future Russian aggression.

Advisers to incoming President-elect Trump are reportedly considering proposals both publicly and privately to end the war that would require Ukraine to cede large parts of the country to Russia for the foreseeable future. Reuters reported this on 4 December based on its analysis of statements and interviews with several individuals close to Trump. The proposals Trump is weighing up also include removing the prospect of NATO membership for Ukraine; Zelensky detailed this as the first element of his victory plan.

Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on 4 December that Ukraine is not insisting on joining NATO immediately. His remarks seemingly break from Zelensky’s recent comments on receiving an invitation to join NATO to end the ‘hot phase’ of the war (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 December 2024). Sybiha noted concerns of NATO member states about their direct involvement in the war if Ukraine were admitted into the bloc while the war was ongoing. That said, he also stated that membership remains a strategic goal for Ukraine.

Ukraine is highly unlikely to willingly abandon its desire to join NATO for the sake of a peace settlement given concerns that previous security guarantees have failed to protect the country and deter Russian aggression. While this position may realistically change in 2025 amid international pressure to reach a settlement, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 3 December detailing Ukraine’s stance that the only real security guarantee and form of deterrence is NATO membership. The statement also refused any alternatives to membership. The statement was released ahead of the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine gave up its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal in exchange for the recognition of its borders and security guarantees.

The ministry described the Budapest Memorandum as a monument to ‘short-sightedness in strategic security decision-making’, arguing that Russia exploited the failure to provide Ukraine with real security guarantees. A repetition of the failure of the Budapest Memorandum is a scenario Ukraine almost certainly wants to avoid given it recognises the very credible threat of Russia not respecting any accords designed to protect Ukraine. However, NATO allies currently have no consensus on inviting Ukraine to join the military bloc; this is highly unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. This could realistically mean that hawkish pro-Ukrainian states will work to propose an alternative arrangement, though depending on the precise nature of the guarantees, Ukraine will highly likely doubt their effectiveness. For further analysis regarding the precedent of the Budapest Memorandum and possible alternative security guarantees, please see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 November 2024.

Dec 05.

Russia: Authorities will highly likely continue digital monitoring of anti-war Russians in long term. On 4 December, the Russian legal rights group Perviy Otdel (Department One) reported a case of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) monitoring an anti-war citizen through the use of advanced Android spyware. The legal group, which specialises in defending individuals accused of treason and espionage in Russia, cited an IT analyst who identified the software, Monokle, on his mobile device. Monokle is capable of recording calls and listening to the microphone of an infected mobile phone, as well as recording the device’s screen, exposing users’ passwords and stealing personal data. Reports indicate that this is possibly the first known case of the authorities using Monokle against anti-war Russians. While we cannot confirm this development, the Russian government has sought to increase its digital control over Russian citizens since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 February 2024). Ultimately, we assess that Moscow will almost certainly continue to surveil dissident Russians for the duration of the war, elevating security, harassment and detention risks for affected individuals.
Armenia-Russia: Growing rift will sustain heightened regional tensions, Russian destabilisation risks. On 4 December, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Yerevan’s re-integration into the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has become ‘nearly impossible’. Pashinyan’s comments were in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statement that the CSTO could not have intervened to aid Armenia vis-à-vis the former breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh (specifically its takeover by Azerbaijan in September 2023). Putin stated that the events did not take place in Armenia proper and, as such, could not be considered an act of external aggression. Pashinyan has systematically criticised the CSTO for failing to ensure Armenia’s security against Azerbaijan’s aggression. Subsequently, Yerevan has de facto frozen its participation in the CSTO, thereby significantly limiting its contribution to the organisation’s activities (though it has not officially withdrawn). Concurrently, Pashinyan has intensified efforts to develop security ties with Western actors amid a broader westwards foreign policy pivot. Ultimately, we assess that Yerevan’s current foreign policy re-alignment will sustain elevated tensions with Moscow, increasing the risk of Russian destabilisation efforts, which will almost certainly intensify ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections.

