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Military And Security Developments
Jun 20
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• KHARKIV: Ukrainian forces have staged successful counter-attacks in the Kharkiv direction in recent days; an intensification of glide bomb attacks could indicate preparations for fresh Russian offensives
• STRIKES: Russian forces have deployed a modified Kh-101 cruise missile with a cluster munition warhead; such attacks will likely focus on targeting airbases ahead of Ukraine’s deployment of F-16s
• NATO: The US and several allies are debating how to refer to Ukraine’s path towards NATO membership at an upcoming summit in Washington DC on 9-11 July
• FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea this week where he signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, boosting bilateral military co-operation
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 17 June indicates that Russian forces have advanced south-west of Klishchiivka, located four miles (6km) south-west of Bakhmut (Donetsk oblast). Russian forces have also made minor progress to the north-west of Bakhmut in the village of Kalynivka. Advances in areas to the north and south of Chasiv Yar could realistically reflect a Russian attempt to flank the heavily defended city. Chasiv Yar remains the Russians’ primary tactical objective in this sector of the front.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Ukrainian sources have reported that Russian forces are intensifying assaults towards Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), a key frontline Ukrainian town which remains the last major section of the 2014-2015 frontline that is still intact. The Toretsk direction has remained relatively stable and quiet in recent months as Russian forces focus their offensive operations on other sections of the frontline; Toretsk also remains a major defensive node for Ukrainian forces, which they have built up since 2014. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 19 June that its forces had improved their positions near Toretsk. However, it remains unclear if Russian forces have made any successful advances in this direction. Nevertheless, the uptick in attacks here likely reflects the broader Russian strategy to increase pressure across the entire frontline to stretch Ukrainian forces thin.
• DONETSK: Over the past few days, Russian forces have continued offensive operations north-west of Avdiivka, making limited confirmed gains. Geolocated footage from 18 June shows that Russian forces made advances north of Sokil (north-west of Avdiivka). Meanwhile, footage from 18 June shows marginal Russian advances south of Heorhiivka, a settlement located west of Donetsk city.
• KHARKIV: Ukrainian forces have staged successful counter-attacks in the Kharkiv direction in recent days, with President Volodymyr Zelensky stating on 17 June that Ukrainian forces are gradually pushing Russian forces out of Kharkiv oblast. Geolocated footage from 17 and 18 June indicates that Ukrainian forces have successfully retaken some positions north of Lyptsi and around Vovchansk. Russian sources have also reported that Ukrainian forces retook the village of Tykne, located directly east of Vovchansk; geolocated footage seems to confirm this development. Additionally, Ukrainian sources reported that, on 18 June, Russian forces launched 13 guided glide bomb attacks against Vovchansk in the space of a single hour; this extremely high tempo of attacks could indicate preparations for offensive operations in the coming days.
• KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Recent reports indicate that Russian forces are reinforcing personnel and equipment along the Oskil-Kreminna line (Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts), likely to intensify offensive pressure. On 18 June, a Ukrainian military source operating along the Oskil-Kreminna line reported that Russia has concentrated up to 10,000 military personnel and 450 pieces of military equipment, including 200 artillery systems, south-west of Svatove along the Raihorodka-Novovodyane line. The source explained that Russian forces are probing Ukrainian defences to identify weak spots. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that the Russian command will step up the operational pressure along the Oskil-Kreminna line. Meanwhile, Geolocated footage posted on 18 June indicates marginal Russian advances north-east of Torske (west of Kreminna).
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Overnight on 18-19 June, Ukrainian forces intercepted 19 of the 21 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia. The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were intercepted over Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Lviv and Mykolaiv oblasts. Later on 19 June, Ukrainian air defences intercepted seven Shahed drones, one Orlan-10, two Lancets and one Supercam drone over Kherson and Mykolaiv.
• STRIKES: Early on 20 June, Russian forces launched four Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles, three Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, two Kh-59 guided missiles and 27 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted all Shahed drones, every Kh-101/Kh-555 missile and one Kh-59 missile. The projectiles were shot down over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Poltava and Vinnytsia oblasts. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that the attack targeted critical infrastructure. Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s state energy grid operator, reported damaged infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kyiv and Vinnytsia oblasts.
