NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jun 06.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• STRIKES: Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air defence battery in Belgorod oblast (Russia); this likely marks one of the first Ukrainian attacks using a US-provided HIMARS after Washington DC approved the use of US-supplied weapons in limited cross-border attacks against targets inside Russia
• NEGOTIATIONS: The upcoming global peace summit on Ukraine in Switzerland will reportedly focus on establishing conditions to involve Russian officials in future talks; this is an important step towards genuine ceasefire or peace treaty talks
• MOBILISATION: Ukrainian ministers are preparing a resolution that will allow 17-year-olds abroad to defer from military registration; this comes amid wider discussions about Ukrainian expatriate obligations to register
• FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia could supply ‘advanced weapons’ to various countries in order to strike at Western targets around the world; since it already supplies weapons to various regimes, this is likely to be primarily rhetorical
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces are trying to make progress in eastern Chasiv Yar, including by crossing the Siverstyi-Donets-Donbas canal; however, Ukrainian forces are successfully repelling most of these attacks. Nevertheless, geolocated footage from 4 June does indicate some limited Russian progress north of Chasiv Yar, specifically in the village of Kalynivka. However, Russian forces also stepped up attacks further north near Siversk, located 16 miles (26km) north-east of Bakhmut; these involved particularly intense assaults on 3 June. Geolocated footage from 3 and 4 June indicates that Russian forces have made limited progress east of Verkhnokamyanske and south of Rozdolivka, located three miles (6km) east and six miles (10km) south of Siversk, respectively.
• DONETSK: On 4 June, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) noted a high level of operational activity along the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axis; this has been the focus of Russian operations in recent weeks. Russian advances north-west of Avdiivka have nevertheless remained limited over the past few days. Geolocated footage from 2 June shows that Russian troops made marginal progress to the west of Solovyove, while footage from 3 June shows Russian advances along the M-30 highway to the west of Netaylove (which is situated to the south-west of Avdiivka). Meanwhile, additional footage from 3 June shows that Russian troops advanced within western Krasnohorivka, as well as to the west and north of Paraskoviivka; these locations are situated to the west and south-west of Donetsk city, respectively.
• DONETSK: The pattern of Russian attacks along the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk line indicates that the Russian command is focusing simultaneously on progressing north-west of Avdiivka and west of Donetsk. This was confirmed by Nazar Voloshyn, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Grouping of Forces, who explained on 3 June that the Russian command is aiming to break through Ukrainian positions in small areas along the front line between Staromykhailivka, immediately west of Donetsk city and Berdychi, the latter being located to the north-west of Avdiivka. Voloshyn added that Russian offensive operations remain intense in the Netaylove sector and are accompanied by heavy shelling against Ukrainian positions.
• KHARKIV: Russian forces have made very little progress in the Kharkiv direction in the past week; geolocated footage from 3 June indicates that Ukrainian forces have managed to retake various small tactical positions in Vovchansk. The town, located around 30 miles (48km) north-east of Kharkiv city, remains the focal point of fighting on this axis, with Russian forces attempting to grind forward with infantry-dominated assaults. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on 5 June that his forces are currently focusing on inflicting maximum casualties against Russian forces and preventing them from making further gains; he notes an opportunity to begin to retaking more territory as well.
• KHARKIV: The Russian opposition outlet Verstka claimed on 3 June that the Russian military is forcibly deploying service personnel who refuse fight to the frontline in northern Kharkiv oblast. While we cannot confirm this, Verstka stated that hundreds of individuals who had been waiting to stand trial for refusing to fight have had their trials cancelled and have subsequently been sent to the frontline. If accurate, this likely reflects Russia’s efforts to strengthen understaffed units in the Kharkiv direction while keeping their formal reserve units intact (possibly for a future second phase of the offensive in the coming weeks).
• KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage posted on 5 June shows Russian advances south-east of Kupiansk, near Ivanivka, and also to the south-west of Novoselivske. Overall, the frontline remains stable along the Oskil-Kreminna axis.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Overnight on 3-4 June, Ukraine intercepted two Iskandr-K cruise missiles over Dnipropetrovsk and two of four unspecified drones over Chernihiv oblast. Ukraine’s air force reported that the remaining drones ceased functioning on their own, which likely means they did not cause any damage. Early on 5 June, Ukrainian air defences intercepted 22 of 27 Russian-launched Shahed-131/136 drones. The projectiles were intercepted over Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 5-6 June, Ukrainian forces destroyed 17 of 18 Russian-launched Shahed-131/136 drones. The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were destroyed over Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Russian forces also launched two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, which reportedly struck Dnipropetrovsk. The local authorities reported that the drones damaged infrastructure facilities, residential buildings and a bus in Nikopol (Dnipropetrovsk). In Khmelnytskyi, Shahed drones reportedly caused a fire at an infrastructure facility.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air defence battery in Belgorod oblast (Russia) between 1 and 2 June, likely with a US-provided High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). Geolocated footage from 3 June shows two destroyed launchers and a damaged command post belonging to a Russian S-300/400 air defence system in a field east of Kiselyovo (just north of Belgorod city) and 37 miles (60km) from the Ukrainian border. As such, the target was within the range of the HIMARS. Although Ukrainian officials have not commented on the attack, it likely marks one of the first instances of Ukrainian forces striking military targets in Russia with US-provided weapons since Washington D.C. approved such strikes last week.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 5-6 June, Ukrainian forces carried out drone strikes against oil infrastructure in Russia. Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) co-oordinated a drone strike against an oil depot near Stary Oskol, a city located in Belgorod. The attack reportedly caused a significant fire at the oil storage facility. Simultaneously, Ukrainian forces launched a drone attack against the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in Rostov oblast (Russia). A fire broke out at the facility, which processed 4.8 m tonnes of crude oil last year and 97,000 barrels per day (bpd). A similar drone attack targeted the facility in March.
• STRIKES: The GUR also claimed responsibility for a naval drone strike that allegedly destroyed a Project 498 ‘Saturn’ raiding tugboat in occupied Crimea (Ukraine) overnight on 5-6 June. The vessel was located in Panske Lake near Chornomorske (western Crimea).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• NEGOTIATIONS: The upcoming global peace summit on Ukraine in Switzerland will reportedly focus on establishing conditions to involve Russian officials (eventually) in future talks. Bloomberg reported that a draft document ahead of the conference, due to be held in Lucerne on 15-16 June, indicated a willingness to build trust on three key issues: ensuring nuclear safety, with calls to return the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to Ukraine while also condemning nuclear threats; ensuring food security, condemning attempts to weaponise the issue and calling for freedom of navigation in the Black Sea to allow Ukrainian agricultural exports to reach third parties; and ensuring that all prisoners of war (POWs) as well as deported children and civilians are returned to Ukraine.
• NEGOTIATIONS: While still an ambitious set of demands, which Moscow will almost certainly not accept at this time, the three principles are notably much narrower in scope than Kyiv’s original ten-point peace plan. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 15 November 2022. Ultimately, the involvement of Russia in some capacity will be vital if such peace summits are to result in any meaningful progress towards a ceasefire or peace treaty. While Moscow continues to claim that it is willing to engage in peace negotiations, we assess that this is unlikely to be the case.
• NEGOTIATIONS: China will reportedly not attend the peace summit and has reiterated its alignment with Russia, stressing that Moscow should be present at any negotiations. President Volodymyr Zelensky previously accused Russia and China of trying to weaken the global peace summit (Beijing stated that the summit does not meet the criteria it proposed for such talks).
• MOBILISATION: On 5 June, the minister responsible for overseeing matters concerning the re-integration of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, Iryna Vereshchuk, stated that ministers are preparing a resolution that will allow 17-year-olds abroad to defer from military registration. Vereschuk noted that the Ukrainian government is aware that requiring students of non-mobilisation age to travel to Ukraine for such purposes would only further strain the military medical commissions and hinder mobilisation efforts. Vereshchuk stated that deferment for students abroad would be valid until their return to Ukraine or when martial law ends.
• MOBILISATION: This comes after Dmytro Lazutkin, Ukraine’s defence ministry spokesperson, stated on 4 June that young men aged 17 – even those abroad – must register with the military. Lazutkin stated that it is not possible to register remotely online and that people in this category need to appear at military recruitment centres in Ukraine. As such, the aforementioned resolution highly likely seeks to reduce criticism and concerns that 17-year-old male students are liable to be mobilised. Ultimately, Lazutkin’s comments focus on registering with the military – not mobilisation. All Ukrainian men under the age of 25 are exempt from mobilisation. Nevertheless, possible misconceptions and concerns about young Ukrainians being mobilised will likely persist; this will in turn possibly fuel negative sentiment with regard to mobilisation.
• CITIZENSHIP: On 4 June, the US embassy in Ukraine announced that Kyiv has revoked a ‘residence abroad’ exception that previously allowed certain Ukrainian males aged between 18 and 60 with dual citizenship to leave the country. The embassy stated that this change is effective as of 1 June, noting that this possibly means that US-Ukrainian dual citizens, including those who live in the US, are no longer able to leave Ukraine.
• CITIZENSHIP: According to the embassy, dual US-Ukrainian male citizens within this age range were previously able to depart Ukraine if they had de-registered their Ukrainian residency and registered their residency in the US. Ukraine’s constitution does not recognise dual citizenship; dual citizens are therefore treated solely as Ukrainian nationals while in Ukraine. The announcement underscores that the Ukrainian authorities can change policies with little forewarning; this raises the risk of sole or dual Ukrainian nationals (mostly men) visiting Ukraine encountering difficulties when trying to leave as long as the war continues.
• ASSETS: A senior US Treasury official disclosed on 4 June that G7 states are working to identify all possible ways to use frozen Russian sovereign assets to aid Ukraine. Assistant Secretary for International Finance Brent Neiman stated that one possible option involves lending a ‘significant amount’ to Ukraine in advance and linking the repayment of this loan to future windfall profits. Neiman suggested that this (or a similar approach) would provide an immediate fiscal boost for Ukraine and signal the West’s resolve to continue supporting Kyiv.
• ASSETS: However, the full details of the idea, such as the precise sums involved, were not disclosed. Ultimately, further advancement among the US and G7 states on using frozen Russian assets will highly likely increase the risk of retaliatory seizures by Moscow in the coming weeks and months, particularly if an agreement is reached at the upcoming G7 summit on 13-15 June. The threat of asset appropriations will possibly delay a unified approach on how to use such Russian resources to support Ukraine.
• ENERGY: On 5 June, the Financial Times reported that Russian forces have seized or destroyed over half of Ukraine’s energy generation capacity; the summer of 2024 is therefore likely to be the most challenging period of energy insecurity of the war. Ukraine’s energy production is reportedly under 20 gigawatts per year (down from 55 gigawatts per year before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022). As energy consumption increases due to rising summer temperatures, further strains on the energy network will likely mean rolling blackouts and restrictions on industrial energy usage for the foreseeable future.

