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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Aug 02,

*Russia: Prisoner exchange with Western powers is highly unlikely to indicate a thawing of tensions. Russia, the US and a range of other countries participated in the largest prisoner swap between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War on 1 August, exchanging 24 people. Those freed from Russian custody include Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, who was sentenced to 16 years in prison for espionage in July. Several of the people released had worked with Russia’s late leading opposition figure, Alexei Navalny, who died in an Arctic penal colony in February. Western interests returned eight prisoners, including Vadim Krasikov, a colonel in Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) who was serving a life sentence in Germany for murdering an exiled Chechen-Georgian dissident. While the exchange is notable, it is highly unlikely to indicate a thawing of tensions between Russia and the West. The event does not indicate an improvement in Russia’s human rights landscape. The exchange will possibly encourage further arbitrary detentions and imprisonment of Russian dissidents and/or Western journalists in Russia as political bargaining chips. Moreover, the exchange possibly indicates that Russia wishes to demonstrate its ability to negotiate in good faith and make deals beneficial to Western interests amid growing pressure for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, we assess that Russia is highly unlikely willing to entertain concessions to cease fighting in the foreseeable future.

Aug 01.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • DONETSK: Russian mechanised assaults in Donetsk oblast are unlikely to be indicative of a new large-scale offensive; equipment losses will continue to impede Russian offensive operations
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian air defences intercepted all 89 drones fired by Russian forces on 30-31 July; this was one of the largest Russian drone attacks so far in 2024
  • DEBT: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law temporarily suspending foreign debt payments amid reports of an impending debt restructuring deal which will likely help Ukraine finance its war effort
  • FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree effectively doubling upfront payments for new recruits to fight in Ukraine as efforts to avoid a second mobilisation continue
  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces have marginally advanced in ongoing offensive operations near Bakhmut over the past 48 hours. Geolocated footage circulated on 31 July indicates that Russian forces have crossed the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas canal north of Novyi microdistrict (Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, further south along the Toretsk axis, geolocated footage posted on 30 July indicates that Russian forces made advances in north-west and south-west Zalizne, which is likely almost entirely under Russian control. On 30 July, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that Russian forces had captured the settlement of Pivdenne, located east of Toretsk, though we cannot confirm this. Earlier on 1 August, two prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have improved their positions on the flanks of Chasiv Yar (east of Bakhmut) over the past 24 hours.
  • DONETSK: Russian mechanised assaults launched over the past few days in the Donetsk sector are not indicative of a new large-scale offensive push. Geolocated footage from 29 July shows that a Russian battalion-sized mechanised assault resulted in limited gains in the south-western outskirts of Kostyantynivka, south-west of Donetsk city. Additional footage shows failed platoon and company-sized mechanised assaults on 29 July south-west of Pobieda, south-west of Donetsk city, and west of Marinka, in the Kurakhove area. Additionally, geolocated footage from 30 July shows Russian forces advancing north-east of Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk city) following a reinforced platoon-sized mechanised assault. These assaults reportedly resulted in heavy material losses. Although Russia has been able to ramp up the production of armoured vehicles and tanks since the start of the war, we assess that such heavy material losses will continue to prevent Russia from making major breakthroughs in the sector.
  • DONTESK:  Meanwhile, Russian forces have made confirmed advances in sustained offensive operations north-west of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage from 29 July shows Russian advances in western Novoselivka Persha, north-west of Avdiivka, likely confirming that the settlement is under Russian control. Russian forces also made confirmed advances as of 29 July up to a windbreak west of Vovche, north-west of Avdiivka. On 30 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that offensive operations towards Pokrovsk, north-west of Avdiivka, have become Russia’s main target amid the faltering operation in eastern Kharkiv oblast.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have made confirmed gains along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline, which remains broadly stable. Geolocated footage from 31 July shows Russian forces advancing south-east of Synkivka, located north-east of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Additional footage shows that Russian forces recently gained ground south of Novoyehorivka, south-west of Svatove (Luhansk oblast).
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces have marginally advanced in ongoing offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia oblast amid reports that the Russian military is transferring increased numbers of troops and equipment to the region. Geolocated footage published on 29 July indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north-west of Robotyne. Also on 29 July, Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmyto Lykhovyi stated that Russian forces had begun attacking the direction of Huliapole following a ‘long pause’.
  • SOUTHERN: On 29 July, an advisor to the exiled Ukrainian mayor of Russian-occupied Mariupol (Donetsk oblast) reported that there had been a sharp increase in the scale of military equipment being transferred to Zaporizhzhia oblast from the city. Although we cannot confirm this, it possibly points to a Russian effort to apply pressure across the frontline, as opposed to one or two sectors in the Donbas region, with Avdiivka and Bakhmut as previous examples. The current push toward Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) possibly represents the current focus of Russian operations. Regardless, we assess that the reported increase in troops and equipment is unlikely to represent preparation for any large-scale offensive.
  • STRIKES: Early on 29 July, Russian forces launched one Kh-59/Kh69 missile and ten Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukraine’s Air Force destroyed the missile and nine of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson and Kirovohrad oblasts. On 30 July, Ukrainian air defences intercepted seven Russian reconnaissance drones in eastern and southern oblasts.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 30-31 July, Russia launched a large-scale drone attack, deploying 89 Shahed-136/131 drones. The Ukrainian authorities noted that this was the largest drone attack since 1 January, when Russia launched the same number of drones. 36 drones targeted the capital Kyiv, where falling debris damaged residential buildings. Other targets included Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russian forces also launched a Kh-59 missile. Ukrainian air defences intercepted all the projectiles, reflecting Ukraine’s usual high interception rates of drone attacks. Earlier on 1 August, Russian forces launched an Iskandr-M ballistic missile and seven Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted all the drones, but the missile reportedly struck a railway station in Kharkiv oblast.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 30 July, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an oil depot in Vozy, in Russia’s Kursk oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed its forces struck an ammunition depot near the city of Kursk (Kursk oblast), on 31 July. Earlier, the Russian MoD claimed that its air defences intercepted Ukrainian-launched Neptune missiles over Kursk oblast. These attacks underscore Kyiv’s ongoing strategy of degrading military logistics in Russian Western regions to disrupt frontline supplies.
  • STRIKES: on 30 July, Ukrainian Deputy Strategic Industries Minister Hanna Hvozdiar stated that Ukraine can produce more than three million drones a year. However, Hvozdiar acknowledged that the country still relies on foreign financing for drone production, indicating that this figure is likely highly dependent on foreign aid. Drones have proven to be a key element of Ukraine’s long-range attacks against Russia, with such attacks having focused on Russian military logistics and oil infrastructure in Western regions.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • AID: Bloomberg reported on 31 July that the first wave of F-16 fighter jets has arrived in Ukraine. The outlet claimed that a small number of vehicles had been delivered without specifying how many. According to the British newspaper The Times, the Netherlands transferred six planes; Denmark is expected to send more in the near term. For further analysis concerning the aircraft and their immediate impact on the battlefield, please see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 29 July 2024.
  • ENERGY: A Ukrainian prime ministerial energy advisor, Yuriy Boiko, assessed on 30 July that Ukraine will experience minimal power outages over the next three months if Russia does not conduct new strikes against energy infrastructure. Although Boiko stated that the ‘energy situation’ has been more or less balanced, he emphasised that Ukraine needs to prioritise protecting repaired facilities from new attacks to maintain energy supplies at their current levels. While Boiko’s comments indicate cautious optimism, energy insecurity will nevertheless remain a persistent concern throughout the conflict for personal and corporate consumers. Ultimately, energy infrastructure will highly likely remain a priority target for Russian strikes in the coming months, particularly over the colder winter period.
  • DEBT: On 31 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law suspending the government’s foreign debt payments until 1 October. This law comes amid ongoing negotiations between Ukraine and its commercial creditors over the restructuring of its outstanding USD 20bn debt. As such, the postponement of foreign debt payments means the country will enter a short-term default until it reaches a deal with its private bondholders. Parties have reportedly reached a preliminary agreement, with a formal deal likely to be concluded in the coming weeks.
  • DEBT: The preliminary debt restructuring deal reportedly envisions a 37% debt write-off and the replacement of existing claims with two series of bonds. For the first series, which constitutes 40% of the outstanding debt, Ukraine will start paying interest from 2025 and begin amortising the bonds by 2029. Interest and amortisation payments for the second series will start in 2027 and 2030 respectively. In the meantime, we assess this short-term default is unlikely to degrade Ukraine’s long-term borrowing prospects. The likely debt restructuring deal will facilitate Ukraine’s war financing efforts.
  • INVESTMENT: On 31 July, US Special Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery Penny Pritzker outlined a five-step plan to increase the attractiveness of the Ukrainian economy to private sector investment. Pritzker said the first step is to develop a body responsible for planning and prioritising reconstruction programmes into a ‘single-project pipeline’. Although investment in Ukraine increased by 17% and over 37,000 new businesses were registered there in 2023, the continuation of the conflict and endemic corruption will likely continue to undermine investor confidence in the medium-to-long term.
  • MOLDOVA: Moldova reportedly plans to reintegrate the separatist pro-Russia Transnistria region by 2038 using German reunification as a model. Spanish newspaper El Pais published a report on 29 July concerning the plan, which envisions ending with a referendum on the matter and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the breakaway territory. According to the report, the central Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities will consider abolishing the Transnistrian ruble in favour of the Moldovan leu (MDL) as well as unifying financial institutions from 2028 to 2031.
  • MOLDOVA: The former deputy prime minister responsible for dealing with reintegration matters, Alexandru Flenchea, stated that the authorities are indeed working on a reintegration strategy. However, Flenchea said the article does not reflect what work officials have done so far and existing developments without providing specifics. We assess that Transnistria’s reintegration into Moldova is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, with the region almost certain to remain an outpost for Russia to use for destabilising the pro-West Moldovan government. For further analysis on Transnistria, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 27 February 2024.