• STRIKES: Recent reports indicate that Russia deployed a modified Kh-101 cruise missile with a cluster munition warhead during strikes on 7 and 12 June. While the missiles were reportedly shot down, these warheads do not automatically detonate upon missile interception. As such, areas where missile debris falls could become contaminated with unexploded ordnance. There is a realistic possibility that Russia will increasingly integrate such warheads into missiles which are more likely to be intercepted, enhancing the lethality of these projectiles. Analysis of the Kh-101 missile strike paths on 7 and 12 June indicates that the projectiles were likely targeting Starokostiantyniv (Khmelnytskyi oblast) and Vasylkiv (Kyiv oblast), where important military air bases are located. As such, the use of missiles with cluster warheads would likely be aimed at degrading aviation infrastructure, such as runways, likely to undermine Ukraine’s future use of F-16s. Such strikes against these sites are highly likely in the coming months once Ukraine begins to deploy F-16s.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, over the past few days, Ukrainian forces have continued to strike Russian oil depots. Overnight on 18-19 June, a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at an oil depot in Azov (Rostov oblast, Russia). Early on 20 June, Russian authorities reported that a Ukrainian drone attack caused fires at oil facilities in Russia’s North Caucasian Adygea republic and Tambov oblast. These attacks are part of Kyiv’s continued efforts to degrade Russian oil infrastructure.
• STRIKES: On 20 June, UK Defence Intelligence reported that Ukraine conducted a series of successful strikes against Crimea. The strikes have likely degraded Russia’s air defence coverage in the peninsula.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• RESHUFFLE: Russian President Vladimir Putin has appointed the daughter of his cousin and the wife of the country’s recently-appointed energy minister as a deputy defence minister. Decrees published on 17 June detailed that Anna Tsivilyova would replace one of four dismissed deputy defence ministers; Tsivilyova will oversee social welfare and benefits for military personnel. It marks the latest reshuffle in Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) following the appointment of technocratic economist Andrei Belousov to lead the department.
• RESHUFFLE: Putin has also appointed Pavel Fradkov to serve as a deputy defence minister. Fradkov is the son of former Russian prime minister Mikhail Fradkov, who was also the longest-serving director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). New appointees replace highly unpopular individuals, with hardline pro-war mil bloggers celebrating the new appointments largely because they have long called for the dismissal of their predecessors over corruption concerns. The latest moves continue the wider MoD reshuffle after the removal of Sergei Shoigu, with the latter’s clan now cycled out of influential positions within the department. However, the nepotistic appointment of Tsivilyova and Fradkov reflects Putin’s preferences for loyalty over a more meritocratic approach.
• NATO: The US and several allies are debating how to refer to their commitment to Ukraine’s path towards NATO membership at an upcoming summit in Washington DC on 9-11 July. According to a report from CNN on 19 June, German and US officials have proposed that the military alliance pledge offered by the US and its allies offers a ‘bridge’ to Ukraine joining NATO rather than an ‘irreversible path’. Conversely, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described Ukraine’s aspirations to join the bloc as the latter in April, with the UK and several Eastern and Central European countries instead framing the pledge in less concrete terms.
• NATO: An unspecified senior US official said individuals within President Joe Biden’s administration doubt the term ‘irreversible’ would gain the support of the whole military bloc, noting that Hungary would likely criticise such a choice. Another US official said some NATO members are reluctant to use this word as Ukraine is yet to implement all of the necessary democratic and anti-corruption reforms needed for membership.
• NATO: White House National Security Council Communications Advisor John Kirby said on 17 June that Ukraine has to win the war before joining NATO. This indicates a possible prerequisite for Washington DC to allow Ukraine to join the alliance, though he did not specify what would constitute a Ukrainian victory. Ukraine is highly unlikely to become a NATO member in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, differing opinions among allies will highly likely undermine consensus on how far the bloc should commit to Ukraine’s membership aspirations ahead of the upcoming US-led summit and over the long term.
• SANCTIONS: On 20 June, the EU agreed on its 14th package of sanctions against Russia; the measures target Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) for the first time. The latest tranche of punitive measures bans re-exports of Russian LNG in EU waters but does not bar imports; crucially, it does not prohibit EU countries from purchasing Russian LNG. The measure is unlikely to have a significant impact, as trans-shipments of gas via EU ports to Asia comprise around 10% of total Russian LNG exports. As such, the EU’s restrictive measures against Russian LNG are unlikely to significantly undermine Moscow’s ability to raise revenue from such resources.
