NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Sept 28.

 

28 Sept 24. Ukraine shot down 69 of 73 drones during an overnight Russian attack that included two ballistic and two cruise missiles, the Ukrainian air force said on Saturday. Ukrainian forces downed the two cruise missiles, the air force said in a statement on the Telegram messaging app. About 15 Russian attack drones were destroyed by air defence forces on the outskirts and in the capital Kyiv, the military administration there said. It said debris was reported falling in one district of the city. “As a result, a non-residential building was damaged. No information on casualties was received,” the administration said on Telegram.(Source: Reuters)

 

Sep 27.

27  Sept 24.  Donald Trump said the war in Ukraine would be “resolved very quickly” if he won the US election as he met Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Friday, and touted his “very good relationship” with both the Ukrainian leader and Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president. The meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy had been in question throughout the week, with the former US president criticising Ukraine’s president for “refusing” to make a deal with Putin and members of the Republican party accusing him of siding with Kamala Harris in the race for the White House. While the meeting was a sign that they are searching for a common understanding of how relations between Washington and Kyiv might change in a second Trump presidency, the former president renewed his push for peace talks with Russia. Ukrainian and many western officials have rejected the proposal as premature, saying negotiations would cement Russia’s control of big chunks of the country’s territory. “We have a very good relationship,” Trump told Zelenskyy as they jointly spoke to reporters before their meeting. “I also have a very good relationship, as you know, with President Putin . . . if we win I think we’re going to get it resolved very quickly.” (Source: FT.com)

 

27  Sept 24.  Joe Biden is preventing Ukraine from firing British Storm Shadow missiles at targets inside Russia over fears of retaliatory attacks on Western military bases. The US president has resisted pressure from Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky and Sir Keir Starmer, the British Prime Minister, to relax restrictions on Kyiv’s use of Western long-range weapons. US intelligence believes that Vladimir Putin would likely respond to such strikes by ordering attacks on US and European military bases, The New York Times reported. He could also step up sabotage efforts on Western soil.Advertisement One intelligence assessment seen by the president said the rewards of allowing Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia were comparatively slim as it is unclear how many more missiles the West can provide. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

