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Military And Security Developments
Nov 01.
01 Nov 24. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine
Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s sixty-ninth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package, which has an estimated value of $425 million, will provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent needs, including: air defense interceptors; munitions for rocket systems and artillery; armored vehicles; and anti-tank weapons.
The capabilities in this announcement include:
- Munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS)
- Stinger missiles
- Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions
- Air-to-ground munitions
- Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS)
- 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition
- Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles
- Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems
- Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers
- Small arms and ammunition
- Medical equipment
- Demolitions equipment and munitions; and
- Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.(Source: U.S. DoD)
The United States will continue to work together with some 50 Allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and its associated Capability Coalitions to meet Ukraine’s urgently needed battlefield requirements and defend against Russian aggression.
Oct 31.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian forces have made significant tactical gains in the Pokrovsk sector and towards Kurakhove (to the west of Donetsk city), forcing Ukrainian troops to withdraw to likely less well-fortified positions
• STRIKES: The Kremlin has denied claims that Russia and Ukraine have resumed talks on halting long-range strikes against energy infrastructure; any such halt remains highly unlikely as we approach the winter (when Russian strikes will have their most significant strategic effect)
• AVIATION: Ukraine presented a roadmap for partially reopening the country’s airspace, though the reopening of Boryspil International Airport (KBP) and Danylo Halytskyi International Airport (LWO) remains unlikely in the short term
• FORECAST: North Korean forces are likely deploying ever-closer to the frontline in Kursk oblast (Russia), with the deployment of three high-ranking North Korean officers reflecting Pyongyang’s commitment to the war effort
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have marginally advanced to the south-east of Chasiv Yar amid a significantly slow offensive effort along the flanks of the town. Geolocated footage published on 29 October indicates Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0504 highway that runs between Bakhmut and Kostyantynivka to the south of Chasiv Yar. Meanwhile, further south along the Toretsk axis, Russian forces have made little progress, while Ukrainian forces continue to launch notable counter-attacks – which have recaptured several positions in the centre of the town. Geolocated footage from 29 October indicates that Ukrainian forces have pushed these Russian forces back along Chervonyi Lane in the centre of the town. However, the fighting ultimately remains highly attritional and positional in the town, with Russian forces making slow, grinding advances over the course of several weeks.
• DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian forces have made significant tactical gains in the Pokrovsk sector and towards Kurakhove (west of Donetsk City). On 31 October, the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that the most intense fighting has taken place in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions over the past 24 hours. On 31 October, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces seized Selydove. Geolocated footage from 29 October shows Russian forces progressing within western and central Selydove, which likely means the settlement is now under Russian control. A Ukrainian military observer confirmed on 30 October that Selydove was seized by Russian forces; it is the largest town to fall since the capture of Avdiivka earlier this year. The fall of the settlement will further threaten Pokrovsk, located 11 miles (18km) to the north-west. Also, reports indicate that Ukrainian forces are retreating to positions that are not heavily fortified. Such vulnerabilities will likely create opportunities for Russian troops to close in on Pokrovsk to facilitate further advances. The rate of Russian advances toward Pokrovsk will depend on the resources the Russian command is able to commit and the combat effectiveness of the forces present in the area (which have likely incurred heavy losses).
• DONETSK: Russian forces have continued to advance in other parts of the Pokrovsk sector while Ukraine has launched successful localised counter-attacks and actively reinforced its defences around Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage from 30 October shows that Ukrainian forces regained positions to the north-east of Novohrodivka (located to the south-east of Pokrovsk), positions that Russia recently captured. However, Russian forces made confirmed gains to the south-east of Promin (located to the east of Pokrovsk). Against Russia’s grinding advances in the sector and likely seizure of Selydove, the Ukrainian governor of Pokrovsk reported that efforts are ongoing to reinforce the city’s defences. As a result, part of the city will be closed.
• DONETSK: Kurakhove (located to the west of Donetsk city) remains a priority for Russian forces, which are making confirmed gains towards the settlement. Geolocated footage from 30 October shows recent Russian advances to the south-west of Hirnyk (located to the north-east of Kurakhove) around the Kurakhivka Central Processing Plant west of Kurakhivka (located to the north-east of Kurakhove). Russian troops also made confirmed advances as of 29 October towards eastern Kurakhove following a reinforced platoon-sized mechanised assault.
• DONETSK: To the south-west of Donetsk city, Russian forces also made confirmed gains near Vuhledar. Geolocated footage from 28 October shows Russian forces advancing to the south-west of Katerynivka and north-east of Shakhtarske, which are located to the north-east and north-west of Vuhledar, respectively. As of 29 October, Russia made confirmed gains to the north-west of Bohoyavlenka (located to the north-west of Vuhledar). The scale of recent advances in the Bohoyavlenka direction likely indicates that the settlement is under Russian control.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Geolocated footage published on 30 October indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Novoivanovka, which is located around ten miles (16km) to the south-east of Korenevo; yet various Russian sources maintain that much of the settlement is a contested ‘grey zone’. Over the last week, the rate of Russian advances in Kursk oblast (Russia) has declined, with a spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting in the area reporting on 29 October that Russian forces have switched to using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), motorcycles and trucks due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian heavy equipment. While we cannot confirm this, Russian forces have resorted to using such vehicles after suffering heavy infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) losses. In addition, the spokesperson also claimed that elements of Russia’s 155th Naval Infantry Brigade that are fighting in the area are less combat effective than in 2022-2023, and are diluting their previous ‘elite’ status with convict recruits. We previously assessed that the 155th had suffered extremely high losses during the battles for Vuhledar and are no longer the ‘elite’ force they had once been in 2022. For analysis on the North Korean deployment to Kursk, see FORECAST below.
• KURSK: Elsewhere, the Russian governor of Bryansk oblast (which neighbours Kursk to the north-west) and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) reported on 27 October that Russian forces had repelled a ‘group of people’ attempting to cross the international border near Manev. While we cannot confirm this, the FSB described the apparent cross-border raiding party as a ‘sabotage and reconnaissance group’.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 30 October shows recent Russian advances to the south of Stepova Novoselivka (located to the east of Kupiansk) and north of Terny (located to the west of Kreminna). Russian forces also made confirmed gains as of 29 October to the east of Kolisnykivka (located to the south-east of Kupiansk) and in a field to the east of Andriivka (located to the west of Svatove). On 29 October, a Ukrainian commander reported that Russian operations remain focused on gaining a foothold on the left bank of the Oskil River, with most of the fighting taking place to the south of Kupiansk.
• SOUTHERN: While Russian forces have made no confirmed advances along the southern axis this week, they are continuing to adapt and experiment with new capabilities. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting along the Zaporizhzhia axis reported on 29 October that Russian forces have now begun deploying first person view (FPV) drones that use a fibre optic wire that can stretch upwards of six miles (10km). Because of the wired connection, these drones are reportedly immune to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, resulting in Ukrainian forces having to shoot down the drones with small arms. Ukrainian EW capabilities have stepped up significantly in 2024. These capabilities have fuelled a back-and-forth fight for supremacy as both sides develop measures and counter-measures. Such capabilities are unlikely to allow Russian forces in this direction to tip the balance in their favour. Nevertheless, they reflect continual technological innovation.