FORECAST
NORTH KOREA: Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea on 19 June, where he met with Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and signed a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership treaty’ with him. Putin likely aims to obtain further military assistance from North Korea for use in Ukraine in the coming months (see Sibylline Alert – 19 June 2024).
The agreement binds the two countries to provide immediate military assistance to each other, using all means in their possession if either side is ‘put in a state of war by armed invasion’. It also stipulates the activation of communication channels without delay if either side faces a direct threat of potential armed aggression. Kim claimed that the deal elevated their bilateral ties to that of an alliance, though Putin did not refer to it as such. Ultimately, the two leaders’ differing opinions further reinforce our assessment that provisions of the agreement have likely been left ambiguous to avoid a scenario in which one party must automatically intervene to aid the other.
Putin said that he would not exclude the development of military-technical co-operation with North Korea following the signing of the treaty. Notably, North Korean state media reported that the agreement requires both countries to take steps to bolster their joint defence capabilities. It is uncertain what specifically this could involve and how it would impact Russia’s ability to wage war in Ukraine, though it indicates a mutual appetite to strengthen bilateral defence co-operation. Concurrently, South Korea announced on 20 June that it would review the possibility of providing weapons to Ukraine following the signing of the partnership. This indicates that the agreement could realistically push a policy shift in Seoul on the matter in the coming months.
Prior to his arrival, Putin published an article in North Korean state media in which he thanked the state for its ‘strong support’ of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian leader said that Russia and North Korea are in solidarity on key international issues. He asserted that both countries are ready to resist the collective West’s efforts to prevent the formation of a ‘multipolar world order’. Putin also praised what he claimed is North Korea’s ability to defend its interests despite years of economic pressure, provocations and ‘blackmail’ from the US. Such comments almost certainly demonstrate Moscow’s greater alignment with North Korea and efforts to consolidate a so-called ‘axis of the excluded’ to challenge US global hegemony.
• Sweden-US: Military agreement will possibly drive Russian grey zone operations. On 18 June, the Swedish parliament agreed to sign a bilateral defence co-operation agreement with the US. The agreement gives the US the right to use 17 Swedish military bases and training areas across the country. Washington DC has signed similar agreements with several other countries, including the Baltic states, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Poland. The agreement is designed to deter Russia from exercising military aggression in the region. Sweden’s green and left-wing factions oppose the treaty due to the lack of an explicit ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish soil, which will possibly drive protest risks. Additionally, Russia is highly likely to react negatively to the agreement. As such, we assess that Russia will possibly target Sweden with grey zone operations, having done so against Finland after it signed a very similar treaty. Tactics that Russia will possibly employ include disinformation, critical infrastructure sabotage and cyber attacks. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jun 24. Serbia turns blind eye to its ammunition ending up in Ukraine Moscow-friendly Belgrade exported about €800m of shells to western allies since 2022 For the west, seeking support for Ukraine has become more important than pushing Serbia’s nationalist leader on democratic reforms, analysts said. Serbia has been discreetly stepping up sales of ammunition to the west that ends up bolstering the defence of Ukraine — even though it is one of only two European countries not to join western sanctions against Russia. Estimates shared with the Financial Times put Serbia’s ammunition exports that have come to Ukraine via third parties at about €800mn — a sum President Aleksandar Vučić indicated was broadly accurate — since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. He presented the situation as a business opportunity, insisting he would not take sides in the war. “This is a part of our economic revival and important for us. Yes, we do export our ammunition,” he said in an interview. “We cannot export to Ukraine or to Russia . . . but we have had many contracts with Americans, Spaniards, Czechs, others. What they do with that in the end is their job. “Even if I know [where the ammunition ends up], that’s not my job. My job is to secure the fact that we deal legally with our ammunition, that we sell it . . . I need to take care of my people, and that’s it. That’s all I can say. We have friends in Kyiv and in Moscow. These are our Slav brothers.” Asked if the €800mn figure was in the right “ballpark”, he said not over one year but “maybe in two or three years, something like that”. Serbia is neither a member of Nato nor the EU, and its people have long had a sentimental attachment to Russia while resenting the west after Nato’s bombing campaign on their country in 1999. Belgrade also counts on Moscow to block international recognition of Kosovo, the former Serbian province recognised by most western states, but which is held back from UN membership by Russia and China. Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić: ‘We cannot export to Ukraine or to Russia . . . but we have had many contracts with Americans, Spaniards, Czechs, others. What they do with that in the end is their job’ He has also sought to hedge his bets and keep a distance between himself and Russian President Vladimir Putin. “Europe and the US have worked for years to distance Vučić from Putin,” a western diplomat said, adding that a crucial player was US ambassador Christopher Hill, who arrived in Belgrade a month after the full-scale invasion. “Everyone expected [Hill] to fight with Vučić but his only agenda has been to distance Belgrade from Moscow,” the diplomat said. “He has succeeded. Vučić has not met, nor even called Putin for years. And of course there is the question of weapons shipments that end up in Ukraine.” For the west, seeking support for Ukraine has become more important than pushing Serbia’s nationalist leader on democratic reforms, analysts said. “Vučić sweeps it under the carpet that there is support — but not directly — to Ukraine,” said Ivan Vejvoda, a fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. “He speaks in a fuzzy way. It is clear that he does not want to recognise this — he wants to keep his far right happy — while in fact Serbia has [offered] massive aid to Ukraine against Russia.” Serbia had a thriving arms industry during the cold war when it was part of Yugoslavia, and is a manufacturer of Soviet-standard ammunition calibres still widely in use in Ukraine’s armed forces. It is also joining a global trend of looking to boost arms sales at a time when Russia has launched a war economy that has ramped up production faster than Ukraine’s western allies. Vučić said Serbia has a golden opportunity as its arms were cheaper than in the west, adding that the scale of Serbia’s overall ammunition exports could increase. “The Russians did a great job regarding renewal and revival of their production of armament. They do it swiftly, but when you need to make a profit, then it’s not easy,” he said. “In the United States and Germany, you cannot say now you’ll produce another tank without earning money . . . And we are good because people now see it [that we are cheaper].” Serbia’s participation in the ammunition flow to Ukraine is sufficiently veiled that official data do not reflect it, according to diplomats and analysts. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which monitors support for Ukraine, has not tracked Serbian activities directly and has not encountered systematic evidence of Serbian contributions, said Christoph Trebesch, who heads the effort. Serbian finance minister Siniša Mali said the defence industry, which employs 20,000 people in the country of 7mn, could expand rapidly. “I see it as a business group,” he said. “I think we are still way below the capacities of more developed countries, but now is the time.” (Source: Google/FT.com)
21 Jun 24. Russia Allegedly Deploys FAB-3000 Glide Bomb in Ukraine. On June 20, video footage surfaced purportedly showing the Russian military using a FAB-3000 high-explosive aerial bomb in Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine. This footage allegedly captures the first combat employment of Russia’s 6,600-pound glide bomb, which has the potential to cause substantial destruction. According to Russian sources, the bomb was deployed against Ukrainian military positions in the village of Liptsy.
The FAB-3000 bomb is a modified Soviet-era munition, enhanced with fixed wings and GPS navigation systems to extend its range beyond Ukrainian anti-air defenses. This bomb contains nearly 1.5 tonnes of explosives, making it significantly more destructive than its predecessors, the FAB-500 and FAB-1500. Analysts warn that this new capability poses a tremendous problem for Kyiv due to its enhanced destructive power and extended reach.
The June 20 video, shared by a pro-Kremlin blogger with alleged ties to the Russian Air Force, depicts a Russian bomber dropping the FAB-3000 on a Ukrainian temporary deployment point. Despite missing the target by a few meters, the bomb’s extensive blast radius still caused significant damage, engulfing three floors of a building in a massive fireball.
In a separate incident, a Russian-guided bomb killed two people and wounded three in the town of Selydove, Donetsk region. The attack damaged multiple residential buildings. The Donetsk regional prosecutors reported the use of a UMPB D-30 bomb in this attack.