FORECAST

SPILLOVER: On 5 June, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia could supply ‘advanced weapons’ to various countries in order to strike at Western targets. Putin’s comments come in direct response to the change in German and US policy allowing Ukraine to use certain German and US weapons systems to strike at targets inside Russia (albeit with significant limiting caveats). Putin stated that if Western nations allow Ukraine to strike Russia with weapons they have supplied, Russia has the right to supply ‘comparable weapons to regions where they could be used to strike sensitive targets of countries that do this to Russia’

It is important to note that Russia is effectively already supplying numerous anti-US/Western states with advanced technology and weapons systems, including Iran, North Korea and Syria. The Russian defence ministry-controlled Africa Corps (formerly known as the Wagner Group) is also continuing to expand Russia’s influence across Africa at the West’s expense, including in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, Mali, Niger and, increasingly, Sudan (where Moscow is ostensibly seeking to change sides and to begin supporting government forces). Russia has also shown diplomatic support for various Iran-aligned Islamist forces across the Middle East, including Hamas and the Yemen-based Houthis; it is also in the process of delisting the Taliban as an extremist organisation in order to improve co-operation with Afghanistan.

Putin’s latest threat should therefore be seen in the context of Russia’s leading role in the so-called ‘Axis of the Excluded’, which seeks to oppose Western hegemony and interests; Moscow is particularly interested in peddling the notion of a global struggle against Western ‘domination’. Since Russia is already supplying numerous regimes around the world with weapons and technology, we assess that this latest threat is broadly rhetorical; it seeks to deter additional Western countries from allowing Ukrainian forces to strike Russia with weapons they supply. However, the prospect of further Russian weapons and technology proliferation augmenting anti-West forces around the world remains a highly credible threat. For example, North Korea is likely making significant progress on various submarine and ballistic missile capabilities due to Russian technological assistance.

*France: Arrest of Russian-Ukrainian national underscores threat posed by hostile states, attack risks. On 5 June, the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office (PNAT) confirmed that the authorities had arrested a 26-year-old Russian-Ukrainian man on suspicion of manufacturing explosive devices and planning a violent attack. The individual was taken to hospital following an explosion on June 4 in his hotel room in Roissy-en-France, near Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG) in the capital Paris. Guns and fake passports were also reportedly found in his room. It is likely that the individual did not intend for the explosive device to detonate when it did; higher-profile upcoming events, such as the Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games, were likely his intended targets. President Emmanuel Macron has pushed an increasingly hawkish stance on Russia in recent months, driving risks associated with Russian grey zone and influence operations. The incident follows the arrest of a Chechen national suspected of plotting an ‘Islamist-inspired’ attack against a football match during the upcoming Paris 2024 Olympic Games, further demonstrating elevated terrorism and attack risks in France.