Dec 02.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

SOUTHERN: Russian forces captured the small settlement of Rozdolne as offensive operations in the direction of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast) continue
NATO: Ukraine remains highly unlikely to receive an invitation to join NATO at the upcoming meeting in Belgium; this is despite a letter from the Ukrainian foreign minister urging such an invite
DESERTION: An Financial Times (FT) report on the growing rate of desertion within the Ukrainian military highlights the severe manpower and recruitment challenges facing Ukraine
FORECAST: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s comments on Kyiv-proposed NATO membership for Ukrainian-held territory signal a change in diplomatic tack
BAKHMUT: Along the southern sector of the Bakhmut axis, geolocated footage posted on 29 November indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). Russian milbloggers have additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced at multiple points in southern Toretsk and to the south of the town, including in Nelipivka (located between Toretsk and Niu-York), though we cannot confirm this. Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Anastasiya Bobovnikova reported on 28 November that Russian forces are losing at least 100 troops per day as efforts to take control of the town continue. Nonetheless, a Ukrainian commander reported on 30 November that Russian forces in Toretsk recently received reinforcements, indicating that the pressure on Ukrainian forces defending the town will highly likely persist.
DONETSK: Russian forces made several territorial gains in the Pokrovsk direction, likely indicating an uptick in offensive operations following a slowdown over the past few weeks. Geolocated footage from 30 November indicates recent Russian marginal advances north of Zhovte (south of Pokrovsk) after making confirmed gains in central Zhovte as of 29 November. Footage from 30 November shows that Russian forces advanced along the E50 highway northeast of Hryhorivka (south of Pokrovsk) and captured the remainder of Yurivka (south-west of Hryhorivka). Russian forces also made confirmed gains west of Pushkine (further south-west of Yurivka). On 30 November, an artillery battalion commander operating in the sector said that the Russian offensive operation was characterised by infantry assaults involving groups of 20-30 personnel. On 29 November, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi noted that units in the Pokrovsk front required additional reserves, ammunition, and overall military equipment after visiting commanders operating in the area.
KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
KURSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have reinforced their presence on the right (west) bank of the Oskil River amid continued offensive operations in the Kupiansk sector. On 2 December, a Ukrainian OSINT analyst group linked to the Ukrainian military reported that Russian forces established a second bridgehead on the right (western) bank of the Oskil River near Masyutivka (north of Kupiansk in Kharkiv oblast). According to the OSINT group, Russian troops are attempting to advance south of Dvorichna (north of Masyutivka and north of Kupiansk). On 28 November, a Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Kupiansk sector had already confirmed that Russian forces had crossed to the west bank of the river. Meanwhile, Geolocated footage from 29 November indicates recent Russian advances west of Vyshneve (west of Svatove in Luhansk oblast) and on the eastern outskirts of Terny (north-east of Kreminna).
SOUTHERN: Russian forces have continued to make advances in ongoing offensive operations towards Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk oblast. Geolocated footage posted on 29 November indicated that Russian forces have captured the settlement of Rozdolne, located north-east of Velyka Novosilka. We cannot confirm claims by Russian milbloggers that Russian forces achieved additional gains to the south of Rozdolne, toward Novyi Komar (located north of Velyka Novosilka), near Blahodatne (located south of Velyka Novosilka) and between Novodarivka and Rivnopil (located south-west of Novosilka). Nonetheless, the capture of Rozdolne will likely facilitate Russian efforts to cut Ukrainian logistical capacity to and from Velyka Novosilka and add to the pressure facing Ukrainian forces on the town’s eastern flank.
SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage posted on 1 December indicated that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Dorozhyanka, located south of Huliapole in eastern Zaporizhzhia oblast. A Ukrainian National Guard brigade commander warned on 30 November that, though Russian forces are currently largely only carrying out infantry assaults, Russian forces are preparing to conduct a large-scale offensive in Zaporizhzhia.
STRIKES: Overnight on 28-29 November, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 132 Shahed drones and other unidentified unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Ukrainian air defences intercepted 88 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 41 drones were reportedly lost, possibly due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures. The Ukrainian authorities in Odesa oblast reported damage to transport infrastructure in the region.
STRIKES: Early on 30 November, Russia launched ten Shahed-136/131 and an unspecified number of unidentified drones. Ukrainian forces shot down eight UAVs over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kirovohrad and Kyiv oblasts. One drone was reportedly lost; another reportedly flew on towards Russian-occupied regions.
STRIKES: On 1 December, Russia launched 78 UAVs, including 136/131 and unidentified drones. Ukrainian air defences shot down 32 drones over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts.
STRIKES: Overnight on 1-2 December, Ukrainian forces intercepted 52 of 110 Russian drones (Shahed-136/131 and unidentified types) launched by Russia. Air defences were active over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 50 drones were reportedly lost, possibly due to Ukrainian EW measures; six flew on toward Belarus and Russia. Falling drone debris damaged an agricultural warehouse in Kyiv oblast. The drone attack reportedly damaged power lines and a gas pipeline in Nikopol (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Russian sources claimed that the attack targeted a railway station and power lines in Ternopil oblast. They also claimed the attack damaged military depots in various Ukrainian oblasts. However, such claims remain unconfirmed.
STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence reported that its forces intercepted 20 Ukrainian UAVs early on 1 December. The drones reportedly targeted Russia’s Kaluga, Kursk and Smolensk oblasts. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), 15 drones were intercepted early on 2 December over Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk oblasts as well as occupied Crimea.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

NATO: Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha has reportedly urged NATO to issue Ukraine an invitation to join the alliance at an upcoming meeting in Belgium (in the capital Brussels). In a letter Reuters claimed to have seen on 29 November, Sybiha emphasised that an invite should not be seen as an escalation. According to the minister, Russia would lose one of its main arguments for continuing the war if Ukraine were to be invited to the meeting on 3-4 December. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky implored the administration of outgoing US President Joe Biden on 1 December to influence European states to extend a NATO invitation to Ukraine. Despite these efforts, there is currently no consensus among allies on the matter, meaning Ukraine is highly unlikely to be invited to join the alliance in the coming days.
NATO: Zelensky stated on 1 December that in the (highly unlikely) event that Ukraine was to join NATO during wartime, the alliance’s collective defence principle would not apply to the entirety of the country. Zelensky stated that Ukraine’s understanding of NATO’s Article 5 is that it does not apply to the whole country while war is ongoing as other states risk being drawn into the conflict. However, Zelensky’s comments fail to consider that Russian long-range strikes continue to target Ukrainian urban centres removed from the frontline and how this would impact NATO states’ obligations towards Ukraine in light of mutual defence. For further analysis on NATO and negotiations, see FORECAST below.
AID: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz pledged new military aid to Ukraine earlier on 2 December worth EUR 650 m (USD 683 m) to be delivered this month. A German defence ministry spokesperson said the package includes IRIS-T air defence systems, Leopard 1 tanks and armed drones. On 1 December, European Council President Antonio Costa announced that the EU will provide Ukraine an additional EUR 4.2 bn (USD 4.4 bn) this month to support the Ukrainian budget.
AID: Costa also said that the bloc plans to give Ukraine aid and assistance worth EUR 1.5 bn each month for a full year starting in January using the proceeds of frozen Russian assets. He added that this support can also be used for military purposes. The developments underscore efforts from Ukraine’s European allies to offer additional support before US President-elect Donald Trump assumes the presidency in January 2025. For further analysis on the prospect of continued US assistance for Ukraine under a second Trump administration, see Sibylline Special Report — 25 October 2024.
DESERTION: The Financial Times (FT) reported on 1 December that Ukrainian prosecutors initiated 60,000 cases against soldiers for desertion between January and October this year, nearly twice as many as in 2022 and 2023 combined. According to an unspecified Polish security official, around a dozen Ukrainian men sent to Poland for military training abscond each month. The report indicates that a lack of weapons, training and personnel rotations are factors driving desertion in Ukraine. While we cannot confirm the veracity of the report, it signals that manpower issues in Ukraine are influenced by more than demographic challenges. We assess that inadequate training and insufficient weapons supplies will likely continue to adversely impact morale, increasing the prospect of desertion and would-be recruits from enlisting willingly.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: On 29 November, Ukrainian President Zelensky suggested a potential ceasefire arrangement during an interview with British media under which Ukrainian territory not under Russian occupation becomes part of NATO. According to Zelensky, this would allow Ukraine to negotiate the return of Russian-held lands to Ukraine at a later stage through diplomatic means. Zelensky stated that an offer of NATO membership to Ukrainian-controlled parts of the country would be a step towards ending what he described as the ‘hot phase’ of the war. However, he caveated that any invitation from the military alliance would have to recognise Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders, implying that the Ukrainian leadership remains opposed to ceding any territory to Russia. In a separate interview with Japanese media on 1 December, Zelensky assessed that the Ukrainian army lacks the strength to retake Russian-occupied Ukrainian lands, including Crimea (which Russia annexed in 2014). Nevertheless, Zelensky’s comments signal a shift in Ukraine concerning the possibility of fully recapturing Ukrainian territory under Russian control militarily, which officials had long held (at least publicly) as their war objective. Russia will highly likely be unwilling to cede territory that it has captured in the coming months, particularly as it continues to make gains across the frontline. Zelensky did not provide a time frame for when Ukraine could realistically seek to regain its Russian-occupied lands through negotiations. This means that they would remain under Moscow’s control for the foreseeable future and the frontline would likely be frozen under Zelensky’s proposal. Even over the longer term, Russia is unlikely to willingly relinquish Ukrainian regions under its control, especially if parts of Ukraine were to join NATO. Moscow has frequently used NATO expansion as a ‘justification’ for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As such, it would highly likely perceive that ceding these lands would possibly result in their incorporation into the military alliance at a later stage. Additionally, we continue to assess that Ukraine is highly unlikely to become a member of NATO for the foreseeable future despite its ambitions to join the military bloc. The then-NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, stated in May 2023 that Ukraine’s accession into the alliance will not happen while the war is ongoing; however, he noted that the path towards membership is open for the future. At the same time, several NATO members (principally Hungary and Slovakia) remain opposed to Ukrainian membership in the alliance and are unlikely to soften their stance on the matter over the long term; others remain sceptical of the prospect. For further analysis, please see Sibylline Ukraine Update — 21 October 2024. (Source: Sibylline)

