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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 19.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

  • KURSK: Ukrainian forces claim that they have ‘stopped’ Russia’s ‘counter-offensive’ in Kursk, and have stabilised the situation (though this remains unclear)
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian forces have launched a drone strike that successfully destroyed a large ammunition storage facility in Russia’s Tver oblast near Toropets, marking a notable blow to Russian logistics
  • CASUALTIES: Unconfirmed estimates put the number of Russians and Ukrainians killed or wounded in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine at 1m
  • FORECAST: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed on 18 September that his ‘victory plan’ is now fully finalised, and while he has not provided details, it will not include territorial concessions to Russia
  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing to increase pressure on the flanks of Chasiv Yar and to penetrate the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal. Geolocated footage from 16 September indicated that Russian forces successfully crossed the canal south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, indicating another opportunity for Russian forces to establish a stable presence on the western banks of the canal.
  • BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces are continuing to make slow and incremental advances into central Toretsk. Geolocated footage from 17 and 18 September confirmed further Russian advances within eastern Toretsk, specifically along the main thoroughfare, Tsentralna Street, that runs west into the town centre.
  • DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian forces have continued to make gains to the east and south-east of Pokrovsk, while Ukrainian forces have conducted limited successful counter-attacks. Geolocated footage from 16 and 17 September indicates recent Russian advances to the east of Pokrovsk, as well as in areas to the north-east of Novokalynove, to the north-west of Arkhanhelske and in north-western Hrodivka – the latter being an important town that has for the last month proven a key node in Ukraine’s outer defences on the approach to Pokrovsk itself. Meanwhile, further south, footage from 17 September likely confirms that Russian forces have seized Ukrainsk, located to the south-east of Pokrovsk. This will likely allow Russian forces to increase pressure on a pocket of Ukrainian forces operating between Ukrainsk and Krasnohorivka some seven miles (11km) to the south-east. If Russian forces continue advancing in this area in the coming days, a limited Ukrainian withdrawal to prevent an encirclement is likely. Russian forces also made confirmed gains to the south-west of Mykhailivka (itself located to the south-east of Pokrovsk). Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces regained positions in western Mykhailivka as of 16 September.
  • KHARKIV: Heavy fighting continues within Vovchansk, a large town located to the north-east of Kharkiv city within which Russian forces have become bogged down in recent months. Geolocated footage from 16 September indicated that Russian forces were striking Ukrainian positions in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant at the centre of the city – indicating that Ukraine has retaken several positions there. In this vein, Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces spokesperson Vitaliy Sarantsev reported on 16 September that while Russian forces continue their attacks within Vovchansk, the intensity of Russian attacks in other areas along the Kharkiv axis has marginally decreased, though their use of reconnaissance drones has reportedly increased by 40% (within an unspecified timeframe).
  • KURSK: On 18 September, Ukrainian Kharkiv oblast administration spokesperson Oleksiy Dmitrashkivskyi claimed that Ukrainian forces have ‘stopped’ Russia’s ‘counter-offensive’ in Kursk and stabilised the situation. While Dmitrashkivskyi did acknowledge that Russian forces retook an unnamed settlement in Kursk during a night attack on 10-11 September, it remains unclear whether Russia’s counter-attacks in Kursk have culminated. Russian forces have succeeded in pushing back Ukraine’s western flank in Kursk in recent days, though it remains unclear how well-resourced Russia’s counter-attacks are and whether Ukrainian forces have succeeded in digging in to slow Russia’s eventual counter-offensive. Nevertheless, geolocated footage from 16 September indicates that Russian forces advanced in northern Obukhovka, located to the south-east of Korenevo, while the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on the same day that its forces took Uspenovka and Borki, located to the south of Korenevo and south of Sudzha, respectively. Meanwhile Ukrainian sources claim that their forces have encircled a group of Russian forces in Kremyanoye (located to the east of Korenevo).
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 18 September shows Russian advances to the west of Tabaivka, to the west of Krmazunivka (located to the south-west of Svatove) and southwards along the O-131306 highway between Svatove and Makiivka.
  • SOUTHERN: On 18 September, Russian forces advanced in rural areas near the village of Marfopil, located less than four miles (6km) to the south-east of Huliapole (Zaporizhzhia oblast). This section of the frontline has been very quiet in recent months, with very few confirmed Russian advances and little significant Russian offensive activity. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched ground attacks to the north of Robotyne on 17-18 September, but did not make any progress. While it is unlikely that Russian forces have sufficient capacity to launch large-scale assaults towards the large town of Huliapole, these small advances reflect Russian efforts to exploit opportunities that present themselves and to maintain pressure on lower-priority frontlines.
  • STRIKES: On 17 September, 51 Shahed-136/131 drones struck Ukraine. The country’s air defences intercepted 34 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Kharkiv, Kerson, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. On 18 September, Russia launched three Kh-59/69 and 52 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces destroyed 46 drones over Cherkasy, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts.
  • STRIKES: Earlier on 19 September, Russia attacked Ukraine with three S-300/S-400 missiles, one Kh-59/69 missile and 42 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences shot down 42 UAVs and the Kh-59/69 missile over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Rivne, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. The Russian MoD claimed on 19 September that Russian forces struck the main centre of the special radio communications of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR). The attack was reportedly carried out with airstrikes, UAVs and missiles. The Russian MoD also claimed that its forces struck critically important airfield infrastructure facilities in Ukraine.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 18 September, Ukrainian forces launched a drone strike and successfully destroyed a large ammunition storage facility in Russia’s Tver oblast near Toropets. According to Ukrainian media outlets, the attack was co-ordinated by the GUR and Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU). The targeted stores reportedly housed Russian-produced Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, anti-aircraft missiles and artillery ammunition. Andriy Kovalenko, the head of Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation, stated that the facility also stored missiles for S-300, S-400 and Grad systems, as well as North Korean-made KN-24 ballistic missiles. According to a Ukrainian OSINT source, the attack resulted in the loss of thousands of tonnes of missiles, artillery rounds and explosive materials.
  • STRIKES: The Russian MoD did not comment on the strike and merely reported that its air defences intercepted 53 drones targeting Russia. However, the attack sparked discontent among Russian milbloggers with the Russian military authorities for not ensuring the facility’s proper protection. The attack underscores Kyiv’s ongoing strategy to degrade Russian logistics and missile capabilities, including highly lethal Iskandr-M ballistic missiles and artillery stockpiles. The clear success of such attacks will continue to pose operational challenges for Russia’s military logistics, given that the Russian authorities have not taken the necessary steps to address the vulnerabilities of military storage facilities up until this point. As a result, Russian forces will possibly have to reform their storage and logistics systems significantly to prevent such large-scale losses in single locations.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • MOBILISATION: The Russian MoD is reportedly pressuring Russian President Vladimir Putin to declare a new wave of mobilisation. According to a report by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on 19 September, Putin met with defence officials earlier this year before his inauguration in May. They allegedly implored the Russian president to call for a fresh round of mobilisation to bolster manpower, though Putin stated that he wanted to continue to rely on those voluntarily signing military contracts. One insider familiar with the matter revealed that more people are considering the inevitability of another round of mobilisation. This comes despite efforts to incentivise potential recruits financially (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 1 August 2024).
  • MOBILISATION: Putin signed a decree on 16 September to increase the regular staffing size of the Russian army by around 180,000 troops to a total of almost 1.5 m active service personnel. The decree enters into force on 1 December, and will provide the Russian MoD with only a few months to increase the on-paper strength of the Russian armed forces, which, if met, would render Russia’s number of active combat troops as the second largest armed forces in the world (after China). This marks the third time that Putin has officially expanded the number of contract troops since 2022. However, we assess that this order is not indicative of another wave of Russian mobilisation, but rather demonstrative of efforts to increase the long-term capacity of the Russian military. Nevertheless, economic challenges, including those in the longer term, will likely present hurdles that undermine Russia’s ability to increase the size of its military.
  • CASUALITIES: The number of Russians and Ukrainians killed or wounded amid Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is estimated to have reached 1m. The WSJ reported this estimation on 17 September but caveated by stressing the challenges involved in determining the exact casualty figures, since neither side publishes official data or realistic figures. According to the WSJ, a confidential unspecified Ukrainian estimate earlier this year indicated that 80,000 Ukrainian troops have been killed, while 400,000 have been wounded.
  • CASUALTIES: Meanwhile, Western intelligence estimates of Russian casualties vary, with some indicating that nearly 200,000 Russian troops have been killed and that 400,000 have been injured. Ultimately, the (unverified) figures illustrate the demographic impact of the war for both countries. However, the consequences are almost certainly more acute for Ukraine; Russia boasts a significantly larger population (146 m people versus 33.4 m). For further analysis on demographic decline in Russia and Ukraine and the wider implication of these crises.
  • SPILLOVER: Reports emerged on 16 September that special forces from Ukraine’s GUR attacked a Russian drone base in Syria. According to an unspecified insider familiar with the matter, the operation took place on 15 September near the city of Aleppo (Aleppo governorate). The Kyiv Post reported that Russian soldiers use this base to manufacture and test attack drones. It is unclear whether these capabilities are used to strike Ukraine, though the target possibly suggests a Ukrainian attempt to undermine Russian drone experimentation facilities. While we cannot independently verify the report, the development possibly points to Ukrainian attempts to disrupt Russian military operations in other theatres of conflict beyond Ukraine. For further analysis on alleged Ukrainian operations in the Middle East and Africa.