FORECAST

RECRUITMENT: On 31 July, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree ordering an increase in the sign-on bonus for new recruits to fight in Ukraine, effectively doubling the upfront payment. Russian citizens and foreigners who sign a contract before the end of 2024 will receive a one-time sum of RUB 400,000 (USD 4,651). Putin signed a decree in November 2022 providing a single payment of RUB 195,000 (around USD 2,300) to individuals who signed contracts after the announcement of partial mobilisation in September of that year.

The new decree almost certainly aims to increase financial incentives to serve in Ukraine without having to declare a second round of mobilisation, which would highly likely be unpopular in Russian society. The document also recommends that regional authorities match this sign-on payment with funds drawn from their budgets. Nevertheless, many Russian regions have already begun offering financial incentives for potential recruits. In the capital Moscow, Mayor Sergei Sobyanin signed a decree on 23 July establishing a one-time signing bonus of RUB 1.9m (USD 21,200). The average nominal monthly wage across Russia in March amounted to RUB 87,740 (just over USD 1,020). Russia likely offers one of the highest sign-on payments for new recruits, likely to take advantage of how partial mobilisation disproportionately impacts less-affluent regions as opposed to Moscow and St. Petersburg (St. Petersburg federal city).

Aside from offering lucrative bonuses, the Russian authorities will likely continue to exert pressure on individuals taking Russian citizenship to participate in the war effort. On 31 July the lower house of Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, approved a bill in all three readings obliging naturalised Russian citizens to register for the military. The legislation stipulates that new citizens who have not registered will have their citizenship revoked. The Federation Council (the upper parliamentary chamber) must approve the bill before it can be signed by the president, though we assess this eventuality to be highly likely.

Meanwhile, the New York Times (NYT) reported on 30 July that Ukraine has been drafting up to 30,000 people per month since May due to legislation tightening mobilisation. According to three unspecified military experts, this figure is two to three times higher than during the last winter months and is about the same number of people as the Russian army is recruiting per month. However, the mobilisation push has not yet significantly bolstered manpower on the frontlines and some recruits are reportedly not physically fit for combat. Over 3,600 convicts are estimated to have been released in exchange for participation in the war – more than 13% of the Ukrainian prisoner population – after the new mobilisation law allowed certain prisoners to serve. Despite efforts to increase troop numbers, we assess that personnel shortages will remain an ongoing concern for Ukraine over the coming months.

*Ukraine: Short-term default is unlikely to degrade long-term borrowing prospects. On 31 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law suspending the government’s foreign debt payments until 1 October. This law comes amid ongoing negotiations between Ukraine and its commercial creditors over the restructuring of its outstanding USD 20 bn debt. As such, the postponement of foreign debt payments means the country will enter a short-term default until it reaches a deal with its private bondholders. Parties have reportedly reached a preliminary agreement, with a formal deal likely to be concluded in the coming weeks. The preliminary debt restructuring deal reportedly envisions a 37% debt write-off and the replacement of existing claims with two series of bonds. For the first series, which constitutes 40% of the outstanding debt, Ukraine will start paying interest from 2025 and begin amortising the bonds by 2029. Interest and amortisation payments for the second series will start in 2027 and 2030 respectively. In the meantime, we assess this short-term default is unlikely to degrade Ukraine’s long-term borrowing prospect. The likely debt restructuring deal will facilitate its war financing efforts.

