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Nov 17.
16 Nov 24. US President Joe Biden has authorised Ukraine to launch limited strikes into Russia using US-made long-range missiles, in a big policy shift before the end of his White House term in January, two people familiar with the decision said. The move by Biden comes in response to the deployment of thousands of North Korean troops to support Russia in its war against Ukraine, and after a barrage of new strikes by Moscow on Ukrainian cities at the weekend. Tuesday will mark the 1,000th day of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The US-made long-range missiles are likely to be first used by Ukraine to target Russian and North Korean forces in Russia’s Kursk region, where Ukrainian troops seized territory during the summer, according to people briefed on the matter. Biden has allowed Ukraine to use HIMARS — the American High Mobility Artillery Rocket System — to strike targets inside Russia. But he has long resisted authorising Kyiv to launch strikes within Russia using US-made long-range missiles known as the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, on the grounds that it could escalate tensions with Moscow. ATACMS missiles have a range of up to 300 kilometres, or 190 miles. He is now dropping those objections more than two months before he leaves office to make way for Donald Trump. The Republican is sceptical of additional military aid to Ukraine and has vowed to bring a swift end to the war — without saying how exactly he would do it. The White House declined to comment. The Pentagon declined to respond to a request for comment. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Sunday noted media reports “talking about the fact that we have received permission” to use American ATACMS missiles inside Russia, although he did not confirm Biden’s decision. Zelenskyy has pleaded for months for the US and other partner countries to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of western-made, long-range weapons inside Russia. He has argued that cross-border strikes with the American ATACMS, British Storm Shadow and French Scalp missiles were necessary to hit Moscow’s forces before they could launch new attacks on Ukrainian targets, including critical infrastructure. (Source: FT.com)
Nov 14.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• KURSK: South Korean intelligence has confirmed that North Korean forces have been deployed in combat roles in Kursk oblast (Russia) amid an uptick in Russian attacks in the area
• SOUTHERN: Ukrainian officials have reported that Russian forces are concentrating trained assault groups and moving them to forward positions along the southern Zaporizhzhia axis
• STRIKES: Russian forces launched the first (limited) missile strike against the capital Kyiv on 13 November amid a very high tempo of Shahed-136/131 drone attacks across the country
• FORECAST: US President-elect Donald Trump could soon appoint a Ukraine peace envoy to lead negotiations on ending the Russo-Ukrainian war; this comes amid a flurry of administration appointments that will influence the White House’s approach to negotiations in 2025
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 13 November indicates that Ukrainian forces have re-taken several positions to the north-east of Chasiv Yar, specifically areas to the north-east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka. Ukrainian forces have also likely re-taken a mine to the east of Stupochky, which is located to the south of Chasiv Yar. Otherwise, there has been little change to the frontline around Chasiv Yar.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have made slight advances in central Toretsk, though the overall pace remains very slow. Geolocated footage from 10-12 November indicates Russian advances along Dzerzhynskoho Street in eastern Toretsk and Druzhby Street in central Toretsk.
• DONETSK: Russian forces have continued to set the conditions for the capture of Kurakhove on the Donetsk frontline, making gains to the north, east and south, as well as grinding gains in the town itself. Geolocated footage from 12 November shows recent Russian advances within north-eastern Kurakhove following a company-sized mechanised assault. Russian forces now possibly control around 15% of the settlement. A Russian reduced company-sized mechanised assault also resulted in confirmed advances as of 12 November in northern Dalne, which is located directly south of Kurakhove. The settlement is likely to be fully under Russian control.
• DONETSK: The capture of Dalne will likely increase the pressure on Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the pocket to the north and north-east of Vuhledar; it will also facilitate advances towards Kurakhove from the south along the C051104 highway. Meanwhile, Russian forces have also likely captured Illinka (located to the north-east of Kurakhove). Russian sources also reported that a Russian strike hit a bridge along Zaporizkyi Prospekt in Kurakhove. While this remains unconfirmed, it likely indicates efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics in the Kurakhove area. Overall, Russia’s multidirectional advances towards Kurakhove will continue to put significant pressure on Ukrainian defences in the area as Russian forces seek to straighten the frontline in this sector.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Geolocated footage from 10 November confirmed that Russian forces advanced south-east of Korenevo during a battalion-sized mechanised assault, though they likely sustained heavy losses. A Ukrainian brigade that took part in the defence claimed that the Russian forces attacked with 29 armoured vehicles in five waves; Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed 18 of the vehicles. It remains unclear whether the battalion-sized assault represents the beginning of a more concerted counter-offensive operation to retake Kursk oblast (Russia). However, Ukrainian Spokesperson for the Northern Group of Forces Vadym Mysnyk reported on 11 November that Russian forces are conducting airstrikes in Kursk at a rate two-to-three times higher than in other areas along the frontlines in Ukraine. This possibly indicates that Russia is conducting preparatory and ‘shaping’ operations amid the opening phase of a new counter-offensive. Regardless of whether the offensive has formally begun, Russian forces will almost certainly increase the tempo of their operations in the coming weeks in a bid to dislodge Ukrainian forces ahead of the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump on 20 January 2025.
• KURSK: On 13 November, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that North Korean forces have been deployed in combat roles in Kursk. The NIS assesses that North Korean forces are already engaged in combat operations. US State Department Spokesperson Vedant Patel also confirmed on 12 November that most of the 10,000 North Korean troops deployed to Russia are now in Kursk and that they are engaging in combat operations alongside Russian forces. As we previously assessed, an estimated 50,000 Russian and North Korean troops will likely take part in the anticipated Kursk counter-offensive this winter.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Although Russian forces have not made any confirmed gains over the past few days, the operational tempo remains high, marked by failed attempts to enter Kupiansk. On 13 November, an OSINT group with ties to the Ukrainian military reported that Russian troops conducted a limited assault on the northern outskirts of Kupiansk, and that they entered the city limits. However, Ukrainian forces were able to repel the attack, which consisted of two columns (including mechanised armoured vehicles) progressing towards the city and the Svatove highway from the Lyman Pershyi direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces countered an attack against Kupiansk that comprised four waves and a total of 15 armoured vehicles (all of which were destroyed). The General Staff also stated that Russian soldiers were dressed in Ukrainian uniforms. If true, this would represent a war crime.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: The latest attack likely underscores a deteriorating operational situation for Ukraine around Kupiansk, with Russian troops closing in on the outskirts of the city. Kupiansk is a major logistical hub and critical railroad junction. However, other sectors along the frontline remain higher priorities for Moscow; given the highly attritional nature of Russian operations, it remains uncertain whether Russian forces will be able to capture the city in 2025.
• SOUTHERN: On 11 November, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Tavriisk Group of Forces, Vladyslav Voloshyn, reported that Russian forces are concentrating trained assault groups, which they are moving to forward positions along the southern Zaporizhzhia axis. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces will possibly intensify armoured vehicle and motorcycle assaults in the near future, given that Russian forces have intensified airstrikes across the southern front by 30-40% over the last few weeks. Russian forces have continuously launched low-level infantry attacks at various points along the southern axis (though the frontline has moved very little in recent months).