June 03.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: Kyiv has acknowledged that US military aid has been slow to arrive and that this is undermining Ukrainian efforts to equip reserve units and conduct scheduled unit rotations
• STRIKES: On 1 June, Russian forces launched a large-scale missile and drone attack primarily targeting energy infrastructure, underscoring Moscow’s continued strategy to undermine Kyiv’s long-term energy resilience
• CHINA: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused China and Russia of attempting to deter other states from attending a conference aimed at promoting Kyiv’s conditions for peace, marking a notable shift in Kyiv’s stance on China
• FORECAST: The US has formally given Ukraine permission to use some of its short-to-medium-range weapons systems to strike targets inside Russia close to Kharkiv oblast; wider caveats limit Ukraine’s ability to disrupt Russian forces beyond the border
• OFFENSIVES: On 1 June, President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged in an interview with The Guardian that US military aid has been slow to arrive and that this is undermining Ukrainian efforts to equip reserve units and conduct scheduled unit rotations. Zelensky acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have understrength reserves. Slow Western weapons shipments are also preventing them from deploying to the frontline, which Zelensky assessed encourages further Russian assaults at certain sections along the front. Zelensky’s comments effectively confirm that Russia’s likely aim in northern Kharkiv to draw off Ukrainian forces and spread Ukraine’s lines ever thinner is highly likely succeeding, at least in part.
• OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian troop rotations are also being impacted by limitations in the training of new recruits. The Washington Post cited numerous Ukrainian commanders in an article published on 2 June that frontline commanders are having to compensate for the poor training of new recruits by diverting resources to training recruits at the frontline before committing them to battle. Mobilisation has undoubtedly added pressure to the Ukrainian training system; a resolution to these issues is unlikely in the short term. Nevertheless, the fact that Ukrainian commanders are training Ukrainian recruits at the front before committing them to battle stands in likely stark contrast to Russian general practice, which readily commits untrained and ill-equipped recruits to frontal assault operations. This will likely ensure a higher calibre of Ukrainian troops in contrast to Russian recruits, but only for as long as personnel pressures do not force Ukrainian commanders to commit new recruits immediately.
• OFFENSIVES: On 31 May, Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov claimed that Russian forces had taken 340 square miles (880 sq km) since the beginning of the year, though this is likely not entirely accurate. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) estimates that visually confirmed evidence indicates Russian forces have only taken 290 square miles (752 sq km) over the same period. Meanwhile, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported on 31 May that Russian casualties (meaning both killed and wounded) have likely reached 500,000 since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. DI further assesses that Russian losses in May averaged over 1,200 casualties per day, which, if accurate, represents the highest casualty rate since the start of the invasion. While we cannot confirm these casualty figures independently, it is clear that Russian forces continue to favour an attritional strategy; Russia’s current recruitment levels mean that these losses are broadly sustainable for the short-to-medium term.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 1 June indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced south of Ivanivske, a settlement located due south-east of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). Further to the north, geolocated footage confirms that Russian infantry units are periodically crossing the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal that runs through eastern Chasiv Yar, but that Ukrainian forces are able to intercept and repulse these forces successfully.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have continued to prioritise offensive operations to the north-west of Avdiivka, making confirmed gains. Geolocated footage from 31 May and 1 June shows that Russian forces advanced south-east of Novooleksandrivka and west of Solovyove. Both settlements are located north-west of Avdiivka. Meanwhile, on 2 June, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces took control of Umanske, located 15 miles (25km) north-west of Donetsk. While such claims have yet to be visually confirmed, it is likely that Ukraine has lost control of the settlement, with Russia having made incremental gains in the sector over the past few weeks. Such gains north-west of Avdiivka likely underscore Moscow’s longer-term goal to reach Pokrovsk, a major logistical hub. Meanwhile, on 31 May, a Ukrainian military source operating in the Donetsk sector reported that Russian forces have mostly stopped using armoured vehicles, instead shifting to infantry-led attacks conducted by groups of around six personnel.
• KHARKIV: Ukrainian Commander in Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on 30 May that Russian forces are transferring units from other unspecified stretches of the frontline to the north Kharkiv area. This likely indicates that Russia seeks to reinforce this axis ahead of ‘phase two’ of the operation, as previously assessed. The seizure of Vovchansk will possibly stand as the cut-off point for the beginning of the second phase of the Kharkiv operation, though timelines will possibly be further extended due to the extremely slow Russian progress in the town. Russian forces have made few confirmed advances in the town in recent days, with geolocated footage from 30 May indicating that Ukrainian forces managed to retake certain positions in central Vovchansk. Russian forces subsequently made limited progress in eastern Vovchansk on 31 May and south-west of the town on 2 June. Spokesperson for the Khortytsia Grouping of Forces Nazar Voloshyn reported on 1 June that Ukrainian forces retain control of about 70% of the town.
• KHARKIV: Following the US’ approval for Ukrainian forces to use some of its weapons to strike Russian targets ‘near Kharkiv’, Ukrainian forces struck various Russian columns in neighbouring Belgorod and Kursk oblasts (both Russia) on 1 and 2 June. Such cross-border strikes will allow Ukrainian forces to disrupt Russian preparations for future offensive operations, though the limitations placed on the range of the weapons used will limit this capability. See FORECAST below.
• KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian offensive operations continued along the Oskil-Kreminna line, though they made limited gains. Geolocated footage posted on 31 May confirmed marginal Russian advances south-west of Novoselivske, located south-east of Kupiansk. Meanwhile, on 31 May, the spokesperson of a Ukrainian military unit in the sector reported that Russian forces have increased operations to identify weaknesses in Ukraine’s defences. Such operations have nonetheless come at a high cost for Russian defence equipment and personnel, according to a Ukrainian source.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Overnight on 30-31 May, Ukraine intercepted four Shahed-131/136 drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and one Iskandr-K cruise missile over Kyiv oblast. However, Ukraine failed to intercept five S-300/S-400 missiles launched by Russia.