• STRIKES: On 29 October, Russia attacked Ukraine with one Iskandr-M ballistic missile and 48 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences shot down 26 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. The Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast) municipal authorities reported that Russia attacked the city with a new projectile, the Grim-E1 hybrid missile-glide bomb. The Grim-E1 was created on the basis of the Kh-38 missile and has a 315kg warhead and 75-mile (120km) range. The new missile was used in an attack launched on 28 October.
• STRIKES: On 30 October, Russia launched 62 Shahed-136/131 drones and an unidentified missile. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 33 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
• STRIKES: Earlier on 31 October, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with two Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, eight Kh-59/69 missiles and 43 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted two Kh-59/69 missiles over Odesa oblast and 17 Shahed UAVs over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Ukraine’s air force reported that 20 UAVs were lost, likely indicating they failed to reach their targets. Drone debris reportedly damaged a high-voltage power line and residential buildings in the Podilskyi urban district of the capital Kyiv. Serihiy Popko, Kyiv oblast’s governor, reported on 31 October that Russia has attacked Kyiv 20 times in October.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 30 October, a Ukrainian drone strike targeted Russia’s Bryansk, Kursk, Oryol, Rostov and Smolensk oblasts. The Russian MOD reported that its air defences intercepted 23 UAVs. In Kursk, the authorities reported that falling drone debris damaged administrative buildings in Zheleznogorsk, which also came under UAV attack on 29 October. Early on 31 October, a Ukrainian UAV attack damaged port infrastructure in the commercial seaport of Berdiansk (Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia).
• STRIKES: On 30 October, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissed a recent Financial Times (FT) report claiming that Russian and Ukrainian senior officials have recently resumed talks on halting long-range strikes against energy infrastructure. The FT reported that these talks started in August but were interrupted following Ukraine’s military incursion into Kursk, whereafter Russia reportedly withdrew from the discussions. We assess that the Kremlin is highly unlikely to agree to halt strikes as long as Ukraine retains a presence in Kursk, with Moscow likely to continue these attacks during the coming cold season to maximise their impact on Ukraine’s energy security. We assess that Russian strikes during the cold season will likely make the coming winter the most challenging to date, particularly due to severe gaps in Ukraine’s air defence coverage.
• STRIKES: Growing strains on US air defence interceptor stockpiles and production capabilities will sustain uncertainty over Washington DC’s ability to provide Ukraine with necessary air defence systems in the longer term (irrespective of the outcome of the 5 November presidential election). Notably, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on 29 October that senior US defence officials are increasingly concerned about the US experiencing a shortage of air defence interceptors globally. US officials remain concerned about the readiness of US air defence capabilities for ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Europe and the potential for conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The WSJ noted that US capabilities are highly stretched due to the growing consumption of such interceptors for the defence of Israel, where US forces have extensively used Standard missiles to counter Iranian strikes. Meanwhile, unnamed Pentagon officials highlighted deficiencies in the US’ defence industrial base, which remains unable to sustain growing demand amid two large-scale conflicts in Europe and the Middle East.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, since October, Skydio, the largest US drone manufacturer, has been facing logistical challenges in procuring key components from China. This is because Beijing has prohibited Chinese companies from supplying critical UAV components since 11 October. This was reported by the FT on 30 October. Skydio primarily supplies Ukraine’s military forces with drones for intelligence-collection purposes. Beijing’s move underscores efforts to exploit the vulnerabilities of US defence companies’ global supply chains. Ultimately, the vulnerability of the US defence industrial base to supply chain shocks and its limited ability to expand its production capabilities will pose a long-term challenge to Washington DC’s provision of military aid to Ukraine.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• AID: On 30 October, the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves pledged GBP 3 billion (USD 3.8 billion) in support for Ukraine annually ‘for as long as it takes’. Reeves did not provide further details about this assistance, though it underscores London’s efforts to commit long-term aid to Kyiv. This pledge from an international partner notwithstanding, Ukraine continues to demonstrate its growing domestic defence production capabilities. On 30 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine now produces close to 20 Bohdana self-propelled howitzers a month.
• AID: Zelensky also announced that the next meeting at which Ukraine’s allies are set to discuss military support for Kyiv will be held ‘in the coming weeks’. The last meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which was due to be held earlier this month, was postponed. The White House confirmed on 16 October that the next meeting would be held virtually in November (without providing a specific date).
• AID: On 30 October, Zelensky complained that Ukraine’s request to the US for long-range Tomahawk missiles as part of his ‘victory plan’ was leaked to the media. Reports emerged on 29 October (citing unspecified US officials) that Kyiv had asked for the missiles, which boast a range of 1,500 miles (around 2,400km). The request apparently comes as part of a secretive ‘non-nuclear deterrence package’. Zelensky stated that this was confidential information between Ukraine and the US, concluding that the leak means there is no confidentiality between partners. Ultimately, the media leak will likely cause a rift between Ukraine and the US as certain elements of the victory plan are supposed to remain classified (in a bid to prevent Russia from adjusting its strategic thinking to counter aspects of Kyiv’s planning).
• AID: An unnamed senior US official on 29 October called the request for Tomahawk missiles ‘totally unfeasible’. The range of the asset is over seven times that of the long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) which the US has already given Ukraine. In addition, approval for strikes using Western-supplied weapons has not been granted. As such, we assess that Washington DC is unlikely to agree to the provision of Tomahawk missiles despite Zelensky insisting that they would be used as a means of deterrence against Russia.
• AVIATION: On 30 October, Ukraine presented a roadmap for partially opening the country’s airspace. Around 100 representatives of the aviation industry attended the event in Warsaw (Poland), including EU, UK and US regulators. Representatives of domestic and foreign airlines that previously operated flights in Ukraine were also in attendance, as were those from insurance and leasing companies and aircraft manufacturers. Ukraine’s airspace has been closed since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 11 March 2024.
• AVIATION: According to the Ukrainian ministry responsible for developing communities and territories, Ukrainian officials presented a risk assessment for civil aviation, while also illustrating issues relating to air navigation safety. The directors of Boryspil International Airport (KBP, Kyiv) and Danylo Halytskyi International Airport (LWO, Lviv) spoke about the readiness of the airports to resume operations. However, the ministry did not specify which airports could possibly resume operations or when. Nevertheless, we assess that the travel hubs most likely to reopen are those located furthest from the frontline and therefore at the lowest risk of being targeted in Russian long-range attacks. That said, Ukraine is still an active warzone, meaning that air travel will remain high risk, even if commercial flights were to resume (which we assess is unlikely in the short term).
• POLAND: Bipartisan US congresspeople have urged President Joe Biden to allow Poland to shoot down Russian missiles over Ukraine. The letter, dated 28 October, was signed by representatives Joe Wilson and Steve Cohen. The appeal specifically referred to missiles that threaten to encroach upon Polish airspace. They claim that acquiring permission to shoot down Russian missiles over Ukraine is necessary for defending NATO territory, as well as safeguarding Ukraine. According to Wilson and Cohen, such authorisation would enhance the military alliance’s deterrent posture. Nevertheless, then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg opposed granting Poland permission to shoot down Russian missiles over Ukraine in July; we assess that a reversal in policy is unlikely in the near term.
