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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jun 27.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • OFFENSIVES: Ukraine has replaced Yuriy Sodol as commander of the joint forces; this likely indicates growing concerns over the extent of Ukrainian casualties in recent months
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian energy infrastructure remains highly vulnerable amid air defence shortages, increasing risks to operational power plants as well as those under repair
  • NORTH KOREA: North Korea will reportedly dispatch engineering troops to Russian-occupied Donetsk oblast, though this is yet to be confirmed
  • FORECAST: Two of former US president Donald Trump’s key advisers set out their plans to facilitate a peace agreement in Ukraine as soon as possible, should Trump win re-election; this would increase pressure on Ukraine to enter into talks with Russia
  • OFFENSIVES: On 24 June, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed he had replaced Lieutenant General Yuriy Sodol as commander of the united forces, appointing Brigadier General Andriy Hnatov to the position. He had been in post only four months, following the wider reshuffle of the General Staff earlier this year. While Zelensky gave no official reason for Sodol’s removal, numerous unconfirmed reports indicate that Sodol is accused of mismanaging operations, resulting in disproportionately high casualty rates – including during the Kharkiv offensive in May. Shortly after Zelensky’s announcement, the president addressed troops in Donetsk oblast on 26 June and called on all present commanders to ‘maintain maximum personnel’ and emphasised the need to reduce casualties. This likely indicates that there are concerns among Ukrainian soldiers that they have suffered significant casualties in recent months, though we cannot confirm the veracity of accusations against Sodol.
  • OFFENSIVES: On 26 June, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have increased the pace of their offensive operations across eastern Ukraine in a bid to break through Ukrainian defences. The most intense areas of operations according to the General Staff are currently the Pokrvosk (meaning west of Avdiivka in Donetsk oblast) and Kharkiv directions.
  • BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
  • DONETSK: On 26 June, Ukraine’s General Staff reported 34 Russian assaults along the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk line over the past 24 hours. Over the past few days, Russian forces made limited confirmed gains in the sector as of 24 June, marginally advancing north of Sokil (north-west of Avdiivka). Meanwhile, on 25 June, a Ukrainian military observer posted footage showing Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian mechanised attack in the Kurakhove (west of Donetsk city) direction on an unspecified date. On 26 June, the General Staff reported an uptick in Russian offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction.
  • KHARKIV: Geolocated footage from 24 and 25 June indicates that Ukrainian forces are continuing to regain minor positions during counter-attacks in central Vovchansk. The rate of Russian air strikes along the Kharkiv axis remains high, with Russian sources continuing to report sporadic FAB-3000 guided glide bomb strikes, though we cannot confirm this. Meanwhile, various Ukrainian military officers have reported in recent days that Russian forces are in the process of transferring elements of various units from other sections of the frontline to Kharkiv to offset high Russian losses.
  • KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
  • SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
  • STRIKES: On 25 June, Ukraine’s Air Force reported that air defences have intercepted 1,953 (86%) of the 2,277 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia since the start of 2024. The Air Force explained that technological innovations in its air defence systems account for the high success rate of destroying Shahed drones. However, we assess that Russia’s ability to mass produce Shahed drones will allow the continuation of frequent drone swarms designed to overwhelm air defences. This will strain Ukraine’s ability to intercept cruise and ballistic missiles.
  • STRIKES: On 26 June, Ukrainian energy operators told the Kyiv Post that persistent air defence shortages have increased the exposure of Ukrainian energy infrastructure to Russian long-range strikes. Dmytro Sakharu, the executive director of Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, explained that for every interceptor missile that Ukraine possesses to defend against Russian strikes on the energy grid, Russia can launch five to six missiles. Sakharu noted that the shortage of air defence ammunition also hampers Ukraine’s ability to protect critical infrastructure facilities that have been repaired or are undergoing repairs, exposing those repairs to further strikes. We assess that Russia will continue to exploit chronic air defence shortages to degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure, particularly power generation facilities. As such, energy insecurity will be elevated in the next months, with power outages likely to remain frequent.
  • STRIKES: On 26 June, Russian forces struck an administrative building in Odesa oblast with a ballistic missile. Early on 27 June, Russian forces launched one Kh-47 M2 Kinzhal ballistic missile, four Kalibr cruise missiles, one Kh-59/Kh-69 missile and 23 Shahed-131/136 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted all Kalibr and Kh-59/Kh-69 missiles and drones.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that, on 25 June, Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in Olkovatka located in Russia’s Voronezh oblast. The Ukrainian National Guard reported that the strike hit two Pansir-S1 air defence systems near Dubovoe and Borisovka, located south and west of Belgorod city (Belgorod oblast), respectively. The attacks underscore Ukraine’s ongoing striking strategy which aims to degrade Russian military logistics and air defence facilities, likely to set conditions for the arrival of F-16s later this year. Russia’s Ministry of Defence reported that air defences destroyed seven Ukrainian drones over Belgorod and Moscow oblasts on 27 June.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • NORTH KOREA: North Korea will reportedly dispatch engineering troops to the Russian-occupied Donetsk oblast, though this is yet unconfirmed. Citing a South Korean government official, South Korean media initially reported on 21 June that North Korea will send a large-scale engineering unit to the region as early as July. It would reportedly be involved in rebuilding Donetsk city and its infrastructure; engineering troops are also promised high wages for their work. As such, the arrangement would likely provide the North Korean government with a lucrative form of income.
  • NORTH KOREA: Commenting on the reports, Pentagon spokesperson Patrick Ryder stated on 25 June that North Korean troops would be ‘cannon fodder’ in Russian-occupied Ukraine. The speculated deployment of North Korean engineering personnel would likely ease pressure on overstretched Russian forces, freeing them up to deploy in combat roles. However, it ultimately remains unconfirmed if North Korean forces will be dispatched and if engineering troops will be used for any other purpose beyond reconstruction (i.e. to fight against Ukrainian forces). North Korea does deploy an engineering unit, this will likely be seen as a test of the West’s response; if Russia and North Korea consider the Western response manageable, the likelihood of future deployments of North Korean combat personnel will increase.
  • NORTH KOREA: Meanwhile, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell assessed on 24 June that North Korea may be seeking help from Russia to develop its nuclear and long-range missile capabilities in exchange for providing weapons. While North Korea likely aims to acquire Russian information on how to advance various capabilities, it remains unlikely that Russia would openly aid North Korea’s nuclear programme directly in the near term, though missile technologies remain plausible. Nevertheless, further military co-operation over the longer term could realistically increase the likelihood of such support.
  • RECRUITMENT: On 27 June, the chief of Russia’s Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, disclosed that around 10,000 labour migrants who received Russian citizenship have been sent to fight in Ukraine. Bastrykin said his agency has ‘caught’ more than 30,000 migrants who received Russian passports but failed to register at military offices during raids. The comments mark a stark admission of how many migrants have been sent to fight in Ukraine, with crypto-mobilisation highly likely to continue in the coming months to bolster troop numbers. We assess that such risks for military-eligible migrants, particularly those hailing from Central Asia, will remain elevated in the medium-to-long term.
  • ICC: The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants on 25 June for Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, and former defence minister Sergei Shoigu. The court said the two officials are suspected of having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity for directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects in Ukraine. The ICC stated that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Gerasimov and Shoigu bear responsibility for Russian missile strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure between 10 October 2022 and 9 March 2023 at least, claiming that systemic targeting of such infrastructure resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties in contrast to the military advantage such attacks would provide Russian forces.
  • ICC: Moscow later denounced the warrants, claiming that they’re legally meaningless and part of the West’s hybrid war against Russia. The development is highly unlikely to change Russia’s prosecution of the war under the leadership of new defence minister Andrei Beluosov. While the issuance of the warrants underscores the court’s efforts to hold Russian officials responsible for waging war in Ukraine, they are unlikely to be served. For further analysis on the ICC arrest warrant issued against President Putin in March 2023.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: On 25 June, two of former US President Donald Trump’s key advisers set out their plans to facilitate a peace agreement in Ukraine as soon as possible, should Trump win re-election. While not official policy, these plans indicate how a Trump presidency would approach Russia’s war in Ukraine and the efforts to end it; the former president has previously claimed that he could stop the conflict within 24 hours without offering clear steps as to how.