FORECAST

STRATEGY: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed on 18 September that his ‘victory plan’ is now fully finalised. Zelensky offered limited details, though he previously revealed that the plan emphasises four main points and that there is a fifth relating to the post-war situation. President Zelensky’s victory strategy reportedly focuses on Ukraine’s security and geopolitical position, the provision of foreign military assistance and (notably) the freedom to use it without restrictions, as well as economic support.

Zelensky insisted that there is not and cannot be any alternative to peace, nor any move to freeze the war nor indulge actions that will postpone Russian aggression to a later date. This aligns with our ongoing assessment that Kyiv is highly unlikely to entertain a temporary ceasefire that would leave Ukraine vulnerable to a renewed Russian attack in the future. Ultimately, a pause in hostilities would highly likely provide Russian forces a window to reconstitute and prepare for another full-scale invasion. Similarly, Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak stated on 17 September that none of the plans Kyiv is developing to end the war envisage a ceasefire or territorial concessions to Moscow. At the same time, Russia will almost certainly demand to retain the territories it has unilaterally annexed. Ultimately, however, compromises are required to end wars, meaning that the possibility of territorial concessions cannot be ruled out as a possibility, despite Ukrainian opposition to such gestures.

The US ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, disclosed on 17 September that US officials have seen Zelensky’s plan for a victory and they believe it ‘can work’. Thomas-Greenfield stated that Washington DC hopes to promote the strategy to world leaders when they gather in New York (US) during the 79th UN General Assembly. The high-level general debate will begin on 24 September and finish on 30 September. However, we assess that elements of the plan will likely need consensus among Ukraine’s allies for the strategy to have a chance of being successful. These largely relate to restrictions on using Western-provided capabilities, as well as economic support. Nevertheless, differing thresholds over concerns about Russian escalation will possibly impact how certain allies support Zelensky’s victory plan and the extent of any such backing.

