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Military And Security Developments
Nov 22.
22 Nov 24. The Swedish government today announced it will provide “substantial funding” for the mass production of long-range missiles and drones inside Ukraine, a major step as Stockholm seeks to bolster Kyiv’s defensive efforts.
Dollars and timelines were not revealed during the announcement, made today by Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson as he hosted his Ukrainian counterpart, Rustem Umerov. But the move shows that Stockholm is dedicated to supporting Ukraine for the long-haul.
“This will be produced in Ukraine by the Ukrainian defense industry. It will be financed by Sweden. President [Vladimir] Zelenskyy has stated that there is an especially high demand for funding long-range weapons and long-range drones,” Jonson said at a press briefing Friday at Karlsberg Palace in Solna.
“Ukraine is Sweden’s number one security priority,” Jonson stated. He later underlined that Ukraine has “the full right” in accordance with international law to defend itself “inside and outside” of its territory. As of Oct. 4, Sweden has donated military assistance worth approximately 48.4bn Swedish krona ($4.37bn), per a government fact sheet. Stockholm has previously pledged a commitment of 25 billion Swedish krona ($2.28 billion USD) for 2025 and the same amount for 2026, numbers the government here has said could go up if needed.
“We’re glad that we can further develop both your capability to produce long-range missiles and also long-range strike approach,” Jonson said, addressing Umerov. (Source: Breaking Defense.com)
22 Nov 24. Eurasia: Newly identified cyber operation underscores espionage risk posed by Russian-nexus groups. On 21 November, the cyber security company Recorded Future reported that the Russian-nexus group ‘TAG-110’ is targeting government, human rights and educational organisations in Central Asia, East Asia and Europe in a cyber espionage campaign. The group typically obtains access to targeted systems via the exploitation of software vulnerabilities and/or phishing emails. TAG-110 then installs a custom loader (‘HATVIBE’) on compromised systems to establish communication with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure and deploy a custom backdoor (‘CHERRYSPY’). Subsequently, the group uses CHERRYSPY to monitor victims’ systems and exfiltrate strategic information to C2 servers. Both custom malware strains contain several advanced obfuscation techniques to evade detection, underscoring the sophistication of TAG-110’s tactics. This operation likely aims to collect information to bolster Moscow’s security and military posture, as Russian-nexus groups routinely target strategically-significant countries in cyber espionage operations. This points to heightened security and espionage risks to the aforementioned sectors amid sustained geopolitical tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
Nov 21.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• STRIKES: Russian forces launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at Ukraine for the first time, which is almost certainly aimed at illustrating Russia’s nuclear capability amid heightened tensions over strikes
• STRIKES: Ukrainian forces have launched their first long-range strikes inside Russia using US-provided ATACMS and UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles
• NEGOTIATIONS: Unconfirmed Russian sources claim that Putin is open to discussing a ceasefire deal with US President-elect Donald Trump, though the Kremlin has continued to reject a ceasefire that would freeze the war along its current lines
• FORECAST: President Putin formally revised Russia’s nuclear doctrine in direct response to the US decision to authorise long-range strikes inside Russia, but a nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely – though hybrid retaliation across Europe remains highly likely
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing to increase pressure along the flanks of Chasiv Yar, and have made advances both to the north and south of the settlement in recent days. Geolocated footage published on 20 November indicates Russian advances east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (located north of Chasiv Yar), notably an area where the Russians have not advanced for months. Similarly, footage also indicates Russian forces are continuing to advance up to the west bank of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal to the south of the town. While it remains unclear how much of the canal remains in Ukrainian hands, Russian forces are clearly advancing in a bid to apply pressure along Chasiv Yar’s southern flank.
• BAKHMUT: Further south in Toretsk, Russian forces are continuing to grind forwards in the centre of the town. Geolocated footage from 19 November indicates Russian advances in the centre of the town around various high-rise buildings, as well as further advances in the southwestern district of the town.
• DONETSK: Recent Ukrainian gains in the Pokrovsk sector likely underscore a moderate slowdown of Russian operations in the area, as Moscow likely prioritises assaults on Kurakhove to the south. Geolocated footage posted on 20 November confirmed that Ukrainian forces regained some lost positions south of Mykolaivka (east of Pokrovsk).
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, the situation of Ukrainian defensive positions in Kurakhove is becoming increasingly critical as Russian forces continue to make grinding gains in the sector. On 21 November, Russian military sources quoted by Russian news agency TASS claimed that Ukrainian forces had lost half of their defensive positions to Russia in Kurakhove. These sources further claimed that Ukraine is attempting to transfer reserves to the western outskirts of the city. Geolocated footage from 19 November shows Russian advances south of Sontsivka (north of Kurakhove), east of Berestky (north of Kurakhove along the northern shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir), along Franka Street in eastern Kurakhove, and along the railway bridge over the reservoir. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko said that the Russia command is transferring Storm-V penal assault detachments from Russian training grounds along the occupied Mariupol-Berdiansk line towards to occupied Volnovakha (north of Mariupol). Such assault detachments will likely be transferred to the Kurakhove sector.
• DONETSK: Geolocated from 20 November shows recent Russian advances north-east of Bohoyavlenka (north-west of Vuhledar) following a platoon-sized mechanised assault.
• KHARKIV: Despite remaining a lower-priority frontline for both Russian and Ukrainian forces, both sides continue to launch attacks and counter-attacks along the Kharkiv oblast border area. Geolocated footage from 19 November indicates limited Ukrainian advances in a wooded region south of Hlyboke (located north of Kharkiv city). Meanwhile, both Ukrainian and Russian sources have also reported in recent days failed assaults by both sides, though we cannot confirm further advances at this time.
• KHARKIV: Notably, a Ukrainian drone platoon commander operating on the Kharkiv frontline reported on 18 November that Russian forces are using technologically sophisticated camouflage systems, which is making it difficult for the Ukrainians to identify hidden targets. The commander claimed that Ukrainian forces are using artificial intelligence (AI) to help identify these hidden targets. While we cannot confirm this, such reports reflect the rapid technological development on the frontline, with both sides experimenting with novel technologies to create advantage or overcome vulnerabilities.
• KURSK: Geolocated footage from 18 November indicates Russian advances in northern Malaya Loknya (located north of Sudzha), while footage from 19 November indicates advances north-east of Nizhny Klin (south-west of Malya Loknya). Various Russian sources have claimed in recent days that their forces have ‘routed’ Ukrainian forces operating in the Olgovka forest areas (located south-east of Korenevo) on the north-west flank of the Kursk salient. However, we cannot confirm whether Ukrainian forces were surrounded in this area, but it remains likely that Ukraine is no longer operating in the area.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Kupiansk continues to remain a hotspot for intense fighting, with Russian assaults ongoing in the eastern part of the town, yielding confirmed gains south-east of the settlement. Geolocated footage from 19 November shows Russian forces advancing in western Hlushkivka (south-east of Kupiansk). Meanwhile Russian milbloggers continued to report fighting within eastern Kupiansk and Russian advances north of Kupiansk. These latter claims remain visually unconfirmed, however.
• SOUTHERN: Along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border region, Russian forces are continuing to increase pressure and have made some advances in recent days. Geolocated footage from 19 November confirms the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD)’s earlier claims that Russian forces have captured the village of Rivnopil, a settlement located less than seven miles (10km) to the south-west of Velyka Novosilka. Wider reporting in recent days has indicated that Russian forces are launching numerous attacks in this direction, but we cannot confirm further advances. Notably, Ukraine’s Spokesperson for the Tavriisk Group of Forces Vyacheslav Voloshyn reported on 20 November that Russian forces are attacking along this section of the frontline in a bid to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) between Velyka Novosilka and Kurakhove.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 18-19 November, Russia launched 87 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 51 drones over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 30 drones were reportedly lost, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures.
• STRIKES: Early on 20 November, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with one S-300 missile, five Kh-59/69 missiles and 122 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces shot down two Kh-59/69 missiles and 56 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 58 UAVs were reportedly lost.
• STRIKES: Early on 21 November, Russian forces fired a Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missile, seven Kh-101 cruise missiles and one non-nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Ukraine’s Air Force intercepted six Kh-101 missiles, while the remaining missile hit a residential building in Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), injuring 26 people.
• STRIKES: The latest attack was the first time Russian forces have used an ICBM since the start of the war, and reportedly hit targets in Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). According to Ukrainska Pravda, Russia launched an RS-26 Rubezh ICBM, though we cannot confirm this. The missile was launched from Russia’s southern Astrakhan oblast, located 403 miles (650km) from the Ukrainian border, where the Kaputsin Yar military training area and a rocket launch complex are located. ICBMs are designed to carry nuclear warheads, though they can also carry conventional warheads, as was the case during the 21 November attack. The RS-26 has an operational range of 3,604 miles (5,800 km) and can reach a maximum speed of Mach 20. Russia has previously launched other nuclear-capable missiles, including short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The latest unprecedented ICBM launch comes after reports of Ukraine launching for the first time US-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems against Russian territory. The ICBM launch is almost certainly part of Moscow’s nuclear signalling in response to Ukraine’s missile attacks (for further analysis, see FORECAST).
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 19 November, Ukrainian media outlets reported that Ukraine had carried out its first long-range strike inside Russian territory with US-provided ATACMS against an arsenal depot in Russia’s Bryansk oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that air defences intercepted five of the six ATACMS launched by Ukraine and that the last missile was damaged, likely in an attempt to frame Kyiv’s attack as ineffective. While we cannot confirm the damage caused, Ukrainian sources claim it triggered multiple secondary explosions. The attack follows US President Joe Biden’s reported authorisation for Kyiv to conduct such strikes (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 18 November 2024). While initial reports indicated that Biden’s authorisation was limited to the Kursk oblast, the attack against Bryansk likely indicates that authorisation is not limited to that single region.
• STRIKES: On 20 November, Ukraine reportedly fired UK-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles into Russia’s Kursk oblast, hitting a Russian command post near Marino. Russian milbloggers claimed that the attack included 12 missiles. The UK government had not made any public statement authorising the use of such missiles against Russian territory and has not yet commented on the latest reports. However, we assess that it is highly likely that this authorisation has already been granted. It remains likely that Kyiv will conduct similar strikes with SCALP missiles, the French variant of the Storm Shadow missiles. Key targets for Ukrainian strikes with ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles include arsenal depots, particularly those housing glide bombs, military concentrations, command posts and military logistics hubs.
• STRIKES: Concurrently, overnight on 19-20 November, Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale drone attack targeting military and defence assets in Belgorod, Novgorod and Voronezh oblasts. Russia’s MoD claimed that air defences intercepted 44 UAVs. Andriy Kovalenko, the head of Ukraine’s counter-disinformation department in the National Security and Defence Council, said that the attack hit an arsenal near Kotovo (Novgorod oblast). The arsenal reportedly houses ammunition for tube artillery, mortar mines, various multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS) missiles, Iskandr ballistic missiles, S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles, North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles, and Tor surface-to-air system missiles. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that one of the strikes hit a command post of the Russian ‘Sever’ (Northern) Grouping of Forces in Gubkin, Belgorod oblast.
