NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Oct 26.

US Election Impact on War.

* US funding for Ukraine is highly complex; the next US president’s ability to alter foreign policy unilaterally will be tempered by congressional oversight. Nonetheless, the executive office is still liable to have a profound impact on the progression of the war in 2025.

* A victory for Vice President Kamala Harris would likely result in continued US support for Ukraine, though congressional deadlock and an escalation in the Middle East crisis will continue to be the main obstacles to any such commitment.

* A victory for the former US president Donald Trump would increase the likelihood of a reduction in US military support for Ukraine and therefore increase the chances of a (temporary) peace agreement in Russia’s favour.

* A Trump victory would also likely prompt increased efforts across Europe to ramp up military production lines in order to continue supporting Ukraine (though this would not be able to plug major capability gaps left by the US).

Context

On 5 November, US citizens will cast their ballots to elect a new president. Given the US is Ukraine’s largest international supporter, the outcome of the presidential vote will almost certainly have a profound impact on the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war, coming as it does ahead of the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

A victory for Harris would likely result in US policy continuity on Ukraine, though this policy would be influenced by growing calls to end the war, as well as competing geopolitical priorities and congressional pressures. A Trump victory would likely result in a distinct policy shift and reduction in support for Ukraine. This would highly likely have a more immediate impact on the battlefield and influence the strategic trajectory of the war, particularly if Trump prioritises a rapid end to the conflict.

Leaders in both Ukraine and Russia currently show little genuine desire or willingness to enter into discussions to end the war. However, whichever candidate is inaugurated as the US president in January 2025 will be well-positioned to influence decision-making in both Moscow and Kyiv; the next president will also possibly attempt to push both Russia and Ukraine to negotiate in 2025. This Special Report assesses how the Ukraine-focused policies of Trump and Harris would likely impact the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the coming year.

Oct 24.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• DONETSK: Russian forces continue to focus their efforts on closing in on Selydove, which is increasing the likelihood of a Ukrainian withdrawal in the coming days to avoid an encirclement
• KURSK: Ukrainian intelligence claims North Korean forces will soon begin deploying to Kursk oblast; this would likely increase Russia’s capabilities, as well as its ability to redeploy forces to the Donetsk offensive
• FINANCE: Ukraine will possibly miss out on receiving EUR 4 billion from the EU due to shortcomings in corruption reforms, though separate progress on granting Ukraine USD 50 billion in loans offset by frozen Russian assets will improve the overall budgetary outlook
• FORECAST: The US has confirmed North Korean forces are inside Russia, though it remains unclear whether they will be deployed directly in combat operations
• OFFENSIVES: On 23 October, RBK-Ukraine cited Ukrainian First Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Havrylyuk when reporting that the ratio between Russian and Ukrainian artillery fire has decreased due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition depots. Havrylyuk reported that artillery fire now stands at one-to-two in Russia’s favour – which is notably much lower than the one-to-eight advantage Russia enjoyed in early 2024. While we cannot confirm this ratio, Ukrainian strikes have likely impacted Russia’s logistics and its ability to transfer shells to the front – which will benefit Ukrainian defensive operations across the frontline.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have continued to attack Chasiv Yar from the east and south-east, though they are unlikely to have achieved a breakthrough (despite contradictory reporting). A spokesperson for Ukraine’s 24th Mechanised Brigade, which is fighting in the town, denied reports that Russian forces breached Ukrainian defences after another official claimed that they had. While Russian forces continue to attack, Ukrainian artillery and first person view (FPV) drones are likely complicating Russia’s ability to exploit its recent advances. Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Anastasiya Bobovnikova stated on 23 October that Ukrainian forces are successfully preventing the construction of pontoon crossings across the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal that runs east of the town.
• BAKHMUT: Further south in Toretsk, Bobovnikova reported on 23 October that Ukrainian forces defending the town have stabilised the frontline and are holding the ‘demarcation line unchanged’. Bobovnikova reported that Russian forces are operating from positions in the eastern part of the town; other Russian sources have reported a high tempo of assaults in recent days and heavy street-to-street fighting in the town centre. However, there have been few confirmed advances in the last few days.
• DONETSK: Russian forces continue to focus their efforts on closing in on Selydove (south-east of Pokrovsk), making significant tactical gains into and around the settlement, where Ukrainian troops are undertaking an active defensive effort. On 24 October, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s National Guard reported that Ukrainian forces are actively countering Russian efforts to infiltrate Selydove. However, Russian forces were able to make confirmed gains within north-eastern and eastern parts of Selydove towards the town centre as of 23 October. Additionally, geolocated footage from 24 October indicates that Izmailivka, a settlement south-east of Selydove, has fallen under Russian control. Russian forces also made confirmed gains on the north-eastern outskirts of Novoselydivka (west of Izmailivka and south of Selydove).
• DONETSK: The extent of Russian advances in recent days likely indicates that Russian forces will be able to capture Selydove in the coming days if Ukrainian forces withdraw to avoid being trapped. Although the capture of Selydove is key to shoring up Russia’s south-western flank before an operation to take Pokrovsk to the north, intense fighting in the sector has likely caused notable Russian losses and exhaustion. This has likely degraded the combat effectiveness of Russian troops who are possibly preparing to advance in the direction of the fortified Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 23 October indicates recent Russian advances to the south-east of Bohoyavlenka (west of Vuhledar and south-west of Donetsk city). Additional footage from 22 October shows that Russian forces progressed westwards along the O0510 Marinka-Kurakhove highway, east of Kurakhove (which is located to the west of Donetsk city and is also one of the priority objectives of Russian operations in the Donetsk sector).
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Geolocated footage from 21 and 22 October indicates Russian advances in western Novoivanovka, to the south of Sheptukhovka and in southern Zeleny Shlyakh (all located to the south-east of Korenevo). However, Russian sources reported that fighting remains intense and that Ukrainian forces have launched numerous counter-attacks – with Ukrainian sources reporting that US-supplied M1 Abrams tanks are being used near Novoivanovka. Footage published on 22-23 October also indicates that Russian forces likely recaptured the village of Olgovka, located around four miles (6km) to the east of Korenevo, underscoring our assessment that the heaviest Russian attacks are occurring along Ukraine’s western flank.
• KURSK: Various Russian commanders have notably commented in recent days that the situation on the Kursk front is particularly difficult. One Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz detachment commander claimed on 21 October that Russian forces are fighting 14 Ukrainian brigades in addition to Western private military companies (PMCs). Such comments possibly reflect wider Russian efforts to semi-normalise the Ukrainian presence in Kursk and to set expectations that Russian forces will possibly not be able to repel Ukrainian forces in the short-to-medium term.
• KURSK: However, the possible deployment of North Korean forces along the Kursk frontline would likely improve Russia’s position, or enable the redeployment of regular Russian units to reinforce the Donetsk offensive. While it remains unclear if such a deployment will occur, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 22 October that two North Korean brigades of up to 6,000 personnel each are currently training inside Russia; he claimed they will possibly be deployed for combat operations. The head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Kyrylo Budanov, claimed on 22 October that the first batch of North Korean forces will possibly arrive in Kursk by 23 October – though this has not been confirmed. North Korean deployments to Kursk would likely constitute the most politically practical manner in which Pyongyang can involve itself in the war, given that these troops would technically be fighting inside the de jure territory of Russia (North Korea’s ally).
• KURSK: A potential North Korean deployment to Kursk would likely be justified by mutual defence clauses of the North Korean-Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in June. While it remains to be seen if North Korean troops will deploy to Kursk, South Korean intelligence indicates that North Korean special forces are being transferred to Russia, specifically elements from the XI ‘Storm’ Corps, which is tasked with conducting unconventional and special warfare operations. These are among the best trained and equipped (and most ideologically loyal) forces in the North Korean military. As such, if XI Corps forces do deploy to Kursk, they would likely provide a more significant capability than poorly trained and poorly fed North Korean infantry troops. However, it remains possible that XI Corps forces have been deployed as ‘block troops’ for other North Korean forces to ensure ideological orthodoxy among their forces. For further analysis on the potential North Korean deployment, see FORECAST below.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have been making steady gains in the Kupiansk sector, allowing them to secure advantageous positions (and therefore intensify their shelling of Ukrainian positions). On 23 October, Governor of Kharkiv oblast Oleh Synehubov claimed that Russian forces are intensifying their shelling of crossings over the Oskil River, complicating efforts to evacuate residents from settlements on the left bank of the river. Over the past few weeks, Russian forces have made incremental gains in this area; they are closing in on the river, particularly areas to the south-east of Kupiansk. Notably, a Ukrainian military observer reported on 23 October that Russian forces have deployed up to ten tactical missile systems in the Kupiansk sector, noting that the Russian command has also increased the tempo of mechanised assaults in the sector. Meanwhile, Russian forces made confirmed advances as of 23 October to the south-east of Kupiansk, specifically westwards along the N-26 highway (to the west of Kyslivka).
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Additionally, geolocated footage from 21 October shows Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian platoon-sized mechanised assault. However, Russian forces managed to progress to the east of Terny (west of Kreminna). The footage likely indicates an uptick in mechanised assaults along the entire Oskil-Kreminna frontline.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: On 22 October, Ukrainian air defences intercepted 42 of 60 Russian-launched Shahed-136/131 drones. Air defences were active in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. A large share of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) targeted Sumy, causing damage across the region.
• STRIKES: On 23 October, Russia attacked Ukraine with 81 Shahed drones and a Kh-31P missile. Ukrainian air defences shot down 51 UAVs over Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Ternopil and Vinnytsia oblasts.
• STRIKES: Early on 24 October, Russian forces launched two Kh-22 missiles, two Kh-59 missiles and 50 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted 40 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, overnight on 21-22 October, Ukrainian forces co-ordinated drone attacks against official buildings and a distillery linked to Russia’s military. The authorities in Tula oblast (Russia) reported that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged distilleries in Yefremov and Luzhlovsky. An independent Russian opposition outlet stated that the strike also hit buildings belonging to the local Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and a branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB). The distillery allegedly produces ethyl alcohol and reportedly manufactures products that are qualified as ‘strategic’ for the government. A Ukrainian source claimed that Russia uses the alcohol distillery to produce fuel for military purposes (and explosives).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• FINANCE: Ukraine will possibly miss out on receiving EUR 4bn (USD 4.3bn) from the EU due to shortcomings in corruption reforms. Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Yevhen Perebyinis warned cabinet ministers on 23 October that the tranche of financing from the EU’s Ukraine Facility risks being delayed until next year. The bloc told Kyiv that it must approve and adopt a relevant law by the end of October to receive the funding, which is scheduled to be dispersed in November. Ukraine was supposed to have met this requirement by Q3 2024, though the parliament only approved the first reading of the law on 9 October. Ultimately, failure to meet the requirement on time will likely sustain budgetary pressures, sustaining socio-economic health risks.
• FINANCE: Meanwhile, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal disclosed on 23 October that Kyiv has received another tranche of support from the IMF worth around USD 1.1 billion. Shmyhal noted that these funds will be used to cover non-military budget expenditures.
• FINANCE: Separately, the US announced on 23 October that Ukraine will receive USD 50bn in loans supported by frozen Russian assets from the G7. According to unspecified US officials familiar with the matter, the US is providing USD 20bn of that sum; the disbursement of the money will begin by the end of the year. A US official specialising on international economics, Daleep Singh, disclosed that President Joe Biden’s administration intends to divide the monetary aid between Ukraine’s economy and military. While the USD 20 billion will highly likely help Kyiv to plug budgetary shortcomings, the use of immobilised Russian funds will highly likely increase the risk of tit-for-tat measures such as asset freezing and appropriations by Moscow.
• BRICS: Between 22 and 24 October, Russia hosted an annual BRICS summit in Kazan (Tatarstan republic); Russia’s war in Ukraine was a key topic during the event. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasised during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin that New Delhi supports the earliest possible ‘restoration of peace and stability’. Modi added that India is ready to provide all possible support to such endeavours. Chinese President Xi Jinping told the summit that there must be no ‘escalation of fighting’, while his Brazilian counterpart, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, called for the initiation of peace negotiations.
• BRICS: Meanwhile, a declaration adopted after the summit noted appreciation for ‘relevant proposals of mediation’ aimed at a peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy. Nevertheless, we assess that Ukraine is unlikely to regard BRICS countries as mediators that would advocate for its best interests given their close ties to Russia. However, Ukraine’s foreign ministry claimed on 23 October that the various calls to end the war showed that Moscow had failed to win support for its full-scale invasion during the summit. That said, the summit did achieve one of Moscow’s likely aims, namely showing that Russia is not isolated on the world stage despite Western sanctions and pressure.
• NATO: At least seven NATO countries reportedly oppose granting Ukraine an invitation to join the military alliance, posing a hurdle to the first point of President Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’. According to unnamed insiders familiar with the matter cited by Politico on 23 October, Germany and the US are impeding any such progress on Ukraine’s NATO aspirations. Nevertheless, the outlet noted that different countries are against the idea for a plethora of reasons.
• NATO: Hungary and Slovakia oppose the move because of their respective prime ministers’ pro-Russia stance. Meanwhile, Belgium, Slovenia and Spain are hesitant because of Berlin’s and Washington DC’s reluctance. Nonetheless, unspecified officials emphasised that neither Germany nor the US are ruling out Ukraine’s eventual accession to NATO. Our assessment remains that Ukraine is unlikely to receive an invitation in the near term given this would require consensus among the various allies. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 21 October 2024.