FORECAST
NORTH KOREA: On 30 November, Ukraine’s ambassador to the UN named three North Korean generals whom Pyongyang has sent to participate in Russia’s war against Ukraine. According to Serhiy Kyslytsia, the top officers include two deputy chiefs of the North Korean General Staff. These are Colonel General Kim Yong Bok, who oversees special forces and commands the XI Corps, and Colonel General Ri Chang Ho. The latter is in charge of North Korea’s intelligence agency. The third is Major General Sin Kum Cheol, the head of the Main Operational Directorate.
While we cannot verify this information, Kyslytsia’s comments indicate that North Korea has likely deployed some high-ranking officers to oversee North Korean operations in support of Russia’s war effort. While previous reports claimed that the deployed North Korean soldiers are of low calibre (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 28 October 2024), the deployment of high-ranking generals amid elements of XI Corps special forces likely has several aims. These likely include gaining warzone experience and ensuring discipline to prevent desertions and defections. Kyslytsia added that Russia plans to form at least five units, with each comprising between 2,000 and 3,000 North Korean troops. While this represents a significant number of personnel, the highly attritional nature of the war means such deployments are highly unlikely to significantly tip the advantage in Russia’s favour in the near term.
Unspecified Ukrainian intelligence officials disclosed on 29 October that Russia has covertly transported around 3,000 North Korean troops from regions in Russia’s Far East to Kursk. However, only a few hundred of these troops are believed to be special forces, while the others are regular troops. Nevertheless, Ukrainian officials claimed on 28 October that they are housed in barracks situated around 31 miles (50km) from the Ukrainian border, underscoring their proximity to Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh stated on 28 October that an unspecified number of North Korean personnel (of an estimated 10,000 sent to Russia) have already moved closer to Ukraine. Singh voiced concerns that Russia intends to use these soldiers in combat or to support combat operations in Kursk. While it ultimately remains unclear what their roles will be, using such soldiers as an expendable force could possibly offer limited benefits for Russia, while posing potential political costs for Pyongyang. A lack of battlefield experience and language barriers will likely render poor-quality North Korean troops easier to identify for Ukrainian troops. As such, Russian forces will possibly decide that they are more valuable in defensive roles to free up Russian forces that need to take part in ongoing offensives.
The US has reportedly called on China to use its influence to pressure North Korea to withdraw its troops from Russia. However, we assess that such attempts are highly unlikely to be successful given the benefits Pyongyang hopes to receive in exchange (such as technological transfers). While China possibly perceives the transfer of North Korean soldiers to Russia as unwanted escalation, it is unlikely to take overt steps to oppose the move given its growing ties with Moscow. At the same time, the development will also likely deflect attention from concerns relating to the possibility of China increasing its support for Russia’s war effort.
Oct 30.
• Russia-Ukraine: Moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes remains highly unlikely for cold season. On 30 October, the Financial Times reported that senior Russian and Ukrainian officials have recently resumed talks on halting long-range strikes against energy infrastructure. These talks reportedly began in August and were mediated by Qatar. However, following Ukraine’s military incursion into Kursk oblast (Russia) in August, Russia reportedly withdrew from the discussions. Moscow denies these talks have taken place (or are taking place). Since the start of the war, Moscow has systematically targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure with long-range strikes to undermine the latter’s energy security, socio-economic stability and morale. Ukraine has also intensified drone strikes against Russia’s oil facilities, including fuel depots and refineries. Russian strikes have severely damaged Ukraine’s energy grid, significantly increasing the country’s reliance on nuclear power generation and energy imports from European allies. We assess that the Kremlin is highly unlikely to agree to halting strikes as long as Ukraine retains a presence in Kursk. Furthermore, Moscow will likely seek to continue these attacks during the coming cold season to maximise their impact on Ukraine’s energy security.
Oct 29.
• Ukraine: Russian state-sponsored activity points to elevated cyber espionage, disinformation risks. On 28 October, the Google Threat Intelligence Group reported that the Russian state-sponsored ‘UNC5812’ has targeted military recruits in Ukraine as part of a cyber espionage and influence operation. The group uses the messaging platform Telegram to trick potential victims into downloading a fraudulent application, purporting to provide users with information on military recruitment in Ukraine. Notably, UNC5812 has also spread anti-mobilisation narratives to undermine Ukraine’s recruitment efforts, highlighting the associated disinformation risks. UNC5812 specifically targets Windows and Android mobile users to install information-stealer malware and to obtain sensitive information from compromised systems (including users’ real-time locations, keystrokes and login credentials). Russian state-sponsored groups have consistently used cyber operations to undermine Ukrainian military efforts since the start of the war in Ukraine. As such, the current campaign underscores the elevated espionage and disinformation risks facing Ukrainian entities; we assess that Russia will likely focus on conducting similar operations in order to achieve its strategic objectives amid the ongoing war.
Oct 28.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Russian forces have made notable progress across the Pokrovsk salient; major tactical breakthroughs north of Vuhledar and near Selydove are increasing pressure on Ukrainian forces
• US: Ahead of the US presidential election, the running mate of presidential hopeful Donald Trump has stated that Ukraine is less of a priority for US strategic interests than other crises worldwide, reinforcing the likelihood of a reduction in aid if Trump wins
• NEGOTIATIONS: Ukraine continues to maintain that negotiations cannot take place until Russia withdraws to its positions before the full-scale invasion in 2022; however, the number of Ukrainians agreeing that negotiations are necessary has increased to 35% according to polling
• FORECAST: NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has confirmed that North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia and that they are operating in Kursk oblast; however, their strength remains unknown
• BAKHMUT: On 27 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russian forces now control approximately two-thirds (67%) of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast); however, we cannot confirm this. Geolocated and confirmed sources indicate that Russian forces are operating in a much smaller area of the town, limited to its southern and eastern sectors. While the Bakhmut axis has been relatively quiet over the last few days, with no confirmed Russian advances around Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast) or Toretsk, Russian attacks continue. Ukrainian milblogger Kostyantyn Mashovets notably reported on 26 October that his sources report Russian forces have six to eight tanks and between 85-88 armoured vehicles in reserve in the Chasiv Yar direction, though we cannot confirm this.
• DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian operations have continued to yield steady gains in the Pokrovsk sector, where they have made notable progress towards Selydove (south-east of Pokrovsk). Geolocated footage from 27 October shows Russian troops progressing into central Selydove, as well as advances south of Vyshneve, directly west of Selydove. Russian sources now claim that Selydove is under Russian control. While this remains visually unconfirmed, it remains likely that Russian forces are dislodging Ukrainian forces from the town, which could realistically precipitate a Ukrainian withdrawal. Concurrently, as of 26 October, Russian forces made confirmed gains into the eastern outskirts of Novotoretske and west of Novohrodivka, east and south-east of Pokrovsk, respectively. Footage from 26 October also indicates Russian progress into northern Oleksandropil (south-east of Pokrovsk). Earlier on 28 October, Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that its forces had seized Tsukuryne (south-east of Pokrovsk), though this remains unconfirmed.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, Russian forces have likely made a notable tactical breakthrough to the north of Vuhledar, south-west of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage posted on 27 October shows Russian advances into the centre of Bohoyavlenka (north-west of Vuhledar), likely indicating that most of the settlement is now under Russian control. Russian military sources told the Russian news agency Tass that Ukrainian troops have withdrawn from most of their positions within the settlement. Additional footage from 26 October shows Russian advances north of Zolota Nyva and north and north-west of Prechystivka, both west of Vuhledar. Footage from 27 October indicates Russian forces have advanced further north still and have entered the village of Shakhtarske, located 15 miles (24km) south-west of Kurakhove. It remains unclear at this stage if Ukrainian forces can establish more stable defensive positions in the approaches to the Sukhi Yaly River to the north. The fairly rapid advances north of Vuhledar with mechanised assaults indicate that Ukraine’s fallback positions in this area are highly vulnerable. Russian forces are likely to attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities to make further advances before the rainy season further deteriorates ground conditions.
• KHARKIV: A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting on the Kharkiv axis indicated on 24 October that Russian forces are constructing quality defences and fortifications by constructing ‘multi-story holes’ under the ground. In line with this, Ukraine’s spokesperson for the Kharkiv Group of Forces, Yevhenii Romanov, stated on 25 October that Russian forces have destroyed most buildings in Lyptsi (a major town along the Kharkiv axis due north of Kharkiv city), leaving no habitable buildings in the area. This lack of cover has likely precipitated the construction of underground fortifications, which will likely augment Russian defensive operations over the winter. Romanov also reported on 26 October that 60% of 122mm and 152mm artillery ammunition fired by Russian forces on the Kharkiv axis is North Korean, which is of such low quality that it frequently misses its target. While we cannot confirm this, if accurate it would suggest that the Kharkiv axis remains a lower-priority axis for Russian forces. This assessment is supported by the very low numbers of mechanised assaults taking place in Kharkiv oblast in contrast to other sections of the frontline.
• KURSK: Ukrainian forces have been counter-attacking across the Kursk axis; geolocated footage from 24-27 October indicates Ukrainian advances south-east of Sudzha along the eastern flank of Ukraine’s salient, as well as south-east of Korenevo, located along the western flank. However, Russian forces have continued to make some ground in these locations, retaking certain positions and advancing near Martynovka (south-east of Sudzha).
• KURSK: On 24 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to present the situation in Kursk as under control, claiming that Russia has now surrounded approximately 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers, who are now ‘blocked’ inside Kursk oblast. He claims these troops are trapped in an area which we have calculated to be around 34.4 square miles (90 sq km). It remains unclear where this encirclement is reportedly taking place, and Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi refuted these claims on 24 October. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian forces have lost around 26,000 personnel during its Kursk operation; while we cannot confirm Ukrainian losses, this is likely an exaggeration. Both sides regularly exaggerate the losses their forces have allegedly inflicted.
• KURSK: Putin also notably reported on 25 October that, two weeks ago, elements of Russia’s 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (a unit heavily mauled during previous assaults on Vuhledar) broke through Ukrainian defences in Kursk. The breakthrough reportedly took place six miles (10km) away from the international border and subsequently advanced towards the border. We cannot confirm this, and it remains unclear as to where precisely Putin is referring.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continued to launch mechanised assaults along the Oskil-Kreminna line while reportedly intensifying glide bomb strikes, particularly against Kupiansk. Geolocated footage from 26 October shows a Russian platoon-sized mechanised assault repelled by Ukrainian forces north-east of Torske (west of Kreminna). Meanwhile, a Ukrainian commander operating in the sector reported an uptick in Russian glide bomb strikes against Kupiansk and the left bank of the Oskil River (where Russian forces aim to gain a foothold).
• SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s spokesperson for the Tavriisk Group of Forces operating along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border region, Vladyslav Voloshyn, confirmed on 27 October that Russian forces have seized the village of Levadne, located 12 miles (19km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka. Nevertheless, despite this reported ‘partial success’ for the Russians, Voloshyn maintains that Ukrainian forces continue to hold tactically significant heights near the village, which will support Ukrainian efforts to counter-attack.
• STRIKES: On 25 October, Russia attacked Ukraine with 63 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukraine intercepted 36 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. According to Ukraine’s Air Force, 16 Russian UAVs were lost in unknown directions. There is a realistic possibility that this was caused by Ukraine’s electronic warfare (EW) measures since they are increasingly able to interfere with Russian drone flights.
• STRIKES: Early on 26 October, Russia attacked Ukraine with a large-scale strike, including three Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, two Kh-59 missiles, two unidentified missiles and 91 Shaheed-136/131 drones. 44 UAVs were intercepted over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kursk, Kyiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukraine’s Air Force stated that 44 drones were lost, suggesting they failed to reach their targets. It also stated that the attack damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts, causing casualties among the population. One missile reportedly struck Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast).
• STRIKES: Overnight on 26-27 October, Russian forces launched 80 Shahed-136/131 drones against Ukraine. 41 UAVs were shot down by Ukraine’s air defences in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. Most of the UAVs were shot down over Kyiv and Odesa oblasts. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that 32 UAVs were lost. This was possibly caused by Ukraine’s EW measures.
• STRIKES: Early on 28 October, Russian forces launched a large-scale UAV strike involving 100 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted 66 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil and Zhytomyr oblasts. Cherkasy, Khmelnytskyi and Kyiv oblasts were among the most targeted regions. The Ukrainian authorities reported several hits against unspecified civilian infrastructure as well as the loss of 24 UAVs.
• STRIKES: Since September, Ukraine’s Air Force has regularly reported on drones affected by EW measures in its daily updates on Russian strikes. According to these reports, EW measures typically divert Russian UAVs from their original paths, resulting in their loss. On 27 October, a Russian military source said that Russian forces were using ‘Okhotnik’ drones to locate lost UAVs. He acknowledged that the UAVs were lost due to Ukrainian EW measures. Ukraine’s use of EW against UAVs highlights efforts to conserve air defence interceptors for engaging more lethal projectiles, such as missiles.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russia’s MoD reported that its forces intercepted 51 Ukrainian UAVs overnight on 26-27 October. The drones targeted Belgorod, Kursk, Tambov and Voronezh oblasts.
• STRIKES: Early on 28 October, a Ukrainian drone attack targeted two ethanol distilleries in the Anninsky and Novokhopersky districts of Russia’s Voronezh oblast. Similarly, last week, Ukrainian forces conducted a similar strike against other distilleries. Such attacks indicate that distilleries have likely become a key priority target for Ukraine as Russia likely uses such facilities to produce fuel for military purposes and explosives. The regional authorities reported that the attack damaged industrial facilities without specifying the nature of the plants. The Russian authorities also reported that 35 drones targeted Bryansk oblast.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• US: The running mate of Republican presidential hopeful Donald Trump has implied that Ukraine is less of a priority for US strategic interests than other crises worldwide. In a podcast which aired on 26 October, Senator JD Vance suggested that Taiwan is more of a priority given its production of computer chips, which he said is ‘such a driver of all economic growth’. These comments reflect our assessment that Ukraine would highly likely be a lower priority for the US under a second Trump presidency.