Jul 29.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • DONETSK: Russian forces have continued to make territorial gains in the direction of Pokrovsk, though they remain unlikely to capture the key logistical town in the near term
  • STRIKES: Russian forces launched large-scale strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure on 26 and 27 July as efforts to degrade the country’s critical infrastructure continue
  • APPROPRIATIONS: The EU announced the transfer of EUR 1.5 bn from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets to Ukraine, raising the risk of retaliatory asset confiscation for Western firms operating in Russia
  • FORECAST: The Washington Post reported that F-16 Jets are set to be delivered to Ukraine in the coming weeks; these are unlikely to have a significant near-term impact on the conflict
  • OFFENSIVES: The head of the Estonia’s Military Intelligence Centre, Colonel Ants Kiviselg, stated on 26 July that Russia likely has the resources to continue its war effort into 2025 and beyond despite its battlefield losses. Kiviselg acknowledged that the current pace of equipment and personnel losses was ‘very difficult’ for Russia. However, he stressed that despite these losses, there has been no notable change (in tactics) at the front, which likely reflects the size of Russia’s population (and its ability recruit for the war effort). Kiviselg also stressed Russia that retains partners and allies, citing North Korea and Iran, who are able to supply the Russian army and help mitigate military equipment losses (which pose a greater medium-term challenge than personnel losses). Kiviselg’s comments align with our own assessment that the war is likely to protract over the coming year.
  • BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
  • DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces continued to make tactical gains towards Pokrovsk, north-west of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage from 25 July showed Russian forces raising a flag west of Avdiivka, in the settlement of Yasnobrodivka. The footage likely indicates that Russian forces control the settlement. Additional geolocated footage published on 26 July indicates that Russian forces advanced near Prohres and Lozuvatske, both north-west of Avdiivka. The Russian MoD claimed that its forces recently captured Lozuvatske; such claims are consistent with the extent of recent confirmed Russian advances. Furthermore, on 26 July, a Ukrainian commander operating in the sector stated to a Ukrainian media outlet that Vovche (located north-west of Avdiivka and directly south of Prohes) as well as Prohres were under Russian control. An OSINT source also reported on 27 July that Russian forces have captured the settlement of Vovche.
  • DONTESK: Despite steady gains towards Pokrovsk, Russian forces are unlikely to capture the settlement in the short-term. On 29 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged the worsening conditions in the Donetsk sector. After capturing Avdiivka earlier this year, Russian forces have concentrated their offensive efforts on advancing towards Pokrovsk, located north- west of Avdiivka. Despite steady tactical gains over recent months, we assess that Russia is unlikely to capture Pokrovsk in the short term. Achieving this objective would necessitate the Russian command reallocating more military personnel and material from other parts of the front. Instead, the Russian command is likely focused on maintaining operational pressure along the entire frontline, aiming to prevent Kyiv from gaining any advantage.
  • KHARKIV: Geolocated footage released on 26 and 27 July indicated that Ukrainian forces recently made marginal advances in counter-offensive operations in Vovchansk, where fighting remains intense. On 28 July, the Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev reiterated that Russian forces are suffering significant losses in this direction. Nonetheless, he also stated that Russian forces continue to adapt their attack tactics, utilising both small groups supported by artillery fire and larger groups.
  • KHARKIV: This indicates that the Russian high command likely remains willing to commit significant numbers of troops to the Kharkiv operation despite the heavy losses that will be sustained in doing so. A Russian milblogger echoed claims that Russian forces had captured the Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv city) on 26 July. We cannot confirm this claim, though Russian forces are likely in nearly full control of the settlement.
  • KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 25 July indicates recent Russian advances east east of Andriivka, west of Svatove.
  • SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
  • STRIKES: On 26 July, Russian forces launched an Iskandr-M ballistic missile and 22 Shahed-136/131 Drones. Ukraine’s Air Force reportedly destroyed 20 drones over Chernihiv, Kherson, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s state energy operator, reported that energy facilities in Chernihiv and Zhytomyr oblasts were hit. Local authorities also reported that a Shahed drone hit a hostel in Nizhny in Chernihiv oblast. Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) posted footage allegedly indicating that the Iskandr-M ballistic missile damaged an ammunition depot in Kramatorsk (Donetsk oblast). Ukrainian military authorities reported that the attack hit industrial facilities in Kramatorsk.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 26-27 July, Ukraine intercepted one Kh-59/Kh-69 missile and four Shahed-136/131 drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Poltava oblasts. Ukrainian forces also destroyed eight reconnaissance drones of various types. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that Russian attacks, including air strikes, shelling, missiles and drone strikes, targeted 145 infrastructure facilities on 27 July alone.
  • STRIKES: On 28 July, Ukrainian air defences shot down one Kh-59 missile and seven of the eight Shahed-136/131 drones over Odesa oblast. Early on 29 July, Russian forces launched one Kh-59/Kh-69 missile and ten Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted the missile and nine drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson and Kirovohrad oblasts.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that overnight on 25-26 July, Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a successful missile strike against the Saky Airbase in occupied Crimea. The attack was reportedly carried out with Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). A pro-Ukrainian Telegram Channel reported that Russian forces intercepted two of the ATACMS missiles, while the remaining two projectiles hit an ammunition depot at the air base and a radar station near the base.
  • STRIKES: Ukraine’s General Staff reported that its forces struck an oil depot in Russia’s Kursk region on 28 July. The Russian MoD reported that early on 29 July, its air defences intercepted 39 drones over Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk and Leningrad oblasts. Ukrainian media outlets reported that the attack damaged a power generating station near the village of Tomarivka (Belgorod oblast), causing localised power outages. Residents of Glaznunivka in Oryol oblast also reported power outages.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • APPROPRIATIONS: On 26 July, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the EU’s transfer of EUR 1.5 bn (over USD 1.6 bn) to Ukraine using the proceeds from frozen Russian assets. Von der Leyen said the proceeds would support defence and reconstruction efforts; there is a realistic possibility of these funds modestly alleviating some short-term budgetary pressure for Kyiv. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western countries immobilised around USD 300 bn in sovereign Russian assets. Most of the funds (USD228bn) are held in Europe.
  • APPROPRIATIONS: The Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on 26 July that Russia would respond but that any action must be considered carefully and correspond with Moscow’s interests. The EU’s decision is highly likely to increase the possibility of retaliatory Russian measures in the coming weeks and months, elevating the risk of Moscow confiscating US and European assets in Russia.
  • CEASEFIRE: According to Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey, around 25% of Ukrainian territory would remain under Russian control in the event of a ceasefire without the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory that is currently occupied.  Vasyl Bodnar stated in an interview published on 25 July that a ceasefire would give Russia time to strengthen its capabilities and renew attacks against Ukraine. This aligns with our continued assessment that Kyiv will highly likely continue to oppose a temporary cessation of hostilities without a Russian withdrawal from occupied territories in the coming months. For further analysis on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s conditions for ‘peace’, please see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 17 June 2024.
  • INDIA: Prime Minister Narendra Modi is slated to visit the Ukrainian capital Kyiv in August, marking his first trip to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Reports emerged on 27 July, citing several unspecified Indian diplomatic sources, that the visit is expected to happen in the third week of August. Modi will most likely visit on 23 August – a day before Ukraine’s Independence Day. Modi travelled to Russia earlier this month and met with Putin (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 11 July 2024). The anticipated visit reflects Ukrainian efforts to engage with the leaders of countries which enjoy friendly relations with Moscow. Kyiv is likely to use the visit in part to encourage New Delhi to use such ties to influence Russia to take steps towards peace in good faith.

FORECAST

AID: The Washington Post (WP) reported on 28 July that the first batch of US-made F-16 fighter jets will arrive in Ukraine in a few weeks. However, WP disclosed that Ukrainian and Western officials doubt that the aircraft will impact the battlefield significantly in the immediate term.