• STRIKES: The latest attacks clearly underscore Kyiv’s growing capabilities to orchestrate complex strikes combining both drones and missiles, amid wider efforts to diversify strike tactics. However, limits on the stockpiles of Western-provide missiles will remain the main obstacles for Kyiv to continue such strikes, with the Times reporting on 20 November that Ukraine only has about 50 ATACMS missiles due to extremely high demand for the systems across the world – with Ukraine reportedly low on the list for replenishment. Nevertheless, in an effort to boost Ukraine’s own domestic production of long-range capabilities, on 19 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky instructed the country’s military-industrial base to produce at least 3,000 cruise missiles and drone-missiles as well as 30,000 long-range drones in 2025.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• PARTITION: Ukrainian intelligence has claimed that unknown Russian actors within Russia’s Ministry of Defence have proposed a plan to partition Ukraine as part of a plan to create a ‘new world order’ by 2045. According to the unconfirmed documents cited by Inferfax-Ukraine on 20 November, the plan envisages partitioning Ukraine into three: firstly, eastern oblasts annexed by Russia will be ceded to Moscow; secondly, central Ukraine will become a pro-Russian puppet state; and thirdly, the remaining oblasts west of Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia oblasts will be deemed so-called ‘disputed territories’, which can be divided up and ceded to various European nations, namely Hungary, Poland and Romania.
• PARITION: These alleged plans remain unconfirmed, but they do align with various statements senior Russian officials have made in recent years relating to Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine. Establishing a pro-Russian regime in Kyiv has remained a key priority for Moscow, alongside annexation of various territories in the so-called Novorossiya region of eastern Ukraine. It remains unclear precisely what territorial concessions Moscow will demand if and when peace negotiations begin in 2025, but this will likely centre around the formally annexed oblasts in the east (including territory therein which remains under Ukrainian control).
• TERRITORY: A recent poll indicates that a majority of Ukrainians are in favour of negotiations to end the war as soon as possible, with an increasing minority agreeing that ceding territory is necessary. Gallup published a poll on 19 November that found that 52% of Ukrainians surveyed between August and October 2024 believe Ukraine should negotiate an end to the war as soon as possible, compared to 38% who believed that Ukraine should continue fighting until it wins the war. This is a notable change given that in 2023, Gallup found 63% believed Ukraine should continue fighting until it wins the war, while only 27% wanted to see negotiations to end the war quickly. This clearly reflects growing desires amongst Ukrainians (particularly in the eastern oblasts) for a resolution to the war in 2025. However, of those 52% that favoured negotiations in 2024, only 52% of that number agree that Ukraine should make territorial concessions to end the war, with 38% of those disagreeing.
• TERRITORY: This means that, overall, only around 25% of the Ukrainian population surveyed agree with territorial concessions. These numbers are nevertheless likely to continue increasing as the war drags on, but it indicates that there is still not majority or consensus on the need to cede territory amongst Ukrainian society. Notably, this week President Zelensky has been emphasising the need for the war to end in 2025, but he has underlined the need for a just peace for Ukraine. However, when asked on 21 November about ceding territory to Russia during possible negotiations, Zelensky notably stated that in the case of Crimea, Ukraine seeks to return it ‘diplomatically’, stating that ‘we cannot spend [tens of thousands] of our people so that they perish for the sake of Crimea coming back [to Ukraine]’. This is the latest indication that Kyiv has abandoned expectations of reclaiming Crimea militarily, though Zelensky did state that Ukraine ‘cannot legally acknowledge any occupied territory of Ukraine as Russian’. While territorial concessions will likely be necessary if an end to the war is to be brought about in 2025, Russia’s readiness to reach a compromise will also be necessary.
• NEGOTIATIONS: On 20 November, Reuters reported that five sources with knowledge of the Kremlin stated that Putin is open to discussing a ceasefire deal with US President-elect Donald Trump. The sources reportedly include current and former Russian officials, who claim that Moscow is prepared to discuss the precise borders of the four eastern regions which Russia has formally annexed (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts). The sources also claimed that Russia is open to withdrawing from territory it controls in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts (likely as part of a territory exchange, which we have previously assessed would be likely proposals during peace talks). Ultimately, these statements cannot be confirmed and the full extent to which Putin is prepared to entertain concessions and compromises remains unclear. In response to the Reuters report, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov ruled out the prospect of freezing the frontline along its current lines – stating this would be unsatisfactory for Putin.
FORECAST
ESCALATION: On 19 November, the 1,000th day since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an updated version of Russia’s nuclear doctrine, in a move that is almost certainly a direct response to the US authorisation of long-range strikes inside Russia. The new 2024 doctrine, the first update since the 2020 nuclear doctrine, stipulates under what conditions Russia could use nuclear weapons. Amongst the most significant changes include an attack by a non-nuclear power (namely Ukraine), supported by or with the assistance of a nuclear power (namely the US, UK or France), to be a ‘joint attack’ on Russia – which could facilitate the potential use of nuclear weapons in response. The doctrine specifies that any aggression against Russia by a state which is a member of a coalition would be seen as aggression from the whole group – a clear illusion to NATO. The doctrine also formally extends Russia’s nuclear umbrella over Belarus for the first time. Notably, the revised doctrine also no longer states that nuclear weapons are ‘solely’ a means of deterrence, implying that they could be used pre-emptively.
The change in nuclear doctrine was expected and is highly unlikely to indicate preparations for an imminent nuclear escalation. Putin had previously outlined the proposed changes to the doctrine on 25 September, again almost certainly in response to earlier discussions around the US providing authorisation for long-range strikes. Russia has accused the US of seeking an escalation, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on 21 November that Russia is making every effort to prevent a nuclear conflict, accusing the US of irresponsible actions. Deputy US Pentagon Spokesperson Sabrina Singh further stated on 20 November that the US has seen no signs that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapons, and the US is not adjusting its own nuclear posture.
Ultimately, Russia has not responded to the latest ATACMS/Storm Shadow conventional strikes inside Russia with nuclear retaliation, and Russia has previously failed to follow through with any of its stated (but often vague) threats of nuclear retaliation against the West when previous so-called ‘red lines’ were crossed. These included the provision of HIMARS systems, short-range ATACMS systems, Western main battle tanks, F-16s and Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles. As such, the revision of the nuclear doctrine was likely aimed at reinvigorating the credibility of Russia’s nuclear threats.
While the launching of the conventionally-armed ICBM at Dnipro is almost certainly aimed at illustrating nuclear capability and willingness to escalate further, we assess that a nuclear escalation over this issue is highly unlikely, with Peskov’s statements indicating that Moscow also does not want an escalation. For further analysis on Russia’s nuclear doctrine, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 26 September 2024.
Nevertheless, despite the low likelihood of a nuclear escalation, Moscow will almost certainly ramp up grey zone attacks in retaliation and in an attempt to deter further support for Ukraine, targeting European and US interests across the region. On 18 November, a fault was detected on the C-Lion1 fibre optic cable that runs under the Baltic Sea between Finland and Germany. Meanwhile, on the same day, Lithuanian-based telecommunications provider Telia Lietuva reported that another undersea cable connecting Lithuania and Sweden, which intersects with the C-Lion 1 cable, was cut on 17 November. It remains unclear whether these incidents were accidental. Nevertheless, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius stated that he suspects the (Finnish-German cable incident) was an act of hybrid sabotage; though, he refrained from attributing blame.
We have repeatedly assessed that Russia’s Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (GUGI) has both the capability and intent to sabotage undersea European infrastructure, though it remains unclear if it was an accident. Various Russian vessels have nevertheless conducted undersea reconnaissance across European waters in recent years, likely mapping critical infrastructure. While we cannot confirm whether this was a Russian operation, hybrid or grey zone operations are set to continue to increase in the coming months as Moscow seeks to deter future support for Ukraine. As such, risks including sabotage, assassination plots, mis- and dis-information influence operations and other espionage will remain high across the continent.
• Russia-Ukraine: Nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely despite Russian nuclear signalling. Earlier on 21 November, Ukraine reported that Russia fired a non-nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the first time since the start of the war in Ukraine. The missile was launched from Russia’s southern Astrakhan oblast, located 403 miles (650km) from the Ukrainian border, targeting Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast, Ukraine). ICBMs have a range greater than 3,400 miles (5,500km) and can carry nuclear and conventional warheads. The latest unprecedented ICBM launch follows reports of Ukraine launching US-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) against de jure Russian territory for the first time. On 19 November, President Vladimir Putin approved an updated nuclear doctrine allowing the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional missile strikes; this was almost certainly in response to Kyiv’s ATACMS strike. Moscow’s conventional ICBM strike is part of the Kremlin’s nuclear signalling following Washington DC’s authorisation earlier this week and is aimed at illustrating Russia’s capability to escalate to deter further support for Ukraine. However, we assess that a major nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely. That said, further nuclear signalling, provocative rhetoric and mis- and dis-information designed to instil panic will continue in the coming weeks.
Nov 20.
• Ukraine: Likely high-intensity long-range strikes in coming days will sustain elevated security risks. Earlier on 20 November, the US embassy in the capital Kyiv stated it had temporarily closed its building out of an ‘abundance of caution’ after receiving credible reports of a possible large-scale Russian strike. The embassy instructed its staff and US citizens in Ukraine to seek shelter, follow the authorities’ guidance, and monitor local media. The Spanish embassy in Kyiv has now also announced it will close due to this threat. The US embassy’s warning comes after Ukraine reportedly launched (for the first time) US-provided long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) against Russia’s Bryansk oblast, targeting a military depot. US President Joe Biden reportedly authorised strikes against de jure Russian territory earlier this week. We assess Moscow will likely conduct retaliatory high-intensity strikes combining a large number of missiles and drones in the coming days in retaliation; the embassy districts in Shevchenkivskyi district are a possible target. Although the capital has the densest air defence coverage in the country, we assess that Russia’s innovative strike tactics will likely aim at overwhelming air defences; the risk of falling projectile debris will pose collateral risks across the country.
Nov 19.
• Russia: Major nuclear escalation remains unlikely despite revision of nuclear doctrine. Earlier on 19 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved an updated nuclear doctrine allowing the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional missile strikes. The decision is almost certainly a response to US President Joe Biden reportedly authorising Ukraine to use US-supplied long-range missiles to strike Russia’s Kursk oblast. Biden’s authorisation, however, is unlikely to yield significant breakthroughs for Ukraine. US President-elect Donald Trump will likely repeal this authorisation later amid efforts to end the war in Ukraine. As we have previously assessed, a nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely despite Russia’s nuclear rhetoric, which is likely aimed at disincentivising further support for Ukraine and at deterring the UK and France from granting similar long-range missile strike approvals. In the meantime, we assess that Russia will likely respond to the approval indirectly by ramping up hybrid operations across Europe and supplying weapons to entities opposed to the West. For further analysis regarding the risks of nuclear escalation.
• Region: Baltic Sea cable incidents underscore heightened sabotage risks. On 18 November, a fault was detected on the C-Lion1 fibre optic cable that runs under the Baltic Sea between Finland and Germany. The Finnish state-owned telecommunication company Cinia Oy confirmed that communication connections were disrupted as a result. Later on 18 November, the Lithuanian-based telecommunications provider Telia Lietuva reported that an undersea cable in the Baltic Sea connecting Lithuania and Sweden, which intersects with the C-Lion 1 cable, was cut on 17 November. The limited information renders it difficult to ascertain the cause of the damage. Undersea cables can be damaged as a result of ships anchoring or certain fishing activities. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius stated that he suspects the (Finnish-German cable incident) was an act of hybrid sabotage; however, he refrained from attributing blame. We have repeatedly assessed that Russia’s Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (GUGI) has both the capability and intent to sabotage undersea European infrastructure. We assess that Russian sabotage of undersea infrastructure will remain a realistic possibility at least while the war in Ukraine persists, including as a retaliation for Western support for Ukraine (including possibly the US authorisation for long-range strikes in Russia on 17 November).