Russian forces have intensified their use of guided and unguided glide bombs in recent months, particularly in Kharkiv Oblast. The Institute for the Study of War has noted that the use of the FAB-3000 bomb significantly increases the destructive potential of Russia’s ongoing attacks against Ukrainian forces and infrastructure. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
21 Jun 24. Ukrainian Drone Strike Damages Major Russian Oil Refinery. One of Russia’s largest oil refineries sustained damage in an overnight drone attack allegedly carried out by Ukraine, according to local officials. The Ilsky oil refinery, located in Russia’s southern Krasnodar Krai, was targeted, resulting in the death of a worker and extensive harm to the facility’s administrative buildings. Veniamin Kondratyev, the governor of Krasnodar Krai, reported on Telegram that drone debris struck a boiler room at the refinery, killing a worker. Additionally, an office building at the refinery was damaged. This attack is part of what local officials describe as a “mass” drone assault by Ukraine on southern Russia, targeting multiple sites including military bases and energy infrastructure.
The Ilsky refinery, with a refining capacity of 6.6 million tons of crude annually (132,000 barrels per day), is a crucial component of Russia’s energy infrastructure. Governor Kondratyev noted that other areas in the region also came under attack, with fragments from one drone causing damage to a guest house in Temriuk district, though no injuries were reported there.
The June 20-21 overnight raid saw a reported 70 Ukrainian drones attacking targets in Crimea, while 43 drones targeted Krasnodar Krai. In addition to the Ilsky refinery, two drones struck a Volgograd oil refinery, far from the immediate conflict zone. Despite Russian air and sea defenses, large fires and damage were reported across multiple locations, with Russian officials claiming all aerial targets were shot down.
Russia’s Ministry of Defense reported intercepting and destroying over 100 drones targeting Crimea, Krasnodar Krai, and Volgograd. However, this claim was contradicted by evidence of widespread damage. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
20 Jun 24. Ukraine Strikes Russian Naval and Oil Targets with Neptune Missiles.
Ukrainian forces launched strikes using domestically developed Neptune missiles against targets in two Russian regions, escalating tensions in the ongoing conflict. Kyiv remains bound by restrictions on using U.S. long-range weapons against Russian territory.
On Wednesday, Ukrainian and Russian media reported that the Konstantin Olshansky landing ship was hit by a Neptune missile and sustained damage, rendering it non-combat-capable, according to Ukrainian navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk. The vessel, originally a Ukrainian warship, was captured by Russia in 2014 when Crimea was annexed. Additionally, the Ivan Khurs reconnaissance vessel was reported to have been struck.
Ukraine also targeted oil depots in Russia’s Rostov and Krasnodar regions. In the town of Azov, near Rostov-on-Don, Ukrainian drones attacked two facilities, igniting a fire at one oil tank. In Krasnodar, Neptune missiles struck an oil terminal in the town of Chushka, causing significant damage. These attacks highlight Ukraine’s capability and willingness to use its missile arsenal against strategic targets within Russian territory.
The Ukrainian military had previously stated that attacks on the Russian naval base in Sevastopol over the weekend caused more damage than initially assessed. Strikes hit the Azov and Yamal landing ships, a communications center, and other naval infrastructure. These attacks have reportedly impaired Russia’s Black Sea Fleet operations, forcing the Russian navy to reassess its deployments and repair damaged vessels.
Russia’s Defense Ministry acknowledged the interception of a Neptune guided missile and 24 Ukrainian drones but provided no further comments. The ongoing strikes are part of Ukraine’s broader strategy to degrade Russian military capabilities, particularly in the Black Sea region. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
20 Jun 24. Russia Redeploys Troops from Finnish Border to Ukraine.
Russia has reduced its military presence near the Finnish border, moving the vast majority of its ground forces to support the war in Ukraine, according to Finnish public broadcaster Yle. This redeployment contradicts Moscow’s earlier threats to bolster its border defenses in response to Finland joining NATO.
Finnish military intelligence sources reported that approximately 80% of the equipment and soldiers from bases near Finland have been transferred to Ukraine. Despite threats of increased military presence, these bases are now notably empty. The source noted that this shift is not isolated to the Finnish border but is observed across various Russian regions, with Moscow Oblast being an exception.
