NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Oct 13.

Oct 10.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• KURSK: US officials reportedly assess that Ukraine will be able to hold territory in Kursk oblast (Russia) for several months; Russia will possibly continue to prioritise offensive operations in Donetsk oblast, regardless
• STRIKES: Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition depot in Bryansk oblast (Russia) overnight on 8-9 October, as efforts to degrade Russia’s strike capabilities persist
• BALTIC: On 7 October, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) claimed that it caused ‘severe damage’ to the Russian Baltic Fleet’s minesweeper Alexander Obukhov in a sabotage operation in Baltiysk (Kaliningrad, Russia)
• FORECAST: Unspecified allies of Ukraine are reportedly noticing signals that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is possibly preparing to adopt a ‘more flexible approach’ to ending the war
• BAKHMUT: North of Bakhmut near the border with Luhansk oblast, Russian forces have made marginal advances to the east of Siversk in recent days. Geolocated footage posted on 7 and 8 October indicates that Russian forces have likely entered western Verkhnokamyanske and advanced east of Hyhorivka, located to the east and north-east of Siversk, respectively. On 9 October a prominent Russian milblogger downplayed reports that Russian forces have captured Verkhnokamyanske entirely, though this prospect remains likely in the coming days. The same source also noted that a number of other small settlements near Siversk remain under the control of Ukrainian forces.
• BAKHMUT: Further south along the Toretsk axis, Russian forces have made further creeping advances in recent days. Geolocated footage posted on 8 October indicates that Russian forces made gains along streets in eastern and southern Toretsk, where intense urban fighting is likely slowing the overall pace of the Russian advance.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian forces counter-attacked to the south-east of Pokrovsk, making confirmed advances into north-western Mykolaivka as of 8 October. Meanwhile, Geolocated footage published on 8 October indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Novohrodivka and made slight gains in central Zhelanne Pershe, both of which are located to the south-east of Pokrovsk. According to Ukrainian and Russian sources, Russian forces likely seized approximately 50% of Maksymilyanivka as of 7 October (the settlement is located to the west of Donetsk city).
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage posted on 7 October indicates that Russian forces have likely recaptured the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant, which was recently largely retaken by Ukrainian forces. While the tempo of fighting in central Vovchansk has likely slowed, Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev reported that Russia has intensified glide bomb strikes in the Kharkiv direction, likely to set the conditions for further Russian advances amid ongoing troop rotations.
• KURSK: According to unspecified US officials cited by Bloomberg, the US assesses that Ukrainian forces will be able to retain control over the territory captured in Russia’s Kursk oblast for several months. The officials reportedly stated that Ukraine has faced minimal challenges supplying its forces in Kursk as Russian forces have prioritised offensive operations in the Donbas and only conducted limited counterattacks. We similarly assess that Kursk is not currently a priority for Russian forces, which are focused on seizing Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast). It is possible that Russian priorities will change in the event that Pokrovsk is captured. However, it is also possible that advancing in Donetsk will remain the priority. The Kremlin will possibly conclude that the territory currently held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk can be captured at a later date and/or does not represent a credible bargaining chip in the event of negotiations.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In recent days, Russian forces made progress in the Kreminna and Svatove directions. Geolocated footage from 7 October shows recent Russian advances along the O-131306 highway to the south-east of Makiivka (north-west of Kreminna). Meanwhile, also on 7 October, a Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian forces recently captured Myasozharivka (located to the west of Svatove).
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage posted on 8 October indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced to the south-west of Kamyanske, located to the south of Stepnohirsk (and to the east of the Dnipro River). The advance notably follows a statement from the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Group of Forces, Vladyslav Coloshyn, on 5 October outlining that Russian forces are massing in preparation for an offensive along the southern axis. However, the Ukrainian General Staff has not reported any substantial uptick in attacks along the southern axis, indicating the advance near Kamyanske was likely part of probing operations.
• STRIKES: On 8 October, Ukrainian forces intercepted 18 of 19 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia over Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Ternopil and Vinnytsia oblasts. Russia also launched two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, which Ukrainian air defences likely failed to intercept. Explosions were recorded in Kremenchuk and Poltava (both Poltava oblast).
• STRIKES: On 9 October, Russia launched three Iskandr-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles and 22 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences downed 21 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Kyiv, Odesa and Vinnytsia oblasts. The drone attacks reportedly damaged a residential building in Odesa oblast.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 9-10 October, Russian forces launched a large-scale attack involving two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, one Kh-31P cruise missile, two Kh-59/69 missiles, three S-300 missiles and 62 Shahed-136/131drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 41 UAVs over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The attack damaged infrastructure in Mykolaiv, as well as port infrastructure in Odesa oblast and residential buildings in Zaporizhzhia oblast.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that overnight on 8-9 October, its air defences intercepted 47 Ukrainian UAVs over Belgorod, Bryansk, Krasnodar, Kursk and Rostov oblasts. Andriy Kovalenko, the head of the Centre for Countering Disinformation of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, claimed that drones hit an ammunition depot in Bryansk. According to the Ukrainian military authorities, the depot reportedly housed glide bombs, as well as missiles and ammunition for artillery weapons, including those delivered from North Korea. Following the attack, the Russian authorities declared a state of emergency in the district affected by the strike. In recent months, Ukraine’s strike strategy has been committed to targeting ammunition depots, including those housing artillery rounds, missiles and glide bombs, in order to degrade Russia’s striking capabilities.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• BALTIC: On 7 October, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) claimed that it caused ‘severe damage’ to the Russian Baltic Fleet’s minesweeper Alexander Obukhov in a sabotage operation in Baltiysk (Kaliningrad, Russia). This is the second alleged Ukrainian sabotage operation against a Russian vessel in Kaliningrad in 2024. Kaliningrad is located between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea. Footage posted by the GUR indicates that the incident possibly occurred on 30 September, though no further details were given. If sabotage did in fact take place (which we cannot yet confirm), then we assess that the risk of retaliatory Russian sabotage operations in the Baltic region will possibly increase, especially if Russia judges that Lithuania and Poland facilitated Ukrainian operations.
• TAXATION: Earlier on 10 October, the Ukrainian parliament approved draft legislation to increase taxes on individuals, companies and banks to fill its budget deficit and finance the war effort. The bill seeks to increase taxes by UAH 58bn (USD 1.4bn) this year and UAH 137bn (USD 3.3bn) in 2025. The legislation increases the military tax from 1.5% to 5%. Opposition lawmaker Yaroslav Zhelezniak stated that another ten-page amendment comprising ‘half of the law’ was removed. According to Zhelezniak, this means that the law will possibly have to be voted on once more; Zhelezniak added that he believes the legislation in its current form is legally problematic. While the legislation aims to address budgetary pressures, higher taxation will likely further elevate socio-economic health risks and criticism over failures to target corrupt business practices as a means of generating revenue.
• ENERGY: Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko assessed on 9 October that Ukraine will possibly pass the upcoming winter period without power outages as long as Russia does not destroy critical infrastructure that withstood previous bombardments. Halushchenko emphasised that blackouts are possible due to emergency repairs, but claimed that these will not be systemic. He also reiterated that air defence systems are the most reliable tool for protecting energy infrastructure, likely as part of an attempt to implore Kyiv’s allies to send Ukraine more such weaponry in preparation for the winter.
• ENERGY: Russia is highly likely to ramp up its attacks against Ukrainian energy facilities ahead of and during the 2024-2025 winter period, which will strain Ukraine’s already-ailing energy security. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is already degraded due to repeated Russian aerial assaults throughout the course of the war. Russia has conducted over 140 missile strikes against Ukrhydroenergo facilities (Ukraine’s largest hydropower generating company) since the beginning of its full-scale invasion.

