NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

May 24.

Executive summary

In our most likely three-month scenario, positional fighting continues to prevent major battlefield breakthroughs on either side.
In our most likely 12-month scenario, the war evolves into a broadly stable attritional conflict that protracts into 2025.
Despite the arrival of Western military aid to Ukrainian forces in May, Ukraine remains on the backfoot as the Russian summer offensive gears up. Supplementary offensive operations launched in northern Kharkiv oblast this month are likely intended to spread the already stretched Ukrainian frontline and to set conditions for breakthroughs elsewhere, rather than to surround the city of Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast) in the short term.
A major reshuffle of the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) marks the most serious reform of the administration since the war in Ukraine began. The reshuffle likely reflects the Kremlin’s desire to maximise military-industrial production to support a protracted war in Ukraine.
Other key triggers, warnings and indicators to watch in June include rolling blackouts and restrictions on the energy industry in Ukraine, the upcoming G7 summit (where a decision on appropriating Russian frozen assets remains possible) and the Swiss peace summit on 15-16 June, which is highly unlikely to result in any major breakthrough towards peace negotiations.

Russia-US: Tit-for-tat asset-seizure risks will remain elevated for US, European businesses. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on 23 May allowing the seizure of assets, securities and property belonging to the US and US citizens in Russia. The decree aims to retaliate against a US presidential order signed in April that allowed the confiscation of USD 5 billion worth of Russian state assets in the US. It also comes shortly after a Russian court ordered the seizure of USD 700 million in assets belonging to three Western banks, the largest seizure since the start of the war in Ukraine. This intensification of Russian policy likely aims to deter Western countries from using the Russian Central Bank’s frozen assets to frustrate Russia’s efforts in the ongoing war in Ukraine. On 24-25 May, G7 finance ministers will discuss Washington DC’s proposal to issue loans backed by Russian frozen assets to support Ukraine. We assess that any agreement to proceed with such a measure will highly likely prompt Russia to intensify its efforts to confiscate US and European assets.
May 23.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have likely retaken Robotyne, which was the only sizeable settlement Ukrainian forces managed to take during their 2023 counter-offensive
• SUMY: Russian forces are likely concentrating under-resourced units along the Sumy oblast border; this is likely aimed at forcing Ukraine to screen the border, though limited cross-border operations are possible this summer
• NUCLEAR: Russian forces have started tactical nuclear weapons exercises close to Ukraine; these likely form part of a strategic deterrence campaign designed to influence Western decision makers and to deter support for Ukraine
• FORECAST: President Volodymyr Zelensky is set to ask NATO to help Ukraine to intercept Russian missiles over Ukraine, similar to when the UK and the US helped Israel to intercept Iranian strikes in April; however, this remains unlikely in the short term
• BAKHMUT: On 22 May, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had retaken Klishchiivka, a highly contested town located around four miles (6km) south-west of Bakhmut. Russian forces originally took Klishchiivka in January 2023, before Ukrainian forces retook the settlement in September 2023 during their counter-offensive. Geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces are in control of the majority of the town, though we cannot confirm whether Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from its western sectors. In any case, it remains likely that Russian forces are advancing in this direction, which will exacerbate pressure on Ukrainian forces defending Chasiv Yar to the north-west. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 22 May indicates that Ukrainian forces have successfully retaken some tactical positions on the eastern outskirts of the eastern microdistrict of Chasiv Yar. However, such counter-attacks will likely be limited as Russian pressure remains heightened in this sector. Nevertheless, Russian progress has slowed over the last few weeks.
• DONETSK: On 21 May, the Ukrainian General Staff stressed that Russian offensive operations in the direction of Pokrovsk (located to the north-west of Avdiivka) have intensified, forcing Ukrainian forces to ‘manoeuvre’. While it remains unclear what precisely these ‘manoeuvres’ involve, the reports possibly point to tactical redeployments and a rotation of forces to contain Russian assaults. Over the past 24 hours, Ukrainian troops have repelled around 25 assaults in this direction, according to the General Staff. Pokrovsk is an important logistical hub located to the north-west of Avdiivka, which Russia likely seeks to capture in the coming weeks or months. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 21 May shows Russian troops advancing south-west of Novomykhailivka and in eastern Paraskoviivka, both located to the south-west of Donetsk city.