27  Sept 24. NATO will set up a new land command in Finland near the Russian border next year, tasked with leading the alliance’s land force operations in northern Europe in the event of a military conflict, the Finnish defence minister said on Friday. Finland joined the NATO alliance last year, in response to neighbouring Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that began in 2022, and is organising the alliance’s presence on its territory. “This morning, I have decided that we will propose to NATO to establish the command in conjunction with the Army Headquarters in Mikkeli,” said the minister, Antti Hakkanen, following up on his June announcement that all NATO member states had given their political consent for the plan. The centre, which NATO calls Multi Corps Land Component Command, will operate under the alliance’s U.S.-based Norfolk Joint Force Command and jointly with Finland’s own land force command that is already located in Mikkeli, about two hour’s drive from the Finnish-Russian border. Hakkanen, speaking at a news conference, said the unit would initially have an annual budget of 8.5m euros ($9.5m) and consist of a few dozen international officials. Earlier this month, Finland and neighbouring Sweden, which also joined the alliance this year, said Sweden would coordinate visits of foreign NATO troops and international drills in northern Finland. However, Helsinki is not looking for the same kind of permanent multinational force that has been deployed, for example, in the nearby Baltic countries, given the considerable size of Finland’s own forces. Speaking at the same news conference on Friday, the commander of the Finnish army, Pasi Valimaki, said the geographic scope of the new unit would be decided at a later date but initially it would oversee land force operations planning in the Nordic region. ($1 = 0.8960 euros) (Source: Reuters)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• STRIKES: Russian forces conducted their first glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia city, marking a notable precedent that could indicate future Russian intentions to target the frontline city
• STRATEGY: The Biden administration is likely concerned that Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’ lacks a comprehensive strategy to win the war amid wider efforts by certain Western leaders to begin discussions on a more realistic strategy for peace
• ENERGY: Kyiv reports that Russia has destroyed all Ukrainian thermal power plants and a large part of the country’s hydroelectric capacity amid allegations that Moscow is preparing strikes against three of Ukraine’s nuclear plants
• FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Moscow is proposing changes to its nuclear doctrine to allow the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional missile strikes, though a major nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely
• BAKHMUT: Russian progress towards Toretsk remains slow, but geolocated footage from 24-25 September indicates limited advances in Pivnichne and in central Toretsk. However, Ukrainian forces are conducting counter-attacks; geolocated footage from 23 September indicated that they succeeded in pushing the Russians back marginally along Tsentralna Street in central Toretsk.
• DONETSK: Russian forces have highly likely entered eastern Vuhledar amid continued progress in their efforts to encircle the town. Geolocated footage posted on 24 September indicates that Russian forces have entered eastern Vuhledar in recent days. Additional geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have also seized the Pivdennodonbaska Coal Mine 3 in Vodyane, located to the north-east of Vuhledar. A prominent Ukrainian milblogger warned on 25 September that Ukrainian forces will possibly need to withdraw in a north-western direction over the coming 24 hours in order to avoid being encircled. However, Russian forces likely maintain fire control over the road between Vuhledar and Bohoyavlenka, which now remains the only exit point for Ukrainian forces.
• DONETSK: It is increasingly likely that Russian forces will capture Vuhledar in the coming days or weeks, though the pace at which the town is captured will depend heavily on Ukrainian tactics. Currently it is unclear whether Ukrainian forces will be permitted to withdraw from the town in good time in order to avoid personnel losses and the risk of encirclement, or whether they will be ordered to hold the town until it becomes untenable (akin to the defence of Avdiivka and Bakhmut). The onset of the rainy season (Bezdorizhzhia, also known as Rasputitsa in Russian) will also be an important factor in the pace of the Russian advance, given that it will likely slow (but not stop outright) any mechanised advance if the fields around the town become extremely muddy.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, geolocated footage posted on 25 September indicates that Russian forces likely achieved a limited advance north of Tsukuryne, located to the south of Selydove. Selydove is a key settlement that Russian forces intend to capture in order to set the conditions for the capture of Pokrovsk, a major Ukrainian logistical hub.
• KHARKIV: Ukrainian forces have intensified their counter-attacks along the Kharkiv axis; they have made notable confirmed gains in the city of Vovchansk. On 24 September, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) claimed that Ukrainian forces have retaken the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant, which geolocated footage from 24 September also seems to corroborate. Geolocated footage from 25 September also indicates further Ukrainian advances in the area, likely confirming that Ukrainian forces are consolidating control over the plant – which Russian forces had been defending for months. Earlier this week, Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Vitaliy Sarantsev stated that Russian forces had pivoted to the defence in this area, which Ukrainian forces have seemingly exploited. However, it remains unclear whether Russian forces have any reserves in the area to launch a counter-attack against the plant.
• KURSK: There have been fewer confirmed changes of territorial control in Kursk oblast in recent days, though both Russian and Ukrainian forces are continuing to launch attacks and counter-attacks. A Russian presidential aide, Alexei Dyumin, claimed on 25 September that he has no doubts that Russian forces will be able to ‘completely liberate’ Kursk oblast ‘in the near future’ based on the plans developed by the Russian General Staff. He provided no further details. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have conducted numerous mechanised assaults around Veseloye, located roughly 16 miles (26km) west of Korenevo; they have likely made some limited advances just north of the international border.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage posted on 21 and 23 September indicates that Russian forces recently advanced marginally to the east of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka, located to the south-east and south of Kupiansk, respectively. Russian forces also recently advanced westwards in north-western Makiivka and westwards in central Makivka, both of which are located to the north-west of Kreminna.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Overnight on 22-23 September, Russian forces conducted their first glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). At least seven glide bombs were launched (the precise number remains unclear), resulting in injuries to at least 21 civilians and damage to 13 residential buildings and two educational facilities. The attack is a notable precedent as it indicates that Zaporizhzhia will possibly become a new target of glide bomb strikes, which have caused significant destruction in frontline cities such as Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast). As Zaporizhzhia city is only around 15-21 miles (25-35km) from the frontline and glide bombs typically have a range of around 35-37 miles (40-60km), there is a realistic possibility that they will be increasingly used to target the city.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 23-24 September, Russian forces launched 81 Shahed-136/131 drones, two Kh-59/69 missiles, one Iskandr-M ballistic missile and one missile of an unspecified type against targets located primarily in central and northern Ukraine. In all, 66 drones were intercepted in Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Furthermore, 13 drones reportedly failed to teach their target, likely due to electronic warfare (EW) measures.
• STRIKES: Russian forces launched 32 Shahed 136/131 drones, four Kh-59/69 missiles, one S-300 missile and three missiles of an unspecified type against Ukraine overnight on 24-25 September. All four of the Kh-59/69 missiles and 28 drones were intercepted. The remaining four drones likely missed their targets, though no information on their whereabouts was provided by the Ukrainian air force. Ukrainian air defences were active in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv Odesa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 25-26 September, Russian forces launched 78 Shahed-136/131 drones and four Kh-59/69 missiles. All four Kh-59 missiles and 66 drones were intercepted. According to the head of the Kyiv City Military Administration, Serhiy Popko, a residential gas pipeline and 20 cars were damaged in the capital, though it is unclear if this was due to successful strikes or falling debris from the drones that were intercepted. Elsewhere, part of Ivano-Frankivsk city (Ivano-Frankivsk oblast) was left without power due to a strike on critical infrastructure; the Ukrainian national grid operator reported outages in Chernihiv and Poltava oblasts. All in all, air defences were active in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, Khmelnystskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Vinnytsia oblasts.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: US President Joe Biden announced more than USD 8 bn in military aid for Ukraine on 26 September. The assistance includes the first shipment of Joint Standoff Weapons – a precision-guided glide bomb with a range of up to 81 miles (130km). The majority of the aid (USD 5.5bn) is to be allocated before 30 September – the end of the US fiscal year. Another USD 2.4 bn comes under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which provides for the purchase of weapons from companies rather than using existing US stocks. This package includes additional air defence and air-to-ground munitions, among other elements.
• AID: Meanwhile, US House Speaker Mike Johnson wrote a letter to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on 25 September demanding the dismissal of Ukraine’s ambassador to the US, Oksana Markarova. Johnson stated that Markarova had organised a visit (in which Zelensky had participated) to a weapons factory. According to Johnson, the tour was a partisan campaign event aimed at helping the Democratic party, as no Republican officials were invited. He stated the tour was evidence of election interference. Although Johnson claimed support for aiding Ukraine continues to be a bipartisan issue in the US, the incident will likely reinforce ‘Ukraine scepticism’ among certain Republicans and possibly undermine support for Ukraine in the future. As such, the issue will likely increase the risk of policy deadlock on bills and/or initiatives relating to Ukraine.
• STRATEGY: Biden’s administration is likely concerned that President Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’ lacks a comprehensive strategy to win the war. The Wall Street Journal reported on 25 September, citing insiders, that the undisclosed plan resembles a renewed request for more weapons and the lifting of restrictions on the use of Western-provided long-range missiles. Senior European and US officials familiar with the outlines of the plan argue it offers no clear path to a Ukrainian victory. The first phase, which is related to requests for weapons, is said to be the most developed part of the plan, while the rest of the details are reportedly less specific.
• STRATEGY: Although senior US officials maintain (at least publicly) that Ukraine can prevail against Russia, the report, while unconfirmed, underscores stark differences in perception between Kyiv and Washington DC of what can realistically be achieved in Ukraine. Zelensky claimed in an interview on 23 September that he believes the war with Russia is closer to ending than many believe. The Ukrainian president is expected to brief Biden on the specifics of the strategy at the White House later on 26 September. This will be the first time that the Biden administration will hear the plan in full. However, claims that US officials are already unimpressed will decrease the likelihood of Zelensky managing to convince the Biden administration that it is viable. For further analysis on the ‘victory plan.’
• STRATEGY: Meanwhile, in a likely effort to initiate discussions on a more realistic strategy to end the war, Czech President Petr Pavel assessed that the most likely outcome of the war involves some Ukrainian territory remaining under Russian occupation ‘temporarily’. During an interview published on 23 September, Pavel caveated that Russia could retain control over these lands for years. Pavel stated that neither side can expect to fulfil their ultimate war objectives, such as Ukraine recapturing all its territory from Russia – including Crimea. According to Pavel, both sides will not be militarily defeated, and that the war is likely to end ‘somewhere in between’.
• STRATEGY: Pavel’s comments underscore growing efforts by certain pro-Ukraine Western voices to acknowledge that Ukraine is unlikely to regain control of all its territory from Russia without significant continued Western support. On 24 September, Pavel insisted that he had never questioned supporting Ukraine in restoring its territorial integrity and stated that this is the ultimate goal. However, he also opined that Western partners have to be realistic about the timeline and the cost of achieving this objective. However, Ukraine is highly unlikely to be willing to entertain territorial concessions or accept the possibility of its regions remaining under Russian control for the foreseeable future. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly – 26 September 2024.
• ENERGY: Zelensky disclosed on 25 September that Russia has destroyed all of Ukraine’s thermal power plants and a large part of the country’s hydroelectric capacity. Zelensky stated that 80% of Ukraine’s energy system is ‘gone’, adding that Russian attacks against energy infrastructure aim to torment the Ukrainian population.
• ENERGY: On 24 September, Zelensky also claimed that Russia intends to target three Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs). There are three operational NPPs in Ukrainian-controlled Ukraine: Rivne and Khmelnytskyi NPPs (Rivne and Khmelnytskyi oblasts) and Pivdennoukrainsk NPP (Mykolaiv oblast). Despite Zelensky’s warnings, Russia is highly unlikely to willingly trigger a large-scale nuclear incident. Furthermore, its capability to inflict such a disaster via external, non-nuclear strikes remains limited . Ultimately, we assess that the coming winter will highly likely prove challenging for Ukraine; Russian attacks against the already-ailing Ukrainian energy system will further compound energy insecurity and undermine business operations in the country.