05 Dec 24. Russia’s worst month sees highest daily casualty rate and 300 battle tanks destroyed. November 2024 has been named as the costliest month of the war for Russia since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022. According to the MOD, the average daily number of Russian casualties reached a new monthly high in November, including the loss of 2,030 troops in a single day. Ukraine claims to have destroyed 300 tanks, 900 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and 900 artillery systems in the last month, including a Zoopark-1 counter-battery radar and a TOS-1A Solntsepyok system. The MOD said: “This is the third straight month that Russian forces have sustained new war high average daily losses. “The average daily loss rate was 1,523, according to Ukrainian general staff reporting. (Source: forces.net)

06 Dec 24. Russia’s Lavrov signals readiness to use any means in Ukraine conflict. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in an interview broadcast on Thursday, said the use of a hypersonic missile in the Ukraine war sought to make the West understand that Moscow was ready to use any means to ensure no “strategic defeat” would be inflicted on Moscow. Russia deployed the Oreshnik hypersonic missile against the Ukrainian city of Dnipro last month in what Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin described as a test of a missile he said could not be brought down. He said Russia could bring other such missiles into action in “combat conditions” if required.

“The message is that you, I mean the U.S. and the allies of the U.S., who also provide these long-range weapons to the Kyiv regime – they must understand that we would be ready to use any means not to allow them to succeed in what they call a strategic defeat of Russia,” Lavrov told U.S. journalist Tucker Carlson. “They fight for keeping their hegemony over the world, on any country, any region, any continent. We fight for our legitimate security interests.” (Source: Reuters)

05 Dec 24. Dutch say tight defense market leaves €750m of Ukraine aid unspent. The Netherlands won’t be able to spend €750m (US$790m) of military aid planned for Ukraine this year because of the tight global market for defense equipment, Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans said. Military aid for Ukraine has shifted from equipment supplied from stockpiles at the start of the country’s fight against invading Russian forces, to newly produced equipment now, Brekelmans said in a letter to the Dutch parliament on Tuesday. The international defense industry is “doubly burdened” by demand from countries that seek to bolster their own militaries as well as provide support Ukraine, which is impacting delivery schedules, the minister said.

The Netherlands pays for equipment upon delivery, and is no longer able to realize €750 m euros of planned military aid this year, Brekelmans said. The unspent funds will be transferred to the 2025 defense budget, and will remain destined to providing support for Ukraine.

“The funds are thus not lost and the planned destination remains unchanged,” Brekelmans said.

The Ukrainian defense industry faces the same tight market, according to the Dutch minister. While local defense firms would benefit from significant investments, which is something the Netherlands is working on, Ukraine doesn’t have significant amounts of equipment available that can be delivered this year, he said. The Netherlands has pledged €10.4bn in military support to Ukraine, of which €9.5bn has either been realized, legally committed, or is being negotiated with partners and suppliers in preparation of an agreement, Brekelmans said. The country has plans for the remaining €970m, aimed at fulfilling urgent needs of Ukraine, mainly in the short term, he said.

”Incidentally, a significant portion of this remaining budget will be used to purchase equipment directly from the Ukrainian defense industry,” Brekelmans told parliament. “While these plans are not yet in the execution phase, new changes would delay the delivery of urgent military support.”