• STRIKES: Early on 1 June, Russian forces launched a large-scale missile strike involving 53 missiles and 47 Shahed-131/136 drones. The attack included 35 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles, four Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, one Iskandr-cruise missile, ten Kalibr cruise missiles and three Kh-59/Kh-69 missiles. Ukrainian air defences interpreted 81 projectiles, including 30 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles, four Kalibr cruise missiles, one Iskandr-K missile and 46 drones. A spokesperson for Ukraine’s air force, Ilya Yevlash, explained that Moscow has intensified combined drone and missile strikes against Ukraine, likely in a bid to pressure Ukraine’s strained air defence resources.
• STRIKES: The attack primarily targeted energy infrastructure, underscoring Moscow’s continued strategy to weaken Kyiv’s long-term energy resilience. Ukraine’s energy minister, Herman Haluschenko, stated that energy facilities in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kirovohrad and Zaporizhzhia oblasts were damaged. Ukraine’s state-owned electric operator, Ukrhydroenergo, reported that the attack critically damaged equipment at two unspecified hydroelectric power plants (HPP). Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, also reported critically damaged equipment at two unspecified thermal electric power plants (TPP). DTEK stated that this was the sixth attack targeting the company’s facilities in two and a half months. The Ukrainian authorities also reported damage to various civilian infrastructure and energy facilities in Kharkiv, Lviv, Vinnytsia, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts, as well as in Zaporizhzhia city.
• STRIKES: Russia’s MoD released a statement explaining that the strike was launched in retaliation for Kyiv’s efforts to damage Russian energy and transport facilities. The MoD also stated that the attack targeted the operations of Ukrainian defence companies as well as storage sites for Western weapons. We assess that Russian forces will likely attempt to disrupt Kyiv’s efforts to supply frontline troops by targeting storage facilities and transport infrastructure, such as railways, but that such strikes will likely remain focused in eastern Ukraine.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 1-2 June, Russia launched one Iskandr-K cruise missile, one S-300 missile and 25 Shahed-131/136 drones. Ukraine intercepted 24 drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Vinnytsia oblasts.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 31 May, Ukrainian forces reportedly launched a drone and missile strike against a Russian Nebo-IED long-range radar system near Armyansk (Crimea). According to Ukrainian military sources, the strike reportedly took the radar offline, which services a 380km-long section of the frontline. On 17 April, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) co-ordinated a successful strike against another Nebo-IED long-range radar system in Bryansk oblast (Russia). Such efforts to degrade Russia’s long-range radars likely reflect Kyiv’s efforts to create favourable conditions for future long-range strikes.
• STRIKES: Concurrently, early on 31 May, Ukrainian forces launched several Ukrainian-made Neptune anti-ship missiles, successfully striking an oil depot near the port of Kavkaz in Krasnodar Krai (Russia). The Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the attack damaged at least two additional facilities at the port and a substation providing energy to the Kerch Strait Bridge.
• STRIKES: The attack was part of a larger operation conducted by military forces and the SBU to disrupt Russian military logistics in Crimea. On 30 May, Ukrainian forces reportedly launched a long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) strike against a ferry crossing the Kerch Strait, damaging two ferries reportedly carrying equipment to Crimea. The strike halted transit operations for the entire crossing. Moscow typically uses ferries to transport military personnel and equipment to Crimea because the railway line across the Kerch Strait Bridge remains vulnerable and damaged. As such, the attack will likely disrupt supplies from reaching Russian military personnel on the peninsula in the coming days.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• CHINA: On 2 June, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused China and Russia of attempting to deter other states from attending a conference aimed at promoting Kyiv’s conditions for peace. Zelensky gave limited details as to which countries Beijing was trying to dissuade from participating in the event, which will be held in Bürgenstock (Switzerland) on 15-16 June, nor if such attempts had been successful. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba expressed in March that China has ‘great potential’ to help end the war. Zelensky’s remarks therefore indicate a notable change in tone, likely reflecting decreasing confidence in Kyiv that Beijing will play a significant role in facilitating a peace beneficial to Ukraine.
• CHINA: Beijing confirmed on 31 May that it would not attend the peace conference, claiming that the event does not meet its expectations. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning stated that China has always insisted that both Russia and Ukraine should endorse an international peace conference that equally involves all parties. The spokesperson also stated that all peace proposals should be discussed in a fair and equal manner otherwise such conferences are unlikely to play a substantive role in restoring peace. Russia was not invited to attend the upcoming peace conference.
• CHINA: Ultimately, Russia and Ukraine will almost certainly eventually have to participate in negotiations to end the war, though this remains highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, Kyiv will highly likely continue to promote its visions for peace to garner international support for when the time for discussions to end the war arrives. However, Moscow’s views and conditions for ceasing hostilities will almost certainly continue to differ significantly from Kyiv’s in the coming months. For further analysis on the low prospects of a ceasefire agreement, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 30 May 2024.
• NATO: On 31 May, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg urged members of the alliance to commit to a multi-year pledge to provide Ukraine at least EUR 40 bn (USD 43 bn) annually in military aid. Stoltenberg disclosed that allies have given around this sum each year to Kyiv since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. He insisted that the bloc must maintain this level of support at a minimum each year for as long as possible.
• NATO: Stoltenberg also proposed that allies share this financial burden ‘equitably’, which he claimed would better ensure the predictability of assistance to Ukraine – a key issue which until now has constrained Kyiv’s ability to plan effectively given the uncertainty around aid timelines. Stoltenberg highly likely wants to avoid the continuation of certain states (principally Germany and the US) disproportionately providing assistance for Ukraine. However, it remains highly unlikely that all NATO members will agree to commit to open-ended yearly military support for Kyiv, with Hungary and Slovakia among the most likely countries to oppose such a scheme.