FORECAST

NORTH KOREA: US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin confirmed on 23 October that North Korean troops are indeed inside Russia. However, he stated that it remains to be seen what exactly they are doing there, adding that it would be ‘very, very’ serious if they are preparing to fight in Ukraine on Russia’s side. Despite mounting evidence of a North Korean deployment, it is less clear whether these troops would actually fight or instead be deployed into supporting roles. Nevertheless, both are credible possibilities given the growing defence co-operation between Russia and North Korea (see KURSK above for further analysis on North Korea’s military capabilities).

According to US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby, Washington DC believes Pyongyang has moved at least 3,000 soldiers to eastern Russia. Kirby added that US intelligence assesses that these soldiers were transported by ship to Vladivostok (Primorsky Krai, Russia) before travelling to military training sites. The official also stated it was too early to determine whether they will enter combat roles alongside the Russian military, but emphasised that there is a ‘highly concerning’ possibility of this happening. Kirby stated that if they do deploy to fight, they are legitimate targets for Ukrainian forces.

An agreement on military co-operation between Moscow and Pyongyang signed in June reportedly included a secret clause to allow North Korea to send soldiers to Ukraine for battlefield experience. The Wall Street Journal reported this on 22 October, noting that the pact initially outlined the transfer of around 1,000 North Korean soldiers (but that more would follow). According to the officer, most of the North Korean troops are far removed from the frontline but are being shown how Russian soldiers manage logistics and tactics while gaining knowledge on drone warfare. While we cannot confirm the report, it is possible that elements of the agreement were not made public so as not to alert Ukraine or its allies. It is also notable that the Russian State Duma ratified the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ agreement today (24 October, prior to any potential deployment). For further analysis on the agreement, please see Sibylline Alert – 19 June 2024.

Despite increasing reports on North Korean troops, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenko has dismissed both their credibility and the possibility of these troops deploying to combat operations. Lukashenko stated on 23 October that the deployment of any foreign armed forces, even from Belarus, on the frontline would be a ‘step towards escalation’. Lukashenko also doubts that Putin would try to persuade another country to involve itself in the war. Nevertheless, there are capabilities that Moscow could offer Pyongyang in exchange for manpower which we assess are almost certainly in North Korea’s interests. Battlefield experience is one offering, though other benefits include Russian submarine technology, as well as material transfers aimed at advancing North Korean capabilities (like ballistic missiles). Russia is unlikely to offer its closely guarded nuclear technology to North Korea in the near term, though what Moscow is willing to share will possibly change with time and the situation on the battlefield. For further analysis, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 29 July 2024.

Growing defensive ties between North Korea and Russia will possibly shift South Korea’s calculus on supporting Ukraine more openly. On 22 October, South Korean Deputy National Security Director Kim Tae-hyo pledged to take ‘phased measures’ against North Korea and Russia due to their growing military co-operation. Meanwhile, Seoul is reportedly considering dispatching personnel to Ukraine to monitor North Korean troops and assess their combat capabilities. That said, there are limitations on how much Seoul can shift its posture in response to this development.

South Korean law prohibits the export of weapons to active conflict zones; furthermore, the current government is unpopular and does not control the legislature, limiting the likelihood of a major change in export legislation. That said, Seoul will possibly increase indirect support for Kyiv, though defensive assistance would possibly be prioritised over lethal capabilities. In any case, Seoul has also indicated its readiness to send intelligence officers to Ukraine to monitor North Korean operations and to interrogate any North Korean deserters or prisoners of war. Ultimately, a deployment of North Korean forces to Ukraine would provide Seoul with a unique opportunity to monitor North Korean military capabilities in an active conflict, which would possibly lead to the Russo-Ukrainian war becoming a proxy conflict in the context of tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

• Ukraine: Foiled attack likely underscores uptick in Russian hybrid operations. On 23 October, Ukraine’s State Security Service (SBU) announced that it detained two residents of Zaporizhzhia oblast whom they suspect were planning an attack in the capital Kyiv with explosive devices. The suspects were reportedly recruited by Russia’s military intelligence (GRU) via the encrypted messaging application Telegram to carry out the attack (the likely aim of which was to cause panic in the capital). The SBU stated that it foiled a similar attempt on 9 May, in which the suspects planted explosive devices in various shops. Meanwhile, on 15 October, Ukraine’s national police reported that around 2,000 messages containing bomb threats were sent via email across Ukraine on 14 October. They stated that the emails originated from Russian IP addresses, and were therefore likely part of a Russian destabilisation operation orchestrated by Russia’s intelligence services. We assess that the foiled attack and bomb hoaxes are part of Russia’s hybrid operations. The latest incidents likely underscore an uptick in such operations, which are intended to destabilise Ukraine by instilling terror among the population.

Oct 22.

• US-Russia: Scrutiny of oil sector operations, sanctions compliance will sustain reputational risks. On 21 October, a bipartisan coalition of over 50 congressional lawmakers called on the Biden administration to tighten sanctions on Russian oil. The coalition specifically requested that the treasury secretary and secretary of state restrict the activity of a major US oil field servicer in Russia. The lawmakers allege that permitting Western investment in the Russian oil and gas sector strengthens Russia’s wartime economy and military capacity. The coalition requested a list of all approved exceptions to US sanctions, likely precipitating an increase in scrutiny over sanctions compliance. Any US firm found to import equipment into Russia from a third nation will almost certainly face heightened reputational and compliance risks. Moreover, the bipartisan nature of the request highlights that a tight sanctions regime against Russia will be sustained in the medium-to-long term, despite waning interest from congressional Republicans to grant military aid to Ukraine. We assess that restrictions on the Russian oil and gas sector will continue to boost US exports of liquified natural gas to Europe, mitigating socio-economic health and energy security risks.
• South Korea: Growing Russia-North Korea ties could prompt greater military support for Ukraine. Earlier on 22 October, South Korea’s Deputy National Security Director Kim Tae-hyo pledged to take ‘phased measures’ against North Korea and Russia due to their growing military co-operation. On 18 October, South Korea’s intelligence agency stated that North Korea had deployed 1,500 special forces to Russia between 8 and 13 October. Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s head of military intelligence, claimed that around 11,000 North Korean infantry personnel are training in eastern Russia (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 21 October 2024). South Korea is reportedly considering dispatching personnel to Ukraine to monitor the North Korean troops and assess their combat capabilities. While South Korea has hitherto only provided non-lethal aid to Ukraine, the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia will possibly shift this dynamic. We assess that South Korea is currently more likely to supply defensive weapons such as the Cheongung-11 missile defence system to Ukraine within the coming months. The growing involvement of North and South Korea in the war in Ukraine will likely exacerbate already heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, further destabilising regional security dynamics
• Ukraine: Ongoing war will sustain uncertainty over long-term borrowing prospects. Media reports from 21 October indicate that the Ukrainian government announced plans to restructure GDP warrants and state-guaranteed Eurobonds of the state-owned electricity company Ukrenergo. This follows Ukraine’s deal in September to restructure USD 20.5 bn worth of international bonds with a group of commercial creditors. The latest move aims to improve Ukraine’s debt sustainability and support its long-term efforts to re-enter the debt market. However, Ukrainian officials have indicated that further restructuring may be needed, particularly concerning debt held by members of the Group of Creditors of Ukraine, which agreed in December 2023 to extend the moratorium on loan payments until 2027. The IMF forecasts that, if the war ends in 2025, Ukraine will be able to return to the external debt market only in 2029. We assess that the high degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome of the conflict will be the key variable in shaping the country’s long-term borrowing prospects and, more broadly, its long-term economic recovery.