FORECAST

NUCLEAR: On 25 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a public meeting of the Russian Security Council that Moscow is proposing changes to its nuclear doctrine to allow the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional missile strikes. The proposals are almost certainly a direct response to ongoing deliberations in the West over whether to authorise Ukraine’s use of Western long-range missiles to strike targets inside Russia. We previously forecasted that Russian nuclear threats would increase in an attempt to influence the debate. However, our assessment has not changed that a major nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely (see Sibylline Alert – 13 September 2024).

Putin stated that Moscow could now consider an attack by a non-nuclear power (namely Ukraine), supported by or with the assistance of a nuclear power (namely the US, UK or France), to be a ‘joint attack’ on Russia – and that this could facilitate the potential use of nuclear weapons in response. Putin also specified that Russia would consider using nuclear weapons if it detected the start of a large-scale launch of missiles, drones or airstrikes against its territory. In addition, Putin effectively confirmed an expansion of Russia’s nuclear umbrella over Belarus, warning that it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in defence of its ally. Russia’s current nuclear doctrine, codified in 2020, specifies that Moscow reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the case of a nuclear attack against its territory or in response to a conventional attack that threatens the existence of the Russian state.

Moscow has frequently resorted to nuclear threats in a bid to deter Western support for Ukraine, particularly in the run-up to major Western decisions or when it is on the back foot militarily in Ukraine. CIA Director Bill Burns stated on 7 September that in the autumn of 2022 there was a ‘genuine risk of potential use of tactical nuclear weapons’ in Ukraine, as Russian forces were reeling amid retreats during the Ukrainian Kharkiv counter-offensive. However, Russian threats at this time did not result in a major escalation, and Burns cautioned against believing Russian nuclear sabre-rattling. All other nuclear threats during the war have thus far proven purely rhetorical. It should also be noted that Russia is currently advancing in the Donbas, and despite defending its own de jure soil in Kursk oblast, it is currently gaining momentum on the battlefield. As such, Moscow’s military situation is stronger than it was in the autumn of 2022, though this latest intervention by Putin is a clear attempt to protect Russia’s current military advantages in Ukraine by re-emphasising so-called ‘red lines’.

The Kremlin has frequently tried to establish and expand so-called ‘red lines’, though these have often been deliberately ill-defined by Moscow and exacerbated by alarmist misinformation. However, these ‘red lines’ (if they even did exist) have proven to be illusory given the West and Ukraine have already ‘crossed’ many such thresholds. Russia previously warned of significant escalation if the West transferred Western tanks, cruise missiles, air defences and fighter aircraft to Ukraine; these have all been transferred, with no major Russian escalation in response. Similarly, Russia warned that strikes against ‘sovereign’ Russian territory in annexed Ukraine would result in an escalation – and yet, attacks against the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol in Crimea and even the Crimean Bridge have all taken place, resulting in no significant shift in Russia’s nuclear or conventional military posture. While it remains possible that Moscow is now attempting to establish a genuine ‘red line’, Russia’s behaviour on the international stage has exposed its own disregard for so-called Western ‘red lines’ in numerous theatres around the world.

Even if the US approves conventional strikes in the coming weeks, a major Russian nuclear retaliation or use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine remain highly unlikely. However, it is possible that the US would not pre-announce a decision to authorise strikes, meaning strikes against Russian targets remain possible without forewarning in the coming weeks. While this could lead to provocative Russian rhetoric or nuclear signalling in response, we assess that a major nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely.While the following do not in and of themselves indicate an escalation is inevitable, key triggers for a genuine increase in the threat of a nuclear escalation include:

• Russian military readiness levels being raised
• Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, Long-range Aviation Command and Radiation, Chemical and Biological (CBRN) Defence Forces being put on high alert
• The activation of Russia’s 12th Chief Directorate (12 GUMO), which is responsible for overseeing Russia’s nuclear arsenal
• Warheads being moved and mated with launch vehicles, possibly under the guise of a nuclear exercise

Further nuclear tests remain possible in the coming months in a bid to back up the Kremlin’s rhetoric. In particular, the apparent failure of a test involving Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICMB) earlier this month could prompt Moscow to perceive that there is a need to demonstrate the potency and credibility of its nuclear capabilities amid its ongoing reflexive control and deterrence campaign.

For further analysis on nuclear escalation scenarios, including triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs), see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 25 October 2022.

Ultimately, Putin’s latest statements have not changed our assessment that Russia is highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, even if the US authorises strikes. The proposed changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine are highly likely aimed at reinvigorating tired nuclear threats as part of an ongoing reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision makers. Specifically, this likely aims to deter decisions that would undermine Russia’s current military advantages in Ukraine – namely the relative safety that Russian forces currently enjoy with regard to being able to launch attacks from inside Russia without fear of Ukrainian attacks in response.

 Sep 26.

Executive summary

• In our most likely three-month scenario, positional fighting continues to prevent major battlefield breakthroughs that alter the strategic balance on either side.
• In our most likely 12-month scenario, the war evolves into a broadly stable attritional conflict that protracts into 2025, though growing international pressure to begin discussing what a genuine peace process would look like marginally increases the prospects of negotiations.
• Debates continue in the US over whether to allow Ukraine to use Western-supplied long-range cruise missiles inside de jure Russian territory, with Moscow issuing renewed threats in an attempt to deter US approval. Russia’s options to respond to US-approved strikes will likely remain limited and hybrid in nature; we assess they are less likely to increase the risk of a major Russia-NATO military escalation.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is set to present his ‘victory plan’ to international partners at the end of September. While the plan is unlikely to mark a significant departure from previous Ukrainian peace initiatives, it will aim to influence Washington DC’s thinking ahead of the US presidential election in November.
• Meanwhile, numerous Western officials are also likely to posit the highly controversial prospect of Ukrainian concessions to end the war – which will increase pressure on Kyiv to begin discussing such matters in 2025.
• Other key triggers, warnings and indicators to watch for in October include major Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure (Moscow likely intends to degrade Ukraine’s energy security in the run-up to winter) and significant Russian battlefield advances in Donetsk oblast that apply pressure on Kyiv.