Nov 18.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• OFFENSIVES: President Zelensky acknowledged that low morale and personnel shortages are causing problems for the Ukrainian defence, leading to Ukrainian withdrawals in the east
• STRIKES: Russian forces launched a high-intensity missile and drone strike across the country on 17 November, including some 210 projectiles, which primarily targeted energy infrastructure
• PEACE: Moscow has rejected a Turkish proposal to freeze the conflict on its current lines, after German Chancellor Scholz held a telephone call with Putin for the first time since 2022
• FORECAST: The US has granted Ukraine authorisation to launch long-range attacks using US-provided ATACMS systems inside Russia’s Kursk oblast; Russia’s response will likely be indirect and hybrid in nature, possibly driving second-order risks in the Red Sea
• OFFENSIVES: On 16 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that troops on the frontline cannot rotate away from the front line to reconstitute and rest if reserve brigades are not equipped with sufficient weapons. Zelensky noted that troops at the front are ‘tired’, and given low morale and issues with equipping reserve brigades to relieve those forces, Ukrainian forces are forced to withdraw and cede territory to Russia. Zelensky furthermore stated that Ukraine has not received ‘even half’ of the weapons that have been officially approved by the US this year. Delays to the delivery of these weapons has undermined Ukraine’s force generation capabilities, but severe personnel shortages remain the key long-term problem which will limit Ukraine’s ability to rotate forces sufficiently. Nevertheless, Paris confirmed on 14 November that Ukraine’s newly raised Anna Kyivska Brigade has completed training in France – it is notably the first brigade fully trained and equipped by France. For further analysis on Ukraine’s decision to focus on generating fresh brigades rather than reinforcing existing ones.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces made some notable, albeit still limited, advances in the Chasiv Yar directly in recent days. Geolocated footage published on 15 November confirmed that Russian forces had advanced deeper into central Chasiv Yar along Dubrovskyi Street. If Russian forces can consolidate this narrow corridor and protect its flanks, further advances into the centre of the town remain possible.
• BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, Russian forces are further expanding their positions south of Chasiv Yar, increasing pressure from the southern flank. Geolocated footage published on 14 and 17 November indicates Russian advances east of Bila Hora and west of Andriivka along the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal south of Chasiv Yar. The canal remains a notable defensive feature for the Ukrainians, but grinding Russian assaults could realistically see Ukrainian forces withdraw to the western banks of the canal at various points in the coming weeks. Notably, a spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting near Chasiv Yar reported on 15 November that Russian forces are using special raincoats and blankets in a bid to hide their thermal signatures from Ukrainian drones. Such thermal camouflage will help conceal troops during the winter in the absence of tree or other cover.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces continued to make marginal, grinding advances in the centre of Toretsk. Geolocated footage from 15, 16 and 17 November confirmed steady advances into the centre of the settlement, including an advance into the heart of the southern district along Hertsena Street.
• DONETSK: Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Pokrovsk, making gains south-east of the city. Geolocated footage posted on 16 November shows that Russian forces recently captured Hryhorivka (south-east of Pokrovsk and west of Selydove). Such advances underscore continued efforts to set conditions for an assault on Pokrovsk, likely through a turning manoeuvre via Selydove to the north.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, Russian forces made gains in and around Kurakhove, amid reports of Russia reportedly redeploying equipment from rear areas. Geolocated footage from 17 November shows recent Russian advances into the northern outskirts of Kurakhove on the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir, as well as the likely capture of Nova Illinka (north of Kurakhove). Geolocated footage from 16 November also confirms that Russian troops have captured Voznesenka (north of Kurakhove). A Ukrainian military observer noted that Ukrainian forces are progressively withdrawing from the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir and that Russian advances south of Kurakhove have slowed down. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko said on 16 November that Russia has been transferring equipment, including armoured vehicles, from the Berdiansk or Polohy directions through occupied Mariupol towards Volnovakha (south-east of Vuhledar) for offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction.
• DONETSK: Further south, fighting continues in the Vuhledar direction, where Russia made confirmed gains over the past few days. Geolocated footage from 17 November indicates recent Russian advances south of Kostyantynopolske (north-west of Vuhledar) along the O-0510 highway. Footage from 14 November also shows that Russia has likely recently captured Antonivka, north-east of Vuhledar.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Fighting continues across the Kursk frontline, with the focus along the northern flank, though the rate of Russian advances remains slow. Geolocated footage from 14 November indicates minor Russian advances to the south of Novaya Sorochina (north-west of Sudzha). Meanwhile, footage from 15 November indicates limited Ukrainian advances in the eastern parts of Novoivanovka (located south-east of Korenevo). For analysis on the impact of long-range ATACMS missile strikes on Kursk oblast, see FORECAST below.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past few days, Russian forces made limited gains in the Svatove and Kreminna areas, amid continued offensive operations in the Kupiansk sector. Geolocated footage from 15 and 16 November shows Russian forces making recent marginal advances in southern Vyshneve (west of Svatove) and central Terny (west of Kreminna). Meanwhile, footage from 15 November shows Russian advances southward to Dzerzhynskoho Street inside the eastern sector of Kupiansk city. According to a Ukrainian soldier defending Kupiansk, Russian forces are using new tactics, resorting to smaller armoured groups to conduct assaults against the settlement. The source also explained that while Ukrainian forces were able to hold defences in June and July, the operational situation became more critical in autumn, with small Russian groups, sometimes of only one to two soldiers, piercing deeper behind Ukrainian defences.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Meanwhile, a Ukrainian military observer reported on 17 November that Russian forces have seized Kolisnykivka (around 10 miles (16km) south of Kupiansk) and control an area of roughly 1.9-2.2 miles (3-3.5 km) long along the east bank of the Oskil River. Recent Russian advances in Kolisnykivka to the south and growing pressure on Kupiansk’s north-eastern flank are exposing vulnerabilities in Ukrainian defences in the area. While it remains unclear if Russian forces have the capability to begin attritional urban assaults in central Kupiansk, the city is coming under increasing pressure, which could eventually precipitate a limited Ukrainian withdrawal from the eastern sector which sits on the eastern banks of the Oskil River.
• SOUTHERN: On 14-15 November, Russian sources claimed Russian forces launched a series of assaults across the southern axis, including areas north of Robotyne, though they have not yet made confirmed advances. However, despite claims of advances, we have not yet seen confirmation of these advances. Nevertheless, further east, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on 16 November that its forces seized Makarivka, a settlement south of Velyka Novosilka along the Mokri Yaly River valley. However, this also remains unconfirmed.
• STRIKES: On 15 November, Russia attacked Ukraine with two Kh-59/69 missiles and 29 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces shot down 25 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), mostly in Odesa oblast, where the attack damaged residential buildings in Odesa City. Air defences were also active in Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and Ternopil oblasts.
• STRIKES: On 16 November, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with one S-300 guided missile and 83 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukraine downed 53 UAVs over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 30 drones were also lost due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures.
• STRIKES: Early on 17 November, Russia launched a high-intensity strike involving 210 projectiles, targeting primarily Ukraine’s energy grid. The attack involved one 3M22 ‘hypersonic’ Tsirkon cruise missile, eight Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 101 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles, one Iskandr-M ballistic missile, four Kh-22/Kh-31P missiles, five Kh-59/69 missiles and 90 drones of unknown type (but most remaining Shahed-136/131s). Ukraine’s air defences reported a relatively high interception rate, downing 144 projectiles: the Tsirkon missile, seven Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 85 Kh-101 and Kalibr missiles, all Kh-59/69 missiles and 42 UAVs.
• STRIKES: Air defences were active in all Ukrainian oblasts, with authorities confirming hits against energy infrastructure, causing blackouts in several oblasts. Precautionary energy shutdowns were also implemented in other regions. Ukrainian officials reported that the attack caused damage to infrastructure facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk and Rivne oblasts and targeted energy infrastructure in Odesa oblast. Energy recovery work is reportedly ongoing in Odesa, Rivne and Volyn oblasts. Ukraine’s largest private energy operator DTEK reported significant damage to an unspecified thermal power plant (TPP), marking the eighth of such attacks on DTEK facilities in 2024. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also reported that Russian strikes forced Ukraine to reduce energy production at several nuclear power plants (NPPs), including Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk. The attack damaged electrical substations connected to these NPPs, though strikes did not target the nuclear plants themselves. Six out of nine reactors at these plants are currently operating at reduced capacity, which will further undermine Ukraine’s energy security and drive the risk of further blackouts.
• STRIKES: The recent strike underscores Russia’s growing use of decoy projectiles, which will place further strain on Ukraine’s air defences. The strike package during the 17 November attack notably included sea-launched Kalibr missiles, which Ukrainian military officials have observed have been increasingly used in combined strikes to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defences. Meanwhile, on 16 November, the Associated Press (AP) reported that Russia’s Shahed drone assembly plant in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (Republic of Tatarstan) is expanding the production of decoy drones and has started manufacturing drones with thermobaric warheads. A Ukrainian military expert quoted by the AP said that half of the long-range drone strikes in recent attacks have been decoys.
• STRIKES: These decoy drones are indistinguishable from Shahed drones on Ukrainian radar systems. As such, there are likely an effective and cheap means for Russia to attempt to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences and attempt to identify weakness, locate air defences and identify optimal striking routes for high-precision missiles. During the 17 November strike, Ukraine’s Air Force reported that Russia launched drones of unknown type, likely underscoring Russia’s growing use of decoy UAVs.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 17-18 November, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, one Kh-59 missile and 11 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences shot down eight UAVS over Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Poltava oblasts; three drones were reportedly lost. Russian missiles targeted Ukraine’s Sumy oblast, where the attack hit a residential building, killing at least 11 people and injuring 89 people. Energy infrastructure facilities were also hit, resulting in blackouts in Sumy. A ballistic missile also hit the port city of Odesa, killing eight people and injuring 18.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 17 November, a Ukrainian drone strike hit the Kupol electro-mechanical plant in Izhevsk, in Russia’s Udmurt Republic. This was the first time that a Ukrainian drone attack has targeted the Russian republic, located 932 miles (1,500km) from Ukraine’s border. The plant produces air defence systems, radars and other equipment for Russia’s military. Local Russian authorities reported that the attack damaged an unnamed factory.
• STRIKES: On 18 November, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that air defences intercepted 59 Ukrainian UAVs over Russian regions. 45 drones reportedly targeted the Moscow oblast, with the remaining targeting Bryansk, Kursk and Tula oblast.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• PEACE: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is set to present his proposals to end the war at the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro on 18-19 November, but Moscow has already rejected it. Erdogan’s proposal involves freezing the conflict on its current lines, delaying discussions on Ukraine joining NATO by 10 years, providing weapons to Ukraine to bolster its security, and establishing a demilitarised zone in the Donbas, enforced by international troops. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dismissed the proposals before they had been formally submitted, describing the proposals to freeze the conflict on the its current lines as ‘unacceptable for the Russian side’. It remains our assessment that Russia is unlikely to seriously consider concessions in the short term, and will demand at the minimum Ukraine withdraw from all regions formally annexed by Russia – namely Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
• GERMANY: On 15 November, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz telephoned Russian President Vladimir Putin, the first such direct communication between the leaders since 2022. During the call, Scholz condemned the invasion and stated Putin should prepare to negotiate and withdraw his forces. Putin reportedly reiterated his standard talking points about the justifications for the invasion, including perceived NATO ‘aggression’, claiming that he never refused negotiations to end the war, but noted that these should happen ‘taking into account new territorial realities’. Scholz stated on 17 November that the call showed ‘little has changed’ regarding Putin’s views on Ukraine, supporting our assessment that the Kremlin is highly unlikely to consider serious concessions to end the war in the short term given current military conditions on the frontline.