FORECAST

STRATEGY: Unspecified allies of Ukraine are reportedly noticing signals that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is possibly preparing to adopt a ‘more flexible approach’ to ending the war. According to a Bloomberg article published on 8 October, US officials have asked Kyiv to devise a roadmap of what it needs in the coming year. This includes military hardware, industrial development assistance and financial support. Zelensky will reportedly disclose the full details once he has finished discussions with Ukraine’s partners.

However, no officials explicitly mentioned the topic of Ukraine making territorial concessions to Russia. We assess that this will highly likely remain a controversial issue among the Ukrainian leadership and population for the foreseeable future. While it is uncertain what Kyiv envisions to amount to an endgame, these developments indicate that Ukraine’s partners are likely to increase pressure for a more detailed roadmap on how the conflict might end. According to one unnamed official, Ukraine will possibly adopt a strategically ambiguous stance that would allow Kyiv more room for flexibility in the coming months. This will likely aim to account for the outcome of the US presidential election and its impact on the trajectory of Washington DC’s military support for Kyiv, as well as possible escalation in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Zelensky stated on 9 October that the current situation on the battlefield has created an opportunity for steps to end the war ‘no later than 2025’. The Ukrainian president stated that he believes there is a ‘real chance’ to progress towards peace and long-term stability in the coming months. Zelensky did not elaborate further on why he perceives the situation to be as such, though he was most likely referring to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk. Ultimately, such comments are likely aimed at increasing confidence in his victory plan (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 19 September 2024). Despite Zelensky’s remarks, our assessment remains that the war is likely to protract well into next year.

A key meeting with international allies on providing military assistance for Ukraine scheduled for 12 October has been postponed; this has likely dealt Kyiv a short-term setback in its efforts to shore up support. The meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format) in Germany was cancelled due to US President Joe Biden being unable to attend. Zelensky was expected to present his victory plan to his allies at the meeting, which would have likely been a litmus test for gauging buy-in from Ukraine’s partners.

Nonetheless, Zelensky is currently visiting European allied states; the Ukrainian president met UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer on 10 October in London (UK). Zelensky shared details of his victory plan with Starmer, who pledged continued commitment and support for Ukraine. The Ukrainian president is expected to meet French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris (France) later on 10 October before travelling to Italy.

*Ukraine: EU aid package will alleviate macro-economic pressure, sustain tensions with Russia. On 9 October, the EU Council approved a EUR 35bn (USD 38.2bn) loan to Ukraine, which will be allocated by the end of the year. The European Parliament has yet to vote on the measure, though it is likely to pass. The move is part of the G7 countries’ commitment to use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine through a USD 50 bn aid package. The loan will be repaid with interest from these frozen assets. The council stated that the aid will be earmarked for Kyiv’s urgent financial needs and includes a mechanism to support the repayment of up to EUR 47bn (USD 51.4bn) in loans provided by the EU and G7 countries. We assess that the EU loan is highly likely to alleviate macro-economic pressure on Ukraine in 2025. However, the EU’s decision is also likely to increase the possibility of retaliatory Russian measures in the coming weeks and months, raising the risk of Moscow confiscating US and European assets in Russia.

Oct 08.

• Russia-Ukraine: Strikes against civilian vessels will sustain threats to Black Sea commercial shipping. The governor of Ukraine’s Odesa oblast, Oleh Kiper, reported on 7 October that Russia hit a Palau-flagged civilian vessel with a ballistic missile in the region’s port of Odesa. The strike killed a Ukrainian citizen who was working as an employee of an unnamed private cargo handling company; five foreign nationals were injured. It follows a similar Russian attack on 6 October against a Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged cargo ship in the port of Pivdennyi (also Odesa oblast) which was carrying 6,000 tonnes of corn at the time. Ukrainian officials stated that this vessel was the 20th civilian ship to be damaged by Russian attacks. The latest incidents underscore the credible threats (either intentional targeting, miscalculation or collateral damage) facing commercial vessels in Ukrainian waters, which will highly likely continue. We assess that Ukrainian ports and port infrastructure in Odesa oblast will likely remain targets of Russian strikes throughout the conflict to undermine confidence in shipping in and out of Ukraine.
• Russia: Shifting tactics will elevate security risks facing government organisations. On 7 October, the cyber security company Kaspersky reported that the advanced persistent threat (APT) group ‘Awaken Likho’ used new software to target Russian government organisations in a campaign between June and August. The group likely gains access to targeted systems via phishing emails, allowing it to load an archive containing a malicious payload on compromised systems. Subsequently, Awaken Likho executes the open-source remote device management solution ‘MeshAgent’, to establish communication with the actors’ command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. Notably, the payload’s code is heavily obfuscated using legitimate system file names, underscoring the sophistication of Awaken Likho’s defence evasion techniques. We assess the group will likely exploit access to compromised systems to collect sensitive information and deploy additional payloads. Awaken Likho increased its activity following the start of the war in Ukraine, continuing to develop new malware and adjusting its techniques to infiltrate Russian entities. We assess that this will elevate security risks in the medium term as the war persists.