Satellite imagery reviewed by Yle corroborates these findings. For instance, a military base near Petrozavodsk, roughly 200 kilometers from the Finnish border, showed a significant reduction in units and equipment from June 2023 to May 2024. New facilities, likely for servicing war-damaged equipment or housing new conscripts, have appeared at these bases.
While the Russian Ground Forces have seen substantial redeployments, the Air Force, Navy, and air defenses remain relatively staffed. The fluctuation in the number of soldiers at these bases is attributed to the induction of new conscripts, but contract soldiers have largely been dispatched to Ukraine.
This redeployment comes amid heavy losses suffered by Russian professional contractors in Ukraine, leading to partial mobilization efforts to replenish ranks. Finnish intelligence estimates that it may take Russia three to five years to recover from these losses.
The strategic shift underscores the heightened tensions between NATO and Russia, particularly after Finland’s accession to NATO in April 2023, which extended the NATO-Russian border by approximately 1,340 kilometers. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
21 Jun 24. The West provoked Russian invasion of Ukraine, claims Farage.
Reform leader says the ‘ever-eastward expansion of Nato and the EU’ gave Vladimir Putin a reason to justify war
The West provoked Russia into invading Ukraine, Nigel Farage has said.
The Reform UK leader said that the “ever-eastward expansion of Nato and the European Union” gave Vladimir Putin a reason to justify war.
The comments in a BBC Panorama interview with Nick Robinson echo arguments made by Donald Trump, the former US president and friend of Mr Farage.
Mr Farage was asked why he had “blamed the West” for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
He said: “Right, I’ll tell you what you don’t know, I stood up in the European Parliament in 2014 and I said, and I quote, ‘there will be a war in Ukraine’.
“Why did I say that? It was obvious to me that the ever-eastward expansion of Nato and the European Union was giving this man a reason to his Russian people to say, ‘they’re coming for us again’ and to go to war.”
Pressed on whether his rhetoric was echoing that of the Russian president, Mr Farage said: “But, hang on a second, we provoked this war. It’s – you know, of course it’s his fault, he’s used what we’ve done as an excuse.”
Asked if he was saying the West “provoked the invasion of Ukraine”, Mr Farage responded: “Yes.”
He added: “By the way, I’m the only person in British politics that predicted what would happen, and of course everyone said I was a pariah for daring to suggest it.
“George Robertson, former Labour cabinet minister, who went on to become the secretary general of Nato, has in the last couple of weeks said the war is a direct result of the EU expansion.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)
21 Jun 24. US changes rules on Ukraine firing long-range missiles into Russia. Ukraine’s military can use US-supplied long-range missiles to strike targets deeper inside Russia if it is acting in self-defence, the Pentagon said on Thursday.
The US had previously maintained a policy of not allowing Ukraine to use the weapons to hit targets inside Russia for fear of further escalating the war with Russia.
But, Joe Biden had earlier loosened those restrictions to help Kyiv defend the eastern city of Kharkiv from a relentless barrage of Russian missiles.
Moscow has been firing on Ukrainian targets from inside its border, which it treats as a “safe zone,” said Maj Gen Pat Ryder, the Pentagon press secretary.
“As we see those forces conducting those types of operations from across the border, we’ve explained Ukraine can and does have the right to fire back to defend themselves,” Mr Ryder said.
It comes as Ukraine launched a major drone assault on “military objects” in Russian territory, targeting oil refineries, drone facilities and radar stations.
However, Russia continues to retaliate and is said to be launching “massive frontal assaults” around the town of Chasiv Yar, according to a Ukrainian military brigade who described the situation there as “extremely difficult”.
