NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Nov 07.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: Russian forces have likely taken 189 square miles (490 sq km) of territory in October as the first North Korean troops engage in limited combat operations in Kursk oblast
• STRIKES: Russia is continuing a relatively high tempo of drone attacks, including experimentation with new strike tactics at low altitudes to identify weaknesses in the air defences around the capital Kyiv
• NEGOTIATIONS: Unconfirmed reports claim that an early peace treaty presented to Ukraine by Russia shortly after the beginning of the invasion in 2022 effectively amounted to Ukraine’s capitulation
• FORECAST: The re-election of former US president Donald Trump has decreased the likelihood of continued open-ended military support to Ukraine; numerous peace plan proposals will likely be presented to the president-elect in the coming weeks and months
• OFFENSIVES: The Ukrainian OSINT source DeepState estimated on 6 November that Russian forces took 189 square miles (490 sq km) of Ukrainian territory in October; this is by far the largest loss of territory in over a year. We maintain that Russia’s current rate of advance is the quickest since 2022. However, large-scale manoeuvre operations that are capable of rapidly surrounding large cities remain unlikely.
• OFFENSIVES: The spokesperson for Ukraine’s General Staff, Dymtro Lykhova, stated on 6 November that Ukraine is raising new brigades (rather than replenishing the losses of existing formations) because Russia has increased the number of troops across the frontline by almost 100,000. Lykhova reported that raising new brigades is necessary to counter this increase in enemy forces, as well as to effectively defend the frontline which is 807 miles (1,300km) long. It has notably lengthened in recent months. Lykhova confirmed that the General Staff sees their approach as providing the quickest way to supply troops to the frontline as they are needed, facilitating for more effective force rotations and allowing exhausted units to recover. However, some Ukrainian and international military commentators have questioned the General Staff’s preference for raising fresh brigades, rather than prioritising reinforcing existing, experienced brigades.
• BAKHMUT: Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are hotly contesting positions to the south of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast); Russia’s efforts to advance in the town remain slow. Geolocated footage from 5 November indicated that both Russian and Ukrainian forces advanced modestly in two locations to the south-east of Chasiv Yar, with Ukrainian forces retaking lost positions on the town’s outskirts. In line with our previous analysis, Ukraine’s spokesperson for the Luhansk Group of Forces fighting in the area reported on 5 November that Russian forces are launching fewer assaults in the Chasiv Yar area than elsewhere on the frontline, namely further south in Donetsk oblast.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have managed to take the remainder of the village of Druzhba, located east of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) after intensifying assaults following a short-lived tactical pause. Geolocated footage from 5 November confirmed the advances, which have likely strengthened Russia’s north-eastern flank in the Toretsk direction and will likely allow Russian forces to increase pressure on the eastern outskirts of Toretsk itself.7
• DONETSK: Intense fighting continues to occur in the Pokrovsk sector, where 39 clashes were recorded over the past 24 hours according to the Ukrainian General Staff. Geolocated footage from 5 November confirmed that Russia controls the settlement of Vyshneve (south-east of Pokrovsk) as well as Russian advances south of Lysivka and south of Petrivka, both south-east of Pokrovsk. Russian forces also made confirmed gains south-east of Novooleksiivka (south-east of Pokrovsk) as of 6 November.
• DONETSK: Russian forces continued to make tactical gains towards Kurakhove, west of Donetsk city. Geolocated footage from 6 November likely shows that Russian forces have recently seized Stepanivka, north of Kurakhove. Similarly, footage from 5 November also showed that Vovchenka (north-east of Kurakhove) is under Russian control. Russia also made confirmed advances south-west of Maksymilianivka (east of Kurakhove) following a company-sized mechanised assault. On 5 November, the UK Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that Russia had captured Hirnyk (north-east of Kurakhove).
• DONETSK: Russian forces continue to maintain a high pace of operations in the Vuhledar sector, where they made confirmed gains over the past few days. According to geolocated footage from 6 November, two separate reinforced platoon-sized mechanised assaults resulted in advances within Antonivka and east of Bohoyavlenka, both located north-east and north-west of Vuhledar, respectively. Russian forces also made confirmed advances south-west of Trudove (north-east of Vuhledar). Meanwhile, on 6 November, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that Russian forces captured Antonivka and Yasna Polyana, located north-west of Vuhledar. However, such claims have yet to be visually corroborated.
• DONETSK: According to the UK DI’s 5 November report, Russia has advanced up to 5.6 miles (9km) in some areas of southern Donetsk oblast within the space of one week. The UK DI also noted that although the rate of such advances has resulted in heavy personnel losses, Russia continues to recruit in high numbers to maintain the current operational pace.
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 4 November indicates Ukrainian forces advanced slightly west of Hlyboke, located north of Kharkiv city and just east of the Travyanske Reservoir. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Spokesperson for the Kharkiv Group of Forces Yevheniy Romanov stated on 6 November that deteriorating weather conditions have reduced the tempo of engagements on the Kharkiv frontline by one-third in recent days.
• KURSK: On 5 November, Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov stated that Ukrainian forces had engaged in ‘small-scale’ engagements with North Korean forces in Kursk oblast. Unnamed US officials also confirmed to Reuters on 6 November that North Korean troops were engaged In combat. The Ukranian authorities estimate that 11,000 North Koreans are deploying to Kursk oblast; while the first components have likely begun fighting, the majority of the deployment is likely still being prepared. It will also likely remain difficult for Ukrainian forces and intelligence to differentiate North Korean forces from regular Russian troops given they have been integrated into existing Russian units; the Ukrainians claim that the Russians have disguised them as being from Russia’s Siberia Republic of Buryatia.
• KURSK: Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on 6 November that, after three months of operations in Kursk oblast, Ukrainian forces have inflicted 20,000 casualties on Russian forces in the area. He claimed that 7,905 were killed, 12,220 wounded and 717 captured and that Ukrainian forces also destroyed 54 tanks, 276 infantry fighting vehicles, 107 artillery pieces and mortars and five anti-aircraft systems. Meanwhile, Russia’s MoD claimed on 7 November that Russian forces inflicted more than 30,200 casualties upon Ukrainian forces in Kursk over the same period. While we cannot confirm this, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have likely sustained notable casualties on this section of the frontline. Nevertheless, these losses remain sustainable for Russia. Syrskyi also noted that Russia has already amassed 45,000 troops in Kursk and is attempting to increase this number still further. With the deployment of North Korean forces and other efforts to increase the number of Russian forces on this axis, Russian forces will likely be able to apply additional pressure on the Ukrainian defence throughout the winter.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past few days, Russian forces made gains in the Kupiansk sector where intense fighting is taking place, marked by an uptick in Russian ground assaults. Geolocated footage posted on 6 November indicates that Russian forces advancing west of Kolisnykivka (south-east of Kupiansk) and across fields and into north-eastern Pershotravneve (west of Svatove). Intense fighting is also likely taking place near Kolisnykivka (south-east of Kupiansk); Russian sources claimed that the settlement is nearly under full Russian control, though this remains visually unconfirmed. Additional footage from 4-5 November shows Russian advances west of Novoselivske (south-east of Kupiansk) and in northern Terny (north-west of Kreminna). The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupiansk sector stated on 5 November that the Russian command has doubled the number of ground attacks in the sector, which are conducted by fireteam-sized assault units comprised of three to five soldiers.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 5 November indicates Russian forces marginally advanced south-west of Novodanylivka, located north of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Russian sources also claimed on 5-6 November that their forces advanced further in the area; however, this has not been confirmed.