FORECAST

AID: President Zelensky’s spokesperson, Serhiy Nykyforov, confirmed on 31 May that the US has granted Ukraine limited permission to use US-supplied weapons for strikes against Russian territory for ‘counter-fire purposes’. Reports emerged on 30 May that US President Joe Biden authorised Ukrainian strikes using US-supplied weapons against military targets inside Russia that are being used in the offensive against Kharkiv.

However, unspecified US officials disclosed that Washington DC will continue to prohibit Ukrainian forces from using Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and other long-range US-supplied capabilities to strike Russia. Officials also noted that the decision does not mean Washington DC now condones Ukrainian drone attacks against Russian oil facilities. Nykyforov assessed that the authorisation will significantly strengthen the ability of Ukrainian forces to counter Russian attempts to advance across the border and into Kharkiv.

Notably, the Senior Director for European Affairs at the US National Security Council, Michael Carpenter, disclosed on 31 May that the authorisation also includes neighbouring Sumy oblast. Carpenter declined to comment on whether Washington DC could further ease its restrictions on the usage of US-supplied weapons by Ukrainian forces against other Russian regions. While pressure will highly likely continue for the US to relax its policy on Ukrainian strikes inside Russia in the coming weeks, a total carte blanche approval is unlikely in the short term. Although the US’ authorisation represents a limited policy change on the matter, Washington DC likely remains wary of an escalation, hence why the authorisation applies to specific regions and prohibits the use of certain capabilities.

Meanwhile, certain other countries, such as Canada, Finland and Poland, have confirmed Ukrainian forces can use their weapons to strike targets in Russia. Notably, Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen disclosed on 30 May that Ukraine may use Danish-supplied F-16s to strike military targets in Russia; Kyiv is expected to receive the first set of Danish F-16s this summer. However, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander de Croo stated that Brussels will not allow Ukrainian forces to use its weapons, including F-16s, to strike Russian territory. Differing risk thresholds and opinions on how Ukraine should use Western-provided capabilities will almost certainly persist, complicating Ukraine’s ability to leverage new systems and necessitating complex tracking systems to ensure only certain weapons are used to strike Russia if needed.

The head of Germany’s Ukraine Situation Centre at the country’s defence ministry, Christian Freuding, stated on 2 June that Ukrainian forces will possibly deploy Patriot air defence systems in Kharkiv to shoot down Russian aircraft. According to Freuding, these would possibly aid in countering Russian aircraft conducting glide bomb attacks, an assessment that assumes that the authority to take down Russian planes inside Russian airspace will be granted. Berlin has also allowed Ukraine to use German-provided weapons to combat Russian attacks against Kharkiv. Ultimately, the relaxation of Western restrictions on Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory using Western-provided arms will greater aid Ukraine in repelling glide bomb attacks and strikes against Kharkiv city and the wider oblast. (Source: Sibylline)

 

07 Jun 24. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s fifty-ninth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package, which has an estimated value of $225 million, will provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent battlefield needs, such as: air defense interceptors; artillery systems and munitions; armored vehicles; and anti-tank weapons.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

• Missiles for HAWK air defense systems;
• Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
• Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• 155mm Howitzers;
• 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
• 81mm mortar systems;
• M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
• Trailers to transport heavy equipment;
• Coastal and riverine patrol boats;
• Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
• Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
• Small arms ammunition and grenades;
• Demolitions munitions;
• Night vision devices; and
• Spare parts, maintenance, and other ancillary equipment.

The United States will continue to work together with more than 50 Allies and partners to ensure Ukraine’s brave defenders receive the critical capabilities needed to fight Russian aggression.