Chasiv Yar has become a flashpoint on the Donetsk front line as its capture could accelerate Russian advances in the industrial region. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
20 Jun 24. The US is pausing the delivery of Patriot interceptor missiles to other nations so it can fast-track orders for Ukraine to bolster its air defences against Russian attacks. US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby on Thursday confirmed that the US had made the “difficult but necessary decision” to prioritise delivering Patriot and NASAM missiles to Ukraine, delaying deliveries to other countries that had purchased them so that Kyiv can maintain its stockpiles “at a key moment in the war”. “We’re going to reprioritise the deliveries of these exports so that those missiles rolling off the production line will now be provided to Ukraine,” he added, saying the shipments were expected to begin in the late summer. “This . . . demonstrates our commitment to supporting our partners when they’re in existential danger,” Kirby said. The decision to bring Kyiv to the front of the production queue, as reported by the Financial Times earlier on Thursday, follows President Joe Biden saying last week that he had secured commitments for the delivery of additional air defence systems to Ukraine. Biden said several nations had agreed to send Patriot and other air defence systems to Kyiv, and that other countries expecting deliveries would have to wait because “everything we have is going to go to Ukraine until their needs are met”. Standing beside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy after the two signed a 10-year defence pact on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Puglia, Biden added that Kyiv would begin receiving more systems “relatively quickly”. Zelenskyy said he was “deeply grateful” to Biden and the US “for prioritising Ukraine in the delivery of air defences that we critically need to defeat Russian attacks”. “These additional air defence capabilities will protect Ukrainian cities and civilians,” he added. Kirby confirmed that countries that had already ordered the missiles would receive them, but “on a delayed timeline”. Washington has briefed all affected countries privately; air defence exports to Taiwan are not expected to be affected. The White House looked at re-sequencing the delivery of air defence systems as well as interceptors and was open to doing so. But ultimately it opted to pursue a “parallel” and “intensive” effort to get Ukraine additional existing air defence systems, a senior White House official said. Romania on Thursday decided to donate one Patriot system to Ukraine, according to the office of President Klaus Iohannis. Zelenskyy thanked Romania for its “crucial contribution”. (Source: FT.com)
21 Jun 24. The truth about Russia’s turtle tanks. Ukraine captures its first Russian defence vehicle amid weaponry war. In April, a strange new vehicle rolled onto the battlefield in eastern Ukraine. It was a Russian tank but not the kind we’re used to. Encased in an iron shell, it bristled with electronics.
The new vehicle, dubbed “the turtle tank”, initially had just a metal shell to protect them from drones. They were then developed to have protection against electronic warfare.
This week, Ukraine captured one of these tanks. It should prove useful in knowing exactly what’s in them and where their weak spots lie. Yet they’re evolving so quickly that by the time Ukraine has pulled it apart and had a dig around, the next iteration might be rolling out the factory.
Whatever that looks like, one thing we’ve learnt is that these tanks are a very particular solution to a very particular problem.
After 26 months of war, each side is struggling to come up with new offensive weapons to gain the upper hand.
The turtle tanks have therefore emerged as testbeds for new tactics and tech. Among their various strengths, they provide a defence against loitering munitions and first-person-view drones. They also have the capacity for electronic breaching – or jamming – operations as part of a ground assault.
In their current form, the tanks are big and bulky but each of these capabilities is being trialled and might feature subsequently in a more miniaturised form on future armoured vehicles, on uncrewed ground vehicles or in a combination of both.
This will lead to a kind of cat-and-mouse situation, with Ukraine trying to catch up and figure out ways it can immobilise and destroy these vehicles.
A striking feature of this war has been the use of drones and their ability to heavily influence battles. Every day, each side uses hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles to track enemy forces, guide artillery and strike targets.
Ukraine is thought to be leading the drone race, in both numbers and innovation, driven partly by its need to compensate for Russia’s huge artillery superiority.
But there is some evidence that the turtle tanks can sustain dozens of strikes from first-person-view drones, which makes them a deadly addition to Russia’s ground combat forces.