• STRIKES: On 5 November, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with two Kh-59/69 missiles and 79 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that air defences intercepted all missiles and 48 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); 30 UAVs were reportedly lost, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures. Air defences were active in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: On 6 November, Ukrainian air defences intercepted 38 of 63 Shahed-136/131 drones deployed by Russian forces; they did so over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 20 UAVs failed to reach their targets, likely due to EW measures. However, Ukraine failed to counter one Kh-39 missile and one Kh-31P missile launched by Russia.
• STRIKES: Early on 7 November, Russia launched a large drone strike involving 106 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces shot down 74 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. 25 UAVs were reportedly lost, likely due to Ukrainian EW measures.
• STRIKES: The authorities in the capital Kyiv reported that 30 UAVs targeted the Ukrainian capital during an attack earlier on 7 November. Falling drone debris caused damage in five of the city’s urban districts, including Holosiivskiy, Obolonsk, Pechersk, Podilskyi and Solomyansk. According to the head of Kyiv’s Military Administration, Serhiy Popko, the attack took place in several waves, with UAVs flying at very low altitudes. We previously reported that this is part of Russia’s ongoing efforts to innovate in their drone technology and striking tactics. Low-altitude strikes complicate projectile detection, thereby shortening the window that air defences’ have to respond. The use of such new UAV strike tactics also likely aims to test the reactiveness of Ukrainian mobile air defence units to identify optimal strike routes for future missile strikes, particularly ahead of the winter. We have observed over the past few weeks that Kyiv has been frequently targeted by strikes (up to 20 times in October). Although the capital retains the densest air defence coverage in the country, Russia’s innovative strike tactics implemented during large-scale missile and drone attacks will continue to challenge its air defences.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 5 November, a Ukrainian drone attack targeted Belgorod city (Belgorod oblast, Russia), where a UAV hit an unspecified building in the city.
• STRIKES: On 6 November, Ukraine conducted a drone strike that, for the first time since the start of the war, targeted the North Caucasian Republic of Dagestan (Russia) on the shores of the Caspian Sea. An independent Russian online news outlet reported that four drones targeted Kaspiysk (Republic of Dagestan), a port city on the Caspian Sea. The Russian authorities claimed that air defences successfully repelled the attack. However, an unnamed Ukrainian intelligence source quoted by the French international news agency AFP claimed that the drones hit two Russian warships in the Caspian Sea Flotilla. Satellite imagery indicates the likely presence of three Russian Buyan-class vessels, two likely Buyan-M-class vessels, one Gepard-class vessel, one Karakurt-class vessel and one Tarantul-class vessel in the Flotilla.
• STRIKES: While the damage to the vessels has yet to be visually confirmed, the attack likely underscores Ukraine’s efforts to extend its strikes against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to naval assets in the Caspian Sea. The strike also highlights Kyiv’s improving ability to conduct long-range strikes, with Kaspiysk located around 932 miles (1500km) from Ukraine’s border. Russia has been conducting long-range missile strikes with strategic bombers, such as the Tu-95MS, as well as sea-borne Kalibr cruise missile strikes from the Caspian Sea. As such, if Ukraine intensifies strikes in the region, it will likely increasingly threaten Russian striking capabilities, especially if Ukrainian attacks start targeting missile platforms in the region.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• ENERGY: Poland will host an international conference on rebuilding Ukraine’s energy infrastructure on 13 and 14 November in the capital Warsaw. One of the goals of the conference is to attract international funding to support Ukrainian energy companies in restoring critical infrastructure damaged during Russia’s full-scale invasion. Hundreds of participants from approximately 30 countries are expected to attend. We assess that restoring Ukraine’s energy facilities is vital for strengthening energy security both during the conflict and in the post-war period.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Unconfirmed reports emerged on 4 November outlining details of an early ‘peace’ treaty presented to Ukraine by Russia shortly after the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, which effectively amounted to Ukraine’s capitulation. The proposal, dated 7 March 2022, sets out conditions that Ukraine become a neutral nation with an army of no more than 50,000 personnel (around five times smaller than the army in 2022). Kyiv would have also been forced to formally recognise Crimea as part of Russia and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) as independent. Ukraine would have been responsible for paying for the reconstruction of the Donbas.
• NEGOTIATIONS: The proposed ‘treaty’ also would have prohibited Ukraine from developing or deploying missiles with a range of over 155 miles (250km). Also, Russia would have been empowered to ban other types of weapons in the future, which would have severely degraded Ukraine’s military capabilities and sovereignty. Such conditions would have almost certainly made Ukraine vulnerable to renewed Russian aggression and isolated it from any Western defence or security assistance. We assess that Russia is unlikely to moderate its current demands compared to the demands it allegedly presented in early 2022, at least for as long as it perceives its military advantage to be increasing. Instead, Moscow’s territorial claims will likely be more extensive (including retaining control over Ukrainian regions it has since annexed (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts).
• NEGOTIATIONS: The head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, said on 4 November that Ukraine is not conducting any negotiations with Russia. Yermak was specifically referencing recent reports that the two countries are discussing a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure. Despite Ukrainian officials’ continued opposition to negotiations with Russia at present, we assess that Donald Trump’s recent re-election will highly likely increase pressure for Kyiv to enter talks in 2025 as well as the likelihood of Kyiv having to make territorial concessions. Concurrently, Russia’s ability to make gains across the frontline will possibly mean Moscow will not want to engage in negotiations in the coming months as it feels its position is improving. Russia may realistically consider that entering talks would be premature and that it can make greater gains to leverage in negotiations at a later stage. For further analysis, please see FORECAST below.