(Source: U.S. DoD)

 

07 Jun 24. The European Commission will recommend the start of EU accession talks with Ukraine this month in a bid to signal support to the war-torn country before Budapest takes over the rotating presidency of the bloc, according to three people familiar with the matter. Kyiv applied for EU membership in the weeks following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 and was granted candidate status just a few months later, in one of the fastest decisions by the bloc catalysed by Moscow’s aggression. Russia’s war has prompted an overhaul of the EU’s enlargement process, as Ukraine and Moldova became candidate countries in June 2022 and Georgia in late 2023, while also accelerating talks with some of the six western Balkan candidates after years of stasis. The commission is pushing for formal talks to begin with Kyiv and Chisinau this month to give a positive signal to both countries on their EU aspirations. On Friday it will declare that Ukraine now meets previously outstanding criteria including anti-corruption measures, restrictions on political lobbying, rules on asset declarations for public officials and protection of languages used by national minorities. Georgia, which adopted a “foreign agents” law in defiance of Brussels’ warnings, will not get the green light on Friday, when the commission will share its assessments with the bloc’s 27 ambassadors. Brussels’ recommendation requires unanimity from EU governments and Hungary is expected to raise objections, citing issues including Kyiv’s treatment of Ukraine’s Hungarian minority. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has in the past held up other decisions related to Ukraine, including giving the country EU candidate status and delaying a $50bn aid package. While it has eventually relented under pressure from other capitals, Budapest has so far this year refused to drop its veto on setting aside EU cash to provide military aid to Kyiv. Budapest has additional concerns regarding the rights of other minorities in Ukraine, particularly on the use of non-Ukrainian languages — that go beyond the commission’s official conditions, said a senior EU diplomat. Recommended War in Ukraine Russia has taken out over half of Ukraine power generation Spokespeople for the Hungarian government did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the EU on July 1, which will give it additional leverage in setting the agenda of meetings where Ukraine-related matters are discussed. Belgium, the current holder, is pressing ahead hoping to achieve unanimity and hold the initial round of accession talks on June 25, before it hands over the baton to Hungary. (Source: FT.com)

 

06 Jun 24. French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday said his country will send some Mirage fighter jets to Ukraine and train pilots to fly them, as part of a step-up in aid to help Kyiv resist Russian advances in its territory. The pledge came after Nato allies, including Belgium, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, committed to dispatching about 80 US-made F-16 fighters to Ukraine. Macron said France was seeking to put together a coalition of countries that own the Mirage 2000 model, made by Dassault Aviation, so it remained to be seen how many aircraft would be sent to Ukraine. “The goal is to have the pilots and the jets in Ukraine by the end of the year,” he added. Nato allies will provide Ukraine with scores of F-16 fighters, starting this summer, and have been training Ukrainian pilots to fly the aircraft for several months. The Mirage is a multi-role fighter jet which first entered service in the 1970s. The 2000-5 is the most modern version, with advanced radar, but has been largely replaced in the French armed forces by the more advanced Rafale. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been pressing western allies to give the country more weapons and lift restrictions on their use, including by letting Kyiv target Russian territory. Macron said last month Ukraine should be allowed to use western-made weapons to hit Russian military sites, and US President Joe Biden has given more limited permission. Zelenskyy on Thursday was in France for talks with Macron and to attend, alongside Biden, a series of events to mark the 80th anniversary of the D-Day landings in Normandy that changed the course of the second world war. Biden used his address at Omaha Beach to call Russian President Vladimir Putin “a tyrant” and vow support for Ukraine. Zelenskyy was expected to press the case for more military aid in a meeting with Biden, and he is due to address France’s parliament on Friday. But one of Zelenskyy’s recent requests, for western allies to send military instructors to Ukraine to help quickly boost the ranks of its armed forces, has not yet been granted. Although French officials hinted last month that Paris would announce such a move, Macron has stopped short of committing to dispatching people to carry out training. He said on Thursday that talks were under way with other countries to put together a coalition of those willing to provide instructors. “There should be no taboo on this since it would be on sovereign territory of Ukraine,” he said, adding he did not view this as an “escalatory factor” against Russia. Putin has threatened to target western soldiers if they were sent to Ukraine, and put countries on notice that he saw this as a serious escalation. Macron said France would train and equip an entire brigade of Ukrainian troops, of about 4,500 men. Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive in the summer of last year demonstrated the country’s difficulty in mounting large-scale military operations involving more than a few hundred men. In another sign of simmering tensions between France and Russia, Moscow on Thursday announced a French citizen had been arrested on suspicion of espionage. Macron confirmed the arrest and said the person was employed by a non-governmental organisation, and had no role working for France. (Source: FT.com)

 

05 Jun 24. Steel Front builds protection for Ukrainian tanks from FPV drones. The company will produce steel screens to protect Ukraine’s tanks from the enduring menace of FPV loitering munitions. A Ukrainian company named Steel Front has announced it will produce another layer of protection for main battle tanks (MBTs) used by Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

Steel Front is an initiative that brings all the military assistance provided by the businesses in the portfolio of Rinat Akhmetov, a Ukrainian billionnaire and former People’s Deputy of Ukraine, under one umbrella.

The company has announced it will kick-start production of steel screens to be fitted around the turrets of the wide variety of MBTs Ukraine has accumulated since Russia invaded its territory more than two years ago. The supplier focuses on fitting its cages to the US-manufactured M1 Abrams as well as Ukraine’s T-64s and its Soviet-era T-72s.

The screens have been designed specifically for each tank type, with the key objective of protecting the soldiers from external threats.

It is also important they do not interfere with the operation of the tank. The screens, which Steel Front is providing free of charge, weigh around 400kg. Each takes ten to 12 specialists and around 12 hours to produce and install.