The proposed plan states that Ukraine will only continue to receive US military aid if it agrees to enter peace talks, while also stipulating that Washington DC’s support for Ukraine would increase if Moscow refuses to begin negotiations. If Trump were to enact such a policy after a November election victory, this would mark a significant shift in US policy towards Ukraine and would present the Ukrainian leadership with effectively an ultimatum on entering into talks. Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden’s administration is highly unlikely (at least publicly) to push Ukraine into consultations with Russia in early 2025 should he be re-elected. It remains our assessment that both Ukraine and Russia are highly unlikely to enter into negotiations at present since both sides likely believe they can achieve further advantage on the battlefield in the coming years.

According to one of the advisers, the proposal envisions a ceasefire based on the ‘prevailing battle lines’ to facilitate the peace talks; the plan would likely seek to freeze the conflict to reach a compromise. However, Ukraine would almost certainly oppose this (at least initially) as it insists that the removal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory is necessary for peace. President Vladimir Putin has made a similar demand for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from all claimed territories in Ukraine before talks can begin. A ceasefire along the frontlines would likely benefit Russia and empower Moscow to make demands to keep the Ukrainian lands it occupies, particularly if Washington DC pressures Ukraine to make wider concessions to end the war.

The initiative (if actioned) would mark a major shift in US policy that would highly likely see serious pushback from not only Ukraine but also its European partners. We assess that European nations remain broadly committed to supporting Ukraine militarily for the foreseeable future, albeit with some exceptions. Such proposals increase the importance of the outcome of the upcoming French parliamentary elections, given the strain such a US pivot would likely have the fragile European consensus on Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron has become increasingly hawkish in his support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, critics have accused the hard-right National Rally (RN) party, which looks set to win the most votes, of being too soft on Russia.

RN’s parliamentary leader, Jordan Bardella, said on 24 June that he is in favour of continuing the provision of logistics and defence equipment to Ukraine. However, long-range missiles or any other equipment that could ‘directly hit Russian cities’ and lead to an escalation remains a red line. Bardella also ruled out sending French troops to Ukraine. An RN victory would likely seriously undermine the provision of advanced military equipment, as well as fuel infighting over the extent of French military support for Ukraine in the coming months.

Meanwhile, news outlets reported on 25 June that the Biden administration is progressing towards allowing US military contractors to deploy to Ukraine. According to four unspecified US officials familiar with the issue, this would be to help Ukraine’s military maintain and repair US-provided weapons systems. US-provided military equipment that has been significantly damaged has had to be transported to Poland, Romania or other NATO countries for repairs. While the details are still being worked out and Biden is yet to issue a final approval on the matter, it would mark a considerable policy shift from Washington DC and show growing risk appetite. As such, the move would likely speed up the repair process of weapons systems, though it would highly likely render US personnel vulnerable to Russian strikes and attacks.

*Russia: Use of Russian frozen assets will highly likely elevate tit-for-tat asset-seizure risks

. On 26 June, Alexei Guznov, the deputy governor of Russia’s Central Bank (CBR), warned that the CBR will file lawsuits opposing Western efforts to freeze its international assets. Guznov’s statements were issued after EU member states recently agreed to use EUR 1.4 bn (USD 1.5 bn) in profits from the CBR’s frozen assets to support Ukraine. Given Hungary’s EU membership and historically cordial ties with Moscow, the former Soviet satellite state has been a major obstacle to the EU proceeding with this measure. However, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell explained on 24 June that EU countries were able to legally bypass Hungary’s veto, facilitating plans to use the funds to aid Ukraine. This move likely paves the way for G7 countries to proceed with their recent plan to issue a USD 50 bn loan to Ukraine backed by Russian frozen assets. The CBR’s attempt to file lawsuits will likely be a lengthy process. We also assess that the use of frozen assets will likely increase the risk of Moscow confiscating US and European assets in Russia as part of a tit-for-tat response in the coming months.

