NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 07.

Sep 06.

06 Sept 24.  Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., today reaffirmed the commitment of the U.S. and other nations to aiding Ukraine at the 24th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Ramstein, Germany.   The UDCG, a coalition of some 50 nations that meet regularly to discuss Ukraine’s security needs, first met in April 2022 as a result of Austin’s efforts to assemble the group after Russia had invaded Ukraine two months earlier.  Austin began the afternoon meeting by welcoming the UDCG’s special guest, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. 

“Your forces and your people have inspired the world, and you have seen firsthand how this contact group has moved heaven and earth to get Ukraine what it needs,” Austin told Zelenskyy. 

“On behalf of everyone here, we hear your urgency, and we share it,” Austin continued.  “This coalition of some 50 nations of goodwill stands united and firm; and today, we’ll push even harder to step up our support for Ukraine.”  

“This coalition has been indivisible in supporting Ukraine to repel Russian aggression,” Brown said at a press conference following the meeting.  

“The principles we are defending — the right to self-determination, the sanctity of national borders, and the rule of law — are the very foundations of global peace and stability,” the chairman continued. 

“I very much appreciate continuously being with since the start of this war,” Zelenskyy told those UDCG members in attendance, adding that it’s thanks to the bravery of the Ukrainian people and the support of the UDCG that Ukraine has been able to continue resisting Russia’s aggression. (Source: U.S. DoD)

Sep 05.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• STRIKES: Russian forces have continued a relatively high tempo of long-range missile and drone strikes across Ukraine, hitting both military and civilian targets in a large number of oblasts, including Lviv oblast
• RESHUFFLE: The largest Ukrainian government reshuffle since the full-scale invasion in 2022 is currently underway; it is likely aimed at reinvigorating the government ahead of a likely extremely difficult winter
• NUCLEAR: Energoatom has refuted reports of an alleged accident at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant amid increasing kinetic activity near the Zaporizhzhia plant and veiled nuclear rhetoric from Moscow
• FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia’s primary war objective is the ‘liberation’ of the Donbas, indicating that the Kursk offensive has not altered Moscow’s priorities
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 2 September indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced in the eastern micro-district of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast) and the nearby village of Kalynivka, located to the north-east. The settlement notably sits on the right (west) bank of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal, which Russian forces have been struggling to cross to expand two small beachheads. It is unclear how much of Kalynivka Russian forces currently control. Russian sources claimed their forces have made further advances in recent days. Notably, the spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting near Chasiv Yar stated on 3 September that Russian forces currently have a two-to-one artillery advantage in the area but are currently deploying fewer glide bomb attacks compared to earlier in the year. This likely confirms that Chasiv Yar remains a lower-priority objective for Russian forces compared to Pokrovsk and Toretsk (both Donetsk oblast).
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 3 September indicates that Russian forces have made minor advances in the north-west of Druzhba, a settlement directly to the east of Toretsk. Russian sources claim that Moscow has made further advances around the area in recent days, including further advances inside eastern Toretsk itself; any such advances remain unconfirmed at this time.
• DONETSK: Russian forces continue to make incremental gains towards Pokrovsk and are now approximately five miles (8km) from the city’s outskirts; however the pace of advance has likely slowed. Geolocated footage from 3 September shows recent Russian advances into south-western Halytsynivka (south-east of Pokrovsk), likely indicating that the settlement is under Russian control. On 4 September, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed that its forces had seized Karlivka (further south-east of Pokrovsk), which it likely took last week. A Ukrainian officer operating in the Pokrovsk sector stated on 2 September that Ukrainian forces had withdrawn from Novohrodivka, south-east of Pokrovsk, to minimise casualties – an outcome we had previously assessed.
• DONETSK: A Ukrainian military observer reported on 2 September that Ukrainian forces still hold Marynivka, restricting Russia’s ability to advance southwards towards Selydove (south-east of Pokrovsk). Later, on 4 September, Ukrainian forces reportedly damaged several Russian vehicles, including a BTR wheeled armoured personnel carrier and an MT-LB armoured tractor in the Selydove sector. Against the backdrop of Russian creeping advances towards Pokrovsk, the authorities reportedly closed Pokrovsk’s train station for civilian evacuations on 5 September due to the deteriorating security environment.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to push south-west of Donetsk City and have likely launched a renewed offensive effort to take Vuhledar. Geolocated footage posted on 4 September shows Russian forces north of Paraskoviivka (south-west of Donetsk City and north-east of Vuhledar along the T-0524 road) following a reinforced company-sized mechanised assault. Additional footage published on the same day indicates Russian gains along the Velyka Novosilka-Pavlivka T-0509 highway, south-east of Prechystivka (west of Vuhledar). An OSINT source also reported that, overnight on 2-3 September, Russian forces occupied Prechystivka; the Russian MoD claimed that the settlement was under Russian control. While all of these advances cannot be confirmed, it is clear that Russian forces are steadily encroaching on Vuhledar from the south and east. The town has been a Russian objective since at least 2023, and previous assaults repeatedly ended in failure and extremely high casualties.
• KHARKIV: The overall situation on the Kharkiv axis remains static, though Ukraine’s Kharkiv Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Vitaly Sarantsev stated on 2 September that Russian forces are stepping up their use of light and heavy vehicles during attacks. Sarantsev stated that, after Russian forces have failed to achieve progress in Kharkiv, they are starting to employ ‘a new tactic’, namely carrying out assaults with the support of heavy armoured vehicles. Over the last few days, there have been no confirmed Russian advances on the Kharkiv axis; it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to achieve any advances. Kharkiv is unlikely to remain a high-priority area for reinforcements for as long as Russia focuses on offensive operations in Donetsk and defensive operations in Kursk.
• KURSK: In an interview with the US news outlet NBC on 3 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ‘conceptually’ planning to hold territory in Russia’s Kursk oblast, though he did not provide further details. Zelensky also reported that Russian forces have already redeployed around 60,000 troops from Ukraine to Kursk, with Zelensky reiterating that one of the objectives of the Kursk offensive was to force Russia to redeploy forces. However, Russia has nevertheless resisted redeploying combat-capable units currently involved in the Pokrovsk offensive; it has only redeployed troops from lower-priority fronts to Kursk so far.
• KURSK: Geolocated footage published on 2 September indicates that Russian forces have retaken some positions east of Korenevo; however, Ukrainian forces have continued to launch attacks at various points, meaning the area remains highly contested. Unconfirmed reports from 4 September claim that Ukrainian forces advanced south-east of Durovka, a settlement located five miles (8km) east of Korenevo and are pushing along the 38K-030 road in the area.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Overnight on 2-3 September, Russian forces launched three Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, one Kh-59/69 missile and 35 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted 27 unmanned aerial vehicles; two drones reportedly missed their targets, flying towards occupied Donetsk oblast and Russia’s Belgorod oblast. Air defences were active over Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. The Ukrainian authorities reported that two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles struck a military educational facility and a nearby hospital in Poltava (Poltava oblast). The attack killed 54 and injured at least 271 people at the military facility, making it one of the single deadliest strikes since the start of the war.
• STRIKES: On 4 September, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 42 drones and missiles. The attack included two Kh-47 M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, two Kh-22 cruise missiles, six Kh-101 missiles, three Iskandr-K cruise missiles and 29 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted four Kh-101 missiles, all Iskandr-K cruise missiles and 22 Shahed drones. According to Ukraine’s Air Force, six drones did not reach their targets, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) suppression, while one drone flew into Belarus’ airspace.
• STRIKES: Russian missiles reportedly hit a hotel, residential buildings and educational facilities in central Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), where six residents were wounded. Missiles also struck Lviv (Lviv oblast), damaging up to 188 buildings and killing seven civilians. These latest attacks are significant deviations from ongoing strike trends, especially given how Russian forces have infrequently targeted western Ukraine in recent months, including Lviv. Additionally, the targeting of another hotel in Kryvyi Rih illustrates the ongoing risks to hospitality venues which Russian forces perceive to be hosting ‘foreign mercenaries’. If further attacks occur against hotels, this could realistically indicate a slight shift in Russian striking patterns towards targeting hotels purposefully, though this remains to be seen.
• STRIKES: On 5 September, Russia attacked Ukraine with one Iskandr-M ballistic missile and 78 Shahed 136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted 60 unmanned aerial vehicles, reflecting Ukraine’s typical high interception rate of UAVs. Air defences were active in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Explosions were recorded in the capital Kyiv.
• STRIKES: Since the end of August, large-scale Russian strikes have inflicted severe damage to Ukrainian infrastructure and resulted in increased casualties among the Ukrainian population. Such attacks also highlight persistent gaps in Ukraine’s air defence coverage. Notably, following the attack overnight on 2-3 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed that Ukraine needs more air defence systems and missiles to counter Russia’s long-range strikes, which have proven to be increasingly lethal over the past few weeks. Meanwhile, on 3 September, former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that US-made Patriot systems and Franco-Italian SAMP/T air defence systems have proven effective in intercepting Russian ballistic missiles.
• STRIKES: The likely provision of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia will sustain elevated security risks for Ukraine over the 2024-2025 winter, especially given persistent Ukrainian air defence gaps. Bloomberg reported on 2 September, quoting a European official, that Iran could begin supplying Moscow in the coming days. Reuters previously reported that Russian military personnel were trained to operate Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Russia would likely use such SRBMS to strike Ukrainian near-rear areas and preserve domestically produced Iskandr-M ballistic missiles for deep-rear Ukrainian targets.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• RESHUFFLE: The largest Ukrainian government reshuffle since the full-scale invasion in 2022 is currently underway. On 4 September, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba submitted his resignation, following the resignation of four other ministers the previous day. On the evening of 3 September, President Volodymyr Zelensky explained that these resignations are part of a significant government overhaul, with a new list of ministers expected to be presented to Ukraine’s Parliament (the Rada) on 5 September.
• RESHUFFLE: The reshuffle comes at a critical juncture in the conflict, as Russia continues to make significant tactical gains in Donetsk oblast despite Ukraine’s surprise incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast. Concurrently, Moscow’s long-range strike campaign is causing severe damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, likely making the 2024-2025 winter heating season the most challenging yet. Meanwhile, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the head of Ukraine’s power transmission network Ukrenergo, was also dismissed on 2 September for allegedly failing to protect energy facilities against Russian strikes. We assess that his major cabinet reshuffle underscores Ukraine’s goal to enhance government effectiveness in preparation for the highly challenging months ahead.
• NUCLEAR: On 4 September, Ukraine’s state nuclear energy agency Energoatom refuted reports of an alleged accident at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant in Mykolaiv oblast. Energoatom said the operating capacity of one of the power units at the facility had been reduced because of Russian attacks against Ukraine’s wider energy infrastructure network. Meanwhile, Energoatom reported on 3 September that Russian shelling during the previous day damaged one of the two external overhead lines powering the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP, Zaporizhzhia oblast). The agency said that damage to the second line would trigger an ‘emergency’ due to the loss of external power to the pumps that cool the reactors and fuel storage pools of the ZNPP. It stated that Ukrainian specialists cannot inspect the damage and begin repairs yet because of the threat of Russian shelling.
• NUCLEAR: On 4 September, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, said that a cooling tower at the ZNPP will ‘probably’ be demolished after a fire last month. Grossi said the structure is not usable in the future.
• NUCLEAR: Earlier on 5 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a thinly veiled threat in response to unsubstantiated claims that Ukraine targeted the ZNPP and Russia’s Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP, Kursk oblast). Putin claimed that such actions are ‘very dangerous terrorist attacks’, adding that one can only imagine what would happen if Russia were to respond in kind and how this would impact Europe more widely. Russian officials often resort to making nuclear threats during periods of particularly heightened tensions. However, despite this rhetoric and the threat of a localised false-flag incident, Russia remains highly unlikely to deliberately facilitate a large-scale nuclear catastrophe in the near term given the risk of spillover into Russian-occupied Ukrainian lands and de jure Russian territory. For further analysis on nuclear and radiological threats.
• ECONOMY: Reports emerged on 4 September that Ukrainian officials were preparing for the IMF to push the government to devalue its currency faster, cut interest rates and enhance efforts to raise taxes to plug Kyiv’s budgetary gap. According to Bloomberg, IMF staff visiting the Ukrainian capital are expected to urge for such steps to be taken so Ukraine can continue receiving financial support as they review a USD 15.6 bn loan programme. The result of the review could unlock a disbursement worth USD 1.1 bn if the IMF deems Kyiv is meeting targets and has sufficient funds and policies arranged to meet its financing needs.
• ECONOMY: However, the National Bank of Ukraine is reluctant to devalue the country’s currency further as this would challenge the central bank’s ability to maintain price stability. Currency devaluation would also possibly lead to increased inflation and import costs, as well as increase the burden of foreign-owned debt. At the same time, a depreciation in currency combined with higher taxes would also likely be politically unpopular and possibly sustain unfavourable socio-economic health conditions. Nevertheless, there is a realistic possibility that Ukraine will be required to take steps to improve its fiscal position.
• AID: The US is reportedly close to reaching an agreement that would provide Ukraine with long-range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs); however, Kyiv would need to wait several months to receive them. Reuters reported on 3 September (citing unnamed US officials) that the inclusion of the missiles in a weapons package is expected to be announced this autumn, though a final decision is yet to be made. In theory, JASSMs would enable Ukrainian forces to strike targets situated deep inside Russia. An older model of the missile has a range of about 230 miles (370km); there is also a longer-range version which can travel more than 500 miles (almost 805km). However, it is uncertain which variant the US would send Ukraine. Pentagon Press Secretary Pat Ryder refused to comment on the reports.
• AID: Although JASSMs would enhance Ukraine’s long-range strike arsenal, their impact on the battlefield would likely be limited without the US easing its restrictions on Ukrainian forces targeting military sites in Russia. That said, the possible provision of this hardware could realistically indicate an eventual policy shift in the coming months on the matter from Washington DC; we have previously assessed that this is likely. A decision to provide JASSMs may realistically force Russia to relocate strategic assets out of reach even if the US does not relax its policy on long-range strikes. Russia has already reportedly moved 90% of its aircraft used to attack Ukraine outside of a 190 mile (300km) zone from the Ukrainian border. US-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) boast such a range, though their usage against de jure Russian territory is prohibited.
• AID: Meanwhile, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz disclosed on 4 September that Berlin ordered an additional 17 IRIS-T air defence systems for Ukraine. An unspecified German official stated that Ukraine should receive 24 IRIS-T systems from Germany by 2026; these include 12 medium-range versions and a dozen short-range ones. Separately, Romanian lawmakers passed a draft bill on 3 September supporting the donation of a Patriot missile system to Ukraine.