FORECAST

US: The re-election of former president Donald Trump in the US has severely reduced the likelihood of continued and open-ended US military assistance to Ukraine. We previously outlined scenarios and implications of a Trump administration’s Ukraine policy prior to the election, including its approach to seeking an end to the war.

In his victory speech, Trump made no explicit reference to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, he repeated his intentions to ‘stop wars’ in his next term without specifying which and how. On 6 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated Trump on his re-election and stated that he appreciated his ‘peace through strength’ approach to global affairs. Zelensky claimed this is what can bring a just peace in Ukraine closer. Nevertheless, the results of the election will highly likely prompt strategic discussions in Kyiv on how to prosecute the war from January 2025, following Trump’s inauguration.

Reports citing Trump’s allies emerged on 6 November claiming that the president-elect has not yet approved a specific ‘peace plan’, including any potential strategy for how he will persuade the presidents of Russia and Ukraine to negotiate. Only Trump, in consultation with key aides, will decide how to handle the negotiations, according to insiders. According to the report, different factions will likely vie for influence in foreign policy matters, including on Ukraine. Such individuals include former secretary of state Mike Pompeo, who is believed to lean more towards a settlement that does not appear to offer Russia a major victory. Meanwhile, other advisors (namely Richard Grenell, who is a top candidate to lead the State Department or serve as national security advisor) may possibly align with Trump’s desire to end the war quickly, even if that requires Kyiv to make significant concessions

One previously unreported but unofficial idea proposed inside Trump’s transition office involves Kyiv promising not to become a member of NATO for at least twenty years amid the establishment of a demilitarised zone. In exchange, the US would continue to give Ukraine weapons to deter renewed Russian aggression. This plan would freeze the frontlines in their current state and the two sides would agree to create a demilitarised zone stretching 800 miles (close to 1290km). However, it remains unclear who would enforce the demilitarised regime. One unnamed advisor excluded the involvement of American personnel or a US-funded international body (such as the UN). An unnamed member of Trump’s team suggested France, Germany, Poland and the UK would be responsible for it, but it remains highly unlikely that Moscow would agree to this. Without an international force on at least one side of the demilitarised zone enforcing compliance (as the US does at the 38th Parallel on the Korean peninsula, for example), it would be easy for either side to violate the ceasefire.

Ukraine is highly unlikely to see these terms as acceptable terms for ending the war without significant security guarantees. Kyiv has frequently refused to countenance a ceasefire and the freezing of the conflict as this would render Ukraine vulnerable to renewed Russian aggression in the future and allow Russia to retain control over areas it occupies. Without NATO membership, Ukraine would likely need alternative security assurances before it would commit to such an agreement. In addition, for this plan to work and create a stable peace, the US (and/or other nations) would likely have to actually increase military support for Ukraine to establish a credible deterrent against future Russian armed aggression. Given that the current level of military support to Ukraine has not been sufficient to deter Russia from prosecuting its war and Russia highly likely retains its maximalist war goals (including regime change in Kyiv), a major military commitment from the international community would likely be required to prevent a third Russian invasion of Ukraine in the future. For further analysis on the (unconfirmed) previous peace terms offered by Moscow to Kyiv in early 2022, see NEGOTIATIONS above.

Ahead of the political transition, the Biden administration is reportedly planning to expedite the last of over USD 6 bn remaining in security assistance to Ukraine by Inauguration Day (20 January 2025). According to two unspecified administration officials familiar with the matter, this will be a significant challenge given that it typically takes months for military aid to reach Ukraine after an aid package is announced. This means that all such assistance is unlikely to arrive in full before the beginning of Trump’s second term and there is a realistic possibility that it could be halted before getting to Ukraine. As such, while the Biden administration’s last-ditch attempt to send Kyiv aid would represent a sizeable influx of equipment and other military resources, certain obstacles may realistically undermine the feasibility of large

• West Africa region: UK sanctions underline likely rising compliance challenges facing Africa Corps. Earlier on 7 November, the UK sanctioned 56 entities and individuals in an effort to counteract Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, including various outfits connected to Africa Corps, a Russian private military company (PMC). With security conditions continuing to deteriorate across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger amid their sustained insistence on isolationism from Western engagement, these states’ respective military governments are likely to rely increasingly on Russian security co-operation. This will likely drive the expansion of Africa Corps’ presence across the region, particularly in terms of ‘regime protection’, which will in turn necessitate the growth of business interests associated with Africa Corps. We assess this will increase compliance challenges for businesses working closely with these governments and their defence sectors, as well as across key industries, particularly extractives. With anxiety in Europe likely to mount over a potential US shift on Ukraine following the election of Donald Trump in the 5 November vote, more European governments are likely to expand sanctions on Africa Corps, compounding these compliance challenges in the coming months.

Nov 05.