During the political stalemate in Washington, which prevented US military assistance from continuing to support Ukraine’s war machine, Ukrainian troops became increasingly reliant on First Person View (FPV) drones and loitering munitions as their conventional equipment reduced. These systems are guided by a user wearing a virtual reality headset.

GlobalData intelligence tells us that “such munitions [have been] used to devastating effect in frontline combat, often compensating for Ukraine’s near-constant shortfall in conventional artillery ammunition.”

From January to February in 2024, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Strategic Industries claimed that FPV production totalled 200,000.

Furthermore, there have been staggering claims that more than 65% of Russia’s MBTs were destroyed by Ukrainian FPV systems.

FPV drones can be equipped with legacy Soviet-era explosive munitions such as hand grenades, under-barrel grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, rockets, and even large-calibre artillery shells, with the man-in-the-loop guidance providing more accuracy and thus cost-efficiency over conventional fire missions.

FPV drones are catching on

The emergence of this tactic is already having implications in defence procurement circles worldwide as it illustrates a potential efficiency gain whereby a small number of explosive-armed commercial-off-the-shelf drones could provide equivalent kinetic effects to a much larger volume of conventional platforms at reduced cost and risk-to-life.

GlobalData estimates that the global military UAS market will expand from a value of $10.927bn in 2023 to $17.963bn in 2033, growing with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.10%. The global drone market was worth $15.2bn in 2020 and will reach $89.6bn by 2030, with the strongest growth coming from commercial drones, which will record a CAGR of 32.6% between 2020 and 2030, rising from $3.4bn in 2020 to $57bn in 2030.

Of course, if Ukraine’s troops have caught onto this new military trend, then so too have the invading Russian forces. On 30 May 2024, one Russian government mouthpiece reported that Russian troops will receive 2,000 Gortenzia 7 FPV drones. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

03 Jun 24. NATO to unveil Ukraine security package as ‘bridge’ to membership. NATO plans to offer Ukraine a security package when the alliance convenes its annual summit this summer in Washington, though it’s expected to stop short of accepting the nation’s long-standing request for membership amid Russia’s invasion.

In addition to unveiling the package in July, an estimated 32 countries are finalizing a series of bilateral agreements to support Ukraine ahead of the summit, with 13 finalized so far, according to Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO.

“Allies will be putting forward a whole package of deliverables that will serve as a bridge to their membership inside the alliance,” Smith said at a Defense Writers Group roundtable on Monday. “Part of the package will be the language we use to describe Ukraine’s membership aspirations in the declaration itself.”

“Part of it will be an institutionalization of some of the bilateral support that’s currently being provided [to] Ukraine, and tucking it under NATO command. Part of it will be working to identify new resources for our friends in Ukraine, and ensuring that we send a signal to Moscow that the NATO alliance isn’t going anywhere,” Smith added.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked for fast-tracked accession into the alliance shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 — a request NATO rebuffed at last year’s summit in Lithuania. Instead, NATO offered Ukraine a multiyear assistance package meant to bolster its defenses and help it transition away from Soviet-era equipment.

Ukrainian entry into NATO would allow Kyiv to invoke the alliance’s collective defense clause, potentially triggering a broader regional conflict with Russia. U.S. President Joe Biden said last year that the war with Russia would have to end before Ukraine enters the alliance.

Still, during an April visit to Kyiv, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg vowed that “Ukraine will become a member of NATO.”

“The work we are undertaking now puts you on an irreversible path towards NATO membership, so that when the time is right, Ukraine can become a NATO member straightaway,” Stoltenberg said.

Some defense companies from the NATO bloc have expressed interest in co-producing certain military capabilities like unmanned systems. The U.S. in May announced a $2 bn Foreign Military Financing package largely geared toward helping Ukraine grow its defense-industrial base.

“This is coming from, in large part, European or Canadian or American companies that are looking at co-production opportunities,” Smith told Defense News.

Regional plans

Smith noted the July summit, which marks NATO’s 75th anniversary, will also focus on the regional defense and deterrence plans for northern, central and southern Europe, which the alliance formally agreed to during last year’s summit.

“It’s going to mean a major shift across the alliance in how countries invest, procure, work together to implement and execute those regional plans,” the diplomat said.

The plans are partially aimed at guiding NATO members when they make military procurement decisions to ensure they’re buying the right capabilities. For instance, a country could be responsible for three core tasks within a regional plan and would be expected to make procurement decisions accordingly.

“It’s ultimately up to them on how to spend the resources, but they have to answer to the regional plans,” Smith said.

She argued that the regional plans will also help reassure defense manufacturers that NATO intends to keep procuring larger amounts of ammunition and other materiel over the long term, encouraging them to ramp up production.

“It’s not a signed contract, but helping them see what the requirements will be across the alliance that’s tagged to these regional plans will certainly assure them that the demand signals will not just be over the next 12 months, but the demand signals to industry will be for the better part of a decade,” she said.

The summit will also focus on burden-sharing. Smith expects that slightly more than 20 countries will spend at least 2% of their respective gross domestic product on defense — a goal set by the alliance.

“We have to make sure that we keep pushing and get every member of the alliance to lay out a plan to get to the 2% within the next few years,” Smith said. “And I think 99% of the allies have a plan in place.” (Source: Defense News)

 

03 Jun 24. Italy to send second air defence system to Ukraine, foreign minister says. Italy will send a second SAMP/T air defence system to Ukraine, its foreign minister said in a radio interview on Monday, responding to Kyiv’s pleas for greater help to fend off Russian missile attacks.

The system, also known as MAMBA, is a Franco-Italian battery that can track dozens of targets and intercept 10 at once. It is the only European-made system that can intercept ballistic missiles.

Rome and Paris jointly delivered a first system in 2023, but in recent months Ukraine has repeatedly called on partners to provide more help with air defence as it faces an increasing barrage of attacks on cities and energy infrastructure.