FORECAST

PUTIN: On 5 September, Russian President Putin stated that Russia’s primary war objective in the war is the ‘liberation’ of the Donbas. His remarks reaffirm our assessment that Russia seeks to fully capture the eastern Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts at the very least. We assess that Moscow is unlikely willing to rescind control over any area of these regions that Russian forces occupy as part of an agreement to end the war. It also remains highly likely that Moscow seeks wider territorial conquests beyond the areas it currently controls, though whether it will be able to achieve these remains unclear. Commenting on Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast, Putin assessed that Ukraine launched the offensive to force Russian forces to deploy troops from one area of the battlefield (Donbas in particular) to another. Putin claimed that Ukraine failed in these efforts. Rather, Putin stated that Ukraine has weakened its position in key areas as it transferred ‘fairly large and well-trained units’ to Kursk oblast. The Russian leader said that this has allowed Russian troops to accelerate the tempo of their offensive in eastern Ukraine. Ultimately, such comments are highly likely intended to give the impression that Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has been a failure and allowed Russia to make gains in Ukraine. It also highly likely intends to suggest that the Kursk offensive has not influenced Putin’s strategic focus for the war, which remains focused on the Donbas.

Putin also claimed that he is ready for negotiations with Ukraine after having previously stated that the incursion had rendered negotiations impossible. Putin insisted that Moscow has never refused peace talks with Kyiv, despite comments to that effect in the past. Notably, the Russian leader suggested that Brazil, China or India could serve as mediators in hypothetical discussions to end the war. The three countries are members of the intergovernmental organisation comprising the world’s major emerging economies (BRICS) alongside Russia. Beijing and New Delhi in particular have been economic lifelines to Moscow following unprecedented Western sanctions against Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian president almost certainly named these states as possible mediators as they would highly likely offer better terms for Moscow during negotiations; conversely, Western states would likely advocate in Kyiv’s favour. However, our assessment remains that talks to end the war are highly unlikely in the short term. That said, pressure on both sides to enter talks will likely increase in early 2025. Putin’s recent statements do not change our assessment that Moscow is unlikely to engage in negotiations in good faith to end the war in the near term, given the Kremlin is highly unlikely to have abandoned its maximalist military objectives in Ukraine.

Sep 04.

• Ukraine: Major cabinet reshuffle likely aims to strengthen government ahead of critical period. On 4 September, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba submitted his resignation, following the resignation of four other ministers the previous day. On the evening of 3 September, President Volodymyr Zelensky explained that these resignations are part of a significant government overhaul, with more cabinet members expected to step down on 4 September and a new list of ministers to be presented to Ukraine’s Parliament (the Rada) on 5 September. This marks the largest government reshuffle since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The reshuffle comes at a critical juncture in the conflict, as Russia continues to make significant tactical gains in Donetsk oblast despite Ukraine’s surprise incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast. Concurrently, Moscow’s long-range strike campaign is causing severe damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, likely making the 2024-2025 winter heating season the most challenging yet. We assess that his major cabinet reshuffle underscores Ukraine’s goal to enhance government effectiveness in preparation for the highly challenging months ahead.