Jun 24.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces are stepping up attacks across the eastern frontlines, making marginal advances at a number of key points, supported by high rates of glide bomb attacks
  • NUCLEAR: Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested that Moscow could lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons; this is likely aimed at deterring Western support for Ukraine rather than reflecting a genuine nuclear escalation
  • AID: The White House has confirmed that the US will redirect planned shipments of air defence interceptor missiles originally destined for other countries to Ukraine, which will boost air defence capability
  • FORECAST: The Russian MoD has alleged that the US is responsible for a Ukrainian missile strike using ATACMs against the city of Sevastopol in Russian-annexed Crimea, likely in a bid to deflect blame for civilian casualties and as a means of deterring wider loosening of rules of engagement for long-range US weapons
  • BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 19 June confirms that Russian forces have advanced up to the bank of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal in the centre of Kalynivka, located due north of Chasiv Yar. In this area, the canal runs underground, providing Russian forces with a means of crossing the canal overground and push westwards towards Chasiv Yar proper if they can consolidate their positions. Other geolocated footage from 22 June also indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances within the Chasiv Yar micro-district on the eastern bank of the canal. While Russian forces have not been able to establish a foothold across the canal as of yet, they are making slow progress at the town’s flanks, which could see further advances in the coming weeks.
  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces are meanwhile making slow advances further north towards Siversk, which is located around 17 miles (28km) north-east of Bakhmut (Donetsk oblast). Around 21-22 June, Russian forces likely entered the southern outskirts of the village of Rozdolivka, located seven miles (12km) south of Siversk, though this is unconfirmed and it remains unclear whether they have established a permanent foothold.
  • BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have significantly stepped up attacks near Toretsk, with limited advances indicating possible attempts to exploit Ukrainian weaknesses along this section of the frontline. Ukrainian sources reported on 23 June that Russian forces have advanced to the outskirts of Pivnichne, located around five miles (8km) north-west of the outskirts of Horlivka (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage also confirms that Russian forces have also forced the Ukrainians to withdraw from the small village of Shumy, located south-east of Pivnichne. While a small settlement, Shumy stands on the pre-2022 frontline which Ukrainian forces have held since 2014. Russian sources have claimed further advances in the last 24-48 hours, but we cannot confirm the extent of Russian advances in this area. Nevertheless, given this section of the front has been quiet for months, an uptick in Russian attacks in this direction likely means this is a vulnerable point in Ukraine’s frontline.
  • DONETSK: Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk sector, making confirmed gains along the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk line. Geolocated footage published on 24 June indicates that Russian forces took control of Novooleksandrivka and advanced in Sokil; both settlements are located to the north-west of Avdiivka. Other unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian forces have also reached the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway. The latest advances come as the Russian command has maintained a high tempo of offensive operations towards Pokrovsk (north-west of Avdiivka) over recent weeks, which has been the main tactical goal of its operations in the sector after taking control of Avdiivka. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 21 June shows Russian advances west of Novomykhailivka and within Krasnohorivka, located south-west and west of Donetsk City, respectively.
  • KHARKIV: The tempo of Russian attacks across the Kharkiv axis has decreased notably in recent days, likely indicating that Russian offensive efforts are prioritising the Donetsk front during this next phase of the summer offensive. Russian forces have achieved no further confirmed advances in recent days, though the overall number of glide bomb attacks in the area has remained consistently high – possibly intended to offset the reduction in ground operations while keeping pressure on Ukrainian forces.
  • KHARKIV: Russian forces reportedly used the new FAB-3000 M-54 glide bomb for the first time in Kharkiv oblast on 20 June, which has a new unified and planning correction module (UMPC). While we cannot confirm this, geolocated footage indicates that the new bomb hit a target in Lyptsi, north of Kharkiv city. While the attack seemingly landed 10 metres from the target, the warhead was large enough that it caused significant destruction in any case. If Russian forces have succeeded in delivering the new FAB-3000 via tactical aircraft, this would mark a notable development in terms of Russian capability, though the size of the weapon (3,000kg) will limit how many such attacks can be conducted at once. Going forward, Russia’s glide bomb capability and the lethality of the attacks is therefore only set to increase given Ukraine’s limited counter-measures and ability to intercept tactical aircraft at present. As such, further updates to US rules of engagement with their longer-range weapons will be vital to expanding Ukraine’s ability to intercept tactical aircraft and begin seriously countering glide bomb attacks.
  • KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 20 June shows recent Russian advances east of Pishchane, south-west of Kupiansk. Footage posted on 21 June shows that Russian troops advanceing west of Novovodyane, south-west of Svatove (Luhansk oblast).
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces are moderately stepped up glide bomb and other aerial strikes along the southern axis, indicating possible preparations for larger ground offensive operations in the coming weeks. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 22 June that Russian forces launched 36 unguided glide bomb attacks near Kamyanske (Zaporizhzhia oblast), before launching a renewed ground assault the day after. Geolocated footage posted on 22 June also indicates that Russian forces have advanced north-east of Robotyne, meaning they are further consolidating their control in the region and retaking territory that Ukraine had originally liberated during its 2023 counter-offensive.
  • STRIKES: On 23 June, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with three Kalibr cruise missiles. Ukrainian forces intercepted two of the missiles over Kyiv oblast. Falling debris reportedly damaged residential buildings in Kyiv oblast. Early on 24 June, Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted one of the two Russian Iskandr-K cruise missiles targeting Odesa oblast. The other missile reportedly hit civilian infrastructure in the region.
  • STRIKES: Early on 21 June, Ukrainian air defences shot down the four Kh-59/Kh-69 missiles launched by Russia over Kherson and Kirovohrad oblasts. On 22 June, Russia launched a medium-scale missile strike targeting critical infrastructure across Ukraine. The attack included ten Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles, two Iskandr-K cruise missiles, four Kalibr cruise missiles and 13 Shahed-131/136 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted seven Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles, one Iskandr-K, and all Kalibr missiles and drones. Ukraine’s state-owned energy grid operator, Ukrenergo, reported damage equipment at energy facilities in Lviv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, overnight on 20-21 June, Ukrainian forces co-ordinated simultaneous attacks against Russian oil infrastructure and military targets in Russia and occupied Crimea. Russian authorities claimed that air defences shot down around 114 drones over Crimea, Krasnodar Krai and Volgograd oblast. However, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that the attack struck the Afipskyi, Ilskyi, and Krasnodarskyi oil refineries in Krasnodar Krai, which reportedly supply fuel for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF). The Astrakhan oil refinery in Astrakhan Oblast was also reportedly struck, according to the General Staff.
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian military authorities reported that the drone attack hit Russian radar stations and electronic intelligence centres in Russia’s Bryansk oblast and annexed Crimea. Later, on 23 June, Ukraine’s Naval Forces also published satellite images confirming that the latest attack destroyed storage and training sites for Shahed-136/Geranium-2 drones and several command drone communication and control posts in Krasnodar Krai.
  • STRIKES: Following the attack, Russian milbloggers reported that Ukraine’s simultaneous use of naval and aerial drones during the Krasnodar Krai strike overwhelmed Russian air defences. This reportedly caused Russian air defences to accidentally shoot down one of its own Ka-29 helicopters that was searching for Ukrainian naval drones. Milbloggers warned that Ukrainian forces may conduct more large-scale attacks in the short-term. The attack clearly underscores Kyiv’s expanding drone capabilities and ability to innovate striking tactics to overwhelm Russian air defences.
  • STRIKES: On 23 June, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that Ukraine carried out an attack with US-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) against Crimea. Russian occupying authorities claimed that the attack killed five people. The Kremlin blamed the US for being responsible for the attack by supplying ATACMS to Kyiv. For further analysis of the implications of the attack, please see FORECAST.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 23 June, the Russian MoD reported that air defences intercepted 33 Ukrainian drones over Bryansk, Lipetsk, Smolensk and Tula regions. At the same time, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of a Russian motorised rifle regiment in Nekhoteyevka in Belgorod Oblast on 23 June. The General Staff did not provide further details on the attack. Given that the command post was located around nine miles (15km) from the border, it likely played a role in overseeing Russian operations in Kharkiv oblast. On 24 June, the Russian MoD also reported that four Ukrainian drones were destroyed over Rostov oblast.
  • STRIKES: On 24 June, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has used maritime Sea Baby drones to lay more than 15 underwater mines near Crimea. The article reported that the SBU resorted to such measures after Russian naval fortifications rendered naval drone strikes against Crimea almost ineffective. In the last quarter of 2023, several Russian vessels were damaged by these mines. This likely marks the first instance of successful remote mining operations, underscoring Kyiv’s growing expertise in drone warfare. The combination of Kyiv’s naval drone strikes and maritime mine activities has significantly elevated the security threats for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in the Black Sea.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • NUCLEAR: On 20 June, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested that Moscow could lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons. Putin did not state under what new circumstances Russia could be permitted to use such capabilities, though he claimed that an unspecified ‘potential adversary’ is working on tasks ‘related to lowering the threshold of nuclear weapon use’. While NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg did state on 17 June that NATO members were discussing increasing the alliance’s nuclear readiness, he mentioned nothing about lowering nuclear use thresholds. Putin added that Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are always in a state of combat readiness, stating that a strategic defeat for Russian forces would represent the ‘end of [Russia’s] statehood’. This reflects wider Russian attempts to frame the war in Ukraine as an existential conflict, and almost certainly forms part of an ongoing deterrence campaign which aims to convincing Western capitals that a Russian defeat in Ukraine would threaten nuclear escalation.
  • NUCLEAR: In a continuation of heightened nuclear rhetoric, Russia’s parliamentary defence committee chairman, Andrei Kartapolov, disclosed on 23 June that Russia could reduce the decision time for using nuclear weapons if Moscow believes threats are increasing. Our assessment remains unchanged that Russia is highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine and against the West in the foreseeable future despite discussion surrounding altering the country’s nuclear doctrine. Rather, such remarks are highly likely intended to influence Western decision makers to stop supporting Kyiv militarily as part of an ongoing reflexive control campaign.
  • SABOTAGE: On 21 June, Bild reported that a foreign intelligence service had informed Germany that Russia was likely behind a fire at a factory used by technology company Diehl Group in the capital Berlin in May. While the site in Berlin largely supplies parts for the automotive industry, Diehl Group also has a defence branch, Diehl Defence, which produces military equipment that has been supplied to Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) subsequently reported on 23 June that Western security officials believe Russian saboteurs orchestrated the blaze to disrupt shipments of arms and ammunition to Kyiv.
  • SABOTAGE: According to the WSJ, security officials suspect the incident was conducted by ‘experienced professionals’, as opposed to criminals, which Russia is likely increasingly reliant on for low-level operations. The reports confirm our assessment that Russian operatives are likely conducting plausibly deniable ‘grey zone’ attacks across Europe in retaliation for Western support for Ukraine. Similar attacks are likely to continue on a sporadic basis in the coming months; most likely in countries providing significant aid to Ukraine, such as Germany.
  • AID: White House National Security Council Communications Advisor John Kirby disclosed on 20 June that the US will redirect planned shipments of air defence interceptor missiles originally destined for other countries to Ukraine. Kirby did not specify how many or which states would be affected, though he described the decision as difficult but necessary. However, the official said Patriot and NASAM interceptors which had been earmarked for other countries will be prioritised for Ukraine, which will likely mitigate air defence shortages in the short to medium term.
  • AID: Meanwhile, on 20 June, Romania pledged to send Ukraine a Patriot air defence system on the condition that allies – particularly the US – agree to provide a temporary solution. The Romanian government said the decision was made due to Russian attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, particularly energy facilities. Ultimately, the developments underscore Ukraine’s enduring need for air defence capabilities, which its allies will likely have to make sacrifices and compromises on to greater protect against Russian bombardment in the coming months.
  • AID: On 23 June, South Korean National Security Director Shang Ho-jin stated that South Korea could alter its export policy to send munitions directly to Ukraine, but that the scope of such military support will depend on the extent of Russian military support for North Korea. The announcement follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea on 19 June (see Sibylline Alert – North Korea-Russia – 19 June 2024). The resultant strategic cooperation agreement between Russia and North Korea has increased the likelihood that South Korea – one of the world’s largest military exporters and production economies – will directly supply Ukraine with 155mm artillery ammunition as well as air defence systems. While Putin has directly warned Seoul that such a decision would be a ’very big mistake’, Shang Ho-jin’s statement underscores the consequences of growing Russian-North Korean cooperation, which could seriously benefit Ukraine even as North Korea supplies Russian forces with significant quantities of artillery ammunition.