• GERMANY: Zelensky criticised the Scholz call, raising concerns that easing Moscow’s international isolation would only reduce its willingness to alter its policy regarding Ukraine. Zelensky also notably stated that there will be no ‘Minsk-III’, referring to the pre-invasion dialogue process that sought to end the Russo-Ukrainian conflict following Moscow’s first invasions in 2014. Alongside France, Germany was a convener of the pre-invasion Normandy Format, which brought Russia and Ukraine together to negotiate. While a return to the Normandy Format remains unlikely, international pressure to begin negotiations will only increase in the coming months ahead. To this end, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau supported the call on 17 November, noting that to bring the war to an end dialogue with Putin is necessary.
• GERMANY: Amid Scholz’s diplomatic efforts, Berlin is highly unlikely to provide Taurus long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine, though rival candidates for the chancellery ahead of elections in February 2025 have pledged to do so. Despite Germany remaining Ukraine’s largest military backer behind the US, Scholz has doubled down on his refusal to provide the weapons to Ukraine, warning of escalation – despite the US approval for ATACAMS (see FORECAST below).
• GERMANY: Leading candidate for the chancellery, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leader Friederich Merz has stated he would provide Ukraine with Taurus missiles. While such a decision could take place following a CDU victory in the February election, Berlin has in the meantime confirmed on 18 November that it will supply over 4,000 kamikaze drones to Ukraine in batches beginning from the end of December. The new Helsing-built drone, dubbed ‘mini-Taurus’ by the Germans, is a highly autonomous system that is capable of operating in complex electronic warfare (EW) environments. While the provision of such drones will improve Ukraine’s medium-range capabilities, their payload will inevitably be significantly less than Taurus cruise missiles.
• NORTH KOREA: Bloomberg reported on 17 November that according to assessments made by G20 nations, North Korea could realistically deploy up to 100,000 troops to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – though likely not all at once. While this isn’t confirmed, the assessment indicates that the commitment would likely be made over time and in batches, allowing for troop rotations during a prolonged deployment. If this is the case, this further underscores the likelihood that Moscow (and Pyongyang) are planning to continue fighting the war for the foreseeable future, despite growing international pressure to reach a peace settlement in 2025.
• NORTH KOREA: The Financial Times (FT) also cited Ukrainian intelligence in an article published on 17 November that North Korea has also provided 50 170mm ‘Koksan’ self-propelled artillery systems and 20 240mm multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) to its forces deployed in Kursk. This further underscores that North Korea’s commitment to the war effort is growing. While the overall numbers are unlikely to dramatically change the balance of the war, it will further solidify Russia’s personnel advantages over Ukraine, and further delay possible decisions on a second wave of partial mobilisation in Russia – if Moscow is determined to continue fighting beyond 2025. In addition, such deployments will provide North Korean forces valuable opportunities to improve and test their own capabilities in a modern war.
FORECAST
US: On 17 November, the New York Times and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorised Ukrainian forces to use US-supplied ATACMS missiles to strike Russian and North Korean targets inside Kursk oblast. The development marks a notable shift in US policy, which has previously withheld authorisation for long-range ATACMS strikes inside Russia, though we had assessed that a change in policy was likely. Biden’s decision was reportedly linked to the deployment of North Korean forces to the front, but comes after months of lobbying by Kyiv, London and Paris for approval. The decision comes ahead of the 1,000th day of the full-scale war on 19 November.
It remains unclear whether France and the UK have similarly approved such long-range strikes, but we assess that this is likely given Paris and London’s strong support for such strikes. Following the US announcement, Le Figaro published an article claiming that France and the UK had provided Ukraine authorisation to use their own SCALP/Storm Shadow cruise missiles for long-range strikes inside Russia (without specifying whether this included areas outside of Kursk oblast). However, the outlet has since removed this confirmation from its article, meaning it remains unclear whether this approval has been granted.
While ATACMS strikes will have a palpable impact on the battlefield in and around Kursk oblast, they are highly unlikely to fundamentally alter the direction of the war. Ukrainian ATACMS strikes in Kursk oblast will aim to blunt or undermine Russia’s anticipated counter-offensive in the region, following the concentration of 50,000 troops (including around 10,000 North Koreans). If such strikes can prevent Russia from re-taking Kursk oblast, this will likely be the most significant strategic impact of the decision and would boost Ukraine’s negotiating position. However, in the meantime, the limited nature of the authorisations will limit Ukraine’s ability to strike more vulnerable targets outside of Kursk oblast, and it remains unclear how many such missiles Ukraine possesses.
US officials report that the first ATACMS strikes will likely take place against Russian and North Korean targets inside Kursk, but that Biden could expand authorisation to other regions in the future. The focus on Kursk oblast highly likely reflects efforts to support Ukraine in retaining the territory it controls in the region as a bargaining chip during possible negotiations in 2025. The limited nature of the approvals strongly reflects the Biden administration’s preference for gradual increases in support, rather than wide-ranging approvals, likely in a bid to limit risks of escalation with Russia. However, given the impending inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump on 20 January 2025, Biden has limited time to make further approvals.
It remains likely that the incoming Trump administration will repeal the approval amid efforts to bring an end to the war in 2025. However, unless the approval is repealed immediately as a ‘gesture of good faith’ before negotiations begin, the promise of a repeal of the approval could also realistically be used by Washington DC as a powerful bargaining chip and incentive to bring Moscow to the negotiating table, if efforts to bring Moscow to the table stall.
The Kremlin’s response to Biden’s decision has so far remained relatively constrained and aligned with previous rhetorical points, namely that it is a ‘dangerous escalation’ and ‘provocation’. While President Putin has yet to make a direct statement on the issue, he has previously stated that should the decision be made, Russia would consider it to amount to ‘direct participation’ in the war by the US (and NATO) – but Moscow has claimed NATO is a direct participant of the war since 2022, and as such didn’t reflect a shift in Russian policy. Nevertheless, in September Putin confirmed that Russia’s nuclear doctrine was changing to allow the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional missile strikes. Putin stated that Moscow could now consider an attack by a non-nuclear power (namely Ukraine), supported by or with the assistance of a nuclear power (namely the US, UK or France), to be a ‘joint attack’ on Russia – and that this could facilitate the potential use of nuclear weapons in response. However, it remains highly unlikely that Russia would use nuclear weapons in response to Ukrainian ATACMS and/or SCALP/Storm Shadow strikes inside Russia.
As we have previously assessed, Russia’s capabilities and ability to respond directly to this decision remains limited; as such, the response will likely be hybrid in nature and indirect. Arming the West’s ‘enemies’ is a likely one of the principal retaliatory options being considered by the Kremlin, alongside an uptick in hybrid attacks across Europe – including sabotage, assassination plots, mis- and dis-information influence operations and other espionage. Putin has previously stated in June 2024 that if Western nations allow Ukraine to strike Russia with weapons they have supplied, Russia has the right to supply ‘comparable weapons to regions where they could be used to strike sensitive targets of countries that do this to Russia’.
As such, the likelihood of Russia providing the Houthis with P-800 Yakhont (Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles has increased significantly, driving security risks in the Red Sea. Launched from transportable Bastion launchers (which Syria also possesses), Yakhont missiles have a range of up to 186 miles (300km), and can reach speeds of Mach 2.2. If provided, these missiles would have a notable impact on Houthi capabilities to undermine international shipping in and around the Red Sea. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Nov 24. Putin: Russia tested new hypersonic missile in Ukraine strike. Vladimir Putin has tested a new hypersonic missile by firing it at Ukraine as he identified Britain as a legitimate target for the Russian military.
The weapon, called the “Oreshnik”, meaning hazelnut, was launched for the first time in response to strikes using British and American-supplied weapons, Putin said on Thursday.
“We are entitled to use our weapons against the military facilities of those countries that allow their weapons to be used against our facilities,” Putin said in a surprise televised address.
“In the event of an aggressive escalation, we will respond just as decisively.”
His threat came after British Storm Shadow cruise missiles were fired into Russia for the first time by Ukraine on Wednesday.
Earlier this week, Joe Biden, the US president, also authorised the use of American long-range ATACMS weapons, which were initially used to Russia’s Bryansk region.
Volodymyr Zelensky has said that he intends to fire all the ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles at Russia that the US and Britain have given him.
(Source: Daily Telegraph)
21 Nov 24. Russians Launch New Missile at Dnipro, U.S. Provides Ukraine With New Tactical Weapons. The Russians today launched a new kind of missile at Ukraine, what the Defense Department is calling an “intermediate-range ballistic missile,” or IRBM, said the deputy Pentagon press secretary.
“I can confirm that Russia did launch an experimental intermediate range ballistic missile,” said Sabrina Singh during a briefing today at the Pentagon. “This IRBM was based on Russia’s RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile model. In terms of notifications to the United States, the United States was prenotified, briefly, before the launch, through nuclear risk reduction channels.”
The IRBM missile was launched at the city of Dnipro. While Singh said the missile carried a conventional warhead, she also said it’s possible the missile could be fitted with other warheads as well.
“It could be refitted to certainly carry different types of … conventional or nuclear warheads,” she said.
The Defense Department has characterized the IRBM as “experimental” in that it’s the first time a weapon of its kind has been used on the battlefield in Ukraine, Singh said.
“This was a new type of lethal capability that was deployed on the battlefield,” she said. “That’s certainly concern to us … I don’t have an assessment of its impacts right now, but it’s something that, of course, we’re concerned by.”
Singh also said an IRBM and an intercontinental ballistic missile have similar flight paths, high trajectories and can carry large payloads.
“But the main difference lies in the range and the strategic purpose,” she said.
Also, this week, the Defense Department confirmed that the United States would provide to Ukraine antipersonnel landmines.
Yesterday in Laos, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III explained why the U.S. would provide antipersonnel landmines to Ukraine and how what the U.S. would provide is different than the landmines the Ukrainians are currently producing for themselves.
“What we’ve seen most recently is because the Russians have been so unsuccessful in the way that they have been fighting they’ve kind of changed their tactics a bit and they don’t lead with their mechanized forces anymore,” Austin said. “They lead with dismounted forces who are able to close in and do things to kind of pave the way for mechanized forces.”
In the face of that changing tactic, Austin said, the Ukrainians have been manufacturing their own landmines to slow down Russian advances.
“They’re fabricating their own antipersonnel landmines right now,” he said. “The landmines that we would look to provide them would be landmines that are not persistent. You know, we can control when they would self-activate, self-detonate. And that makes it, you know, far more safe eventually than the things that they are creating on their own.”
Singh told reporters today that the Ukrainians have assured the U.S. that the landmines, when they arrive, will be used only inside Ukrainian space.
“Absolutely they have committed that they’re going to use these mines in their own territory,” she said. “I should have added that they’re not going to use them in populated areas.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
20 Nov 24. Austin Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. The U.S. is sending a new round of military assistance, valued at up to $275m to Ukraine, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said today.
The package includes ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, mortar and artillery rounds and unmanned aerial systems to meet critical battlefield needs as Russia’s war of aggression surpasses 1,000 days.
In previewing the White House announcement of the latest round of assistance, Austin underscored the importance of continuing to support Ukraine.
“What we learned early on is that Ukraine matters and not just to Ukraine, and not just to Europe,” Austin said. “It matters to the world.
“We shouldn’t have any situation where someone can wake up one day and attack its neighbor and change the borders and annex its neighbor’s property,” he said. “That is just not the world that any of us want to live in.”
The secretary added that the U.S.-led efforts to rally global allies and partners in support of Ukraine continue to be effective in countering Russia’s onslaught.
“The largest military in Europe invaded its neighbor, who had a much smaller inventory, much less capability, and 1,000 days later they’ve yet to be successful,” he said. “This war has gone on for 1,000 days and Putin has failed in every case to achieve any sort of strategic objective.”