Sep 23.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• DONETSK: The Russian forces are beginning to close numerous cauldrons around key Ukrainian defensive points in Donetsk oblast, increasing pressure on Ukraine to withdraw to avoid encirclement
• KURSK: Ukrainian sources claim that Moscow has ordered the Russian forces to push the Ukrainians out of Kursk oblast by the end of October; however, this remains unconfirmed as Moscow continues to prioritise offensives in Donetsk oblast
• AID: The US is expected to announce a major military aid package to Ukraine as soon as this week; however, delivery will likely be delayed due to inventory shortages
• FORECAST: Russia has conducted over a thousand strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure since October 2022; the cumulative damage will likely make the upcoming winter the most challenging yet
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 20 and 21 September confirms Russian advances deeper into central Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), and are now operating in the town centre. Russian milbloggers have claimed that in recent days Russian forces advanced over 650m along Tsentralna Street while taking residential blocks in the area. Notably, Russian forces are consolidating control over Niu York and have also advanced northwards from Niu York into central Leonidivka, a settlement around two miles (3km) west of Toretsk (all Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 21 September confirms the advance, which would suggest Russian forces have also likely made progress in neighbouring Nelipivka, though this remains unconfirmed. Pressure is mounting on Ukrainian forces as Russia continues to launch highly attritional infantry assaults in the area, which are slowly making grinding progress, despite likely heavy losses.
• DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian forces have made marginal advances across multiple points along the frontline in Donetsk oblast. Russian forces continue to slowly expand their Pokrovsk salient, including closing a cauldron on the southern flank designed to force further Ukrainian withdrawals. Geolocated footage posted on 19 September indicates that Russian forces advanced south-west of Mykhailivka, located south-east of Pokrovsk. Footage posted on 21 and 22 September indicates that Russian forces made additional marginal advances near Pokrovsk (west of Mykhailivka), to the north of Novooleksandrivka (located east of Pokrovsk) and into southern Krutyi Yar (located south-east of Pokrovsk).
• DONETSK: Russian forces have also made some notable advances near Vuhledar and further to the west in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia border area. Geolocated footage posted on 22 September indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances north-west of Pavlivka, located immediately south-west of Vuhledar; the Russian forces are in the process of forming a cauldron there. The Russian forces succeeded in crossing the Kashlahach River to the west of Vuhledar. This will provide Russian forces with an opportunity to threaten Vuhledar’s western flank for the first time. The Russian forces have been trying to take the small town of Vuhledar for almost two years, incurring significant losses in the process. However, they have gained momentum in the area, providing Russia with an opportunity to force a Ukrainian withdrawal in the coming weeks.
• DONETSK: A spokesperson for the Russia-aligned Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), Eduard Basurin, stated on 20 September that Russian forces in Donetsk oblast are focusing on encircling targeted settlements in Donetsk oblast rather than conducting frontal assaults. Basurin stated that this approach was visible in efforts to capture Ukrainsk (which Russian forces likely captured last week) and Selydove (which remains under Ukrainian control); both are key settlements for Russia to seize in order to set conditions to capture the key logistical hub of Pokrovsk to the north. While frontal assaults continue to result in heavy Russian troop and equipment losses, Russia has consistently resorted to frontal assaults (likely partly due to political pressure to achieve results) when efforts to encircle settlements fail; it will almost certainly continue to do so. Nevertheless, numerous cauldrons are beginning to form at multiple points on the frontline. The salient between Ukrainsk and Krasnohorivka is the most dangerous for Ukrainian forces. A limited Ukrainian withdrawal from the area is increasingly likely to prevent an encirclement.
• KHARKIV: Russian forces continue to launch infantry assaults in and around Vovchansk, a frontline town north-east of Kharkiv city; progress remains slow and grinding. Geolocated footage published in recent days indicates both minor Russian and Ukrainian advances in the area, including around the aggregate plant in the town centre. The site likely remains highly contested, but both sides continue to commit personnel and resources to capture the area. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting in Vovchansk stated on 22 September that the Russian forces are deploying former Wagner Group fighters to the area, who reportedly only receive a few weeks of training before being committed to attritional infantry assaults.
• KURSK: The situation across the Kursk axis remains highly dynamic, with both Russian and Ukrainian forces counter-attacking at various points; however, there has been little confirmed change to the frontline. The Russian forces are counter-attacking from various directions, but the most significant remains along the Ukrainians’ western flank, south-east of Korenevo. It remains likely that the Russian forces have pushed the Ukrainians back in this direction, but it remains unclear how far amid conflicting reports. The Russian forces are nevertheless also attacking from the north and east, with geolocated footage from 21 September indicating Russian advances south of Kamyshevka (located around 11 miles (18km) north of Sudzha). Nevertheless, the Ukrainian forces are continuing efforts to disrupt Russian counter-attacks. Earlier on 23 September, Ukraine’s 95th Separate Polissia Air Assault Brigade claimed that it had broken through another section of the international border in Kursk oblast, though they did not disclose the precise location. We cannot confirm this at the time of writing.
• KURSK: Ukrainian outlet RBC-Ukraine reported on 19 September that unnamed sources claimed the Russian forces have been ordered to push the Ukrainians out of Kursk oblast by the end of October. We cannot confirm these reports. Nevertheless, RBC-Ukraine’s sources maintain that 37,000 Russian troops are now concentrated in Kursk oblast and that the Kremlin has also ordered the Russian forces to establish a ‘buffer zone’ along the Ukrainian border by 30 October. Such an order is a significant operation for Russian forces, which they would likely struggle to achieve unless significant Russian reinforcements are redeployed to the region. Throughout the war, Ukrainian sources have frequently claimed that Moscow has set seemingly arbitrary temporal deadlines to achieve operational objectives – deadlines which, if they were given, have almost always been missed. It remains unclear when Moscow expects to repel Ukrainian forces from Kursk oblast. However, the Russian High Command continues to prioritise offensive operations in Donetsk oblast, and it remains unlikely that this would change in the short term.
• KURSK: Russian military documents seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk oblast reportedly indicate that the Russian authorities were aware of the threat of a Ukrainian offensive into the region for months before Kyiv launched its operation. On 20 September, the Guardian cited various unconfirmed documents recovered in Kursk that indicate local Russian commanders ordering preparations to be made, including additional training and fortification building; it is unlikely that the Russians completed these efforts. The documents also indicate that Russian units stationed along the Kursk border were staffed at between 60-70% of their intended strength and that these were mostly poorly trained reservists. Despite being aware of the possibility, it is clear that the Russian forces were not prepared for the Ukrainian incursion.
• KURSK: Nevertheless, in an interview published on 22 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that it was ‘too early to judge’ whether the Kursk offensive has been a success. He did note, however, that the operation has shown ‘our partners what we’re capable of’, which aligns with our assessment that one of the key objectives of the operation was to illustrate to the West that Ukrainian forces are capable of launching and sustaining large-scale offensive operations successfully. However, as Russia’s counter-attacks in Kursk continue, and Russia’s offensive in Donetsk shows no signs of ending, it remains unclear whether the Kursk offensive has improved or undermined Ukraine’s overall military position.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage posted on 21 September indicates recent Russian advances north of Staromaiorske along the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk oblast border region. Elements of Russia’s 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA) likely advanced along Pyatykhatky Street north of Staromaiorske, located around four miles (7km) south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). At this stage, it remains unclear whether Russian forces are intensifying efforts to advance north along the Mokri Yaly River valley in the area; however, it is clear that the Russian forces are attempting to maintain pressure right across the frontline to disrupt Ukrainian defensive operations and to discourage troop rotations to reinforce critical points, namely around Pokrovsk and Toretsk.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 19-20 September, Russia fired 61 Shahed 131/131 drones and one Kh-59/69 missile at targets in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that it intercepted all the projectiles; they were shot down in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. Likewise, overnight on 20-21 September, the Ukrainian Air Force stated that it had intercepted 11 Shahed 136-131 drones and five Kh-59/69 missiles; these were shot down in Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. The Russian forces reportedly lost five additional drones (overnight on 20-21 September) due to electronic warfare (EW) conducted by Ukrainian forces.
• STRIKES: The Russian forces conducted large-scale strikes against Ukraine overnight on 21-22 September. Moscow launched 80 Shahed 136/131 drones and two Kh-59/69. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that it intercepted 71 of the drones, while the locations of six drones were lost amid anti-aircraft fire. Ukraine’s air defences were active in Cherkasy, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. In line with the Ukrainian Air Force’s usual reporting practice, no information was given on the locations of the projectiles that penetrated Ukrainian air defences.
• STRIKES: The Russian forces fired two Kh-59/69 missiles and four Shahed 136/131 drones at targets in Ukraine overnight on 22-23 September. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that three drones were shot down while unspecified anti-aircraft measures ensured that the other projectiles failed to hit their targets. No locations were given. For further analysis of Russia’s growing long-range drone capabilities, see DRONES below.
• STRIKES: On 21 September, the Ukrainian General Staff announced that the Ukrainian forces had conducted two highly notable strikes against Russian weapon depots inside Russian territory in recent days. First, Ukraine struck a weapons depot (which the General Staff described as one of Russia’s top three largest weapon storage sites) in Tikhoretsk in the south-western Krasnodar region. According to Ukrainian intelligence, a train carrying 2,000 tonnes of ammunition (including supplies from North Korea) arrived at the site prior to the strike. The authorities in Krasnodar krai blamed the explosion in Tikhoretsk on falling debris from Ukrainian drones and declared a state of emergency.
• STRIKE: The second notable Ukrainian strike was against a depot in Oktyabrsky near Toropets in Russia’s northwestern Tver oblast; satellite imagery indicates that the strike caused extensive damage. The Ukrainian forces successfully struck another weapons depot in Toropets on 18 September. On 21 September, UK Defence Intelligence (DI) assessed that the strike on 18 September will highly likely disrupt Russian ground operations, most significantly in Kursk region. Ukraine will almost certainly continue to degrade Russian military capabilities and logistics through its long-range strike campaign, targeting sites hundreds of miles from the frontline. These latest attacks will likely cause some short-term artillery and missile shortages. However, Russian industrial production will likely be able to offset these shortages in the medium term.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: On 21 September, Ukrainian Minister of Defence Rustem Umerov disclosed that Kyiv is awaiting the provision of an unspecified number of French Dassault Mirage 2000 jets. While Umerov said Ukraine has an agreement to receive the aircraft, he did not provide a timeline for any possible deliveries. Meanwhile, Umerov stated that Ukraine is also in talks to acquire Swedish-made SAAB JAS 39 Gripen and the German-British Eurofighter Typhoon multirole fighters. Details of Kyiv’s efforts to obtain such Western aircraft remain unknown, though Umerov’s comments underscore Ukraine’s ambitions to bolster its air capabilities in addition to F-16s.
• AID: CNN reported on 20 September that the US is expected to announce a major military aid package to Ukraine as soon as this week, though its delivery will likely be delayed due to inventory shortages. The assistance will likely include artillery, air defence missiles and other munitions. The US currently has USD 5.9 bn left in Presidential Drawdown Authority for Kyiv; it is set to expire at the end of the US government’s fiscal year (30 September). While the package is therefore highly likely to be sizeable given timing constraints, delayed assistance will likely undermine Ukrainian military planning and will do little to alleviate materiel shortages in the immediate term.
• AID: According to Politico, US officials are considering transferring medium-range missiles to Ukraine for its F-16s in the new package, which is expected to be worth USD 375 m. The Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) can hit targets around 70 miles (112.6km) away. However, unnamed officials familiar with the matter noted that the contents of the aid package could still realistically change before an official announcement is made. Washington DC is expected to announce the assistance later on 23 September during President Zelensky’s visit to the US capital. Although JSOWs do not possess the longer-range reach Ukraine desires, they would allow pilots to target Russian defences and logistics within occupied Ukraine.
• APPROVAL: The European Parliament has called for allowing Ukraine to fire Western-provided weapons at military targets inside de jure Russian territory. In a resolution adopted on 19 September, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) argued that Ukraine cannot fully exercise its right to self-defence with current restrictions on weapon usage. The resolution attained 425 votes in favour and 131 against, with 63 abstentions. Although the development underscores mounting pressure for Ukraine’s Western allies to authorise long-range strikes, the European Parliament has no direct power to initiate such authority.
• APPROVAL: Meanwhile, sources reported on 20 September that the UK and US may possibly grant Ukraine private permission to launch British-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles into Russia. According to the British newspaper The Sunday Times, such an arrangement may not be made public until the first missile is fired. Western diplomats are expected to make the decision soon but may realistically refrain from making an official announcement at the UN this week. The newspaper said there is ‘wariness’ about publicising the decision in advance to alert Russia. Even so, we assess that the risk of escalation between NATO and Russia is unlikely to increase significantly if Ukraine is granted approval for such long-range strikes (see Sibylline Alert – 13 September 2024).
• DRONES: On 19 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his country is increasing its drone production almost tenfold to nearly 1.4m this year. Putin said that around 140,000 drones of various types were transferred to the Russian army in 2023. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Minister of Defence Rustem Umerov said on 21 September that Ukraine can produce several m drones annually and made assurances that Kyiv will not allow Russia to surpass the number of drones Ukraine has in its arsenal next year. As such, Russia’s planned drone production is likely lower than Ukraine’s, with the latter likely to continue demonstrating its growing ability and will to strike targets deep inside Russia.
• DRONES: On 21 September during a military parade in the capital Tehran, Iranian forces showcased an upgraded model of its Shahed-136 drone that Russia uses during its aerial bombardments of Ukraine. The Shahed-136B reportedly boasts several upgrades, including a larger warhead, improved stealth capability and a range of between 1,553 to 2,486 miles (2,500-4,000km). However, it remains unknown if or when Iran could transfer these newer models to Russia.