FORECAST

STRIKES: On 23 June, the Russian MoD said the US bore responsibility for a Ukrainian missile strike using ATACMs against the city of Sevastopol in Russian-annexed Crimea. The ministry reported that the missiles were loaded with cluster warheads and that four of the five projectiles were intercepted. According to the MoD, the explosion of the fifth missile caused ‘numerous’ civilian casualties.

The ministry claimed without evidence that US specialists enter all flight assignments in ATACMs missiles based on the US’ own satellite data in an almost certain attempt to demonstrate Washington DC’s involvement in the war. The MoD vowed that the strike will not go unanswered but did not specify how or when Moscow will respond. While Ukrainian forces frequently attack targets on the Crimean peninsula, the recent strikes were particularly notable in terms of civilian casualties. Five people, including children, were killed; over 150 were injured. The assignment of blame to the US is notable and is likely aimed at deflecting backlash against the authorities and military for failing to thwart the attack and ensure the safety of Crimea – which remains a popular tourist destination despite the fact that it remains an active warzone. Such messaging also highly likely aims to deter foreign nations from transferring long-range strike capabilities to Kyiv in the near term.

Russia’s attempt to accuse the US could possibly set a precedent should Ukraine launch other strikes against claimed or de jure Russian territory in the coming weeks using US-provided weapons. Politico reported on 20 June, citing unspecified US officials, that Washington DC told Kyiv its military can use US-supplied weapons to strike Russian forces attacking from across the border – not just those near Ukraine’s Kharkiv oblast. They insisted that this does not represent a change in US policy as Ukrainian forces can already target across the border from Kharkiv oblast (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 3 June 2024). Nevertheless, the US is unlikely to completely relax its restrictions on Ukraine launching strikes inside de jure Russian territory in the near term given escalatory risks, and it ultimately remains unclear whether ATACMS systems were used in the Sevastopol attack. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Jun 24. North Korea to send engineering troops to help Russia rebuild bombed cities. North Korea will send a “large number” of engineering and construction troops to help rebuild Russian-occupied cities in eastern Ukraine, according to reports.  The soldiers will arrive as early as June and take part in “reconstruction” works largely in the heavily bombed Donetsk region, TV Chosun reported, citing a South Korean government official. The report stated that the North Korean army has 10 engineering brigades, three out of four of which will be sent to Ukraine in exchange for an annual payment of $115m (£92m) from Russia.

“The goal is to rebuild a city destroyed by fighting,” said the unnamed official, without specifying further on the location.

There is currently no indication the soldiers would have combat roles.  Pentagon spokesman Pat Ryder warned on Tuesday that North Korean troops would become “cannon fodder” if they joined Moscow’s forces on the battlefield in Ukraine. It follows Vladimir Putin’s rare state visit to Pyongyang last week to sign a new military pact with his growing ally, Kim Jong-un as the two states position themselves at the centre of an anti-West axis.  North Korea is already a major weapons supplier to Moscow which is facing depleted weapons stocks and a defence industry hampered by Western sanctions. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

27 Jun 24. The US, Israel and Ukraine are in talks to supply Kyiv with up to eight Patriot air defence systems, dramatically improving its ability to counter Russian air strikes. While not finalised, the arrangement would likely involve the highly prized Patriot systems being sent first from Israel to the US, before being delivered to Ukraine. The outlines of the deal, which would mark a shift in Israel’s relations with Moscow, have been discussed between ministers and senior officials of the three countries, according to five people briefed on the negotiations. Israel said in April that it would begin retiring its eight Patriot batteries, which date back more than 30 years, and replacing them with more advanced systems. But the batteries, which have been used in Israel’s current war with Hamas, have not yet been discontinued due to concerns that tensions with the Iran-backed Hizbollah militant group could erupt into a full-blown war. If realised, such a transfer would represent a step change in Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. The country currently has at least four Patriot systems, supplied by both the US and Germany. Ukraine has frequently requested that western allies supply it with air defence systems, in particular the US-made Patriots. Last week, the US announced that it was pausing the delivery of Patriot interceptor missiles to other nations to prioritise supply to Ukraine. Israel has been cautious about taking sides over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine given the clout Moscow holds in Syria, where the Israeli air force often acts against Iranian proxies. But US officials have sought to convince Benjamin Netanyahu’s government that Russia’s increasingly close ties with Iran, particularly in the field of military co-operation, are a more pressing concern.

Washington gives Israel about $3.8bn annually in military support, and by April had released an additional $14bn in emergency funds for its ally since the war with Hamas broke out. “It would be fortuitous if these older Patriot missiles were put to good use in another theatre before they aged out,” said Tom Karako, head of the missile defence project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think-tank in Washington, “especially given the levels of US military aid to Israel”. While the transfer of all eight systems was being discussed, they might not all end up being sent to Ukraine, four of the people said. Three of the people with knowledge of the discussions said Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba had held talks on the matter with his US counterpart Antony Blinken in recent weeks. White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan had spoken on the issue at least twice with Andriy Yermak, the chief of staff to the Ukrainian president, the three people said. “Ukraine continues to work with various countries around the world on obtaining additional Patriot systems,” Kuleba told the Financial Times, though he did not confirm the talks. “We once again urge all countries that have such systems to provide them to Ukraine,” he added. As well as discussions between the US and Ukraine, a person familiar with the diplomacy said there had also been direct talks between Israel and Kyiv on the transfer of Patriots. The US and Ukrainian governments declined to comment. Israel’s prime minister’s office referred questions to the defence ministry, which did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Ukraine is battling to defend against Russian missile and bombing attacks that have crippled its infrastructure and terrorised its cities. Russia’s latest and most intense long-range air strike campaign escalated in March. Israel’s M901 PAC-2 batteries are of an older variety than many of the Patriot systems currently in Ukraine. But according to military analysts, the older model is still fully compatible with the newer ones. Crucially, Israel has also ample stocks of interceptor missiles — which Ukraine also needs — to go with the batteries, according to one person familiar with the size of Israel’s arsenal. Analysts also said the old Israeli interceptor missiles had a longer range and a bigger warhead than the newer PAC-3 model. This could make them well suited for intercepting the Russian fighter jets that have been dropping devastating glide bombs on Ukrainian cities and military positions from far behind the front lines. “PAC-2 is actually more useful than PAC-3 for long range intercepts against aircraft, so they’d certainly be useful [in Ukraine],” said Justin Bronk, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London. (Source: FT.com)