Sep 02.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• DONETSK: Russian forces are relentlessly attacking towards Pokrovsk, seemingly forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw to more heavily defended urban centres to minimise losses
• STRIKES: On 1 September, the Russian defence ministry reported intercepting 158 Ukrainian drones in an unprecedented large-scale overnight Ukrainian attack that mainly targeted energy infrastructure
• OIL: Ukrainian presidential aide Mykhailo Podolyak has confirmed that Ukraine will honour its contracts to transit Russian oil to Europe after suggesting that Kyiv may halt supplies via the Druzhba pipeline next year
• FORECAST: The Polish Foreign Minister has said that Poland has a responsibility to shoot down Russian missiles approaching its airspace, but Poland’s own Defence Ministry and NATO have rejected this – alliance policy is unlikely to change in the short-to-medium term
• BAKHMUT: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 31 August that their forces have now taken the entirety of Pivnichne, a settlement directly east of Toretsk, but this remains unconfirmed. Russian forces are currently fighting at the eastern and southern entrances to Toretsk, but there has been little confirmation of major Russian advances into the centre of the town over the last few days. Further north along the Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut axis, geolocated footage published on 31 August indicates that Russian forces made limited advances into the eastern outskirts of Hryhorivka, a small settlement located roughly three miles (5km) north of Chasiv Yar.
• DONETSK: The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 2 September that Russian forces are leveraging their advantage in ‘manpower and equipment’ to ‘relentlessly’ attack Ukrainian positions along the Pokrovsk axis. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi described the situation in Donetsk as ‘difficult’ on 1 September, as Ukrainian forces continue to cede ground to the east of Pokrovsk, likely in a bid to minimise their losses ahead of the defence of Pokrovsk itself. The General Staff confirmed that Russian forces attacked in the Pokrovsk direction alone 63 times over the last 24 hours. A commander of a Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance unit currently fighting in the area also claimed in an interview in the Telegraph published on 31 August that Russian forces currently enjoy a five-to-one personnel advantage over Ukraine in the area.
• DONETSK: Syrskyi reported on 29 August that the most intense fighting is currently taking place on the eastern outskirts of Hrodivka, located eight miles (13km) east of Pokrovsk. This indicates that Ukrainian forces have committed to defending this town for the time being, while continuing to slowly withdraw from more vulnerable positions further south. Russian sources have described Hrodivka as a relative strongpoint in the Ukrainian defences around Pokrovsk, and it remains possible that Russian forces are attempting to bypass these defences to maintain momentum and set conditions for the eventual advance on Myrnohrad – a major town directly east of Pokrovsk. However, it remains unclear if Russian forces have already taken Hrodivka, as some Russian sources have claimed. Nevertheless, Russian forces are confirmed to have already taken almost the entirety of Novohrodivka, a settlement south-west of Hrodivka. Russian and Ukrainian sources have also reported that the Russians have advanced north of Novohrodivka and reached the southern outskirts of Myrnohrad and are engaged in small-arms exchanges inside the town, but this remains unconfirmed.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, Russian forces are also continuing to push south from their Pokrovsk salient, and have advanced relatively quickly in recent days. Russian forces are now in control of Karlivka, Halytsynivka and Dolynivka, all small settlements located near the source of the Vovcha River. It now remains highly likely that the next key target in this direction will be the town of Ukrainsk, located around 14 miles (23km) south-east of Pokrovsk. Russian forces are clearly committing significant resources to expanding the salient to the south (in the opposite direction to Pokrovsk), and this is highly likely aimed at securing Russia’s flanks to ward against potential Ukrainian counter-attacks, as well as potentially setting conditions for a tactical encirclement of Ukrainian forces to the south.
• DONETSK: Russia’s salient theoretically remains vulnerable to a Ukrainian counter-attack from the southern direction, which could aim at cutting off Russia’s forces currently attacking towards Pokrovsk. While expanding the salient to the south would reduce this risk, it may also allow Russian forces to threaten to encircle Ukrainian forces currently defending the outskirts of Krasnohorivka, located around eight miles (13km) south of the current Russian salient. If Russian forces continue to advance south along the Vovcha River, they may hope to force the Ukrainians to withdraw from these locations, which would likely stabilise the Pokrovsk salient and push Ukrainian forces back from the outskirts of Donetsk city – a key Russian logistics hub.
• DONETSK: Russian sources have claimed that their forces have reached the centre of the town of Selydove, which is one of the larger satellite towns to the south of Pokrovsk. While we cannot confirm this, geolocated footage from 1 September has confirmed that Russian forces have taken almost the entirely of Mykhailivka, which is located directly east of the eastern outskirts of Selydove. If Russian forces succeed in taking Selydove and continue pushing west, this could indicate that Russian forces intend to begin encircling Pokrovsk, rather than conduct a frontal assault against the town. However, this remains unclear at this stage, particularly given that Russia’s previous attempts to encircle both Avdiivka and Bakhmut failed and eventually ground down into attritional frontal assaults that lasted months. It also remains unclear when the Russian Pokrovsk offensive will culminate, and where (and whether) Ukrainian forces will be able to establish a sustainable defence before the offensive culminates.
• KHARKIV: On 1 September, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Kharkiv Group of Forces Vitalii Sarantsev stated that Russian forces have partially shifted to defensive operations on the Kharkiv axis. The rate of Russian attacks around Lyptsi and Vovchansk, located north and north-east of Kharkiv city respectively, has steadily decreased in recent weeks, as Russian forces redeploy forces to support defensive operations in Kursk oblast. Despite this, small-scale attacks have still taken place over the past week, with geolocated footage from 1 September indicating Russian advances in western Hlyboke, a settlement located around 16 miles (25km) north of Kharkiv city, and now remains almost entirely under Russian control.
• KURSK: Ukrainian operations in Russia’s Kursk oblast continue, but the rate of Ukraine’s advances has continued to slow over the past week amid Russian counter-attacks. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi reported on 30 August that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 1.2 miles (2km) in separate directions, enabling Ukraine to take 1.9 square miles (five sq km) of territory over the previous 24 hours. This remains unconfirmed, and there has been little confirmed progress since then as Russian forces continue to counter attack. Russian sources claiming they have retaken a number of positions in recent days – including pushing the Ukrainians further back from the town of Korenevo. Geolocated footage from 29 August indicates, for example, that Russian forces have retaken Ulanok, located around six miles (10km) south-east of Sudzha, and have pushed east of Korenevo.
• KURSK: Russian forces are expanding efforts to reinforce defensive operations in Kursk, but are continuing to rely upon irregular formations, including the redeployment of private military contractors (PMCs) and new territorial defence units. On 29 August, Acting Kursk Governor Alexei Smirnov confirmed the creation of so-called ‘BARS-Kursk’ volunteer territorial defence units which aim to ‘ensure security’ in the region. BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve) units have been used across the frontline, and the creation of new units likely reinforces the Kremlin’s ongoing opposition to a second round of formal mobilisation and the redeployment of combat effective units taking part in the current Pokrovsk offensive. The combat effectiveness of these new units remains to be seen, however, and adding further irregular units to the Kursk operation is likely to compound existing command and control (C2) challenges which have thus far undermined defensive efforts.
• KURSK: Meanwhile, Le Monde reported on 30 August that Russian PMC fighters have been redeployed from Burkina Faso to Kursk oblast. The Russian forces only deployed to the Burkina Faso capital Ouagadougou in May. It is estimated that around 200-300 Russian fighters operate in Burkina Faso, though Le Monde cited a Russian commander of the ‘Bear’ brigade in the country as confirming the complete withdrawal of his unit of around 100 personnel. We previously reported that elements of former Wagner Group (Africa Corps) units had deployed to Kursk last month. This last deployment from Burkina Faso reinforces our assessment that Russia is remaining reliant upon internal security forces, conscripts, PMCs and now volunteer territorial defence units to reinforce Kursk, rather than redeploying large numbers of combat effective units from the Donbas.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have been steadily increasing the pressure on Ukrainian forces across the Oskil-Kreminna line, making limited advances over the last week. Geolocated footage published on 29 August indicates Russian forces have advanced in central Synkivka, located around five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk. The Russians have also achieved marginal advances near Pishchane, south-east of Kupiansk, where Russian forces are currently advancing and creating a salient pushing towards the Oskil River. Meanwhile, footage from 30 August indicates advances further south, including taking the village of Stelmakhivka, located around 11 miles (18km) north-west of Svatove (Luhansk oblast).
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on 1 September that over the past week (from 25 August), Russian forces have launched more than 160 missiles, 780 glide bombs and 400 drones against Ukraine.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 29-30 August, Russian forces launched a series of strikes across the country, including one Iskandr-M ballistic missile and 18 Shahed-131/136 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 12 of the drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Sumy and Vinnytsia oblasts, though four other drones reportedly crashed on their own due to unknown reasons. These strikes were followed by overnight attacks on 30-31 August involving one Iskandr-M and 52 Shahed-131/136 drones. Ukraine intercepted 24 of the drones over Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force also reported that 25 of the drones failed to hit their target and three flew off course.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 31 August-1 September, Russian forces launched one Iskandr-M missile and 11 Shahed drones that primarily targeted grain infrastructure in Mykolaiv oblast. Kyiv claims it intercepted eight Shaheds over Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. Russian forces also reportedly fired an additional two Iskandr-M strikes against targets in Kharkiv city, and at least two Iskandr-Ms equipped with cluster munition warheads against targets in Sumy oblast.
• STRIKES: On the morning of 2 September, Russian forces launched its latest long-range missile and drone attack against Kyiv oblast. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russia launched 35 missiles and 23 drones, with Ukrainian air defences intercepting nine out of 16 Iskandr-M or North Korean-supplied KN-24 ballistic missiles, 13 out of 14 Kh-101 cruise missiles and 20 out of 23 drones. While the full extent of the damage and the targets remains unclear, missile debris also fell in numerous districts of the capital, including Holosiivskyi, Sviatoshynskyi and Shevchenkivskyi districts. The relatively high number of ballistic missile interceptions over the capital is notable, and would suggest numerous North Korean KN-24s were used, given they are easier to intercept than Russian Iskandr-Ms.
• STRIKES: On 1 September, the Russian MoD reported intercepting 158 Ukrainian drones in an unprecedented large-scale overnight Ukrainian attack that mainly targeted energy infrastructure. According to the MoD, Russian air defence systems downed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Belgorod, Bryansk, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kursk, Lipetsk, Oryol, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tambov, Tula, Tver and Voronezh oblasts. Elsewhere, two drones were intercepted over the capital Moscow, while seven were shot down over the wider Moscow oblast. Russian officials and media reported that drone debris caused fires at the Moscow Kaputnya Oil Refinery and the Konakovo Power Station (Tver oblast). The Ukrainian strike was highly likely a response to what was one of Russia’s largest attacks of the war on 26 August, which involved around 200 drones and missiles.
• STRIKES: The 1 September attack against the Moscow Kaputnya Oil Refinery is notable, given its proximity to Moscow city centre – it is located within the MKAD ring road only 10 miles (17km) south-east of the Kremlin. Moscow is protected by a dense ring of short, medium and long-range air defences, including an estimated 22 S-300/S-400 systems, as well as numerous additional Pantsir S1/S2 systems across the city. Air defences in rear areas throughout European Russia have frequently proven inadequate to intercept even relatively low-capability long-range drones. This is partly explained by the shear amount of territory that needs protecting, with some recent attacks suggesting that some critical sites had little to no formal air defence systems protecting them. However, the ability of relatively crude drone systems to penetrate major city defences reflects wider capability gaps in Russia’s efforts to protect rear area critical infrastructure – gaps which Ukraine will continue to exploit, particularly as it continues to develop new long-range offensive capabilities.
• STRIKES: Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on 2 September that Ukrainian forces had successfully used its new long-range ‘missile-drone’ the Palyanytsia against military targets on the Crimean peninsula in August. Ukrainska Pravda’s sources cannot confirm further details, but it comes after Zelensky updated the nation on Ukraine’s growing domestically-produced long-range capabilities.
• STRIKES: On 29 August the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed the loss of a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet during air defence operations. US officials confirmed the jet crashed on 26 August – the same day as a large-scale Russian strike. The precise cause of the crash remains unconfirmed, but US investigators do not believe it was a friendly fire incident involving Patriot air defence systems.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov has presented the US with a list of targets that Ukrainian forces could strike using long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) if it lifted restrictions prohibiting deeper strikes into Russian territory. In an interview with CNN published on 30 August, Umerov said that airfields from which Russia is targeting Ukrainian urban centres are within ATACMS range. However, on 27 August, Pentagon Press Secretary Pat Ryder said that Washington DC’s policy on long-range deep strikes into Russia has not changed.
• AID: Ultimately, Umerov’s list is almost certainly part of wider effort to pressure US President Joe Biden’s administration to soften its stance on the matter. Ukraine has previously provided the US with a list of potential targets in Russia. Although the new one is said to be more detailed, we assess that the US is unlikely to revise its policy in the immediate term due to concerns over an escalation with Russia, though an approval for UK-provided Storm Shadows remains relatively more likely (though still uncertain) in the coming months.
• OIL: Ukrainian presidential aide Mykhailo Podolyak confirmed on 30 August that Ukraine will honour its contracts to transit Russian oil to Europe after suggesting that Kyiv may halt supplies via the Druzhba pipeline next year. Podolyak said Ukraine supported EU efforts to diversify its oil supply and would continue to transit the commodity until the end of 2029. Podolyak initially stated earlier that Ukraine would stop transiting Russian oil through the pipeline from 1 January 2025. Meanwhile, an agreement allowing the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine is set to expire at the end of this year.
• OIL: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed on 27 August that Kyiv does not intend to extend this arrangement. However, Zelensky said Ukraine is prepared to discuss the transit of gas through its territory with other suppliers if Europe requests this. We previously assessed that this contract was unlikely to be renewed, though Zelensky’s comments reflect willingness to facilitate other deliveries for European countries if necessary.