Oct 21.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have made some notable advances at the eastern flanks of Chasiv Yar this week; these will place further pressure on Ukraine’s defences as Russia’s theatre-wide offensive continues
• NORTH KOREA: Ukrainian intelligence claims that around 11,000 North Korean infantry personnel are currently training in eastern Russia before being sent to fight in Ukraine
• CBRN: Moscow has vowed that it will not allow Ukraine to develop nuclear weapons under any circumstances; this follows unclear statements from the Ukrainian authorities likely aimed at increasing support for Ukraine’s NATO membership
• FORECAST: Unconfirmed sources indicate that the US currently has no fundamental objections to inviting Ukraine to join NATO; an adjustment of US policy following the US elections is a realistic possibility if Vice President Kamala Harris wins
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have made some notable advances at the eastern flanks of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast) this week; these will place further pressure on the Ukrainian defences. Geolocated footage published on 17 October confirms that Russian forces have managed to penetrate the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal, have advanced west along the T-05-04 highway to seize a road junction and penetrate further west and south-west still towards the outskirts of the town’s southern flank. Russian forces have highly likely advanced into the ‘Block-9’ mine area in south-east Chasiv Yar. The development represents the most significant advance in the area for months, and will now place Russian forces in a position to attack the town from another direction, namely from the south-east.
• BAKHMUT: Chasiv Yar remains an operational significant objective for Russian forces given its elevated position and control of the T-05-04 road that leads west to Kostiantynivka, a large and heavily fortified town in Donetsk oblast. While progress remains very slow, Russian forces are likely attempting to seize Chasiv Yar before the winter sets in to allow them to prepare for a 2025 spring offensive which would likely aim at taking Kostianynivka.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have also made some advances in and around Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 18 October indicates Russian advances in eastern Toretsk, while footage from 20 October confirms advances north-east of Neplivka (located on the south-western outskirts of Toretsk town itself).
• DONETSK: Russian forces have reportedly intensified mechanised assaults along the Donetsk front, likely to maximise gains before the muddy season restricts mobility. Over the past week, Russia reportedly launched three battalion-sized mechanised assaults, a notable increase in the size of such attacks. Ukrainian National Guard spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk reported on 18 October that Russia has intensified the use of armoured vehicles to support infantry assaults. Muzychuk claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to inflict a high rate of destruction of Russian armoured vehicles, likely underscoring the highly attritional nature of Russian tactics. The uptick in Russian assaults likely underscores efforts to maximise gains before the muddy season severely deteriorates mobility conditions. As such, while the muddy conditions are at their onset and mobility is moderately restricted, Russian forces will likely focus their operations across open fields, relying on armoured vehicles.
• DONETSK: Russian forces have continued to make gains in the Pokrovsk sector over the past few days. Geolocated footage posted on 19 October indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the southern outskirts of Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk). Additional footage from 20 October suggests that Russian forces made limited advances on the north-eastern outskirts of Selydove (south-east of Pokrovsk), a settlement it is currently trying to encircle.
• DONETSK: Russian forces continued their offensive operations towards Kurakhove (west of Donetsk City), making progress towards the city. Geolocated footage from 19 October shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Zoryane, south-east of Zoryane and in Zhelanna Druhe, a settlement north-east of Zoryane. This suggests that Russian forces likely seized Zhelanna Druhe. A Ukrainian OSINT source confirmed that Zhelanna Druhe is under Russian control. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated on 19 October that its forces captured Zoryane. Russia’s confirmed advances and claims underscore efforts to encircle Kurakhove.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK: Geolocated footage from 17 and 18 October indicates Russian advances along the western flank of the Ukrainian salient, advancing east from the direction of Korenevo towards Malaya Loknya (located north-west of Sudzha). Certain Russian sources have claimed that their forces have succeeded in enclosing small tactical encirclements of Ukrainian forces south-east of Korenevo, but we cannot confirm this. Nevertheless, Russian forces have also been attacking along the eastern flank of the salient, including applying pressure on the eastern flank of Malaya Loknya. However, geolocated footage published on 20 October also indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced along the P-200 highway north-east of Sudzha. This demonstrated that the frontline remains dynamic and that numerous locations likely remain highly contested as Ukrainian forces continue spoiling attacks and other efforts, undermining Russia’s counter-attacks in the area.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 19 October shows that Russian troops recently advanced in south-western Kruhlyakivka (south-east of Kupyansk) following a reinforced company-sized mechanised assault. After the attack, Russian forces were able to close in on the Oskil River, which aligns with the Russian command’s efforts to set a foothold directly on the river to pressure the Ukrainian salient to the north between Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and Hlushkivka, and the Ukrainian salient south of Kruhlyakivka. Russian forces made confirmed gains into central and northern Kruhlyakivka, according to geolocated footage from 17 October. However, as of 18 October, Ukrainian forces were able to recapture lost positions in northern Kruhlyakivka.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 18 October indicates some minor Russian advances along the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk oblast border region. The footage indicates Russian forces advanced north of Pryyutne, located around nine miles (14km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) also stated that their forces took the village of Levadne, located north-west of Pryyutne, though this has not been confirmed.
• STRIKES: On 18 October, Ukraine was targeted by 98 Shahed-136/131 drones and six Kh-59/69 missiles. Ukrainian forces intercepted four missiles and 42 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 19-20 October, Russian forces launched 49 Shahed-136/131 drones and two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Ukrainian mobile air defence fire units intercepted 31 UAVs over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 13 drones reportedly failed to reach their targets due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures. Russian ballistic missiles hit Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), injuring 17 people and damaging administrative buildings, educational institutions, a hotel and residential buildings.
• STRIKES: Earlier on 21 October, Russia attacked Ukraine with one Iskandr-M/Kn-23 ballistic missile, one Kh-35 missile, one Kh-31P missile and 116 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences shot down 59 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukrainian EW measures reportedly diverted 45 drones from their planned trajectory. A missile reportedly struck the centre of Zaporizhzhia (Zaporizhzhia oblast).
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russia’s MoD reported that 20 Ukrainian UAVs were intercepted over the Russian Belgorod, Bryansk and Rostov oblasts on 19 October. A Russian online opposition outlet reported that the attack struck the ‘Kremniy El’ microelectronic plant in Bryansk City (Bryansk oblast). Local Russian authorities claimed that falling debris hit a non-residential building in Bryansk oblast, possibly referring to the plant.
• STRIKES: The Ukrainian General Staff reported that, overnight on 19-20 October, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and military intelligence (GUR) orchestrated an unspecified attack against military facilities in Russia. The targets included the Lipetsk-2 military airfield in Russia’s Lipetsk oblast, which reportedly houses Su-34, Su-35 and MiG aircraft. The General Staff also reported that the operation targeted a state-owned defence Sverdlov plant in Dzerzhinsk (Nizhny Novgorod oblast), which produces chemical components for artillery rounds and explosive aerial bombs. According to the General Staff, aerial bombs were stored at the plant. According to Ukrainian sources, the plant is one of Russia’s largest explosives factories.
• STRIKES: Although the General Staff did not specify the nature of the attack, the Russian MoD claimed that Russian regions, including Kursk, Lipetsk, Nizhny Novgorod and Oryol oblasts, were targeted by more than 100 UAVs. Nizhny Novgorod oblast authorities claimed that a drone attack was repelled above Dzerzhinsk’s industrial zone and did not report any damage. The attack highlights Ukraine’s efforts to degrade Russia’s military equipment and its ability to replace such equipment by targeting defence plants and depots. The latest attacks also underscore the SBU and GUR’s capability to collect intelligence on such facilities across Russia, which remain highly vulnerable to Ukrainian attacks.
• STRIKES: According to the Russian MoD, Russian air defences intercepted 18 UAVs early on 21 October over Bryansk, Kursk, Oryol and Rostov oblasts.
• STRIKES: Media reports from 20 October state that Ukraine is developing the ‘Sting’ drone, a first-person view (FPV) UAV designed to neutralise Russian Shahed-136/131 drones. According to its developers, the UAV would be able to fly at altitudes approaching 10,000 feet (3000m) and reach a maximum speed of 100 miles per hour (161km/h). The use of such a UAV would likely allow Ukraine to minimise the use of conventional air defence systems, thereby freeing stocks of air defence interceptors to shoot down Russian missiles. Ukraine has already been increasing its use of electronic warfare (EW) measures to disable Shahed drones for that purpose.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• NORTH KOREA: Around 11,000 North Korean infantry personnel are currently training in eastern Russia before being sent to fight in Ukraine, according to Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence. Budanov assessed on 17 October that they will be ready to serve in Ukraine from 1 November; however, he caveated that Ukraine does not have all the details at present. Budanov stated that the first 2,600 soldiers will allegedly go to Russia’s Kursk oblast, where Ukraine launched an offensive in August; it is unclear where the other North Korean soldiers will go. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) also reported on 18 October that 1,500 North Korean special forces personnel have been transferred to eastern Russia, where they are reportedly undergoing training before deployment to Ukraine. While we cannot confirm these assessments, the growing number of reports indicate a notable shift in North Korea’s involvement in the war.
• NORTH KOREA: US officials are unable to verify reports that North Korean soldiers have already been deployed to Ukraine. US National Security Council spokesperson Sean Savett said on 19 October that, while Washington DC cannot confirm this development, it would indicate Russia’s ‘growing desperation’ to sustain the war. Nevertheless, an unspecified military insider told Ukrainian media on 21 October that the Russian authorities have already detained 18 North Korean soldiers who reportedly abandoned their positions in Kursk oblast, indicating some have already deployed. They allegedly deserted to find the Russian command after being left without food and instructions for several days. While difficult conditions for North Koreans will lower morale, they are almost certainly going to be seen as highly expendable forces by Russian commanders, which will likely enable Russia to sustain its current highly attritional strategy.
• APPROVAL: Reports emerged on 20 October that Ukraine’s Western partners are unlikely to decide on whether to allow Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes using Western-provided weapons deep inside Russia before the US presidential election on 5 November. The leaders of France, Germany, the UK and the US reportedly failed to reach an agreement on 18 October when they met in Germany, in the capital Berlin. Germany and the US are reticent to allow such authorisation to limit the risk of escalation, while France and the UK are more open to the idea. Notably, US President Joe Biden stated on 18 October that there is currently no consensus between allies on the matter.
• CBRN: President Vladimir Putin stated on 18 October that Russia will not allow Ukraine to develop nuclear weapons and that discussion on the matter is a ‘dangerous provocation’. Putin insisted that Russia will not allow Ukraine to do this under any circumstances and that any progress towards developing them will result in an ‘appropriate response’. It comes after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that Ukraine either needs to join NATO or pursue obtaining nuclear weapons to guarantee its security. Nevertheless, Zelensky later backtracked and said Ukraine is not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons; Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry has also denied any plans to develop nuclear capabilities (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 18 October 2024).
• CBRN: Nevertheless, Zelensky has frequently criticised the Budapest Memorandum, an accord under which Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal post-independence in exchange for guarantees of peace, territorial integrity and sovereignty. As such, Zelensky’s nuclear comments were most possibly made to highlight what Ukraine considers to be viable forms of deterrence over the long term: either nuclear weapons or NATO, rather than an indication that the Ukrainian authorities would seek to acquire nuclear weapons if NATO membership fails.
• CBRN: We assess that Ukraine is highly unlikely to pursue nuclear capabilities in the short term despite theoretically having the potential to acquire nuclear weapons. Ukraine would almost certainly be unable to enrich weapons-grade plutonium without alerting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors the country’s nuclear power plants extensively at the invitation of the Ukrainian authorities. A secret programme would be impossible without ejecting the IAEA from Ukraine; this remains highly unlikely.
• CBRN: Any suspicions that Ukraine is developing nuclear capabilities would highly likely provide Russia ‘justification’ to conduct large-scale strikes against Ukrainian nuclear infrastructure to prevent the advancement of a hypothetical nuclear programme. It would also likely increase the risk of tactical nuclear usage against Ukraine on the battlefield if Moscow perceives the need to inflict a rapid defeat against Ukrainian forces. These dynamics mean that Ukraine will highly unlikely seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction for the foreseeable future.