Oct 07.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s Southern Group of Forces reports Russian forces massing in preparation for an offensive along the southern axis; however, this is unlikely to be a new priority axis for Russia
• STRIKES: Overnight on 6-7 October, Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike across Ukraine, targeting (among others) the Starokostiantyniv Airbase, a high priority military target for Russia
• TAXATION: The Ukrainian Parliament is set to approve an increase in the military tax from 1.5% to 5% on 15 October amid efforts to strengthen government revenues
• FORECAST: Ukraine and its Western partners are reportedly considering a compromise that could grant Ukraine NATO membership in exchange for a potential diplomatic solution to Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 3 October indicates recent Russian advances west of Nelipivka, located between Toretsk and Niu-York (both Donetsk oblast) to the south-west. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on 30 September that its forces had taken the town, though we cannot confirm whether Russian forces control the entire settlement; however, it is clear that Russia now controls the majority of it. Meanwhile, Russian forces have also continued to make very limited progress in central Toretsk itself, advancing along key streets at the centre of the settlement on 4 October.
• DONETSK: Russian forces have continued to make slow advances south-east of Pokrovsk over the past few days. Geolocated footage from 5 October shows recent Russian advances south-west of Novohrodivka (south-east of Pokrovsk). In the past few days, Russian forces have also made confirmed advances within eastern Tsukuryne (south-east of Pokrovsk). Russian forces are likely now in control of the entire settlement, though this cannot be confirmed at time of writing. Meanwhile, according to geolocated footage from 5 October, Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post in Avdiivka, likely using Storm Shadow missiles and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) strikes.
• DONETSK: On 4 October, an OSINT source reported on X (formerly Twitter) that Russia has lost 1,830 pieces of heavy equipment in Pokrovsk raion (Donetsk oblast) since October 2023, when it began its offensive to capture Avdiivka. This includes 539 tanks and 1,020 armoured vehicles. The overall numbers are estimated using geolocated footage; such losses clearly highlight the highly attritional nature of Russian mechanised offensives in the sector. This high rate of material losses will likely continue despite the steady adaptation of Russian tactics. However, given the significant constraints on the country’s military-industrial production and dwindling stockpiles of Soviet-era equipment, Russia will likely face long-term difficulties in offsetting these losses and significant challenges to its efforts to reconstitute its military for future conflicts.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, earlier on 7 October, a Ukrainian source reported that Russian forces had completed the occupation of Krasnohorivka, west of Donetsk city. The settlement has been a key operational target for Russian forces since the start of the war, and its capture will likely facilitate Russian advances towards Kurakhove, located south-west of Donetsk city and due south of the Pokrovsk salient. As of 5 October, Russian forces made confirmed advances north of Kostyantynivka following a company-sized mechanised assault.
• KHARKIV: Russian forces are continuing assaults in central Vovchansk, though the tempo has likely decreased in recent days amid troop rotations. Geolocated footage from 3 October indicates Russian advances in central Vovchansk, which likely took place during an assault on 30 September. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s Spokesperson for the Kharkiv Group of Forces Vitaliy Sarantsev reported on 3 October that Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their operations across the Kharkiv axis in recent days. Russian troop rotations continue, however, likely as part of preparations for further assaults in central Vovchansk, where Ukrainian forces recently retook much of the aggregate plant at the centre of the city.
• KURSK: Geolocated footage from 6 October confirmed limited Russian advances along the northern flank of the Kursk salient, advancing east of Korenevo. While Russian forces did advance south-east of the villages of Kalinov and Zhuravli, there were no other confirmed advances by either side over the last few days.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 3 October shows recent Russian advances north-east of Terny, located north-west of Kreminna (Luhansk oblast). Later, on 5 October, a Russian source claimed that Russian forces had advanced up to 1.2 miles (2km) east of Terny. While such claims remain uncorroborated, they, along with other confirmed Russian advances, reflect Russian efforts to make progress in the Terny sector west and north-west of Kreminna.
• SOUTHERN: The Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Group of Forces Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on 5 October that Russian forces are currently massing in preparation for an offensive along the southern axis. The Russian build up is reportedly aimed at setting conditions for a breakthrough along the line towards Orikhiv and Mala Tokmachka, two key towns situated due north of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). In May, Russian forces retook the small town of Robotyne, which was the only settlement seized during Ukraine’s 2023 counter-offensive in the south. Since May, the southern front has remained broadly quiet, given that Russian and Ukrainian forces have been focused on other priorities in Donetsk and Kursk oblasts. Nevertheless, Russian forces have conducted limited attacks in this direction over the last week. These could realistically be probing attacks in preparation for future operations.
• SOUTHERN: Ultimately, despite a reported Russian build-up, the southern front is unlikely to represent a priority for Russian forces, which are likely struggling to generate sufficient reserves to reinforce and maintain the tempo of the Pokrovsk offensive. However, if Russian forces do launch an effort to break through in this direction, such an operation would more likely be aimed at maintaining pressure across the full length of the frontline to spread Ukrainian forces thin.
• STRIKES: On 5 October, Russia launched three Kh-59/69 missiles and 13 Shahed-136/131 drones. Three unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were shot down over Odesa oblast, while ten drones reportedly failed to reach their targets. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that electronic warfare (EW) measures resulted in the three missiles failing to reach their targets.
• STRIKES: On 6 October, Russia attacked Ukraine with two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, one Iskandr-K cruise missile, one Kh-59/69 missile and 87 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 56 UAVs over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. 25 UAVs reportedly failed to reach their targets due to Ukrainian EW measures.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 6-7 October, Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike, including an Iskandr-M ballistic missile, one Kh-59 missile, three Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, an unidentified missile and 74 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted 32 drones over Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. Ukraine’s Airforce reported that several UAVs struck frontline positions in Kharkiv oblast. One of the Kinzhal ballistic missiles (often referred to by Russians as ‘hypersonic missiles’) struck locations near the Starokostiantyniv airfield in Khmelnytskyi oblast. We previously assessed that the Starokostiantyniv airbase will remain a priority target for Russian strikes in the coming months due to Moscow’s efforts to undermine Ukraine’s ability to operate Western-provided F-16 aircraft in the future. The Netherlands confirmed on 6 October that the first batch of a total of 24 Dutch F-16s had arrived in Ukraine (potentially at Starokostiantyniv airbase). Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted the remaining Kinzhal ballistic missiles targeting the capital Kyiv. 37 UAVs reportedly missed their targets in several regions, likely due to Ukrainian EW measures.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, overnight on 6-7 October, a Ukrainian drone strike reportedly struck Russia-annexed Crimea’s largest oil terminal in Feodosia, causing a fire at the facility. The terminal serves as a key regional logistics hub for the transhipment of oil products. If the damage leads to a long-term suspension of production and transhipment, it could significantly strain oil supplies for both Crimean residents and Russian military forces in Ukraine. The occupying Russian authorities reported the fire but did not mention the drone attack. Separately, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that its forces intercepted 21 Ukrainian UAVs earlier on 7 October over Crimea and the Russian Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk and Voronezh oblasts.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: Reports emerged on 6 October that the EU is considering changing the way it sends most of its assistance to Ukraine due to Hungary consistently using its veto powers. On 9 October, we expect EU ambassadors to reach agreements on granting Kyiv EUR 50 bn (USD 54.8 bn) from the interest generated on frozen Russian assets. According to an unnamed EU diplomat, Hungary has blocked the eighth tranche of assistance from a fund which reimburses EU member states for the cost of weapons transferred to Ukraine for almost a year. As such, the development underscores the EU’s overall efforts to bypass Hungary’s blocking of assistance to Kyiv, though it remains unconfirmed what system is planned to replace the current assistance procedure.
• NORTH KOREA: British media reported on 4 October that unspecified Western intelligence estimates that North Korea is supplying half of the three m shells Russia uses in Ukraine annually. According to unnamed intelligence sources, Moscow has become ‘dependent’ on Pyongyang’s military support even though many of the shells delivered are believed to be faulty. Nevertheless, their quantity has reportedly assisted Russian forces in making steady gains on the battlefield. While the report cannot be confirmed, if accurate it would highlight North Korea’s key role in enabling Russia to maintain its artillery advantage over Ukraine (albeit a reduced advantage compared to the first half of 2024).
• NORTH KOREA: Meanwhile, six North Korean officials were reportedly killed in a missile strike on Russian-occupied territory near Donetsk on 3 October. Russian forces were reportedly demonstrating how they were preparing defensive positions and assault operations when the strike occurred. Although the development cannot be verified, it could realistically indicate that North Korean military officials are (or were) present in Russian-occupied Ukraine, reflecting the growing military assistance Pyongyang is providing Russia in Ukraine. For more analysis on military co-operation between Russia and North Korea.
• CBRN: Earlier on 7 October, Russia accused Ukrainian forces of using Western chemical weapons in Sudzha (Kursk oblast, Russia) in August, without providing clear evidence. Russian Chief of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops Igor Kirillov claimed that Ukrainian troops used chemical weapons disguised as smoke shells. Kirillov stated that laboratory samples indicated that Russian personnel ingested a ‘large amount’ of aerosol containing chlorine, and unnamed poisonous substances.
• CBRN: Russia has made similar (unverified and likely false) claims intermittently throughout the war. As such, the latest comments are likely aimed at garnering condemnation for Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk oblast in August. Kirillov’s recent accusations are highly unlikely to indicate an increased chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threat in Ukraine or Russia.
• TAXATION: Over half (55%) of Ukrainian companies will reportedly not be able to compensate their employees if the government raises the military tax. According to a survey from the European Business Association shared on 4 October, 15% of companies are ready to fully make up the difference to workers if the national war levy is increased to 3%. Meanwhile, just 14% said they are ready to partially do so. However, the percentage of companies able to compensate their employees will be slightly lower if the military tax is increased to 5% (14% fully and 13% partially).
• TAXATION: Ultimately, the inability of companies in Ukraine to compensate workers for a likely increase in the military tax to 5% will decrease people’s real income, straining already challenging socio-economic health conditions. The Ukrainian Parliament is set to approve the increase in the military tax from 1.5% to 5% on 15 October; however, it will apply retroactively from 1 October. While the tax hike will likely be unpopular among certain citizens and businesses, the fact that the measure is necessary to aid with the war effort will highly likely reduce domestic unrest.