FORECAST

POLAND: Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski stated in an interview published on 2 September that Poland and other countries bordering Ukraine have a duty to shoot down Russian missiles over Ukrainian territory, despite NATO opposition. Sikorski insisted that Warsaw has an obligation to guarantee the safety of its citizens, adding that membership in the military alliance does not override each country’s responsibility to protect its airspace. According to Sikorski, striking ‘hostile missiles’ that are on course to enter Polish airspace would be legitimate self-defence. The Polish authorities reported that a Russian drone likely briefly entered Poland’s airspace on 26 August during a large-scale bombardment against Ukraine.

Despite the foreign minister’s statements, a NATO spokesperson stated on 2 September in response that NATO has ‘a responsibility to prevent further escalation’ of the war and ‘will not become a party to the conflict’. This clearly underscores NATO’s objections to the proposal to shoot down Russian missiles – a stance that is unlikely to change given the consensus model governing the alliance.

Deputy Defence Minister Paweł Zalewski also said on 30 August that Poland will not shoot down Russian drones or missiles, nor train Ukrainian soldiers on Ukrainian territory. Instead, Zalewski argued that steps by the West to radically strengthen Ukrainian air defences should be sufficient in protecting Ukraine against Russian strikes. As such, the remarks underscore divisions among Polish officials on intercepting Russian missiles over Ukrainian territory, which will likely lower the prospect of a policy change on the matter in the near term. However, there is a realistic possibility that Warsaw’s position could change if spillover incidents become more frequent and/or disruptive over the coming months, and at the very least could be designed to deter Russian attacks in Western Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the majority of Poles believe that their military should shoot down Russian projectiles which enter Polish airspace during attacks against Ukraine. According to polling released on 1 September by Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, 58.5% of respondents support intercepting unidentified objects during Russian attacks against Ukraine. Meanwhile, 22.1% of Poles disagreed with this and 19.4% were unsure. Despite considerable public support for shooting down Russian drones and missiles, this alone is unlikely to prompt a policy shift from the Polish government given NATO opposition to such actions.

• Russia-Ukraine: Large-scale drone attack confirm Ukraine’s growing long-range strike capabilities. On 1 September, the Russian defence ministry reported intercepting 158 Ukrainian drones in an unprecedented large-scale overnight Ukrainian attack that mainly targeted energy infrastructure. According to the ministry, Russian air defence systems downed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Belgorod, Bryansk, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kursk, Lipetsk, Oryol, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tambov, Tula, Tver and Voronezh oblasts. Elsewhere, two drones were intercepted over the capital Moscow, while seven were shot down over the wider Moscow oblast. Russian officials and media reported that drone debris caused fires at the Moscow Kaputnya Oil Refinery and the Konakovo Power Station (Tver oblast). The Ukrainian strike was highly likely in response to what was one of Russia’s largest attacks of the war on 26 August, which involved around 200 drones and missiles. The attack also demonstrates Ukraine’s growing domestic drone production capabilities and the ongoing deficiencies in Russia’s air defences over rear areas – including critical infrastructure. Ultimately, we assess that further long-range Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory will highly likely continue to degrade the operating environment in Russia, particularly with regard to energy security. (Source: Sibylline)

06 Sept 24. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine.

Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs.  This announcement is the Biden Administration’s sixty-fifth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.  This Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package, which has an estimated value of $250m, will provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent needs, including: air defense missiles; munitions for rocket systems and artillery; armored vehicles; and anti-tank weapons.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

• RIM-7 missiles and support for air defense;
• Stinger missiles;
• Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition;
• Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles;
• Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
• Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles;
• M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
• Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles;
• Small arms ammunition and grenades;
• Patrol boats;
• Maritime training equipment;
• Demolitions equipment and munitions; and
• Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.