Sept 16.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • DONETSK: Russian forces are likely experimenting with more effective mechanised assault tactics west of Donetsk City (Donetsk oblast); they have achieved some notable success
  • ESCALATION: Moscow has warned NATO that providing Ukraine with approval to conduct long-range strikes inside de jure Russian territory would mark a serious escalation of the war; however, even if approval was granted, we assess that a major escalation is unlikely
  • CARGO: Russian forces launched a Kh-22 missile against a civilian cargo vessel transporting Ukrainian grain in Romania’s economic zone; this was likely to undermine international confidence in the grain corridor
  • FORECAST: A pro-Ukrainian US activist was reportedly involved in an assassination attempt against US presidential hopeful Donald Trump; this will likely further reinforce polarisation on the issue of aiding Ukraine
  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces are steadily advancing north-east and south-east of Chasiv Yar, but Ukrainian defences along the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal continue to slow their progress. Geolocated footage from 13 September indicates Russian advances west of Klishchiivka (south-east of Chasiv Yar), underscoring that the small town is now firmly under Russian control. Footage from 14 September further confirms Russian advances towards the canal to the south of Hryhorivka (north-east of Chasiv Yar), but these advances remain very marginal. Further north, Russian forces also made confirmed advances on 15 September west of Zolotarivka, a settlement over six miles (10km) east of Siversk.
  • BAKHMUT: Further south along the Toretsk axis, Russian forces continue to slowly grind forwards into Toretsk itself, as well as consolidating their eastern and south-western flank near Niu York (both Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 12 September confirmed limited Russian advances in eastern Toretsk, though it remains unclear how much of neighbouring Niu York Russian forces now control.
  • DONTESK: Russian forces continued to make gains towards Pokrovsk, though at a slower rate due to Ukraine’s active defensive operations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 13 September that Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has succeeded in slowing down Russia’s Donetsk offensive, reporting that Russia’s artillery advantage in the area has been reduced from a factor of 12 to a factor of 2.5. Currently, Russian operations in the Pokrovsk sector are likely prioritising efforts to dislodge Ukrainian forces out of Ukrainsk (south-east of Pokrovsk) by increasing pressure on the northern and southern flanks. Geolocated footage from 13 September shows Russian forces advancing west of Ukrainsk via the northern flank. Meanwhile, on 14 September, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that Russian forces had seized Zhelanne Pershe, located south-east of Pokrovsk and just south-east of Ukrainsk. However, such claims remain visually unconfirmed.
  • DONETSK: Russian forces are likely experimenting with more effective mechanised assault tactics west of Donetsk City and have achieved some notable success. Geolocated footage from 12 September showed Russian forces launching a reinforced battalion-sized mechanised assault and advancing across fields south-west of Krasnohorivka and into eastern Hostre, both west of Donetsk City. The Ukrainian brigade repelling the attack reported that Russia launched four waves of assaults.
  • DONETSK: Although Ukrainian defensive operations inflicted severe material losses during the attack, Russian forces were able to advance between three and five miles (6 to 8km) south-west of Krasnohorivka; this is a significant rate of advance considering how often previous mechanised assaults have failed. A Ukrainian commander operating in the sector reported on 13 September that the Russian command is implementing new mechanised assault tactics, resorting to a task-organised, small, mechanised unit led by a heavily armoured tank with mine-clearing equipment, followed by several armoured vehicles. The carriers deploy infantry close to Ukrainian positions before returning to their point of departure. The Ukrainian military source noted that, although innovative, such assaults incur heavy losses, particularly of armoured vehicles. Nevertheless, such tactics can further facilitate Russian advances towards Pokrovsk and Kurakhove.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK: On 12 September, Ukrainian forces crossed the international border into Glushkov raion (Kursk oblast) and established positions south of the Seym River, likely in a bid to disrupt Russia’s ongoing counter-attacks to the east, which began on 10 September. Geolocated footage from 12 September indicates that Ukrainian forces managed to bypass Russian fixed defences along the border, including anti-tank ‘dragon’s death’, allowing infantry and armoured vehicles to make rapid gains relatively unopposed. Geolocated footage from 13-14 September indicates Ukrainian forces have advanced south of Veseloye, located south-west of Glushkovo; however, it remains unclear if Ukrainian forces retain a presence in the town. Additionally, footage published on 12 September further indicates that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike damaged a Russian pontoon bridge across the Seym River to the north. This likely reflects Ukrainian efforts to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) south of the river in a bid to isolate Russian defences.
  • KURSK: Meanwhile, Russia’s counter-attack in Kursk oblast continues, with the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claiming that their forces recaptured 10 settlements between 10-11 September alone. This remains unconfirmed, though geolocated footage from 14 September indicates Russian advances in Lyubimovka, located east of Snagost. The scale of the Russian operation remains unclear. Zelensky described the operation on 13 September as the beginnings of a full counter-offensive; however, US Pentagon spokesperson Patrick Ryder described the operation as ‘marginal’. As such, it remains likely that Russian forces will have to assemble significantly more force to launch (and crucially sustain) a major counter-offensive operation capable of pushing the Ukrainians back.
  • KURSK: Zelensky claims that Russia has 40,000 troops in Kursk oblast; it remains likely that limited transfers of more combat-experienced units to Kursk oblast have begun though the numbers involved likely remain limited. It remains unclear precisely what comprises Zelensky’s 40,000 number, and whether that includes conscripts and other less-combat effective personnel. However, Russian forces reportedly hope to increase this number to 60-70,000 personnel. Geolocated footage indicates that elements of relatively combat-effective Airborne (VDV) units are now fighting in the area, likely having redeployed from the Siversk area (Donetsk oblast)). CNN also reported on 14 September that elements of ‘Wagner Group’ forces (likely referring to the Africa Corps) have deployed to Kursk from West Africa and that these forces are likely better equipped and trained than regular Russian forces in the area. Despite this, Zelensky’s claim that Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has created the desired result, namely slowing Russia’s eastern offensive in Donetsk oblast, remains to be seen. We have seen little indication that combat-effective units have been redeployed from the key Pokrovsk and Toretsk offensives, which likely remain Moscow’s priority.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Oskil-Kreminna line, making confirmed gains in the Kupiansk and Svatove sectors. Geolocated footage from 13 September shows recent Russian advances into northern Petropavlivka, east of Kupiansk. Meanwhile, Russian forces have made confirmed gains as of 15 September, north of Stelmakhivka, located northwest of Svatove.
  • SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
  • STRIKES: On 13 September, Russia attacked Ukraine with 26 Shahed drones. Ukrainian forces downed 24 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. Overnight on 14 September, Russia launched a large-scale UVA attack involving 76 Shaed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted 72 UAVs over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.
  • STRIKES: On 15 September, Russia launched 14 Shahed-136/131 drones, two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles and one Kh-59 missile. Ukrainian air defences intercepted ten UAVS and the missile over Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. However, Ukraine failed to intercept the two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles that targeted Odesa oblast. Earlier on 16 September, Russian forces launched a large-scale drone attack involving 56 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukraine intercepted 53 UAVs over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Ukraine’s Air Force noted that Kyiv oblast was the main target of the latest attack.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, according to unnamed European intelligence sources quoted by Reuters on 13 September, Russia’s new long-range attack drone, Garpiya-A1, includes Chinese engines and components. Russia started producing the drone last year, and it has already been deployed in Ukraine against civilian and military targets. While the production rates of such drones remain unknown, their mass production would make Russia possibly less dependent on Iranian-provided Shahed-136/131 drones and reflects growing Russian-Chinese military cooperation.
  • STRIKES: On 14 September, at the 20th annual Yalta European Strategy (YES) meeting in the capital Kyiv, Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), explained that Moscow’s procurement of foreign military equipment continues to pose a serious challenge for Ukraine. For instance, Budanov noted an increase in Russia’s operational tempo shortly after receiving North Korean artillery rounds. North Korea and Iran have also been providing Moscow with ballistic missiles, which will enhance Moscow’s ability to conduct lethal long-range strikes against Ukraine. Meanwhile, Budanov claimed that Moscow has significantly ramped up the production of Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, which remain among the most challenging projectiles for Ukraine to intercept. However, he did not provide specific production numbers.
  • STRIKES: At the YES meeting, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that 35% of Russian Shahed drones were intercepted with man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). Over recent months, reports have also stressed the effectiveness of MANPADs, particularly against low-flying Russian aircraft. MANPADs operated by Ukrainian forces include the US-provided STARSstreak, the first batch of which was delivered to Kyiv in mid-March. Zelensky, nonetheless, stated that Ukrainian forces continue to grapple with persistent shortages of artillery rounds as well as first-person view (FPV) drones.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • ESCALATION: On 12 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned the UK, US and wider NATO states that providing Ukraine with approval to conduct long-range strikes inside de jure Russian territory would mark a serious escalation of the war and mean Russia and NATO would be in direct conflict. However, following UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer’s visit to Washington DC to seek approval for Storm Shadow cruise missile strikes in Russia, the leaders did not announce a change of authorisation policy.
  • CARGO: On 12 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that a Russian strategic bomber launched a Kh-22 missile against a civilian cargo vessel transporting Ukrainian grain to Egypt. The vessel, under the flag of St Kitts and Nevis, was transporting Ukrainian grain to Egypt when it was struck after it left Ukrainian waters and was reportedly still located in Romania’s maritime economic zone. Since the start of the war, Russia has carried out numerous strikes against grain vessels. However, all these attacks occurred within Ukrainian territorial waters. As such, the latest attack is unprecedented given that it took place in international waters (according to international law, the surface waters of a country’s maritime economic zone are international waters).
  • CARGO: The attack coincided with heightened regional tensions related to the UK’s possible agreement to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles against Russian de jure territory. Additionally, on 10 September, the former Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu hinted that Russia would not refrain from attacks against vessels in the Black Sea following Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk oblast (Russia), likely in a bid to undermine international confidence in the safety of the shipping route and link Ukrainian military action to instability in the Black Sea. Overall, we assess this incident underscores the persistent threat to civilian shipping in the Black Sea, a threat exacerbated by increasing regional tensions.
  • NUCLEAR: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will reportedly increase its monitoring missions to Ukrainian facilities critical for ensuring nuclear safety. Ukraine’s state nuclear energy company Energoatom announced this development on 13 September and disclosed that IAEA experts had visited an unnamed Ukrainian power substation the day prior that was reportedly damaged in a recent Russian attack. According to Energoatom, more than 100 Russian drones and missiles have flown near Ukrainian nuclear power plants in less than a month. Increased IAEA monitoring missions likely aim to ensure nuclear safety and provide unbiased reporting of strikes or provocations in the vicinity of nuclear infrastructure.
  • AID: On 15 September, Zelensky stated that Western aid was insufficient to equip even four of 14 unspecified Ukrainian army brigades needed on the frontline. Zelensky did not specify what the brigades would be used for, nor where they would be deployed. Nevertheless, Zelensky insisted that it did not matter how many brigades were defending the eastern portion of the frontline if half of them were not equipped properly. Zelensky stated that such brigades were lacking sufficient quantities of armoured vehicles and artillery shells.
  • AID: Reports emerged on 13 September that an agreement for the Netherlands to provide Ukraine with a full Patriot air defence system collapsed after an unnamed partner backed out of the plan. This development demonstrates how partners’ failure to honour their commitments (as well as insufficient or delayed assistance) undermines Ukraine’s position on the battlefield and its ability to counter Russian strikes. Such delays will have an impact on the overall operating environment in Ukraine this winter.
  • AID: The Guardian reported on 12 September that Russia managed to import aircraft tyres worth over USD 30 m from Western and other manufacturers last year, despite sanctions. Russia reportedly acquired such goods by using third-country intermediaries, underscoring the need for robust compliance and due diligence procedures in strategic sectors. While the veracity of the report cannot be confirmed, it highlights that loopholes remain that Russia can exploit to obtain critical technologies and products. Although Ukraine’s Western allies will likely maintain efforts to close sanctions evasion techniques, we assess that Moscow will nevertheless continue to utilise different methods to ensure it can access sanctioned goods.