FORECAST

Ukraine and its Western partners are reportedly considering a compromise that could grant Kyiv NATO membership in exchange for a potential diplomatic solution to Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory. The Financial Times (FT) reported this on 5 October but emphasised that neither Ukraine nor its allies are proposing to recognise Moscow’s sovereignty over these regions.

Instead, the unconfirmed proposal envisages a ‘tacit acceptance’ from Ukraine that those lands should be reclaimed through diplomacy in the future. An unspecified Western diplomat claimed ceding land to obtain NATO membership may possibly be one of the few choices Kyiv could accept for want of a better one. Although Ukraine’s leadership and the Ukrainian population remain strong supporters of wanting to join the bloc, the desire to reclaim all territory occupied by Russia is also significant. As such, this idea would likely be perceived as an unrealistic compromise as it assumes that Russia would firstly accept such an arrangement and be willing to consider territorial concessions in the future.

Russian officials have consistently cited the expansion of NATO as a reason for the war in Ukraine and sought to obtain assurances that Kyiv will not join the alliance prior to the full-scale invasion in 2022. Preventing Ukraine from joining the military alliance is almost certainly one of the Kremlin’s principal war objectives; Russia would likely remain unwilling to accept such conditions even if it retained control over Ukrainian lands that it has claimed as its own or occupied. We also assess that Russia will highly unlikely agree to resolve territorial disputes through diplomatic means in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, such a vague solution could realistically provide Moscow with an opportunity to freeze the conflict and reconstitute its military for several years, should the Kremlin desire a pause in the fighting before reactivating the conflict at a time of its own choosing. This latter scenario is something Kyiv has consistently warned against and will likely resist, even as pressure from its Westerrn partners to reach a settlement increases in 2025.

Nevertheless, former NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg implied in an interview with the FT on 4 October that Ukraine could possibly be accepted into NATO even if Russia continues to occupy part of the country. Stoltenberg stated that there are ways to work around a clause that binds member states to mutual defence in case of an armed attack. However, Stoltenberg warned against making comparisons with other countries, such as the security arrangements the US has with Japan, as well as the precedent of West and East Germany. Nevertheless, certain Ukraine-sceptic and/or cautious NATO member states are likely to oppose such an arrangement given the perceived risk of escalation with Russia.

In this regard, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico insisted on 6 October that he would always oppose Ukrainian accession into NATO throughout his mandate. Fico has retained cordial relations with Moscow and stated that he would ensure lawmakers from his party never agree to Kyiv’s membership in the military alliance, noting that a prospective member state’s membership requires ratification by the parliaments of NATO countries. The Slovak prime minister claimed that Kyiv’s accession would represent a trigger for a ‘third world war’. With Fico set to remain in office until at least 2027, this could seriously delay any prospective agreement to even consider Ukrainian membership. We also assess that neighbouring Hungary will also highly likely remain categorically opposed to Ukraine’s bid to join NATO for the foreseeable future.

NATO countries may possibly offer Ukraine ‘more concrete steps’ regarding its aspirations to join the bloc at an upcoming summit of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format) on 12 October. According to an unspecified Western diplomat, any assurances will likely fall short of what Kyiv wants (such as an invitation to join the alliance). We expect Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to present his ‘victory plan’ at the summit, details of which remain limited. However, membership in the alliance is part of this strategy. Ultimately, we assess that Ukraine will highly unlikely be invited to join the bloc in the near term, though the alliance could realistically provide clearer, more definitive steps or timelines for accession. (Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Oct 24. France confirms Mirage 2000s to arrive in early 2025. The first of an undisclosed number of Mirage 2000 combat aircraft will arrive in Ukraine in early 2025, the French defence minister said. (French Air and Space Force)

Dassault Mirage 2000 combat aircraft promised by France will arrive in Ukraine in early 2025, it was announced on 8 October.

French Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu made the disclosure from his official X (formerly Twitter) account, providing a timeline some five months after French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed the transfer in June.

“Mirage 2000 bound for Ukraine: delivery still scheduled for the first quarter of 2025. In Cazaux, Gironde, they will be equipped with new equipment: air-ground combat and anti-electronic warfare defence. The training of Ukrainian pilots and mechanics continues,” the minister tweeted.

In March 2023 Le Figaro reported that up to 30 Ukrainian pilots were being trained on the Mirage 2000 in France, and that the French Air and Space Force could deliver “dozens” of such jets to Kyiv if the French government takes the decision. Neither Lecornu nor Macron have said how many Mirages will be transferred to Ukraine.

As noted by Janes World Air Forces , the French Air and Space Force has 27 single-seat Mirage 2000-5F combat aircraft it received from 1997, as well as seven twin-seat Mirage 2000Bs from 1983, and 60 twin-seat Mirage 2000Ds from 1993. These are all progressively being replaced in French service by the Dassault Rafale, hence their availability for Ukraine. France also has an undisclosed number of Mirage 2000Cs in storage, having retired the last squadron in 2022. (Source: Janes)

 

10 Oct 24. Get Moving! Ukraine has captured significant territory in Russia’s Kursk oblast. Ukraine’s land forces exhibited impressive electronic warfare and kinetic effects synchronisation during the operation.

Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast underscores the effectiveness of the former’s electronic warfare capabilities, but logistical challenges remain.

With over 8,800 dedicated Electronic Warfare (EW) personnel, the Ukrainian Army has arguably the largest EW land forces complement in the free world, according to a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) official working closely with it. This revelation was shared with Armada during the 2024 EWLive event held in the southern Estonian city of Tartu between 17th and 19th September. The official revealed that Ukrainian land forces had exhibited impressive coordination between its EW and kinetic units during the recent Kursk incursion. On 8th August, Ukrainian forces began their drive into Russia’s Kursk oblast. The region is northeast of the Russo-Ukrainian border.

As of mid-September, Ukrainian forces still appear in control of significant parts of the oblast. “They kept their game really tight,” observed the NATO official referring to coordination between EW and kinetic forces during manoeuvres supporting the incursion. The official continued that Ukrainian forces are exhibiting good Emissions Control (EMCOM) to protect their own communications against Russian jamming. Beyond EMCON, most of the EW effort of Ukrainian land forces focuses on the Counter-Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (CUAV) battle. This battle is complicated by Russian land forces employing increasingly diverse frequencies for UAV control. These are often beyond the 2.4 gigahertz/GHz and 5.8GHz wavebands employed for civilian standard UAV pilotage. Ukrainian EW cadres have had to respond with CUAV systems which can monitor an ever-widening band of frequencies to spot these UAVs via the radio links connecting the aircraft with its pilot.

Deception and Teamwork

Ukrainian EW cadres have performed electromagnetic manoeuvre effectively. The official remarked that Ukrainian EW troops would perform deception attacks against Russian communications networks. These attacks distracted attention, convincing Russian forces that these networks were in the main schwerpunkt (focal point). Electronic deception is thought to have played a key role during the Kursk incursion.

Doctrinally, Ukraine’s land forces are deploying their EW troops in innovative ways. EW personnel are typically deployed at the tactical edge embedded with dismounted and mounted infantry, and armour. One or two EW personnel will be responsible for providing EW in support of these formations. The result is that numerous, dedicated EW troops are dispersed across the battlefield. Specialist EW formations are instead reserved for EW support at the high tactical/operational level.

Logistical challenges

Beyond the spectrum successes of the incursion, serious challenges exist for Ukrainian land forces EW cadres. The NATO official noted that EW materiel supplied by Ukraine’s allies had been welcomed. Nonetheless, a large, disparate collection of equipment causes concerns from an interoperability perspective. For example, Israeli EW equipment deployed into theatre might not meet NATO Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs). This may hamper its ability to work efficiently with equipment designed to these latter standards.

An additional problem is that the logistical support of this equipment remains patchy in some cases and non-existent in others. Ukraine’s allies have, on occasions, provided EW systems, but not spare parts or supporting logistical infrastructures. As a result, when equipment becomes unserviceable, it is often simply discarded. The NATO official urged countries providing EW kit to give logistical support to this end.

The Kursk incursion has underlined the impact of the electronic warfare acumen of Ukraine’s land forces. The incursion illustrates how effective EW can be once Ukrainian land forces are fighting fast manoeuvre warfare. This contrasts with the largely protective nature of the electronic warfare characterising the attritional combat seen across much of the front. A key takeaway from this phase of the conflict is that Ukraine’s allies need to increase the armaments they are sending to their ally. Alongside ensuring ammunition overmatch at Russia’s expense, fresh meaningful infusions of platforms, weapons and sensors could help Ukrainian get the land battle moving again. Clearly, electronic warfare capabilities provided by Ukrainian allies now need to be backed with comprehensive logistical support and issues regarding EW system compatibility must be urgently addressed. The Kursk incursion shows the difference EW can make when ground combat gets mobile. It is time for Ukraine’s supporters to recognise this and make sure their ally gets the EW and kinetic capabilities she so badly needs. (Source: Armada)

 

09 Oct 24. EU countries have approved providing Ukraine with a loan of up to €35bn before the end of the year as part of a G7 plan to fund Kyiv’s defence against Russian aggression. A majority of EU ambassadors on Wednesday backed the issuance of a loan guaranteed by the bloc’s common budget, according to people familiar with the matter. The decision comes after months of wrangling over how to structure their share of a $50bn plan by the G7 to support Ukraine. The option of raising money against the EU budget was announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen when she travelled to Ukraine last month, as a way to circumvent objections from countries opposed to further aid for Kyiv. Under the G7 plan, the entirety of the $50bn loan will be repaid by profits from Russian state assets frozen in the west in response to Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. More than €200bn of those assets are immobilised in the EU. It remains unclear whether the US will be able to join the G7 scheme and reduce the EU’s share from €35bn. The UK, Canada and Japan are also part of the G7 fundraising effort.  Washington had premised its participation in the G7 loan on the EU extending the length of its sanctions regime from 6 months to 36 months in order to guarantee that the Russian assets remained frozen and put the repayment scheme on a more predictable footing. (Source: FT.com)

 

08 Oct 24. Ukraine’s Zelenskiy wants missiles, faster results on battlefield. Ukrainian service members of the 33rd Separate Mechanised Brigade practice firing an anti-tank guided missile weapon system MILAN as they attend a military drill near a frontline, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Donetsk region, Ukraine.

President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Tuesday that Ukraine needed to secure and deploy advanced missiles and to achieve faster results with them on the battlefield.

Speaking in his nightly video address, Zelenskiy said a meeting with top commanders had been devoted to the development of domestic weapons supplies in the more than 2-1/2-year war against Russia.

This, he said, involved drones, electronic warfare and, above all, deploying missiles that would reap rapid benefits in battlefield confrontations with Russian forces.

“Special emphasis is on our national missile programme in all its elements. In all of Ukraine’s missiles achievements, there must be more combat accomplishments both at the front and on Russian territory,” Zelenskiy said.

“Results are needed faster. And all relevant tasks are now being carried out.”

Since Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukraine has requested its Western partners, principally the United States, to supply sophisticated long-range missiles.

It has also focused on rapidly developing a domestic arms industry. Much of the focus has been on drones, with Zelenskiy calling last year for 1 m to be manufactured in 2024, but officials have also stressed the importance of missile development.

Defence Minister Rustem Umerov said this month Ukraine would announce in the coming months the development of new missiles, including ballistic missiles. (Source: Reuters)

 

08 Oct 24. Ukraine receives first JURA armored vehicles, based on the Toyota Land Cruiser.  The 40th Separate Artillery Brigade was the first to receive the vehicles, which were approved for military use in August this year.

The Jura is a 5-ton tactical vehicle, developed to protect soldiers on frontline missions. Equipped with a powerful diesel engine and lightweight armor, the vehicle is capable of stopping shrapnel and bullets from small arms, providing greater safety for troops in hostile environments.

Soldiers from the 40th Brigade reported that they are beginning to familiarize themselves with the Dzhura, testing it in challenging terrain. So far, the vehicle has shown good performance on sandy terrain, and the brigade is waiting to see how it will behave during the rainy season, when it will face flooded roads.