 

27 Jun 24. Russia bombards Ukraine with 100 glide bombs in one day. Moscow’s forces launched nearly 100 deadly glide bombs and dozens of drones at Ukraine in the past day, Kyiv said. Its military reported that over 96 glide bombs, two missiles, 4000 shells and 44 kamikaze drones were fired across the border. Glide bombs are an air-dropped munition launched from a distance rather than above the target and can pack a payload up to 1.5 tonnes. Last week, President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Russia dropped more than 2,400 glide bombs on Ukraine since the beginning of June, with 700 of them hitting the Kharkiv region. It comes as the International Criminal Court (ICC) slapped Russia’s top military chiefs with arrest warrants over their attacks on civilian targets. Russia’s former defence minister Sergei Shoigu and leading general Valery Gerasimov are accused of orchestrating a campaign of long-range bombardments against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the winter of 2022. The Russian military shelled 20 settlements in the Donetsk region in the last 24 hours, killing one and injuring at least nine, regional governor Vadym Filashkin said. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

26 Jun 24. US, Russia defense chiefs speak as tensions rise over Crimea attack.

  • Summary
  • The two sides give widely divergent accounts of conversation
  • The Pentagon says defense chiefs discussed importance of open lines of communication
  • Russia warns against continued US arms supplies to Ukraine
  • Moscow blames US for Ukrainian attack on Crimea

The U.S. and Russian defense chiefs spoke by telephone on Tuesday in rare communication between the two powers and with tensions rising after Moscow blamed Washington for a deadly Ukraine attack over the weekend on the Russian-annexed Crimea.

The two sides gave widely divergent accounts of the conversation – the first one between U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Russia’s new Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, who replaced Sergei Shoigu in May.

The Pentagon said Austin and Belousov discussed the importance of open lines of communication.

Austin initiated the conversation and it was the first such call since March 2023, Pentagon spokesperson Air Force Major General Patrick Ryder told reporters.

Russia’s Defense Ministry, however, said that Belousov warned Austin of the dangers of continued U.S. arms supplies to Ukraine in the 28-month-old war.

“A.R. Belousov pointed to the danger of further escalating the situation through continued supplies of American weapons to the Ukrainian armed forces,” the ministry statement said on the Telegram messaging app after the call.

Relations between Moscow and Washington have plunged to their lowest level since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Diplomatic contacts between President Vladimir Putin’s government and President Joe Biden’s administration are now at “an absolute minimum,” Moscow said last week.

Over the weekend, Russia said the United States was directly responsible for a Ukrainian attack on the Crimean peninsula with five U.S.-supplied missiles that killed four people.

The Pentagon said earlier this week that Ukraine makes its own targeting decisions.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and views it as an integral part of its territory, although most of the world condemned the annexation and sees the Black Sea peninsula as part of Ukraine.

Supplies of U.S. weapons to Ukraine resumed in April with Congressional approval of a $61 bn aid package. The U.S. says it stands by Ukraine’s demands for Russian troops to leave and for Ukraine’s post-Soviet borders to be restored.

On Tuesday, Moscow’s arms control point man, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, warned that if the West underestimated Moscow’s resolve, it could lead to “tragic and fatal” consequences because the U.S. and its allies were confronting a major nuclear power – Russia.

In a 2023 call with Russia’s Shoigu, Austin had pointed to risky behavior by Russian fighter pilots that caused a U.S. drone to crash in the Black Sea near Ukraine. (Source: Google/Reuters)

 

26 Jun 24. EU and Zelenskiy expected to sign Ukraine security pact. The European Union is expected to sign a security agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Thursday, pledging to keep delivering weapons, military training and other aid to Kyiv for years to come. The agreement will lay out the EU’s commitment to help Ukraine in nine areas of security and defence policy – including arms deliveries, military training, defence industry cooperation and demining, according to a draft seen by Reuters.

Zelenskiy is expected to sign the pact at a summit of EU leaders in Brussels. His visit has not been officially announced but diplomats said he was expected to attend.

The pact is intended to complement similar agreements sealed between Ukraine and its allies as it continues its defence against Russia’s invasion.

In the event of “future aggression”, the document says the EU and Ukraine intend to consult within 24 hours on Kyiv’s needs and “swiftly determine” next steps in line with the commitments.

The document is part of a broader effort by Ukraine’s partners to provide assurances that they will stand by Kyiv for the long haul, with no end in sight to the war and no immediate prospect of Ukraine joining the EU or NATO.

Countries including the United States, Britain, France and Germany have sealed security pacts with Kyiv.

Officials say such agreements are not the same as the mutual defence pact between NATO nations, but are pledges to provide Ukraine with weapons and other aid to bolster its own security and deter any future invasion.

Because this isn’t just what’s happened this week.

The draft EU document says its commitments will remain in effect “as Ukraine pursues its European path” and will be reviewed in 10 years at the latest.

It does not specify the value or quantity of future assistance. It notes the EU agreed to give 5bn euros ($5.34bn) to a fund for Ukraine military aid this year. But it stops short of pledging the same for the coming years.

“Further comparable annual increases could be envisaged until 2027,” the document says. (Source: Reuters)

 

26 Jun 24. Russia’s Faces New Threat from Saboteurs with Drones. Russia is facing a wave of destruction from a new quarter: small drones flown by partisan groups within its own borders and in occupied territory. The new weapons make existing security measures obsolete, and open up many new targets for large-scale sabotage.

Alongside Ukraine’s growing long-range drone strike capability small sabotage drones could simultaneously set Russia ablaze while throwing it into darkness. But the effects may not be confined to Russia for long.

Partisans Drone Attacks

The partisans tipped their hand with attacks on the Kremlin last May with small, short-range quadcopters flown from a few miles away at most. While larger drones presumably launched from Ukraine have also hit Moscow, there are groups within Russia carrying out such attacks. The Kremlin attack was symbolic but the current wave are entirely practical.

It is not easy to separate drone strikes from the background noise of general disruption in Russia. The Ukrainian OSINT agency Molfar, which tracks sabotage inside Russia told me that they do not specifically identify cases where small drones were used.

Sometimes there are indications that an attack was carried out by local groups with drones. For example, one recent FPV drone attack which destroyed a BUK mobile air defence system took place sixty miles behind Russian lines, far beyond FPV range.

A Russian freight train was derailed after a drone hit a tank car carrying diesel fuel in the first attack of its type. Ukraine’s long range drones cannot, as far as is known, hit moving targets and have never targeted trains so again this looks like a short-range FPV strike.

There is also video of FPV strikes on Russian electricity substations. Older substations still use flammable oil for cooling, so they burn fiercely when ignited and are vulnerable to even small explosions. We are now starting to see Russian substations protected by light netting: this would not stop a 400-pound long-range drone and appears to be a defence against bombs from small sabotage drones.

The attacks shows how small drones can hit high-value targets from a safe distance. A growing number of groups are now able to carry out such attacks.

Drone Sabotage Get Into Gear

After the Kremlin attack, CNN reported: “Ukraine has cultivated a network of agents and sympathizers inside Russia working to carry out acts of sabotage against Russian targets and has begun providing them with drones to stage attacks,” citing U.S. intelligence sources.