FORECAST

ENERGY: Russia has conducted over a thousand strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure since October 2022. Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Nikolai Kolesnik reported this on 22 September, adding that large-scale attacks will continue to undermine the stability of Ukraine’s energy system. Kolesnik stated that the Ukrainian authorities are currently prioritising undertaking repairs of energy. However, many power systems remain irreparably damaged and will need to be replaced entirely.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha said on 21 September that Russia is preparing additional strikes on critical Ukrainian nuclear energy infrastructure ahead of winter. Sybiha listed open distribution devices at nuclear power plants and transmission substations as possible targets that Ukrainian intelligence considers to be vulnerable. He said these are essential for ensuring the safe functioning of Ukraine’s nuclear energy system and that damage to them would significantly elevate the risk of a nuclear incident that would have ‘global consequences’. Sybiha stated that Ukraine has informed its Western partners and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the possibility of this threat.

We continue to assess that Russia is highly likely to target Ukrainian energy infrastructure in winter. While the Russian forces could realistically strike components of nuclear energy infrastructure, and undermine nuclear safety, large-scale direct attacks against nuclear power plants are considerably less likely. Nevertheless, while a major nuclear incident remains highly unlikely, Moscow will likely continue to leverage Ukrainian and Western fears of a nuclear escalation at various moments throughout the conflict to discourage support for Kyiv and increase international support for ending the war sooner. For further analysis, see Sibylline Special Report – 19 July 2023.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) warned on 19 September that this coming winter will be the ‘sternest test yet’ for Ukraine’s energy grid since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. About half of Ukraine’s power generation capacity was either occupied, destroyed or damaged by Russia in 2022 and 2023. As Ukraine has lost more than two-thirds of its electricity production capacity since February 2022, the IEA has warned of a wide gap between available electricity supply and peak demand. Meanwhile, experts interviewed for the UN’s Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine assess that power outages will likely last between four to 18 hours each day in Ukraine during the winter months. Ultimately, such comments forecast a highly challenging winter for both business operations and citizens, with Ukraine likely to have to rely on international support to offset blackouts and limit its energy insecurity.