“It is known that we will send SAMP/T, which is an instrument of air defence, therefore of protection, that Ukraine itself asked us for,” Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani told state broadcaster Rai, confirming earlier media reports.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Italy has approved eight support packages to the government of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. Tajani said the SAMP/T will be part of a ninth package under preparation, but did not give a time frame for delivery.

All shipments have so far been covered by official secrecy and the government has never made public the exact list of weapons it has sent to Ukraine.

A source close to the matter told Reuters earlier that Italy would likely ship to Ukraine a SAMP/T system which is currently deployed in Kuwait, but is soon due to return to Italy.

Corriere della Sera newspaper reported on Monday that the government could green light the new supplies after a summit of leaders of the Group of Seven major democracies, which Italy will host on June 13-15.

G7 foreign ministers pledged in April to provide more air defence help to Ukraine during a meeting Italy hosted on the island of Capri, saying they were committed to saving lives and safeguarding critical infrastructure.

(Source: Reuters)

 

03 Jun 24. Russia intercepts 20 Ukrainian drones in Kursk, governor says. Russian air defence units intercepted 20 Ukrainian drones on Monday in southern Russia’s Kursk region bordering Ukraine, regional Governor Alexei Smironov said.

Smirnov, writing on the Telegram messaging app, said Ukrainian forces had attacked four villages in his region using attack drones and helicopters, but no injuries were reported.

In Belgorod region, to the southeast, regional Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov said air defence units had downed “several airborne targets”. Roofs of some dwellings were damaged.

Reuters could not independently verify the reports.

Ukraine has regularly staged attacks on Russian border regions, angering the Kremlin. President Vladimir Putin said the attacks prompted a push by Russian troops last month into northern parts of Kharkiv region to form a “buffer zone”.

The Russian military says it captured about 12 villages, but Ukrainian officials say their troops remain in control of 70% of Vovchansk, a key town 5 km (3 miles) inside the border. (Source: Reuters)

 

03 Jun 24. Russia not looking for direct confrontation with Nato, says head of the Armed Forces. Russia is not looking for a direct war with Nato, the head of Britain’s Armed Forces has said.

In an interview with Sky News, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin admitted things had become “a bit more dangerous”.

But the Chief of the Defence Staff explained: “Putin does not want a war with Nato. Putin does not want a nuclear war. And we have enormous overmatch because of the strength of Nato.

He added: “We’ve got to be very careful that we distinguish between the really severe and deep threats in the late 1930s and then how we entered into a world war, and not use loose language that we’re somehow on the cusp of a world war now.

“The world’s got a bit more dangerous. But we should be reassured by all that we’ve got in place.”

The military chief was speaking to the news outlet to mark the 80th anniversary of D-Day.

He said the British people would respond in force if the UK faced another external threat like the one put to them by Nazi Germany.

“Absolutely! I think our nation has got that pride, it has got that commitment,” he said.

Speaking about D-Day, he said it shows when “nations come together, you can do amazing things”.

He also compared the Allies’ response to the Nazis and how the West was helping Ukraine in its fight against Russia.

“It’s a war of economies. It’s a war of logistics. It’s a war of industrial production. It’s a war of, political will,” he said.

“It is all of those things for the simplicity of bringing peace back to the people of Ukraine.” (Source: forces.net)

 

03 Jun 24. Russia ‘loses 1,200 troops in 24 hours.’ Russia’s military suffered 1,270 casualties in the past 24 hours, the Ukrainian general staff said on Monday. If accurate, the total would mark one of the highest daily Russian casualty figures of the war.

The Ukrainian military has regularly reported Russian daily casualties figures of more than 1,000 since Moscow launched a new offensive in the Kharkiv region on May 10.

Following initial Russian gains, Ukraine says it has stabilised the new frontlines.

In the city of Vovchansk, just three miles from the Russian border, Moscow’s forces have been bogged down in vicious combat since the first few days of the May 10 assault.

The Kharkiv offensive has also drawn Ukrainian resources away from other areas, leading to small but steady Russian advances across the rest of the 600-mile front line. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

02 Jun 24. Ukraine ‘fires Himars into Russia for first time.’ Ukraine has fired US-made weapons at targets inside Russia for the first time, according to Russian sources.

Russia’s ministry of defence and Russian military bloggers have reported that HIMARS, long-range artillery, were fired by Ukraine at Russia on Saturday evening.

“The enemy has begun using Western-made weapon systems to attack ‘old’ Russian territory. These are fragments of M142 HIMARS MLRS shells,” said the sanctioned Russian war reporter and Kremlin propagandist Evgeniy Poddubny on his Telegram channel underneath a slideshow of several photos. “The Russian Army’s air defence crews destroyed more than 10 missiles in the sky over the Belgorod region.”

Ukraine has not commented.

The US this week gave Ukraine limited permission to fire US-made weapons at targets inside Russia close to the border with the Kharkiv region.

It had delayed handing permission to Ukraine because of fears the strikes would escalate the war.

Ukraine, though, said that Russia was massing forces behind the border ahead of attacks and it needed to strike them as an act of self-defence.

US permission only covers the area immediately north of the border and only allow (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

03 Jun 24. Ukraine develops software to allow drones to fly without GPS. The Economist has reported that Ukraine’s special forces have developed new software that allows drones to fly without the use of GPS, disrupting Russian jamming efforts. The AI-enabled Eagle Eyes is designed to allow drones to navigate by machine sight with no need for outside input. According to The Economist, the new software “compares live video of the terrain below with an on-board map stitched together from photographs and video previously collected by reconnaissance aircraft”. This capability enables the drones to continue with their missions even after being jammed. The software can also recognise targets including missile launchers and tanks, and can drop bombs or fly into them without the drone operator needing to give the order. A Ukrainian special forces commander told The Economist that the software is already being used widely, and is cheap enough to be used on kamikaze drones. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

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