Since then a variety of Russian opposition groups have started taking action. A Tatar group calling itself Machine Uprising or Rise of the Drones “created in response to the repression of the occupiers against Tatar” offers advice on drone use and training, including software downloads.

A partisan using the handle Medici, founder of the White Bear group, told me that there are several groups in Russian-occupied Ukraine plus anti-Putin groups inside Russia itself now buying and flying small drones for attacks.

The Russians have been quick to appreciate the threat, but countering it is not simple. Drone no-fly zones have now been imposed across vast swathes of Russia. These days, drone hobby flying is limited to Siberia.

The drone no-fly zone now includes all of Western Russia – AVTM RUSSIA

Russia also jams GPS signals over much of its territory in an attempt to prevent drones from flying. While this will stop many consumer quadcopters, it is useless against cheap FPV drones which do not have satellite navigation.

There are strict rules on importing drones, which cause problems for Russian volunteer groups trying to buy drones for the troops. But as CNN notes, drone smuggling is common, and made possible by high levels of corruption among the border guards. Money is tight in Russia, and, as one informant noted, “cash works wonders.”

Russia: The Original Drone Saboteurs

There is some irony in Russia suffering drone sabotage when arguably Russian infiltration units perfected the method.

Back in 2015-18, years before the latest invasion, a series of massive explosions hit Ukraine’s ammunition storage depots. In one such event near Kharkiv, fire and explosion destroyed thousands of tons of munitions and forced the evacuation 20,000 people from nearby housing.

As I noted at the time, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) discovered that the explosions were caused by quadcopter drones dropping thermite grenades, specifically the Russian ZMG-1, a high-temperature incendiary weapon. The attacks showed spectacularly how small drones can have a disproportionate effect by striking in the right place. The SBU believed the attacks were carried out by Russian Spetsnaz Special Forces units operating inside Ukraine but they were never caught: unlike other methods, drone sabotage can be carried out from a distance.

In hindsight, these attacks, which destroyed bns of dollars of artillery ammunition, rockets and other munitions were an effective way of weakening Ukraine and making it less capable of fighting the full-scale war which was to follow.

Drones Are Now Everybody’s Problem

The tables have now been turned and Russia itself faces widespread drone attacks. Hardening an entire country’s infrastructure against a threat that can travel miles and fly over walls and fences is going to be a major challenge.

But both sides can use drones. A spate of fires across Europe — an IKEA in Vilnius, a Polish shopping mall and others — have been blamed on a suspected Russian sabotage campaign. Arson, which only requires a small ignition source to cause massive destruction, is an obvious application for drones. The Russians will not have forgotten how effective they were in Ukraine.

Meanwhile the U.S Justice Department is prosecuting a Chinese national for flying a drone over the Newport News shipyard in Virginia where an aircraft carrier and nuclear submarines are under construction.

Small drones are produced by the m and universally available. What happens next in Russia may become a textbook example of how much damage drone sabotage by small groups of determined individuals can do — and a lesson for other countries to learn from. (Source: UAS VISION/Forbes)

 

25 Jun 24. Ukrainian Sea Drones Damage Four Russian Warships with Underwater Mines. In a groundbreaking operation, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) has used “Sea Baby” drones to plant over 15 underwater mines near Russian-occupied Crimea, resulting in significant damage to four Russian warships. This innovative naval tactic, employed in 2023, is a new phase in Ukraine’s warfare against Russian naval forces.

The Wall Street Journal reported that the Sea Baby drones deployed by the SBU laid plastic bottom mines, each weighing 180 kg, in strategic routes used exclusively by Russian warships. These mines are nearly undetectable due to their placement in shallow, silty waters. The operation, which followed a month and a half of meticulous intelligence gathering, damaged the corvette Samum, the patrol boat Pavel Derzhavin, a large tugboat, and the modern minesweeper Vladimir Kozitsky.

The first notable strike occurred on September 14, when the corvette Samum hit a mine, sustaining significant damage to its stern. Despite increased Russian defenses, including larger barriers at the entrance to Sevastopol Bay, the Sea Baby drones continued their mission, covering over 3,000 nautical miles and planting additional mines along key naval routes.

On October 11, the patrol boat Pavel Derzhavin was damaged while entering Sevastopol Bay. Just two days later, as it was being redirected for repairs, it struck another mine, and a large tugboat sent to assist it also hit a mine.

A few days later, the modern minesweeper Vladimir Kozitsky, one of only two such vessels in Russian service, was also damaged by a mine. The SBU’s innovative use of Sea Baby drones have significantly impacted Russian naval operations.

Brigadier General Ivan “Hunter” Lukashevych, involved in the operation, explained that the Sea Baby drones, capable of carrying 850 kg of explosives and reaching speeds of 90 km/h, have expanded their capabilities. Recent upgrades include the installation of Grad multiple rocket launchers, allowing these drones to target land-based forces as well.

This remote mining operation is unprecedented, marking the first successful example of using unmanned naval drones for such purposes.

(Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

25 Jun 24. Ukraine Shows ‘Bulava’ – a New Loitering Drone at Eurosatory 2024. Ukraine unveiled a new ‘Bulava’ kamikaze drone at the Eurosatory 2024 international exhibition in Paris. Defence Express said the Bulava is an analogue to a Russian “Lancet” unmanned aerial vehicle.

UAC, the Ukrainian-Czech company, showed the drone, also known as a Mace loitering munition, at the National Association of Defense Industry Enterprises of Ukraine panel.

According to its specifications, an X-shaped kamikaze drone has a powerful combined 3.6 kg heat-thermobaric warhead and can hit targets at a distance of up to 60 kilometers.

A drone can stay in the air for more than 50 minutes at a 100 km/h speed and is equipped with an electric engine. The wingspan is about 1.6 meters, while the fuselage length is about 1.5 meters. Bulava weighs 11 kg and has a maximum flight altitude of 2000 meters.

A drone can be piloted directly by an operator or via satellite coordinates. It features a communication module with an encrypted channel and a CRPA antenna resistant to electronic warfare interference.

The “Bulava” boasts high maneuverability due to its X-shaped tail and can strike targets in the least protected upper hemisphere.

Targeting is carried out through an optical station with day and night thermal imaging channels. The developers said that targeting can be done directly by an operator or a machine vision-based system. (Source: UAS VISION/Euromaidan)

 

25 Jun 24. Two key advisers to Donald Trump have presented him with a plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine — if he wins the presidential election — that involves telling Ukraine it will only get more U.S. weapons if it enters into peace talks.

The United States would at the same time warn Moscow that any refusal to negotiate would result in increased U.S. support for Ukraine, retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, one of Trump’s national security advisers, said in an interview.

Under the plan drawn up by Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, who both served as chiefs of staff in Trump’s National Security Council during his 2017-2021 presidency, there would be a ceasefire based on prevailing battle lines during peace talks.

They have presented their strategy to Trump, and the former president responded favorably, Fleitz said. “I’m not claiming he agreed with it or agreed with every word of it, but we were pleased to get the feedback we did,” he said.

However, Trump spokesperson Steven Cheung said only statements made by Trump or authorized members of his campaign should be deemed official.

The strategy outlined by Kellogg and Fleitz is the most detailed plan yet by associates of Trump, who has said he could quickly settle the war in Ukraine if he beats President Joe Biden in the Nov. 5 election, though he has not discussed specifics.

The proposal would mark a dramatic shift in the U.S. position on the war and would face opposition from European allies and within Trump’s own Republican Party.

The Kremlin and Ukraine’s foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment on the plan.

NATO MEMBERSHIP ON HOLD

The core elements of the plan were outlined in a publicly available research paper published by the “America First Policy Institute,” a Trump-friendly think tank where Kellogg and Fleitz hold leadership positions.