The latest round of assistance marks the 70th drawdown of military equipment for Ukraine from DOD inventories since August 2021.
It follows President Joe Biden’s commitment in September to surge the more than $5bn in remaining presidential drawdown authority funds authorized by Congress.
The assistance also comes with new urgency as Russia leans on thousands of North Korean troops to fill out its ranks.
Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said earlier this week that nearly 11,000 North Korean troops have moved into Russia’s Kursk Region.
She said the Pentagon had not confirmed reports that the North Koreans had begun to engage in combat operations but said, “They’re moving into Kursk for a reason.”
“We have every expectation that they would be engaged in combat operations,” Singh said.
Austin announced a new round of assistance from Vientiane, Laos, where he is attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus.
U.S. defense secretaries have participated in the forum since 2010 when it was established by the 10-member bloc of Southeast Asian nations.
During the two-day series of engagements, Austin will meet with a range of regional allies and partners informally during the meeting and reaffirm the United States’ commitment to regional security.
Following the first round of discussions today, Austin announced that ASEAN member states approved a second iteration of a U.S.-led maritime exercise with ASEAN countries, which was first held in 2019.
Tomorrow, Austin is expected to announce the first-ever Defense Department vision statement for a prosperous and secure Southeast Asia.
“It’s great to be back at the ADMM-Plus for my fourth time as secretary,” he said. “Being here is a priority and a sign of strong support for ASEAN’s central role in regional security. Engagement with ASEAN is focused on practical cooperation and mutual respect, and that includes training the next generation of leaders and tackling emerging challenges and deepening maritime cooperation.”
Austin proposed a meeting with People’s Republic of China’s Minister of National Defense Dong Jun, who’s also a member of ADMM-Plus.
The secretary has continued to advocate for open lines of military-to-military communication between the U.S. and China but said today that his Chinese counterpart chose not to meet during this week’s forum.
“The PRC decision is a setback for the whole region,” he said. “As I’ve said consistently, the right time to meet is any time.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
21 Nov 24. Russia ‘fires intercontinental ballistic missile’ at Ukraine for first time. Russia launched an intercontinental ballistic missile at Ukraine for the first time on Thursday morning, Kyiv’s air force said.
The missile, which has never been used in combat before, was launched from Astrakhan and targeted critical infrastructure in the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro, it added.
Ukraine’s military did not specify if the attack caused any damage.
On Wednesday, Ukrainian media reported that the Kremlin was threatening to strike the country with a “massive” new missile in retaliation for Kyiv firing UK and US long-range missiles at targets inside Russia.
Russian media reported that Moscow was preparing to launch RS-26 Rubezh missiles from a site in Astrakhan by the Caspian Sea.
Western nations including the United States shut their embassies on Thursday in anticipation of a large-scale air strike.
The RS-26, which can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, has not been used in combat before, according to Western missile experts. It is said to fly at five times the speed of sound, making it harder for Kyiv’s US-supplied Patriot missile systems to shoot down.
(Source: Daily Telegraph)
21 Nov 24. Ukraine to Produce 30,000 Long-Range Drones in 2025 – Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented the country’s resilience plan to the Ukrainian Parliament and emphasized goals for advancing Ukraine’s defense capabilities, Ukrainian media UNIAN reported on November 19.
Among other things, Zelenskyy pointed out the importance of focusing on drone and missile production in 2025.
“Next year, Ukraine will produce at least 30,000 long-range drones,”
Zelenskyy announced, highlighting the critical role of UAVs in the country’s defense strategy.
He also set a target for manufacturing 3,000 long-range missiles and introduced plans to establish a Technological Headquarters to coordinate and streamline these efforts.
“As for our missile program. Many people, especially Russians, remember our Ukrainian Neptune missiles. But we have also made ‘long’ Neptunes. And the name itself speaks of the task. And we already have first hits,”
added the President.
“The first meeting of the Technological Headquarters will be held in early December. In this format, we will gather the best specialists and the most useful technological ideas regularly. It is Ukraine’s strong defense industry that can ensure our independence in choosing our military strategy,”
President Zelenskyy concluded.
Meeting this goal would require Ukraine to produce approximately 80 long-range drones and 8 ballistic missiles daily, amounting to approximately 2,400 drones and 240 missiles each month.
According to Forbes, Russia currently manufactures between 132 and 171 missiles per month, significantly fewer than Ukraine’s proposed output. (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24 MEDIA)
21 Nov 24. Hungary is going to install an air defence system in the northeastern part of the country as the threat of an escalation of the Ukraine-Russia war is “greater than ever”, its defence minister said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday lowered the threshold for a nuclear strike in response to a broader range of conventional attacks, after the United States allowed Ukraine to fire American missiles deep into Russia.
Ukraine used U.S. ATACMS missiles for the first time on Tuesday, Moscow said, an attack regarded by Russia as a major escalation.
“We still trust that there will be peace as soon as possible, through diplomacy instead of a military solution,” Kristof Szalay-Bobrovniczky said in a video posted on his Facebook late on Wednesday.
“However, to prepare for all possibilities, I ordered the recently purchased air control and air defence systems and the capabilities built on them to be installed in the northeast,” he said after a meeting of the Defence Council that was convened by Prime Minister Viktor Orban to discuss the developments in Ukraine.
“The threat of the escalation of the Ukraine-Russia war is greater than ever,” Szalay-Bobrovniczky said.
Hungary, a NATO and European Union member, shares a border with Ukraine.
The minister did not specify which parts of Hungary’s air defence system would be installed in the northeast.
Hungary’s military, currently undergoing a modernisation program, bought the French Mistral air defence systems alongside four other EU countries last year. In 2020 Hungary agreed to buy NASAMS air defence systems from Norway’s Kongsberg and U.S. arms manufacturer Raytheon Technologies.
The minister said some units of the Hungarian military were also on high alert. (Source: Google/Reuters)
20 Nov 24. Russia Developing Thermobaric Drones Capable of Causing Widespread. Russia is producing and deploying thermobaric warhead-equipped drones in its conflict with Ukraine. These weapons are designed to cause devastating damage to civilian and military infrastructure, according to an Associated Press report.
The report reveals that a production facility in Alabuga, Tatarstan, has been equipping Iranian-Russian Shahed drones with these devastating payloads since at least the summer.
The Alabuga complex, originally established in 2006 to attract investment, has transitioned to military production following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Since mid-2023, the facility has produced drones armed with thermobaric payloads, alongside decoy drones designed to confuse Ukrainian air defenses.
A person familiar with the operations at Alabuga reported that approximately 10 armed Shahed drones and 40 decoys are produced daily. Decoy drones, which can be equipped with cameras, are primarily used to deplete Ukrainian air defense resources.
Thermobaric warheads, also known as vacuum bombs, create a high-pressure blast that sucks oxygen from the surrounding environment, generating extreme temperatures and overpressure capable of penetrating thick structures. These warheads are additionally loaded with steel ball bearings to inflict maximum damage beyond the initial blast radius.
The effects on human targets include collapsed lungs, brain trauma, and ruptured organs, making them particularly lethal even to those outside the immediate impact zone. Despite their destructive capacity, thermobaric munitions remain legal under international law, complicating efforts to restrict their use.
Russia’s strategy, codenamed “Operation False Target,” involves overwhelming Ukrainian defenses by deploying large swarms of unarmed decoy drones alongside armed drones. The decoys, often filled with non-lethal materials like foam, are indistinguishable from armed drones on radar, forcing Ukraine to expend scarce air defense munitions. The tactic is intended to protect critical infrastructure while diverting attention away from the thermobaric drones, which target fortified positions such as underground energy facilities.
Ukrainian electronics experts, such as Serhii Beskrestnov, have noted a shift in drone attacks since their introduction. Videos from the Kyiv Post on social media platforms, including a thermobaric drone attack in Odesa, have showcased the destruction caused by these weapons, underscoring the severity of their impact on urban areas. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
20 Nov 24. Erdogan opposes Ukraine use of U.S. long range missiles, urges restraint. Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan opposes a U.S. decision to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles to attack inside Russia, saying it would further enflame the conflict, according to a readout shared by his office on Wednesday.
Ukraine used U.S. ATACMS missiles to strike Russian territory on Tuesday, taking advantage of newly granted permission from the outgoing administration of U.S. President Joe Biden on the 1,000th day of the war in Ukraine.
On the same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a policy document that lowers the threshold for Moscow to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks by an enemy using conventional weapons.
“Biden’s step would be interpreted as a move to enflame the war and to ensure that it never ends but spreads,” Erdogan told reporters on his flight back to Turkey from Brazil, where he attended the G20 Summit.
“This step will not only escalate the conflict, but will also lead to a greater response by Russia,” he said, urging both Moscow and Kyiv to exercise restraint. (Source: Reuters)
20 Nov 24. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. As part of the surge in security assistance that President Biden announced on September 26 to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position, the Department of Defense (DoD) today announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s seventieth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package, which has an estimated value of $275m, will provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent needs, including: munitions for rocket systems and artillery and anti-tank weapons.
The capabilities in this announcement include:
• Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
• 60mm and 81mm mortar rounds;
• Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles;
• Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
• Small arms and ammunition;
• Demolitions equipment and munitions;
• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment; and
• Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.
The United States will continue to work together with some 50 Allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and its associated Capability Coalitions to meet Ukraine’s urgently needed battlefield requirements and defend against Russian aggression. (Source: U.S. DoD)
20 Nov 24. Ukraine has launched British-made Storm Shadow missiles at military targets in Russia for the first time, according to three people familiar with the matter. The attack follows Ukraine’s first use of US long-range Atacms missiles on Russian soil on Tuesday, after authorisation from US President Joe Biden. A western official briefed on the strike said that multiple missiles had been fired at at least one Russian military target. A Russian pro-war military blog on social media app Telegram posted photos on Wednesday of what it said were fragments from a Storm Shadow missile, including engravings indicating it as such. The blog said the fragments had landed near the village of Marino, a village in the Kursk region. Alexei Smirnov, the local governor, said that Russian air defences had shot down two Ukrainian missiles. Kyiv has been pleading for months with western allies to use their long-range weapons to hit Russian territory as Ukrainian troops struggle to hold on to land they have occupied in the Kursk region. Biden’s decision to authorise the use of Atacms came two months before president-elect Donald Trump, who has said he will swiftly bring the conflict to an end, re-enters office. The White House has been nervous about possible escalation of the conflict. On Tuesday, Russia officially adjusted its military doctrine to lower the threshold to use nuclear weapons. Downing Street, the Ministry of Defence and the UK Foreign Office all declined to comment, citing “operational reasons”. But ahead of travelling to a G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer said the international community had to “double down” in its support for Kyiv, pointing to the deployment of North Korean troops alongside Russians as a serious escalation. (Source: FT.com)
20 Nov 24. Putin, ascendant in Ukraine, eyes contours of a Trump peace.
Summary
• Russian leader is open to Trump discussions – sources
• Moscow won’t cede significant territory, they say
• Putin: Ukraine must remain neutral under any deal
• Kyiv: Every Russian soldier must be driven out
Vladimir Putin is open to discussing a Ukraine ceasefire deal with Donald Trump but rules out making any major territorial concessions and insists Kyiv abandon ambitions to join NATO, five sources with knowledge of Kremlin thinking told Reuters.
U.S. President-elect Trump, who has vowed to swiftly end the conflict, is returning to the White House at a time of Russian ascendancy. Moscow controls a chunk of Ukraine about the size of the American state of Virginia and is advancing at the fastest pace since the early days of the 2022 invasion.
In the first detailed reporting of what President Putin would accept in any deal brokered by Trump, the five current and former Russian officials said the Kremlin could broadly agree to freeze the conflict along the front lines.