FORECAST

US: On 15 September, former US president and presidential hopeful Donald Trump was targeted in an apparent second assassination attempt. The suspect, Ryan Wesley Routh, is reportedly a supporter of Ukraine. Routh allegedly travelled to Ukraine after the beginning of the full-scale invasion; he has also previously urged Congress to dispatch funding and weapons to Kyiv.

The incident comes amid the Biden administration’s efforts to double down on support for Kyiv ahead of the US presidential election in November. On 13 September, the Biden administration requested that Congress extend the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to facilitate the transfer of USD 5.8 bn in military aid to Ukraine. The funds face a 30 September deadline, given that the amount was outlined under the spending plan for the 2024 fiscal year (FY). Aside from this, the Biden administration is also reportedly considering providing Kyiv with more advanced technology (namely the provision of Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles) and easing restrictions on how Ukrainian forces can prosecute the war. However, approval for long-range strikes inside Russia remains absent.

Ukrainian President Zelensky has condemned the apparent assassination attempt, though the incident will likely further polarise American society on the topic of aiding Ukraine ahead of the election. The seeming involvement of a pro-Ukraine activist in an assassination attempt against Trump will likely reinforce disapproval over arming Kyiv among Ukraine-sceptic Republican or Republican-leaning voters. Russian or pro-Russia actors will likely use the suspect’s pro-Ukraine stance to drive mis- and dis-information operations to fuel negative sentiment against Washington DC supporting Kyiv militarily and financially. Allegations that the would-be assassin was a Ukrainian agent are also likely to circulate among conspiracy theorists and pro-Russian outlets.

US officials are reportedly trying to improve Ukraine’s strategic position on the battlefield before Biden’s term expires in January. According to a report in the Wall Street Journal on 12 September, the White House is debating how best to assist Kyiv over the next four months given its limited resources. Senior Biden administration officials are reportedly under ‘no illusions’ that Kyiv can win the war by 20 January, when a new president will be inaugurated. US Officials are not pushing Kyiv to enter peace talks, nor are they dictating battlefield planning. While authorisation for strikes inside Russia remains a likely option, broader enduring issues (such as manpower shortages and insufficient/delayed weapons supplies) will likely undermine Ukraine’s ability to secure a definitive battlefield advantage in the near term.

Nevertheless, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi announced on 15 September that Kyiv is working to improve the training quality for its military and will introduce new plans in the coming weeks and months. Syrskyi emphasised the importance of high-quality training and noted that the Ukrainian military authorities are considering creating a special educational institution for instructors. This school would be the main and only source of well-trained instructors. Though this is highly likely a longer-term objective, it underscores efforts to increase training quality and the overall calibre of military personnel.

The head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, assessed on 14 September that Russia aims to achieve a victory in Ukraine before the beginning of 2026. According to Budanov, Moscow predicts that the negative socio-economic impact of the war will become apparent around the summer of 2025. Budanov noted that troop shortages are becoming an increasingly pressing matter also and claimed that the Russian authorities could realistically be forced to declare a new round of formal mobilisation or reduce the intensity of their offensives. Our assessment remains that Russia will likely try to avoid declaring another round of mobilisation for as long as it can to avoid societal backlash. Nevertheless, a need to accelerate the end of the war in Russia’s favour and/or increased Ukrainian attacks or operations into de jure Russian territory could realistically push the Russian government to order mobilisation in 2025 or 2026. Nevertheless, crypto-mobilisation and coercion will likely remain the main methods for replenishing troop numbers. (Source: Sibylline)

 

19 Sept. 24. Zelenskiy says Ukrainian military has reduced Russian potential to attack on eastern front.

President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Thursday that Ukrainian forces had reduced the potential of Russian troops to launch attacks in Donetsk region on the eastern front of the more than 2 1/2-year-old war.

Zelenskiy, speaking in his nightly video address after conferring with commanders, said the military was doing its utmost “for the resilience of our battle brigades”.

“At this time, the Ukrainian Defence Forces have managed to diminish the occupiers’ assault potential in Donetsk region,” he said.

The situation, he said, remained “critically difficult with tough battles every day” in the two sectors of the eastern front subjected to the most Russian attacks — near the cities of Pokrovsk and Kurakhove.

Ukraine’s operation in southern Russia’s Kursk region, launched last month, succeeded in getting the Russian military to redirect resources away from the eastern front, Zelenskiy said.

And capturing Russian troops had bolstered Ukraine’s “exchange fund” of prisoners of war to be used as a bargaining chip in facilitating exchanges with Moscow.

“In this theatre we managed to divert close to 40,000 Russian troops,” he said. “Our active measures are proceeding.”

The president also said that one person had died in a Russian attack on an elderly people’s residence in Ukraine’s northern Sumy region, an area subject to frequent Russian assaults. (Source: Reuters)

 

19 Sept 24. Ammunition from India enters Ukraine, raising Russian ire.

  • Summary
  • European customers have been transferring Indian munitions to Ukraine
  • Kyiv has dire shortage of artillery shells as it fights Russia
  • Delhi and Moscow have warm relationship built on defence cooperation
  • Despite Russian protests, India sees arms exports as commercial opportunity

Artillery shells sold by Indian arms makers have been diverted by European customers to Ukraine and New Delhi has not intervened to stop the trade despite protests from Moscow, according to eleven Indian and European government and defence industry officials, as well as a Reuters analysis of commercially available customs data.

The transfer of munitions to support Ukraine’s defence against Russia has occurred for more than a year, according to the sources and the customs data. Indian arms export regulations limit the use of weaponry to the declared purchaser, who risks future sales being terminated if unauthorised transfers occur.

The Kremlin has raised the issue on at least two occasions, including during a July meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Indian counterpart, three Indian officials said.

Details of the ammunition transfers are reported by Reuters for the first time.

The foreign and defence ministries of Russia and India did not respond to questions. In January, Indian foreign ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal told a news conference that India had not sent or sold artillery shells to Ukraine.

Two Indian government and two defence industry sources told Reuters that Delhi produced only a very small amount of the ammunition being used by Ukraine, with one official estimating that it was under 1% of the total arms imported by Kyiv since the war. The news agency couldn’t determine if the munitions were resold or donated to Kyiv by the European customers.

Among the European countries sending Indian munitions to Ukraine are Italy and the Czech Republic, which is leading an initiative to supply Kyiv with artillery shells from outside the European Union, according to a Spanish and a senior Indian official, as well as a former top executive at Yantra India, a state-owned company whose munitions are being used by Ukraine.

The Indian official said that Delhi was monitoring the situation. But, along with a defence industry executive with direct knowledge of the transfers, he said India had not taken any action to throttle the supply to Europe. Like most of the 20 people interviewed by Reuters, they spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.

The Ukrainian, Italian, Spanish and Czech defence ministries did not respond to requests for comment.

Delhi and Washington, Ukraine’s main security backer, have recently strengthened defence and diplomatic cooperation against the backdrop of a rising China, which both regard as their main rival.

India also has warm ties with Russia, its primary arms supplier for decades, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has refused to join the Western-led sanctions regime against Moscow.