Kellogg said it would be crucial to get Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table quickly if Trump wins the election.

“We tell the Ukrainians, ‘You’ve got to come to the table, and if you don’t come to the table, support from the United States will dry up,'” he said. “And you tell (Russian President Vladimir) Putin, ‘He’s got to come to the table and if you don’t come to the table, then we’ll give Ukrainians everything they need to kill you in the field.'”

According to their research paper, Moscow would also be coaxed to the table with the promise of NATO membership for Ukraine being put off for an extended period.

Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine in February 2022. Until some gains by Russia in recent months, the frontlines barely moved since the end of that year, despite tens of thousands of dead on both sides in relentless trench warfare, the bloodiest fighting in Europe since World War Two.

Fleitz said Ukraine need not formally cede territory to Russia under their plan. Still, he said, Ukraine was unlikely to regain effective control of all its territory in the near term.

“Our concern is that this has become a war of attrition that’s going to kill a whole generation of young men,” he said.

A lasting peace in Ukraine would require additional security guarantees for Ukraine, Kellogg and Fleitz said. Fleitz added that “arming Ukraine to the teeth” would likely be a key element of that.

“President Trump has repeatedly stated that a top priority in his second term will be to quickly negotiate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war,” said Trump spokesperson Cheung. “The war between Russia and Ukraine never would have happened if Donald J. Trump were president. So sad.”

The Biden campaign said Trump is not interested in standing up to Putin.

“Donald Trump heaps praise on Vladimir Putin every chance he gets, and he’s made clear he won’t stand against Putin or stand up for democracy,” said campaign spokesperson James Singer.

UPPER HAND

Some Republicans will be reticent to pay for more resources to Ukraine under the plan. The U.S. has spent more than $70 bn on military aid for Ukraine since Moscow’s invasion.

“What (Trump’s supporters) want to do is reduce aid, if not turn off the spigot,” said Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations.

Putin said this month that the war could end if Ukraine agreed to drop its ambitions to join NATO and hand over four eastern and southern provinces claimed by Russia.

During a meeting of the United Nations Security Council last week, French and British ambassadors reiterated their view that peace can only be sought when Russia withdraws from Ukrainian territory, a position Kyiv shares.

Several analysts also expressed concern that the plan by Kellogg and Fleitz could give Moscow the upper hand in talks.

“What Kellogg is describing is a process slanted toward Ukraine giving up all of the territory that Russia now occupies,” said Daniel Fried, a former assistant secretary of state who worked on Russia policy.

During a podcast interview last week, Trump ruled out committing U.S. troops to Ukraine and appeared skeptical of making Ukraine a NATO member. He has indicated he would quickly move to cut aid to the eastern European country if elected.

Biden has consistently pushed for more Ukraine aid, and his administration supports its eventual ascension to NATO. Earlier in June, Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement. (Source: Reuters)

 

25 Jun 24. Ukraine will start EU accession talks on Tuesday, more than a decade after pro-western demonstrations in Kyiv called for the country to join the bloc despite Russian threats and the invasions that followed. EU ministers will meet Ukrainian officials in Luxembourg to officially begin a process that is set to take years but which marks a hugely symbolic moment for a country fighting off Russia’s full-scale invasion, now in its third year. “We have surpassed the barrier of promise to delivery,” Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, told the Financial Times. “It’s a decision that’s merit-based,” she said, noting that her country had met all the criteria for negotiations to commence. German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock also highlighted the “important signal” this step represented. “Putin wanted to annex Ukraine. Instead, [the country] is now closer to the EU than ever before,” she said. The bloc will also start talks with neighbouring Moldova, a former Soviet republic that applied for EU membership weeks after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. At the meetings, the EU will present both countries with a “negotiating framework” of reforms and legislation they need to adopt before being deemed ready to join. The start of accession talks is timed to take place before Hungary, the EU’s most pro-Russia member, takes over the rotating presidency of the bloc on July 1 — a six-month role that allows that country to steer policy priorities.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has held up several Ukraine-related decisions, including on the start of membership talks, though he eventually relented, saying Budapest would have plenty more opportunities to veto the process down the road. EU officials expect substantive negotiations to start under the Polish presidency of the bloc that starts on January 1. Stefanishyna said that “starting from 2025, we will push for a very dynamic accession process”. The start of talks signifies a monumental step for Ukraine. Stefanishyna said the roughly 90 per cent of Ukrainians shown by polls as seeing their future in the EU were “head over heels”. Pro-European protests against then-president Viktor Yanukovich central Kyiv in November 2013 © Genya Savilov/AFP via Getty Images In 2013 tens of thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in what was dubbed the pro-democracy “Euromaidan” uprising following pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich’s decision to pull out of a closer association agreement with the EU. That movement eventually led to Yanukovich seeking refuge in Russia and put the country firmly on a pro-western path, despite threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin not to allow Ukraine to leave what he describes as his sphere of influence. Over 100 protesters, known as the “heavenly hundred”, and 13 police officers were killed in the uprising. Putin’s subsequent annexation of Crimea, his war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region and the 2022 full-scale invasion of the country have cost the lives of more than 15,000 civilians, according to the UN, which has said that the real figure is likely to be much higher. On the military side, Kyiv has said that more than 100,000 of its soldiers have been wounded or killed since 2022. Western capitals estimate the equivalent number for Russian casualties to be at least 350,000. Europe Express, premium, Monday to Saturday. (Source: FT.com)

 

24 Jun 24. Battlefield Realities, Pace of Innovation at Center of NATO-Ukraine Defense Innovators Forum. Since the outset of Russia’s war of aggression, Ukraine has skillfully orchestrated a whole-of-society approach to develop innovative technology to defend itself. In this spirit, operational end users, technologists, investors, entrepreneurs, academics, researchers and defense officials from 17 countries gathered at AGH University in Krakow, Poland, earlier this month to bring together innovation ecosystems on real-world challenges — including live flight testing for drone software. The Defense Innovation Unit organized the event in partnership with NATO, Ukraine’s Brave1 and the Polish Ministry of National Defence.

The multi-stakeholder forum comprised panel discussions, keynote addresses, an educational series, and a hackathon, all focused on building partnerships between technology partners from across the Euro-Atlantic community to help solve operational problems in the near and long term. It included an extensive discussion of the pace of innovation required on modern battlefields, techniques for building feedback loops that constantly improve military technologies, ideas to improve procurement and training, and other ways armed forces can adapt and change.

“The confluence of bright minds, collected resources, an urgent problem set, and a common vision creates amazing possibilities,” said DIU Deputy Director of Commercial Operations Liz Young McNally. “DIU’s commercial efforts do not stop at our own borders, but are coordinated with our international initiatives to create, expand and deepen the commercial and investor network, implement programming for partner nation startups and non-traditional companies, and catalyze private investment in new capabilities.”

The forum broadly recognized that knowledge must be shared and turned into actionable solutions as well as the continued need to find ways to quickly and efficiently distill knowledge in real time. For example, DIU is currently executing a project focused on the emerging and persistent challenges of electronic warfare interference gleaning from the continuously evolving EMI landscape in Ukraine.

Leadership and partnerships are critical to this feedback loop.

In a keynote address, the Executive Director of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Air Force Maj. Gen. Edward ‘Hertz’ Vaughan reflected on the criticality of partnerships throughout history and on the importance of constantly improving “people, ideas, and things,” a theory first popularized by U.S. military strategist John Boyd, to prevail in modern war. Maj. Gen. Vaughan also note that Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a Polish military engineer who fought in the American Revolutionary War and later led a Polish uprising against Russian rule, is one of the earliest American military innovators.