In addition to its efficiency in difficult terrain, the Jura is ideal for transporting small groups of fighters or ammunition to strategic positions using its baggage compartment. According to reporters from Army TV, the vehicle, despite its weight, has a smooth exit from the road and maintains a low noise level inside the cabin, favoring discretion in operations.

Developed by the Ukrainian company NPO Praktika, the Jura is based on the chassis of the Land Cruiser 70 SUV. The structure was modified with the installation of an armored capsule specially designed to offer protection at the PZSA-4 level, equivalent to the STANAG 4569 level 1 standard. This allows the vehicle to withstand 5.45mm rifle bullets and explosions from multiple grenades under the wheelarch. (Source: Paulo Dominonni via LinkedIn)

 

07 Oct 24. Ukraine seeks respite from Russian artillery in ammunition depot strikes. Ukraine appears to have shifted its modus operandi for long-range strikes into Russia away from the targe sites of critical national infrastructure, such as oil and gas storage sites, to ammunition and supply depots, far behind the front lines. In particular, a series of strikes carried out in September point towards a near-term shift in operations, with the deliberate targetting of Russian ammunition depots in Tikhoretsk and Toropets around mid-to-late September as prime examples of this shift.

The strike on Toropets in particular resulted in one of the largest explosions on the Eurasian continent in recent times, with a force measured at 2.7 on the Richter scale.

It is possible that the strikes were carried out by Ukraine using its new Palianytsia munition, which aesthetically appears to be a hybrid of cruise missile and long-range drone. The strikes on Tikhoretsk and Toropets were around 300km and 500km inside Russian territory respectively, with the latter site alone struck twice in September.

Monitoring the strikes, Western officials point to a shift in Ukrainian strategy, although it is not known whether this represents a short-term change, or points to a longer-term decision. It is thought that up to 100,000 tonnes of ammunition was destroyed.

The development of the Palianytsia munition by Ukraine has gone some way to negating restrictions being placed on it by its Western backers of the ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles, provided by the US and UK respectively. Both countries currently prohibit Ukraine using such weapons to strike targets inside Russia.

Russia maintains quantitative artillery edge

Artillery has been, along with the advent of cheap loitering munitions, one of the key military capabilities to have emerged from the lessons being learned in the Ukraine-Russia war more than two-and-a-half years since the outbreak of large-scale combat operations.

To this end, the ability to maintain a daily rate of fire of artillery against enemy frontlines serves to degrade military capability and have become a prerequisite for softening up positions when defence turns to attack. In this respect, the combat being seen in Ukraine is not dissimilar to the major wars of the 20th Century, where artillery carried significant influence.

In targetting Russian ammunition stores, Ukraine is likely looking to provide some respite for its frontline forces that are on the backfoot across many areas of the frontline.

Russia requires around six m artillery rounds per year to maintain its current rate of firings, with around half of what is needed currently being provided by North Korea and the remainder coming from Moscow’s own stocks.

It is thought that Russia advantage of Ukraine in terms of daily ammunition expenditure is around 9:1 ratio, with the reduction of this disparity of paramount importance to Kyiv.

Recent days and weeks in Ukraine have continued to see Russia push gradually westwards, capturing the town of Vuledar in early October after months of bloody urban combat.

Russian casualty rates are currently thoughts to be at around 1,200 per day across the eastern and southeastern fronts. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence claims that more than 660,000 Russian military personnel have been killed or wounded since February 2022.

Assessment by the Institute for the Study of War indicates the cost to Russia for its recent successes. Credit: ISW

Although exact casualty figures are difficult to determine due to inflated claims by both Ukraine and Russia, it was reported by Army Technology in June that around 500,000 military personnel across both sides had been killed or wounded in the war.

Extrapolating assessed daily casualty figures from the start of H2 2024, it is possible that combined figures now run to approximately 600,000, and potentially higher.

Meanwhile, following a concentration of forces, Russia has begun its counterattack against Ukrainian forces occupying the Kursk bulge, which was unexpectedly seized in August this year. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

08 Oct 24. September was the deadliest month for Russia’s army since the start of the war in Ukraine, British military intelligence said on Monday. The average casualty rate for the Russian army rose to 1,271 soldiers killed or badly injured per day.

Previously, the highest daily casualty rate for Russian soldiers had been in May, with an average of 1,262 soldiers killed or injured.

“The increase in the casualty rate since May 2024 is almost certainly due to the extension of the combat zone to include both Kharkiv and Kursk military operations, and increased intensity along the frontline,” the Ministry of Defence said. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

08 Oct 24. Kamala Harris has cast doubt over Ukraine’s membership of Nato after dodging a question on whether the country should join the military alliance.

The Democratic presidential candidate declined to say whether Nato should expand to include Ukraine when questioned on CBS’ 60 Minutes on Monday.

Her answer appears to contradict longstanding US policy and may be cause for concern among allies.

She also refused to say whether she considered Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, a “close ally” in the interview, broadcast on the anniversary of the Oct 7 attack on Israel.

Ms Harris was asked if she considered Benjamin Netanyahu a “real close ally”.

She did not answer the question outright and instead suggested that the bond between the US and Israel went beyond political leadership.

“The better question is, do we have an important alliance between the American people and the Israeli people?” Ms Harris said.

“And the answer to that question is yes.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

07 Oct 24. DefendTex attack UAV operational in Ukraine after UK-Latvia Drone Coalition selection. Australian company DefendTex has launched its first first-person-view (FPV) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), confirming to Janes a limited number have already been shipped to Ukraine for evaluation with indigenous forces.

The quadrotor, Vengeance FPV, designed as a “mass manufacturable” FPV UAV, participated in a ‘fly-off’ event in Latvia just weeks ago as part of the UK-led Drone Coalition, which says it is “focused on providing Ukraine with drones and components produced by the industry of Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) countries, as well as finding ways to support Ukrainian manufacturers to ensure that the Ukrainian armed forces are equipped with the most efficient capabilities”.

The FPV UAV was then selected by the Drone Coalition for ‘test and evaluation’ with the Ukrainian armed forces, with a total of 20 unarmed FPV UAVs delivered to Ukraine several weeks ago. The company is awaiting feedback from operations, Janes was informed.

The Vengeance FPV is described by a company official as being “weapons-agnostic” but was displayed at the Land Forces 2024 exhibition in Melbourne, Australia, in September, carrying a mortar bomb in a one-way attack (OWA) UAV configuration.

Weaponised FPV UAVs have risen to prominence over the course of the ongoing war in Ukraine, with social media channels awash with footage showing weaponised solutions engaging dismounted soldiers, soft-skinned as well as armoured vehicles on both sides. Russian soldiers are also understood to have taken their own lives to avoid being attacked by such a weapon, a defence source informed Janes. (Source: Janes)

 

07 Oct 24. Su-57 Downs Russia’s Sukhoi S-70 Stealth UCAV Over Ukraine.

A prototype of Russia’s Hunter S-70 combat drone was shot down over the occupied Donetsk region, in what experts are calling a significant embarrassment for Moscow’s air force.