According to the outlet, Ukraine will receive too few of the planes in the near term, while Russia boasts a significant quantity of air defences that can shoot them down. Although officials have not disclosed precisely how many aircraft Kyiv will receive, it is expected to receive around 20 this year. The WP claimed that the first F-16s will likely be utilised to enhance Ukrainian air defence capabilities, such as shooting down aerial targets like missiles, drones and aircraft.

The jets are therefore unlikely to be used to strike Russian ground forces and other military assets near the front in the near term. According to unspecified officials, the F-16s are unlikely to fly close to immediate fighting on the frontline (at least initially). We previously assessed that the planes will likely be used in an air defence role initially, rather than focusing on offensive ground support functions due to logistical pressures and air defence shortages.

We assess that Russian forces will likely continue to strike Ukrainian airfields both in preparation for their arrival and after the planes become operational to undermine their deployment. Russia has attacked at least three Ukrainian airfields this month, evidencing that these will remain a high-value target for Russian strikes in the coming months. Strained Ukrainian air defence coverage will likely increase the risk of F-16s being damaged. Ukraine will realistically have to allocate additional air defence capabilities around airfields where F-16s are kept to avoid assets being damaged in strikes; Russia will highly likely monitor for such activity. Efforts to keep runways in optimal conditions for F-16 operations will likewise likely draw Russian attention

*Ukraine-EU: Transfer of frozen Russian assets will increase retaliatory asset seizure risks. On 26 July, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the EU’s transfer of EUR 1.5bn (over USD 1.6bn) to Ukraine using the proceeds from frozen Russian assets. Von der Leyen said the proceeds would support defence and reconstruction efforts; there is a realistic possibility of these funds modestly alleviating some short-term budgetary pressure for Kyiv. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western countries immobilised around USD 300 bn in sovereign Russian assets. Most of the funds (USD 228 bn) are held in Europe. The Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on 26 July that Russia would respond but that any action must be considered carefully and correspond with Moscow’s interests. The EU’s decision is highly likely to increase the possibility of retaliatory Russian measures in the coming weeks and months, elevating the risk of Moscow confiscating US and European assets in Russia.

*Ukraine: Cyber operation sustains espionage risks from Belarusian-nexus actors. On 29 July, international news outlets reported that the Belarusian-nexus group ‘GhostWriter’ targeted Ukrainian organisations with the ‘PicassoLoader’ malware in mid-July. The group used phishing emails related to a local governance reform project in Ukraine to gain access to targeted systems. They then deployed PicassoLoader to download the ‘Cobalt Strike’ beacon and remotely execute code. GhostWriter primarily targeted local government agencies, likely to collect information on Ukraine’s financial and economic indicators as well as the reform of local government bodies. The group has repeatedly targeted public and private organisations in Ukraine and Baltic countries in multiple espionage operations since the onset of the war in Ukraine. GhostWriter is likely linked to the Belarusian and Russian governments, pointing to the continued use of cyber operations to supplement kinetic action. As a result, we assess this will sustain security and espionage risks for Ukrainian organisations in the long term.

Jul 26.

*Ukraine: War will continue to damage business environment, sustain socio-economic health risks. On 26 July, the European Business Association (EBA) published a survey indicating that 56% of surveyed Ukrainian businesses fear that their business performance will worsen in the coming six months. According to the surveyed companies, the main factors negatively impacting business operations include labour shortages, damage to power infrastructure, and the deterioration of the country’s macroeconomic indicators. These issues highlight the severe negative impact of the war with Russia on Ukraine’s business environment. Ukraine’s ongoing efforts to boost military personnel recruitment (to sustain its attritional war against Russia) have exacerbated labour shortages. Furthermore, Russia’s long-range strike campaign has consistently targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure since the start of the war, resulting in increasingly frequent power outages and long-term security risks. Ultimately, we assess that the ongoing war, which will likely protract throughout 2024 and possibly into 2025, will continue to degrade Ukraine’s business environment, driving long-term socio-economic health risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Aug 24. Ukraine’s Skyeton Expands UAV Production to Slovakia.

Ukrainian company Skyeton, which manufactures ACS-3/Raybird-3 reconnaissance systems, has launched production in Slovakia. The company’s founder, Oleksandr Stepura, told Militarnyi that investments in the factory have reached $3.5m.

Tropozond s.r.o., a member of the Skyeton group, has opened a UAS manufacturing facility under the Skyeton brand in Slovakia. This journey began less than two years ago, and we are thrilled to see it evolve from an idea into a full-fledged facility that will produce in-demand products worldwide and boost the economy of the region.

By the end of next year, Tropozond s.r.o. expects to have as many as 200 employees. The facility is located in the industrial park in the village of Haniska, near Prešov, eastern Slovakia.

Raybird systems have been in service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2018. One system, which includes three UAVs, a portable ground control station, an antenna system, a launcher, as well as a camera, a photo camera, and radars, costs $1.2m.

A Raybird can stay in the air for 28 hours and cover a distance of up to 2500 km at an altitude of up to 4500 m. Only five companies in the world can produce unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with similar characteristics, but their products are more expensive than the Ukrainian ones.

From February 2022 to May 2024, Ukraine’s defense forces ordered more than 75 reconnaissance systems from Skyeton. Production of Raybird UAVs in Slovakia began in the spring of 2024.

Today, Skyeton’s Ukrainian facilities are capable of producing approximately 100 systems per year, while Ukrainian troops require 140 systems annually. The Slovak plant can manufacture 25 reconnaissance systems in 12 months, and after closing an investment round, the capacity will be increased fourfold.

Due to martial law, Raybird systems cannot be exported abroad. The plant in Slovakia is not subject to these restrictions, which opens up more opportunities for the global market. (Source: UAS VISION/Euromaidan)

 

31 Jul 24. F-16 fighter jets finally fly in Ukraine in major boost for Kyiv. The much-vaunted arrival of the warplanes will be met by significant fanfare given their potential role in Ukraine’s fight against Russia

Ukraine has flown its first combat missions with an F-16 after the American-made fighter jets’ long-awaited arrival.

The Telegraph understands the modern warplanes have only been used in an “air defence” capacity so far.

A Ukrainian air force official did not deny this.

A report by the Bloomberg news wire first revealed that a small, but unspecified, number of F-16s had been delivered to Kyiv.

Soon after, a pixelated picture purporting to be an F-16 in the skies above Ukraine was shared on social media and by Ukrainian media outlets.

Kyiv has not officially confirmed receipt of the jets.

Ukraine is expecting to receive 79 F-16s from Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands.

An international coalition to support the deliveries and training of Ukrainian pilots – which also includes the US and UK – had pledged to have the first jets flying by the end of July. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

31 Jul 24. Ukraine conflict: Russia producing 4,000 FPV UAVs per day, minister claims. Russia is producing nearly 4,000 first-person-view (FPV) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) per day, Russian Minister of Defence Andrei Belousov announced to troops at the Moscow Military District on 30 July.

Production has accelerated following a mandate from Russian President Vladimir Putin in December 2022 to scale the development of UAVs. Under this mandate, the Russian Ministry of Defence published a list of 28 instructions, containing orders for the serial production of UAVs and their components, development of necessary infrastructure, training of personnel, and stimulating demand for domestic production.