There may be room for negotiation over the precise carve-up of the four eastern regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, according to three of the people who all requested anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. (Source: Reuters)
19 Nov 24. Kyiv’s Drone Suppliers Ramp Up Production of Cheap EW-Proof Computer-Guided Drones. In a significant step not previously reported, Ukraine’s drone suppliers are ramping up output of robot attack drones to an industrial scale, not just prototypes.
Enabling the upshift is producers’ successful integration of inexpensive computers into sophisticated, compact systems that replicate capabilities previously found only in far pricier equipment.
“None of this is new,” said Auterion founder and chief executive Lorenz Meier. “The difference is the price.”
Kyiv is set to receive tens of thousands of Auterion’s miniature computers, known as Skynode, which should hit the battlefield early next year. Vyriy Drone, a top Ukrainian drone startup, said it would produce several thousand autopilot drones starting this month. Other companies are also ramping up production
Ukraine, with a population one-quarter the size of Russia’s, is reliant on maintaining a technological edge to hold off waves of Russian tanks and infantry. The use of computer-controlled drones is particularly promising as it significantly reduces the number of people needed to carry out tasks from identifying targets to striking them. They also offer a cheap alternative to more expensive missiles and artillery shells that could help Ukraine maintain its defense if the new Trump administration cuts funding.
Ukraine’s small explosive drones are already carrying out most of strikes on the front line. The large-scale production of autonomous drones could turbocharge Ukraine’s fight against Russia by overcoming the biggest obstacle those drones face: Russian electronic jamming.
“The tech has moved from concept to the battlefield, but the question is, will it exist in numbers to make an impact?”
said Samuel Bendett, senior associate in the Europe, Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The advances also place further developments on the immediate horizon, such as enabling one pilot to control a swarm of several drones that can largely fly and coordinate themselves. Auterion is collaborating with Ukrainian startup Swarmer to bring autonomous swarms to the front line, while Vyriy is working with Sine Engineering, another new Ukrainian company.
Russia has also said it is using computer-guided drones to strike targets. In addition, several videos have appeared online claiming to show Russian explosive drones guided by long fiber-optic cables, avoiding jamming and providing a clearer video feed.
Ukraine’s nimble use and adaptation of aerial drones for reconnaissance and strikes has given it an edge over Russia since the start of the war. Ukraine has typically innovated faster than Russia, but the Kremlin’s advantage lies in its ability to increase production in its state-directed economy once it has equipment that works.
Kyiv’s drone makers are the antithesis of modern armament producers, which have become industrial behemoths. Ukraine’s young companies, operating under threat of attack and tapping innovation from all corners of society, have formed an industrial ecosystem of garage-sized factories and converted workshops. Coordinated with government help, many specialized in certain components, such as propellers, structural elements and motors.
Russia has countered Ukrainian drones primarily by using electronic-warfare equipment that can down them by drowning out the signal between the controller and the craft. That means that, depending on the skill of the pilot, about one in five FPVs hit their targets, according to pilots.
Autopilot technology negates that countermeasure by integrating the control system into the drone via software loaded onto a cheap minicomputer.
Ukraine is using first-person-view drones, known as FPVs, that have an autopilot function that allows them to evade Russian electronic jamming.
Expensive missiles have used the technology, known as terminal guidance, since the 1970s. Companies including Auterion and Vyriy are making it small, cheap and smart—able even to track and hit moving targets.
Both companies’ solutions track a battlefield target using a technology called pixel-lock, where the drone latches onto its prey using its camera and computer, without needing to be remotely guided by an operator.
Vyriy aims for the lowest cost possible. It was founded after the Russian invasion in 2022 by 26-year-old Oleksiy Babenko, a motorbike fanatic who studied sociology. His company developed software that allows a tiny, off-the-shelf computer costing around $15 to fly the drone toward a target, using a camera that costs about the same.
Babenko said the drones have a success rate of around nine out of 10 once autopilot is engaged but had recently encountered problems with Russian forces using electronic jamming to cut the analog video signal that the pilot uses to fly the craft to the strike zone.
Vyriy is seeking to overcome the issue by enabling the video feed to hop between frequencies, as well as by developing a digital video link. The company is seeking to keep the cost under $50.
“The best thing is that it’s very cheap,” said Babenko. “We can’t put some high price video link.”
Almost all components for the drone are produced in Ukraine. The motors and camera come from China, while the minicomputer comes from another country.
Babenko and his co-founders put up $20,000 to start the company and money has poured in from the government, military units and charity funds who buy their drones. Ukrainian charities that source equipment for their military have been a key partner as they don’t require much paperwork, meaning they can buy something, give it to soldiers to test and try something else if it doesn’t work, creating competition between drone companies.
“Now in Ukraine, if you produce something cool you don’t need a lot of money to make more,” Babenko said.
Virginia-based Auterion, which has supplied the Defense Department and other federal agencies with a variety of drones for several years, is part of Pentagon efforts to develop drones that can evade electronic jamming. For Ukraine, it only produces Skynode, a bespoke minicomputer the size of a small fist that already uses a digital video. The processor goes into drones built by Ukrainian companies.
Auterion differs from many other drone-technology suppliers because Skynode integrates a range of functions including guidance, targeting and networking, all using fully digital communications that complicate hacking or jamming. Meier, Auterion’s founder, compares it to how smartphones combined tasks previously handled separately by cellphones, digital cameras and satellite-navigation units. Because of its versatility, it has also been used on fixed-wing strike drones, which have a greater range, he said.
Once autopilot is activated, autonomous drones don’t depend on maintaining a signal with the pilot to reach their targets
Skynode, which Meier said costs about as much as an Android smartphone, replaces the computer brain in almost any drone, he said. Meier is known in the drone world for having years ago created a variety of widely used open-source software.
Autopilot offers a string of advantages. In standard FPVs, the link between the controller and the drone relies on radio waves, so the drone needs to avoid large objects that can block the signal. Ukrainian drone teams often send up a second craft to hover in the air and relay the signal between pilot and FPV, allowing them to operate from a bunker and extend the range of the craft up to 15 miles. But the Russians hide tanks and other potential targets on the far side of hills or behind obstacles that cut the link as the drone approaches.
Using terminal guidance overcomes those issues. Autopilot mode can be engaged roughly two-thirds of a mile from a target—well outside the short range of jammers. Drones with autopilot can strike objects behind hills as they don’t need to maintain a signal with the pilot in the attack phase.
The onboard computer stabilizes the drone, meaning the pilot doesn’t have to constantly toggle the pitch and throttle to keep it steady. One pilot told Auterion that flying the drone and striking Russian targets was so easy that it was boring. (Source: UAS VISION/The Wall Street Journal)
18 Nov 24. Norway to assist military equipment production for Ukraine.
The development is part of a broader initiative to enhance military support and production capacity for Ukraine.
Norway and Ukraine have signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen collaboration on military supplies, marking a significant step in defence collaboration.
The effort will see Norway assist in the production of military equipment for Ukraine to ensure that weapons and ammunition are delivered swiftly to Ukrainian forces.
The agreement, signed by Norwegian Defence Minister Bjørn Arild Gram and Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov, outlines principles and frameworks for cooperation. During a meeting in Oslo on 14–15 November 2024, the ministers focused their discussions on maintaining and enhancing support for Ukraine.
This development is part of a broader initiative to enhance military support and production capacity for Ukraine.
Denmark has established a financing model for Ukrainian projects, allowing direct acquisition from Ukrainian industry to Ukrainian forces.
Norway plans to join this mechanism, ensuring that Norwegian funds are used in Ukraine.
This collaboration is closely coordinated with Ukrainian authorities to address Ukraine’s identified needs.
The mechanism enables Ukraine to propose specific procurements and projects, which are then reviewed and approved by Danish authorities before receiving support.
Monitoring systems are in place to ensure transparency and accountability for these projects.
Norway and Denmark will formalise an agreement on the allocation of Norwegian funds.
Bjørn Arild Gram said: “This agreement is crucial to better support Ukraine’s defence efforts and develop the potential for further cooperation.
“Norway has so far donated various types of equipment from its own stockpiles, but moving forward, we must increasingly look for alternative ways to support Ukraine with equipment. Establishing this framework is therefore vital for facilitating further military assistance to Ukraine.”
In August, the Norwegian Government approved the transfer of Norwegian defence technology to Ukraine, backed by Norwegian funding.
Norwegian defence company Nammo entered into an agreement to facilitate the license production of 155mm artillery shells in Ukraine by a Ukrainian defence company.
In October 2024, the Norwegian government unveiled a roadmap to bolster the defence industry’s production capacity, with an investment of Nkr967m ($87.4m).
The Government has now proposed increasing the Nansen Support Programme’s budget framework from Nkr75bn to at least NKr135bn and extending the programme to 2030. Funding for the direct support mechanism will be allocated through the Nansen Programme. (Source: army-technology.com)
19 Nov 24. Ukraine demonstrates how far its air defence has come.
In its most extensive missile assault in the past three months, Russia launched a major strike which confirmed fears that they would begin targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in the winter months. Overnight, Russia unleashed an aerial assault consisting of 120 missiles and 90 drones. Despite the scale of the attack, Ukrainian forces successfully intercepted the majority of the incoming projectiles, suggesting that the Ukrainians have been prepared for a return to Russian missile strikes.
The assault, which led to widespread power and water outages in regions like Odesa, aimed to cripple Ukraine’s already strained energy infrastructure. Indrek Kannik, head of the International Center for Defense and Security (ICDS), who recently visited Ukraine, emphasised that the strike did not catch Ukrainians off guard.
“The Russians had not carried out a large-scale attack for several months and it was clear that they had amassed a certain stockpile of missiles to launch such an attack. From Russia’s perspective, the likely goal of this strike was to damage Ukraine’s energy system. It certainly caused some harm. However, I would say that, based on initial assessments, it appears Ukraine has managed to prevent the worst outcomes,” Kannik stated.
The Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, witnessed a high interception rate of missiles, highlighting just how far the Ukrainian air defence capabilities have come. However, Kannik pointed out that despite Ukraine’s robust response, cumulative damage over time has led to a notable reduction in electricity production capacity.
Leo Kunnas, deputy chair of the Riigikogu National Defence Committee, noted Ukraine’s resilience and the continuous efforts to rebuild its energy infrastructure:
“They are doing what they can to repair power plants, hydroelectric and thermal power stations that have been hit. They are working on repairing substations and ensuring that lines and substations are more secure, but it is, of course, impossible to completely rule out Russia’s targeted strikes,” Kunnas remarked.
Experts remain cautious yet confident in Ukraine’s capacity to withstand such attacks. Kunnas concluded that despite Russia’s repeated offensives, they are unlikely to subdue Ukraine’s infrastructure this winter.
Kannik also noted that these strikes could be part of a broader strategy linked to geopolitical shifts:
“Russia is certainly attempting to escalate the situation before the inauguration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump in January. However, Russia cannot deplete Ukraine’s air defence stockpiles solely through infrastructure attacks, as their own resources are limited,” he explained.
Highlighting Ukraine’s resourcefulness, Kannik mentioned that while advanced systems like F-16 jets and Patriot missiles were used, simpler and more accessible means also played a role in defence.
“Drones are often shot down using relatively simple, available means. Sunday’s attack also demonstrated this, with Ukraine employing various measures. Some were intercepted using F-16 jets, others with the Patriot system and there was even an image of a Ukrainian female soldier taking down a Russian missile with a MANPADS,” he said.