The United States will continue to work together with some 50 Allies and partners through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and its associated capability coalitions to meet Ukraine’s urgently needed battlefield requirements and defend against Russian aggression.  (Source: U.S. DoD)

05 Sept 24. Biden administration races to save billions in Ukraine aid as deadline looms. U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration is engaged in urgent discussions with Congress to allow it to use up $6bn in military aid for Ukraine before a Sept. 30 deadline, according to multiple sources familiar with the matter.

The effort comes at a high-risk moment for Ukrainian forces, who are advancing into Russia’s Kursk region while trying to hold off Russian forces threatening the eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk.

The Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), a key component of a $61bn aid package for Ukraine passed in April, allows the president to transfer defense articles and services from U.S. stocks in response to emergencies.

PDA has been the primary mechanism the Biden administration has used to ship weapons to Ukraine. Most recently, the administration announced on Aug. 23 a new military aid package worth $125m, including air-defense missiles, counter-drone equipment, anti-armor missiles and ammunition.

However, most of the $7.8bn in PDA in the bill Biden signed into law in April has not been used, leaving officials scrambling to find a way to keep the remaining $6bn from expiring as the Sept. 30 deadline – the end of the 2024 fiscal year – approaches.

Sources close to the negotiations told Reuters that the State Department hopes to attach an extension of the PDA authorities to a Continuing Resolution, a short-term emergency spending bill that the Senate and House of Representatives must pass this month to avoid a Sept. 30 government shutdown.

Congressional aides, who requested anonymity to discuss ongoing negotiations, insisted there would be a solution, given strong bipartisan support for assisting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government.

Zelenskiy travels to the United States this month and hopes to present a “victory plan” to Biden. He is expected to take part on Friday in a meeting of the Ramstein group of nations, including the U.S., which supplies arms to Ukraine.

U.S. COMPANIES BENEFIT

Congressional aides said it was not fully clear why the flow of weapons to Ukraine had slowed this year, but said it was partly due to U.S. Department of Defense concern that its own stocks were being depleted, as the weapons industry struggles with supply chain issues.

Lawmakers who back Ukraine, from both parties, stressed the importance of continuing the support.

“Bipartisan support for Ukraine is critical to American interests, and we will do whatever we can in 2024 to build on these successes and secure additional future military aid necessary to maintain the momentum,” Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal and Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, said in a statement last month after their sixth visit to Ukraine.

Congress has approved nearly $175 bn of aid and military assistance for Ukraine and allied nations since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Much of that has come in the form of long-term funding for U.S. defense production, as the Pentagon looks to replace equipment sent to Kyiv. Biden administration officials and Ukraine supporters in Congress have stressed the benefits for U.S. producers as they look to overcome the resistance from a vocal bloc of Republicans who say taxpayer money should be spent at home, not sent abroad.

Companies like RTX’s (RTX.N), opens new tab Raytheon in Arizona which makes Patriot missile systems and General Dynamics’ (GD.N), opens new tab 155 millimeter artillery plants in Pennsylvania, are receiving contracts for products that will replace those sent to Ukraine using PDA. Arizona and Pennsylvania are among the “swing” states expected to decide the Nov. 5 U.S. presidential election.

As negotiations with Congress continue, the administration is considering a backup plan, according to sources familiar with the discussions, in which the State Department would make a substantial PDA announcement before the Sept. 30, effectively spending the remaining $6 bn before it expires.

Under this contingency plan, the delivery timeline for the weapons and equipment would be extended, sources said, allowing for a more gradual transfer of resources to Ukraine.

Congressional aides and administration officials also note that there is another resource available: about $3 bn in PDA authority resulting from a Pentagon accounting error remains available to help Ukraine. It does not expire. (Source: Reuters)

06 Sept 24. UK to provide £162m package of air defence missiles for Ukraine as Defence Secretary meets international partners. UK to supply 650 Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM) through £162m contract to boost Ukraine’s air defences. The UK will supply 650 Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) systems to Ukraine to boost the country’s air defence capabilities, as part of the new government’s commitment to Ukraine.

The air defence package will be announced by Defence Secretary John Healey MP today at the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) meeting at US Air Force Base in Ramstein – his first as Defence Secretary. At the 24th meeting of the group, the Defence Secretary will set out the UK’s ironclad commitment to Ukraine and urge allies to continue to supply Ukraine with vital equipment.

It comes following a bilateral meeting between John Healey and his Ukrainian counterpart Rustem Umerov in London earlier this week, where the pair discussed how the UK will continue to ramp-up support over the coming months. At that meeting, the Defence Secretary confirmed that £300 m worth of artillery ammunition will start to be delivered by the end of this year to support Ukraine’s war effort.

In keeping with the new government’s commitment to speed up deliveries of aid, the first batch of LMM missiles announced today are also expected to be delivered by the end of this year.

Today’s package is part of the UK’s work to help step up UK and European defence production – with today’s £162m order helping to energise the supply chain for the future.  Built by Thales at their Belfast factory, the missiles are highly versatile and can be fired from a variety of platforms on land, sea, and air.

The package is primarily funded through the UK’s £3bn a year financial package for Ukraine, and contributions from Norway through the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) and follows the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary’s commitment to stand by Ukraine will continue for as long as it takes.

It comes after the Defence Secretary signed a new Defence Export Support Treaty with his counterpart Umerov in July, during President Zelesnkyy’s visit to Downing Street. The agreement will fire up both the UK’s and Ukraine’s defence industrial bases and increase military hardware and weaponry production. The treaty will enable Ukraine to draw on £3.5bn of export finance to support its war effort.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP said: “This new commitment will give an important boost to Ukraine’s air defences and demonstrates our new government’s commitment to stepping up support for Ukraine.

In recent days we have seen the tragic cost of Russia’s indiscriminate strikes on Poltava and Lviv. These new UK-made missiles will support Ukraine to defend its people, infrastructure, and territory from Putin’s brutal attacks. With our international partners today, we will show that we are united for Ukraine. And we will discuss how best we can work together to improve support. Because the security of the UK and Europe starts in Ukraine.”

Ahead of the meeting with international partners, the Defence Secretary visited the Joint Intelligence Coordination Centre (JICC) at the Ramstein Air Base. UK Armed Forces personnel deployed at the JICC work alongside allies to analyse intelligence.

Since Russia’s illegal invasion, the UK has provided hundreds of LMM missiles to Ukraine for air defence, destroying hundreds of Russian drones and other air threats.

Travelling at Mach 1.5 with a range of more than 6km, the LMM is highly versatile against a wide range of threats, including Armoured Personnel Carriers, fast in-shore attack craft and Unmanned drones.

This contract with Thales in the UK will further prime the world leading British defence industry to increase production rates, enabling future production to be ramped up.

Addressing allies at the UCDG, the Defence Secretary will reiterate the UK’s commitment to supporting Ukraine and ramping up the production and delivery of vital equipment.

A Thales spokesperson said: “As a strategic partner of UK Government, Thales is proud to be working with MoD to support defending democracy in Ukraine through the provision of our Lightweight Multi-role Missile, delivered from our Belfast site.   Since the start of the conflict in Ukraine, UK MoD and Thales have worked in close collaboration to support the Ukrainian effort by delivering key air defence systems at pace. We are pleased that this contract is the first to be signed under Task Force Hirst, which has been established to deliver a deeper defence industrial partnership between the UK and Ukraine.”

Earlier this week, the Government confirmed a milestone moment in international support for Ukraine, with eight countries from across the world having now joined the UK to provide more than £1bn to the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU), in a significant show of unity from Ukraine’s allies.

The IFU was first launched by the UK and Denmark in 2022 to provide an efficient way for countries to pool resources to buy equipment and weapons to support Ukraine’s most urgent capability needs. The UK has donated £500m to the Fund to date.

This is also the first contract approved under Task Force Hirst, a MOD initiative created to ramp up defence industrial capacity and capability, laying the foundation for larger sustained supply of missiles and other key capabilities to Ukraine and, in the longer term, enable industrial cooperation between our two countries. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

05 Sept 24. Austin, Brown to Host Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Germany. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., are scheduled to host the 24th edition of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group tomorrow at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, the Pentagon announced today.

The UDCG, a coalition composed of more than 50 nations that meets regularly to discuss Ukraine’s security needs, first met in April 2022 as a result of Austin’s efforts to assemble the group after Russia invaded Ukraine two months prior.

“At Ramstein, will bring together ministers of defense and senior military officials from some 50 nations to ensure that Ukraine has what it needs to defend its people from Russian aggression,” Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters.