• Region: Alleged Russian sabotage operation targeting airlines shows significant hybrid escalation. On 4 November, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) stated that unnamed Western officials and the authorities in Poland suspect that the Russian intelligence services have plotted a sabotage campaign targeting Transatlantic cargo flights. On 24 October, the Polish authorities arrested four individuals suspected of having dispatched parcels embedded with explosives through courier services. The arrests in Poland follow two notable cases in Germany and the UK wherein packages caught fire. These packages were either destined for plane transit or are suspected to have arrived at a logistics depot via plane. The Polish authorities suspect that these incidents were part of a wider operation to test routes and transit times for further attacks in Europe and possibly in Canada and the US. The report points to a potentially significant escalation of Russian grey zone tactics and a direct increase in risk to airline and logistics companies. We assess that Russia has been conducting a grey zone campaign against Europe over the past several years, and will highly likely continue to prosecute this campaign while the war in Ukraine continues.

Nov 04.

 KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• DONETSK: Russian forces are advancing at their fastest rate since 2022; Estonian intelligence estimates that Russia has taken 58 square miles (150 sq km) in Donetsk oblast in the last week alone
• KURSK: At least 8,000 North Korean personnel have almost certainly deployed to Kursk oblast; the first unconfirmed reports indicate that they are now fighting alongside Russian forces
• CONSCRIPTION: Ukraine’s parliamentary defence committee assessed that 500,000 additional troops should be mobilised; however, while this remains unlikely given political considerations, the deployment of Air Force units as infantry reflects growing personnel pressures
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces launched a battalion-sized mechanised offensive south-east of Siversk (Donetsk oblast) on 2 November resulting in only limited Russian advances. Geolocated footage from 2 November showed Ukrainian forces repelling the assault, which Ukrainian sources indicate comprised of some seven tanks, 13 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and two MT-LB amphibious armoured personnel carriers. Ukrainian forces claim to have destroyed six tanks and nine IFVs. The Russian forces made marginal advances in the area north-east of Vesele and south of Ivano-Darivka; however, the Russians remain around five miles (8km) south-east of Siversk (the main Russian operational objective in this area).
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces continue to launch daily attacks east of Chasiv Yar, but have made little progress over the last week. Russian forces are launching small raids across the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal that runs through the eastern sector of the town. However, Ukrainian artillery fire is seemingly preventing Russian forces from consolidating positions on the western banks of the canal. Notably, the head of a Ukrainian brigade’s electronic warfare (EW) component reported on 2 November that Russian forces are using a large number of unspecified new EW ‘rifles’, which are not very effective at shooting down Ukrainian UAVs. The commander also noted that Russia’s drone capabilities in the Chasiv Yar area have deteriorated recently, likely as a result of the redeployment of experienced drone operators to support other, higher-priority offensives elsewhere.
• BAKHMUT: On 31 October, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Luhansk Group of Forces, Anastasiya Bobovnikova, reported that Russian forces have decreased the intensity and tempo of assaults in Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), though she noted that the rate of artillery and air strikes have not decreased. Bobovnikova further reported on 2 November that the situation in Toretsk has stabilised; other Ukrainian officers have similarly reported a reduction in the tempo of assaults in recent days. This possibly indicates a temporary tactical pause as Russian forces recover and reconstitute ahead of future offensive operations, which could realistically begin soon. Nevertheless, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 1 November that their forces had seized the villages of Oleksandropil and Leonidivka (located south-west of Toretsk) and Katerynivka (located north-west of Toretsk). However, this has not been confirmed.
• DONETSK: Russian forces continued to pressure Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk sector, likely taking 58 square miles (150 sq km) in Donetsk oblast last week alone. On 3 November, the Russian MoD claimed that its forces had captured the settlement of Vyshneve (south-east of Pokrovsk and just to the west of Selydove). Although the rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk has slowed over the past few days, Russia has made significant tactical gains in the sector over the past week. The overall rate of Russia’s advance across the entire Donetsk axis stands at the fastest since 2022. Notably, Estonian intelligence services noted that Russia was able to occupy about 58 square miles (150 square kilometres) last week. Meanwhile, Russian forces continued to make gains in other parts of the Donetsk frontline.
• DONETSK: Russian forces are sustaining a high tempo of assaults towards Kurakhove, resulting in steady advances. On 3 November, the spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces continued to launch mechanised assaults in the Kurakhove direction. Geolocated footage from 31 October shows Russian troops recently advancing north-west of Voznesenka (north of Kurakhove). A Ukrainian OSINT entity indicated that Kurakhivka (located to the north-east of Kurakhove) had fallen under Russian control, which remains highly likely as Russian forces push south-west towards the Kurakhove reservoir.
• DONETSK: Russia also continued to make significant tactical gains in the Vuhledar sector over the past few days. Geolocated footage from 2 November indicates that eastern Antonivka (north-east of Vuhledar) and Maksymivka (north-west of Vuhledar) are now under Russian control. Additional footage also shows that Russian forces captured Katerynivka (north-east of Vuhledar) while progressing towards a bridge east of Yelyzavetivka (north-west of Katerynivka) as of 3 November. A Ukrainian OSINT entity with connections to the Ukrainian military also confirmed that Shakhtarske, north-west of Vuhledar, is now under Russian control.
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 1 November indicates that both Russian and Ukrainian forces made some advances in the central Vovchansk (north-east of Kharkiv city), indicating that the centre of the town remains highly contested.
• KURSK: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reported on 31 October that 8,000 North Korean troops are already in Kursk oblast and were set to enter into combat ‘in the coming days’, with the first unconfirmed reports of fighting on 4 November. The head of Ukraine’s counter-disinformation department in the National Security and Defence Council, Andriy Kovalenko, also claimed on 4 November that the first North Korean forces in Kursk have come under fire; however, we cannot yet confirm this. Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) also reported on 2 November that, over the last week, Russia has transferred 7,000 additional North Korean personnel to somewhere near the frontline, though they did not specify where.
• KURSK: As we have previously assessed, the injection of between 8,000 and 12,000 North Korean troops represents around a week’s worth of losses for Russian forces. While the injection will further augment Russia’s personnel advantage, it will not radically change the manpower situation across the wider frontline. Austin reiterated estimates on 31 October that Russia suffers over 1,200 casualties per day. Nevertheless, the deployment will reinforce Russia’s personnel advantages over Ukraine and will make the current attritional losses slightly more sustainable in the coming months, particularly if North Korea commits additional forces to supplement losses over the winter.
• KURSK: Ukraine’s spokesperson for the Northern Operational Command, Vadym Mysnyk, reported on 2 November that Russian forces have concentrated a notable number of personnel and accompanying equipment in the Kursk region. He stated that good weather conditions are allowing Russian forces to continue using equipment that would otherwise be more difficult in wetter conditions. Mysnyk nevertheless confirmed that Russian forces remain reliant upon highly attritional infantry assaults to advance in the area, resulting in infantry attacks every 10 to 15 minutes in some areas of the Kursk salient.