But Delhi, long the world’s largest weapons importer, also sees the lengthy war in Europe as an opportunity to develop its nascent arms export sector, according to six Indian sources familiar with official thinking.

Ukraine, which is battling to contain a Russian offensive toward the eastern logistics hub of Pokrovsk, has a dire shortage of artillery ammunition.

The White House declined to comment and the U.S. State Department referred questions on Delhi’s arms exports to the Indian government.

India exported just over $3bn of arms between 2018 and 2023, according to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute think-tank.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said at an Aug. 30 conference that defence exports surpassed $2.5bn in the last fiscal year and that Delhi wanted to increase that to about $6 bn by 2029.

Commercially available customs records show that in the two years before the February 2022 invasion, three major Indian ammunition makers – Yantra, Munitions India and Kalyani Strategic Systems – exported just $2.8m in munitions components to Italy and the Czech Republic, as well as Spain and Slovenia, where defence contractors have invested heavily in supply chains for Ukraine.

Between February 2022 and July 2024, the figure had increased to $135.25 m, the data show, including completed munitions, which India began exporting to the four nations.

Arzan Tarapore, an India defence expert at Stanford University, said that Delhi’s push to expand its arms exports was a major factor in the transfer of its arms to Ukraine.

“Probably in the sudden recent expansion, some instances of end-user violations have occurred.”

DISCREET DELIVERIES

Unlisted Italian defence contractor Meccanica per l’Elettronica e Servomeccanismi (MES) was among the companies sending Indian-made shells to Ukraine, said the former top Yantra official.

MES is Yantra’s biggest foreign client. The executive said the Rome-based company buys empty shells from India and fills them with explosives.

Several Western firms had explosive filling capabilities but lack the manufacturing capacity to mass produce artillery shells, the executive said.

Yantra said in its 2022-23 annual report that it had agreed a deal with an unnamed Italian client to set up a manufacturing line for L15A1 shells, which the former Yantra executive identified as MES.

MES and Yantra India did not respond to emails seeking comment.

Customs data indicate that Yantra shipped $35 m worth of empty 155mm L15A1 shells to MES between February 2022 and July 2024.

Customs records also show that in February 2024, U.K.-based arms company Dince Hill – whose board includes a top MES executive – exported $6.7 m in ammunition from Italy to Ukraine.

Among the exports were 155mm L15A1 shells, which the customs declaration said were manufactured by MES for Ukraine’s Defence Ministry and supplied for “promoting the defense capability and mobilization readiness of Ukraine.”

Dince Hill did not respond to an email seeking comment. Its new owner, Rome-based Effequattro Consulting, could not be reached.

In another instance, Spain’s Transport Minister Oscar Puente shared on social media in May an end user agreement signed by a Czech defence official that authorised the transfer of 120mm and 125mm ammunition shells from Munitions India to arms dealer Czech Defence Systems.

Pro-Palestinian activists had alleged that the Borkum, a vessel carrying Indian-made arms which had stopped in a Spanish port, was carrying the weapons to Israel.

Spanish newspaper El Mundo reported in May the final destination was actually Ukraine. A Spanish official and another source familiar with the matter confirmed to Reuters that Kyiv was the end user. Munitions India and CDS did not respond to questions.

Customs records dated March 27 show Munitions India had shipped 10,000 rounds of 120mm and 125mm mortar shells, worth more than $9 m, from Chennai to CDS.

FRIENDLY FIRE

Russia, which supplies more than 60% of Delhi’s arms imports, is a valued partner for India. In July, Modi chose Moscow for his first bilateral international trip since being elected to a third term.

At another meeting that month in Kazakhstan between top Indian diplomat Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Lavrov, the Russian minister pressed his counterpart about Indian munitions being used by Ukrainians and complained that some were made by state-owned Indian companies, according to an Indian official with direct knowledge of the encounter.

The official did not share Jaishankar’s response.

Walter Ladwig, a South Asia security expert at King’s College London, said the diversion of a relatively small amount of ammunition was geopolitically useful for Delhi.

“It allows India to show partners in the West that it is not ‘on Russia’s side’ in the Russia-Ukraine conflict,” he said, adding that Moscow held little leverage over Delhi’s decisions.

(Source: Reuters)

 

16 Sept 24. US investigates domestic components in Russian weapons. More than 40% of nearly 2,500 components analysed in Russian weapons on the Ukrainian battlefield were made by four American suppliers. Image of Senator of Connecticut and Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Richard Blumenthal, on 23 February 2024. Blumenthal chaired a hearing exploring the US components used to operate Russian weapon systems on 10 September 2024. Credit: Shutterstock/Bumble Dee.

On 10 September 2024, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations – the oldest subcommittee in the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs – called on four US companies to give evidence regarding the use of their products that were “disproportionately found” in Russian weapons.

According to their findings, more than 40% of nearly 2,500 components analysed in Russian weapons on the Ukrainian battlefield were made by these four domestic suppliers.

Approximately 16% from Analog Devices, 15% from Texas Instruments, 5% from AMD and 5% from Intel.

“These are the rough numbers,” noted the Chairman and Connecticut Senator, Richard Blumenthal, “they may be off by one or two [percent], but you get the idea, this phenomenon is undeniable.”

Avoiding sanctions

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US and its allies imposed severe sanctions on the invader that have had severe costs on the Russian economy and industry.

These controls include sweeping financial sanctions and export controls that supposedly cut off the country’s access to vital technological inputs, weakened its industrial base and undercut their strategic ambitions.

The US government have even revised their export controls over the past two-and-a-half years to target issues such as Russia’s use of Iranian-made Shahed uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs).

However, since 2023, Russia’s wartime economy has stabilised with GDP growing by 3.6% (following a 1.2% contraction in 2022). Nevertheless, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warns that while this phenomenon may last a long time, “it is not eternal.”

While the West worries about Russia’s apparent stability, the reality that sanctions are not working as well as intended – with Amercian components being used to suppress Ukraine’s military resistance, as well as its civilian population and infrastructure – reduces the West’s position in the war even more.

“Despite two years of savage, criminal aggression, and two years of sanctions, American technology is still fuelling Russia’s murderous war against Ukraine,” observed Blumenthal in his opening remarks.

Call for audits

Companies must do more to tighten their grip on the life-cycle of their products.

Members of the subcommittee pushed representatives of the four suppliers to commit, in the moment, to establishing new audit protocols when dealing with potential buyers. These additional compliance procedures would verify customers and their use of the products down the flow of commerce in accordance with stronger internal due diligence processes.

However, the subcommittee’s efforts to pin-point areas of vulnerability in global trade proved difficult. The vice president for global trade compliance and government affairs at Analog Devices, Michelle Stout, commented:

“Unfortunately, stopping diversion completely is impossible because of the ubiquity of chips in modern economies, the sprawling nature of chip markets and determined efforts by bad actors to circumvent regulations.”

Russian weapons: Kh-101 case study

Senator Blumenthal opened the hearing by recalling Russia’s strike against a children’s hospital in Kyiv on 8 July when a Kh-101 cruise missile was fired, “slaughtering dozens of medical staff and children, brutally injuring many. That missile was made by Russia, but the technology in it was American.”

When asked to explain the problems with tracking the use of their products, Tiffany Scurry, chief compliance officer, AMD, rightly pointed out the enduring use of products in the global supply chain.

“There are a significant amount of components that were already legally in the stream of commerce before the invasion of Ukraine. When teams are able to trace components found on the Ukrainian battlefield they are often old – sometimes decades old.”

Although, after the attack on the hospital, investigators with Conflict Armament Research, a UK-based investigative organisation, found that the missile that struck Ukraine’s largest children’s hospital that day was manufactured in the Russian Federation “only weeks, and potentially just days, before the attack.”