While the latest attack once again reminds us of the ongoing threat posed by Russia’s aggressive tactics, it also reaffirms Ukraine’s adaptive defence strategies and determination to keep its essential infrastructure functioning against all odds.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-demonstrates-how-far-its-air-defence-has-come/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
19 Nov 24. Russia Develops Flamethrower FPV Drones to Counter Ukrainian UAV Attacks. On November 14, 2024, the Russian Telegram channel UAV Technician announced a new development by Russian engineers: a flamethrower-equipped FPV drone designed to counter Ukrainian UAVs, including models like Mavic and Vampire.
This innovation underscores the ongoing adaptations in drone warfare between Russia and Ukraine, where unmanned aerial systems play a central role in military operations.
This Russian initiative follows Ukraine’s introduction of the “dragon drone” in September 2024. Equipped to deploy incendiary substances such as thermite, these Ukrainian drones have been documented setting fire to Russian-held treelines, effectively disrupting positions and equipment in forested areas. The Russian flamethrower drones aim to neutralize such threats by targeting Ukrainian UAVs mid-flight, potentially diminishing their reconnaissance and offensive effectiveness.
The use of flamethrower-equipped drones extends beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In the United States, companies like Throwflame have developed attachments such as the TF-19 Wasp, capable of projecting flames up to 25 feet. While marketed for agricultural and industrial applications, such as clearing debris or pest control, these systems highlight the dual-use potential of such technology.
Similarly, China has equipped drones with flamethrowers for non-military tasks, including clearing debris from power lines and waste management. Ukraine has taken a distinct approach by adapting commercial drones for military purposes, using thermite payloads to create “dragon drones” capable of delivering molten metal onto enemy positions.
The deployment of flamethrower-equipped FPV drones reflects the differing strategies of the two sides in the conflict. Russian forces primarily employ these drones for counter-UAV operations, using incendiary attacks to disable or destroy Ukrainian drones mid-flight. This strategy aims to reduce the reconnaissance and offensive capabilities of Ukrainian forces.
Conversely, Ukraine employs “dragon drones” offensively, targeting Russian positions with molten thermite to destroy equipment, dislodge personnel, and disrupt supply chains.
Russian forces are prioritizing flamethrower-equipped FPV drones to address the growing threat posed by Ukrainian drones, including FPV models. These Ukrainian drones have been modified for precise targeting, enabling them to strike Russian military assets such as tanks and helicopters, while also conducting reconnaissance and incendiary attacks.
For instance, Ukrainian FPV drones have targeted Russian Mi-28 attack helicopters, and “dragon drones” have inflicted significant damage on equipment and positions with molten thermite. The ability of these drones to evade traditional countermeasures, operate in swarms, and deliver payloads effectively has pushed Russian forces to adopt incendiary-equipped FPV drones to try to intercept and destroy them mid-flight.
(Source: UAS VISION/Army Recognition)
19 Nov 24. Ukraine has struck Russia using US-made long-range Atacms missiles for the first time since the Biden administration lifted restrictions on their use, according to people familiar with the matter. The Russian ministry of defence confirmed an attack on its soil had taken place, claiming its air defence systems shot down five of six Atacms missiles over the Bryansk region. Videos circulated on Telegram showed a military facility in flames and a smoke trail in the sky above it resembling that of a missile. Ukraine’s General Staff did not confirm the use of Atacms but claimed responsibility for the strikes on the Russian arsenal, which it had previously attacked with drones. “The destruction of ammunition depots will continue for the army of the Russian occupiers in order to stop the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine,” it said. (Source: FT.com)
18 Nov 24. Ukrainian Security Service Arrests High-Ranking Officer Accused of Espionage for Russia. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) announced the arrest of a high-ranking officer in the Special Operations Forces, accusing him of espionage for Russia’s GRU military intelligence. The officer, identified only as a lieutenant colonel, allegedly leaked critical military intelligence that Russian forces used to target Ukrainian troops.
The SBU’s investigation revealed that the officer had been recruited by the GRU before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. His espionage activities were reportedly “activated” in spring 2024.
The suspect used his access to sensitive military information to pass details about sabotage and reconnaissance missions conducted by Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea. This intelligence included planned routes, operations, and troop deployments, which Russia used to target Ukrainian Defense Forces on the front lines and in Russian-occupied areas.
During the officer’s arrest, the SBU confiscated communication devices, computers, and data storage equipment used in transmitting classified information.
The suspect is currently in custody and faces charges of high treason and espionage under Ukrainian law. These charges carry severe penalties, including life imprisonment and asset forfeiture.
The SBU highlighted that the officer’s betrayal put the lives of Ukrainian soldiers at risk. The agency worked closely with Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi during the counterintelligence investigation that led to the officer’s capture.
The arrest comes amid increasing efforts by Russia to infiltrate Ukrainian military and intelligence ranks. In August, the SBU dismantled a Russian intelligence cell involving former members of ex-President Viktor Yanukovych’s security team and a National Guard member. Another individual in Kharkiv was arrested for spying on Ukrainian air defense systems and troop positions.
The SBU has vowed to continue exposing and countering such threats, stating, “Special forces continue to fulfill tasks, destroy the enemy, and liberate Ukrainian land. All those who endanger our soldiers will be exposed and sent behind bars.” (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
19 Nov 24. Ukraine, marking 1,000 days of Russian invasion, eyes end to war next year.
• Summary
• Ukrainians mark 1,000 days since Russian invasion
• Trump comeback spells uncertainty and prospect of talks
• Biden allows US missiles to strike deeper inside Russia
• Ukraine says war must be brought to just end in 2025
• Both sides rush to improve battlefield positions
Ukraine marked 1,000 days on Tuesday since Russia’s full-scale invasion, with weary troops battling on numerous fronts, Kyiv besieged by frequent drone and missile strikes, and officials preparing for Donald Trump to reclaim the White House in January.
In a boost for the beleaguered country, U.S. President Joe Biden gave the green light for U.S. missiles to be used against targets deeper inside Russia, potentially limiting its options to launch attacks and supply the front.
But the dramatic shift in policy may be reversed when Trump returns to the White House in January, and military experts cautioned that it would not be enough on its own to change the course of the 33-month-old war.
Thousands of Ukrainian citizens have died, over 6 m live as refugees abroad and the population has fallen by a quarter since Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion by land, sea and air that began Europe’s biggest conflict since World War Two.
Military losses have been catastrophic, although they remain closely guarded secrets. Public Western estimates based on intelligence reports vary widely, but most say hundreds of thousands have been killed or wounded on each side.
Tragedy has touched families in every corner of Ukraine, where military funerals are commonplace in major cities and far-flung villages, and people are exhausted by sleepless nights of air raid sirens and anguish.
Now the return of Trump, who has vowed to end the fighting quickly – without saying how – calls into question the future of U.S. military aid and the united Western front against Putin, and raises the prospect of talks to end the war.
PROSPECT OF TALKS PROMPTS ESCALATION
With Ukraine entering uncharted territory, a sense of escalation has been palpable as Moscow and Kyiv push to improve their battlefield positions ahead of any negotiations. (Source: Reuters)
19 Nov 24. European leaders should be prepared to send military forces to Ukraine to underpin any peace deal engineered by Donald Trump between Kyiv and Moscow, Estonia’s foreign minister has said. Margus Tsahkna told the Financial Times that the best security guarantee for Ukraine was Nato membership, as requested by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. But if the US was opposed to inviting Kyiv to join the military alliance, Europe would have to step in with troop deployments once the fighting was over to deter further Russian aggression. “If we are talking about real security guarantees, it means that there will be a just peace. Then we are talking about Nato membership,” said Tsahkna. “But without the US it is impossible. And then we are talking about any form [of guarantee] in the meaning of boots on the ground.” Trump has vowed to bring a swift end to the war in Ukraine once he takes office, prompting fears he could impose an unfair deal on Kyiv by threatening to withdraw US military support or abandon Ukraine altogether. Several Trump allies have called for Europe to take on the burden of propping up Ukraine. Tsahkna said Trump’s victory in the US presidential election had accelerated discussions among Kyiv’s allies about how to shore up Ukraine given its recent battlefield losses, as well as pressure Moscow to come to the negotiating table and ensure that any ceasefire was sustainable. “There are lots of talks and lots of communications between each other in Europe and also with the Trump team and the administration.” The minister said it would be “really, really, really complicated” for Europeans to provide security guarantees to Ukraine without US backing, not least because Nato could ultimately be dragged into any clash with Russian forces. Estonia has long been one of the most vocal supporters of Ukraine and critical of other allies’ reservations over supplying weaponry to Kyiv that Moscow claims would be a cause for escalation. Tallinn also fears that if Russia prevails in Ukraine, the Baltic states will be next in Vladimir Putin’s drive to re-establish Moscow’s sphere of influence in the former Soviet space. Some analysts believe any European effort to shore up Ukraine could be organised by a coalition of the willing, starting with Poland and the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, a defence group that includes the Nordic and Baltic states and the Netherlands. These countries, who are meeting in Tallinn next month, are Ukraine’s staunchest supporters and account for two-thirds of European bilateral military aid to Kyiv. It would be essential for France and Germany also to come on board, Tsahkna said. Germany is Ukraine’s second-largest donor of military aid after the US. Britain had the “opportunity and all the responsibility to take the leadership” of Europe’s efforts to bolster Ukraine’s security, while Poland was also playing a very active part in the discussions, he added. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk last week said he would engage in talks with the US, Nato and European allies on how to guarantee Ukraine’s security. Tsahkna said he did not believe Trump would abandon Nato because it was not in America’s political or economic interests to leave Europe at the mercy of an imperialist Russia. But the Europeans would have to show they were willing to invest more in their own defence. Estonia spends the equivalent of 3.4 per cent of its GDP on defence and wants Nato to agree a minimum spending level of 2.5 per cent, up from 2 per cent, at the alliance’s summit in The Hague in June next year.
(Source: FT.com)
18 Nov 24. Ukraine leaning into defence SME sector amid domestic production drive. Army Technology gained access to a Ukraine SME defence exhibition in the city of Lviv in September. Ukraine is leaning into industrial innovation in order to bridge the quantitative disparity with Russia, as efficiencies are sought across a range of sectors, from recruitment to personnel management, through to platform development and autonomy.
By simple demographics, Ukraine cannot compete with Russia on a like-for-like basis, in industry nor in sheer numbers of personnel. To that end, it has become imperative for Kyiv to embrace the ideas of emergent generations in a bid to find new capabilities that can provide battlefield advantages for its forces.
In October, Rustem Umerov, Minister of Defence of Ukraine, outlined a 2025 target to increase domestic production of drones, long-range weapons, and ballistic missiles.
Speaking at the International Forum of Defense Industries (DFNC2) hosted in Kyiv, Umerov said Ukraine had “already invested $4bn in advancing the Ukrainian industry” and that funding would increase over the coming 12 months.
“Our priority is the development of domestic drones and long-range weapons, including ballistic missiles,” Umerov stated.
Rustem Umerov, Minister of Defence of Ukraine, wants to increase domestic production of military equipment. Credit: Ukrainian MoD
Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) highlighted efforts to engage foreign partners in establishing joint enterprises to advance the defence sector, including vital element such as securing long-term contracts for producing, supplying, and maintaining weapons to support the needs of the country’s military.
Herman Smetanin, Minister for Strategic Industries of Ukraine, thanked delegates at the DFNC2 event, adding that Ukraine’s defence industry had “notably improved” its capabilities, and that due to new agreements and partnerships it was “heading in the right direction”.
Out of partnerships with international defence primes and donor countries, Ukraine also has opportunity to extract further gains from within the country, often marginal, but nevertheless still potentially key in reducing inefficiencies and harnessing private sector innovations.
This can be exemplified through two distinct efforts: recruitment and personnel management, and the role the country’s small and medium enterprises (SME) can have in driving innovation.