Following this, in June 2023 Putin instructed the development of support centres for the design, testing, and production of UAVs, supported by the government and the ANO ‘Platform of the National Technology Initiative’. The centres are based in Moscow, St Petersburg, Sevastopol, Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan, Samara, Sakhalin, Tomsk, and Tula, as well as in Bashkiria and Tatarstan. Putin also instructed scaling production of the Lancet and Zala KYB one-way UAVs (known colloquially as Cube).

Russia’s UAV production capacity benefits from a large, domestic industrial infrastructure. By concentrating on the large-scale manufacturing of a specific system, they can expedite production without the constraints imposed by intellectual property and commercial sensitivities, Lieutenant Colonel Haydn Gaukroger, Unmanned Systems Programme lead for Ukraine at the UK Ministry of Defence, previously told Janes. (Source: Janes)

 

31 Jul 24. Russia launched almost 90 drones against Ukraine in one of its largest attacks since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. The overnight attack, which lasted for seven hours and well into Wednesday morning, mainly targeted Kyiv where more than 30 drones were shot down, according to Ukraine’s air defence forces. It marked an escalation in Russia’s renewed offensive, which has prompted Ukrainian forces to also increase their aerial attacks on Russian targets. Kyiv city administration head Serhiy Popko described it as “one of the most massive drone attacks on Ukraine during the entire war”, while noting that none reached their targets. Authorities said 13 houses in the Kyiv region were hit by falling debris and the rest of the drones were downed outside of residential areas. Explosions were reported in four other Ukrainian regions — Mykolayiv, Dnipro, Sumy and Poltava. It was the first nationwide attack since July 8, when Russian missiles overpowered Kyiv’s air defences, killing 42 people and injuring 190 in an attack on a children’s hospital and several residential buildings. Russian drone attacks on Kyiv have become rare since 2023 when Ukraine built up strong air defences around the capital, which include US-made Patriot systems. Ukrainian drone strikes in Russia have also intensified, with several reported over the past week. On Wednesday, Kyiv’s forces claimed to have hit a weapons depot in the Kursk region near the Ukrainian border. The Russian defence ministry said its forces destroyed 19 drones launched by Ukraine overnight. On Sunday, Ukraine said its drones had damaged two Tu-22M3 bomber planes at an airfield in Murmansk, in the far north of Russia. “Destroying the enemy’s aircraft that is striking Ukraine is a priority. We can reach it everywhere,” said the head of Ukraine’s presidential administration Andriy Yermak. The aerial attacks come as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has increased his diplomatic efforts to get more countries behind his peace formula and as Russia’s land offensive made incremental gains along the 1,000km-long frontline. On Monday, Russia announced that it had taken the village of Vovche, near the strategic town of Pokrovsk, which, if captured, would make it very difficult for Ukrainian forces to hold the line. While Russia has said it is open to talks, its conditions are unacceptable for Ukraine, as they include occupying four Ukrainian regions, including territory it does not currently hold. Beyond the peace overtures, both sides are making efforts to recruit more soldiers and arm themselves for a long war. The long awaited F-16 fighter jets are due to arrive in Ukraine in August. Ukraine has said it hopes that they can be used to shoot down Russian bomber planes and intercept missiles. But some experts are sceptical of just how much the F-16s will change the dynamic of the war, especially given the time Russia has had to prepare for their arrival. (Source: FT.com)

 

30 Jul 24. Czech Republic Considers Forming Ukrainian Legion Similar to Polish Initiative. The Czech Republic is evaluating the possibility of creating a Ukrainian Legion, modeled after a similar project in Poland, to support Ukraine’s defense efforts. The Czech Ministry of Defense is currently examining the Polish project from both practical and legal standpoints to determine the feasibility.

Under the proposed plan, Ukrainian men residing in the Czech Republic would receive voluntary military training abroad, serve in the Ukrainian Defense Forces, and subsequently return to Ukraine. This approach mirrors the Polish initiative, which recently established a volunteer military unit comprising Ukrainian nationals living in Poland, trained by the Polish Armed Forces.

David Polak, a spokesperson for the Czech Ministry of Defense, stated, “The Czech Defense Ministry is gathering information from the Polish side about the creation of the so-called Ukrainian Legion. Once we have the necessary information, we will consider our involvement.” The Czech government is exploring whether to establish a similar unit within its territory or to contribute to the efforts in Poland.

Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová expressed support for the plan, noting that it could provide an opportunity for Ukrainian men in the Czech Republic to contribute to their country’s defense without the uncertainty of returning to Ukraine immediately. “A lot of Ukrainian citizens want to help their country, but they don’t want to return to Ukraine because they don’t know what to expect,” Černochová said in an interview with CT24.

According to the Czech Ministry of Internal Affairs, there are over 100,000 Ukrainian men aged 18 to 65 living in the Czech Republic. Participation in the training programs would be entirely voluntary. Interior Minister Vít Rakušan has ruled out any possibility of forcibly returning Ukrainian men to Ukraine.

The consideration of this initiative follows a security agreement signed between Ukraine and Poland in July, which encourages Ukrainians to return home and serve in the Ukrainian Defense Forces. As part of this agreement, the Polish government proposed the creation of a Ukrainian Legion, where Ukrainian volunteers would be trained in NATO countries and then deployed to combat Russian forces in Ukraine.

Czechia has already trained over 4,000 Ukrainian soldiers on its territory in 2023, demonstrating its commitment to supporting Ukraine. There are approximately 570,000 Ukrainians residing in Czechia, including about 380,000 living under temporary protection as refugees. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

29 Jul 24. Russian Plywood UAVs with Ukrainian SIM Cards Stalk Patriots. Reports from Ukrainian media on the ground indicate that Russia is increasingly deploying drones to pinpoint the locations of Ukrainian anti-aircraft systems. Experts point out that these drones are inexpensive, presenting a financial dilemma for Ukraine as countering them with missiles is costly and impractical. Russia has recently introduced two new types of drones, used in five attacks over the past two to three weeks, including a nocturnal assault last week. According to an official speaking to Reuters, these drones are constructed from materials like styrofoam and plywood. One variant of these drones is equipped with a camera and a Ukrainian cell phone SIM card, enabling it to transmit images back to Russian forces. The use of a Ukrainian SIM card is strategic, offering extensive coverage across Ukraine without raising alarms.Andriy Chernyak, spokesperson for a military intelligence agency, explains that these drones are identifying the positions of Ukrainian mobile groups and machine guns capable of shooting them down. The goal is to map out where all Ukrainian air defenses are situated. Russia appears to be refining its tactics and experimenting with new technologies to secure an upper hand in its relentless missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. (Source: UAS VISION/Bulgarian Military)

 

26 Jul 24. Russia deploys cheap drones to locate Ukraine’s air defences. Russia has begun including new, cheaply-made drones in its long-range attacks on Ukraine, to try to identify air defences, film any damage and act as decoys, a Ukrainian military spy official said.

The two new types of drone, which Russia has used in five drone attacks in the last two to three weeks including an overnight strike on Thursday, are produced from materials like foam plastic and plywood, the official told Reuters.