• SOUTHERN: Russia is also likely increasing its efforts to advance towards the key logistical hub of Velyka Novosilka on the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia border. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 13 November that its forces had taken Rivnopil, a settlement located less than seven miles (10km) to the south-west of Velyka Novosilka. However, this remains unconfirmed.
• STRIKES: Early on 12 November, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with one S-300 missile, two Kh-59/69 missiles and 110 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 46 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Additionally, 60 drones were lost, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures, while two returned to Russia.
• STRIKES: On 13 October, Russia launched a missile and drone strike involving 90 Shahed-136/131 drones, two S-300 missiles, two Kh-101 cruise missiles and two Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles – the first missile strike against Kyiv in 70 days. Ukrainian air defences intercepted all Kh-101 and ballistic missiles as well as 37 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Additionally, 47 drones were reportedly lost, while two left Ukraine’s airspace and headed towards Belarus and Russia. The local authorities reported explosions in Kyiv, while the Associated Free Press (AFP) reported that several residents sought shelter in an underground train station in the city centre. Falling debris reportedly caused damage to an unspecified site in the capital.
• STRIKES: Earlier on 14 November, 59 Russian-launched Shahed-136/131 drones targeted Ukraine. Ukrainian forces intercepted 21 UAVS over Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts; 38 drones were reportedly lost.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 12 November, the authorities in Belgorod oblast (Russia) reported a Ukrainian drone attack against an oil depot in Stary Oskol city. Two large oil depots are located in the Stary Oskol area. The Russian MoD stated that 13 Ukrainian UAVs were shot down over Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk oblasts (all Russia); it also reported that its air defences intercepted 30 Ukrainian drones over Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Penza, Tver and Voronezh oblasts (all Russia) on 13 November.
• SABOTAGE: On 12 November, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that it thwarted a Ukrainian attack against railway tracks in Sevastopol (occupied Crimea) near the Balaklava thermal power plant (TPP). According to the FSB, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) co-ordinated the attack; it allegedly used a local resident (who was reportedly detained). On 13 November, a Russian military official was killed in a car explosion in Sevastopol (Crimea). A Ukrainian media outlet reported that the SBU orchestrated this attack, which killed the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF)’s 41st Missile Boat Brigade Chief of Staff Captain First Rank Valery Trankovsky. The latest incidents underscore a recent uptick in sabotage and assassination attempts across the peninsula, which are typically conducted by pro-Ukraine partisans.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• AID: Outgoing US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated on 14 November that the Biden administration plans to request additional funding for Ukraine from Congress for the 2025 financial year. The Biden administration reportedly wants to increase funding to help put Kyiv in ‘the best possible position’, though Sullivan did not provide further details. He did, nevertheless, confirm that all outstanding funds pre-authorised by Congress would be dispersed to Ukraine before the end of Biden’s term in office. Pentagon Spokesperson Pat Ryder confirmed on 13 November that of the funding Congress passed in April, 83% of pledged ammunition, including 155mm artillery shells, high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) ammunition and Patriot missiles, has been committed from available stockpiles. In addition, 67% of promised air defence capabilities, including Stinger and HAWK missiles, have been delivered. The timely distribution of the remaining funds and military equipment will likely be vital to shoring up Ukraine’s military capabilities ahead of the inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump on 20 January 2025 – whereafter further large-scale military funding is much less likely.
• KOREAS: Bloomberg reported on 14 November that the South Korean government is likely to delay a decision on potentially changing its stance on supplying weapons directly to Ukraine until after the Trump administration takes office. An unnamed senior South Korean official claimed that President Yoon Suk Yeol’s government will now consider the incoming US administration’s stance before committing to a course of action. We previously assessed that a change in South Korean policy remained unlikely, though this will likely also remain contingent upon North Korea’s actions and involvement in the war in 2025.
FORECAST
US: Fox News reported on 13 November that US President-elect Donald Trump could soon appoint a Ukraine peace envoy to lead negotiations on ending the Russo-Ukrainian War; this comes amid a flurry of appointments for the incoming administration. The precise remit of the peace envoy remains unclear, though it will be expected to pursue the second Trump administration’s stated ambition of ending the war quickly. To that end, the newly proposed National Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on 13 November that Trump wants to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table to end the war.
Ahead of their approval in the Senate, Trump has nominated loyalists to senior administrative positions; while they all remain committed to Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy, their views on Ukraine and Russia differ slightly. The proposed Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, is a foreign policy hawk who has taken very strong lines on countries including China and Iran (though less so on Russia). Meanwhile, Waltz previously suggested that the US should lift restrictions on Ukraine using Western-supplied missiles for strikes inside Russia (which the Biden administration has not approved); he has also strongly advocated for tighter economic sanctions on Russian energy exports. However, both men have previously voted against US funding for Ukraine; they are both also likely to prioritise China and other geopolitical engagements over Ukraine. Elsewhere, Tulsi Gabbard was nominated to the position of Director of National Intelligence – another pivotal role that directly impacts Ukraine. Gabbard is openly against further military support to Ukraine and has been a leading voice in calling for a rapid end to the war, stating in 2022 that the invasion of Ukraine was a result of the Biden’s administration’s failure to acknowledge ‘Russia’s legitimate security concerns’.
Ultimately, and despite the stances of the new administration’s nominees, President-elect Trump will dictate the US’ policy towards the war; it will be Trump’s decisions that determine Washington DC’s approach to negotiations and support (or lack thereof) for Kyiv. It nevertheless remains unclear if Kyiv and Moscow will agree to any proposed ceasefire or peace deal in 2025, with Russia in particular unlikely to agree to any major concessions given its current (and growing) military advantage on the battlefield. The Trump administration will therefore likely need to convince (and coerce) both parties to reach a timely agreement.
Ahead of possible US-brokered talks in early 2025, robust security guarantees will likely be required to convince Kyiv to agree to any ceasefire or peace agreement. Security guarantees to ensure a ceasefire holds will be of paramount importance to Kyiv, given widespread fears that an unstable and unenforced peace will merely allow Russia time to reconstitute its military to invade Ukraine once again so as to achieve its maximalist objectives – namely further territorial conquests, regime change and the demilitarisation of Ukraine.
The failure of the 1993 Budapest Memorandum (which sought to provide guarantees for Ukraine in exchange for Kyiv handing over its nuclear stockpile to Moscow) and the failure of the Minsk Accords after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea (and de facto invasion of Ukraine’s Donbas) have inevitably left Kyiv highly sceptical of vague and loosely enforced peace agreements to deter future Russian aggression. On 14 November, the New York Times reported that an unnamed senior Ukrainian official stated that ‘the territorial question is extremely important, but it’s still the second question […] the first question is security guarantees’. This likely reflects a growing acceptance in Kyiv that territorial concessions will need to be made, but only if Ukraine’s long-term security can be guaranteed. Kyiv has underscored its view that the most effective security guarantee comes with NATO membership, though this is highly unlikely in the next decade. As such, if the Trump administration seeks to end the war permanently, alternative security guarantees will likely be required.
Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on 13 November that proposals to freeze the war along the current frontlines are ‘even worse’ than the Minsk Accords. Similarly, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on 13 November that peace can only be achieved in Ukraine when the West ceases providing military aid to Ukraine. While it remains unclear if this is a genuine Russian prerequisite for entering negotiations, these statements indicate that the Kremlin is attempting to set conditions for negotiations ahead of Trump’s inauguration. We continue to assess that the Kremlin is highly unlikely to consider major concessions in the short term given that its military advantage on the battlefield is increasing. As such, the timeline for negotiations will likely depend to a large extent upon what terms the Trump administration will propose, and whether these favour Russia (which would encourage Moscow’s participation) or not (which would possibly alter Trump’s strategy towards a more coercive approach to force Russia to the negotiating table).
Nov 11.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: The destruction of the Ternovskaya dam, located west of Kurakhove (Donetsk oblast), will likely further complicate Ukrainian defensive operations in the area amid continued Russian advances
• KURSK: Russia has likely concentrated around 50,000 personnel ahead of a major counter-offensive in Kursk oblast which could be launched within days
• STRIKES: Russia and Ukraine launched their largest respective drone attacks against one another, including attacks against the capital Moscow and the capital Kyiv; this comes amid Ukraine introducing its first temporary emergency blackout of the winter
• FORECAST: The Biden administration is ramping up efforts to support Ukraine ahead of President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration; this could yet include a revision of existing policies and approvals for long-range strikes inside Russia
• OFFENSIVES: UK Defence Secretary John Healey reported on 9 November that Russian forces have sustained an estimated 80,000 casualties between September and October to take around 579 square miles (1,500 square kilometres) of territory. The Ukrainian General Staff also claimed earlier on 11 November that Russia suffered its deadliest day of the war to date, sustaining a record high of 1,770 casualties over the previous 24 hours. While we cannot confirm this, the ongoing Russian offensive has highly likely resulted in a significant increase in casualty rates (as we have previously reported). The pace of Russian advances over the last month has been the quickest since 2022. That said, Russian forces are paying an increasingly high price to advance mostly through the countryside and villages at present, rather than seizing operationally significant towns and cities such as Pokrovsk, Toretsk and Chasiv Yar (all Donetsk oblast). Nevertheless, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi acknowledged on 9 November that the situation at the front is difficult and has the potential to ‘worsen’. Given Russia is likely able to offset these high losses (at least in the short term) it remains highly likely that Russian forces will continue to make notable advances in the coming weeks for as long as they can sustain this momentum.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 9 November indicates that Ukrainian forces have retaken various positions north-east of Siversk, including the northern areas of Bilohorivka. The development follows reports among Russian milbloggers and ultranationalist commentators that strongly criticise the failure of a recent Russian assault near Bilohorivka that took place on 2 November. The attack reportedly involved a frontal assault without sufficient fire support; this resulted in extremely high casualty rates and equipment losses. While we cannot confirm the details of the failed assault, Bilohorivka has been the site of repeated failed Russian assaults since May 2022. Despite Bilohorivka itself being a relatively small town, it has nevertheless assumed operational significance given Russia’s inability to take the settlement. This failure has largely prevented further advances towards the more significant settlement of Siversk (located north-east of Bakhmut).
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 8 November indicates Russian advances to the south of Chasiv Yar. While Russian sources have claimed that Russian forces have advanced around 1.8 miles (3km) at Chasiv Yar’s northern and southern flanks in recent days, this remains unconfirmed. Nevertheless, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Luhansk Group of Forces fighting in the area, Anastasiya Bovovnikova, reported on 9 November that Russian forces are concentrating forces in the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions and have also accumulated a ‘sufficient’ number of reserves. She furthermore claimed that Russian forces are conducting fewer assaults in the Toretsk direction specifically, as we have previously reported. Her statement went on to estimate that Russian forces suffer a daily casualty rate of between 50 and 70 personnel in the Toretsk direction alone.
• DONETSK: Although Russia continues to maintain a high tempo of operations in the Pokrovsk sector, the rate of its advances has slightly slowed down, likely due to ongoing efforts toward Kurakhove, further south. Ukraine’s General Staff reported 35 clashes over the past 24 hours. Russian troops made confirmed progress along the E-50 Donetsk City-Pokrovsk highway north of Selydove (south-east of Pokrovsk) as of 9 November. Geolocated footage from 7 November also confirms that Novooleksiivka (south of Pokrovsk and west of Selydove) is now under Russian control. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 9 November confirmed that Ukrainian forces had regained lost positions north of Novohrodivka (south-east of Pokrovsk).
• DONETSK: The destruction of the Ternovskaya dam, located west of Kurakhove, will likely facilitate Russian operations to capture Kurakhove, a key objective for Russia. The head of the Kurakhove Military Administration, Roman Padun, reported the destruction of the Ternovskaya dam earlier on 11 November. The dam is located on the western edge of the Kurakhove Reservoir, spanning the Vovcha River, which is a major defensive feature located south-west of the Pokrovsk salient. Local officials have ordered the immediate evacuation of the residents of settlements affected by the resultant flooding. Reports also indicate that the remaining supply route to Kurakhove has now become impassable due to flooding. A Ukrainian military source, quoted by a Ukrainian media outlet, accused Russia of blowing up the dam. Also earlier on 11 November, the head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), Denis Pushilin, claimed that Russian forces had cut off the main supply routes for Ukrainian forces in Kurakhove; however, Pushilin did not mention the dam.
• DONETSK: Disrupting supply routes to Kurakhove has been a key element of Russia’s efforts to encircle the city. It remains uncertain whether Russia damaged the dam and, if it did, whether this was intentional. We assess that the flooding resulting from the dam’s explosion will nevertheless facilitate Russian efforts to cut off supply routes to Kurakhove. It will also further complicate defensive operations and withdrawal routes for Ukrainian forces.
• DONETSK: Kurakhove remains one of the most intense hotspots along the frontline. Ukraine’s General Staff reported 48 Russian attacks in the Kurakhove direction over the past 24 hours. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated that Russian forces are attacking from both the north and south and maintain a high tempo of operations despite the deteriorating weather conditions. Geolocated footage from 9 November indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Sontsivka (north-east of Kurakhove). Additional footage posted on 8 November indicates recent Russian advances along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway following a platoon-sized mechanised assault south-east of Kurakhove.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: The New York Times cited unnamed Ukrainian and US officials in a 10 November report indicating that Russia has concentrated around 50,000 personnel ahead of a major counter-offensive in Kursk oblast which could be launched within days. A US assessment cited by the newspaper indicates that the counter-offensive force, which includes North Korean troops, has been assembled without having to redeploy forces from eastern Ukraine. We have consistently assessed that the Russian High Command was highly likely to resist deploying forces from its principal offensive efforts in Donetsk oblast; the deployment of around 10,000 North Korean troops has almost certainly supported this approach. Ukrainian officials reportedly expect a major attack to begin in the coming days, though North Korean forces have likely only been deployed in limited, tactical operations thus far. Should Russia launch a new winter counter-offensive in Kursk which succeeds in pushing Ukrainian forces back, this will likely only reinforce growing desires in Washington DC for a rapid end to the war. The incoming Trump administration will likely view a successful offensive as indicative of Ukraine’s inability to win the war.