The Dutch government coalition has agreed to continue to actively support Ukraine “politically, militarily, financially and morally.” Countries across Europe have been boosting their defense budgets following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and spending by European Union countries on equipment is forecast to climb to €90 bn this year from €61bn in 2023, according to the European Defence Agency. EU countries are buying more weapons to replenish stocks depleted by providing military aid to Ukraine, address capability gaps and increase preparedness for high-intensity conflict, the EDA said in a report on Wednesday. European suppliers of military hardware such as KNDS, Rheinmetall, Saab and MBDA have all reported record order books. Dutch military support to Ukraine includes 24 F-16 fighters, a Patriot air-defense system, main battle tanks including 14 Leopard 2A4s, hundreds of YPR tracked armored personal carriers and two mine-hunting vessels. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)

05 Dec 24. Ukraine Modifies A-22 Foxbat Aircraft into Long-Range Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle. This transformation illustrates a shift in asymmetric warfare, where civilian technologies are repurposed for military use, thereby creating new, unconventional offensive capabilities. On April 4, 2024, Russian media reported that two Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles), modified by Ukrainian forces, were used to carry out strikes in the Republic of Tatarstan, over 1,200 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. These UCAVs reportedly targeted a Shahed-136 drone manufacturing facility and an oil refinery, marking the first use of this strategy and this type of aircraft in that region since the start of the conflict. The Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat, known for its versatility and simplicity, was designed by Ukrainian engineer Yuri Yakovlev as a two-seater ultralight aircraft. First flown in 1996 and introduced in 1999, the A-22 remains popular in recreational aviation due to its lightweight design, ease of assembly, and maneuverability. With its high-wing design, tricycle landing gear, and a stall speed of 52 km/h, the A-22 is manageable and accessible to amateur pilots. Its structure, combining metal and composite materials, offers a balance between durability and lightness, supporting its use in diverse environments. Typically powered by an 80 to 100 horsepower engine, the A-22 reaches a cruising speed of 160 km/h and a maximum speed of 170 km/h, with a flight range of approximately 1,100 km. Although designed for civilian use, the construction and versatility of the A-22 have made it an appealing candidate for conversion into a UCAV platform, allowing its use in combat operations. To transform the A-22 into a UCAV capable of long-range missions, significant modifications were necessary.

Removing non-essential components, such as seats, interior panels, and manual control systems, was likely one of the initial steps, reducing weight and freeing up space for additional fuel and payload capacities. This restructuring also required reinforcing certain structural parts to withstand the stresses associated with increased load, including the fuselage and wings. One critical adjustment for the A-22’s new role was extending its operational range. Although the original aircraft had a maximum range of approximately 1,100 km, Ukrainian forces reportedly modified it to fly over 1,200 km to reach targets deep within Russian territory, such as the Republic of Tatarstan. Achieving this required increasing fuel capacity, likely through additional tanks installed in vacated spaces, maximizing the A-22’s endurance without significantly impacting weight distribution or aerodynamic performance. To complement the increased fuel capacity, optimizing the propulsion system was also essential. This might involve fine-tuning the existing Rotax engine or replacing it with a more fuel-efficient variant to support long-duration missions. With the conversion of the A-22 into an unmanned aircraft, its control systems required substantial upgrades. A sophisticated control and navigation system capable of remote management was integrated, allowing for long-range autonomous flight. Precision guidance was achieved through GPS and inertial navigation systems, providing accurate trajectory toward designated targets even in electronic warfare conditions. Redundant navigation systems, critical in high-risk environments, ensure operational reliability, allowing the UCAV to readjust its course if primary systems are disrupted. Long-range communication systems, potentially encrypted for security, would maintain the link with command centers, permitting real-time updates and adjustments during flight. These adaptations enable the A-22 to execute precise missions deep within enemy territory. For its UCAV role, the A-22 was reconfigured to carry an explosive payload, necessitating the engineering of a dedicated compartment to ensure safe transport and effective deployment. This compartment would need to support up to 90 kg of explosives, potentially tailored for the desired impact and damage profile. A reliable detonation mechanism—likely triggered on impact or remotely activated by operators—was essential for mission success. This configuration makes the A-22 capable of targeting specific installations, such as infrastructure or production facilities, with high-impact munitions, thereby expanding Ukraine’s strategic options in the ongoing conflict. The modification of the A-22 into a UCAV introduces a new strategic capability for Ukrainian forces, allowing long-range strikes against critical infrastructure and military production sites. The attack on a Shahed-136 drone factory and an oil refinery over 1,200 km from the Ukrainian border illustrates how this capability disrupts the perceived safety of rear-echelon sites. By targeting production and resource facilities deep within Russia, the A-22 UCAV exerts a psychological impact on the enemy and imposes a logistical burden by requiring increased defensive measures over a larger area. The accessibility and relatively low cost of kit-built aircraft like the A-22 Foxbat also highlight the potential for similar modifications across other platforms. This tactic could inspire other nations or non-state actors to adopt similar approaches, raising the stakes in asymmetric warfare. The civilian origins and simplicity of the A-22 allow for rapid adaptation, making it an effective platform for such missions with minimal detection risk, especially when flying at low altitudes to evade radar systems.

While the conversion of the A-22 demonstrates adaptability, it carries inherent risks and challenges. The transformation process requires a coordinated approach involving specialists in engineering, avionics, and explosives, which can strain resources and extend timelines. Furthermore, maintaining operational security is crucial; any exposure during the testing phases could lead to countermeasures that diminish the UCAV’s effectiveness in combat. Additionally, executing missions over such distances presents operational risks. Long-range control can be compromised if communication links are disrupted, potentially leading to mission failure or unintended target engagement. Encryption and redundancy are thus essential, but even with these measures, adversarial electronic warfare remains a persistent threat. (Source: UAS VISION/Army Recognition)

04 Dec 24. Safe Pro Group Inc. (Nasdaq: SPAI), a leader in artificial intelligence-driven drone imagery analysis, today announced its latest landmine detection milestone in Ukraine, identifying over 16,500 lethal explosive items using imagery taken from everyday drones and its recently patented Artificial Intelligence (AI)-powered SpotlightAI™ software ecosystem. The rapidly increasing number of detections is the result of expanded real-world data collection and prior usage by customers and stakeholders including the United Nations, the Ukrainian government and major humanitarian organizations currently conducting operations across Ukraine. For a real-life short video demonstration of SpotlightAITM’s newly released features in operation, please click here. Safe Pro is actively working with Ukrainian government entities, multiple humanitarian organizations, and U.S. government prime contractors advocating to increase awareness of SpotlightAI™ and its ability to rapidly detect hundreds of explosive items including newly approved anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. Moving beyond humanitarian land release efforts, the Company believes that its AI-powered image analysis tools can play a critical role in supporting country-wide drone surveys as a precursor to safe reconstruction efforts including drone survey operations around military installations and civilian infrastructure including roads, bridges, dams, and power/water utilities.