One type carries a camera and a Ukrainian mobile phone SIM card to send images back to the Russian military.

“They identify where our mobile groups are positioned, where the machine guns are that can destroy them. They’re trying … to get a picture of where all our air defences are located,” said Andriy Cherniak, a military spy agency spokesperson.

The previously unreported details from Cherniak are further evidence of Russia seeking to adapt its tactics and try new technology to gain an edge during its daily missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

Iranian-designed Shahed attack drones, which fly to their target and detonate on impact, have become a staple of Russian aerial attacks since they began being used in the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion launched in February 2022.

Ukraine, which has been appealing to the West to provide more air defences to repel increased Russian airstrikes on its power facilities since March, tries hard to conceal the locations of its air defence systems. The new Russian drones with cameras do not carry explosives but closely resemble regular Shahed drones and fly with groups of them, Cherniak said.

The second new type of drone contains no explosive charge or only a small one and is being used as a decoy, Cherniak added.

Because it is virtually indistinguishable from a regular attack drone from the ground, it still needs to be shot down, revealing where Ukraine’s air defence systems are located.

He said the new drones probably cost as little as $10,000 each despite their long range, making them far cheaper to produce than air defence missiles.

The drones can also fly at an altitude of 1,000 m (3,000 ft), putting them out of range of machine guns and automatic rifles, he said.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has served as a testing ground for drone warfare technology, with both sides using attack and reconnaissance drones on the battlefield extensively. Kyiv has poured energy into domestic drone production to narrow the gap between its strike capabilities and Moscow’s, staging long-range drone attacks on Russian targets including oil refineries.

Russia says its long-range aerial attacks are used to degrade Ukraine militarily. Ukraine says Russia’s attacks have hit civilian buildings and caused serious damage to civilian energy facilities and loss of civilian life.

Russian troops occupy around 18% of Ukrainian territory and have been making incremental gains in the east in recent months, putting Kyiv on the back foot along a 1,000-km (600-mile) front line.

(Source: Reuters)

 

26 Jul 24. Ukraine gets first $1.6bn from frozen Russian assets. The EU has sent the first payment to Ukraine for ‘military capabilities’ and ‘reconstruction’, financed by frozen Russian assets. Ukraine has received the first payment of €1.5bn ($1.6bn) taken from frozen Russian assets, the EU has announced today (26 July).

The payment marks the first step in the EU and G7’s wider plan to support Ukraine with a $50bn loan.

Annual interest on this loan will be generated from $325bn of frozen assets in the Russian Central Bank, which the EU imposed sanctions against following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

“The EU stands with Ukraine. Today we transfer €1.5 bn in proceeds from immobilised Russian assets to the defence and reconstruction of Ukraine,” said Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. “There is no better symbol or use for the Kremlin’s money than to make Ukraine and all of Europe a safer place to live.”

In the past 24 hours, Russia has launched a series of attacks on the northeastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv and the surrounding area, killing three people and wounding at least six, local officials said. The office of a Swiss mine-clearing NGO was also damaged.

Moscow also launched drones on southern Ukraine from the occupied Crimean peninsula, wounding three people and damaging port infrastructure and residential buildings in the city of Izmail.

How will Ukraine’s military spend the funds?

The EU’s plan intends to bolster Ukraine’s military capabilities and finance its eventual reconstruction.

There is also speculation that the Ukrainian armed forces could use these funds to acquire ammunition amid shortages, which would feed into the European defence sector.

German prime Rheinmetall has announced it will build an ammunition factory in Ukraine, creating a direct production line. Oleksandr Kamyshin, Ukrainian Minister for Strategic Industries and Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger signed the agreement in June – weeks before reports emerged that Russia had planned to assassinate Papperger.

The UK has also announced a £2bn ($2.6bn) loan to Ukraine air defence systems and other equipment, following Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s cabinet meeting in London last week.

UK officials will sit on a joint panel to decide what the funds are used for. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

28 Jul 24. Only six Ukrainian pilots trained to fly new F-16 fighter jets. Volodymyr Zelensky says weapons once championed as game-changers are now ‘too little, too late’ as Russia’s air defences improve.

Only six Ukrainian pilots have reportedly been trained by European Nato members to fly F-16 fighter jets due to be delivered to Kyiv next month.

Ukraine has been urging its allies for months to send them the jets, claiming they would help defend against long-range strikes and bring about a swift end to the war.

Citing Ukrainian and Western officials, the Washington Post reported that not only are there far too few trained pilots to give Ukraine an edge but the jets can not immediately be used on the front line due to improving Russian air defences.

Several European countries have been involved in the programme to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s, which includes language training in Britain. But the project had limited spots and was marred by delays, the unnamed officials told the Post.

The officials said that Ukraine would only receive one squadron of F-16s this year, roughly 20 fighter jets, far fewer than it had been hoping for.

Russian military bloggers were quick to mock the situation, particularly for all the hype over F-16s and the hope they could change the course of the war.

Fighterbomber, a Telegram channel that specialises in aviation, said that six pilots meant Ukraine would only be able to deploy two fighter jets at the same time because “a pilot can’t work around the clock”.

“Two pilots are at most 10 combat sorties per day in total,” Fighterbomber said. “For the whole of Ukraine, 10 F-16 sorties is nothing.”

For two years, Ukraine has been asking for F-16 fighter jets to counter Russia’s domination of the skies. In total, 80 F-16 fighter jets have been promised to Ukraine by Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Belgium.

But Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian commanders have complained that like with other weapons pledges, it is too little, too late. The officials said that when the much-vaunted F-16s do finally arrive in Ukraine, they won’t be the game-changers as hoped.

One reason is that Ukrainian commanders have said they will be deployed in a defensive capacity because Russia still controls the skies and has set up air defence systems across the front line, making it too risky to send out F-16s.

“We will not use it too close to the Russians” due to the threat of air defences, a Ukrainian official told the Washington Post. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

30 Jul 24. Russia Develops Advanced Radiogoniometric Drone to Pinpoint Ukrainian Radio Interference Sources. On July 29, 2024, the Russian newspaper Sakhalin News announced that the Russian company Kursir had unveiled an important step in surveillance and technological management with the development of a radiogoniometric drone specialized in the rapid identification of radio interference sources.

This new tool was revealed during the recent “Archipel” intensive design and training exhibition in the Sakhalin region, highlighting Russia’s continuous progress in drone technology.

The drone is equipped with a specially designed radiogoniometer and a directional antenna that enables it to precisely locate radio emission sources. This capability is crucial for various applications, including the accurate determination of base station and drone operator positions, functionalities increasingly essential in the era of electronic warfare and sophisticated communications.

The developers explain that the use of this drone can greatly enhance the efficiency of military operations, particularly in countering issues caused by the use of enemy drones in combat zones. By quickly and effectively identifying interference sources, this drone offers a strategic solution for maintaining the integrity of communications and field operations.

Beyond its military use, the radiogoniometric drone also finds utility in civilian scenarios. It is particularly suited for search and rescue missions, capable of locating crashed aircraft or missing persons emitting distress signals via radio beacons. The drone’s ability to detect targets up to a distance of 5 kilometers could transform rescue operations, making interventions quicker and more targeted.