• KURSK: The influx of North Korean forces will likely enable Russian forces to maintain this tempo; however, it remains unclear precisely how North Korean forces will perform and how Russian commanders will use them. Unconfirmed reports indicate that many of these North Korean personnel are reinforcing Russian Airborne (VDV) and naval infantry brigades. If this is accurate, this would likely enable North Korean forces with limited or no combat experience to gain experience from some of the better-provisioned and trained Russian ground forces. VDV and naval infantry units generally tend to receive priority for equipment, UAVs and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. This would indicate that North Korean personnel will stand a higher chance of receiving the equipment and support they require to conduct offensive operations, in contrast to lower-priority infantry assault forces which are broadly employed to conduct highly attritional and grinding ‘meat’ assaults. For further analysis, see NORTH KOREA below.
• KURSK: Geolocated footage from 31 October indicates Ukrainian forces advanced west of Russkoye Perechnoye, entering the south-western sector of the settlement, located north of Sudzha on the eastern flank of Ukraine’s salient. Footage from 2 November also confirms limited Ukrainian advances north of Pogrebki, located around 13 miles (21km) north of Sudzha; however, Russian forces also advanced in the area, indicating that the region remains highly contested.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past few days, Russia made confirmed gains along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline. Geolocated footage posted on 3 November indicates recent Russian advances on the eastern outskirts of Andriivka (west of Svatove) and in northern Terny (north-west of Kreminna). On 2 November, the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces captured Pershotravneve (west of Svatove), though this remains visually unconfirmed. Meanwhile, as of 1 November, Russian troops made confirmed marginal advances in western Petropavlivka (north-east of Kupiansk) and within north-eastern Terny (north-west of Kreminna).
• SOUTHERN: On 3 November, Russian sources claimed that their forces had advanced north-east of Robotyne on the Zaporizhzhia front; however, this has not yet been confirmed.
• STRIKES: On 1 November, Russian forces targeted Ukraine with three Kh-59/69 missiles and 48 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 31 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and one missile over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. According to Ukraine’s Air Force, 14 drones were lost and the remaining missiles were disabled by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures.
• STRIKES: On 2 November, Russia attacked Ukraine with one Kh-31P missile and 71 Shahed-136/131 drones. 31 UAVs were intercepted over Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts; 21 drones were lost, while five returned to Russia. The drones caused damage in Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts; falling debris was recorded in six urban districts in the capital Kyiv.
• STRIKES: On 3 November, Ukraine came under attack with one Kh-59/69 missile and 96 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted the missile and 66 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, and Zhytomyr oblasts. The strike hit Shevchenkivskyi district in Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast), causing damage to several buildings and injuring at least 15 people. Falling drone debris also damaged a building at the Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv oblast).
• STRIKES: Early on 4 November, Russia attacked Ukraine with one Iskandr-M ballistic missile and 80 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukraine’s mobile air defence units shot down 50 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts; 27 UAVs were reportedly lost. Russia’s MoD claimed that Russian strikes on 4 November hit Ukrainian military airfields, energy facilities, and an oil refinery in Ukraine. While this remains visually confirmed, the statement likely indicates that Russia is replicating Ukrainian strikes against oil infrastructure while continuing to attack military infrastructure and energy facilities.
• STRIKES: On 3 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russia launched 900 bombs and nearly 500 Shahed drones in the previous week alone. Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that Moscow’s use of Shahed drones increased by 40% in October compared to September. This trend aligns with our monthly strikes pattern analysis indicating a sharp rise in Russian UAV strikes since August. Additionally, the spokesperson for the Kyiv City Military Administration, Mykhailo Shamanov, highlighted on 2 November that Russian drones fly at very low altitudes to gather intelligence on weaknesses in Ukraine’s air defence networks and to identify optimal strike paths, enhancing the effectiveness of their attacks. For further analysis of Russia’s strike patterns, please see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly: Forecast and Scenarios – 28 October 2024.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, the Russian MoD reported that its forces intercepted 83 Ukrainian drones early on 1 November. The UAVs reportedly targeted Russia’s Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Oryol, And Voronezh oblasts, as well as occupied Crimea.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• CONSCRIPTION: On 2 November, the secretary of Ukraine’s parliamentary defence committee, Roman Kostenko, assessed that the current dynamic on the frontline necessitates the mobilisation of another 500,000 troops. According to Kostenko, mobilisation fell in September after being relatively steady after a law signed in April further empowered the government to increase mobilisation and punish draft dodgers. On 29 October, the secretary of Ukraine’s National Security Council, Oleksandr Lytvynenko, announced that the army plans to call up more than 160,000 people over three months.
• CONSCRIPTION: Kostenko’s assessment indicates growing concerns that Ukraine needs to mobilise a significantly larger number of people than the authorities are currently planning to engage. However, Ukraine has likely exhausted much of its eligible manpower and efforts to marshal half a m personnel would likely be unpopular in Ukrainian society despite the necessity to continue fighting against Russia. The extent of personnel shortages was underlined by a statement on 2 November from the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Air Force, Yuriy Ignat, confirming that some Air Force personnel are being transferred to serve as infantry. The Russian Armed Forces have done this extensively across the various service branches; this latest acknowledgement from Kyiv underscores that the growing need for infantry to hold the frontline will likely undermine other specialist roles.
• NORTH KOREA: North Korea is likely to receive cash, food supplies and space technology in exchange for sending troops to aid Russia in its war against Ukraine. A member of South Korea’s parliamentary intelligence committee, Wi Sung-lac, stated on 3 November that North Korean soldiers each receive USD 2,000 per month from Russia for participating in the war. This could amount to at least USD 200 m annually for 10,000 soldiers. We have previously forecast that foodstuffs and financial support are among the likely offerings from Russia to North Korea, with the provision of nuclear technology (if not non-nuclear military technology) much less likely in the near term.
• NORTH KOREA: The EU’s chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, encouraged South Korea to step up support for Ukraine on 4 November after meeting South Korean Defence Minister Kim Yong-hyun. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul disclosed on 1 November that Seoul is considering ‘all possible scenarios’ when asked about the possibility of sending weapons to Kyiv. Cho said South Korea will monitor the deployment of North Korean troops in Russia and that the compensation Pyongyang receives in return to determine an appropriate response. While the remarks indicate a possible increase in South Korean support for Ukraine, the prospect of Seoul directly supplying weapons or deploying troops to Ukraine remains unlikely in the near term.
• AID: On 1 November, the US Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to Ukraine worth USD 425 m. The package includes munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), stinger missiles, air-to-ground munitions, and ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) among various other capabilities. The announcement comes before the US presidential election on 5 November, which will highly likely have a significant impact on the trajectory of the war.
• AID: Meanwhile, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski disclosed details on 1 November about a proposal which would allow Ukraine to buy Polish weapons on credit. Sikorski detailed that Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government considered a defence loan option that would allow Ukraine to purchase from Polish defence firms and repay when Ukraine begins to rebuild. While it remains unclear if and when Poland would possibly begin such a scheme, it would likely provide Kyiv a reliable source for purchasing weapons. At the same time, Poland’s proximity to Ukraine would also allow for quicker and easier transport. However, such an initiative would likely increase debt pressure on Ukraine’s international partners in the post-war period.