• Russia-Ukraine: Major nuclear escalation is highly unlikely if US approves long-range strikes. On 25 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Moscow is proposing a change to its nuclear doctrine to allow the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional missile strikes. The proposals are almost certainly a direct response to ongoing deliberations in the West over whether to authorise Ukraine’s use of Western long-range missiles to strike inside Russia. Putin stated that Moscow could now consider an attack by a non-nuclear power (namely Ukraine) backed by a nuclear power (namely the US or the UK) to be a ‘joint attack’ on Russia – and that this could facilitate the potential use of nuclear weapons in response. Moscow has frequently resorted to nuclear threats in a bid to deter Western support for Ukraine, all of which have thus far proven purely rhetorical. Even if the US approves conventional long-range strikes in the coming weeks, a major Russian nuclear retaliation and/or the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine remain highly unlikely. However, it is possible that the US will not pre-announce a decision to authorise strikes, meaning that strikes against Russian targets without warning remain possible in the coming weeks. While this could lead to provocative Russian rhetoric or nuclear signalling in response, we continue to assess that a major nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Sept 24. UK picks up the pace with AS90 howitzer delivery to Ukraine.

Currently, there are 16 units inbound, ten already delivered and six more to arrive in the coming weeks.

The UK Ministry of Defence will surpass its pledge to deliver 12 AS90 howitzers to Ukraine within 100 days of taking office.

Currently, there are 16 units inbound, ten already delivered and six more to arrive in the coming weeks.

Known as the ‘Braveheart’, the AS90 is a 155-millimetre self-propelled howitzer that entered service in the British Army in 1992. BAE Systems have built 179 in all for the service, though this number has considerably reduced.

Impact of the AS90 donation

Artillery systems such as the AS90 serve as cover for Ukrainian troops and as a means to destroy Russian targets. The British government have gifted 20 battle-ready systems last year and ten more since.

While the commitment demonstrates the country’s unrestricted support for a nation on the frontier of Russian autocracy, the donations have bled the British Army dry.

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Despite the government’s decision in July to select the German Remote Controlled Howitzer-155 (RCH-155) as the Mobile Fires Platform – a programme that is now beyond the stringent cost/benefit analyses expected in the Strategic Defence Review – there is little interim artillery capability available.

Speed up delivery

Britain’s ability to increase and expedite the AS90 delivery is itself, besides the donations, an exemplary form of Western support to the struggling nation.

Ukraine’s forces remain entrenched in a bitter struggle to repel the marginal Russian advances in the Donbas, while occupying some 900 square kilometres in the Kursk region inside Russia. In response, the Head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, called for allies, particularly the US, to speed up the delivery of military assistance as part of Ukraine’s newfound ‘Plan for Victory’ presented to allies this week.

“I call on our allies to increase and speed up the delivery of military assistance packages. Air defence equipment, drones, electronic warfare equipment, long-range systems, and artillery shells are on our priority list.”

New methods of acquisition

In addition, Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), the defence procurement arm of government, acquired 14 Swedish Archer howitzers to compensate for the reduced number of artillery systems

Notably, the first of these systems arrived in October 2023 just six months after signing the contract.

The pace of this procurement is due to an extensive overhaul of how UK Defence traditionally acquires new systems. DE&S is close to implementing the new Integrated Procurement Model; the set-up will reach minimum viable product in October 2024.

Unveiled by the former Defence Procurement Minister James Cartlidge in February, he implored: “a clear focus on pace and consistent, timely delivery needs to be our new normal.” (Source: army-technology.com)

 

26 Sept 24. Latest Security Assistance for Ukraine Announced, White House Directs DOD to Allocate Remaining Appropriations. The Department of Defense announced yesterday the 66th round of security assistance for Ukraine, which includes some $375m in presidential drawdown authority of equipment from the existing U.S. military inventory.

Among other things, the PDA package includes air-to-ground munitions; ammunition for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System; 155 mm and 105 mm artillery ammunition; Javelin and AT4 anti-armor systems; and M1117 armored security vehicles.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States has committed approximately $56.3bn in security assistance to Ukraine though both presidential drawdown authority and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

Also, the White House announced it had directed the DOD to allocate all remaining security assistance funding appropriated for Ukraine by the end of the year.

“As part of this effort, the Department of Defense will allocate the remaining Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds by the end of this year,” President Biden said in a statement yesterday. “I also have authorized $5.5bn in presidential drawdown authority to ensure this authority does not expire so that my administration can fully utilize the funding appropriated by Congress to support the drawdown of U.S. equipment for Ukraine and then replenish U.S. stockpiles.”

The White House also said the DOD will provide $2.4bn in security assistance through USAI. That additional support through USAI will provide Ukraine with additional air defense, unmanned aerial systems and air-to-ground munitions.

To enhance air defense, Biden said, he has directed the DOD to refurbish and provide Ukraine with an additional Patriot air defense battery and additional Patriot missiles. The president also said he has agreed to provide Ukraine with the Joint Standoff Weapon long-range munition.

While the U.S. has not agreed to give Ukraine F-16 fighter aircraft, other nations have. The U.S. has assisted by providing training on the F-16 to Ukrainian pilots. The president said he has directed the DOD to expand that training, including by supporting the training of an additional 18 pilots next year. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

25 Sept 24. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance support to ensure Ukraine has the tools it needs to prevail in its fight against Russian aggression. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package, which has an estimated value of $375m, to provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent needs, including: air-to-ground weapons; munitions for rocket systems and artillery; armored vehicles; and anti-tank weapons.

The capabilities in the PDA package include:

• Air-to-ground munitions;
• Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
• Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles;
• Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
• M1117 Armored Security Vehicles;
• Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles;
• Light tactical vehicles;
• Armored bridging systems;
• Small arms;
• Patrol boats;
• Demolitions equipment and munitions;
• Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.

This is the Biden Administration’s sixty-sixth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.

The United States will continue to work together with some 50 Allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and its associated capability coalitions to provide the support Ukraine needs to win the war. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

26 Sept 24. UK to speed up military kit deliveries to support Ukraine’s fight. The Government is set to surpass its commitment to deliver 12 AS90 artillery guns within 100 days of taking office, with 16 units now on course to be delivered. The UK will send more vital artillery guns to support Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s illegal invasion after the UK recommits to £3bn a year of military support for Ukraine until 2030/31 and for as long as it takes.

The announcement comes as the UK speeds up the delivery of vital military support, with the new government set to surpass its pledge of delivering 12 AS90 artillery guns within 100 days of taking office.

A total of 16 units are now on course to be delivered, with 10 already delivered and six more to follow in the coming weeks. Artillery has played a vital role in providing cover for Ukrainian troops and destroying key Russian targets.