The tanks will continue to be useful in offensive operations but are likely to be an evolutionary dead end. The vehicles are large, slow-moving and unwieldy, with limited crew visibility, unless there are numerous external cameras we aren’t aware of. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
21 Jun 24. South Korea has said that it would “reconsider” sending weapons to Ukraine in a warning to Vladimir Putin after the Russian president signed a mutual defence pact with North Korea amid rising tensions on the Korean peninsula. “We will reconsider the issue of supplying weapons to Ukraine,” South Korean national security adviser Chang Ho-jin told reporters late on Thursday after Putin, who visited Pyongyang for the first time in more than 20 years, said he would consider supplying high-precision weapons to North Korea. “Any co-operation that helps increase North Korea’s military power is a violation of the UN Security Council,” Chang added. “It doesn’t make sense to promise military co-operation, assuming a pre-strike by the international community that will not happen.” South Korea’s foreign ministry on Friday summoned Russia’s ambassador in protest against the strategic partnership, under which Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un pledged to deploy “military and other assistance” in the event of conflict. Seoul’s foreign minister Cho Tae-yul and US state secretary Antony Blinken condemned the deal as a serious threat to regional peace and stability. The officials agreed to “strengthen the US-Korea alliance’s deterrence power and security co-operation” with Japan, Seoul’s foreign ministry said in a statement. South Korea has condemned Russia’s invasion and provided non-lethal aid to Ukraine but has resisted international pressure to supply Kyiv with weapons, citing a long-standing policy of not giving weapons to countries involved in an active conflict. US state department spokesperson Matthew Miller said Washington would “welcome any support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression, but that’s ultimately a decision for South Korea”. Putin warned on Thursday that it would be a “big mistake” for Seoul to begin supplying weapons to Ukraine while on a trip to Vietnam. Western countries have accused North Korea of supplying Russia with munitions, artillery shells and ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine. The threats came amid rising tensions on the Korean peninsula. South Korean soldiers fired warning shots after North Korean soldiers crossed the demilitarised zone between the countries on Thursday, in the third such incident this month. The intrusion was “unintentional” and the North Korean soldiers immediately returned, according to Seoul’s joint chiefs of staff. A South Korean civic group drew threats from Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s sister, on Friday after they dispatched balloons carrying anti-Pyongyang leaflets, USB drives containing South Korean dramas and popular songs and US dollars over the border. Seoul has also resumed loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts along the border after North Korea sent balloons filled with trash into South Korea. “No doubt that they will get to suffer unnecessarily from doing what we told them not to,” Kim Yo Jong told Pyongyang’s state-run Korean Central News Agency. (Source: FT.com)
19 Jun 24. Ukraine interested in acquiring Australia’s retiring Tiger helicopters. The Armed Forces of Ukraine has an interest in the Australian Defence Force’s retiring Eurocopter Tiger attack helicopter fleet, according to ambassador of Ukraine to Australia Vasyl Myroshnychenko.
Ambassador Myroshnychenko confirmed there was interest in acquiring the four-blade, twin-engine attack helicopter, manufactured and maintained by Airbus, which originally entered deployment in 2003 and are due for a withdrawal from service in 2028.
Ukraine has previously made a request for access to the Australian Defence Force’s now-scrapped MRH-90 Taipan helicopter fleet in late December last year but was denied by the federal government.
“I mean on the Taipan (helicopters) it was a decision of the government not to supply them. There might be some other helicopters or some other capabilities which may become available sometime soon. And if those could be provided to Ukraine, we’ll be thankful,” the ambassador said during a recent media conference regarding a shipment of Kord Defence equipment to Ukraine, held on 19 June.
“That would be the Tigers; we’d be interested in having that conversation and about something that will help.
“In terms of the Taipans (helicopter) we just have to move on. At the end of the day, it’s a decision that has just been made, things have happened and at the end of the day, it’s up to the Australian government to decide what they can do, what they cannot, and we fully respect them.”
Defence is also currently undertaking scrapping of the retired F/A-18 Classic Hornet aircraft fleet, which were originally withdrawn with their support equipment from January 2019 to December 2021.
Ambassador Myroshnychenko confirmed there was little interest in those aircraft.
“In terms of the F/A-18 (Classic Hornets), I mean there were some discussions. There never was a kind of a clear request from Ukraine,” he said.
“Ukraine figured out, you know, these systems are very complicated and they’re very expensive to maintain – so a decision was made in Ukraine to focus on F-16 aircraft and to train the pilots for them. That’s kind of the strategy we are following.”
(Source: Defence Connect)
19 Jun 24. Thales signs three agreements with Ukrainian industry to strengthen front-line support and local defence capability
• Thales has signed at Eurosatory three agreements with Ukrainian industry under the aegis of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries.
• These agreements aim to strengthen operational support of Ukrainian Armed forces front-line operations and reinforce local defence capability.
• Domains of cooperation include Electronic Warfare, Tactical Communications, Air Defence Systems and radars, as well as Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
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