FORECAST

WINTER: The private energy supplier DTEK has stated that Ukraine will possibly not require scheduled power outages this winter if the authorities can adequately protect energy facilities from Russian long-range strikes; however, this remains unlikely. The executive director of Ukrainian energy provider DTEK, Dmytro Sakharuk, shared this assessment on 31 October; he noted that effective air defences will be key for energy security during the winter months.

Sakharuk disclosed that the authorities have restored 60% of Ukraine’s energy generation capabilities. He had forecast in spring that 60-70% would be restored by October, indicating that efforts to repair damaged generation facilities have been relatively on target. However, Sakharuk’s assessment appears to exclude the highly likely possibility of intensified Russian strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure during the colder months, meaning that more extensive outages are likely.

Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko also assessed on 1 November that Ukraine has enough natural gas for the upcoming autumn-winter months. Haluschenko stated that Ukraine has sufficient gas supplies including for electricity generation but added that Kyiv can import gas if required.

While we agree that air defences will almost certainly play a crucial role in ensuring energy security, elements of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure remain unrepaired or irreparably damaged. As of late September, Ukraine estimated that Russia had conducted over a thousand strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities since October 2022 (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 23 September 2024). As such, infrastructure that is yet to be fixed or is completely damaged will likely continue to create strains regarding the meeting of consumer demands. This will possibly mean Ukraine will have to rely on energy imports from other countries during particularly cold spells and/or after severe strikes.

Despite optimistic assessments from Sakharuk, a member of the supervisory board of a major Ukrainian electric and thermal energy company (Centrenergo) predicts that scheduled power outages may begin as early as this week. Volodymyr Velychko based his assessment on 1 November on an expected significant drop in temperatures. Velychko said this will require measures to balance the energy system, such as emergency assistance from neighbouring states. However, Velychko noted that before resorting to such action, Ukraine will maximise all its resources first; that said, he concluded that scheduled power outages will occur in case of failure to balance the power system. We assess power outages are likely over the winter, and will possibly drive moderate business disruption depending on their timing and duration.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

07 Nov 24. Volodymyr Zelenskyy said it would be “unacceptable” and “suicidal” for Europe to ask Ukraine to make concessions to Russia in exchange for a potential peace deal. The Ukrainian president joined some 40 European leaders on Thursday in Budapest for a summit on the latest security challenges facing the continent. The meeting was hosted by Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has broken with EU and Nato policy to push for immediate peace, something Kyiv says will amount to capitulation on Moscow’s terms. “Some of you present here were strongly advocating for Ukraine to make ‘concessions’,” Zelenskyy told the gathering. “It’s unacceptable for Ukraine and suicidal for all of Europe.” Orbán hosted the European Political Community summit a day after his political role model, Donald Trump, won the US election. The Hungarian premier said that result had meant more leaders now agreed with his call for ceasefire talks. Trump has vowed to bring an end to the war as soon as he takes office in January, and threatened to cut off US military and financial aid to Kyiv. “We all want to end this war, it is tragic . . . but if it will be very fast it will be a loss for Ukraine,” said Zelenskyy when asked about Trump’s pledge for rapid peace talks. Orbán said Trump’s win meant the “pro-peace camp has grown enormously”. “We are not talking about victory and defeat, but about ceasefire, human lives, and the stopping of destruction,” the Hungarian leader told reporters after the summit. “There are more people now with this perspective in the western world than there were before the US election.” Zelenskyy, when asked if this was true, responded: “No.” “I believe that it is very dangerous for Ukrainians to have a ceasefire now and then discuss peace later,” the Ukrainian leader told reporters. “A ceasefire is a preparation for [Russia] to ruin and destroy our sovereignty,” he added. “A simple ceasefire mentioned by some leaders here [in Budapest] . . . this equals an excellent model for Russia.” Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday said it was “useless to put pressure on us”. “But we are always ready to negotiate with full consideration of mutual legitimate interests,” he added. “We have been calling for this and we are calling on all participants.” Zelenskyy instead asked for European leaders to send “sufficient weapons” to Ukraine so that his troops could put “pressure” on Russia. Orbán, who has blocked EU sanctions on Russia and held up financial support from Brussels to Kyiv, said Ukraine could not rely on future aid from the bloc. (Source: FT.com)

 

07 Nov 24. Trump V-BATs Helped Ukrainians Cut Through Russia EW.

When Russian jamming neutered the recon drones flown by a group of Ukrainian special operators near Dnipro in August, they turned to a new solution: V-BAT drones built to withstand the massive electronic interference used by both sides in the war in Ukraine.