• US: Vance’s comments likely align with the views of the wider Republican and Republican-leaning electorate. According to Pew Research Centre findings published in February, 81% of Democrat or Democratic-leaning respondents consider the war in Ukraine to be of importance to US national interests compared to 69% of Republican or Republican-leaning individuals. At the same time, 78% of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents consider tensions between China and Taiwan to be an important issue for US national interests. A Trump-Vance administration will likely threaten the continuation of open-ended military assistance to Ukraine in the coming months.
• US: Notably, on 27 October, Vance declined to call Russian President Vladimir Putin an enemy, describing him instead as more of a ‘competitor’ or ‘adversary’ to the US. Vance also stated that just because the US dislikes a leader it does not mean that Washington DC cannot ‘occasionally engage in conversations with them’. This likely again suggests that a Trump administration would be prepared to engage in dialogue with Putin if Trump wins the vote on 5 November. This would almost certainly drive tensions with Ukraine, which would likely perceive any engagement as a precursor to the US pushing for it to enter talks to end the war with Moscow on unfavourable terms. For further analysis regarding different scenarios for Ukraine in the context of the upcoming US presidential election, see Sibylline Special Report – 25 October 2024.
• NEGOTIATIONS: The head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, said on 27 October that negotiations cannot take place until Russia withdraws to its positions before the full-scale invasion in 2022. Yermak stated that, after this is undertaken, the Ukrainian authorities can discuss ways to restore its full territorial integrity, meaning reclaiming control over Donbas and Russian-annexed Crimea. According to him, these territories are not up for negotiation, and Ukraine remains against freezing the war. As such, these comments indicate that the Ukrainian leadership (at least publicly) maintains its opposition to entering negotiations with Russia for the foreseeable future and the possibility of making territorial concessions to end the war. International pressure on Ukraine to consider concessions is likely to grow significantly in the coming months; as a result, a slow but steady policy shift in this regard is possible in 2025.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Meanwhile, just over 35% of Ukrainians believe that talks with Russia are an effective means to achieve peace and should be used now. This is according to polling from Ukraine’s Razumkov Centre on 24 October. Most Ukrainians (49.4%) believe negotiations should only take place after Russian troops leave the entirety of the country. Between September and October 2023, 20.9% of respondents stated that they believed discussions with Moscow were an effective way to achieve peace, with 63.1% of respondents disagreeing with this assessment compared to 47.8% most recently. The latest results therefore indicate that interest in and willingness to negotiate with Russia among Ukrainians is increasing gradually. This trend will likely continue in 2025.
• NEGOTIATIONS: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has rejected the possibility of inviting Ukraine to join NATO in the near term. Scholz emphasised on 24 October that a country at war cannot become a member of the alliance, adding that an invitation to join is usually followed by membership fairly quickly. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has insisted on the importance of Ukraine obtaining an invitation to join NATO; this condition forms the first point of his ‘victory plan’ (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 17 October 2024).
• NEGOTIATIONS: Scholz’s comments reflect our ongoing assessment that Ukraine is unlikely to receive an invite from NATO in the coming months. This is despite the fact that Kyiv likely sees this step as necessary to deter renewed Russian aggression in the future as well as a condition which would strengthen its position during negotiations with Russia. For further analysis regarding attitudes towards granting Ukraine an invitation to join NATO, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 21 October 2024.
• ECONOMY: Reports emerged on 27 October that high spending on the war is driving the risk of the Russian economy overheating. According to the Washington Post, significant military spending, including high payments to soldiers, has fuelled both economic growth and inflation. Meanwhile, wages in non-military roles have skyrocketed amid low unemployment and production capacity. Close to 83% of private Russian companies are having difficulties in attracting workers, according to a survey in October. Russia’s Central Bank (CBR) raised its key interest rate to a record-high 21% on 25 October. Nevertheless, we assess that Russia’s need to sustain the war effort will continue to strain the economy, driving inflation and socio-economic health risks.
FORECAST
NORTH KOREA: Earlier on 28 October, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed that North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia and that they are operating in Kursk oblast. Rutte said that the deployment marked a ‘significant escalation’ and a ‘dangerous expansion’ of Russia’s war in Ukraine. It comes after the White House assessed on 25 October that North Korean troops could be sent to Kursk oblast but that it was less clear what tasks they would be doing there.
It also remains unclear how many North Korean personnel have been sent to the Russian border region, where Ukraine launched an offensive in August. Ukrainian President Zelensky stated on 25 October that Russia plans to deploy the first North Korean troops to the battlefield on 27-28 October, citing domestic intelligence reports. However, Zelensky did not state to which combat zone they would be sent. According to Russian intelligence intercepted by Ukraine, Russia is transporting North Korean soldiers to the frontline using trucks with civilian license plates. On 27 October, the Russian authorities stopped a truck carrying North Korean military personnel on the Kursk-Voronezh highway. It is unclear where they were being sent.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on 27 October that the North Korean troops in Russia are seemingly young and inexperienced based on unspecified video footage and intelligence officials. The personnel could reportedly be teenagers or in their early 20s as well as in the early stages of military conscription; their physique also reportedly reflects widespread malnourishment across North Korea. While we cannot confirm the reports, this suggests that the first wave of soldiers will highly likely be regarded as expendable. It is possible that more experienced and/or higher-value North Korean military personnel could be sent at a later stage, though this will likely depend on whether North Korea sees this as beneficial for its interests. As we previously assessed, South Korean intelligence reported that elements of North Korea’s elite XI Corps have been sent to Russia; these could realistically be used as ‘block troops’ to command and oversee the less experienced conscript forces (and to ensure ideological orthodoxy and discipline).
South Korea assesses that North Korea plans to send more troops to Russia. According to reports on 25 October, North Korea intends to provide around 10,000 soldiers in total. North Korean troops must reportedly undergo a month-long training at military facilities in Russia’s Far East before deployment. Russia also reportedly plans to disguise North Koreans as residents of Russia’s eastern regions. Nevertheless, language barriers will highly likely mean that North Korean troops are easily identifiable from the perspective of Ukrainian forces.
NATO’s potential responses to the involvement of North Korean troops in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine are limited. According to unspecified sources familiar with the matter, options include intensifying support for Ukraine and strengthening partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. However, these responses are highly unlikely to deter North Korea; sanctions by Western states are also highly unlikely to change its decision-making since North Korea is already heavily sanctioned. Additionally, it is unclear what precisely the alliance could realistically do to increase support for Ukraine in light of this development, especially given uncertainty over US commitment to Ukraine after the presidential election. The deployment of NATO troops as a response is highly unlikely, for example.
Lastly, Polish President Andrzej Duda stated on 25 October that Poland would not consider transferring weapons that it purchased from South Korea to Ukraine. Despite Poland being a hawkish supporter of Ukraine, Duda’s comments reflect that the development has unlikely shifted Warsaw’s calculus on increasing support for Ukraine in the near term, though this is also likely influenced by strict South Korean legislation and regulations restricting the re-export of military equipment.
Executive summary
• In our most likely three-month scenario, positional fighting continues to prevent major battlefield breakthroughs that alter the strategic balance definitively in favour of one side or another.