• KURSK: Meanwhile, ahead of the expected counter-offensive, fighting continues at numerous highly contested hotspots on the Kursk axis, with both Russian and Ukrainian forces making advances. Geolocated footage from 10 November indicates Ukrainian forces made minor advances north of Novoivanovka (located south-east of Korenevo) as Russian forces advanced south of the village. Meanwhile, Russian forces have also advanced to the east of Pogrebki, located north of Sudzha, on the eastern flank of the Kursk salient.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Overnight on 7-8 November, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with one Iskandr-M ballistic missile, four Kh-59/69 missiles and 92 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted all Kh-59/69 missiles and 62 drones over Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukraine’s Air Force also reported that 26 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were lost, likely due to electronic warfare (EW) measures. The ballistic missile reportedly hit critical infrastructure in Sumy oblast.
• STRIKES: On 9 November, Russia launched 51 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences shot down 32 drones over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Ternopil, Vinnytsia and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. 18 UAVs were reportedly lost due to Ukrainian EW measures.
• STRIKES: On 10 November, Russia launched its largest UAV strike to date, including against the capital Kyiv; the attack involved 145 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 62 drones over Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. According to Ukraine’s Air Force, 67 additional UAVs were lost (likely due to EW measures) while ten drones exited Ukraine’s airspace toward Belarus, Moldova and Russia. The Moldovan authorities reported that two drones had entered Moldova’s airspace, crashing near the northern village of Borosenii Noi (Rîșcani district) and the southern village of Firladen (Căușeni district) without causing any damage. The attack damaged various buildings in Odesa (Odesa oblast) and caused several civilian casualties. 15 UAVs targeted the capital, Kyiv, without causing damage or casualties.
• STRIKES: Earlier on 11 November, Ukraine was targeted by two Kh-59/69 missiles and 74 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukraine’s Air Force intercepted all missiles and 39 UAVs over the Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that 30 UAVs were lost due to malfunctions, while three more drones exited Ukraine’s airspace toward Belarus. Concurrently, a Russian ballistic missile hit a residential building in the city of Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast).
• STRIKES: Earlier on 11 November, Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine’s counter-disinformation department in the National Security and Defence Council, reported that Russia has accumulated stockpiles of long-range missiles in preparation for large-scale strikes. These stockpiles are reportedly located at strategic airfields. Concurrently, Ukraine’s Air Force noted that, earlier on 11 November, eight Tu-95MS strategic bombers likely carried out simulated missile strikes in the Caspian Sea region, activating Ukrainian missile alerting systems. This manoeuvre possibly aimed to confuse missile detection systems and ensure readiness for upcoming large-scale strikes. As such, we assess that Russia will realistically carry out a very large-scale missile strike in the coming weeks. The strike could possibly match the unprecedented intensity of the large-scale missile attacks conducted at the end of August.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, overnight on 7-8 November, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) orchestrated a drone attack against an oil refinery in Russia’s Saratov oblast. This was the first attack on such infrastructure since September. Russian oil refineries have been priority targets for Kyiv’s long-range attacks, underscoring efforts to degrade Russia’s oil production capacity. In early November, Reuters reported difficulties faced by three Russian oil companies in repairing damaged oil refineries due to Western restrictions on imported equipment. Unable to complete scheduled repairs in October, three refineries extended the downtime of individual refining units. Unnamed sources from Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (FISU), quoted by Reuters, reported that Russia’s import substitution programme for oil equipment covers only 30-45% of the market needs. At the same time, Chinese components are not always compatible with Russian equipment, limiting Russia’s ability to offset component shortages with China. As such, though Russia retains significant oil production overcapacity, Kyiv’s strikes against refineries have proven to be effective, particularly in exacerbating Russia’s shortages of oil refining equipment.
• STRIKES: Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that 50 Ukrainian drones attacked seven Russian regions early on 9 November. The targeted regions included Bryansk, Kursk, Novgorod, Oryol, Smolensk, Tula, and Tver oblasts. Quoting sources from Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), a Ukrainian media outlet reported that the attack targeted the Aleksin Chemical Plant in Tula oblast. According to the SBU sources, the plant produces ammunition and gunpowder as well as other products for Russia’s defence industrial base. The attack also damaged a transmission line at a nearby thermal power plant.
• STRIKES: Russia’s MoD reported that air defences intercepted a total of 70 drones targeting Russia on 10 November, including drones targeting the capital Moscow. 34 UAVs reportedly targeted Moscow, which represents one of the largest drone strikes against the capital to date. Russian Telegram channels reported damage caused by falling debris in the capital’s suburbs. Flight operations were momentarily interrupted at major airports, including Domodedovo (DME) and Sheremetyevo (SVO) airports.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• ENERGY: Earlier on 11 November, the Ukrainian government confirmed that emergency blackouts had been temporarily put in place nationwide for the first time this winter amid the threat of large-scale Russian strikes against energy infrastructure. Blackouts reportedly impacted numerous major cities, including Cherkasy (Cherkasy oblast), Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast), Kropyvnytskyi (Kirovohrad oblast), Kyiv, Mykolaiv (Mykolaiv oblast), Sumy (Sumy oblast) and Zhytomyr (Zhytomyr oblast). However, the private energy firm DTEK has since confirmed that emergency blackouts have ended in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kyiv and Odesa oblasts. This marks the first emergency blackout of the 2024-2025 winter period. It remains highly likely that further blackouts will continue in the coming months as the Ukrainian authorities attempt to limit the impact of what is expected to be the most challenging winter yet for the Ukrainian energy grid.
• EUROPE: European leaders are preparing plans to continue supporting Ukraine during the presidency of President-elect Donald Trump; France, Poland and the UK will likely remain the most significant pro-Ukraine voices on the continent. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has indicated the need for continued European support in the absence of US military aid and is seeking to establish a new coalition of pro-Ukrainian states. On 10 November, Tusk stated that, while plans for a US-brokered ceasefire could realistically be presented by the incoming Trump administration, any such decisions regarding a ceasefire cannot be made ‘over the heads of not only Ukrainians but also ours’ (referring to Poland). Tusk is set to meet with British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Baltic leaders in the coming weeks to discuss continued European support for Ukraine. For further analysis regarding British and French efforts to ramp up support for Ukraine, see FORECAST below.
• EUROPE: Meanwhile, Ukraine’s second-largest military backer after the US, Germany, is unlikely to be in a position to take a leading role concerning aid to Ukraine ahead of the US transition due to its own domestic political instability. The ruling coalition, led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, collapsed last week, with early federal elections increasingly likely in early 2025, possibly January. While a pro-Ukraine foreign policy is highly likely after the federal election, political uncertainty in the meantime will likely prevent major policy decisions from being made until a new coalition government is installed in early 2025. Nevertheless, Scholz did confirm on 10 November that he wants to speak to Russian President Vladimir Putin ‘soon’ to discuss ending the war in Ukraine. This further underscores the growing willingness of Western leaders to open talks with Moscow. For further analysis, see FORECAST below.