• KHARKIV: On 20 May, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the situation in northern Kharkiv has been stable for around a week, but that the operation has drawn almost all attention away from Russian operations in the Donbas. Over the last week, the rate of Russian advances has slowed notably, with only small advances confirmed in recent days in central Vovchansk and to the north of Lyptsi, located north-east and north of Kharkiv city, respectively. Ukrainian sources reported on 22 May that elements of the 7th Motorised Rifle Regiment were withdrawn from offensive operations near Lyptsi for reconstitution, indicating a possible pause in operations as Russian forces prepare for ‘phase two’ of the operation. To that end, Ukrainian forces have also indicated that the size of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces has increased to around 40,000 personnel in the region, though sizeable elements remain in reserve in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts; these will possibly be committed to support phase two. For an analysis of the possible phases of the Kharkiv operation, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 20 May 2024.
• KHARKIV: On 21 May a Ukrainian soldier operating in Kharkiv oblast claimed that Russian forces have deployed ‘African mercenaries’ along the northern Kharkiv front. It is unclear what ‘African mercenaries’ he was referring to, though we previously mentioned unconfirmed reports that elements of the Russian Africa Corps were planning to deploy to the Kharkiv sector. On 20 May, Ukrainian sources also shared unconfirmed reports that Africa Corps elements were operating to the north of Lyptsi, though we cannot confirm this at present. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 18 April 2024.
• KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 21 May shows Russian advances to the south-east of Makiivka, itself located to the north-west of Kreminna. Overall, Russian operations remained on trend along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline, with little confirmed gains made in the sector.
• SOUTHERN: It remains likely that Russian forces have now taken the entirety of Robotyne, a highly contested settlement along the Zaporizhzhia line that was the only significant settlement Ukrainian forces managed to retake during their 2023 counter-offensive. Geolocated footage from 20 May confirms that Ukrainian forces are now striking Russian positions in the north of the town. Russian sources have since claimed that their forces have made further advances northwards along this sector, though this cannot be confirmed at present.
• SUMY: Ukrainian sources indicate that Russian forces are concentrating under-resourced units along the international border with Sumy oblast in north-eastern Ukraine. Reports from a Ukrainian brigade commander near the area from 20 May indicate that Russian forces massing in this direction are limited. They are therefore likely aimed at forcing the Ukrainians to screen the border and to redeploy reinforcements, rather than preparing for a major offensive operation. Other estimates place the force massing in Kursk oblast (Russia) at between 9,000 and 10,000 personnel, including Chechen units and three under-staffed motorised rifle regiments, eight motorised rifle, tank and infantry battalions and one airborne (VDV) battalion. We previously assessed that supplementary offensive operations across the international border into Sumy are possible this summer as part of a bid to support other diversionary operations in northern Kharkiv and to stretch the Ukrainian frontline even further.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia’s strikes have mostly entailed drone attacks, underscoring what we assess are Russian efforts to replenish missile stockpiles. Ukraine’s rate of intercepting these drones remains high. Overnight on 20-21 May, Ukraine’s air defences destroyed 28 of 29 Shahed 136/131 drones launched by Russia. The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were intercepted over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. Early on 22 March, Ukrainian forces intercepted 24 Russian-launched Shahed-131/136 drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s national energy operator, reported that the strikes damaged Sumy’s power supply infrastructure, leaving Sumy city without electricity. On the morning of 22 May, engineers partially restored the electricity supply.
• STRIKES: On 22 May, the authorities in Belgorod oblast (Russia) reported that a Ukrainian drone hit an electric train near Belgorod city. Russia’s MoD reported that the oblast was also targeted earlier on 23 May by a large-scale Ukrainian rocket and drone attack. The MoD’s statements mention that air defences intercepted three Vilkha MLRS rockets, 32 Vampire MLRS rockets and three drones.