The technology for detecting radio frequencies using drones, as described, is not exclusive to Russian developers. Indeed, as early as 2018, Israeli researchers were also working on similar capabilities, demonstrating a broad international interest and development in this type of surveillance technology.

While it’s unclear if the Russian approach to detecting radio waves is similar to that used by Israeli scientists, to better understand the significance of this research focus, let’s consider the advancements made by Israel. The Israeli technology focuses on capturing and analyzing variations in radio frequency signals to detect changes in the environment. This system operates by employing drones equipped with sensors capable of detecting subtle shifts in the radio signals used for communication with operator-controlled devices, such as smartphones or remote controls.

Israeli drones are designed to intercept radio signals, not just for navigation and control but also for intelligence gathering. These drones analyze the signals between operators and their devices, focusing on metadata rather than the content of the communications.

Israeli drones monitor data transmission rates. Significant changes in the data sent by a drone—triggered by changes in the visual field, such as the activation of a smart film on a window—indicate a change in the monitored scene. This can lead to a spike in the data throughput of the radio frequency signal as the drone transmits a large amount of new pixel data.

Israeli drones use advanced algorithms to interpret these changes. If a normally transparent window suddenly becomes opaque, the drone recognizes this as an anomaly and records the event, marking it for further analysis.

On the battlefield, radiogoniometric drone technology offers significant strategic advantages. These drones can detect and precisely locate sources of radio interference, thereby enhancing surveillance and enabling the neutralization of electronic threats. By identifying the locations of enemy drone operators or other radio emission sources, military forces can conduct jamming or targeted countermeasures to disable or disrupt enemy communications and commands. This enhances troop security by reducing exposure to attacks and increasing the effectiveness of offensive operations.

Additionally, this capability can be used to protect critical infrastructure and monitor enemy movements without direct engagement, thus minimizing risks to personnel while maximizing tactical impact.

(Source: UAS VISION/Army Recognition)

 

29 Jul 24. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package valued at up to $200 m to provide Ukraine with key capabilities, including: air defense interceptors; munitions for rocket systems and artillery; and anti-tank weapons.

In addition, DoD is announcing a significant package of support using approximately $1.5 bn in Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds. This package includes capabilities to augment Ukraine’s air defenses, fires, and anti-tank weapons, as well as funding to sustain equipment previously committed by the United States.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

  • Munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS);
  • Short- and medium-range air defense munitions;
  • RIM-7 missiles for air defense;
  • Electronic Warfare equipment;
  • Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
  • 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
  • 120mm mortar rounds;
  • Precision aerial munitions;
  • Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
  • Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
  • Small arms;
  • Explosives material and demolitions equipment and munitions;
  • Secure communications systems;
  • Commercial satellite imagery services; and
  • Spare parts, maintenance and sustainment support, and other ancillary equipment.

This is the Biden Administration’s twentieth USAI package and sixty-second tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine and since August 2021.

The United States will continue to work together with some 50 Allies and partners to ensure Ukraine’s brave defenders receive the critical capabilities needed to fight Russian aggression. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

29 Jul 24. DOD Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. 

The Defense Department today announced a security assistance package for Ukraine as it continues its fight to counter Russia’s invasion.

The package includes up to $200m of equipment drawn from DOD inventories under the presidential drawdown authority and approximately $1.5bn in assistance authorized under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

The package marks the 62nd drawdown of military equipment for Ukraine from DOD inventories and 20th tranche authorized under USAI.

It includes air defense interceptors, munitions for rocket and artillery systems and antitank weapons. The USAI package also includes funding to sustain equipment previously provided by the U.S.

The U.S. has provided more than $55.4bn in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia launched its unprovoked invasion in February 2022.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III has continued to reaffirm the United States’ unwavering support for Ukraine and has led an international coalition of dozens of allies committed to Ukraine’s immediate and long-term security.

“Make no mistake, Ukraine is not alone,” Austin said during a meeting with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov at the Pentagon earlier this month.

“The United States will never waver, and our support alongside some 50 allies and partners will continue to provide the critical capabilities that Ukraine needs to push back Russian aggression today and to deter Russian aggression tomorrow,” he said.

That same commitment to Ukraine’s success was echoed among NATO allies as the alliance marked its 75th anniversary at the NATO Summit in Washington earlier this month.

During the summit, member states advanced a range of initiatives to further strengthen the alliance and take steps to advance the support of Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression, as well as Ukraine’s long-term bridge to membership in the alliance.

Those initiatives include the standup of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine initiative which will coordinate equipment, training and force development for Ukraine as it advances on its path to full interoperability with NATO. The effort will be based in Germany and carried out in countries throughout the alliance.

President Joe Biden also announced during the summit that more than 20 countries, together with the European Council and European Union further affirmed their commitment to Ukraine’s long-term defense and security by endorsing the Ukraine Compact.

“What happens to Ukraine matters,” Biden said in announcing the compact. “It matters to all of Europe. It matters to NATO. Quite frankly, matters to the whole world. We’re united against Putin’s senseless brutal war. We are united behind Ukraine as it fights to defend its freedom and its future.”(Source: U.S. DoD)

 

26 Jul 24. UK has sent 12,000 anti-tank missiles and 400,000 artillery shells to Ukraine. The UK has also provided Kyiv with more than six m rounds of small arms ammunition to aid it in operations against Russia.

A British soldier firing an NLAW munition in training. The system has also been provided to Ukraine. Credit: UK MoD/Crown copyright

Aseries of newly released figures on UK military equipment provision to Ukraine has shed further light on the scale of London’s support of Kyiv, with ms of rounds of small arms ammunition and hundreds of thousands of anti-tank missiles and artillery ammunition.

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Figures released on 25 July 2024, by the UK government, state that the country’s Ministry of Defence has supplied more than 12,000 anti-tank weapons to Ukraine since February 2022. Known anti-tank weapons that have been provided have been the NLAW anti-tank munition, which was widely used in the first months after Russia’s large-scale invasion of its neighbour.

Other munitions provided include six m rounds of small arms ammunition, 400,000 artillery shells, and more than 2,100 “air defence systems”, likely referring to systems such as the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM), HVM Starstreak, Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM).

While it is not clear exactly how much of the provided stock has come from the UK’s own ammunition stockpiles and what has been sourced from the international market due to national security reasoning, whatever donations have come from within the UK’s own inventory cannot be readily replaced at speed.

In recent months the UK has sought to reactivate production lines of the NLAW, built in Belfast by Thales UK, among other ammunition. In December 2022 the UK signed a £229m ($294.6m) for the manufacture of “thousands” of NLAW munitions, deliverable between 2024-2026.

Highly capable system such as the Brimstone anti-tank missile have also been provided in significant quantities to Ukraine, with hundreds of units known to have been committed.

Such has been the success of Ukraine’s Brimstone use that the UK seemingly has sought to copy some deployment practices, under Project Wolfram.