FORECAST
US: On 10 November, the Washington Post (WP) reported that President-elect Donald Trump held a telephone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, allegedly advising him against escalating the war in Ukraine. While the WP cited unnamed individuals reportedly familiar with the matter, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated earlier on 11 November that no such phone call took place, describing such reports as ‘fake’. It therefore remains unclear if such a telephone call did or did not take place, though such a call is likely in the coming weeks, before or shortly after Trump’s inauguration in January 2025. The Kremlin remains cautious in its approach to President-elect Trump, despite growing indications that the incoming administration favours a peace settlement that could be favourable to Russia. Confirmation on 10 November that Nikki Haley and Mike Pompeo, two pro-Ukraine members of Trump’s first administration, would not be receiving positions in the new administration has further underscored the high likelihood of a rapid shift of US policy on Ukraine under Trump’s second administration.
On 7 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the Valdai Discussion Club forum that he is prepared to open discussions to ‘restore’ US-Russian relations at the same time as promoting his vision for a ‘new world order’. He stated that the US must initiate such talks and that a true reset is only possible if the US drops sanctions on Russia and its support for Ukraine. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov notably clarified on 8 November that Putin’s statements do not mean that Russia’s military objectives in Ukraine have changed. This aligns with our own assessment that the Kremlin retains its maximalist objectives in Ukraine and is unlikely to agree to significant concessions in the short term if and when the incoming Trump administration seeks to pressure both sides into a ceasefire agreement.
In the meantime, the Biden administration is ramping up its efforts to expand support for Ukraine and deliver over USD 7 bn in approved aid ahead of Trump’s inauguration in January 2025. White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated on 10 November that President Joe Biden will appeal to Congress to approve more aid to Ukraine in the final 70 days of his term. The Wall Street Journal also reported on 9 November that the US is set to deliver an additional 500 interceptor missiles for the Patriot and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile (NASAMS) air defence systems to Ukraine.
However, the Biden administration’s efforts to ramp up support for Ukraine in the next 70 days are not limited to expediating aid shipments, but will also likely involve a wider review of outstanding policy positions and approvals. For example, on 8 November, Reuters reported that the Biden administration has allowed US defence contractors to work in Ukraine to maintain and repair US-provided weapons systems for the first time, effectively overturning a previous ban. The US Department of Defense (DoD) reportedly confirmed that a ‘small number’ of such contractors will deploy to rear areas ‘far from’ the frontlines to maintain systems such as F-16s and Patriot air defence batteries.
British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron are meeting in Paris later on 11 November to discuss European security and support for Ukraine, likely including an effort to influence the US towards approving long-range strikes inside Russia. The Telegraph reported earlier on 11 November that sources close to the talks indicate there are hopes that the leaders will influence Biden to approve the use of Western-supplied long-range cruise missiles for strikes inside Russia. Ukraine has long sought such approval as a means of expanding its capabilities to hit Russian rear areas and further undermine Russia’s own long-range strike capabilities. Both London and Paris support the use of Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles inside Russia, but the US authorities’ refusal to authorise such strikes has prevented a consensus. It remains unclear, however, whether the Biden administration would make such a policy shift so close to Trump’s inauguration, after which approval would likely be rescinded. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Nov 24. Ukrainian Leopard Tanks Destroy Russian Convoy Near Kurakhove. In eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, Ukrainian forces successfully halted Russian armored vehicles advancing toward Kurakhove with a coordinated tank and artillery assault.
The operation was carried out by the 33rd Mechanized Brigade of Ukraine, equipped with German-made Leopard 2A4 tanks.
Drone footage released by the brigade shows Ukrainian tanks and artillery striking Russian tanks, an armored personnel carrier, and several combat vehicles in a precise operation, resulting in significant Russian losses. The Leopard 2A4 tank, operated by a four-person crew, used its high-power armor-piercing rounds to neutralize key targets, disrupting the Russian advance. Ukrainian drones further pursued Russian infantry who retreated into nearby wooded areas, reportedly deploying shells to prevent regrouping.
The brigade reported that they eliminated 47 soldiers, two tanks, an armored personnel carrier, three combat vehicles, and a motorcycle.
Russia has experienced significant vehicle losses in Ukraine. In October alone, it lost 695 pieces of equipment, including 103 tanks that were destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured, according to the open-source research project Oryx.
(Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
14 Nov 24. British Challenger 2 tank ‘destroyed in Kursk.’ A British Challenger 2 tank in Ukrainian service has been destroyed by the Kremlin’s troops, Russian media has said. Russian marines from the 155th Guards Naval Infantry brigade destroyed the vehicle during fighting in Russia’s Kursk region, according to prominent pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Rybar. In a video released by Russian marines, first-person camera footage shows a drone hitting the tank underneath the turret.
Rybar said the fact that the tank was operating in Kursk suggested that Ukraine intended to hold the line in the region “at all costs”.
Another Challenger 2 was reported to have been destroyed by Russian troops in Kursk earlier this year. Pictures broadcast by Russian state media at the time showed the tank’s turret blown off, lying in a wooded area amongst a heap of twisted metal. Russia has amassed 50,000 troops in an effort to retake Kursk from Ukrainian forces. The US confirmed last week that the Kremlin had also deployed 10,000 North Korean soldiers to the region. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
14 Nov 24. DOD Will Work Quickly to Meet President’s ‘Surge’ Commitment to Ukraine Support. In September, President Joe Biden announced he plans to “surge” security assistance to Ukraine. That surge includes plans to ensure all remaining congressionally authorized funding to support Ukraine, including $5.5bn in presidential drawdown authority, should be transferred to Ukraine before the administration closes out activities in January.
Executing that presidential drawdown authority, which means moving some $5.5bn in gear from U.S. military inventory to Ukraine before Jan. 20, is a tall order. But Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said the Defense Department has demonstrated a remarkable ability to quickly get things done over the past three years.
“It is a short time … just under 70 days,” Singh said during a briefing today. “This department can do incredible work in that amount of time. The president made clear that … he wants to spend down the authority that Congress has allocated and authorized before he leaves office. We’re going to work very hard to make sure that happens.”
Since Russia illegally invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. has provided about $60.4bn in security assistance. On Nov. 1, for instance, the department initiated the 69th presidential drawdown authority package to Ukraine, worth some $425m.
“I expect that for the next coming months of this administration, you’re going to continue to see those packages draw down from … what’s available in our stockpiles,” Singh said. “Again, we’re committed to ensuring that Ukraine has what it needs to be successful on the battlefield.”
Singh also said that the department has been, since the first transfer of military hardware to Ukraine though PDA, cognizant of what’s being sent and of what the department needs for itself to ensure that readiness is maintained. That’s something that’s not going to change, she said.