• STRIKES: In our previous update, we reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian minesweeper in the port of Sevastopol (occupied Crimea) on 19 May. However, satellite imagery from 20 May indicates that the damaged asset was the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) Tsyklon vessel, a small missile ship capable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles. The attack likely involved the combination of a drone strike and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACM) missiles. The Tsyklon is one of Russia’s four Kalibr-capable Karakurt-class vessels operating in the Black Sea, where it has been deployed since 2022. In addition, two of these vessels were transferred to the Caspian Sea, while one was seriously damaged by a Ukrainian attack in November 2023. As such, the attack against the Tsyklon underscores Kyiv’s efforts to degrade Russia’s missile-launching naval platforms.
• STRIKES: In response to Kyiv’s persistent strikes targeting BSF vessels in Crimea, Russia has relocated the majority of the BSF’s major surface vessels to Novorossiysk port in Krasnodar krai (Russia) in recent months. This largely removes Russia’s naval missile carriers from the range of Ukrainian missile strikes. That said, strikes from Novorossiysk, which is farther from Ukrainian targets as compared to Crimea, will increase the response time for Ukrainian air defences, likely facilitating the interception of naval-launched missiles.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has explained that Kyiv did not want to invite Russia to attend a peace summit in Switzerland on 15-16 June to avoid Moscow derailing the event. In an interview with Reuters on 20 May, Zelensky insisted that the agenda of the peace summit cannot be in Russia’s favour given that it is Russia that is waging war against Ukraine. Zelensky disclosed that Moscow will be involved (via intermediaries) at a later stage, which in itself is a notable acknowledgement on the part of the Ukrainians. However, as the event aims to promote Ukraine’s conditions for peace, we assess that the prospects of Russia’s meaningful participation at the upcoming summit in June are very limited.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Zelensky also stated that discussions with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin are currently impossible given what he claimed is Putin’s desire to destroy Ukraine. Ultimately, Zelensky’s statements reaffirm our ongoing assessment that neither side is prepared to enter into negotiations in the near term. Kyiv will almost certainly remain highly sceptical of Russia’s willingness and ability to participate in talks to end the war in good faith in the coming months.
• APPROPRIATIONS: EU member states formally adopted a plan on 21 May to use the windfall profits generated from frozen Russian central bank assets for Ukraine’s benefit. The assets themselves remain untouched, with only the interest and profit earned being appropriated. The overwhelming majority of the proceeds (90%) will be transferred into an EU-run fund for military assistance for Kyiv. Meanwhile, the remaining 10% will go towards restoring and reconstructing Ukraine. Ukraine is expected to receive the first tranche in July; the EU expects that the assets will generate around EUR 15-20 billion (USD 16.30-21.70 billion) in profits by 2027.
• APPROPRIATIONS: G7 finance ministers and central bank governors are meeting in Stresa (Italy) on 23-25 May; the issue of how to utilise frozen Russian assets will be on the agenda. Ministers are reportedly trying to agree on a plan to use the assets that would give Ukraine enough funds to meet its medium-term military and civilian needs. While EU progress on using Russian assets will possibly incentivise the G7 to reach a consensus in the near term, credible concerns over Russian retaliatory appropriations will highly likely continue in the coming months.
• NUCLEAR: On 21 May, Russia’s MoD announced the start of tactical nuclear weapons exercises close to Ukraine. The MoD stated that the drills are being held in the Southern Military District (which borders and includes annexed Ukrainian regions) without specifying the exact location. The first phase of the exercises (aimed at testing the readiness of personnel and equipment in response to perceived threats from the West) involved Iskandr and Kinzhal ballistic missiles. The drills are almost certainly part of an ongoing Russian deterrence campaign aimed at influencing Western decision makers. However, the exercises are highly unlikely to reflect a change in Russia’s nuclear weapons posture or plans by Moscow to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
• EU: Reports emerged on 21 May that EU officials are pushing to begin formal negotiations on Ukraine’s bid to join the bloc in June. According to sources familiar with the matter, the goal is to start negotiations as early as 25 June; diplomats are reportedly working to persuade the Hungarian government to approve the opening of accession talks. The sources disclosed that both the bloc and Kyiv are engaging with Budapest to address concerns about the rights of Hungarian minorities in Ukraine. Although Ukraine is highly unlikely to become an EU member for the foreseeable future, Hungary is likely to be the main obstacle along Kyiv’s path towards joining the bloc.