Difficulty tracing supply chains

“Your products may be tiny, but your culpability is huge. In moral and perhaps legal terms, you bare deep responsibility,” asserted Blumenthal. “Our investigation is ongoing, and we’re going to determine whether your failure to stop these products from reaching Russia stems from wilful ignorance or perhaps something more.”

Omission often speaks loudly, and this was the case in Blumenthal’s statement. However, the four companies are right that is increasingly difficult to ensure microchips do not get into the wrong hands, and it is clear from the evidence that more must be done to regulate this in the semiconductor industry.

A spokesperson for Intel provided a statement on the hearing and its findings, commenting:

“We do not do business in Russia, and we operate in strict accordance with export laws, sanctions and regulations in the US and every jurisdiction in which we operate.

“We hold our suppliers, customers and distributors accountable to these same standards. Intel is diligently working to track and mitigate the potential diversion of our products, including actively coordinating with non-governmental organisations, the US and other governments to identify and stop this activity.”

Analog Devices, Texas Instruments and AMD were likewise contacted but none responded for comment. (Source: naval-technology.com)

 

17 Sept 24. Ukrainian shipyard executives exposed for Russian naval plan ties. The State Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) exposed the top management of a Ukrainian construction holding that was aiding Russian aggression through contracts worth $722m.

On July 29, 2018, in Novorossiysk, Russia, the Russian Navy Day was celebrated with the patrol ship “Vasily Bykov”. Source: Shutterstock

The SSU has gathered evidence implicating the leadership of a Ukrainian shipyard in financing and supporting Russian military efforts, including work on naval bases.

SSU unveils alleged Ukrainian holding’s role in Russian warship construction

In a counterintelligence breakthrough, the State Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) has exposed an organised scheme involving the leadership of a Ukrainian construction holding company. The holding is accused of clandestine cooperation with Russian military and governmental entities since the onset of the full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine.

The SSU’s investigation has revealed contracts totalling nearly Rbs100bn ($722m), enabling Russia’s naval and defence sectors while bolstering the aggressor state’s economy.

The allegation involves the company’s contracts for constructing a ship repair plant designed to service Russian warships at the Novorossiysk naval base, a maritime hub for Russia.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Ukrainian attacks using swarms of low-cost USV platforms have inflicted losses on Russian naval assets, sinking both a corvette and a landing ship within the first two months of 2024.

Similar swarming attacks have also forced the Russian military to divert additional defensive assets to protect naval installations in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk, as highlighted by GlobalData’s “Thematic Intelligence: Ukraine Conflict Impact in Aerospace, Defense & Security (2024).”

Collaboration with Russia unveiled

One of the investigation’s findings is the potential for future projects, including negotiations regarding reconstructing a submarine shipyard in St. Petersburg. This development signals ongoing cooperation that, if unchecked, could further reinforce Russia’s maritime military capabilities.

The SSU’s investigative efforts uncovered that the Russian branch of the holding company had been systematically funnelling bns of rubles into the Russian state budget. To obfuscate their illicit activities, the Ukrainian businessmen utilised offshore companies to hide the transactions and shield their operations from Ukrainian authorities. This financial manipulation is typical of sanctioned entities attempting to continue business operations while avoiding detection.

Western sanctions on Russia, following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, have significantly impacted the Russian defence industry, mainly by cutting off access to semiconductors and defence components.

As GlobalData’s intelligence on the Russian defence market reports, with the invasion of Ukraine, sanctions continue to impact Russian naval shipbuilding programmes.

Russia’s dependence on foreign components, exacerbated by sanctions and isolation following the Ukraine invasion, hampers its ability to produce and maintain advanced warships.

Evidence and arrests

The SSU executed search warrants across multiple offices and residences in Kyiv. Among the seized items were digital evidence, including computers, flash drives, and documents, all corroborating the unlawful activities. Investigators also discovered gold bars and nearly $700k in cash, hinting at the scale of the illicit gains.

The confiscated items included digital evidence such as computers, flash drives, and documents, all providing further evidence of the illegal activities. Source: Security Service of Ukraine.

Charges have already been brought against three individuals central to the conspiracy. The owner of the construction holding is charged under several articles of Ukraine’s Criminal Code, including organising economic activity with an aggressor state. The director of one of the holding’s enterprises and the chief accountant of the Russian branch also face similar charges for coordinating the illegal activities. All suspects could face up to 12 years in prison if convicted.

Ongoing investigations and future safeguards

The SSU’s investigations continue under the procedural oversight of the Kyiv City Prosecutor’s Office, signalling that further revelations could emerge regarding the full scope of the holding’s activities. Ukrainian authorities are now expected to reinforce measures designed to prevent future incidents of economic collaboration with Russia, as the country remains in a heightened defence against ongoing aggression.

(Source: naval-technology.com)

 

16 Sept 24. Two-week timeline for Russian use of new ballistic missiles in Ukraine. Western powers have stated that Iran has supplied Russia with the Fath-360 short-range ballistic missile, which has a 150kg warhead. A Fath-360 short-range ballistic missile during a test fire event in Iran. Credit: FARS via Creative Commons (CC BY 4.0)

As the fallout continues to settle from the news that Iran has sent stocks of its Fath-360 ballistic missile to Russia for use in its ongoing war against Ukraine, an estimated two-week timeline has emerged before the missile could be first used on the battlefield.

Bottom of Form

It is understood that the Fath-360 ballistic missile are most likely to be used on battlefield targets in the east of Ukraine, although they could be used to target sites of critical national infrastructure in Ukraine, causing a new element to be added to Ukraine’s already stretched air defence systems.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly called for the provision of more air defence batteries by Nato allies in order to better protect key infrastructure and military sites.

On 13 September 2024, the UK deputy permanent representative to the UN James Kariuki at a UN Security Council meeting said that Iranian “close-range ballistic missiles” would “soon reach European soil”, following an earlier confirmation from Western powers of Tehran’s latest support of Moscow.

“[The transfer] will increase Russia’s capability to launch short-range attacks on the front lines, enabling it to use more of its long-distance missiles to strike deeper inside Ukraine,” Kariuki said.

In recent weeks, Russian attacks have shifted to conducting waves of long-range missile and loitering munition strikes against sites of critical national infrastructure in Ukraine, particularly against utilities.

The bombardments have also caused significant civilian harm, with the UN verifying more than 35,000 non-combatant casualties so far as a result of Russia’s February 2022 invasion.

According to analysis carried out by Army Technology, Iran has been actively developing both solid-fuel and liquid-fuel rockets as part of its ballistic missile programmes, dating back to the 1980’s, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps playing a significant role in their development, viewing the missiles as a crucial deterrent against potential adversaries.

Iran possesses several short-range ballistic missiles in its arsenal, designed for distances ranging from 300-1,000km. Among these is the Fath-360, which was revealed and tested in September 2023, and thought to have a range of 120km and a 150kg warhead.

New threat to Ukraine’s battlefields

The new Iranian-provided Fath-360 ballistic missile will also come as something of an unknown entity for Ukraine and its Western backers and could bring new difficulties for the country’s already stretched air defence systems.

While a relatively small number of Patriot air defence batteries have been provided to Ukraine by Nato countries, it is by no means certain that these systems will be able to detect, track, and intercept the Fath-360.

Should Patriot even be able to detect and intercept the Fath-360, such is the paucity of high-end air defence platforms in Ukraine’s inventory, and their focus around the protection of CNI sites, that the use by Russia of its new SRBMs could present significant problems at the tactical battlefield level.