FORECAST

NATO: The French newspaper Le Monde reported on 19 October that the US currently has no fundamental objections to inviting Ukraine to join NATO. According to the outlet, Biden may possibly take unspecified steps in this direction while he is the outgoing president if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the US election next month. This is according to an unspecified European diplomatic insider, though we are unable to verify the report. If true, this would almost certainly bolster Ukrainian optimism towards joining the bloc. Le Monde reported that Zelensky is optimistic that an invite to join the military alliance could ideally come before December and Biden’s departure from the White House in January 2025. Nevertheless, even if Ukraine were to receive an invitation to NATO (though this is still highly unlikely in the near term) its actual membership of the alliance remains a significantly less likely scenario, particularly while the war continues. Nevertheless, if the US does lift its reservations concerning inviting Ukraine to NATO, this would possibly encourage other countries which support Ukraine but are also concerned about escalating tensions with Russia to do the same. This primarily concerns Germany, given France and the UK are already reportedly warmer to this prospect. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said on 19 October that Paris is open to the idea of inviting Ukraine to join the alliance but noted that negotiations with allies on the matter will continue. Nevertheless, more cautious and/or Ukraine-sceptic members of the alliance will highly likely continue to resist any progress towards Ukraine’s aspirations to join the bloc. These would most likely include Hungary and Slovakia. For example, Russia-friendly Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico reiterated his assessment on 18 October that Ukrainian NATO membership could provoke a ‘third world war’. Consensus is required among all members to invite a country wanting to join. Ultimately, Hungary and Slovakia are highly unlikely to soften their stance on the matter in the coming months, which would represent the most significant hurdle to Ukraine’s NATO ambitions if the US adjusts its position in favour of an invitation. President Zelensky assessed on 18 October that Ukraine’s position at the negotiating table with Russia would be strengthened with an invitation to join NATO and the provision of sufficient, powerful weapons. Zelensky emphasised that these conditions would allow Ukraine to sit as equals and change the dynamics of any hypothetical discussions to end the war. Ukraine will continue to argue that increased Western support will be necessary to bolster its negotiating position when formal talks to end the war begin. For further analysis on Zelensky’s ‘Victory Plan’, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 17 October 2024. That said, an invitation for Ukraine to join NATO will unlikely incentivise Russia to end fighting, given Moscow has cited NATO expansionism as a reason for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia could realistically ask the bloc to rescind a hypothetical invitation in exchange for a quick peace, therefore leaving Ukraine vulnerable to a renewed attack in the coming years if such a concession was made. Nevertheless, Ukraine is almost certainly aware of the risk of this and would highly unlikely agree to it. However, pressure from the international community could realistically mount for Ukraine to agree to such terms. (Source: Sibylline)

 

25 Oct 24. Rheinmetall is supplying 20 additional Marder infantry fighting vehicles. Rheinmetall has handed over 20 additional Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to the Ukrainian armed forces for their defence against the Russian aggressor. The delivery was completed at the end of the third quarter of 2024. This brings the total number of combat vehicles delivered directly to Ukraine or in the context of so-called ring exchanges (Ring¬tausch) to around 200.  A three-digit number of these systems are Marder 1A3 infantry fighting vehicles.  In addition, Rheinmetall has provided Marder infantry fighting vehicles and Leopard main battle tanks in double digits through a ring exchange process. The latest order for the delivery of 20 Marder, financed by the German government, is worth a mid double-digit million euro amount. The order intake has already been booked in March 2024. The Marder 1A3 version being delivered by Rheinmetall to the Ukraine features additional laser rangefinders for efficient and precise target engagement. The first delivery of 20 combat vehicles of this type was arranged by Rheinmetall on behalf of the German government in March 2023; further deliveries followed, each in the double digits. As early as in the spring of 2022, Rheinmetall began taking over and refurbishing Marder 1A3 IFVs from Bundeswehr stocks – initially at its own expense. Since then, the combat vehicles have been repaired for their immediate deployment. The work is carried out at the corporation’s sites in Unterlüß and Kassel. The Marder is one of the most proven weapon systems of its kind worldwide. It was developed for the Bundeswehr, and is still in service there to some extent. Over the years, it has been modernised several times and its combat performance enhanced. In the meantime, the Puma has been introduced into the Bundeswehr, where it is gradually replacing the Marder in the army. Over 300 of the cutting-edge IFVs are now in use by the German armed forces.

 

23 Oct 24. US finalises $20bn loan to Ukraine Treasury officials say at least half of the funds could be delivered to Kyiv before end of year Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meeting US President Joe Biden in New York in September. G7 countries have been working for months on the structure of the loan © Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP/Getty Images US finalises $20bn loan to Ukraine on x (opens in a new window) US finalises $20bn loan to Ukraine on facebook (opens in a new window) US finalises $20bn loan to Ukraine on linkedin (opens in a new window) Share Save current progress 53% Colby Smith in Washington 9 MINUTES AGO 0 Print this page The US has finally finalised plans to give an additional $20bn to Ukraine as part of a G7 loan backed by profits generated from Russian assets frozen in Europe, with at least half of the money disbursed by the end of the year. The agreement comes on the heels of an announcement that the UK will extend an additional £2.3bn loan for military aid to the country as part of a wider effort by G7 countries to provide $50bn in additional support. The EU approved providing up to €35bn earlier this month, but with US support, it will now be able to contribute less. Brussels is likely to lend about $20bn. Canada and Japan are poised to provide the remainder. Most of Russia’s frozen central bank assets are held in Europe and are expected to generate about €3bn in profits per year. “Never before has a multilateral coalition frozen the assets of an aggressor country and then harnessed the value of those assets to fund the defence of the aggrieved party, all while respecting the rule of law and maintaining solidarity,” Daleep Singh, the White House’s deputy national security adviser for international economics, told reporters on Wednesday. Singh added that Ukraine would now “receive the assistance it needs now without burdening our taxpayers”. Half of the funds from the US will be earmarked for economic programmes, including direct budget aid for social assistance and other initiatives. The other portion will go towards military support, if Joe Biden’s administration can get authority from Congress to raise the amount of foreign military financing that can be provided to Ukraine. Singh said his team would be working with legislators between now and December, when some of the funds will be dispersed to an entity run by the World Bank, to “assess those odds”. “The only question we’re talking about here is the split between economic assistance and security assistance,” said Singh. “We’re going to provide $20bn either way.” Looming over the deadline is the upcoming US presidential election, which is less than two weeks away. Former president Donald Trump, who is neck-and-neck in polls with vice-president Kamala Harris, has questioned the need to provide aid to Ukraine if re-elected. (Source: FT.com)

 

23 Oct 24. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin says North Korea has deployed troops to Russia. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said North Korea has deployed troops to Russia, the first senior US official to confirm the development on the record, as North Korea and Russia have forged increasingly friendly ties since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

“We are seeing evidence that that there are North Korean troops that have gone to Russia,” Austin told reporters traveling with him in Rome on Wednesday. “What, exactly, they’re doing is left to be seen.”

Ukraine and South Korea have alleged that North Korea has deployed thousands of troops to Russia to help Russia fight the Ukrainians. A US source familiar with the intelligence told CNN that “thousands” of North Korean troops are already in Russia.

The US plans to release intelligence on Wednesday showing thousands of North Korean troops moving by ship to training areas in Russia, according to an official familiar with the matter. The release of information is likely to include satellite imagery showing the movements in eastern Russia.

The US does not believe the North Korean troops have reached Ukraine, but the movements have generated deep concern at a potentially serious escalation in the conflict.

Austin said the US is still trying to determine what role the North Koreans will play in the conflict and whether they intend to travel to Ukraine. (Source: CNN)

 

23 Oct 24. Japan to Supply AI Drones to Ukraine for Humanitarian Demining. Prodrone, a Japanese industrial drone producer, plans to supply Ukraine with its drones for humanitarian demining. Tokyo has previously assisted Kyiv in mine clearance efforts. Japan delivered four ALIS systems to search mines and 50 metal detectors.

Additionally, Ukrainian experts have undergone demining training in Japan.

Prodrone intends to supply Ukraine with drones capable of operating 50 cm above the ground. Ukrainian specialists will develop its mine detection technology, which is expected to incorporate artificial intelligence, allowing a drone to mark detected mines on an interactive map. The Japanese company aims to begin drone deliveries to Ukraine next year.

Prodrone manufactures unmanned aerial vehicles for high-resolution aerial surveillance of specific land areas (for construction and mining), inspection of infrastructure objects (bridges, dams, and tunnels), as well as logistics and cargo transportation.

Earlier, Japan’s new Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba, delivered his first policy speech to parliament, warning that “today’s Ukraine could be tomorrow’s East Asia” and expressing concerns about an increasingly divided world.

Ishiba expressed support for creating a regional military alliance similar to NATO, stating that the security environment in Asia was “the most severe since the end of World War II.”

The mine detection technology will be developed by Ukrainian specialists and, as expected, with the introduction of artificial intelligence, thanks to which the drone will be able to place detected mines on an interactive map of the area.

The Japanese company expects to start supplying drones to Ukraine next year. Prodrone’s website states that it produces unmanned aerial vehicles for high-resolution imaging of individual land plots (for construction, mining, etc.), inspection of infrastructure facilities (bridges, dams, tunnels, and other structures), as well as logistics and transportation of goods.

Tokyo has previously provided assistance to Kyiv in demining issues. Japan handed over to Ukraine four ALIS installations, which allow finding mines with great accuracy, as well as 50 metal detectors. In addition, Ukrainian experts have completed demining training in Japan. (Source: UAS VISION/Euromaidan; Ukrinform)

 

22 Oct 24. South Korea may consider supplying weapons to Ukraine over North Korea-Russia ties. South Korea may consider directly supplying weapons to Ukraine as part of measures to counter military ties between North Korea and Russia, officials said on Tuesday, after accusing Pyongyang of sending troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine. South Korea’s spy agency said last week that North Korea had shipped 1,500 special forces personnel to Russia’s Far East for training and acclimatising at local military bases likely for combat in the war in Ukraine. A senior official at President Yoon Suk Yeol’s office said it was preparing diplomatic, economic and military measures under various scenarios of military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, including providing Ukraine with lethal weapons if the situation worsened.