• CHINA: On 22 May, UK Defence Minister Grant Shapps claimed that UK and US defence intelligence agencies are in possession of evidence that China is now providing (or will provide) Russia with lethal aid for use in Ukraine. Shapps did not offer evidence to support his statement but pointed to a 64% increase in trade between the two countries since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. However, a spike in mutual trade is not necessarily indicative of Chinese plans (or a lack thereof) to send lethal aid to Russia; it therefore remains unclear what intelligence the UK has acquired.
• CHINA: Later on 22 May, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan appeared to distance himself from Shapps’ comments. Sullivan instead stated that his country had not seen evidence to date of China directly providing such assistance to Russia. As it is ultimately unknown what evidence Shapps was citing, the veracity of his claims remains uncertain. Nevertheless, we assess that the Chinese government remains unlikely to dispatch (openly) lethal aid to Russia in the near term given the credible sanctions risks such a move would entail. However, efforts to circumvent sanctions and indirectly supply Russia’s war effort remain much more likely.
• TAXES: Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko disclosed on 22 May that the Ukrainian budget lacks USD 5 billion for military expenditure, raising the prospect of tax hikes. Forbes Ukraine reported earlier on 23 May (citing insiders familiar with the matter) that the Ukrainian government will possibly increase VAT and the military levy. A 1% VAT increase would possibly generate over USD 1 billion in additional annual revenue. In addition, a hike in the military levy from 1.5% to 5% for salaried employees would possibly bring in up to USD 2.5 billion. A corresponding bill on the matter will reportedly possibly be submitted to the parliament in late June or early July; the changes will possibly enter into force as early as September if the legislation is approved quickly.
FORECAST
AID: In June, President Volodymyr Zelensky is reportedly planning to attend a D-Day commemoration in France and a G7 meeting in Italy, where he is expected to ask NATO to shoot down Russian projectiles that target Ukraine. According to a report from Politico on 22 May, Zelensky will request for help to intercept Russian missiles in a similar manner to when the UK and the US helped Israel to intercept Iranian retaliatory strikes in April. At that time, we outlined several reasons why this could not be replicated for Ukraine, such as the size of the country compared to Israel and Ukraine’s lack of air superiority (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 15 April 2024). Our assessment has not changed; it remains highly unlikely that major countries such as France, the UK and the US will agree to Zelensky’s request in the short term.
Polish foreign ministry spokesperson Paweł Wroński nevertheless disclosed on 22 May that Warsaw is reviewing the technical and legal aspects of using its air defences to shoot down Russian missiles over Ukrainian territory. Wroński stated that no final decisions have yet been made on the matter, but noted that Ukraine had approached Poland. Warsaw is one of the more hawkish supporters of Kyiv within NATO and is the most likely state of Ukraine’s neighbours (which include Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) to step up support. If Poland were to shoot down Russian projectiles over Ukraine, this would highly likely aid in the interception of strikes over western Ukrainian territory. We assess that the capital Kyiv, as well as other regions in central Ukraine and/or those closer to the frontline, would likely remain at risk, depending on the range of Polish air defences.
Meanwhile, debates are ongoing among US officials about allowing Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike targets inside de jure Russian territory. Notably, the New York Times (NYT) reported on 22 May that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is urging President Joe Biden to lift restrictions on how Ukrainian forces can use US-supplied weapons to strike targets in Russia. Meanwhile, US House Speaker Mike Johnson appeared to support enabling Ukraine to strike targets in Russia using US-supplied weapons. Johnson argued on 22 May that Washington DC should allow Kyiv to prosecute the war as it sees fit, indicating possible bipartisan support in the House of Representatives on this issue. While certain US officials are possibly increasingly in favour of allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided arms in this way, the ultimate decision rests with Biden. A policy revision is therefore unlikely in the coming weeks. However, this could change in the coming months on the back of the UK’s decision effectively to green light the use of its weapons (namely Storm Shadow cruise missiles) against Russia.