“We’re constantly refilling our shelves and our stockpiles,” she said. “The secretary is not going to allow the department to dip below readiness levels that he doesn’t feel comfortable with. So, as we continue to refill our own shelves, you’re going to see equipment, capabilities continue to flow out.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
15 Nov 24. Russia is threatening to make a major strategic breakthrough across Ukraine’s shaky front line, making stark the reality of the conflict’s dynamics even as Europe’s politicians fret about the geopolitical shifts taking place in the background. Context: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will soon enter its 34th month. Russia has a manpower and materiel advantage, as Europe struggles to ramp up defence production and US president-elect Donald Trump vows to “end the war in 24 hours” after taking office. Russian troops have intensified attacks across the 1,000km-long front line in recent months and are advancing at a faster rate than at any point since 2022. Since August, Moscow has captured more than 1,200 sq km. Ukrainian officials have admitted that their defences are “crumbling”, and have stepped up deployments of medical personnel at the front in anticipation of heavy battles in the coming days and weeks, “particularly in the south and east”. Yesterday, Russian forces briefly entered the town of Kupiansk in Ukraine’s eastern Kharkiv region, breaking Kyiv’s frontline defences that had held firm for more than two years. Kupiansk is a highly symbolic location. Ukraine’s liberation of the town in September 2022 was one of the key victories in its lightning counteroffensive that pushed back occupying Russian troops from vast swaths of the country’s east. Ukraine’s general staff said the attack was repelled, but the incursion suggests the frontline is now faltering in multiple directions. That’s a major concern for EU capitals already scrambling to work out how they can maintain military support for Ukraine in the event that Trump orders the suspension of US security assistance. EU leaders are also contemplating how to respond to Trump’s likely demand for immediate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine to force a ceasefire. It is a chilling prospect for Brussels that Russian President Vladimir Putin, feeling that his forces have the upper hand and are close to a major breakthrough, could reject that offer and instead push for a renewed offensive. “Ukraine could attempt to fight on perhaps with increased European support. The consensus seems to be that, without US military support, Russia would make gains and eventually force Ukraine to the negotiating table,” writes William Jackson, head of emerging markets at Capital Economics, a research consultancy. (Source: FT.com)
13 Nov 24. Victory Plan negotiations. But there is no strategic imperative for Russia to re-direct its efforts from Eastern Ukraine, where marginal gains are slowly becoming operationally significant.
Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, on a telephone call with the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, discussing the Victory Plan on 12 November 2024. Ukraine’s Victory Plan hangs in the balance as the forces’ gains in Kursk Oblast – a major bargaining chip in future negotiations – continue to recede. Credit: Office of the President of Ukraine.
The potential loss of Ukraine’s gains in Russia’s Kursk Oblast will prove fatal to any future negotiating position with the aggressor.
Kursk sits at the heart of Ukraine’s so-called ‘Victory Plan’, drafted in a very different political landscape in the weeks leading up to the US election last week. The second point in the plan aims to shore-up a “buffer zone” in Kursk from where Ukrainian forces will destroy as much war potential as possible, including airstrips, bridges and production sites inside Russia.
Now, Ukraine’s grasp over the salient will prove detrimental following the return of the US President-elect Donald Trump to the White House.
It is believed that a new Trump administration – eager to end the conflict, even if it means conceding Ukrainian territory to Russia – will pressure Ukraine to retain what little leverage they can ahead of future discussions.
Major General Pat Ryder, a leading US Department of Defense spokesperson, assured the press that the Northern theatre still hangs in the balance, describing Russian gains as “incremental” on 12 November 2024.
However, the Ukrainian defensive line is said to have receded by a third of the original 900 square kilometres according to a source in October.
Russian plans to retake Kursk
The Institute for the Study of War indicated that Russia’s response to the Kursk incursion has not represented a significant inflection, even now. A rough estimate says that Russia has concentrated 50,000 personnel, including 8-10,000 North Korean troops more recently, to retake Kursk.
Especially after geopolitical developments this past week, there is currently no strategic imperative for Russia to re-direct its efforts from Eastern Ukraine, where marginal gains are slowly becoming operationally significant, particularly in the Donbas around the town of Pokrovsk.
Although, that does not mean a sufficient Russian counter-offensive is not expected in the coming weeks or months, but likely before the end of January 2025 as the winter period wanes.
Ukrainian military training border guards from Steel Border brigade in the Dnipropetrovsk region, April 2023. Credit: Petro Zadorozhnyy/State Border Guard Service of Ukraine/the Collection of war.ukraine.ua.
The Russians can now afford to take their time politically as well. The longer the war drags on throughout this winter, the more Ukraine will be deprived of its resources when they enter a new year with a new US administration unwilling to provide the level of military assistance that President Joe Biden has issued over the past four years.
As of 1 November, US security assistance to Ukraine is valued at $61bn since the Biden administration took office, and $60.4bn since Russia’s unlawful invasion began on 24 February 2022.
“It is important to remember that Donald Trump is not president yet. There are still more than two months for President Biden to secure his place in history by taking decisive steps to support Ukraine,” commented Kira Rudik, a Ukrainian member of parliament and Golos Party leader.
“This could include lifting restrictions on missile strikes inside Russia, or inviting Ukraine to join Nato” – two hot issues that the US has avoided. (Source: army-technology.com)
14 Nov 24. Exporting Excellence. Understandably, the Ukrainian government does not like to see weapons being exported. As the country continues her brave fight against Russian aggression and occupation, all materiel is indispensable. Yet, the domestic political will is building to allow some controlled arms exports under certain conditions.
Ukraine is having to think about money. In the United States, Congressional shillyshallying earlier this year delayed a huge military aid package promised to Kyiv. As these words were being written, the United States is locked in a tight presidential election race. Regardless of whoever emerges victorious, the Ukrainian government must be aware that, at best, guarantees of US support may come with delays. At worst, help may dry up altogether. The situation is no different in Europe. Russia-supporting or Russia-sympathetic extremist, populist political parties are on the rise in France and Germany. Similar parties hold the reins of power in Hungary and Slovakia.
A report by Politico in early October said that loosening Ukrainian export controls just a little, albeit under strict conditions, could earn the country $15bn annually. Obviously, exports must not be made at the expense of the frontline, but the idea has potential. Israel has largely been in a state of war since the country’s founding in 1947. This crucible of conflict has given the nation a world class, and competitively priced, defence industry. Moreover, it has allowed Israel to emerge as the strongest nation in the Middle East.
Ukraine’s kit is battle proven, cost effective and innovative. Our Radio Roundup article in this month’s newsletter reports on a Ukrainian company which has teamed with a US supplier to offer radios to military customers in America. These radios incorporate the harsh lessons learned from the frontline with robust protection against the worst that Russian electronic warfare can throw at them. Loosening the export rules could pay dividends on and off the battlefield. More cash equals more materiel, and more kit will help Ukraine kick Russia out of her territories. (Source: Armada)
13 Nov 24. Cuashub.com said today that Estonian firm to develop low-cost C-UAS missiles for Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence has confirmed that it will soon conduct tests on a new air defence missile developed by Estonian firm, Frankenburg Technologies. This announcement followed discussions between Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defence, General Anatolii Klochko, and the leadership of the Estonian defence company.
Details on the missile remain limited. It is capable of targeting aerial threats at altitudes up to 2,000 metres and is specifically designed to counter UAS. Frankenburg Technologies’ CEO, Kusti Salm, commented on the price, noting:
“It’s a brand-new low-cost missile.”
A spokesperson for Frankenburg Technologies noted that if the trials prove successful, plans would be made for production within Ukraine:
“We are considering future domestic production alongside exploring funding sources for this project,” they said.
Frankenburg Technologies’ official website includes limited technical specifics but notes their mission to make missile systems “ten times more affordable, a hundred times faster to produce, and in quantities far exceeding current industry capabilities.”
The goal of the missile’s development is to offer cost-effective anti-drone defence at a fraction of typical missile expenses. Ukraine anticipates the first shipment of these Estonian-made missiles in the coming months.