“We would consider supplying weapons for defensive purposes as part of the step-by-step scenarios, and if it seems they are going too far, we might also consider offensive use,” the presidential official told reporters. (Source: Reuters)

 

22 Oct 24. Russia halting strikes on energy targets could lead to peace talks, says Volodymyr Zelenskyy Ukrainian president floats mutual cessation of aerial attacks on power grids as first step towards ending war A utility worker removes debris at an energy facility damaged by Russian shelling in Kharkiv, Ukraine © Ukrinform/Cover Images/Reuters Russia halting strikes on energy targets could lead to peace talks, says Volodymyr Zelenskyy on x (opens in a new window) Russia halting strikes on energy targets could lead to peace talks, says Volodymyr Zelenskyy on facebook (opens in a new window) Russia halting strikes on energy targets could lead to peace talks, says Volodymyr Zelenskyy on linkedin (opens in a new window) Share Save current progress 36% Fabrice Deprez in Kyiv 2 MINUTES AGO 0 Print this page Russia putting an end to aerial attacks on Ukrainian energy targets and cargo ships could pave the way for negotiations to end the war, the Ukrainian president has said. Volodymyr Zelenskyy told journalists in Kyiv on Monday that “when it comes to energy and freedom of navigation, getting a result on these points would be a signal that Russia may be ready to end the war”. Ukraine has been bracing for a painful winter after a series of Russian missile strikes on thermal power plants destroyed almost half of its energy generation. The country is now largely dependent on its nuclear power plants and the import of energy from European countries. If Moscow and Kyiv agreed to end strikes on their respective energy infrastructures, it would be a significant step towards de-escalating the conflict, Zelenskyy said in reference to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries. “We saw during the first [peace] summit that there could be a decision on energy security. In other words: we do not attack their energy infrastructures, they don’t attack ours. Could this lead to the end of the war’s hot phase? I think so,” he said. Ukraine’s military has suffered a series of setbacks in recent months as Russian forces pressed ahead in several areas along the 1,000km frontline, despite an unexpected offensive Kyiv mounted in Russia’s Kursk region where its troops still hold territory. The battlefield losses and the prospect of a winter marked by prolonged power cuts have prompted Zelenskyy to accelerate his efforts to get western support for his “victory plan”, which includes an invitation for Kyiv to join Nato and further security guarantees that would deter Russia from attacking again. But the Ukrainian leader has also been faced with increased pressure to look for a negotiated end to the conflict, given that Donald Trump who has vowed to end the war “on day one”, could return to the White House if he wins the US presidential election next month. Russia’s readiness to negotiate “depends firstly on the US elections”, said Zelenskyy, adding that he expected a “more positive reaction” from the US vote. “Not because there will be a new president, but because right now the focus of the US is on the elections and I think it probably makes any harsh statement challenging; they don’t want the added risk.” Zelenskyy denied any discussions with western countries over a land-for-peace deal that would see Ukraine brought into the Nato fold in exchange for giving up territories at present held by Russia. (Source: FT.com)

 

22 Oct 24. Turkey has secretly barred exports to Russia of US military-linked hardware after Washington warned Ankara of “consequences” if it did not halt the trade. Ankara has in recent weeks adjusted its customs systems to block exports of more than four dozen categories of US-origin goods that Washington and its western allies view as vital to Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine, according to three people with direct knowledge of the matter. Turkey’s electronic customs system no longer allows exporters to proceed with sending shipments of the so-called “battlefield goods” to Russia, one of the people said, having previously enabled them to be transported there. Similar goods originating from the EU were blocked earlier and remain so, two of the people said. The trade curbs, which affect civilian parts such as microchips and remote control systems that western allies say are being used in weaponry, were not publicly announced because of “political sensitivities”, one of the people said. Turkey’s trade ministry and Dmitry Peskov, spokesperson for Russian President Vladimir Putin, did not respond to requests for comment. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has positioned himself as a potential peacemaker in the Ukraine war while retaining warm relations with Putin. The two men are due to meet at this week’s Brics summit in Kazan on Wednesday. The quiet bans on military-linked exports to Russia, however, are the latest sign that Turkey is stepping back from the role as a lifeline from western sanctions that it embraced earlier in the war. Turkish banks sharply cut back their business with Russian counterparties this year after the US issued an executive order threatening sanctions against lenders processing transactions for the Kremlin’s war machine. (Source: FT.com)

 

22 Oct 24. Russia branches out drone arsenal beyond Iranian Shahed. Chinese and Iranian UAS continue to play a central part of the Russian war strategy as Ukraine and the West try to curb their supply chains. Russia is beginning to diversify its range of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) beyond the infamous, Iranian-made Shahed family of systems which have served as the primary means for the bombardment of Ukrainian military and civilian targets. A new set of US restrictions will be implemented to overcome the proliferated use of an alternative Chinese loitering munition. The US Treasury and State Department, together, laid out the latest sanctions to be implemented against entities within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russian defence organisations on 17 October 2024. The new controls aim to disrupt the supply and production of ‘Garpiya’ long-range loitering munitions.

Russia’s state-owned weapons company, Almaz-Antey, is targetted for coordinating the production of the Garpiya UAS from factories in China before transferring them to Russia. Likewise, the Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine company, simply referred to as ‘Limbach’, produces L550E engines in the PRC to be fitted into the Garpiya.

In addition, Redleplus, a Shenzhen-based supplier just 17 miles north of Hong Kong, collaborates with the Russian defence organisation TSK Vector, which serves as an intermediary between AO IEMZ Kupol and other PRC-based suppliers for Russia’s Garpiya project.

Rise of the Garpiya

Garpiya incorporates major components from the PRC such as engines and numerous electrical, mechanical and automated data processing components but the system is assembled in Russia.

According to IEMZ Kupol, 500 of these loitering munitions were produced in the second half of 2023 while 2,000 of them were produced in the first half of 2024. Thus, the company claims the production rate has increased by 75% in under a year.

The range of the Garpiya-3, which is supposedly an upgrade of the original A1, seems to have a range of 1,200 miles (nearly 2,000km).

Iran’s Shahed family of UAS have been, and still continue to be, a centrepiece of Russian methods of waging war and imposing chaos over Ukraine’s armed forces and wider society.

Typically, the loitering munitions are used as a cost-effective alternative for conventional missiles given the strain of the Russian war economy two-and-a-half years into its unlawful invasion of Ukraine.

This substitution is reflected in the heaviest Russian strikes fired against Ukraine to date in August this year. The hybrid salvo, including Kinzhal ‘hypersonic’ and traditional Iskander ballistic missiles, also deployed 109 Shahed UAS.

Continual bombardments comprising these cheap loitering munitions will continue to drain Ukraine’s air defences and the Western resolve to sustain munitions.

More recently, on 20 October, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, revealed that there had been 129 Shahed strikes in one day alone.

Russia has deployed more than 6,000 Shahed loitering munitions since the start of 2024. Albeit, the war-torn nation is not totally vulnerable as “our warriors manage to shoot down a significant portion of them,” emphasised the head of state.

The range of a Shahed varies dramatically, depending in part on how willing you are to believe Iranian sources. Regardless, there is still a wide range in maximum distances because some variants of the Shahed are able to fly further than others.

Countering loitering munitions

“We need the capability to destroy not only the storage bases for the ‘Shaheds’ but also the entire infrastructure for their production and logistics,” Zelenskyy entreated the West. “Unfortunately, terrorists know how to take advantage of the time that the free world’s indecision gives them.”

The Ukrainian leader refers to the pressure he is under to encourage the US, the largest donor of military assistance, to remove restrictions when it comes to eliminating targets deep inside Russia from which the enemy is able wage strikes against Ukraine.

In particular, the use of long-range weapons powered by American-made components hinges on US approval. Doubtless, US unwillingness rouses anger after it was found that Ukraine’s forces have been victim to the full impact of Russian weaponry powered by certain American components.

Notably, Iran has collaborated in constructing a new plant in Russia’s Tatarstan region that will reportedly manufacture at least 6,000 Shahed drones by 2025, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

However, if Garpiya production continues to boost at a considerable rate then Russia’s consolidation of both drone types, while not detracting from the continued import of Shaheds, may threaten to cultivate a more robust trilateral defence cooperation between so-called ‘axis’ powers.

Axis of autocracy

“Some big news here is that Russia is collaborating more closely than ever with its peers in the axis of autocracy – namely, Iran, North Korea, and China,” GlobalData Defence Analyst, Fox Walker, identified.

“The widespread use of the Iranian Shahed, the deployment of North Korean troops, and now the production of lethal UAS by Chinese companies (albeit perhaps without the knowledge of the government) are all examples of escalation by Russian allies.”

This escalation is vital to Russia as the Army’s casualties increase further, with a rate of up to 1,200 per day according to Walker.

“The escalation by those in Iran, North Korea, and China comes as Russia refits old tanks and relies on older recruits. Each country has its own reasons to want to see Russia win – or at least not lose – and now is a critical time with some small Russian momentum in the east of Ukraine.”

While the arrival of troops and materiel to the frontline is not yet measurable, it should be seen as further evidence that these autocratic nations are willing to work together to achieve their individual and collective goals. Even if their autocratic institutions inherently prevent any meaningful interdependence. (Source: army-technology.com)

21 Oct 24. Austin Affirms United States’ Unwavering Support for Ukraine During Visit to Kyiv. The U.S. remains unwavering in its support for Ukraine as Russia’s disregard for international norms and ongoing war of aggression continues to threaten democracies throughout the globe, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said today.

Austin underscored the imperative for countries around the globe to stand in defense of Ukraine’s freedom and sovereignty in an address at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in Kyiv, marking his fourth visit to Ukraine since taking office.

“When the largest military in Europe becomes a force of aggression, the whole continent feels the shock,” Austin said in his prepared remarks. “When a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council tries to deny self-rule to more than 40 m people, the whole world feels the blow. And when a dictator puts his imperial fantasies ahead of the rights of a free people, the whole international system feels the outrage.”

“That’s why nations of goodwill from every corner of the planet have risen to Ukraine’s defense,” he said. “And that’s why the United States and our allies and partners have proudly become the arsenal of Ukrainian democracy.”

Ukraine’s security is vital to maintaining peace and stability throughout the globe, Austin said, adding that American values call on the U.S. to defend against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assault.

“Putin’s war threatens European security,” he said. “Putin’s war challenges our NATO allies. Putin’s war attacks our shared values. And Putin’s war is a frontal assault on the rules-based international order that keeps us all safe.”

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. has continued to rally the international community in supporting Ukraine’s defenders.

Since April 2022, the U.S.-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a coalition of nearly 50 countries committed to Ukraine’s defense, has surged critical military assistance to Ukraine’s frontline defenders and organized standing capability coalitions committed to Ukraine’s long-term defense.

Today, the Defense Department announced its latest aid package containing critical capabilities for Ukraine valued at nearly $400 m. Since February 2022, the U.S. has provided more than $59.5 bn in critical assistance including air defense, artillery, armored vehicles and other critical munitions.

“Now, that is a very real financial commitment,” Austin said. “But for anyone who thinks that American leadership is expensive — well, consider the price of American retreat. In the face of aggression, the price of principle is always dwarfed by the cost of capitulation.”

The secretary said due to the unprecedented international support, coupled with the bravery and ingenuity of Ukraine’s frontline defenders, Russia has failed to achieve any of its strategic objectives and continues to incur heavy costs, 970 days since it launched its full-scale invasion.

” President Zelenskyy didn’t flee,” Austin said. “Kyiv didn’t fall. And Ukraine didn’t fold.”

The secretary noted that Russian forces have suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties since the start of the war and squandered more than $200 bn to sustain its invasion.

Despite suffering greatly from Russia’s assault, Ukraine’s spirit remains unbroken, Austin said.

“Ukraine stands unbowed — and strengthened,” he said, noting the strength of Ukraine’s battle-tested warfighters and its “roaring” defense industrial base that is now producing some of the best unmanned aerial vehicles in the world.

“Your soldiers have shown incredible skill. Your frontline defenders have shown heroic resolve,” he said. “And your citizens have shown stunning courage.”

Ukraine’s unrelenting strength continues to inspire the world, Austin said, adding that the U.S. “will get Ukraine what it needs to fight for its survival and security.”

While Ukraine faces complex challenges ahead, Austin noted that its strategic advantage of fighting for a just cause remains.

“Never underestimate the resolve of free citizens,” he said. “And never underestimate the power of a democracy summoned to defend itself. Ukraine has chosen the course of courage. And so have we.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

22 Oct 24. Ukraine’s Drone Units are Using Russia’s Own Explosives Against it. The drone war, one of the defining features of the more than two and a half years of full-scale war in Ukraine, evolves at a blinding pace. Hundreds of airborne drones zip across the skies above the front lines each day, ticking off tasks ranging from reconnaissance to targeting, as well as kamikaze strikes designed to take out enemy armored vehicles, personnel and positions.