A typical 155mm artillery shell contains, depending on country and manufacturer a warhead roughly around 12kg in weight. According to the UN Human Rights Office, such a munition has a kill radius of between 50-150m.

While not scalable on a 1:1 basis, a 150kg high explosive warhead will have a kill or injury radius far exceeding this, measured in the hundreds of metres.

Russian continues to make tactical gains

Elsewhere, Russian combat operations in Ukraine continue to make small, steady gains across areas of the eastern front, although it is assessed that the average daily casualty rate of its forces is around 1,200 per day, against an estimated recruitment of 1,000 new personnel over the same period.

Total Russian casualties, meaning military personnel killed or wounded in combat, since its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine are now thought to be in the region of 610,000.

Key areas of attack include ongoing gains around Avdiivka, with Russian forces now reported to be operating significantly to the west of the city, which fell in February 2024 after months of brutal combat.

Ukraine’s own surprise summer incursion into Russian territory in the Kursk Oblast shifted to a defensive position covering some 820km². It is understood that Russian forces will likely seek to regain as much of its own territory as possible before the onset of winter. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

16 Sept 24. The EU is preparing to provide up to €40bn in new loans for Ukraine by the end of the year regardless of US participation, after a G7 plan to use frozen Russian assets to aid Kyiv faltered. The unilateral push comes amid concern in Brussels that Hungary will prevent the bloc from delivering safeguards that the US needs for it to participate in the frozen asset scheme, according to three people involved in the talks. The government of Viktor Orbán, the EU’s most pro-Russia leader, has sought to delay a decision on the frozen assets scheme until after the US presidential election on November 5. But Brussels must start work on any alternative within the next few weeks since such a move would rely on powers that expire at the end of the year. The funds are intended to aid the financial stability of Ukraine, which faces a $38bn financing gap in 2025, according to Kyiv and the IMF. The country relies on foreign aid to keep functioning as Russia steps up attacks on its infrastructure. (Source: FT.com)

 

16 Sept 24. NATO’s Stoltenberg says each country must decide if Ukraine can use its long-range missiles on Russia. The outgoing head of NATO Jens Stoltenberg said on Monday he welcomed talks on Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles to strike inside Russian territory, but any decision on the issue would have to be made by individual allies.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has been pleading with allies for months to let Ukraine fire Western missiles including long-range U.S. ATACMS and British Storm Shadows deep into Russia to limit Moscow’s ability to launch attacks.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and U.S. President Joe Biden held talks in Washington on Friday on whether to allow Kyiv to use the long-range missiles against targets in Russia. No decision was announced.

“I welcome these developments and these decisions but its for individual allies to make the final decisions,” Stoltenberg told LBC radio. “Allies have different policies on this.”

Some U.S. officials are deeply skeptical that allowing the use of such missiles would make a significant difference in Kyiv’s battle against Russian invaders.

President Vladimir Putin has said the West would be directly fighting Russia if it allowed Ukraine to strike with Western-made long-range missiles.

Asked about possible Russian retaliation, Stoltenberg said there were “no risk-free options in the war”.

“But I continue to believe that the biggest risk for us, for United Kingdom, for NATO, will be if President Putin wins in Ukraine,” he added. (Source: Reuters)

 

16 Sept 24. Russia Produces Kamikaze Drone with Chinese Engine. Russia started producing a new long-range attack drone called the Garpiya-A1 last year using Chinese engines and parts, which it has deployed in the war in Ukraine, according to two sources from a European intelligence agency and documents seen by Reuters.

The intelligence – which included a production contract for the new drone, company correspondence on the manufacturing process and financial documents – indicated that IEMZ Kupol, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned weapons maker Almaz-Antey, produced more than 2,500 Garpiyas from July 2023 to July 2024.

The existence of the new Russian drone incorporating Chinese technology has not been previously reported. IEMZ Kupol and Almaz-Antey did not respond to requests for comment.

The two intelligence sources said that the Garpiya, which means Harpy in Russian, has been deployed against military and civilian targets in Ukraine, causing damage to critical infrastructure as well as both civilian and military casualties.

They shared with Reuters what they said were images from Ukraine of the wreckage of a Garpiya, without providing further details. Reuters found information that reinforces this conclusion, but was unable to confirm the images independently.

The sources asked that neither they nor their agency be identified due to the sensitivity of the information. They also asked that certain details, such as dates, related to the documents be withheld.

Samuel Bendett, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington DC-based think tank, told Reuters that Garpiya, if confirmed, would mark a departure from Russia’s reliance on Iranian designs for long-range drones.

“If this is happening, it could indicate that Russia can now rely more on domestic development as well as, obviously, on China, since both sides in this war depend on many Chinese components for drone production,” he said.

Iran, which didn’t comment for this story, has supplied more than a thousand Shahed “kamikaze” drones to Russia since the start of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in May last year.

They have been used to exhaust Ukrainian air defences and hit infrastructure far from the front lines. Iran has repeatedly denied sending drones to Russia for use in Ukraine.

Russia’s defence ministry did not respond to a request for comment for this story. The Chinese foreign ministry said in a statement to Reuters that Beijing strictly controls the export of items with potential military applications, including drones.

“With regard to the Ukrainian crisis, China has always been committed to promoting peace talks and political settlement,”

the statement said. It added that there were no international restrictions on China’s trade with Russia.

NATO APPEAL

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg last week called on China to stop supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine and said Beijing’s assistance has been a significant factor in the continuation of the conflict.

The Garpiya “closely resembles the Shahed” but it has several distinguishing features, including a unique bolt-on fin and Limbach L-550 E engines, the European agency said in a statement to Reuters. The engine, which was originally designed and manufactured by a German company, is now produced in China by a local firm, Xiamen Limbach. The company did not respond to a request for comment.

Reuters reviewed a contract worth more than 1 bn rubles (10 m euros) signed in the first quarter of 2023 between the Russian defence ministry and Kupol for the development of a factory to produce the drones.

The intelligence sources said a former cement factory situated in Izhevsk, Udmurt Republic, in western Russia – which was purchased by Kupol in 2020 – is being used to produce the drones.

Using a video of a Russian drone production facility, posted on the Telegram messaging app, Reuters was able to identify the site as the factory in Izhevsk from the colour and design of the building’s beams and internal architecture which matched file imagery of the site. The location of the file imagery was verifiable from nearby buildings, roads, and trees that matched street views and satellite imagery.

A prototype of the Garpiya was launched in the first half of 2023, company communications showed. Production reached several hundred in the second half of 2023 and more than doubled to around 2,000 in the first half of 2024, the agency said.

Bendett, the defence analyst, said 2,500 drones per year would represent a sizeable chunk of Russia’s output. Ukraine’s top military commander, Oleksandr Syrskyi, said last month that Russia has fired nearly 14,000 strike drones since it invaded in February 2022, including the Iranian Shahed as well as the Russian-made Geran-2 and Lancet drones.

Corporate documents dated from the second quarter of 2023, reviewed by Reuters, showed that supplier TSK Vektor procured parts from Chinese companies for assembly at the Kupol site; 800 Chinese engines were also to be delivered to the new plant where the production line was due to ready by end of the quarter.

TSK Vektor did not respond to request for comment.

The European intelligence service said in the statement it was concerned that Chinese companies were continuing to provide components that enabled Russian production of large kamikaze drones.

“The export of the essential components to Russia needs to stop,” it said.

UNITED STATES VOICES CONCERN

Washington has repeatedly warned Beijing over its support for Russia’s defence industry. It has imposed hundreds of sanctions aimed at curbing Moscow’s ability to exploit certain technologies for military purposes. The State Department and the White House did not respond to a request for comment for this story.