“Shared interests bring coalitions together, but what makes those partnerships enduring are shared values,” said Vaughan. “At the top of that list is freedom and the global defense of countries that seek it.”

Another key focus of the forum was attributable military systems such as drones, an area where Ukraine has unique, hard-earned expertise. Lessons from Ukraine are driving the pace of innovation, and the need for an innovation pathway and resilient industrial base to best employ attributable systems. Battlefield realities are informing DOD concepts of operations — or CONOPS. These systems are meant to put fewer people in the line of fire, and can be changed, updated or improved with substantially shorter lead times. Ukraine has shown the importance of constant iteration in the use of attributable systems to keep them working despite countermeasures employed by adaptive adversaries.

“We believe that Ukraine is a central hub for defense technology innovation, said Chief Operating Officer of Brave1, Nataliia Kushnerska. “Ukrainian experience in technology and warfare, combined with Allied expertise, has the potential to be the technological foundation for a safer and more secure Europe.”

Brave1 is the united coordination platform created by the government of Ukraine to promote collaboration between all stakeholders of the defense tech industry by providing them with organizational, informational, and financial support for defense tech projects in Ukraine.

Discussions also addressed the criticality of identifying and channeling trusted capital. For the first time, Ukrainian innovators could access some of the accelerator work developed for the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and get real-time feedback from NATO Innovation Fund personnel.

In addition to candid dialogue, the forum featured an unmanned aerial system automated visual guidance hackathon geared toward improving the capability of low-cost, light-weight drone systems to navigate to an object of interest hosted in part by the National Innovation Security Network component of DIU.

In total, 13 teams and 75 participants from around the globe competed for $100,000 USD in prizes in a 48-hour design sprint to develop a solution to a real-world challenge. Teams delivered working software solutions, capable of successfully navigating to a set desired terminal point with the winning team being a collaboration between Ukrainian and Norwegian developers, Sensorama Lab and KEF Robotics.

Working against the two-day timeline, results proved the ability to innovate and iterate at the speed of need in the software space  —  and demonstrated the collaborative ingenuity fostered by the event. Rapid iteration is required to be successful on the modern battlefield, and the hackathon proved that it can be done.

“The energy for more collaboration between Ukrainian and allied innovation ecosystems was contagious, and is exactly why allies and Ukraine are working together on a new innovation agreement in the NATO-Ukraine Council,” said David van Weel, NATO assistant secretary general for innovation, hybrid and cyber.

This event built on the success of an earlier forum on “Ukraine and the Future of Unmanned Aerial Systems” that DIU convened in Warsaw in October 2023. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

24 Jun 24. The EU has devised a legal workaround to sidestep Hungary’s veto on buying weapons for Ukraine with the profits generated by Russia’s frozen assets this year, in a move that could also clear the way for the G7 to pay $50bn to Kyiv. EU chief diplomat Josep Borrell told the Financial Times that since Hungary abstained from an earlier agreement to set aside the proceeds from Russia’s frozen assets, it “should not be part of the decision to use this money”. He added that the workaround was “sophisticated as every legal decision, but it flies”. Bypassing Budapest this way could also remove a hurdle that could complicate G7 efforts to raise a $50bn loan for Kyiv by December — designed to be paid off by the future proceeds — a decision taken by leaders at a summit in Italy earlier this month. About €210bn are immobilised in the EU, the bulk of which is in Belgium — and the bloc earlier this year agreed to use the profits generated as of February to buy arms for Ukraine. Hungary, the EU’s most pro-Russian member state, has long argued against the 27-country bloc collectively providing military support to Ukraine. Budapest is also blocking seven other decisions related to arming Kyiv, worth about €6.6bn. The legal workaround, which was discussed by EU foreign ministers at a meeting in Luxembourg on Monday, could also be crucial for the G7 deal to work and for the $50bn loan to be issued by the end of the year.

Under the G7 plan, the profits generated by Russia’s frozen assets from next year will be spent on paying off the loan. Hungary’s foreign minister Péter Szijjártó did not strongly object when the details of the legal workaround were presented at the meeting, according to two people briefed on the private discussions. That has raised hopes among other ministers that Budapest would not consider its own legal options to block it, the people added. But some capitals are concerned about the legal basis used for the loophole, officials said, and the potential precedent it could set for other issues where Brussels could circumvent potential vetoes. Concerns from the US and other G7 partners over Hungary likely blocking an EU decision to keep the Russian assets immobilised indefinitely caused significant delays in the negotiation over the $50bn loan. The legal workaround for the EU use of proceeds is likely to suffice in guaranteeing the payout of the loan, according to officials familiar with the matter. However, Hungary could still block EU sanctions under which Russian assets are blocked, a decision that needs to be renewed unanimously every six months by the EU’s 27 countries, officials said. Borrell said Brussels had offered Hungary a similar deal to the one Nato struck with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán last week — giving Budapest an opt-out from activities supporting Ukraine in exchange for not vetoing other allies assisting Kyiv under the alliance umbrella — but it had been rejected. “We have offered Hungary: your money will not be used to support Ukraine in any means. Not just lethal, but on anything. Take your money. Put your money out of the box. I don’t want to use your money,” Borrell said. (Source: FT.com)

 

24 Jun 24. Ukraine launches new Atacms missile attack at Russian targets in Crimea. Ukraine launched a fresh salvo of Atacms missiles at Crimea overnight on Sunday, with local residents reporting loud explosions near several sensitive Russian military sites. The attack is said to have hit the NIP-16 space communications complex and deep space tracking radars, with a locally-sourced video showing the complex in flames. Ambulances were later reported to be heading to the site.

Other impacts were recorded in Zaozerne, Yevpatoriia and Donuzlav, local media said.

“I heard two very powerful explosions in the city. The windows were shaking in my house, and ambulance and police sirens were heard in the city,” a Yevpatoriia resident said.

The governor of Sevastopol, the largest city in Crimea, said that an air raid warning had been issued shortly after 10pm and that all public transport was suspended for the duration of the attack.

A missile also reportedly hit a military base between the settlements of Molochne and Uiutne. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

23 Jun 24. Russia withdraws troops from town near Kharkiv after becoming ‘bogged down.’ Armed forces pulled back from Vovchansk, says Ukrainian military, as Kremlin gears up for expected summer offensive in Donbas region.

Criminologists carry the body of an elderly man after an aerial bombardment by Russia in Kharkiv on Sunday CREDIT: Global Images Ukraine

Russia is withdrawing some of its forces from Vovchansk after becoming “bogged down” in the now-destroyed town north east of Kharkiv, the Ukrainian military has said.

A spokesman for Ukraine’s Khortytsia military group said that Russian forces had also been pulling back from the border villages of Lyptsi and Tykhe.

“This indicates that the enemy has suspended its active hostilities in that area as they have not conducted any operations there over the past day and in the morning,” Nazar Voloshyn said.

Ukraine has stationed thousands of soldiers near the border after Russia launched a surprise cross-border attack at the start of May that went six miles into Ukrainian territory.

Earlier this month, General Oleksandr Syrsky, the commander of Ukraine’s military, said Russian forces had become “bogged down” in fighting focused on Vovchansk, 40 miles from Kharkiv.

The US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) believes that Russia ordered the cross-border attack to draw Ukrainian soldiers away from the front line in the Donbas region, rather than actually take Kharkiv.

“Some Ukrainian forces have redeployed units to the Kharkiv direction from Donetsk Oblast, so Russian forces may be exploiting this perceived weakness of Ukrainian lines to intensify attacks, particularly in the Toretsk-Horlivka direction,” it said.

Toretsk is a town lying on the front line between Bakhmut and Donetsk that has been relatively quiet, although this week, eyewitnesses have reported intense Russian attacks. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

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