SME sector seeking investment
Gaining unprecedented access to Ukraine’s burgeoning SME sector in western Ukraine in late-September, Army Technology explored some of the new platforms and capabilities being developed that could offer a way for Kyiv to gain an advantage.
At a series of undisclosed locations in the western city of Lviv, representatives from Ukraine’s defence SME sector gathered to showcase some of the capabilities being developed for the country’s military, with multiple platforms at various stages of development and testing.
Exhibits predominantly centred on the development of autonomous systems for the land, sea, and air domains, areas in which it is possible for Ukraine to develop an asymmetric edge over Russia.
All representatives spoke on condition of anonymity due to security reasons.
Developed by Hard Cat, the Black Widow uncrewed surface vessel (USV) is intended to perform a range of maritime security functions, including reconnaissance and mine countermeasure, as well as what it termed ‘kamikaze missions’, whereby the platform operates as a one-way attack munition.
The use of one-way attack USVs by Ukraine in targetting Russia’s Black Sea fleet has seen a number of successes, with numerous examples of successful operations carried out since 2022.
Able to reach speed of up to 40km/h with a 10km range, the Black Widow features a 3kg payload capability to accommodate mission modules, including explosives.
At present, two prototype USVs have been developed and have undergone testing by the Ukrainian military, with aspirations to scale production up to 500 units per month should it secure a production deal, company officials told Army Technology.
In an example of programmes focussed on the land domain, Ukrainian SME Rononeers showcased an automated turret, known as Shablya, of which some 400 units had been shipped to the Ukrainian Army for use in combat roles.
The turret is platform agnostic and able to be used statically or mounted, while the company had also developed a medium-sized uncrewed ground vehicle that could house the system as well as be used for logistics roles.
Elsewhere, and with the need for uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) at an all-time high in Ukraine, a number of companies were producing platforms, command and control (C2) units, and sensors for use in that domain. One such platform was the Batar-1, which had already demonstrated an ability to operate in an EW-contested environment, company officials said, mainly in reconnaissance roles.
A smaller and cheaper alternative, the Skyhopper T-1, was also on display, with an entire unit of three UAVs and one C2 terminal costing in the region of $20,000, officials said. Skyhopper was able to operate in two gigahertz ranges, having found the 5.8GHz as being “not effective”.
In addition, the company demonstrated the capabilities of its Co-pilot C2 system, which was able to integrate into C2 agnostic UAVs as well as the Delta command database being brought into service in Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence.
“We are trying to promote the system as best we can. The [Ukrainian military] UAV teams, they like it,” a company official told Army Technology, outlining plans to attract inwards investment in order to further develop and trial their platforms.
MoD sourcing thousands of China-origin drones
What Ukraine cannot develop from within its own SME industrial base, it will look to markets overseas, including in the area of small UAS for use in reconnaissance and strike operations, as well as loitering munitions, otherwise known as suicide drones.
In May 2024 the Ukrainian MoD more than doubled the number of DJI Mavic drones it had acquired for use in operations against Russian forces through the purchase of a further 4,200 BPAK DJI Mavic 3E small uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).
According to the MoD’s Lethal Defense Acquisition Agency the total value of the contracts amounted to $27.4m (Hrv1.1bn). Together with previous purchases, the number of DJI Mavic’s contracted by the Lethal Defense Acquisition Agency stood at the time at 8,200 sets, comprised of 7,200 DJI Mavic 3E and 1,000 DJI Mavic 3T.
“Drones have evolved into an essential component of modern warfare. They strengthen our defence capabilities, increasing military operations’ effectiveness. Therefore, the procurement of drones is one of the main tasks of the Ministry of Defense,” said Deputy Defense Minister of Ukraine Dmytro Klimenkov at the time.
In addition, the Ukrainian MoD’s Defense Procurement Agency conducted auctions for an additional 4,000 DJI Mavic 3E and 1,500 DJI Mavic 3T BPA as of 20 May, with contracts “expected to be signed”. (Source: army-technology.com)
18 Nov 24. Chancellor Olaf Scholz is coming under growing pressure to drop his resistance to sending German-made cruise missiles to Ukraine after the US allowed Kyiv limited use of its weapons for strikes inside Russia. US President Joe Biden has authorised Ukraine to launch limited strikes into Russia’s Kursk region using US-made long-range missiles, a major policy shift before Donald Trump takes office in January. Scholz has long been resistant to sending Germany’s long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine over fears that such a move would drag Nato states into the conflict. A spokesperson for the chancellor reiterated his position on Monday. But calls for Scholz to change his policy are growing. Economy minister and Green candidate for chancellor Robert Habeck said on Sunday that he would send Tauruses if he prevailed in the country’s snap elections in February. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, a senior MEP, noted that the Greens, opposition Christian Democratic Union party and her party, the liberal FDP, were all in favour of supplying Tauruses to Ukraine. She told German radio that there was now a “numerical majority in the Bundestag [for this]”. German-made Tauruses would significantly bolster Ukraine’s ability to inflict damage on Russia, analysts said. The weapons have an intelligent warhead system that can ensure maximum damage to structures such as bridges and bunkers, and have a range in excess of 500km. Scholz’s intransigence on Tauruses contrasts with the positions of the UK and France, which have both been urging Biden to back them in authorising Ukraine to use their Storm Shadows and Scalps to hit targets in Russia. However, Biden had until now declined to support Kyiv’s use of the British- and French-made weapons for fear of triggering further escalation of the conflict. The increased pressure on Scholz also comes at a delicate time for the chancellor, who pulled the plug on his coalition this month. He was criticised by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for holding an hour-long phone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin last Friday, his first in nearly two years. Zelenskyy accused him of “opening Pandora’s box”. “This is exactly what Putin has long sought. It is critical for him to weaken his isolation,” he said on X. On Monday, Polish President Andrzej Duda took aim at Scholz, saying it was a “pity” that Germany did not join France and the UK in aligning with the US on helping Ukraine defend itself with more missiles. (Source: FT.com)
15 Nov 24. Estonia proposes agreement to buy Ukrainian weapons. Estonia’s authorities are showing interest in combat-proven weapons from Ukraine, including long-range missiles, and hope to reach an agreement with the Ukrainian government to facilitate arms purchases despite Kyiv’s ban on exports by its own defense industry. Under Ukraine’s law, the country’s defense companies are obliged to deliver their entire output to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The nation’s lawmakers and government officials are currently discussing ways to share the sector’s products with allies, and countries such as Estonia are following the talks. During his visit to Ukraine last month, Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated that various weapons, including the R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missile developed by State Kyiv Design Bureau Luch, could be of interest to his country’s military. Eleka Rugam-Rebane a spokesperson for the Estonian Ministry of Defence, told Defense News that bilateral agreements could be implemented to give allies access to weapons whose “value and quality mark … is certainly based on their combat experience.”
“Export bans will not pose a barrier if countries reach mutual agreements, and such cooperation would benefit both Estonian and Ukrainian defense industries,” she said.
“Our defense industries already have a solid working relationship: many Estonian companies are active in Ukraine, and we equally encourage all Ukrainian companies to participate in public tenders in Estonia,” said Rugam-Rebane. “We hope that Ukrainian manufacturers will be able to participate in public tenders not only in Estonia but also in other international markets relevant to them.”
Even a partial relaxation of the export ban could generate a significant stream of income for the Ukrainian economy as it is combating Russia’s ongoing invasion. Speaking in Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, on Sept. 5, lawmaker Halyna Yanchenko said the country’s defense sector is able to manufacture products worth some $20 bn annually.
“At the same time, the state is able to purchase weapons for only $6bn, this includes purchases from abroad. We are slowing down the development of a strategic industry through export restrictions,” Yanchenko said. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)
15 Nov 24. Cuashub.com said today that Russia could be preparing for winter assault on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Russia has intensified its aerial assault on Ukraine by launching a combination of missiles and drones against Kyiv overnight between November 12-13. This marks the first use of both missiles and drones on the Ukrainian capital in over 70 days, according to Ukrainian authorities.
Ukraine’s air force reported that it intercepted four missiles and 37 drones across eight regions during the night and into the early hours. President Volodymyr Zelensky once again highlighted the importance of enhancing air defence capabilities, stating:
“It is important that our forces have the means to defend the country from Russian terror.”
The surge in attacks comes as Ukraine continues pressing Western allies for additional systems to protect its cities and essential infrastructure. On the ground, the situation remains tense, with Russian forces advancing in the eastern parts of Ukraine and concerns over future aid in light of Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential elections.
The drone and missile assaults come as the geopolitical landscape surrounding the war shifts. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha expressed “cautious optimism” following discussions with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Brussels about the potential for deep strikes on Russian military targets and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations.
“We discussed issues of long-range strikes and Euro-Atlantic integration. And here we also are cautiously optimistic,” Sybiha stated.
However, the U.S. and other allies have hesitated to support long-range strikes into Russia, wary of further escalation.
It has been speculated that the reduced use of Russian missiles suggest an attempt to conserve stockpiles for the Winter. Renewed assaults on energy infrastructure during the colder months, featuring drones and missiles, when attacks on energy infrastructure could put the Ukrainian people under immense stress. The strategic targeting of Ukraine’s power grid has previously been a hallmark of Russia’s winter campaigns, significantly disrupting electricity and heating services.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/russia-could-be-preparing-for-winter-assault-on-ukrainian-energy-infrastructure/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
17 Nov 24. Pyongyang has supplied Moscow’s army with long-range rocket and artillery systems, some of which have been moved to Russia’s Kursk region for an assault involving North Korean soldiers to push out Ukrainian forces, a Ukrainian intelligence assessment has found. In recent weeks, North Korea provided some 50 domestically produced 170mm M1989 self-propelled howitzers and 20 updated 240mm multiple launch rocket systems that can fire standard rockets and guided ones, said the assessment, which was shared with the Financial Times. The new weapons deliveries from North Korea mark the latest expansion of the authoritarian state’s support for Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Michael Kofman, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said they follow a pattern of deepening North Korean involvement, “from sending large volumes of ammunition, weapons, and becoming a direct party to this war, which could help Russian forces retake the Kursk region”. North Korea has already played a critical role in providing ms of rounds of artillery ammunition for the Russian military in 2023, he noted. It has deepened its involvement this year by sending more than 12,000 troops, according to multiple western intelligence assessments, further internationalising the conflict. “North Korea has now become Russia’s accomplice and is helping Putin in this illegal war,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in an address on Saturday after meeting Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Takeshi Iwaya in Kyiv. “I informed [Iwaya] about the North Korean military’s activities in the Kursk region, about all the threats posed by Pyongyang and Moscow’s co-operation,” Zelenskyy added. “Russia is training North Korea in modern warfare, and this can cause a much wider destabilisation.” The deliveries come at a pivotal moment, as the Ukrainian and Russian armies fight for territorial advantage before the presidential inauguration of Donald Trump, who has vowed to force a swift end to the nearly three-year war. Ukrainian officials provided information about the weapons after a photograph showing North Korean howitzers began circulating on social media this week. The photograph, which open-source analysts were able to geolocate to central Russia’s Krasnoyarsk region, showed several howitzers covered in camouflage netting and being transported by rail westward. The heavyweight weapons systems can fire shells upwards of 60km. The M1989 howitzers, produced in 1989, are slightly upgraded versions of the original M1979 models first produced in the late 1970s, which Pyongyang supplied to Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war. The upgraded rocket system is based on the Soviet-designed BM-27 “Uragan”, or Hurricane system, a self-propelled 220mm multiple rocket launcher designed to deliver cluster munitions. North Korea said in May it had successfully tested the updated system with precision-guided munitions. (Source: FT.com)
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