Singh said key areas of focus for this month’s UDCG will include bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, energizing the defense industrial bases of coalition nations to enable support to Ukraine for the long term and updates on the UDCG’s capability coalitions — to include the Air Force coalition.

“As Secretary Austin has said, Ukraine matters to U.S. and international security, and the efforts of the UDCG continue to play a vital role in Ukraine’s fight for freedom and sovereignty,” Singh said.

During the briefing, Singh also provided an update on the Defense Department’s humanitarian efforts in Gaza, noting that the motor vessel Cape Trinity has completed its offload of approximately 6m pounds of humanitarian aid in the Israeli port city of Ashdod.

“The 6m pounds of aid delivered this week brings the grand total of aid delivered to the people of Gaza through maritime and air corridors to more than 38m pounds,” Singh said. “This effort represents the highest volume of humanitarian assistance the U.S. military has ever delivered in the Middle East.”

Since Cape Trinity has completed its aid delivery, the vessel will prepare, over the next couple of days, for its return trip to the Port of Beaumont, Texas, Singh added. (Source: U.S. DoD)

06 Sept 24. Ukrainian SHARK and PD-2 Drones to be Manufactured in Poland. Poland’s defense industry representatives have received licenses from Ukrspecsystems, the Ukrainian defense company, to produce its advanced drones.

With this step, the Ukrainian enterprise has begun collaborating with Poland’s ALS Systems, which plans to manufacture SHARK, MINI SHARK, and PD-2 reconnaissance drones.

Ukrspecsystems will provide technology and expertise, while the Polish defense company will produce the drones at its facility in southern Poland. According to the enterprise, the production will help conquer new markets in the future and promote Ukrainian drone systems on the Western market.

The multifunctional Shark unmanned aerial system is designed for a wide range of missions – to help Ukrainian forces locate Russian equipment and positions, subsequently guiding artillery strikes on them.

It provides the capability for fully autonomous reconnaissance, surveillance, precise identification, and recognition from long distances and at significant altitudes.

The PD-2 drone can also detect targets and adjust fire behind enemy lines, both on land and at sea. This reconnaissance drone has a controlled flight radius of up to 180 km and is equipped with an optical observation station featuring a 30x zoom for the daytime channel and a 5x zoom for the thermal imaging channel. (Source: UAS VISION/Euromaidan)

04 Sept 24. British-led IFU hits £1bn mark as Ukraine’s allies ramp up efforts. The funding mechanism uses rapid procurement processes to deliver critical capabilities in line with Ukraine’s priority requirements for military equipment. The International Fund for Ukraine (IFU), a funding mechanism in which a group of Western allies pool resources to buy equipment and weapons for the war-torn nation, has reached £1bn ($1.3bn).

This milestone was achieved at the same time Ukraine’s Minister for Defence, Rustem Umerov, visited London to discuss the accelerated delivery of the UK’s military assistance to the country as it attempts to turn the tide of the war with a month-long incursion into Russia.

Alongside the UK, which administers the initiative, IFU contributors include Australia, Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. The mechanism uses rapid procurement processes to deliver critical capabilities – lethal and non-lethal – which are aligned to Ukraine’s priority requirements for military equipment. The largest single package committed was a £300m British order for artillery ammunition in July. This encompasses 20,000 rounds of 152-

Although, the latest offering to tip the figure over the bn-pound mark was a Norwegian drone package, announced on 3 September; this donation amounts to Nkr570m (£40.6m).

“Ukraine has an urgent need for more military equipment to protect itself against the Russian war of aggression. Together with other countries, Norway will do what we can to contribute,” commented Norway’s Minister of Defence Bjørn Arild Gram.

Gram’s assertion rings true after Russia’s heaviest strike against Ukrainian territory so far, which occurred toward the end of August. The salvos were made up of a combined missile and drone barrage targetting Ukranine’s critical infrastructure. Altogether, the strikes targetted more than half of Ukraine’s regions, that is 15 out of 24 Ukrainian oblasts. More recently, a Russian missile strike has also killed 51 people and injured more than 250 people in the Ukrainian city of Potlava earlier this week. (Source: army-technology.com)

05 Sep 24. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian C-UAS balloon tech takes drone warfare to new heights. A new C-UAS balloon technology developed in Ukraine could give it a much-needed edge in its ongoing war with Russia. The Aero Azimuth system, developed by Kvertus and using a balloon, or aerostat, from Aero Bavovna, operates by mounting an electronic warfare payload on the aerostat. This elevates the system to detect and intercept drone communication signals from high altitudes, extending its range and enhancing its ability to locate enemy drone operators over long distances.

The primary objective of the Aero Azimuth system is to detect the location of enemy drone operators. By identifying the operators, Ukrainian forces can directly target them, aiming to neutralise the source of the drone threat. This approach represents a shift in C-UAS strategies, as it focuses on eliminating the command centres rather than just the drones themselves.

The Aero Azimuth system tracks UAS by detecting signals from their onboard systems, such as control and data transmission channels. According to Kvertus, the system has a maximum detection range of 30 kilometers (18 miles) and can simultaneously track multiple targets. The system’s light weight, just 8 kg (17 pounds), makes it easy to deploy on balloons, allowing it to remain airborne for extended periods.

During trials, the Aero Azimuth was positioned 9 km (5.5 miles) away from enemy forces to ensure its safety from drone attacks and other threats, although this placement reduces its maximum detection range. When airborne, the system successfully detected radio communications with drones from as far as 60 km (37 miles), showcasing its potential for long-range surveillance.

As UAVs continue to play a significant role in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, both sides have employed drones for strikes, surveillance and even unconventional tactics like the use of flamethrower drones. With the widespread use of drones in warfare, systems like Aero Azimuth provide a crucial tool in disrupting enemy operations by targeting not just the drones, but the operators controlling them.

Kvertus is also known for other counter-drone technologies, including the AD MW handheld anti-drone system, which uses radio frequency interference to disrupt the communication between drones and their operators.

The development of Aero Azimuth is just the latest in a series of C-UAS technology developments stemming from the Russ-Ukraine war, offering a new strategic solution to mitigate the growing threat of drones in conflict zones.

https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-c-uas-balloon-tech-takes-drone-warfare-to-new-heights/?utm_campaign=C-UAS%20Hub%20General&utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_KU69NF_3Tyg0RnvSr0RCFayfwO2b9HeGArYRTIUwexqIps-93lX083zkyJ-b72FM4fR79tdrshmawV14Qoj9FCNNKqUehl9ZRAhn2SODouVGCSGA&_hsmi=323276986&utm_content=323276986&utm_source=hs_email (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

05 Sept 24. Ukraine’s parliament is expected to approve a new wartime cabinet, as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seeks the biggest overhaul of his government since Russia’s full-scale invasion almost 31 months ago. The Verkhovna Rada is meeting on Thursday to dismiss several ministers who tendered resignations and approve nine ministerial candidates put forward by Zelenskyy’s ruling Servant of the People party, according to several party members. But they said few new faces were expected to be appointed, with many of the nine positions to be filled by officials who were already serving in ministerial roles or the presidential administration. Zelenskyy’s critics have warned that the cabinet changes are likely to further concentrate power in the president’s hands and those of Andriy Yermak, his influential and controversial head of office. Oleksandr Merezhko, an MP in Zelenskyy’s party, told the Financial Times that the president explained to his deputies late on Wednesday that a “new energy” inside the government is needed to take the country forward. The decision to replace Dmytro Kuleba, one of Ukraine’s longest-serving foreign ministers, has been the most contentious. A career diplomat, Kuleba has been one of the country’s most effective interlocutors with Washington and EU capitals and played a crucial role in securing western military aid for Kyiv’s defence. Andriy Sybiha, who has served as Kuleba’s first deputy minister since April, was appointed by parliament on Thursday to succeed his boss. Sybiha, an experienced, multilingual diplomat, is seen as one of only a few insiders to have the president’s ear. He was previously the deputy head of Zelenskyy’s office in charge of foreign policy. Before that, he served as ambassador to Turkey and held two posts at Ukraine’s embassy in Poland, roles that will help him navigate two important relationships as the new foreign minister. ,(Source: FT.com)

04 Sept 24. Germany won’t let up in military aid to Ukraine, Scholz says. Germany will not slacken in its military support for Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz said on Wednesday, trying to dispel fears Berlin might disappoint Kyiv amid a domestic budget squeeze and media reports of a freeze on new German military aid.

“Germany’s support for Ukraine will not cease. We have made provisions, struck (defence) deals and secured the funding in good time so that Ukraine can continue to fully rely on us in future,” Scholz said.

European defence stocks fell in mid-August after the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung (FAS) newspaper said the German finance ministry would not approve additional applications for Ukraine military aid due to budget constraints.