• In our most likely 12-month scenario, the war evolves into a broadly stable attritional conflict that protracts into 2025. However, growing international pressure to begin discussing what a genuine peace process would look like marginally increases the prospects of negotiations, particularly if Donald Trump wins the US presidential election.
• President Volodymyr Zelensky presented his ‘victory plan’ this month which included calls for an invitation to NATO; this is unlikely in the short term. While the victory plan excluded territorial concessions to Russia, international calls for a compromise peace deal will likely increase in the coming months even as North Korean forces likely begin deploying to directly support Russia’s war effort.
• The US presidential election will remain the key trigger to watch in the coming month; its outcome is highly likely to impact both Ukraine’s ability to fight and the wider strategic trajectory of the war. A victory for Vice President Kamala Harris will likely result in US policy continuity on Ukraine. Conversely, a victory for former president Donald Trump will likely result in a reduction of US military support for Ukraine and therefore increase the chances of a (temporary) peace agreement in Russia’s favour.
• Other key triggers, warnings and indicators to watch for in November include the South Korean response to the deployment of North Korean forces to the frontline; there is a realistic possibility that this will increase the risk of both sides viewing the war as a proxy conflict. Intensive Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in advance of the winter period will also drive the risk of power shortages. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Oct 24. Ukraine rolls out dozens of AI systems to help its drones hit targets.
• Summary
• Ukraine and Russia look to automation as next phase of war
• Kyiv making several dozen drone AI systems, official says
• One maker already sold 15,000 copies of AI software
Ukraine is using dozens of domestically made AI-augmented systems for its drones to reach targets on the battlefield without being piloted, a senior official said, disclosing new details about the race against Russia to harness automation.
Systems that use artificial intelligence allow cheap drones carrying explosives to spot or fly to their targets in areas protected by extensive signal jamming, which has reduced the effectiveness of manually piloted drones. The shift towards the use of AI, particularly in drone target finding and flight control, is an important emerging front in the technology race that has unfolded since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.
“There are currently several dozen solutions on the market from Ukrainian manufacturers … they are being purchased and delivered into the armed forces and other defence forces,” Ukraine’s deputy defence minister Kateryna Chernohorenko said of drone AI systems. (Source: Reuters)
01 Nov 24. South Korea’s conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol is weighing directly providing arms to Ukraine, a potentially consequential shift in the conflict, in response to North Korea’s deployment of troops to the Russian front line. Seoul has previously resisted entreaties from western allies to draw on its vast stockpiles of military armaments, preferring to contribute to Kyiv’s war effort through non-lethal aid. But North Korea’s deployment in Russia’s western Kursk region, which US officials said on Thursday could be as large as 8,000 troops, is shifting that calculation, according to analysts and diplomats. Yoon and other senior officials in Seoul have described Pyongyang’s direct participation in the conflict as a threat to South Korea’s security, offering North Korean troops valuable battlefield experience. They also fear Moscow may share sophisticated military technologies in exchange for Pyongyang’s support. Yoon has vowed not to “sit idle” in response to the North Korean deployment. His office confirmed this week that Seoul intended to send a delegation to Ukraine to monitor the North Korean forces, following a call on Tuesday between Yoon and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy. But the prospect of directly supplying arms to Ukraine has been fiercely opposed by South Korea’s leftwing opposition, which holds a majority in parliament and blames the Yoon administration’s hardline stance towards North Korea for pushing Pyongyang into Moscow’s embrace. (Source: FT.com)
30 Oct 24. Ukraine’s frontline is “crumbling” against Russian advances, one of Kyiv’s generals has admitted.
Col-Gen Dmytro Marchenko said a dwindling supply of ammunition was one the main reasons for Ukraine’s weakening frontline and described Volodymyr Zelensky’s “victory plan” as misguided.
“I won’t be revealing a military secret if I say that our front has crumbled,” he told a former Ukrainian MP in an interview posted on YouTube.
This week, Russian forces claimed the capture of the town of Selydove, which had a pre-war population of around 20,000 people and lies between Donetsk and Pokrovsk.
Pokrovsk is a major Ukrainian logistics hub that the Russian army has made a priority target.
Ukraine’s military has not commented on Russia’s reported capture of Selydove but Gen Marchenko conceded that Russian soldiers had entered the town.
“I think that in the near future they will encircle it and capture it completely, which will give them a tactical exit to Pokrovsk. This is very bad for us,” he said.
Gen Marchenko rose to prominence in 2022 as the commander of Ukrainian forces who defended Mykolaiv and then helped to liberate the city of Kherson.
He blamed Ukrainian weakness along the frontline on a shortage of ammunition, problems with military recruitment and poor leadership, and also said that Mr Zelensky’s victory plan was too heavily focused on pleading with Western allies for more support.
“This plan lacks any points addressing Ukraine or our needs,” Gen Marchenko said.
Mr Zelensky has presented his plan to Joe Biden and various European leaders but it was largely dismissed as a wishlist for more Western weapons rather than a master plan to defeat the Kremlin.
(Source: Daily Telegraph)
30 Oct 24. U.S., South Korea Concerned North Koreans May Soon Fight Against Ukrainians. The Defense Department is closely tracking the unprecedented level of direct military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III.
Austin met with South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun today for the 56th annual security consultative meeting. They also held a joint news briefing in the Pentagon.
Evidence suggests that North Korea has sent approximately 10,000 troops to Russia. Some of these soldiers have already moved closer to Ukraine and they’re being outfitted with Russian uniforms and equipment, Austin said.
“I am increasingly concerned that Kremlin plans to use these North Korean soldiers to support Russia’s combat operations in Russia’s Kursk Region, near the border with Ukraine,” Austin said.
” Putin has gone tin-cupping to get weapons from and Iran. Turning to a pariah state like North Korea for troops just underscores how much trouble he is in,” Austin said.
“Putin will not prevail in Ukraine, even with more help from North Korea,” the secretary said.
Discussions today were about modernizing and deepening the South Korea-U.S. alliance that will help protect the security of the Korean peninsula and shape the future of the Indo-Pacific region, Austin said.
“I assured Mr. Kim today that the United States remains fully committed to the defense of the ROK,” Austin said, referring to South Korea. “Our extended deterrence commitment remains ironclad. That commitment is backed by the full range of America’s conventional, missile defense, nuclear and advanced non-nuclear capabilities.”
Austin also noted that the U.S. has returned to large-scale exercises with South Korea. That, he said, strengthens the countries’ combined readiness and interoperability.
Kim reaffirmed that the U.S.-South Korea alliance is more important than ever and applauded the two nations’ strengthening of security cooperation, including large-scale combined exercises, multidomain training and regional cooperation with East Asia nations.
The defense minister also condemned North Korea and Russia’s violation of the rules-based order, saying North Koreans will likely be used as cannon fodder. (Source: U.S. DoD)
28 Oct 24. Ukraine receives 20 Marder IFVs and Canadian LAV 6.0 ACSV.
The IFV delivery by Rheinmetall increases the total number of combat vehicles supplied to Ukraine to approximately 200.
The Ukrainian armed forces have received an additional 20 Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) from Rheinmetall and the first batch of LAV 6.0 armoured combat support vehicles (ACSV) from Canada.