The incident, which occurred near the front lines in the Donetsk Oblast, has raised questions about the drone’s deployment in such a volatile area.

Military specialists, after examining images of the wreckage, concluded that the destroyed aircraft was likely a Russian Hunter S-70, a next-generation combat drone that was being tested. According to reports, the drone was shot down either due to a loss of control or deliberately after it malfunctioned during the test flight.

Justin Bronk, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, called the incident a “stunningly embarrassing failure” for Russia. He pointed out that the fact the test flight occurred so close to the frontlines reveals poor decision-making.

If the S-70 Okhotnik [Hunter] were to fall into Ukrainian or American hands, it would be a substantial setback for the Russian Federation, both technologically and strategically. The biggest concern would be the exposure of sensitive construction details and stealth technologies utilized in the drone. “Hunter” is engineered with cutting-edge composite materials and specialized coatings that dramatically reduce its radar signature.

Should these technologies be acquired by rivals such as the US or Ukraine, they could potentially create counterstrategies to undermine the tactical edge of Russian stealth drones. Furthermore, US and allied electronic warfare [EW] capabilities could be significantly enhanced by identifying and exploiting the Hunter’s vulnerabilities. This would make it easier to detect and disable drones in future engagements.

Yet another critical concern is the revelation of the control systems and sensors employed by the Hunter. Its Active Phased Array Radar [APAR] and other integrated optoelectronic systems could be scrutinized by Western powers to pinpoint weaknesses in Russian reconnaissance and attack methodologies. Autonomous control systems might also be of high interest, as they likely consist of algorithms for independent decision-making, coordination with manned aircraft, and evasion of enemy threats.

According to reports, a pair of aircraft, consisting of a piloted Su-57 and the unmanned S-70, took off from Akhtubinsk Air Base, located about 365 miles from the front lines, for an operational test flight. The mission was part of the drone’s experimental trials, aiming to test its capabilities in live combat situations. However, a technical malfunction caused the drone to lose contact with its ground operator, veering off course toward Ukrainian-controlled territory.

Panic ensued among the Russian military responsible for the test. Radio intercepts from the flight control center revealed that ground commanders ordered the accompanying Su-57 pilot to attempt to disrupt the rogue drone’s flight path, even suggesting using the aircraft’s wing to divert it. Ultimately, a decision was made to launch an air-to-air missile to bring down the drone.

The S-70 “Okhotnik” crashed in Kostiantynivka, just 16 kilometers from the frontline, and its remnants were recovered by Ukrainian forces. Initial assessments of the wreckage cast doubt on Russian claims about the drone’s advanced capabilities. Contrary to Russian propaganda, the S-70 does not appear to feature the stealth polymers or advanced artificial intelligence systems that were advertised. “This is no advanced combat drone,” a Ukrainian defense expert said. “It’s more like a glider equipped with basic flight capabilities and radio controls.”

Additionally, the use of the Su-57 manned fighter as a command relay for the drone was seen as inefficient and highlighted the limitations of Russian networking capabilities. The S-70 lacks the robust stealth technologies that Russia has claimed to possess, and it does not feature the kind of network-centric systems comparable to NATO’s Link-16. Instead, the drone relies on a basic radio link for guidance, limiting its operational flexibility.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has long promoted the S-70 as a “loyal wingman” to the Su-57, capable of engaging in coordinated missions and using a wide range of airborne weaponry. However, the incident casts doubt on the drone’s ability to execute sophisticated combat maneuvers, including the use of air-to-air missiles or precision-guided weaponry.

(Source: UAS VISION/ukdj; Bulgarian Military; Defence Blog)

 

06 Oct 24. Dutch defence minister pledges 400m for Ukraine drone plan,

• Summary
• Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans announces investment on surprise visit to Kyiv
• Half of 400m euros will be spent in Netherlands, rest in Ukraine and other countries

Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans said on a surprise visit to Kyiv on Sunday that his country will invest 400m euros ($440m) in advanced drone development with Ukraine and deliver more F-16s in the coming months.

More than 2-1/2 years since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion, Ukraine is fighting to thwart Russia’s troops as they inch forward in the east and attack critical infrastructure ahead of the winter months.

“The war, of course, is intensifying every day, and Ukraine is setting up more brigades who all need support, who all need military equipment. We need to have this continuous flow of support,” Brekelmans told Reuters in Kyiv.

The drone action plan will combine Ukraine’s innovation and Dutch knowledge to improve technology used on the battlefield, he said.

“We will focus on different types of drones, so both surveillance drones, more defensive drones, but also the attack drones, because we see that Ukraine needs those more offensive drones also to target military facilities,” Brekelmans said.

Around half of the investment will be spent in the Netherlands, while the rest will be split between Ukraine and other countries, he added.

If the developed drones are successful, more funding will be available to scale up production, according to the defence minister.

The Netherlands has pledged 10 bn euros in military support for Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion and spent around 4 bn euros so far.

AIR DEFENCE

After visiting the city of Kharkiv, pummelled by Russian glide bombs, on Saturday, Brekelmans said attacking military targets in Russia was the only way to defend the city.

Ukraine has asked its partners to give it permission to use their weapons to strike targets deep in Russia and provide it with more air defences.

The Netherlands has contributed to its air defence support by driving international partners to supply Ukraine with F-16 jets and pledging 24 of them.

The first batch of planes from the Netherlands is already operating in Ukrainian airspace, according to the minister, while the others will be delivered “in the upcoming months and maybe beginning of next year.”

The country is also delivering reserve parts, ammunition and fuel for jets as it seeks to expand pilot training opportunities through meeting with partner countries and private sector players like Lockheed Martin to keep jets operational, he said.

The Netherlands has also announced a plan to assemble a Patriot air-defence system for Ukraine relying on parts from different countries but Brekelmans said it had struggled to source some parts.

He said Ukraine was already using one Dutch-supplied Patriot radar and “three launchers are going to be delivered very soon.” (Source: Reuters)

 

06 Oct 24. UK trade mission visits Kyiv to deepen industry ties.

Trade mission agrees key requirements for Ukraine’s future equipment and capability needs.

A UK trade mission, formed of representatives from the Ministry of Defence, Department for Business and Trade, and the defence trade association ADS, visited Ukraine to hold meetings with Ukrainian Government and industry representatives.

It is the latest step in the growing relationship between the UK’s defence industrial sector and Ukraine’s, following the signing of a major agreement in July which will enable Ukraine to harness the power of UK industry by drawing on £3.5bn worth of export finance to purchase further military capabilities.

The cross-government group, led by the Minister for the Armed Forces, travelled to Kyiv, where the trade mission visited the Ukraine Defence Industrial Forum to take part in a series of meetings and forum discussions.

Whilst there the minister discussed the UK’s steadfast support for Ukraine as long as it takes, the ever-growing relationship between the UK and Ukraine’s defence industry and the government’s pledge to continue to boost investment into our own industry which will in turn support Ukraine’s fight.