But although Ukraine’s stockpiles of various types of explosive drones are a crucial part of its unmanned aerial vehicles strategy, “we are short, very short on explosive substances,” Vadym Mazevych, a former commander of the UAV battalion of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, told Newsweek during an interview in the Ukrainian capital on the sidelines of the Yalta European Strategy conference, organized by the Victor Pinchuk Foundation.

Some Ukrainian operators have turned to scavenging unexploded Russian shells and attempting to take out the explosives, Mazevych said via an interpreter. It is a task fraught with danger, but

“we do need communication systems for these drones, and we need explosive substances.”

“We need a lot of it,” Mazevych added.

Also speaking in Kyiv was Serhii Varakin, the commander of a drone unit under Ukraine’s 58th Brigade, who described this as “quite a long-standing problem.”

Ukrainian forces have been “cannibalizing” unexploded ordinance to use against Russian troops, Varakin told Newsweek, also through an interpreter.

“We have been short of explosives for a long time. It is a big deficit, and we need a lot of them. We need them in large volumes,”

Varakin later said in written comments to Newsweek.

Ukraine’s drone operations on land, in the air and on the water are huge. Throughout the war, Kyiv has said its drone production is on the rise, and new designs almost constantly debut on social media. In late July, a Kyiv defense official said Ukraine was able to produce more than 3 m drones each year, with this propped up by financial support from Ukraine’s international backers.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in February that Kyiv would create a new branch of Kyiv’s military, known as the Unmanned Systems Forces, dedicated exclusively to drone warfare.

“Drones, unmanned systems, have proven their effectiveness in battles on land, in the sky and at sea,” the Ukrainian leader said.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said in an interview with Ukrainian media that Kyiv had developed a “very thorough and extensive” plan to lay out how Kyiv will produce drones, electronic warfare equipment and ground robots for the next three years.

The problem, Kyiv officials stress, is funding. Ukraine’s capability far outstrips the money being funneled into the more than 250 companies involved in drone production, said Oleksandr Kamyshin, Ukraine’s former strategic industries minister, who is overseeing Kyiv’s defense industry.

“It’s so frustrating, it’s so embarrassing, to be capable but not to have enough resources”

for the defense industry, Kamyshin, now a presidential adviser on strategic affairs with a focus on the military-industrial complex, told Newsweek.

Varakin said, “Ukraine is capable of producing a lot of things, and we are more creative than Russians. What we need is the ability to produce a place for this production and, of course, financing.”

“Funding will make it possible to develop various conceptual areas, not just production areas,” Mazevych added.

Russia’s own industrial capacity is formidable. In December 2023, Samuel Bendett, a drone expert with CNA, a Washington-based nonprofit for research and analyses, told Newsweek that Russian volunteers, as well as state and affiliated manufacturers, had “significantly ramped up” the development of FPV drones and were likely handing off tens of thousands of FPVs to the Russian military each month.

President Vladimir Putin said in mid-September that Russia was planning to increase its overall drone production nearly tenfold in 2024. Around 140,000 UAVs were given to Russia’s military in 2023, Putin said.

“Their military-industrial complex is developing every day,” Mazevych said.

There is evidence that Russia is launching up to 250 drones along “very narrow” stretches of the front, somewhere between 4½ and 5 kilometers in length, during the day,” he said.

“We probably win in quality with drones, but Russia wins in quantity,” Varakin said.

“Back in the day, when we were just dropping homemade devices with Mavic, they were already opening factories and were already sending us factory-made drones,”

he said, referring to the Mavic quadcopter produced by Chinese technology company DJI.

Ukrainian companies may be pumping out drones, but many UAVs seeing action come from abroad.

“We are very much dependent on Chinese supplies,” said Mazevych.

As developers tweak the drones, the tactics visible in Ukraine also shift. Yegor Firsov, a staff sergeant with a drone attack company in Ukraine’s military, was away from the front lines in eastern Ukraine for only a handful of days when he spoke to Newsweek in Kyiv. But that is long enough for drone warfare tactics along the front lines to have changed, he said.

When he’s looking out from the view of a reconnaissance drone, Firsov said via an interpreter, “you might think I’m looking for, you know, armored vehicles, tanks, artillery pieces.”

Firsov’s unit of 12 people, which spent the first part of September close to the embattled eastern cities of Pokrovsk and Toretsk, destroys around 200 Russian military targets each month, he said.

When he’s looking for targets, Firsov said, it’s more likely he will

“see some enemy guys using either a buggy, bike, golf car, maybe—trying to advance.” These are “mutilated cars, rebuilt for the purposes of the war,” he added.

Varakin recounted a similar story. “Recently, for example, the Russians have stopped assaulting with armor because when [a] Ukrainian FPV arrives and hits their armor, everyone who is inside will die.”

He continued: “So they now use buggies, ATVs [all-terrain vehicles], motorbikes,” he said. “And when one FPV for 20 motorcyclists flies out, it will kill only one motorcyclist. Russia uses very different tactics and it is constantly improving, constantly analyzing its mistakes and correcting them,” he said. (Source: UAS VISION/Newsweek)

 

22 Oct 24. UK strengthens national security and bolsters Ukraine’s war chest with £2.26bn military loan.

Ukraine will receive further funding to purchase essential military equipment to defend itself against Russia’s illegal invasion, as the Chancellor today announces that the Government will loan a further £2.26bn in new money to Ukraine.

• UK announces £2.26bn loan to Ukraine backed by profits from sanctioned Russian sovereign assets
• Forms Britain’s contribution to the $50 bn loan announced at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in June
• New money for Ukraine will bolster equipment on the frontline

The new £2.26bn is the UK’s contribution to the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans to Ukraine scheme, in which $50 bn from G7 countries will be delivered to Ukraine for its military, budget and reconstruction needs. The loan will be repaid using the extraordinary profits on immobilised Russian sovereign assets.

The Chancellor Rachel Reeves made the announcement alongside Defence Secretary John Healey while visiting Ukrainian personnel who are being trained in the UK. More than 45,000 personnel have been trained in the UK under Operation INTERFLEX and the scheme has been extended to at least the end of 2025.

The UK’s £2.26bn loan is earmarked as budgetary support for Ukraine’s military spending, enabling the Ukrainians to invest in key equipment to support their efforts against Russia, such as air defence, artillery and wider equipment support. It comes on top of the UK’s existing £3 bn a year military aid for Ukraine, which the Prime Minister re-committed to within his first week in office.

The UK has sent around 400 different capabilities to Ukraine, with Defence Secretary John Healey MP recently announcing that the UK will supply 650 Lightweight Multirole Missile systems to Ukraine to boost the country’s air defences.

Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves, said: “Our support for Ukraine and her men and women in their fight for freedom from Putin’s aggression is unwavering and will remain so for as long as it takes. This new money is in Britain’s national interest because the frontline of our defence – the defence of our democracy and shared values – is in the Ukrainian trenches. A safe and secure Ukraine is a safe and secure United Kingdom.”

The $50bn G7 ERA scheme was first announced at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Apulia, Italy, in June this year. Russia’s obligation under international law to pay for the damage it has caused to Ukraine is clear and this G7 agreement is an important step to ensuring this happens. Today the UK has announced its contribution to the scheme and will introduce domestic legislation in the coming weeks to enable the transfer of the new funds to Ukraine as quickly as possible.

The loan is on top of the £12.8bn already committed in military, economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine.

The funding comes alongside the UK and international partners introducing the largest and most severe package of sanctions ever imposed on a major economy. Without this, Russia would have over $400 bn more for its war machine – enough to fund its illegal invasion for a further four years. The war is having an economic and human cost for Russia; it is soaking up 40% of Russia’s annual budget and last month the country suffered its highest rate of daily casualties since the war began.

The loan announcement comes ahead of the Chancellor’s attendance of the International Monetary Fund Annual Meetings in Washington D.C. later this week, at which she will underline on the international stage that the UK and its partners stand united and will not let aggressors like Putin succeed. Earlier this month Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Downing Street to discuss his victory plan for Ukraine.

Defence Secretary John Healey, said: “By using the money generated from these sanctioned Russian assets, we can help turn the tables on Putin’s war machine. This urgent funding will directly support Ukraine’s defence using the proceeds from assets that had helped fuel Putin’s aggression.

The UK is stepping up our support to Ukraine, speeding up supplies of vital equipment and boosting our defence industries. We will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

22 Oct 24. ROK-UK Joint Statement on DPRK-Russia Cooperation. Joint statement between the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs of the United Kingdom David Lammy and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Cho Tae-yul.

We condemn in the strongest terms the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s continued unlawful arms transfers and the reported deployment of its troops to the Russian Federation to support Russia’s unlawful war of aggression in Ukraine. Such cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is not only in violation of multiple UNSC resolutions, but also prolongs the suffering of the Ukrainian people and threatens global security, including those in the ROK and the UK, and demonstrates the desperation of the DPRK and Russia. We are committed to providing the support Ukraine requires to secure a just and lasting peace.

We are closely monitoring what Russia provides to the DPRK in return for its provision of arms and military personnel, including Russia’s possible provision of materials and technology to the DPRK in support of Pyongyang’s military objectives. We are also deeply concerned about the possibility for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology to the DPRK, which would jeopardize the international non-proliferation efforts and threaten peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and across the globe. We take note that the security of the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic are more closely intertwined than ever, and commit ourselves to closely monitoring the situation and actively pursuing necessary measures together with the international community to deter further unlawful, reckless and destabilising behaviour. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

21 Oct 24. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s sixty-eighth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package, which has an estimated value of $400 m, will provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent needs, including: munitions for rocket systems and artillery; mortar systems and rounds; armored vehicles; and anti-tank weapons.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

• Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
• 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortar systems and rounds;
• Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles;
• Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
• M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
• Satellite communication equipment;
• Small arms and ammunition;
• Grenades and training equipment;
• Demolitions equipment and munitions;
• Equipment to protect critical national infrastructure; and
• Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.

The United States will continue to work together with some 50 Allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and its associated Capability Coalitions to meet Ukraine’s urgently needed battlefield requirements and defend against Russian aggression. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

18 Oct 24. What does Ukraine’s ‘Victory Plan’ mean for the West?

While the five-point plan may not suit the whims of the West, it has still jolted a new impetus of support for the struggling country. The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has unveiled the long-awaited ‘Victory Plan’ to the public for the first time, presenting his five points to the Verkhova Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, on 16 October 2024.

Following two and a half years of conflict, one of the major impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been the rising deployment of drones and the evolution of counter-drone technologies, underlining the crucial role of Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS)…

1. An immediate invitation to join Nato;
2. continued Western aid in equipping Ukrainian brigades;
3. formulating a non-nuclear strategic deterrence against Russia;
4. cultivating joint protection of the Ukrainian critical resources and investment;
5. and replacing US military contingents in Europe with hardened Ukrainian forces.

In a speech to the European Council a day later, the head of state stipulated that “Russia will resort to diplomacy only when it sees that it cannot achieve anything by force.” For that reason, the five points each determine a way to improve Ukraine’s diplomatic stance militarily, politically and economically.

The release of the plan comes just after the leader’s whistle-stop tour of Western backers over the last few weeks, when Zelenskyy presented the five points – with three secret annexes on a need-to-know basis – to each state respectively. His plan hinges on the participation and approval of these countries – namely France, Italy, Germany, the UK and the US.