“The scale and magnitude of the landmine crisis in Ukraine continues grow daily with the potential increased usage of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions. Before the critically needed reconstruction of civilian infrastructure begins, the land will need to be surveyed for deadly landmines — a massive undertaking only possible with off the shelf drones and AI. That is why we are actively engaging with stakeholders in Washington and a wide range of international stakeholders to illustrate how novel technologies such as our SpotlightAI™ can accelerate global efforts, reduce costs and improve the safety of those denied their land,” said Dan Erdberg, Chairman and CEO of Safe Pro Group Inc.

Unprecedented Detection and Speed with SpotlightAI™

Safe Pro’s patented SpotlightAI™ system, has analyzed more than 921,471 drone images in Ukraine, pinpointing over 16,540 explosive remnants of war (ERW) across 4,219 hectares (over 10,424 acres). Operating at lightning speed on the AWS cloud, SpotlightAI™ analyzes each drone image in less than 0.2 seconds. In contrast, traditional human analysis can take several minutes per image—a process that could span decades if done manually.

World Bank Group assessments estimate an astounding 17 m hectares of Ukrainian land may be contaminated with explosive ordnance. With AWS’s Hyperscale capabilities, SpotlightAI™ is helping to tackle this massive challenge every day, accelerating the survey and land reclamation process. For updates on Safe Pro’s technology in action, visit Safe Pro AI’s Real-Time Landmine Detection Counter, where every mine detected brings Ukraine a step closer to safety and recovery. (Source: BUSINESS WIRE)

04 Dec 24. UK to push Allies to increase support for Ukraine and defence spending at NATO.

Foreign Secretary David Lammy will attend the NATO Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Brussels.

NATO Allies will be urged to bolster support for Ukraine at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Brussels
UK will underscore its commitment to 2.5% defence spending
push will include calls for greater spending on defence capabilities

The UK will call on all NATO Allies to ramp up their support for Ukraine during the Foreign Secretary’s first NATO Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Brussels today. As Ukraine endures a third winter since Russia’s full-scale invasion, he will call on Allies to boost their military assistance and ensure Ukraine continues on its irreversible path to NATO membership. The visit reaffirms the UK’s unshakable commitment to NATO, and our mission to delivering stability and security to enable a more prosperous future for our country. Investing in our collective defence is vital to supporting opportunity and prosperity in the UK – securing supply chains, protecting energy security and underpinning the conditions for continued growth at home. During his intervention at the North Atlantic Council, the Foreign Secretary will reiterate the vital importance of NATO as the foundation of UK and Euro-Atlantic security, which supports the conditions for our economic security and growth including through the UK’s own defence industry. He will also call on Allies to deter cooperation between Russia and its key enablers. Russia has increasing third-party support which must be met with a robust and decisive response from NATO Allies, with the deployment of DPRK forces to Kursk, and Iranian transfers of ballistic missiles to Russia. We will make clear that failing to increase Euro-Atlantic support, will embolden an increasingly aggressive Putin, and force Allies to invest far more in the future. The UK has provided £12.8bn of support to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion and has committed to providing £3bn a year of military support for Ukraine for as long as it takes, with some of the UK’s leading defence companies further helping to strengthen Ukraine’s defensive. The Foreign Secretary will also reiterate the Alliance‘s concerns about China’s role in enabling Russia’s invasion through its exports to the Russian defence industry.

Foreign Secretary David Lammy said: “Investment in Ukraine’s security is investment in Euro-Atlantic and global security. 99% of military support to Ukraine has been from NATO Allies. This support is critical to enabling Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression, and the UK and Allies must double down on our efforts to ensure Ukraine prevails. This government has been clear that Europe must do more together now by increasing defence spending. This is a strategic imperative for our whole continent and it is why the UK is committed to 2.5% as soon as possible.”

At the Foreign Ministerial Meeting, the Foreign Secretary will meet key Allies, including the Finnish, Danish and Turkish foreign ministers. He will discuss a range of matters, including the need to boost defence spending, helping to strengthen both the UK and Ukraine’s defence industrial bases and support investment in further military capabilities.

Minister of State for Europe, North America, and the Overseas Territories, Stephen Doughty, attended the first day of the NATO Foreign Ministerial Meeting, where he advocated for continued support for Ukraine and attended the NATO-Ukraine Council working dinner. He also met with HM King Abdullah II of Jordan alongside Allies to discuss Jordan’s vital role as a NATO partner, and the wider security picture in the Middle East.

The Foreign Secretary will travel on to Malta on Wednesday evening for a working dinner at the OSCE Foreign Ministerial meeting where he will further reiterate the importance of doubling down on support to Ukraine.

(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

02 Dec 24. U.S. Provides More Security Assistance to Ukraine. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III spoke with Rustem Umerov, Ukraine’s defense minister, this morning to discuss battlefield dynamics and U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, said Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, Pentagon press secretary. This security assistance provides key capabilities to support Ukraine’s most urgent battlefield needs, including air defense, munitions for rocket systems and artillery and antitank weapons, Ryder said. This announcement is the 71st tranche of equipment to be provided from Defense Department inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This presidential drawdown authority package has an estimated value of $725m, per a DOD press release today. In other news, the ceasefire between Israel and the terrorist organization Lebanese Hezbollah is holding, with the plan for the Lebanese Armed Forces to provide security in southern Lebanon. Army Maj. Gen. Jasper Jeffers III, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Central, is working with the State Department to help coordinate with the Israeli Defense Forces, France and others to ensure that the LAF has the training, capacity and strategy to provide security there, Ryder said. Jeffers will serve as a co-chair, alongside Amos Hochstein, senior advisor to President Joe Biden, for the implementation and monitoring mechanism of the cessation of hostilities, according to a Nov. 29 U.S. Central Command press release. The monitoring and implementation activities will be chaired by the United States and consist of the LAF, Israel Defense Forces, the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon and France, per the press release. Separately, Ryder said DOD is closely monitoring events around the Aleppo area of northwest Syria, where the terrorist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is battling forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The U.S. is not involved in the fighting, he said, adding that the U.S., together with allies and partners, is urging de-escalation. DOD remains fully prepared to defend and protect U.S. personnel and assets deployed to the region, including U.S. forces in eastern Syria, who are there to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS so it can never again resurge, Ryder said. (Source: U.S. DoD)

03 Dec 24. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine using ‘spoofing’ technology to divert Russian Shahed Drones into Belarus. According to a report by Le Monde on November 26, Ukraine is employing sophisticated Electronic Warfare (EW) technology to intercept and modify the satellite coordinates of Russian Shahed strike drones, redirecting them back into Russian and Belarusian territories.