“They launched from about 40 kilometers from the front, flew 100 kilometers past the front line of troops and then found these SA-11 surface-to-air missiles [on] 11 Buks, targeted them, called in HIMARS airburst rounds,”

said Brandon Tseng, president and co-founder of Shield AI, the San Diego-based maker of the V-BATs.

That destroyed the SAMs—and, Tseng said, marked a big operational test for the V-BATs: flying, collecting targeting data, and relaying it to artillery units, all in the face of the most sophisticated electronic warfare tactics on earth.

Ukraine has some drones that can perform well against EW, but they work through autonomy and on-platform computing, good for one-way attack missions with whatever munitions can be squeezed onboard. But the ability to pass data quickly back to a fires solution with real power, like a howitzer or Lockheed Martin HIMARS, is essential to taking out Russian positions. This is what the V-BAT supplied to the Ukrainians, according to Tseng, who witnessed the operation first-hand.

The 300-mile range of the V-BAT, even in the face of anti-aircraft defenses, gave the Ukrainians a new view of the battlefield.

“They were able to collect intelligence that they had never collected before was because they had a long-endurance aircraft that was able to watch things for long periods of time,” Tseng said in a Thursday interview. “That absolutely blew their minds, because, while they had some aircraft, some weapon systems that could go 60 kilometers, maybe 100 kilometers, the on-station time was like, for those aircraft for like, 10,15, minutes. So when you’re comparing it against us who’s loitering around for eight, 9,10, 11 hours, you know, after we get on-station…you just actually have the time space to actually find lots and lots of targets.”

Tseng and his team at Shield AI originally brought the drones to Ukraine to test against electromagnetic warfare effects in June.

The drones proved able to work in jam-heavy environments in ways that others could not, according to a June report from the Ukrainian military obtained by Defense One.

“We flew within 1,000 meters of these jammers. No impact to our aircraft. It was wildly successful,” Tseng said.

But those June results didn’t have the persuasive effect that Tseng was hoping for.

“There were skeptics on the NATO side, on the American side, that were like, ‘You know, no one’s passed this testing. All drones fail here; you guys are going to be like everybody else.’”

They insisted on an actual battlefield experiment against the enemy. Tseng’s account was backed up by a Ukrainian operator who spoke to the Wall Street Journal on Thursday. In August, Tseng also testified  before Congress on the battlefield deployment success.

There is no silver bullet that can bring Ukraine victory, Defense Department officials routinely remind the public, often when discussing why they refuse to provide certain weapons, (or withhold permissions to use them in the way the Ukrainians would like). Despite that, some common themes are emerging after years of war. Ukraine’s success against the larger Russian military is based in large part on their ability to move faster, firing off rounds and maneuvering quickly to duck Russian counterfire. But the Russians are fast learners.

The Russians are far better supplied with ammunition, a problem exacerbated by continued debates among Western allies about whether to provide Ukraine with what observers say it needs.

The V-BAT works to lessen both problems. First, its size—small enough to fit in an SUV—and vertical takeoff help the Ukrainians scoot and shoot.

“Airstrips, air fields are targeted. They’re observed. They’re watched, and so they’re just highly vulnerable points. So if your aircraft requires a runway, it’s really not a good, great place to be,” Tseng said.

And because the V-BAT can pass not just targeting data but also battle damage assessment, it helps Ukrainian forces make the most of their limited ammo.

Without EW-hardened drones, Tseng said, “they don’t know if they’re hitting things most of the time.”

Tseng said the next step is to integrate missiles onto the drone itself.

“We have launched, organically off the V-BAT, a Northrop Grumman munition called the Hatchet, which is a laser-guided munition that was a prototype capability [for] board kinetic effects, is being released late next year.” (Source: UAS VISION/Defense One)

 

07 Nov 24. Trump mulls Ukraine peace plan: British troops patrolling an 800-mile buffer zone. First suggestions by president-elect to freeze war with Russia, as Putin says he is ready to talk with ‘courageous’ leader. Donald Trump may call on European and British troops to enforce an 800-mile buffer zone between the Russian and Ukrainian armies as part of a plan to freeze the war between the two countries.

Details of the plan emerged as Volodymyr Zelensky warned that any attempt to make peace by appeasing Russia would mean “suicide” for Europe.

The plan is one of several being considered by Mr Trump, who said before being elected as US president that he would start peace talks before he enters office in January.

Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, on Thursday congratulated Mr Trump on his election victory and said Moscow was ready to talk to him over resolving the war in Ukraine.

Putin added that what Mr Trump had said “about the desire to restore relations with Russia, to help end the Ukrainian crisis, in my opinion, deserves attention at least.”

The president-elect’s plan, outlined by three Trump staffers, would see the current front line frozen in place and Ukraine agreeing to shelve its ambition to join Nato for 20 years.

In exchange, the US would pump Ukraine full of weapons to deter Russia from restarting the war.

The US would neither contribute troops to patrol and enforce the resulting buffer zone nor finance its mission.

“We can do training and other support but the barrel of the gun is going to be European,” a member of Trump’s team told The Wall Street Journal.

“We are not sending American men and women to uphold peace in Ukraine. And we are not paying for it. Get the Poles, Germans, British and French to do it.”

The plan came as Putin spoke for the first time since Trump’s election victory.

Addressing the Valdai Discussion Club in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi, Putin said he hoped to see his country’s relations with the US “restored” but that the ball was in Washington’s court.

 

05 Nov 24. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian mobile fire groups funded by U.S. boast 200 drone kills. The U.S. State Department has allocated funds for 800 mobile fire groups for Ukraine’s armed forces in 2024, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink announced on November 3. The initiative is part of ongoing efforts to bolster Ukraine’s defences against increasing drone attacks on critical infrastructure.