Agreements were made with Ukrainian officials on their requirements for complex weapons and land systems support during the event, which provides a signal to UK industry as to the types of equipment they most need and for which the MOD will now contract with UK industry on Ukraine’s behalf.

Minister for the Armed Forces, Luke Pollard MP said: “The UK’s support for Ukraine is ironclad. We continue to lead the way in providing military aid, but our support is much broader than simply providing equipment. Our flourishing defence industrial relationship symbolises the work happening across Government and the private sector to ramp up and speed up our support. By deepening our ties with Ukraine’s defence industry, we are expanding own industrial capacity, while boosting Ukraine’s own capabilities. We stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine, and we will provide support for as long as it takes.”

The MOD already placed contracts with Thales for air defence missiles and Sheffield Forgemasters for artillery gun barrels forgings, in order to warm up industry in preparation for further orders.  Future orders are in the pipeline and will be funded by Ukraine, drawing on their own reserves and the £3.5bn of United Kingdom export finance made available by the UK to support Ukraine’s war effort.

Task Force HIRST is the UK cross-government team incorporating MOD, DBT and UK Export Finance to stimulate UK industrial production and international collaboration in support of Ukraine, including collaboration with Ukrainian companies.

Last week, the Defence Secretary confirmed the Government is delivering on its commitment to speed up and ramp up deliveries of support for Ukraine, surpassing its pledge to deliver 12 AS90 artillery guns within 100 days of taking office. A total of 16 units are now on course to be delivered, with 10 already provided, and six more to follow in the coming weeks. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

06 Oct 24. UK trade mission visits Kyiv to deepen industry ties.

Trade mission agrees key requirements for Ukraine’s future equipment and capability needs.

A UK trade mission, formed of representatives from the Ministry of Defence, Department for Business and Trade, and the defence trade association ADS, visited Ukraine to hold meetings with Ukrainian Government and industry representatives.

It is the latest step in the growing relationship between the UK’s defence industrial sector and Ukraine’s, following the signing of a major agreement in July which will enable Ukraine to harness the power of UK industry by drawing on £3.5bn worth of export finance to purchase further military capabilities.

The cross-government group, led by the Minister for the Armed Forces, travelled to Kyiv, where the trade mission visited the Ukraine Defence Industrial Forum to take part in a series of meetings and forum discussions.

Whilst there the minister discussed the UK’s steadfast support for Ukraine as long as it takes, the ever-growing relationship between the UK and Ukraine’s defence industry and the government’s pledge to continue to boost investment into our own industry which will in turn support Ukraine’s fight.

Agreements were made with Ukrainian officials on their requirements for complex weapons and land systems support during the event, which provides a signal to UK industry as to the types of equipment they most need and for which the MOD will now contract with UK industry on Ukraine’s behalf.

Minister for the Armed Forces, Luke Pollard MP said: “The UK’s support for Ukraine is ironclad. We continue to lead the way in providing military aid, but our support is much broader than simply providing equipment. Our flourishing defence industrial relationship symbolises the work happening across Government and the private sector to ramp up and speed up our support. By deepening our ties with Ukraine’s defence industry, we are expanding own industrial capacity, while boosting Ukraine’s own capabilities. We stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine, and we will provide support for as long as it takes.”

The MOD already placed contracts with Thales for air defence missiles and Sheffield Forgemasters for artillery gun barrels forgings, in order to warm up industry in preparation for further orders.  Future orders are in the pipeline and will be funded by Ukraine, drawing on their own reserves and the £3.5bn of United Kingdom export finance made available by the UK to support Ukraine’s war effort.

Task Force HIRST is the UK cross-government team incorporating MOD, DBT and UK Export Finance to stimulate UK industrial production and international collaboration in support of Ukraine, including collaboration with Ukrainian companies.

Last week, the Defence Secretary confirmed the Government is delivering on its commitment to speed up and ramp up deliveries of support for Ukraine, surpassing its pledge to deliver 12 AS90 artillery guns within 100 days of taking office. A total of 16 units are now on course to be delivered, with 10 already provided, and six more to follow in the coming weeks. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

07 Oct 24. As the Kremlin rolls out a new budget for 2025, gone are hopes that this year’s unprecedented levels of military spending represent a peak of what Vladimir Putin can afford to spend on his ugly war of conquest against Ukraine.  Contrary to global expectations — and even the Russian government’s own projections — the Kremlin now plans to increase defence spending by 22.6 per cent compared with this year, a staggering 58 per cent rise from the original budget drafted in late 2023. This signals that Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine remain as entrenched as ever. Far from scaling back, the Russian president appears willing to absorb rising costs in his fight, which he views as existential to his regime’s survival. The numbers are stark: added together, defence and national security spending will now surpass 8 per cent of Russia’s GDP and account for 40 per cent of all federal expenditure, the highest levels since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although projections for 2026 and 2027 suggest a slight reduction to 5.6 per cent and 5.1 per cent of GDP respectively, this does little to ease concerns. From a fiscal perspective, military expenditure seems like an obvious candidate for cuts. But in Putin’s Russia, the war drives the economy. Other key sectors — education, healthcare and even social policy — are seeing minimal growth or outright decline, despite Kremlin rhetoric about prioritising social welfare. Russia is entering a period of military strategic reconstruction that could last up to eight years, according to my colleague Dara Massicot. With a steady stream of commodity revenues, a competent economic team and escalating repression at home, the Kremlin can continue funding its war effort for the foreseeable future. However, the resources Putin can muster are not unlimited. By pouring more money into defence, the Kremlin is exacerbating existing economic imbalances. It is clear that Russian leadership prioritises military strength over long-term economic stability. The Kremlin’s logic is: “We’ll cross that bridge when we come to it.” Two major constraints loom over Putin’s economic strategy: a shrinking workforce and the weight of international sanctions. With unemployment at a historic low of 2.4 per cent, Russia’s labour market is already struggling. The shortage of workers will undermine the military-industrial complex’s ability to boost production, despite recent efforts to expand capacity. While continued trade with countries such as China aids the Russian economy, sanctions have significantly restricted the Kremlin’s ability to modernise its military, squeezing access to essential components and creating bottlenecks in supply chains and financial transactions. Putin faces an unsolvable trilemma of simultaneously maintaining a balanced financial system, meeting social obligations and sustaining defence spending at current levels. The trade-offs are already apparent. As military expenditure rises, other areas of the budget are being squeezed, and this will only worsen as the war drags on. The main loser is the public sector — education, healthcare, science and utilities — which has been and will remain underfunded and underemployed. Still, Putin’s adaptable economy can survive for several more years. This is an unpleasant truth for policymakers in Europe and the US. Instead of hoping that Russia’s economic combat power will soon be exhausted, the west must focus on a long-term strategy that will further constrain Putin’s war machine and boost Ukraine’s own economic resilience. With co-ordinated efforts from across the west — chiefly the increased enforcement of sanctions, resulting in ever-increasing transaction costs for Russia — the time when Putin will be forced to make tough choices can be brought forward. (Source: FT.com)

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