If successful, this missile could become yet another tool in the Ukrainian arsenal to counter Russian UAS, comparable to anti-aircraft FPV drones. Ukrainian officials see these trials as an essential step to enhance their anti-drone capabilities.
Ukraine’s recent collaboration with Thales on missile production demonstrates a strategic focus on diversifying its defence partnerships and expanding its technological edge.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/estonian-firm-to-develop-low-cost-c-uas-missiles-for-ukraine/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
13 Nov 24. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian drone strike ignites blaze at major Russian munitions depot. An ammunition depot in Russia’s Bryansk region erupted in flames on Sunday following a series of Ukrainian drone strikes. The targeted facility, identified as part of the 1060th Material and Technical Support Centre, sustained significant damage as critical supply points were hit, triggering secondary explosions.
Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed the operation targeted the site, previously known as the 120th arsenal of the Russian Ministry of Defence’s Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate.
A statement shared on social media noted that “The Defense Forces of Ukraine do not stop destroying the military infrastructure of the Russian invaders. At least eight explosions were recorded, [with evidence of] at least two ignition points on the territory of the military unit and signs of secondary detonation.”
The drone strikes, executed by coordinated units in conjunction with other branches of Ukraine’s Defence Forces, resulted in a series of powerful detonations.
This operation follows a recent wave of drone activity in Moscow, suggesting an escalation in Ukraine’s strategic targeting of key military facilities inside Russian territory.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-drone-strike-ignites-blaze-at-major-russian-munitions-depot/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
13 Nov 24. Ukraine Develops Own Drones to Replace Chinese Mavics.
Ukrainian developers of unmanned systems have presented their solutions to the Ukrainian government and military to replace Chinese Mavic drones.
Footage from the event was released by the Minister of Strategic Industries, Herman Smetanin.
This weekend, the Ministry of Strategic Industries organized a demonstration for 8 Ukrainian manufacturers of tactical reconnaissance copters that are at different stages of readiness, and two of them have already been tested and codified by the Ministry of Defense.
Six teams completed flight missions: a 10 km flight at an altitude of over 250 meters and a target search. This was a demonstration for the General Staff, the Unmanned Systems Forces Command, the Logistics Forces Command, government procurement and military units.
The military evaluated the quality of the products and talked directly with the manufacturers about the production features and capabilities.
“First of all, I thank the Ukrainian production teams who managed to create such a product in Ukraine. It is inexpensive, functional, and easy to operate. And most importantly, it is created within the country, which, firstly, makes us more independent of foreign supplies, and secondly, keeps money in the country,”
Herman Smetanin wrote in his message.
In the future, the state should codify and conduct comparative tests of the demonstrated drones. Based on the results, the best ones will be purchased for the Defense Forces.
According to the Ministry of Defense, since April, the Defense Procurement Agency has contracted Mavic 3E and Mavic 3T thermal imaging drones for about UAH 2.5bn.
It was the first time the Ministry of Defense purchased 3,000 DJI Mavic 3E UAVs and 1,000 DJI Mavic 3T thermal imaging drones with additional equipment for the military. The total value of the contracts amounted to UAH 575.2m.
The average price of one unmanned aerial vehicle was as follows:
UAH 126,900 – DJI Mavic 3E with three additional batteries and a charger;
UAH 194,200 – DJI Mavic 3T with three additional batteries and a charger.
In October, procurers of the State Special Communications Service managed to sign a contract for DJI Mavic 3T thermal imaging drones at a record low price: UAH 416.94 m for 2,250 quadcopters, or UAH 137,500 per unit.
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has assigned an identification code to another Ukrainian-made reconnaissance drone, the quadcopter named Shmavik. What it means is that now this remote-controlled copter can be purchased for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The codification of Shmavic and other similar UAVs was announced during their live demonstration by the Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin.
The Shmavik, as stated by the manufacturer, is a specialized tactical scout drone, with a battery endurance up to 60 minutes, an operational radius of 15 km and a jam-resistant navigation system and frequency-hopping (FHSS) capability. The camera and the suspension is just a type of payload within the limits of the specified lift capacity. (Source: UAS VISION/MILITARNYI; Defense Express)
11 Nov 24. UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron pledged their “unwavering” support for Ukraine as the two leaders met in Paris days after a second Trump administration was elected in the US. They “reaffirmed their commitment to co-ordinate closely, stressing their determination to support Ukraine unwaveringly and for as long as necessary to thwart Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine”, the Elysée said in a statement on Monday. It added that Macron “stressed the need to assert the specific interests and responsibilities of Europeans in matters of security and defence”. Downing Street issued a statement after the meeting suggesting that the defence of Ukraine was at the top of the agenda during talks between the two leaders. “The leaders started by discussing the situation in Ukraine, including how best to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position going into the winter,” it said. Starmer met Macron in Paris on Monday as the prime minister became the first UK leader to attend Armistice Day commemorations in France for 80 years. The meeting was an attempt by the two European leaders to show a united front on Ukraine ahead of a new administration in Washington that could upturn western support for Kyiv. Earlier this year Macron’s stance on the conflict took a more hawkish tone when he broke a taboo among allies by refusing to rule out sending ground troops to Ukraine — taking EU leaders as well as the Kremlin by surprise. Macron said the aim was to re-establish “strategic ambiguity” with Russia. Donald Trump and his advisers have spoken repeatedly of their desire to end the conflict during the campaign without saying how that would be achieved. European partners worry that Trump’s isolationist tendencies and criticism of the region’s defence spending could lead to the US withdrawing from efforts to support Ukraine in the conflict. Trump has called on Nato member states to raise their defence spending to 3 per cent of GDP — a sizeable jump for most even after European countries increased their defence budgets in the years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
(Source: FT.com)
10 Nov 24. Russian Military Faces Unsustainable Losses and Recruitment Challenges, Says ISW. Russian forces are experiencing high levels of losses in Ukraine that may not be sustainable in the long term, according to a report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
In its report published on Saturday, ISW said that since October 2023, Russia has lost the equivalent of five divisions of armored vehicles and tanks in the Pokrovsk region alone. Despite Russia’s efforts to prioritize military equipment in key areas, their reliance on Soviet-era vehicles and limited production of replacements raises concerns about how long they can maintain this level of loss.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently said Russia is losing over 1,200 troops daily, amounting to about 36,000 per month.
The ISW report suggests that the Russian military is struggling to find enough recruits to replace these casualties. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the shortage of workers and Russia’s reliance on migrant labor during a speech last Thursday. There are also reports that migrants are being pressured to join the military.
Meanwhile, Russian military bloggers, known as “Milbloggers,” have openly criticized the high casualty rates. A former Russian instructor recently called Russia’s current tactics—using small, under-prepared assault groups—“improperly organized” and said they are causing unnecessarily high casualties without major battlefield gains. Milbloggers have also reported incidents of commanders sending drone operators and specialists on dangerous assault missions as punishment, resulting in additional deaths.
The ISW report indicates that this growing frustration among pro-war voices in Russia could increase pressure on the Kremlin to address these issues. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
10 Nov 24. US to speed up interceptor missiles delivery to Ukraine, WSJ reports. A resident stands inside of his house destroyed by a Russian drone strike, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Odesa, Ukraine November 8, 2024.