In an overnight operation beginning on November 25, Russia conducted its largest drone attack on Ukraine since the start of the war, deploying 192 aerial targets, including 188 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported 76 of the drones were shot down using kinetic means – such as fighter jets, helicopters, mobile anti-aircraft batteries, surface-to-air missiles – and electronic jamming systems.

It has now been reported that on Tuesday an additional 95 Russian drones were diverted from their intended target using a system that spoofs satellite coordinates. By disrupting the radar-navigation systems guiding Russian drones, Ukrainian Forces have manged to divert incoming attack drones into neighbouring country Belarus, a key Russian ally in its offensive against Ukraine.

The Belaruski Gayun monitoring project – an open-source intelligence project tracking and monitoring Russian and Belarusian military activity in the territory of Belarus – reported that on the night of November 25-26 “at least 17” Russian Shahed drones entered Belarusian airspace, redirected from Ukraine. Three more Shahed drones were reported in Belarusian airspace by Belaruski Gayun over the following two nights.

It was reported in September 2024 by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) that Ukrainian EW systems were being used to force incoming Russian drones to change course and crash after running out of fuel, disabling them before they could reach the intended destination. Now, it appears that Ukrainian capabilities have advanced to force incoming attack drones redivert into enemy territory.

https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-diverting-russian-shahed-drones-into-belarus/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

02 Dec 24. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine.

The United States has committed more than $62bn in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration, including approximately $61.4bn since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion on February 24, 2022.

Air Defense

Three Patriot air defense batteries and munitions;
12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions;
HAWK air defense systems and munitions;
AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense;
More than 3,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
Avenger air defense systems;
VAMPIRE counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) and munitions;
c-UAS gun trucks and ammunition;
Mobile c-UAS laser-guided rocket systems;
Other c-UAS equipment;
Anti-aircraft guns and ammunition;
Air defense systems components;
Equipment to integrate Western launchers, missiles, and radars with Ukraine’s systems;
Equipment to support and sustain Ukraine’s existing air defense capabilities; and
21 air surveillance radars.

Fires

More than 40 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition;
Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb launchers and guided rockets;
More than 200 155mm Howitzers and more than 3,000,000 155mm artillery rounds;
More than 7,000 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds;
More than 70,000 155mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems;
72 105mm Howitzers and more than 800,000 105mm artillery rounds;
10,000 203mm artillery rounds;
More than 400,000 152mm artillery rounds;
Approximately 40,000 130mm artillery rounds;
40,000 122mm artillery rounds;
60,000 122mm GRAD rockets;
More than 300 mortar systems;
More than 700,000 mortar rounds;
More than 100 counter-artillery and counter-mortar radars; and
More than 50 multi-mission radars;

Ground Maneuver

31 Abrams tanks;
45 T-72B tanks;
More than 300 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles;
Four Bradley Fire Support Team vehicles;
More than 400 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers;
More than 900 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
More than 400 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles;
More than 1,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles;
More than 5,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);
More than 200 light tactical vehicles;
300 armored medical treatment vehicles;
80 trucks and more than 200 trailers to transport heavy equipment;
More than 1,000 tactical vehicles to tow and haul equipment;
153 tactical vehicles to recover equipment;
10 command post vehicles;
30 ammunition support vehicles;
27 armored bridging systems;
20 logistics support vehicles and equipment;
239 fuel tankers and 105 fuel trailers;
58 water trailers;
Six armored utility trucks;
125mm, 120mm, and 105mm tank ammunition;
More than 1,800,000 rounds of 25mm ammunition; and
Mine clearing equipment.

Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Systems

20 Mi-17 helicopters;
Switchblade Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS);
Phoenix Ghost UAS;
CyberLux K8 UAS;
Altius-600 UAS;
Jump-20 UAS;
Hornet UAS
Puma UAS;
Scan Eagle UAS;
Penguin UAS;
Raven UAS;
Two radars for UAS;
High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
Air-to-ground munitions;
More than 6,000 Zuni aircraft rockets;
More than 20,000 Hydra-70 aircraft rockets; and
Munitions for UAS.

Anti-armor and Small Arms

More than 10,000 Javelin anti-armor systems;
More than 120,000 other anti-armor systems and munitions;
More than 10,000 Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
More than 50,000 grenade launchers and small arms;
More than 500,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades;
Laser-guided rocket systems and munitions;
Rocket launchers and ammunition; and
Anti-armor mines.

Maritime

Two Harpoon coastal defense systems and anti-ship missiles;
More than 100 coastal and riverine patrol boats;
Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels; and
Port and harbor security equipment.

Other capabilities

M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions;
C-4 explosives, demolition munitions, and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing;
Obstacle emplacement equipment;
Counter air defense capability;
More than 100,000 sets of body armor and helmets;
Tactical secure communications systems and support equipment;
Four satellite communications (SATCOM) antennas;
SATCOM terminals and services;
Electronic warfare (EW) and counter-EW equipment;
Commercial satellite imagery services;
Night vision devices, surveillance and thermal imagery systems, optics, and rangefinders;
Equipment to protect critical national infrastructure;
Explosive ordnance disposal equipment and protective gear;
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment;
Medical supplies, including first aid kits, bandages, monitors, and other equipment;
Field equipment, cold weather gear, generators, and spare parts; and
Support for training, maintenance, and sustainment activities.

The United States also continues to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself.

(Source: U.S. DoD)

02 Dec 24. Ukraine sees use of uncrewed ground vehicles, AI-targeting drones surging next year. Ukraine ramps up warfare technology production to help frontlines

Summary
Fedorov promotes drone and missile innovation
Sees ‘revolution’ in use of ground vehicles
Expects AI targeting in drones to surge next year
Says Russia striking long-range drone launch sites

Ukraine will need tens of thousands of uncrewed robotic ground vehicles next year to shuttle ammunition and supplies to infantry in the trenches and evacuate wounded soldiers, a senior government minister told Reuters. The buggy-like vehicles, an example of how technology is transforming trench warfare in Ukraine, would spare troops from operating in areas near the front where Russian shelling and drones are rife, Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said.