A UK Ministry of Defence spokesperson responded positively to the details of the Victory Plan, commenting: “The UK commends Ukraine’s Victory Plan and will work alongside them through our continued support of Europe’s defence.”

Ukraine’s position in the war right now

Zelenskyy is right to emphasise that Ukrainian soldiers “are holding the front under incredibly difficult, really difficult, tough conditions.”

Currently, Ukrainian troops are struggling to prevent Russian forces from making marginal and operationally insiginificant gains in the Donbas, particularly around the city of Pokrovsk.

Russia’s intensified summer offensive to reduce the wider Ukrainian salient in Western Donetsk Oblast will likely culminate in the coming months, warned the Institute for the Study of War.

A Ukrainian soldier seen with a rifle in a trench during a combat mission in Donetsk, 14 February 2024. Credit: Shutterstock/Drop of Light.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory relies on Russian forces conducting consistent offensive operations indefinitely, but these grinding assaults will likely degrade available Russian manpower and materiel which will reduce the tempo of the offensive and leave open opportunities for Ukrainian forces to take the initiative on the battlefield.

In the North East, Ukraine continues to hang onto some 700 square kilometres of Russian territory following its incursion into Kursk Oblast in August. However, Ukraine’s hold is beginning to tremble as gains have reduced by a third according to recent reports.

At the time, Ukraine’s objectives in the region were shrouded in mystery but since then Zelenskyy explained that the incursion impedes Russian efforts to strike into Ukraine. It is understood that Russia is currently utilising VDV airborne troops – a formidable unit of the Russian Army – to regain the territory in Kursk.

Gaining leverage

“I think a lot of the rhetoric thrown around by both sides is concealing the fact that, of course, all wars technically end in a negotiation of some shape,” argued GlobalData Defence Analyst James Marques. “But it is a matter of what kind of leverage each side possesses.”

At present, Ukraine is in an uneviable position. The government insists that it will not make any major territory concessions or refrain from joining the EU/Nato. “However, any negotiations before that is accepted are pointless,” Marques asserted.

“Whereas it is unlikely Russia will sit down with anyone and sign anything until they are convinced they have sufficiently depleted Ukraine and left it without outside help, or until circumstances dictate they don’t have what they need to actually continue fighting.”

Joining Nato

Right from the outset the plan calls for an invitation to join Nato, albeit Ukraine’s accession would come at a later date. This will, Zelenskyy suggested, “have no political cost” on the alliance at all.

However, this assertion is not entirely accurate given the responsibility on Nato to enter a war with Russia when the conflict invariably resumes after a dormant period whereupon Russia has a chance to re-poistion itself for another phase of the war.

While the full-scale invasion only goes back more than two-and-a-half years, the war itself predates this with the annexaxtion of Crimea in 2014, and deep-seated regional tensions have played out since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Late on 17 October, after Ukraine’s Defence Minister, Rustem Umerov, presented the Victory Plan at the Nato-Ukraine Council in Brussels, the new Nato Secretary General and former Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, without the promise of an invitation, assured the war-torn nation that:

“Ukraine will be [a] member of Nato, there is no doubt about it, and until that happens we will make sure that Ukraine has everything it needs to prevail.”

Whereas, Rutte’s focus in the council meeting was fixed on existing efforts to bolster support for Ukraine. Namely, the new Nato command to coordinate security assistance and training for the country, and to deliver on the €40bn ($43.4bn) pledge in military aid agreed upon at the Washington summit in July.

While at first the two sides appear to be on the same page, the alliance’s non-commital assurance goes some way to dissipating the sense of certainty that Zelenskyy seeks in his Victory Plan.

“Determination on the Nato issue… means the inevitability of European integration for Ukraine and the fact that there is no alternative to democracy,” the nation’s president emphasised.

Extending operations inside Russia

Although the second point calls for aid to Ukrainian brigades it also translates to extending operations inside Russia. The Victory Plan depends on clenching Ukraine’s grasp on Russian territory, which is already gradually receding.

“The implementation of this point envisages further operations by the Defence Forces in designated areas of Russia,” the Office of the President identified. “Strengthening Ukrainian positions, and destroying Russia’s offensive potential in the occupied territories.”

There is a familiar subtext to this: the removal of enduring restrictions on activity inside Russia. This argument has recently centred around the ability to fire long-range weapons that use American-made components at key targets inside Russia. Doubtless, US unwillingness rouses anger after it was found that Ukraine’s forces have been victim to the full impact of Russian weaponry powered by certain American components.

The war has reached a crucial point, and it seems Ukraine must strengthen its gains to prop up its position at the negotiating table. Without any fixed defensive lines in the Kursk region, this is bargaining chip is already too close to being spent. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

21 Oct 24. South Korea has called on Russia to stop the deployment of North Korean troops to fight on Moscow’s side in Ukraine, amid allegations by Seoul and Ukraine that North Korean commandos are on Russian territory and preparing for battle. South Korean vice-foreign minister Kim Hong-kyun “strongly urged Russia to immediately to pull out North Korean soldiers and to end their co-operation”, South Korea’s foreign ministry said in a statement on Monday. In a meeting with Russia’s ambassador to Seoul Georgy Zinoviev, “[Kim] pointed out that the fact that Russia-North Korea collaboration is moving beyond military equipment to the real dispatch of North Korean soldiers is a grave threat to international security and a violation of multiple UN security council resolutions and the UN charter.” South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) last week published satellite images that it said showed North Korean troops being transferred to the far-eastern Russian port of Vladivostok on Russian naval ships earlier this month. The NIS said on Friday that 1,500 soldiers from elite North Korean units were receiving training in Russia, having been issued with Russian military uniforms, weapons, and “fake identification cards” presenting them as residents of regions in Siberia. It added that a second deployment would be “carried out shortly”. South Korea’s vice-foreign minister Kim Hong Kyun, right, meets Russian ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev in Seoul on Monday © South Korea Foreign Ministry/AP In response, the Russian embassy in Seoul issued a statement saying that Moscow’s co-operation with Pyongyang was consistent with international law, and was not directed against the security interests of South Korea. The Kremlin said the information about North Korea’s possible deployments was “contradictory”, sidestepping the issue of whether the troops had been sent to Russia. “The DPRK is our close neighbor and partner. We are developing our relations in every area, and this is our sovereign right,” Dmitry Peskov, President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, said on Monday, according to Interfax. “This should not raise any concerns for anyone, because this co-operation is not directed against third countries. We will develop this co-operation going forward,” Peskov told reporters. Mark Rutte, secretary-general of Nato, said on Monday he had spoken to South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol, in which they discussed the issue. “North Korea sending troops to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine would mark a significant escalation,” Rutte said in a short statement after the call. In June, Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a strategic partnership that includes a mutual assistance clause promising “immediate military and other aid” in the event of war. Since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, North Korea has supplied Russia with rockets, ballistic missiles and millions of artillery shells, according to the Ukrainian, US and South Korean intelligence agencies, while Seoul and Kyiv say some North Korean military personnel are already on the ground in eastern Ukraine to monitor and assist with the deployment of these assets. (Source: FT.com)

 

18 Oct 24. Secretive Phoenix Ghost Kamikaze Drones Rushed to Ukraine Revealed. The secretive Phoenix Ghost kamikaze drone, first developed for the U.S. Air Force and supplied to Ukraine in its ongoing fight against Russia, has finally emerged publicly. We now know for sure that Phoenix Ghost is not a single design, but a family of increasingly larger and longer-ranged one-way attack munitions from AEVEX Aerospace, some of which have been seen before, while at least one was only revealed last week.

AEVEX confirmed the connection between various kamikaze drones it offers and the Phoenix Ghost effort at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual symposium in Washington, D.C., this week. The Pentagon first announced Phoenix Ghost kamikaze drones provided by AEVEX would be headed to Ukraine back in 2022, but scant information about them had subsequently emerged before now.

“It’s been a long time coming,” Elizabeth Trammell, senior director of business development at AEVEX, told TWZ Tuesday. “This has been around for a while … We’ve been able to receive specific permission to talk about it.”

The Phoenix Ghost family of one-way attack munitions includes types with distinctly different forms and performance capabilities. At least some of the designs were derived from aerial targets that AEVEX originally developed for testing counter-drone systems, according to the company.

Phoenix Ghosts were among the first kamikaze drones the U.S. military publicly announced it would be sending to Ukraine, but it had not been previously confirmed what they were and no conclusive imagery showing one had emerged before now. It is worth noting that the development of the Phoenix Ghost family, which traces back to a project under the Air Force’s Big Safari special projects office, also predates Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As such, AEVEX was very much ahead in the United States in working on one-way-attack drones, in general.

All “AEVEX loitering munitions use visual-based navigation to autonomously identify and follow landmarks or features in their environment, enabling precise positioning and pathfinding without reliance on GPS,” according to the company’s website. “Our systems leverage alternative PNT [precision navigation and timing] solutions to maintain precise navigation and operational capability in GPS-denied or degraded environments.”

In addition,

“AEVEX loitering munitions automatically detect, identify, locate, report (DILR) and deliver lethal and non-lethal effects against threats across multiple scenarios and domains with unprecedented accuracy and speed” and are able to “navigate, make decisions, and complete missions without direct intervention,” the company says.

However, the drones can also be fitted with line-of-sight links and/or mesh networked radios, as well as electro-optical and infrared sensors, to provide some degree of direct control. In addition to acting as kamikaze drones, AEVEX says the uncrewed aerial systems in its product line can be configured for electronic and cyber warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. (Source: UAS VISION/AEVEX Aerospace; The War Zone)

 

18 Oct 24. Austin Reaffirms U.S., NATO’s Long-Term Commitment to Ukraine. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III in Brussels, today, reaffirmed the U.S. and NATO’s long-term commitment to a free and sovereign Ukraine while speaking at a press conference one day after a defense ministerial meeting that addressed Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia.

“Like countries of goodwill around the world, our NATO allies continue to stand up for Ukraine’s sovereignty and self-defense,” Austin said.

“And the United States and our allies and partners are determined to stand by Ukraine for the long haul, and we’ll stand by one another,” he continued.

Two simultaneous objectives are key to providing Ukraine with the assistance it needs to counter Russian aggression, Austin said, with the first being focused on the present.

“We’re focused on providing Ukraine what it needs to be successful on battlefield today, as it tries to defend its sovereign territory,” Austin said.

“It’s been very successful at that, and I would remind everybody that Ukraine has taken on the largest military in Europe; and for two and a half years, it has successfully defended its territory,” Austin continued, adding that Ukraine’s capital city of Kyiv still stands, and that Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to achieve any of his strategic objectives.

Beyond being focused on the present, Austin said the second objective of supporting Ukraine is making sure to supply the country with the resources necessary to both deter and defend against future aggression.

As an example of this, Austin spoke about several capability coalitions that have been established in support of Ukraine.

He stated that those coalitions include an air force coalition that has brought F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine; an artillery coalition that has brought long-term artillery and ammunition support to the country; an information technology coalition that helps make sure Ukraine has what it needs to function and be effective in the information domain, and others.

“These coalitions are designed to ensure that Ukraine has what it needs to deter aggression and defend itself going forward,” Austin said.