A German government spokesperson later called that report “incorrect” and reiterated Berlin’s support for Ukraine for “as long as necessary”.

Scholz was speaking at a military base close to the northern town of Todendorf, where Germany’s first IRIS-T SLM medium-range air defence system was declared operational.

Even before the Luftwaffe took delivery of its first unit, Germany funded several IRIS-T SLM systems for Ukraine, where they are mainly used to guard Kyiv against Russian missile attacks, making it one of the most coveted Western arms donations.

So far, Germany has supplied four out of a total 12 pledged IRIS-T SLM units to Kyiv, with two more systems to be shipped by the end of the year.

“In Ukraine, IRIS-T has shot down more than 250 missiles, drones and cruise missiles so far and saved countless lives, at an impressive hit rate of 95% or even more,” Scholz said.

Boasting a range of some 40 km (25 miles) and a 360-degree view, the system built by German arms maker Diehl has been used to shoot down cruise missiles used by Russia to attack power stations – and also aircraft, including Iran-made Shahed drones. (Source: Reuters)

03 Sept 24. Germany sticking to Kyiv air defence supply plan, source says. Germany is sticking to its plan to deliver 12 IRIS-T SLM air defence systems to Ukraine, a source familiar with the matter told Reuters on Tuesday, clarifying that he was referring to previous commitments. Four units have been supplied, two more are expected to be shipped by the end of the year, with the leaving six to be delivered at a later stage. The German air force has taken delivery of the first of six IRIS-T systems it has ordered in total so far. (Source: Reuters)

03 Sept 24. Defence Secretary welcomes Ukrainian counterpart to UK and confirms £1bn milestone in UK-administered fund. The milestone comes as the International Fund for Ukraine’s largest support package will start delivering this year. Urgent work to accelerate the delivery of the UK’s military support for Ukraine will be discussed between the Defence Secretary and his counterpart, Rustem Umerov, during a visit to London today.

The visit comes during a milestone moment in international support for Ukraine, with eight countries from across the world having now joined the UK to provide more than £1 bn to the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU), in a significant show of unity from Ukraine’s allies.

It comes after the Prime Minister announced the IFU’s largest ever support package at the NATO Summit in July, with a £300m contract to supply 152mm artillery shells to supply Ukraine’s Soviet-era guns. He also confirmed £3bn of UK aid for Ukraine per year for as long as it takes.

The Defence Secretary confirmed today the £300m contract has now been signed and is expected to deliver thousands of shells before the end of the year – providing a significant boost for Ukraine’s stockpiles and aligning with the Government’s acceleration of military support deliveries.

Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Norway all confirmed their intent this summer to invest additional money in the Fund to purchase more drones to help on the frontline, as well as vital air defence capabilities to help shield Ukraine’s people and key infrastructure from relentless Russian bombardment.

Defence Secretary, John Healey, said: “UK military equipment continues to prove invaluable for Ukraine’s war effort. The ongoing defensive operation in Kursk underlines the crucial importance of continued support. And today’s milestone for the International Fund for Ukraine shows the value of working with our Allies to deliver that support.

Our government is stepping up Britain’s support for Ukraine to fight Putin’s illegal invasion. We are speeding up deliveries of aid, with a much-needed ammunition package announced by the Prime Minister at NATO set to begin deliveries within months. We will continue to step up our support to help Ukraine achieve victory.”

In his first days as Defence Secretary, John Healey met President Zelenskyy and Minister Umerov in Ukraine, where he pledged to accelerate the delivery of the UK’s military support for Ukraine.

The artillery ammunition contract, placed by Defence Equipment & Support – the MOD’s procurement arm – will deliver 120,000 newly-manufactured shells over the next 18 months, and will stimulate industrial capacity in Europe and safeguard reliable supply chains that will continue to provide Ukraine with vital ammunition.

It follows previous packages of support from the IFU, which have delivered heavy-lift and reconnaissance drones, maritime drones, minefield-clearing capabilities, combat vehicle spares and air defence systems. The IFU was first launched by Denmark and the UK in 2022 to provide a more efficient way for countries to pool resources to buy equipment and weapons to support Ukraine’s most urgent capability needs. The UK has donated £500m to the Fund to date. With artillery having proved critical to Ukraine’s previous battlefield successes, this new investment will support them in further degrading Russia’s forces and preventing them from making significant breakthroughs. Other contributors to the IFU include Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, and Sweden. Further deliveries from the IFU’s other contracts will continue through the coming months. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

03 Sept 24. US close to agreeing on long-range missiles for Ukraine; delivery to take months.

Summary

• Stealthy JASSM weapons have range to hit targets inside Russia
• Decision expected in autumn, U.S. officials say
• Pentagon trying to integrate JASSMs on Soviet-era Ukrainian jets

The U.S. is close to an agreement to give Ukraine long-range cruise missiles that could reach deep into Russia, but Kyiv would need to wait several months as the U.S. works through technical issues ahead of any shipment, U.S. officials said.

The inclusion of Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) in a weapons package is expected to be announced this autumn, three sources said, though a final decision has not been made. The sources declined to be named because they are not authorized to discuss the topic.

Sending JASSMs to Ukraine could significantly alter the strategic landscape of the conflict by putting more of Russia in range of powerful, precision-guided munitions, an important concern of the Biden administration, the officials said.

Military analysts have suggested the introduction of JASSMs – which are stealthy and can strike further than most other missiles in Ukraine’s current inventory – could push Russian staging areas and supply depots back by hundreds of miles.

This would severely complicate Russia’s ability to sustain its offensive operations and potentially provide Ukraine with a strategic advantage.

Launching them from points near Ukraine’s northern border with Russia could allow them to hit military installations as far away as the Russian cities of Voronezh and Bryansk. In the south, dropping them near the front lines could enable strikes on airfields or naval facilities in Crimea.

The JASSM missile could enable Ukraine to hit targets about 300 km inside Russia, including at least 30 airbases, some of which Russia has used to launch attacks.

The JASSM has so far only been integrated into U.S.-designed aircraft. Ukraine will ultimately operate several dozen F-16s, each of which can carry two of the cruise missiles.

One of the U.S. officials said there were efforts to make the missile operable with non-Western fighter jets in Ukraine’s inventory, which has not been reported previously. Although the official did not provide further detail on which jets in Ukraine’s inventory JASSM could be used with, they operate Soviet-era MiG-29, Su-24 and Su-27 jets.

Politico reported last month the Biden administration was “open” to giving Ukraine JASSMs.

Ukraine’s need for more arms, and more powerful weaponry, is growing as it continues to face intense pressure from Russian forces along its eastern front.

Older-model JASSMs, which are made by Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) have a range of about 230 miles (370 km). The missiles, about 14 feet (4m) long, are designed to be somewhat stealthy, making them difficult to spot on radar. They can also fly close to the ground and can be programmed to take circuitous routes that avoid air defenses.

There is also a longer-range JASSM missile that can fly more than 500 miles. Reuters could not immediately establish which of the two types Washington was considering, but providing the shorter-range missiles would put less strain on its stockpiles.

Giving Ukraine JASSMs would also add pressure for Washington to drop restrictions on how Ukraine uses U.S. weaponry because their effects would be limited if they were not cleared for use on targets inside Russia, said a congressional staffer who works on the issue.

The U.S. has been reluctant to supply weapons that could strike targets deep inside in Russia for fear it would escalate the conflict. Kyiv’s allies have been supplying weapons but with restrictions on how and when they can be used inside Russia, out of concern such strikes could prompt retaliation that draws NATO countries into the war or provokes a nuclear conflict.

Each JASSM has a large, 1,000-pound warhead, but unlike the Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles already provided to Kyiv by Britain and France, it is not explicitly designed to penetrate hardened bunkers. The newest versions cost about $1m each.

Global Positioning System (GPS) signals and an inertial navigation system provide guidance. When it nears its target, an infrared imaging seeker can help steer it to an impact point with an accuracy of about 10 feet (3m).

Although older models might be less resistant to electronic warfare than the current iteration of JASSM, the infrared seeker would help it find its target even amid heavy jamming, said George William Herbert of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey in California.

“They’re pretty stealthy, but not completely designed around maximum stealth,” Herbert said. “A few years ago, a bunch were fired at Syria after chemical weapons incidents, and Russian air defense systems in the country failed to shoot many down, possibly none of them.

“I would expect that carefully planned missile flight paths would let JASSM be effective almost anywhere in the war area.” (Source: Reuters)

02 Sept 24. Netherlands send 28 Viking BVS10 amphibious vehicles to Ukraine. Netherlands is donating armoured amphibious all terrain vehicles Viking BSV10’s to Ukraine.

The Netherlands Ministry of Defence (Mod) announced on 31 August 2024, the donation of 28 an amphibious tracked vehicles to Ukraine.

The BVS10 Bandvagn Viking  all-terrain vehicles were donated from Netherland stocks with the Marine Corp, and the Marine Corp have been involved in the training of Ukrainian personnel for both operational purposes and technical maintenance.