The government have also announced a new joint MOD and FCDO Ukraine unit – led by Foreign Secretary David Lammy and Defence Secretary John Healey –which will integrate expertise and help drive a new whole-of-government approach to Ukraine.

Alongside this, defence is creating a new direct cyber pathway to help boost the UK’s cyber resilience, with different tailored selection and basic training requirements.

This scheme would create direct entry paths into cyber careers in Defence and provide routes for lateral entry for specialists who are mid-way through their cyber careers, expanding Defence’s appeal, increasing workforce diversity, and in turn complementing other trades in the services, rather than acting in competition.

The Government has also announced that more than 100 outdated policies have been scrapped or updated since July. These include measures blocking recruitment within the Armed Forces of some sufferers of hay fever, eczema and acne, and some injuries that have fully healed, with work ongoing at pace to modernise recruitment. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

24 Sept 24. Germany leans on industry for latest PzH 2000 artillery provision to Ukraine. A new batch of 12 PzH 2000 SPHs will be provided, six arriving in late-2024 with the remaining six later in 2025.

Germany will send an additional 12 Panzerhaubitze 2000 (PzH 2000) 155mm self-propelled howitzers (SPH) to Ukraine over the next 15 months, boosting the number provided to Kyiv to 30 as Berlin continues its steady provision of military equipment.

A spokesperson for the Federal Ministry of Defence subsequently informed Army Technology that the 12 SPHs were obtained “from industry”, rather than being drawn from Bundeswehr’s inventory.

“The 12 [PzH 2000s] are in addition to the 18 PzH 2000 and 36 RCH155 already announced,” the spokesperson said.

Developed by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), the PzH 2000 SPH was first delivered to the German military in 1998, although the number in service has dramatically reduced to as low as eight units at present, according to GlobalData analysis.

The Greek Army has 24 systems, delivered between July 2003 and June 2004, with 70 units also delivered to Italy, and 38 PzH 2000s provided to the Netherlands.

Nato allies show differing provision preferences

The decision by Germany to reach out to industry for the supply of military platforms to Ukraine in this instance contrasts with the usual practice of drawing straight from existing inventories.

In opting to head to industry for the latest batch of PzH 2000 155mm artillery for Ukraine, it could indicate that Gemany’s PzH 2000 inventory at a significantly reduced state. Alternatively, it could be that Germany is seeking maintain a viable Pz 2000 fleet.

The spokesperson for the German Federal Ministry of Defence declined to state how many PzH 2000 SPHs remain in Germany’s inventory.

Elsewhere, the UK has donated much of its 155mm artillery to Ukraine, leaving large gap in the British Army’s ability to conduct long range fires.

As reported by Army Technology in July 2024, Nato member states and other allies have provided between 805 to 947 artillery or multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Ukraine since February 2022.

This ranges from 105mm vehicle drawn short-range tactical platforms such as the L118 light gun, medium range 155mm artillery, through to long-range MLRS such as the HIMARS or M270 systems.

(Source: army-technology.com)

 

25 Sept 24. Vladimir Putin has issued a stark threat to Ukraine’s Nato allies, saying he would expand Russia’s nuclear doctrine to potentially cover attacks against his country using advanced western missiles. Speaking to his security council on Wednesday, the Russian president said he would deem nuclear powers to have attacked Russia if they “participated in or supported [ . . . ] aggression” by a country using conventional weapons against them. Putin’s threats were a clear message to Ukraine’s western allies as the US and UK deliberate letting Kyiv hit targets deep inside Russia with western-made Storm Shadow missiles. Though Putin said Russia could respond to a conventional attack with nuclear weapons, he did not say whether it would do so if hit by the western missiles. He also did not specify which countries could be targets for Moscow’s retaliation. But the threats, which are expected to be codified in Russian doctrine, were among the most direct the president has made to use nuclear weapons since announcing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. The changes could mark a significant lowering of Russia’s declared nuclear threshold and spell out more criteria for Russia to potentially authorise nuclear strikes, experts said. Putin said that Russia could use nuclear weapons after receiving “reliable information” about a massed aerial assault by aircraft, missiles and drones. Moscow would also consider an attack against its ally Belarus to be an attack on Russia itself and could defend it with nuclear weapons. Russia’s current nuclear doctrine, last updated in 2020, allows for the use of nuclear weapons in response to an enemy nuclear first strike or if the state’s existence is critically threatened during a conventional attack. The US, UK, and France — Nato’s three nuclear powers — are con. (Source: FT.com)

 

25 Sept 24. Ukrainian Stronghold Vuhledar Faces Collapse After 31 Months of Defense. The town of Vuhledar in the Donetsk region faces a significant threat as Russian forces intensify their offensive, pushing toward what could be one of the most strategic gains in recent months. After 31 months of fighting, Vuhledar, a long-standing fortress for Ukrainian defense, is on the verge of falling under Russian control.

According to Colonel Vladyslav Seleznyov, former head of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) General Staff press service, Vuhledar is now semi-surrounded, with Russian forces reaching the outskirts of the town. Russian troops are advancing from three sides, threatening to encircle the Ukrainian military units. The UK Defence Ministry has noted that this is part of an intensified offensive that has seen Russian forces make gradual, though costly, progress around Vuhledar in recent weeks .

Reports from open-source intelligence and pro-Russian military bloggers suggest that Ukrainian forces are at risk of encirclement, with Russian troops penetrating the eastern parts of Vuhledar and advancing via nearby towns like Vodyane and Prechystivka . The situation has become so precarious that the Ukrainian 72nd Mechanized Brigade, which has defended Vuhledar for over two years, appears to have begun a gradual withdrawal to avoid being trapped.

Vuhledar, a mining town with a pre-war population of 14,000, is located 50 kilometers south of Pokrovsk and serves as a critical roadway junction and logistics hub in the Donetsk region. Its position anchors the junction between the southern and eastern fronts, making it a key defensive point for Ukrainian forces. However, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) argues that while the loss of Vuhledar would be a symbolic blow, it is unlikely to dramatically alter the overall course of the conflict in the Donetsk region. The ISW suggests that Russian control over Vuhledar would not provide immediate access to vital supply lines or significantly disrupt Ukrainian logistics, as Russia already controls many of the surrounding roads.

Back in January and February 2023, Ukrainian forces managed to repel Russian assaults near Vuhledar. However, after months of relentless attacks, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade is reportedly exhausted and stretched thin.

Despite being well-equipped with T-64 tanks, BMP-2 combat vehicles, and M-109 howitzers, the 72nd cannot hold the line indefinitely. David Axe, a military analyst for Forbes, highlighted that two years of continuous combat without a unit-wide break has taken a toll on Ukrainian Brigade. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

20 Sept. 24. Ukrainian officials eye export potential of pent-up weapons expertise. As Ukraine continues its fight against the Russian invasion, the country’s defense companies hope to convert their wartime experience into foreign exports once a mandate lifts to supply only local forces.

The sentiment comes amid a desire by Ukrainian and European manufacturers, in particular, to forge partnerships that are meant to blossom when the country enters something of a post-war period. Local arms makers have touted their products as war-proven, tested in an intense land conflict not seen in Europe since World War 2, since the Russian full-scale invasion began in February 2022.