May 20.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• KHARKIV: Russian forces continue to advance in northern Kharkiv oblast, with President Vladimir Putin stating that Moscow does not have immediate plans to take Kharkiv city, which is likely accurate
• STRIKES: Ukraine successfully intercepted a series of Russian drones launched over the past few days, while also increasing the tempo of its own drone attacks across Russian-occupied territory
• NATO: Some member states are considering sending military instructors to Ukraine to train Ukrainian forces; Russia will highly likely seek to deter this, increasing the risk of possible hybrid deterrence operations
• FORECAST: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s first presidential term nominally comes to an end on 20 May, which Russian information operations are almost certain to exploit in a bid to undermine his legitimacy
• BAKHMUT: Between 17 and 19 May, Russian forces launched a series of mechanised assaults against the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar (located due west of Bakhmut) where they have achieved some modest advances. While Ukrainian forces repelled the majority of the attacks, geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces have advanced into the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar’s eastern microdistrict, which is located on the eastern side of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal. Russian forces have broadly slowed their operations around Chasiv Yar since April, making very little progress despite a high tempo of glide bomb attacks. The timing of the latest attack likely seeks to take advantage of the ongoing operation in northern Kharkiv, which we assess aims to draw off Ukrainian forces and reserves in order to facilitate possible Russian advances elsewhere across eastern Ukraine – possibly including Chasiv Yar.
• DONETSK: In recent days, the pace of Russia’s offensive operations around Avdiivka has slowed down, resulting in limited advances. Geolocated footage from 17 and 18 May shows marginal Russian advances to the east of Yasnobrodivka and south-west of Solovyove, two settlements located west and north-west of Avdiivka, respectively. Meanwhile, footage posted on 19 May shows Russian forces advancing south-west of Marinka and in eastern Paraskoviivka, located to the south-west of Donetsk City. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on 19 May that intense fighting continues around Krasnohorivka, situated to the west of Donetsk city. We assess that the Russian command possibly aims to reach Kurakhivka, located around 7.5 miles (12km) west of Krasnohorivka. This would allow Russian forces to cut off Kurakhove (located to the west of Donetsk city and Krasnohorivka) from important logistical routes.
• KHARKIV: On 17 May, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the Russian objective in northern Kharkiv oblast is to establish a ‘sanitary’ buffer zone; this aligns with our earlier assessment. Putin stated that Russian forces have no immediate plans to capture Kharkiv city, which also aligns with our assessment. While Kharkiv city almost certainly represents a longer-term war goal for Moscow, the current operation in northern Kharkiv oblast is highly likely relatively limited. Supporting this assessment, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe Christopher Cavoli stated on 16 May that Russian forces in Kharkiv do not have sufficient personnel to achieve a ‘strategic breakthrough’.
• KHARKIV: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 17 May that Russian forces have only reached the first of three Ukrainian defensive lines in Kharkiv, the last of which Zelensky described as the ‘most powerful’. Zelensky and the Ukrainian General Staff have reiterated in recent days that the situation on this axis has stabilised. Zelensky has acknowledged that Russian forces have advanced up to six miles (10km) deep on this axis, while Commander in Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on 17 May that Russian forces have ‘expanded the zone of hostilities’ by almost 43 miles (70km) in Kharkiv. Geolocated footage has confirmed further Russian advances over the last few days, including the seizure of the town of Lukyantsi on 15 May, located four miles (7km) north-east of Lyptsi. Russian forces have since advanced south to within a few hundred metres of Lyptsi, which is likely the main tactical objective for Russian forces on the west (right) bank of the Siverskyi-Donets River during the first phase of the operation – Vovchansk being the principal objective of those forces on the east (left) bank of the Siverskyi-Donets.
• KHARKIV: The Washington Post reported on 17 May that Russian forces utilised sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) capabilities during the initial phase of the operation in northern Kharkiv, which resulted in Ukrainian units losing connections to drones and communications systems. According to Ukrainian personnel operating at the front, Russian EW jamming successfully disrupted Ukrainian forces’ connection to the internet via Starlink terminals. This is seemingly the first time Russian forces have been able to deprive Ukrainian forces completely of access to Starlink since the start of the invasion; it therefore represents a notable evolution and advantage in Russian EW capabilities.