The United States will ship more than 500 interceptor missiles to Ukraine in the weeks ahead, speeding up Washington’s military aid delivery to the war-ravaged country, the Wall Street Journal reported on Saturday.
Citing an unnamed Pentagon official, the WSJ reported that before the U.S. presidential election, in which former Republican President Donald Trump defeated his Democratic rival Vice President Kamala Harris, the U.S. administration had been aiming to deliver the remainder of its aid to Ukraine by April.
The delivery of the interceptors for the Patriot missile defence system and the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, or NASAMS, should meet Ukraine’s air defence needs for the rest of this year, the newspaper reported, citing an unnamed U.S. official.
Reuters could not independently verify the Wall Street Journal report.
The office of Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, the Ukrainian defence ministry, the Pentagon and the U.S. State Department did not immediately respond to Reuters’ requests for comment.
Trump, Putin speak as Biden plans to lobby Trump to stick with Ukraine.
• Summary
• Trump spoke with Russia’s Putin in recent days
• Biden, Trump to discuss top U.S. policy priorities on Wednesday
• Biden to urge Trump, Congress to keep supporting Ukraine
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin and advised him not to escalate the Ukraine war, a source familiar with the conversation told Reuters on Sunday, as President Joe Biden plans to urge Trump not to abandon Kyiv.
Trump and Putin spoke in recent days, said the source. Trump spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Wednesday. Trump has criticised the scale of U.S. military and financial support for Kyiv, vowing to end the war quickly, without saying how.
Ukraine’s foreign ministry said it was not informed in advance of the call between Trump and Putin and subsequently could neither endorse or object to it.
“We do not comment on private calls between President Trump and other world leaders,” said Steven Cheung, Trump’s communications director, when asked about the phone call, which was first reported by The Washington Post.
The Russian embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment. (Source: FT.com)
08 Nov 24. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian electronic warfare is disrupting civilian smartphones. The General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces has warned that smartphone clocks across Ukraine may experience disruptions due to the deployment of electronic warfare (EW) systems aimed at countering Russian drone attacks. Ukrainian users have reported frequent, automatic time changes on their smartphones during air raid alarms as electronic warfare measures activate.
These EW systems use a technique known as GPS spoofing, which involves broadcasting false GPS signals to mislead Russian drones by altering their perceived location. This tactic aims to deflect drones off course, but it also impacts civilian devices reliant on GPS for time zone settings. As modern smartphones automatically adjust time zones based on their geolocation, users in Ukraine may find their devices switching to incorrect times when EW is active.
Screenshots posted by Ukrainian users on social media in recent days reveal instances where their smartphone locations appeared in Russian territory, indicating the impact of GPS interference.
In response, the General Staff advised residents:
“It is advisable to disable the automatic time update mode in the phone and take into account that the accuracy of satellite navigation systems may be disturbed during the announcement of air alerts.”
The uptick in EW deployments comes amid an extended period of regular Russian aerial attacks. According to President Volodymyr Zelensky, Russian forces have launched over 900 bombs, nearly 500 Shahed drones and about 30 missiles in the past week alone. October saw Russia deploying more than 2,000 Shahed-type drones over Ukraine, in a persistent attempt to crack Ukrainian C-UAS defences.
Despite international sanctions, Russia continues to acquire resources through sanctions evasion networks involving allies such as China, Iran and North Korea, allowing it to maintain its offensive capabilities.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-electronic-warfare-is-disrupting-civilian-smartphones/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
09 Nov 24. Ukraine to test new air defence missile from Estonian company Frankenburg Technologies. Ukraine is set to receive new air defence missiles from Estonian defence company Frankenburg Technologies, as part of an upcoming testing programme. The first batch of these missiles is expected to arrive in Ukraine within the next few months.
This development was announced following a recent meeting in Kyiv between Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defence, Brigadier General Anatolii Klochko, and representatives of Frankenburg Technologies. The missiles are primarily designed to counter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and can engage targets at altitudes of up to 2 kilometres.
Kusti Salm, CEO of Frankenburg Technologies, expressed the company’s commitment to supporting Ukraine’s defence efforts. “Our goal is to help Ukraine win this war. To achieve that, we are offering a prototype of a new, affordable missile for downing airborne targets, particularly UAVs,” Salm stated.
Salm further indicated that if testing is successful and Ukraine opts to continue with the technology, the company may look to establish production facilities within Ukraine. Preliminary discussions also touched on the potential financing framework for the missile’s production.
Brigadier General Klochko highlighted Ukraine’s urgent need for a diverse arsenal of missile weapons to defend against Russian attacks. He urged international defence manufacturers to supply Ukraine with advanced weaponry and to allow their systems to be tested in active combat conditions.
“We are open to collaboration and ready to utilize various models of modern weaponry,” said Klochko, underscoring Ukraine’s readiness to integrate new defence technologies. This collaboration marks a potential step forward in bolstering Ukraine’s air defence capabilities against evolving threats in the region. (Source: Google/https://defence-industry.eu/)
11 Nov 24. Rheinmetall and ICEYE cooperate to provide Ukraine with satellite imagery on behalf of the German government
The strengthened cooperation between Rheinmetall and SAR satellite company ICEYE, announced in September 2024, is already bearing fruit. To meet Ukraine‘s urgent demands for SAR satellite reconnaissance capabilities, Rheinmetall and Ukraine, supported by the German government, signed a contract. The agreement further increases the SAR data and other support Ukraine has been receiving from ICEYE during the war.
Since early October 2024, Ukraine receives new satellite images taken by ICEYE’s SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) satellites, under the collaboration between Rheinmetall and ICEYE. This provision will supplement further reconnaissance data obtained by other sensors and provide the basis for decision-making and operational planning by the Ukrainian armed forces. The collaboration includes dedicated satellite capacity and constellation access, which allows the capacity of the entire ICEYE satellite fleet to be utilized. Since 2018, ICEYE has launched 38 satellites for ICEYE’s and its customers’ use.
SAR satellites offer the advantage over conventional satellites that they can generate high-resolution images regardless of weather conditions or time of day. These are very detailed and make even the smallest objects on the earth’s surface identifiable. This can bring decisive advantages for the armed forces in terms of surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance or their own positioning on the battlefield.
In June 2024, the Düsseldorf-based technology group announced its participation in the world’s largest fleet of radar reconnaissance satellites. In September 2024, Rheinmetall and ICEYE had further intensified their cooperation. In the course of this, Rheinmetall had secured exclusive rights to market the SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) satellites to military and government end users in both the German and Hungarian markets.
ICEYE has been working closely with the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to support and help Ukraine in building space defence capabilities. In August 2022 ICEYE announced a contract with the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation to provide the Government of Ukraine with ICEYE’s SAR satellite imaging capabilities with one of ICEYE’s SAR satellites designated for the Government of Ukraine’s use over the region. ICEYE also provides access to its constellation of SAR satellites, allowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces to receive radar satellite imagery on critical locations. In July 2024, ICEYE and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Cooperation outlining partnering to strengthen Ukraine’s space defence capabilities.
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