Rheinmetall announced that the IFV delivery, finalised at the end of the third quarter (Q3) of 2024, increases the total number of combat vehicles supplied to Ukraine to approximately 200, either directly or through ring exchanges.
Rheinmetall began refurbishing Marder 1A3 IFVs from Bundeswehr stocks in spring 2022, initially funding the process independently.
The refurbishment work is conducted at the company’s facilities in Unterlüß and Kassel.
Developed for the Bundeswehr, the Marder is still partially in service and has undergone several modernisations to improve its combat performance.
Meanwhile, the Puma is gradually replacing the Marder, with more than 300 of these IFVs currently in use by the German armed forces.
In a separate development, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) said in a post on X that it has facilitated the delivery of ACSVs to Ukraine. Operation UNIFIER is the Canadian Armed Forces mission to support the security forces of Ukraine.
These vehicles, including the ‘ambulance’ variant of the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV), are claimed to be crucial for evacuating wounded personnel from combat zones.
After extensive training in Germany, the LAVs were shipped to Ukraine, ready to contribute to the nation’s defence.
The LAV, used by the Canadian Army and the US Marine Corps, is designed for reconnaissance and support, featuring a 7.62mm machine gun and a crew of four. (Source: army-technology.com)
29 Oct 24. Cuashub.com said today that Russian infrastructure hit by Ukrainian drone strikes once again. Ukrainian drones targeted ethanol facilities in Russia’s Voronezh region on Sunday night, causing fires and injuring two workers, according to the Russian regional governor, Alexander Gusev. Reports indicate that the UAS targeted two ethanol production sites.
While traditionally used in the production of alcohol, these distilleries are reported by Ukrainian officials to also manufacture components for military fuel and explosives. The targeting of these sites is a continuation of the ongoing Ukrainian strategy to disrupt critical supply lines within Russia’s military infrastructure.
Firefighters extinguished a fire in the Anninsky district, where several buildings were damaged, and debris from destroyed drones also affected nearby areas. Gusev reported approximately 10 drones were intercepted in the region, while the Russian Defence Ministry stated only one Ukrainian drone was downed in Voronezh, from a total of 21 shot down across Russia that night.
The head of Ukraine’s Centre for Combating Disinformation, Andrei Kovalenko, revealed that these facilities may serve dual purposes. According to Kovalenko:
“Russian distilleries are used to produce not only alcohol, but also military fuel and explosives. These are all military objects, despite being disguised as something else.”
The strikes on these ethanol plants followed a warning by Russia, which recently made new threats of retaliation if Ukraine begins using long-range missiles against Russia.
As tensions heighten, Russia alleged that NATO’s involvement in providing reconnaissance and strategic guidance could be behind such Ukrainian strikes.
According to Russian authorities, only NATO-affiliated specialists would have the required resources, particularly advanced reconnaissance from space, to support Ukraine’s longer-range operations. Russia claims that Western actions raise the risk of broader conflict, indicating that an increase in Ukraine’s missile capabilities could provoke a significant response.
Russia has made similar claims previously, likely in the hopes of isolating Ukraine from the support it has received from Western allies.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/russian-infrastructure-hit-by-ukrainian-drone-strikes-once-again/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
28 Oct 24. Nato has confirmed North Korea’s troop deployment to the combat zone in western Russia, warning that Pyongyang’s involvement in the war in Ukraine constituted a threat to both European and Indo-Pacific security. “I can confirm that North Korean troops have been sent to Russia and that North Korean military units have been deployed to the Kursk region,” Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte said on Monday after a meeting with a delegation from South Korea and representatives from the Indo-Pacific. He described the deployment as a “significant escalation in the DPRK’s ongoing involvement in Russia’s illegal war” and “a dangerous expansion of Russia’s war”. Earlier this month, South Korea released footage showing North Korean soldiers training on Russian soil and being kitted out with Russian military uniforms and weapons. A contingent of those soldiers has since been transported westward to help Russia’s 50,000-strong force in its operation to retake territory in Kursk region that has been occupied by Ukrainian troops since their surprise incursion in August. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said last week that North Korean soldiers could be deployed with the Russian army to “combat zones” as soon as October 27 or 28. Rutte said that Pyongyang had already supplied Moscow with ammunition and ballistic missiles in its fight against Ukraine, and that Russia was in turn aiding North Korea to circumvent international sanctions, including by providing crucial technology.
“The first step to a world war”. That was how Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the anticipated arrival of North Korean troops on the front lines of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Western security officials have warned for months of growing co-operation between an “axis of adversaries”, made up of Russia, North Korea, Iran and China. North Korean support for Russia is the most dramatic evidence yet of that axis in action. Of the four adversaries, North Korea has received the least attention in the west. The country slipped out of the headlines after the attempted rapprochement between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, the North Korean dictator, failed in 2019. However, specialists on North Korea have been sounding the alarm for months. In January, two leading North Korea watchers, Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker, warned: “Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war.” Carlin ran the US State Department team working on North Korea for decades and Hecker is a former head of the Los Alamos laboratory. Both men have visited North Korea many times. In their joint article, they warned that Kim has abandoned his effort to improve relations with America, in favour of a policy of confrontation with South Korea and the US. They concluded bleakly: “North Korea has a large nuclear arsenal . . . of potentially 50 or 60 warheads . . . [Kim’s] recent words and actions point toward the prospects of a military solution using that arsenal.” (Source: FT.com)
29 Oct 24. Ukraine and Russia are in preliminary discussions about halting strikes on each other’s energy infrastructure, according to people familiar with the matter. Kyiv was seeking to resume Qatar-mediated negotiations that came close to agreement in August before being derailed by Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk, said the people, who included senior Ukrainian officials. “There’s very early talks about potentially restarting something,” said a diplomat briefed on the negotiations. “There’s now talks on the energy facilities.” An agreement would mark the most significant de-escalation of the war since Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said this month that a deal to protect energy facilities could signal a Russian willingness to engage in broader peace talks. Moscow and Kyiv have already reduced the frequency of attacks on each other’s energy infrastructure in recent weeks as part of an understanding reached by their intelligence agencies, according to a senior Ukrainian official. With winter approaching, Ukraine faces severe challenges due to the extensive Russian missile strikes that have decimated nearly half of its energy generation capacity. (Source: FT.com)
25 Oct 24. Babcock supports the latest cohort of Ukrainian fighter jet pilots. We are proud to continue providing vital support to the Ukrainian Air Force. Aircraft availability is crucial to military operations and our team is by the RAF’s side, ensuring the UK’s best flying instructors have everything they need to train Ukraine’s next generation of fast-jet pilots. We were honoured to join the latest cohort of pilots this week as they graduated. The graduation ceremony marked the completion of the Elementary Flying Training (EFT) phase of the programme for trainee Ukrainian pilots who are preparing to fly F-16 fighter jets. With 24 pilots having gone through the training to date, this was the third ceremony of its kind this year. This intense training, under the guidance and world-leading expertise of Royal Air Force instructors, includes basic flying, ground school and language training in preparation for protecting Ukraine’s skies. We supply the Grob Tutor aircraft, including all the technical and operational support functions, ensuring aircraft availability is 100%. This is a key UK contribution to the Air Capability Coalition, which is helping build an air force of modern fighter jets to form the cornerstone of Ukraine’s armed forces. As a capability partner, we’re committed to providing critical support for Ukraine’s military operations across all domains.