In July, China said it would tighten drone export rules starting on Sept. 1. Beijing has said U.S. sanctions on Chinese entities over the Ukraine war are “illegal and unilateral”.

The Garpiya has a take-off weight of less than 300 kilos and a maximum range of 1,500 kilometres, the production contract between Kupol and the Russian defense ministry said – roughly similar to Iran’s Shahed-136 drones that Moscow has used extensively in Ukraine.

The Washington Post reported in August that Russia aimed to increase production of a domestic version of the Shahed-136, known as the Geran-2, at a plant in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, in Tatarstan. Ukraine said in April it had carried out a drone strike against a drone manufacturing plant at Alabuga.

Russia began production last year of a new drone, the Garpiya, at a factory in Izhevsk, Udmurt Republic, in western Russia, according to a European intelligence agency and documents seen by Reuters.

A third document reviewed by Reuters – a delivery status update between the intermediary TSK Vektor and the manufacturer Kupol, dated in the first quarter of 2024 – detailed an order for 100 axles, carburettors and other Limbach engine parts supplied by two other Chinese companies: Juhang Aviation Technology and Redlepus Vector Industries, both based in Shenzhen.

Juhang, which was placed under British sanctions in February and U.S. sanctions in May for providing Russia with drone equipment, and Redlepus did not respond to requests for comment.

Customs data, obtained from a commercial supplier that records and compiles the information, showed that from April 2022 to December 2023, TSK Vektor imported $36.3 m in goods from Chinese Juhang Aviation Technology, and $6.2 m from Redlepus TSK Vector Industrial Shenzhen Co Ltd.

According to the customs documents, the goods included aircraft engines, transistors, electronic modules, connectors, plugs and sockets, spare parts and components most of them marked as “for general civil purpose”, “for general industrial purpose”, “for general civil use”.

Photo: Russian kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicle landed by a radio electronic warfare during one of latest drone strikes January 26, 2024. (Source: UAS VISION/Reuters)

 

16 Sept 24. Ukraine Repurposes Quadcopter Drone to Fire Soviet-Era RPG-18 Anti-Tank Missiles. Ukraine has now developed a drone capable of firing anti-tank missiles, further advancing its innovative warfare techniques.The country has outfitted a quadcopter drone with a Soviet-era RPG-18 Mukha anti-tank missile launcher.

Undergoing Testing

In a video circulated on social media, Ukraine was seen conducting a flight test of this anti-tank unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

It is possible that after conducting these trials, the drone will be passed on to Ukraine’s frontline fighters to target Russian positions with literal fire. The drone performed well in the test; however, Ukraine may encounter challenges with long-range operations using this drone.

Carrying a 2.6 kg RPG-18 Mukha rocket launcher may be challenging in longer-range operations. Considering Ukraine’s previous success with new types of drones, the new drone could be deployed soon. Ukraine may employ drones for short-range operations and launch anti-tank missiles at Russian targets from higher elevations.

This drone will provide Ukraine with a much more affordable solution to hit Russian tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and howitzers. Upon reviewing the footage, the drone is fitted with a state-of-the-art guidance system and a high-resolution nano camera.

Both capabilities will allow Ukraine to hit Russian targets with high precision.

RPG-18 Mukha

The RPG-18 Mukha (Russian: Муха, romanized: Fly) is a Soviet short-range, disposable light anti-tank rocket launcher. The RPG-18 is very similar to the US M72-series LAW anti-tank rocket launcher.

The RPG-18 was succeeded by the RPG-22, which has a very similar design with a larger warhead. The RPG-18 fires a 64 mm PG-18 HEAT warhead mounted on a small rocket capable of engaging targets within 200 meters.

The warhead self-destructs 6 seconds after launch, limiting the range even if the sight is effectively used with targets beyond 200 meters. The RPG-18 itself can penetrate up to 375 mm of conventional armor.

However, performance is significantly diminished when the RPG-18 is employed against targets protected by High-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) resistant explosive reactive armor (ERA) or composite armor.

Unlike better-known weapons, the RPG-18 requires only one operator because it is not reloadable. Assistant grenadiers help reload the RPG-2, RPG-7, and RPG-16 systems. The RPG‐18 launcher comprises an extruded plastic‐fibre outer tube and a telescopically joined aluminum inner tube. The launcher is a disposable single‐shot weapon; hence, no loading/reloading of ammunition is required. The firing mechanism is mechanical and unlike the US M72 series.

Ukraine has developed several innovative drones. Recently, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy unveiled a new domestically developed long-range drone missile in a state address. (Source: UAS VISION/Interesting Engineering)

 

13 Sept 24. Ukraine wants 12 Viper attack helicopters spurned by Slovakia. As Slovakia’s government wobbles over the previous Cabinet’s plan to buy 12 AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters from the United States, Ukrainian officials are intensifying their lobbying in Washington to secure the aircraft for their defense against Russia.

The U.S. State Department in July approved a tentative foreign military sale of 12 Vipers, made by Bell, to Slovakia for an estimated $600m, a hefty increase compared to the initial offer of $340m extended to the previous Slovak government. The discount was in part due to the fact that a deal with the initially envisioned recipient of the U.S. equipment, Pakistan, had fallen through.

A senior industry official close to the talks said Bratislava’s efforts have since aimed at decoupling the discount from the Vipers and instead apply it to other prospective purchases like F-16 warplanes and air-defense systems. That has left officials in Washington miffed, the industry official said, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing negotiations.

Meanwhile, Vadym Ivchenko, a Ukrainian lawmaker for the Batkivshchyna party, told Defense News that Ukraine has shown interest in the 12 Vipers since 2022. At that time, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces filed a letter of request to the U.S. to obtain the aircraft through a foreign military sale.

“We need these helicopters for our soldiers who are fighting on the frontline in the Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and other regions but also leading an operation in the Kursk region,” Ivchenko told Defense News.

As a member of the parliamentary Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, Ivchenko said he has written letter to U.S. lawmakers to convince the Biden administration to reroute the Vipers to Kyiv if Slovakia turns them down.

“Slovakia should decide what kind of weapons and equipment they require for their military, and if they don’t need these helicopters, then their delivery to Ukraine should take place as soon as possible,” he said.

Ivchenko said that officials in Kyiv are also making efforts to host the production of Bell helicopters at a designated Ukraine-based facility.

“We wish to deepen our industrial cooperation with the United States to produce such helicopters in Ukraine,” according to the lawmaker. “This foreign investment would be guaranteed by the Ukrainian government.”

In March 2023, then-Slovak Defence Minister Jaroslav Naď announced the U.S. had offered to Slovakia the copters along with AGM-114 Hellfire II air-to-ground missiles, valued at about $1 bn, for roughly a third of their regular price to compensate the country for its donation of Soviet-designed Mikoyan MiG-29 fighter jets and 2K12 Kub air defense systems to Ukraine.

However, since a new Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Robert Fico was sworn in last October, Bratislava has suggested that attack helos are no longer high on its shopping list. Instead, the Slovak ministry would rather use the offered discount to buy Patriot air defense systems or additional F-16 fighters on top of the 14 jets it ordered in 2018, local officials suggested.

Naď, who chairs the opposition Demokrati (Democrats) party, told Defense News the new government in Bratislava, which is more aligned with Russian interests, still has gripes about the transfer of outdated fighters and air defense systems to Ukraine during the early days of the war. Fico officials now claim those donations had no basis in law, making Slovakia the only country of Eastern European allies to Kyiv where legal trouble is brewing over military aid to Ukraine, Naď said.

Industry officials have noted that the latest U.S. offer for the Vipers no longer includes Hellfire missiles, attributing the change in scope to growing discontent in Washington. (Source: Defense News)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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