“And I have to applaud the work of our allies and partners who are leading some of these coalitions … rallying support for Ukraine … and digging deep to provide them with what we think they’ll need going forward,” he added.

When asked whether he supports the victory plan that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy introduced to his country’s parliament on Wednesday, Austin said that — while it’s not his place to  evaluate or endorse such a plan publicly — the U.S. and allies are going to continue to do all they can to provide the security necessary to support Zelenskyy as he tries to accomplish his objectives.

“We have been supporting him by providing security assistance in a major way for over two and a half years we’re going to continue to do that,” Austin said.

Speaking about NATO in a broader sense beyond just the scope of Ukraine, Austin reiterated that the multinational organization is galvanized around its Article Five commitment to come to the defense of all its member countries.

“The U.S. commitment to Article Five remains ironclad, and we will defend the sovereignty and the territory of every member country of this alliance, whatever changes lie ahead,” Austin said.

“We will tackle them together,” he continued. “And that solidarity is the reason why NATO is the greatest defensive alliance in history.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

19 Oct 24. Russia flaunts doomsday weapons to curb Western support for Ukraine. In this image taken from video released by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service in October 2022, a Yars intercontinental ballistic missile is test-fired as part of Russia’s nuclear drills from a launch site in Plesetsk. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP)

This year has seen President Vladimir Putin repeatedly brandish the nuclear sword, reminding everyone that Russia has the world’s largest atomic arsenal to try to deter the West from ramping up support for Ukraine.

He ordered his military to hold drills involving battlefield nuclear weapons with ally Belarus.

He announced Russia will start producing ground-based intermediate range missiles that were outlawed by a now-defunct U.S.-Soviet treaty in 1987.

And last month, he lowered the threshold for unleashing his arsenal by revising the country’s nuclear doctrine.

Putin is relying on those thousands of warheads and hundreds of missiles as an enormous doomsday machine to offset NATO’s massive edge in conventional weapons to discourage what he sees as threats to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

A look at Russia’s atomic arsenal and the issues surrounding it:

Russia’s strategic weapons

The Federation of American Scientists estimated this year that Russia has an inventory totaling 5,580 deployed and nondeployed nuclear warheads, while the U.S. has 5,044. Together, that’s about 88% of the world’s nuclear weapons.

Most of these are strategic, or intercontinental-range weapons. Like the U.S., Russia has a nuclear triad of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers and ICBM-armed submarines.

Since Putin came to power in 2000, the Kremlin has worked to upgrade the Soviet-built components of the triad, deploying hundreds of new land-based missiles, commissioning new nuclear submarines and modernizing nuclear-capable bombers. Russia’s effort to revamp its nuclear forces has helped prompt the U.S. to launch a costly modernization of its arsenal.

Russia has reequipped its land-based strategic missile forces with mobile Yars ICBMs and recently began deploying the heavy, silo-based Sarmat ICBMs — designated “Satan II” missiles in the West — to gradually replace about 40 Soviet-built R-36M missiles. Sarmat has had only one known successful test, and reportedly suffered a massive explosion during an abortive test last month.

The navy commissioned seven new Borei-class atomic-powered submarines, each with 16 Bulava nuclear-tipped missiles, and plans to build five more. They are intended to form the core of the triad’s naval component alongside a few Soviet-era nuclear subs still operating.

Russia still relies on Soviet-built Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers carrying nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Moscow has restarted production of the supersonic Tu-160 that was halted after the 1991 Soviet collapse, aiming to build several dozen modernized aircraft with new engines and avionics.

Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons

The U.S. estimates that Russia has between 1,000 and 2,000 nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons intended for use on the battlefield that typically are far less powerful than the strategic warheads capable of destroying entire cities.

Russia has high-precision ground-launched Iskander missiles with a range of up to 310 miles, which can be fitted with either a conventional or a nuclear warhead.

The air force has a fleet of MiG-31 fighter jets that carry a hypersonic Kinzhal missile, which can be equipped with a nuclear or conventional warhead. Russia has widely used conventional versions of both Iskander and Kinzhal against Ukraine.

As part of the Kremlin’s nuclear messaging, Russia and ally Belarus held drills to train their troops with the battlefield nuclear weapons in May, shortly after Putin began his fifth term.

MAD and Russia’s nuclear doctrine

Moscow and Washington have relied for decades on nuclear deterrence under the concept of mutually assured destruction — MAD for short — based on the assumption that an overwhelming retaliation would discourage either side from launching an attack.

Russia’s nuclear doctrine adopted in 2020 envisaged using such ultimate weapons in response to a nuclear strike or an attack with conventional weapons that threatens “the very existence of the Russian state.” Moscow hawks criticized that document as too vague, urging Putin to toughen it.

Last month, he warned the U.S. and NATO allies that allowing Ukraine to use Western-supplied longer-range weapons for strikes deep inside Russia would put NATO at war with his country.

He reinforced the message by announcing a new version of the nuclear doctrine that considers a conventional attack on Russia by a nonnuclear nation that is supported by a nuclear power to be a joint attack on his country — a clear warning to the U.S. and other allies of Kyiv.

Putin also declared the revised document envisages possible nuclear weapons use in case of a massive air attack, holding the door open to a potential nuclear response to any aerial assault — an ambiguity intended to deter the West.

Changes in the doctrine suggest Russia “is doubling down on its strategy of relying on nuclear weapons for coercive purposes” in the war in Ukraine, said Heather Williams, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in a commentary.

The future for arms control

The 2010 New START U.S.-Russian arms reduction treaty, the last remaining arms control pact between Moscow and Washington that expires in 2026, limits each country to no more than 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers.

In July, Putin declared Russia will launch production of ground-based intermediate range missiles that were banned under the now-defunct U.S. Soviet INF Treaty. The 1987 pact banned missiles with a range of 310 to 3,410 miles. He said Moscow will respond in kind to the planned deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles to Germany, taking steps to “mirror” Washington’s move.

Even as U.S.-Russian tensions soared to their highest point since the Cold War amid fighting in Ukraine, Washington has urged Moscow to resume dialogue on nuclear arms control. Putin rejected the offer, saying such negotiations are meaningless while the U.S. is openly seeking to inflict a strategic defeat to Russia in Ukraine.

Resuming nuclear testing

Russian hawks are calling for a resumption of nuclear tests to demonstrate Moscow’s readiness to use its atomic arsenal and force the West to limit aid for Kyiv.

Putin said Russia could resume testing if the U.S. does so first, a move that would end a global ban in place after the demise of the USSR.

Last month, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said the nuclear test range on the Arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya is ready to resume tests if the U.S. does so.

Prospective new weapons

In 2018, Putin revealed an array of new weapons, claiming they would render any prospective U.S. missile defenses useless.

They include the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, capable of flying 27 times faster than the speed of sound and making sharp maneuvers to dodge an enemy’s missile shield. The first such units have already entered service.

Putin also mentioned the nuclear-armed and atomic-powered Poseidon underwater drone, designed to explode near coastlines and cause a radioactive tsunami. Earlier this year, he said Poseidon tests are nearing completion, without giving details.

Also under development is an atomic-powered cruise missile, a concept that dates to the Cold War. But the missile, called the Burevestnik, or Petrel, has raised skepticism among experts, who cite technological obstacles and radiation safety concerns. During tests in 2019, an explosion at a naval range on the White Sea reportedly involving the Burevestnik killed five engineers and two servicemen, and caused a brief spike in radiation.

Putin said this year its development was in the final stages and the military has reportedly built a base for the missiles in the Vologda region of northwestern Russia. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

 

17 Oct 24. US sanctions China amid reports North Korea could enter Ukraine-Russia war. The Ukraine-Russia war could expand amid reports that North Korean troops could enter the fray as the US issues new sanctions on Chinese defence sector for aiding Russia. Recent developments in the Ukraine-Russia war point to the disturbing possibility that it is nearing a new escalatory phase, as allies of the two sides are further drawn into the consequences for their support. Coupled with new US sanctions on Chinese industry amid claims that China’s is building and providing Russia with long-range attack drones, and the prospect of a European state-on-state war heading regional could have moved a step closer.

Are North Korea troops preparing to enter Ukraine-Russia war?

Recent reports by the BBC and other outlets on the prospect that North Korean nationals could make an entry into the Ukraine-Russia war indicate a potential serious military escalation, which up to now had seen Pyongyang restricting its support d to the provision of artillery ammunition and other equipment.

It is thought that between 2,000-12,000 North Korean nationals could be readied for operations in either eastern Ukraine or Russia’s Kursk region. Any use of North Koreans in the Kursk region would likely be attributed to the June signing between Moscow and Pyongyang of a mutual security pact, where the two countries pledged to come to each other’s aid should they be attacked.

However, the difficulties in integrating North Korean forces into Russian military structures are likely to be profound, ranging from differing weapons systems, command and control, and even the basics such as language.

It is not clear whether any North Korean troop contribution would be in the form of frontline troops or engineers and other specialists for use in further behind the lines.

US sanctions China for building Russian attack drones

Meanwhile, on 17 October the US State Department announced new sanctions on three entities and one individual involved in the development and production of Russia’s Garpiya series long-range attack UAVs.

The platform, designed and produced in China in collaboration with Russian defence companies, has been used to destroy critical infrastructure and has resulted in mass casualties, the State Department said.

“These sanctions targets were involved in the development and production of military equipment for a US-sanctioned Russian defence firm for use by the Russian military in Ukraine,” explained Matthew Miller, State Department spokesperson.

While the US has previously imposed sanctions on Chinese entities providing what the State Department described as “critical inputs to Russia’s military-industrial base, the latest set represent the first such sanctions issued to China’s defence base directly developing and producing complete weapons systems in partnership with Russia.

Ukraine has lost 30% of captured Kursk salient

Winter cannot come soon enough for Ukraine as it continues to defend against Russian attacks across the frontline, with the assessment that Ukrainian forces have lost around one-third of the territory it seized in August’s incursion in Russia’s Kursk region.

The maintenance of Ukrainian operations in Russian territory was set as a key condition in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s newly revealed victory plan, likely as a bargaining chip to limit the amount of territory that Ukraine would have to cede in any peace negotiations.

Following the unexpected incursion into Russia, Ukrainian forces have been engaged in constant combat as Moscow looks to retake the territory. It is understood that Russia is currently utilising VDV airborne troops in the Kursk region, with Ukraine’s defence hampered by the lack of fixed defensive infrastructure seen in the frontlines inside Ukraine itself.

Western officials have spoken of the slow degradation of the amount of land Ukraine seized in the Kursk region, amid daily Russian attacks.

Analysis indicates that Ukraine has lost up to 300km² of the 900km² it seized in the initial incursion into Russia, as it contends against hundreds of glide munition attacks.

Operations in the Kursk region are responsible for around 50% of Russia’s glide bomb attack on Ukrainian forces across the entire frontline, which totalled around 1,500 in September, potentially indicative of the importance that its recapture to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Conditions on the ground inside frontline areas of Ukraine and Russia remain above freezing during nighttime, with a resultant wet or sub-zero winter period having significantly differing effect on the battlefield.

Russia has been on the offensive for much of 2024, capturing a series of strategically located towns in the east of Ukraine. (Source: army-technology.com)

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