“This year we purchased several thousand ground platforms, and next year, I believe, we need tens of thousands,” the minister, who has overseen drone procurement for most of the war, said in an interview.

The vehicles, he said, are already being used along the front and in Russia’s Kursk region, where Kyiv’s troops carved out an enclave in an August incursion. Ukraine has several training centres to teach their use, he added. (Source: Reuters)

02 Dec 24. Ukraine improves at knocking out Russian drones. Ukraine has significantly increased its capacity to intercept Shahed drones, which are then destroyed or sent back into Russian and Belarusian airspace. Russia’s drone strikes are less effective as a result and have added an “increased burden” on Russian and Belarusian air defence systems, according to the Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank. Of the 110 Shahed drones and decoys that were launched at Ukraine on December 1-2, 50 were “lost” (45 per cent) due to EW interference, while 52 more were shot down, according to Petro Chernyk, a Ukrainian military expert. By contrast, of the 105 drones launched on Oct 2, 78 were shot down and 23 were “lost” (22 per cent). Innovations in electronic warfare (EW) interference means that the majority of Russian drones are grounded, lost, or sent back to the country they were launched from. A record number of Russian Shahed drones – 38 – were sent back via Belarusian airspace on Nov 25, forcing Minsk to scramble several fighter jets in response to the airspace violation. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

02 Dec 24. Ukraine Unveils Buntar-1 Advanced VTOL Reconnaissance Drone. The Ukrainian company Buntar Aerospace has developed the Buntar-1, a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) reconnaissance drone, Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation reported. The Buntar-1 drone is designed for real-time reconnaissance, target guidance, artillery adjustment, and directing the use of various weaponry, including both barrel and rocket artillery. The standout feature of the Buntar-1 drone is its uninterrupted communication capability, even under electronic warfare conditions. According to reports, one of the drone’s developers is a member of the Security and Defense Forces, ensuring the Buntar-1 was tailored to meet the practical needs identified on the front lines. Additionally, Buntar Aerospace has integrated proprietary software into the drone, automating the work of the external crew and enhancing their situational awareness. The Buntar-1 has an operational range of approximately 50 kilometers. In its next iteration, the Buntar-3, developers aim to extend the drone’s flight time to three hours. An experienced crew can master the Buntar-1 in just 3 days, while training from scratch takes about 3 weeks. The report also highlights feedback from a commander of an aerial reconnaissance unit operating in the Kharkiv region. He noted that 100 minutes of flight time with the Buntar-1 proved far more effective than other reconnaissance drones with a flight duration of around 3 hours. At the beginning of October, the Netherlands announced a €400m investment to support the development of reconnaissance, combat, and other drones for Ukraine. (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24MEDIA)

02 Dec 24. Frankenburg Technologies plans test of anti-UAV missile in Ukraine. Estonian defence firm Frankenburg Technologies plans to test its Frankenburg Missile Mark 1 in Ukraine in the coming months, hoping to ramp up production, the company told Janes. The missile, according to Kusti Salm, CEO of Frankenburg Technologies, targets unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) capable of flying at altitudes of up to 2 km. Shahed UAVs are regularly used at those altitudes by Russia to attack Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The Iranian loitering munitions Shahed-131 (called Geran-1 by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and Shahed-136 (Geran-2) weapon systems have been used in Ukraine by Russian forces since 2022, according to Janes Weapons: Air-Launched. Frankenburg Technologies aims to “revolutionise missile targeting by employing our cutting-edge, AI [artificial intelligence]-powered situational awareness platform”, according to information on the company’s website. Frankenburg’s Missile Mark 1 includes this AI feature “to a limited extent”, Salm told Janes on 28 November 2024. “We have a proprietary threat anticipation platform for aerial threat detection and target acquisition.”

The company’s goal is to “bring down the price of air-defence missiles by a factor of 10”, Salm told Janes. “We also aim to increase manufacturing to hundreds per day (not hundreds a year as it is now).” If trials are successful, production of the missile could be established inside Ukraine, as per a press release published by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) on 8 November. During a meeting between the Frankenburg Technologies team, which included Salm, and Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defence Brigadier General Anatolii Klochko, both sides agreed that financing for missile production would need to be determined as a next step. (Source: Janes)

02 Dec 24. On the digital frontlines, Ukraine creates cyber-attack training system. Ukraine has leveraged its ongoing experience of digital warfare in its war against Russia to create a new cybersecurity training offering. While Ukraine’s experiences on the frontlines of Russia’s war is providing Nato and allied countries with opportunities to take notes of real-world combat lessons, so too are operations the cyber domain offering valuable insight into Moscow’s digital grey-zone tactics. Ukraine has found finds itself combatting Russian operations in the digital domain on a daily basis, as Moscow seeks to leverage state and non-state tools at its disposal to meet its goals. Delving into lessons learned in combatting Russian cyber-attacks, Ukraine has created a synthetic cybersecurity platform centre dubbed TRYZUB (Trident), intended to offer training experiences from what it termed “the trenches of the first-ever cyberwar”, via high-fidelity cyber-attack emulations. The TRYZUB centre offers participants the role of a cybersecurity team facing cyber incidents from Gamaredon and Sandworm threat actors and related hacker groups, which have targetted sectors such as defence, energy, and other critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Scenarios for TRYZUB were developed by CERT-UA, part of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (SSSCIP), which together with US-based CYBER RANGES created the examples of real-world operations, incorporating modern digital defence tactics.

Brig Gen Oleksandr Potii, head of Ukraine’s SSSCIP, said the use of real-world scenarios in TRYZUB would “undoubtedly help train security officers in the most modern methods of countering cyberattacks”.