Vadym Ivchenko, a Ukrainian lawmaker for the Batkivshchyna party, told Defense News Ukraine’s defense industry has developed a wide range of capabilities since then. The country’s defense industry is obliged by law to supply its entire output to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, keeping the sector’s innovations local for now.

“We test all weapons and equipment in the battlefield, and all of them undergo upgrades based on the combat experience of our soldiers. We have very efficient drones that can successfully strike the enemy, and Ukrainian defense companies are very competitive with regards to drones, armored vehicles and many other types of gear,” Ivchenko said.

Ukraine is currently making efforts to ramp up its industry’s ammunition production capacities. In the long term, local plants could supply the surplus of their output to other militaries across Europe, as numerous allies are currently building up their stockpiles, according to Ukrainian officials.

“We also make mines and ammunition of different types: 122mm, 152mm and 155mm, among others. Right now, our industry produces only for our military. But once the war is over, it will be possible to export weapons that are needed by allied militaries abroad,” Ivchenko said.

Under Ukrainian law, local manufacturers are required to sell their output to the country’s armed forces to bolster its combat against Russia’s military. However, some officials have begun pointing out what they see as the limitations of such an approach, arguing the restriction deprives both the industry and the state budget of revenue.

At a Sept. 5 meeting of the Temporary Special Commission on Protection of Investors’ Rights in Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, lawmaker Halyna Yanchenko said opening up weapon and equipment exports could generate a major income stream for the country.

“Weapons made in Ukraine and tested in real combat are of interest to many countries around the world,” she said, as quoted in a statement released by the parliament. “Our defense industry can annually produce goods worth $20bn. At the same time, the state is able to purchase weapons for only $6bn, this includes purchases from abroad. We are slowing down the development of a strategic industry through export restrictions.”

Similarly to other industry players, Ukrainian defense company Kvertus supplies its entire output of electronic-warfare and reconnaissance systems to the country’s military. However, after the exports ban is eventually lifted, the manufacturer hopes to launch foreign sales of its combat-proven systems with the help of foreign partners in Europe or the United States.

Serhii Skoryk, the commercial director of Kvertus, told Defense News the business is promoting its offers, including anti-drone jamming systems, abroad even as it cannot sell it to foreign users. The company took part in the MSPO defense industry show in Kielce, Poland, in early September.

“We are the biggest anti-drone jamming system producer in Ukraine. Our company makes around 5,000 products per month, and all of it goes to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Kvertus equipment is combat-proven and saves lives every day. The demand is high, because a $400 drone can destroy a tank worth $10m,” he said.

“Today, it’s forbidden to export such products, but it might be possible tomorrow. The demand abroad is huge, and we are discussing with our foreign partners how we can use our extensive experience with fighting against Russia’s attack,” according to Skoryk.

Ukraine’s industry is dominated by state-owned players, including the country’s defense giant Ukroboronprom. At the same time, the ongoing war has spurred the growth of many private companies such as Kyiv-based Kvertus. (Source: glstrade.com/Defense News)

 

24 Sept. 24. Russian Forces are Coating Drones with Toxic Substances.

Ukrainian forces have reported that the Russian military is now using drones coated with a hazardous substance that can cause chemical burns. This tactic was confirmed by Yurii Fedorenko, the commander of the “Achilles” battalion of the 92nd Separate Assault Brigade.

According to Fedorenko, Russian forces are employing all available means to inflict harm on Ukrainian troops, which includes the recent shift from mining drones to treating them with dangerous chemicals. He emphasized that the Russia is not adhering to international warfare norms, utilizing methods that include white phosphorus and toxic substances.

“The enemy uses all weapons that can help him destroy Ukrainians. They do not follow any defined universal rules of warfare. Therefore, the enemy uses everything against us, except for nuclear weapons. This is white phosphorus, these are poisonous substances. This is, in particular, a new tactic used by the enemy. At first, the Russians mined their UAVs, now they treat them with additional chemicals. The goals of which are the maximum poisoning of our military, including chemical burns. That’s why the rules at the front are simple – don’t touch anything the eye catches your eye on.”

He reminded that Ukraine cannot use a number of means: poisonous substances, anti-personnel marking:

“As for Ukraine, our situation is somewhat different. We are signatories to a number of conventions. We ratified them within the state. Accordingly, it is necessary to build up capacities and efforts with the means by which we can work. In particular, unmanned systems today are an irreplaceable tool for reconnaissance of the enemy, its detection and highly effective, precise destruction.”

Fedorenko also called to join the “Achilles” group:

“At a later point, there is a collection for wings with artificial intelligence. They are expensive. They help to destroy, in particular, anti-aircraft means of the enemy, which interfere with the work of our drones. Thanks to drones with artificial intelligence, we have destroyed at the moment a significant number of the enemy’s most expensive assets, such as Tors, Armors, and Buks. And in order to increase the ability to hit the enemy as much as possible, we need additional wings with artificial intelligence. Therefore, we ask everyone who has the opportunity to go to social networks and definitely support us.”

(Source: UAS VISION/United24; Hromadske Radio)

 

22 Sept. 24. Ukraine is anticipating the delivery of Swedish Saab JAS-39 Gripen and European Eurofighter fighter jets from its allies.

Ukraine is in talks with its allies to receive Swedish Gripen and European Eurofighter fighter jets, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov revealed during a national telethon.

“Consultations are ongoing regarding Gripen fighters, as well as Eurofighter jets. This is a strong lineup of platforms, and we are discussing the timeline for when they will be delivered,” Umerov stated.

According to Umerov, Ukraine is in active discussions with its allies, outlining the number of aviation brigades and aircraft required. He also stressed the importance of intensifying negotiations with partners to expand the country’s air capabilities, announcing that solutions are already being developed.

“Last year, we concentrated on pilot training, platform acquisition, and infrastructure development. This year, our focus is on expanding these efforts to gain an advantage over the enemy in the air. These processes were already in motion, but they now need to be scaled up. We’re actively working on that, and we already have solutions that we’re coordinating with our partners,” Umerov explained.

Defense Express emphasizes an important point – for the first time since the beginning of the full-scale war, an official statement has been made that Ukraine is working on the potential acquisition of Eurofighter jets. This can be considered somewhat intriguing news, as up until now, Ukrainian officials had not publicly addressed the issue of acquiring these jets at such a high level.

Throughout 2023, Western media speculated that the United Kingdom might transfer some of its Eurofighter jets to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, specifically the oldest version, known as Tranche 1.

British Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 1 jet, 2020

In early February 2023, reports indicated that the UK could provide Ukraine with its oldest Eurofighter jets, which had previously been used in combat over Libya and were now serving as “aggressor” aircraft for training purposes. However, by December 2023, the reports changed, stating that the UK would not be sending these outdated Eurofighter Typhoons to Ukraine and would instead scrap them. Notably, these reports were not accompanied by any official statements from Ukraine’s military or political leadership.

Therefore, we need to consider that throughout 2024, a different and more favorable configuration may have developed, within which consultations on Eurofighters for Ukraine are now underway, and it is possible that details of this configuration will be revealed in the near future.

(Source: News Now/https://bulgarianmilitary.com/)

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