The announcement from the MoD was clear that while Ukraine adheres to international humanitarian law, the Vikings are to be used at the discretion of Ukraine. This is an uncommon declaration from the Netherlands MoD, one that likely reflects a position supportive of the Ukrainian counter-invasion into the Russian territory of Kursk, contrasting with the US reticence to allow its donated arms to be used against Russian targets on Russian sovereign land.

The Vikings serve in a number of combat roles, including command vehicle and mobile firs support, as well as troop transport and medical extraction.

The vehicle is armoured, providing protections from enemy fire, however, as the MoD states, the driver of the Viking suffered from a limited field of vision, and must communicate with the gunner to overcome this limitation. The MoD emphasised that this was an important aspect of training for the Ukrainian soldiers.

The Viking is a fully-amphibious armoured all-terrain vehicle consisting of two tracked vehicle units linked by a steering mechanism, that communicate via a two-way voice communications unit. The roof of the forward cabin is fitted with a ring mount for a 12.7mm Browning heavy machine gun or a 7.62 general-purpose machine gun. The front cabin accommodates a driver and three fully equipped soldiers. The rear cabin can hold up to eight soldiers. Alternatively, the rear cabin can carry a mortar section, a heavy machine gun section, or a fully-equipped anti-tank detachment with Milan anti-armour missiles and firing posts.

In June 2005, the Netherlands Defence Materiel Organisation awarded a contract to Land Systems Hägglunds for the delivery of 74 BvS10 all-terrain vehicles to the Royal Netherlands Marines. These vehicles were acquired in four different variants: troop carriers (46 vehicles), command vehicles (20), repair and recovery vehicles (four), and ambulances (four).

The BvS10 vehicles were intended to supplement the Bv206 vehicles that had been in service with the Marines since the early 1990s. Deliveries commenced in January 2006, and by 2008, the Netherlands had received 66 of these vehicles. As of 2020, the country possesses 73 Vikings and 88 Bv206s. Plans are underway to replace some of these vehicles with 124 new tracked vehicles, with deliveries expected to begin in 2027. (Source: army-technology.com)

02 Sept 24. Ukraine Receives New Grey Widow Kamikaze Drones. Ukraine’s Security Service has acquired new Grey Widow kamikaze drones, capable of 120 km/h speeds and 52 km range. These domestically-produced, highly maneuverable drones showcase how Ukraine bolsters its defense capabilities with home-grown technology. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has received several new Grey Widow kamikaze drones, which are capable of flying up to 120 km/h and are very maneuverable.

The acquisition of these advanced Grey Widow drones represents a significant enhancement to Ukraine’s military capabilities, particularly in covert operations and precision strikes. As the war continues, such domestically produced, high-performance unmanned systems provide Ukraine with cost-effective tools to counter enemy forces and protect its territory. Furthermore, this development also highlights Ukraine’s growing domestic defense industry and its ability to innovate in response to urgent battlefield needs.

As reported by the manufacturer of the drones, Heavenly Punishment, the drones have been delivered to the SBU’s special operations center ”A”.

Batch of Gray Widow attack drones. The Grey Widow drones are quite popular among charitable foundations and regional administrations, which buy them through a tender.

Made in Ukraine

In July of this year, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution that allows the purchase of domestically produced drones through Prozorro.

With this resolution, manufacturers will have equal access to government contracts, and competition will help the government procure drones at a better price. A customer who wants to buy a UAV places a frame ad on Prozorro with a description of the drone he wants.

Sellers can register in this framework, and then they receive information about the terms, place of delivery, and other data necessary for the purchase. Then an auction is held, and the seller with the most favorable offer wins. Prozorro is a fully electronic public procurement platform that ensures open access to public tenders in Ukraine. (Source: UAS VISION/Euromaidan)

02 Sept 24. Ukrainian Troops Down Mysterious Russian Jet-Powered Drone. Ukrainian troops successfully intercepted a mysterious new type of Russian jet-powered unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), marking the first appearance of this drone model on the battlefield.

The incident occurred during one of the latest drone attacks by Russia on Ukraine, featuring a UAV that was previously unknown to both the public and military analysts.

The downed UAV, which occurred on August 30, is described as a jet-powered drone following the “flying wing” aerodynamic configuration, indicating a design focused on stealth and speed. Notably, the UAV did not carry any weapons or visible reconnaissance equipment, suggesting it might have been used as a decoy or for testing Ukrainian air defenses rather than direct engagement.

The craftsmanship of the drone suggests it was not a high-end factory product but rather a more rudimentary, possibly experimental model.

“The drone appears quite rudimentary and exhibits many flaws,” stated a Ukrainian military official.

Military analysts speculate that the UAV could likely have been a false target used by Russian forces to probe Ukrainian air defenses without risking more valuable or sophisticated equipment. The absence of any optical or other sophisticated surveillance equipment further supports this theory. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog)

02 Sept 24. Romanian government approves draft law to give Patriot defence system to Ukraine. Romania’s coalition government approved a draft law on Monday enabling the donation of a Patriot missile defence system to Ukraine and sent it to parliament for a final vote.

Romania, a NATO member since 2004, shares a 650-km (400-mile) border with Ukraine and has had Russian drone fragments stray into its territory repeatedly as Moscow attacks Ukrainian ports just across the Danube River border.

Bucharest said in June that it would donate one of its two operational Patriot systems to Ukraine on condition that allies replace it with a similar air defence system.

It is part of a delivery of five such systems and other strategic air defence units pledged by NATO states to Kyiv as it battles Russia’s invasion.

“After parliament approves the law, the government will be able to issue the decision that makes the donation operational,” government spokesman Mihai Constantin said.

The draft law also states that Romania will send letters of offer and acceptance to the U.S. for the replacement of the donated battery, and expects to pay roughly $60m in taxes and fees.

Romania signed a $4bn deal to buy Patriots, built by RTX Corp (RTX.N) in 2017, its biggest procurement contract to date. The first shipment was delivered in 2020. Romania has received four systems so far, with two operational. (Source: Google/Reuters)

02 Sept 24. Innovative British UAV manufacturer Evolve Dynamics announced the incorporation of its new Ukrainian entity,

having had a presence in the country since 2017 and serving an active role in the current conflict since it began in 2022. A British company with a long history in Ukraine, Evolve Dynamics was founded in response to the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. Founder Mike Dewhirst was inspired to utilise his passion for, and deep knowledge of, technology to support the Ukrainian resistance, which led to him starting Evolve Dynamics in 2016, a business dedicated to providing sUAS support to the Ukrainian military with its flagship platform, Sky Mantis.

Some ten years later, Evolve Dynamics now employs over 50 staff in the UK, with a further 20 team members based in Ukraine, and this year launched its new SKY MANTIS 2 UAV to the international market, with technology developed and tested on the front line in Ukraine. The incorporation of the new Ukrainian entity underlines the company’s long-term commitment to the country and its position as a market leader in the design and supply of UAV technology for military operations.

THE BENEFITS OF A TEAM ON THE GROUND

The company’s team in Ukraine, some of whom have themselves seen active

service in the current conflict, has endured through the challenges of operating in a country disrupted by war and the personal difficulties that that entails. This team includes specialists in software development, aero mechanical engineering, training, piloting, and customer support, all working to deliver a full in-country

service to military end users on the front line. The team fosters close working relationships with military units to develop a deep

understanding of their operations, and to be able to iterate technology rapidly in order to meet specific and constantly evolving requirements. This dedicated in-country support, delivered in users’ native language, is vital to ensuring the technology’s usability, reliability and relevance.

The company’s newly-released flagship platform, SKY MANTIS 2, benefits from technology that was developed in direct response to the challenges that are experienced by front line UAV operators in Ukraine. SKY MANTIS 2 comes with a Doodle Labs Helix Mesh Rider Radio fitted as standard, a low-SWaP radio that was rigorously tested in the field in Ukraine in collaboration with Evolve Dynamics, ensuring its resilience to active jamming efforts. This radio is supplied separate to the controller, in order to enhance the safety of the user.

SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE

Evolve Dynamics’ founder, CEO and CTO Mike Dewhirst commented: “This is a

very proud moment for us as we formally establish our operations in Ukraine, consolidating our team’s dedicated work over the past ten years. We would like topay tribute to the strength and courage of our team in Ukraine, and to renew our unwavering support for the armed forces and people of Ukraine. Slava Ukraini!

Heroyam Slava! Smert’ voroham!”

MSPO

Evolve Dynamics is exhibiting at the International Defence Industry Exhibition (MSPO) in Poland 3-6 September 2024. A key event for the global defence industry, this year’s edition takes place against the backdrop of the continuing conflict in Ukraine and rising tensions in the Middle East. Evolve Dynamics can be found on Stand D-15.

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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