In July 2023, the UK’s MoD’s procurement arm, Defence Equipment & Support, placed a “significant order” for 155mm artillery shell production, intended to increase the UK’s stockpile and deliver an eight-fold increase in production capacity. A follow-on contract also committed hundreds of m of pounds to additional 155mm, 30mm, and small arms ammunition manufacture for UK stockpiles.

In some instances, it can be discerned which ammunition has been sourced from the international market, such as the package announced by the UK on 11 July for up to 120,000 rounds of 152mm artillery rounds. The British Army does not utilise 152mm artillery shells, instead using 155mm and 105mm in its AS90/Archer self-propelled howitzers and L118 light guns respectively.

Further, regarding air defence systems, the UK government states that on behalf of the International Fund for Ukraine, the UK MoD has placed contracts for more than 500 air defence systems, indicating the possible provision of 1,500 from existing available resources, potentially from its own inventory.

UK artillery ammunition provision dwarfed by US

While significant, the quantities provided by the UK represent only a portion of ammunition given to Ukraine so far, with the US contributing 800,000 rounds of 105mm, 10,000 203mm, over 400,000 152mm, around 40,000 130mm, and 40,000 122mm in artillery ammunition alone.

In addition, the US has provided more than 10,000 Javelin anti-armour systems and in excess of 90,000 anti-armour munitions of other systems, as well as more than 9,000 Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles.

In smaller calibres, the US has provided nearly two m rounds of 25mm ammunition and more than 400 m rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades.

The European Union too is seeking to increase its own provision of 155mm artillery ammunition to Ukraine through the ASAP programme, commitments hundreds of ms of euros in grants to member states to ramp up production.

Artillery capability and ammunition supply has been proven in the Ukraine-Russia war to be one of the key differentiators of success on the battlefield, with hundreds of artillery pieces and howitzers provided to Kyiv by its Western allies.

Where Ukraine’s artillery capability ran short at the end of 2023 due to political infighting in Washington preventing a much-needed military assistance package being sent, Russia was seen to capitalise, seizing Avdiivka and other key towns in its ongoing 2024 summer offensive. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

30 Jul 24.  Germany ramps up aid to Ukraine with Leopard 1A5 MBTs.

Berlin amplifies military support with advanced battle tanks.

Following Germany’s recent commitment of $8.2bn in extra aid, there was a provision of military supplies like Sea King helicopters and Leopard 1A5 tanks. Source: Giannis Papanikos/Shutterstock

Germany has announced the delivery of eight more previously committed Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks to Ukraine to strengthen its defence against ongoing Russian aggression.

Their deployment in Ukraine is expected to enhance its armoured warfare capabilities, providing an advantage in countering Russian advancements.

This follows Germany’s recent pledge of $8.2bn in additional support, which included military equipment such as Sea King helicopters and Leopard 1A5 tanks. Germany is also investing in enhancing Ukraine’s long-term defence capabilities, as demonstrated by the ongoing training of 10,000 Ukrainian troops.

The delivery of these Leopard 1A5 tanks complements its previous military contributions and plans to deploy Leopard 2A8 tanks to Nato’s eastern flank.

Military support overview

Germany’s military aid to Ukraine is twofold: direct contributions from the Federal Armed Forces’ stockpiles and purchases financed by the Federal Government’s security capacity-building funds. The delivery of the Leopard 1A5 tanks falls under the latter category, showcasing Germany’s commitment to equipping Ukraine with military technology.

In addition to the Leopard 1A5 tanks, Germany has also provided a variety of other military equipment, including: – 20 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, ammunition for main battle tanks for Leopard 2 and Leopard 1, and ammunition for Marder infantry fighting vehicles.

Strategic implications

By providing such weaponry, Germany is bolstering Ukraine’s immediate defence needs and sending a strong signal of its commitment to its long-term security.

The Leopard 1A5 tanks and the package of military aid highlight Germany’s partnership with Ukraine.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Western allies have provided support to Ukraine, including over 800 main battle tanks (MBTs) from various countries. Recent contributions include Spain’s delivery of ten Leopard 2A4 tanks.

The US also announced a new defence package for Ukraine on 29 July, providing air defence interceptors, rocket and artillery munitions, and anti-tank weapons.

This package features munitions for NASAMS, RIM-7 missiles, HIMARS ammunition, various artillery and mortar rounds, precision aerial munitions, TOW missiles, Javelin and AT-4 anti-armour systems, small arms, electronic warfare equipment, secure communications systems, commercial satellite imagery services, and maintenance support.

Future commitments

Germany has committed an additional €7.1bn for military assistance in 2024, with further authorisations amounting to approximately €6bn for subsequent years. This sustained financial and military support is crucial for Ukraine as it navigates the complexities of war and defence.

As the conflict with Russia continues, such high-calibre support from Germany is vital for Ukraine’s strategic defence. The deployment of these tanks not only strengthened Ukraine’s military but also solidified the support from its European allies. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

29 Jul 24. Russia inches toward strategic supply route in Ukraine’s east.

  • Ukraine reports fiercest fighting on front near city of Pokrovsk
  • Strategic city is just 20 km from front line, Ukraine says
  • Russian troops are bearing down on strategic road in east

Russian forces are focusing their heaviest assaults near Ukraine’s strategic eastern city of Pokrovsk, Kyiv said on Monday, as Moscow bears down on a key Ukrainian supply route more than 29 months since its full-scale invasion.

Fighting on the Pokrovsk front was the fiercest anywhere in the war-scarred east, the General Staff said in a regular battlefield update, adding that Ukraine had fought off 52 Russian assaults there in the last 24 hours.

Pokrovsk, a transport hub with a pre-war population of 61,000, lies on a main road that serves as an important supply route to other embattled Ukrainian-held outposts, such as the towns of Chasiv Yar and Kostiantynivka in the Donetsk region. Some residents have fled during the war, but others have settled there after fleeing elsewhere.

“As of today, the city is 20 km (12 miles) from the front line,” Serhiy Dobriak, head of the city’s military administration, told U.S. broadcaster Radio Free Europe.

To the northeast of the city, Russian troops have advanced even closer to the strategic road. On Saturday, Moscow claimed control of the village of Lozuvatske, which lies about 6 km from it. Ukraine did not comment on the claim.

Dobriak said many of Pokrovsk’s residents were reluctantly deciding to evacuate. He put the current population at 60,000, including 4,000 children.

“The greatest concentration of enemy attacks was around Zhelanne and Novooleksandrivka,” Ukraine’s General Staff said, referring to two villages that lie to the east of Pokrovsk.

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Russia’s defence ministry said that its forces had also taken the villages of Prohres, Yevhenivka and Vovche. All three settlements lie east of Pokrovsk. Kyiv did not comment on the claim.

Donetsk’s regional governor said at least three people had been killed and three others wounded in Russian shelling of Toretsk, another town reeling from heavy fighting in recent weeks.

Dobriak said civilians from Toretsk were evacuating to Pokrovsk.

Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022 and still occupies nearly a fifth of Ukraine. Ukrainian forces repelled the Russians from the outskirts of Kyiv early in the war and recaptured territory in the east and south later in 2022. But since a failed counteroffensive in 2023, Kyiv’s troops have mainly been on the defensive this year. (Source: Reuters)

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