Cyberattacks on Ukraine by Russian paramilitary forces or aligned groups have become increasingly common, with a recent disclosure by the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) singling out Unit 29155, a specialist military unit of Russia’s GRU, as having carried out attacks at scale. A joint advisory issued in September 2024 by the NCSC – a part of GCHQ – and a range of Nato agencies as well as Australia and Ukraine, revealed Unit 29155’s operations had targetted organisations for espionage purposes, causing “reputational harm” by the theft and leaking of sensitive data, defacing of websites, and “systematic sabotage” caused by the destruction of data. The group differs to more established GRU-related cyber groups Unit 26165 (Fancy Bear) and Unit 74455 (Sandworm). At a recent Nato cybersecurity conference, a senior UK government official singled out Unit 29155, as a particular threat, warning it had attacked government services, the financial sector, transport systems, and energy and healthcare in Nato member countries. To this end, Nato “must learn” from Ukraine’s experience in operations in the digital domain, according to Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Pat McFadden, speaking at the Nato Cyber Defence Conference at Lancaster House on 25 November 2024, where the UK announced the creation of a new AI security research laboratory. Ukraine provides a great example, because it has displayed unimaginable courage and innovation in the face of a daily barrage of cyber-attacks. It has worked tirelessly with industry and civilian organisations to bolster its cyber security,” McFadden said.

According to GlobalData’s Thematic Intelligence: Cybersecurity in Defense (2024) report, the global cybersecurity market is forecast to hit $290bn by 2027, growing at a compound annual growth rate of 13% over the period. Typically, cyberattacks target critical infrastructure in grey-zone operations, part of a hybrid warfare approach that offers a degree of deniability by state actors. Crucially, analysis indicates that defence companies have adopted a ‘zero-trust’ model, and collaborate to combat cyber threats. (Source: army-technology.com)

02 Dec 24. Ukraine sees use of uncrewed ground vehicles, AI-targeting drones surging next year.

Summary
Fedorov promotes drone and missile innovation
Sees ‘revolution’ in use of ground vehicles
Expects AI targeting in drones to surge next year
Says Russia striking long-range drone launch sites

The buggy-like vehicles, an example of how technology is transforming trench warfare in Ukraine, would spare troops from operating in areas near the front where Russian shelling and drones are rife, Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said.

The use of military technology has rapidly evolved, even as the war has been locked in a bloody, attritional struggle with no major battlefield changes despite Russia’s recently accelerating gains 33 months since the 2022 invasion.

Fedorov, whose official remit is digital affairs, has played a prominent role in supporting the development of military technology through a government-backed platform to nurture private-sector innovation. As of this month he no longer oversees the procurement of drones.

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Ukraine has focused heavily on increasing production and improving the specifications of long-range attack drones to conduct deep strikes on Russia, narrowing the gulf in capabilities with its adversary.

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Ukrainian production of long-range drones has increased dozens of times since 2023, with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy targeting output of 30,000 of the deep-strike weapons next year, Fedorov said.

Russia has been launching thousands of long-range drones per month, making heavy use of low-cost “decoy” drones that wear down Ukraine’s air defence forces, which see a blip on the radar and are forced to shoot it down.

Fedorov said Ukraine was also using decoy drones and was sometimes launching more attack drones on a given night than Russia, but it was not purely a numbers game.

“[AI is] used to some extent, but the more critical issues are connectivity and launch methods of deep strike (drones),” he said.

“Russia has improved monitoring of (Ukraine’s) drone launches, quickly responding and targeting launch sites. These nuances require constant launch method and connectivity changes.”

Ukraine had attack drones that could fly up to 1,800 km (1,120 miles), he said.

He also confirmed Ukraine was working on drones to intercept the Shahed-type long-range attack drones that Russia uses for its nightly attacks on Ukrainian cities.

“There is some testing by certain companies producing … aircraft that, thanks to specialised software and radars, can strike Shaheds, but this is still in the research and development phase. There are certain results,” he said.

He said Ukraine had contracted to buy 1.6m drones this year, of which 1.3m had been supplied, including low-cost “first person view” (FPV) drones that have cameras allowing remote pilots to fly them towards their targets.

Ukraine has also been using dozens of domestically made artificial intelligence-augmented systems for its drones to reach targets on the battlefield without being piloted, allowing it to remain effective in areas protected by extensive jamming.

Fedorov said 10 companies were consistently competing in state procurements to offer AI products.

“I think next year will significantly increase the percentage of autonomous drones with targeting,” he said. “We might see the first real drone swarm uses, though not on a massive scale. The first steps will happen.” (Source: Reuters)

29 Nov 24. Ukraine takes delivery of air defence system from Canada. Canada’s donation of a National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), valued at approximately CAD406 m, has arrived in Ukraine. This system was purchased by Canada from the United States, and is a new build from Raytheon in partnership with Kongsberg. It has been donated specifically to help Ukraine strengthen its air defence systems against destructive drone, missile and aircraft attacks on military sites, civilian critical infrastructure, and population centres. This donation builds on previous deliveries of armoured vehicles, artillery, drone cameras, winter clothing, and ongoing efforts by the Royal Canadian Air Force to transport Ukraine-bound military aid donated by Canada, Allies, and partners. Canada is also providing a training mission known as Operation UNIFIER. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

29 Nov 24. Summa Defence partners with Ukrainian firms for ‘industrial-scale’ UAV production. Finnish defence and security technology group Summa Defence Ltd, in collaboration with its Ukrainian partners, plans to produce more than 1,000 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) per year, Jussi Holopainen, CEO and president of Summa Defence Ltd, told Janes on 29 November.

He also stated that Summa Defence does not plan to build new facilities but use old ones, with production starting in the first half of 2025 and that Ukraine will be provided with the first batch of UAVs produced through the venture over the course of 2025.

The “industrial-scale” UAV production will be part of the group’s plans to establish a facility in Finland with its Ukrainian partners “to rapidly increase production capacity for drones used in combat in Ukraine”, according to the company’s press release on 28 November.

The company said that to do this it will establish a subsidiary called Summa Drones Ltd, which “will then form a joint venture in Finland with its Ukrainian partners, with Summa Drones holding the majority ownership”.

Summa Defence said its future subsidiary Summa Drones would also manufacture marine drones, which could mean either unmanned surface vessels (USVs) or unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) as part of the venture.

“Drones will be delivered not only to Ukraine but also across the European Union and NATO countries,” Holopainen said. (Source: Janes)

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