These specialised mobile units, which include personnel from Ukraine’s National Guard and State Border Guard Service, have proven effective in intercepting and neutralising incoming Russian drones. Since the beginning of the year, more than 200 Russian Shahed drones have been downed by these U.S.-supported mobile fire groups, preventing further damage to both civilian lives and infrastructure.

“Mobile Fire Teams are saving lives with their successful work protecting people and critical infrastructure being attacked by Russian drone attacks,” Brink said in her announcement.

This support forms part of a broader, coordinated U.S.-Ukrainian military aid partnership. Following a meeting on October 18 between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and U.S. President Joe Biden, Kyiv is set to receive regular weapons deliveries approximately every two to three weeks.

Zelenskyy hinted at the scale of these new aid packages, commenting:

“I won’t disclose the details yet because I don’t have the authority to do so, but I believe the packages will be substantial, ranging from half a bn to $750m.”

In addition to this ongoing assistance, President Biden announced a fresh $425m aid package on October 17, expected to supply additional resources in the coming months to further strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to counter Russian aggression.

https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-mobile-fire-groups-funded-by-u-s-boast-200-drone-kills/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

 

04 Nov 24. Ukrainian officials said on Monday that their forces had fired at North Korean soldiers in combat for the first time since their deployment by Russia to its western Kursk region. The clashes mark the first direct intervention by a foreign army since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, as well as an expansion of what was already the largest land war in Europe since the second world war. “The first military units of the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] have already come under fire in Kursk,” Andriy Kovalenko, Ukraine’s top counter-disinformation official within the national security council, said on Telegram. A senior Ukrainian intelligence official confirmed the military engagement to the Financial Times but declined to provide further details. In Kyiv, foreign minister Andrii Sybiha said he had discussed with his visiting German counterpart Annalena Baerbock the “need for decisive action” in response to North Korea’s deepening involvement in the war. “We urge Europe to realise that the DPRK troops are now carrying [out] an aggressive war in Europe against a sovereign European state,” Sybiha said in a news conference. The US on Monday called out Russia and China at the UN Security Council for “shamelessly protecting” and emboldening North Korea. South Korea and the EU also condemned the deployment and expressed concern that Russia could reward North Korea with transfers of nuclear and ballistic technology. Another senior Ukrainian official told the FT that Moscow was already providing military technologies to Pyongyang to help with its missile programmes, as well as “money”. In Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin met North Korea’s foreign minister, Choe Son-hui, in the Kremlin on Monday. (Source: FT.com)

 

02 Nov 24. Thales Belgium and Ukraine Sign MoU for Joint Production of Counter Drone Missiles. Thales Belgium has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with a leading Ukrainian defense company to co-produce Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) missiles. This agreement, announced On November 2, 2024, by the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries, paves the way for increased collaboration and technology sharing between the two parties, focusing on countering aerial threats through locally manufactured solutions.

Thales Belgium, a subsidiary of the global Thales Group, specializes in advanced defense and security technologies, including air defense systems, counter-drone solutions, secure communication networks, and missile components (Picture source: Thales)

According to the MoU (Memorandum of Understanding), Thales Belgium and its Ukrainian partner will work together to develop and produce C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aerial System) missile systems specifically designed to intercept and neutralize drones. With Ukraine facing an intensifying threat from UAVs amid ongoing conflict, the partnership aims to expedite the protection of critical infrastructure across the country. The framework also envisions the gradual transfer of advanced technologies and specialized equipment, empowering Ukraine’s defense sector with the capabilities needed to produce and sustain C-UAS missile systems independently.

Herman Smetanin, Ukraine’s Minister of Strategic Industries, expressed his appreciation for Thales’ commitment to supporting Ukraine’s defense needs in the face of the Russian invasion. “The signed MoU sets up a framework for the joint production of C-UAS missiles. In the future, both sides expect to deepen cooperation and conduct the transfer of technologies and equipment for the production of C-UAS components. I am grateful to THALES for cooperating with the Ukrainian defense industry and for its assistance in our struggle against Russian armed invasion,” Smetanin stated.

The production of C-UAS missiles is a critical component of Ukraine’s air defense strategy, aiming to reduce the risk of UAV attacks on essential infrastructure. The partnership reflects Ukraine’s continued drive to strengthen its domestic defense industry while benefitting from the expertise of established international defense firms like Thales. This cooperation is anticipated to expedite the deployment of these systems in the field, offering swift reinforcement to Ukraine’s defensive capabilities.

Through this collaboration, Thales Belgium and Ukraine’s defense sector are expected to contribute to a resilient defense infrastructure that can adapt to emerging threats. As the MoU unfolds, the partnership could serve as a model for other defense alliances aimed at rapid technological and production advancements in wartime settings. (Source: Google/https://armyrecognition.com/)

 

03 Nov 24. Continuous Russian Drone Attacks Hit Kyiv. For two days, Russian forces have launched almost non stop drone attacks on Kyiv and other Ukrainian areas, causing damage and igniting fires. The attacks, which began early Saturday, involved waves of drones approaching from multiple directions and flying at low altitudes to evade defenses.

Kyiv’s military administration reported widespread damage to buildings, roads, and power lines due to falling debris from downed drones. Ukraine’s air force intercepted 39 of the 71 drones launched by Russia, but fragments still struck six Kyiv districts, damaging apartment buildings, cars, and infrastructure. Fires ignited in several areas, including Holosiivskyi and Shevchenkivskyi districts, though most were quickly controlled. One police officer and an 82-year-old woman suffered injuries. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

01 Nov 24. Multiple drones reported near nuclear power plant in western Ukraine. A team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspecting the safety of the Khmelnytskyy nuclear power plant in Ukraine had to shelter at their hotel for several hours this week after hearing drones which triggered an air raid alarm. The IAEA team was subsequently informed by the Ukrainian regulator that 12 drones had been flying near the site during the morning of October 28, the closest 400 metres away. The regulator also said drones had been reported on three occasions over the previous week.

“Frequent reports of drones flying near nuclear power plants continue to be a source of deep concern for nuclear safety and security,” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said on October 31. “As we have stated repeatedly, any military activity in the vicinity of nuclear power plants represents a potential risk.” (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

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