25 Oct 24. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian Leopard tanks equipped with steel anti-drone shields. Steel Front, founded by Ukrainian billionaire Rinat Akhmetov, is providing steel grid screens to provide an additional level of protection for Leopard tanks and their crews from FPV drones.
The steel screens are designed to protect military equipment and soldiers from FPV drone strikes – which continue to pose a major threat on the battlefield, as well as to cities and towns. Despite a brief respite earlier this month – with Russia ceasing night time attacks on Monday 14 October for the first time in 48 days – Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Oleksandr Lytvynenko, warned that Russia is preparing to target Ukrainian energy infrastructure as winter draws closer.
The cost of each steel structure is quoted as approximately $20,000 by Steel Front. This translates to roughly 0.3% of the cost of a Leopard tank deployed in Ukraine, which is reported at roughly $6 m on the official Steel Front website. Furthermore, Steel Front are providing the steel screens to the Ukrainian Armed Forces for free in support of the war effort.
Olexander Myronenko, Chief Operating Officer of Metinvest Group – one of the companies contributing to the Steel Front initiative – outlined the advantages of equipping Ukrainian Leopard tanks with steel screens:
“The primary goal of these screens is to protect the equipment without compromising its functionality, crew safety, or manoeuvrability. The screens are designed in a way that doesn’t affect the equipment’s performance. Otherwise, their use would be unjustified and unnecessary.”
Myronenko provided feedback from the battlefield, highlighting that “the survivability of the equipment increases by 30-40%. We’ve seen real cases where a vehicle was hit on the battlefield, but thanks to our screen, the crew survived unscathed. The soldiers were able to get out, and later, the vehicle was recovered for repairs.”
The Steel Front is the largest private initiative in Ukraine helping the Armed Forces, with Akhmetov and his businesses so far providing more than $240 m for Ukraine’s defence and humanitarian needs.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-leopard-tanks-equipped-with-steel-anti-drone-shields/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
25 Oct 24. Cuashub.com said today that the anti-drone “invisibility cloaks” hiding troops in Ukraine. The battlefield is evolving rapidly, and with drones becoming increasingly prevalent, the way soldiers protect themselves has had to adapt. Drones, with their high-definition cameras and heat-seeking sensors, have transformed how warfare is conducted, particularly in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. To counter this new threat, the concept of anti-drone “invisibility cloaks,” originally developed in Ukraine, is gaining traction.
The drone threat on the battlefield
Drones have become a game changer in modern warfare, especially in the Ukraine conflict, where both sides rely heavily on UAS for reconnaissance and attack missions. Russian quadcopters and other UAS often carry high-tech sensors, thermal imaging and cameras, allowing them to spot troops from afar. As a result, Ukrainian forces face constant surveillance and attacks from above, requiring new methods to evade detection and protect soldiers in the field.
Drones can not only locate enemy positions but can also carry deadly payloads, further increasing the threat to troops on the ground. UAS have played a significant role in identifying targets for artillery strikes and launching attacks themselves. This has spurred innovations like anti-drone suits, also dubbed “invisibility cloaks,” designed to reduce visibility to drones and their advanced detection systems.
Anti-drone camouflage
In response to the increasing use of drones, Ukrainian soldiers have begun adopting new types of camouflage—most notably the anti-drone suit, known as “Phantom Skin.” This suit is designed to shield soldiers from detection by the cameras and thermal sensors that drones often use to identify targets. Phantom Skin and similar garments aim to blend soldiers into their surroundings and reduce the infrared signature that thermal sensors pick up.
Aside from traditional optical camouflage, thermal camouflage materials help soldiers remain undetected by thermal imaging cameras installed on surveillance drones.
The anti-drone suits are not just a gimmick, they are fast becoming essential equipment for soldiers after initially being developed specifically to combat the dangers posed by Russian quadcopters. Ukrainian soldiers have already begun using them in real combat scenarios, where the suits have demonstrated their value by reducing the likelihood of being targeted .
The “Phantom Skin” suit was originally designed by a materials scientist from Bucha, Ukraine, following the traumatic events of the Russian invasion, including the Bucha massacre. The suit is now produced for the Ukrainian Military by Intermat Group SA a specialist in stealth technology coatings.
Other companies have since adopted the approach, such as Miranda Military, a Polish company specialising in multispectral camouflage systems. Their “anti-drone poncho” provides a shield against drones’ visual and thermal imaging systems. This wearable technology is lightweight and portable, ensuring that soldiers can maintain their agility while staying hidden from UAS. The poncho can be easily packed away when not in use, adding to its practicality in combat situations.
Challenges and the future of camouflage
While the technology behind anti-drone suits is promising, challenges remain. No system is perfect, and the effectiveness of these suits may depend on various factors, including the type of drone being used and the environment in which soldiers operate. As drone technology evolves, anti-drone measures will also need to advance to stay effective, it is a constant battle of technology innovation.
Anti-drone camouflage will become more sophisticated, particularly in light of the lessons that will be learned from their deployment in Ukraine. As conflicts continue to become more drone-intensive, such innovations will be crucial for troop safety.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/the-anti-drone-invisibility-cloaks-hiding-troops-in-ukraine/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
25 Oct 24. Polish president rules out sending brand new weapons to Ukraine. Polish President Andrzej Duda has ruled out the possibility of supplying newer weapons to Ukraine, including the tanks, self-propelled howitzers, missile launchers and light attack aircraft that his country has ordered from South Korean manufacturers for Poland’s military.
Duda made the announcement on Oct. 25 during his official visit to South Korea where he met with his counterpart, Yoon Suk Yeol.
The South Korean president recently announced his country is considering to provide weapons to Ukraine to support its ongoing combat against Russia’s attack.
Duda was asked whether Poland could also supply some of its South Korea-made weapons to Kyiv, which play a key role in a broad effort to modernize Warsaw’s arsenal.
“There is no scenario under consideration in which we transfer the weapons that we have acquired … with taxpayers’ money, to anyone,” the Polish president said, as quoted by local news agency PAP.
Duda also said Ukrainian leaders had already asked for the weapons directly.
“My answer was unequivocal: There is no such possibility, as long as I’m president, that we give to anyone the weapons that we have bought for bns of dollars … over the past years,” according to the president.
Since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Poland has established itself as a key ally of its neighbor under attack. Warsaw has supplied tanks, armored vehicles, howitzers, fighter jets and other types of gear to Kyiv, predominantly transferring outdated Soviet-designed equipment.
However, over the past year, the bilateral relationship has turned sour, with contentious issues such as a clash over a Polish ban on Ukrainian grain imports eventually bleeding into defense cooperation.
While Polish weapon deliveries have largely phased out, the country’s centrist government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk continues to support Ukraine, and the two countries signed a security cooperation agreement in July 2024. The deal foresees Polish support for integrating Ukraine’s defense industry with Western partners, and intensifying air-defense cooperation between the two nations in the event of an attack. (Source: Defense News)
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