• KHARKIV: President Zelensky nevertheless stated on 18 May that Russian forces are likely preparing for the ‘second phase’ of their offensive in northern Kharkiv. In the meantime, Russian forces are almost certainly prioritising the seize of the border city of Vovchansk, located over 32 miles (50km) north-east of Kharkiv city. They have maintained a very intense tempo of glide bomb attacks as ground forces slowly advance towards the centre of the town. Russian forces are likely keeping forces in reserve on this axis to support a second phase of the operation, which could aim at expanding the so-called ‘sanitary’ buffer zone along the border and bring Kharkiv city into tube artillery range – this would in turn significantly increase the vulnerability of the city to Russian attacks.
• KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Russian sources have largely refuted the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD)’s claim on 15 May that Russian forces have taken Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). There is no evidence at present to indicate that Russian forces are in control of the entire settlement, which has remained heavily contested for months. Instead, geolocated footage from 17 May indicates that Russian forces have advanced into the northern sectors of Robotyne, where Ukrainian forces are likely still operating.
• STRIKES: Ukraine successfully intercepted a series of daily Russian drone launches over the past few days. On 18 May, Ukrainian forces destroyed 13 Russian-launched Shahed-136/131 drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Vinnytsia oblasts. Overnight on 18-19 May, Ukrainian air defences intercepted 37 Shahed-136/131 drones over Cherkasy, Kherson Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. Earlier on 20 May, Ukrainian forces also shot down 29 Shahed drones over Lviv, Poltava, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued to launch large-scale strikes targeting oil and military infrastructure in Russia and occupied Crimea in recent days. Russia’s MoD reported that its forces destroyed 123 Ukrainian drones over Crimea and Krasnodar Krai and 25 naval drones in the Black Sea overnight on 16-17 May. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukraine launched 140 aerial drones and 20 naval drones. Ukrainian media outlets reported that the attack targeted military facilities in Novorossiysk and Tuapse in Krasnodar Krai and occupied Sevastopol (Crimea), respectively. This marks the largest Ukrainian aerial drone attack since the start of the war, underscoring Kyiv’s growing domestic drone production capabilities.
• STRIKES: Russia’s MoD reported that air defences intercepted 61 Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and nine Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) missiles on 19 May. The MoD stated that 57 UAVs were intercepted over Krasnodar Krai; the remaining drones were destroyed over Belgorod oblast. The missiles reportedly targeted Russian-annexed Crimea.
• STRIKES: The drone attack in Krasnodar Krai reportedly damaged the Slavyansk oil refinery, which subsequently suspended its operations. Ukrainian media, quoting Ukrainian intelligence sources, stated that the drones hit the Kushchyovskaya airfield in Krasnodar Krai, which typically houses Su-34, Su-25, Su-27 and MiG-29 aircraft; the intelligence sources claimed the strike damaged several unspecified aircraft. Ukrainian forces previously struck the refinery at the end of April and in March, as well as the Kushchyovskaya airfield in April. Footage posted by Russian milbloggers shows that Ukrainian drones also targeted the port of Novorossiysk, where Russia has deployed most of its Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels to remove them from Ukraine’s striking range.
• STRIKES: A prominent Russian milblogger reported that the ATACMS missiles were intercepted near Sevastopol and the Belbek airfield. The milblogger also stated that the attack struck a vessel in Sevastopol port. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that its forces struck a Kovrovets Natya-class minesweeper belonging to the BSF. However, it remains uncertain whether the vessel was located in the port of Sevastopol or in that of Novorossiysk.
• STRIKES: On the same day, a Ukrainian media outlet reported blasts at the Vyborg oil depot in Leningrad oblast that were caused by three explosive devices. The media outlet claimed that military intelligence (GUR) reportedly orchestrated the attack, while geolocated footage shows that a fire erupted at the facility on 18 May. The Leningrad authorities denied reports of damage to the facility.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NATO: Reports emerged on 16 May that some NATO member states are considering sending military instructors to Ukraine to train Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian officials reportedly asked their US and NATO partners to help train some 150,000 new recruits closer to the frontline so as to expediate their deployment. The US has so far refused to do so due to the risk of Russia targeting instructors.
• NATO: However, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas stated in an interview published on 20 May that NATO allies should not worry about drawing the military alliance into a war with Russia simply through sending instructors to Ukraine. Kallas claimed there are countries that are training soldiers on the ground in Ukraine already at their own risk without providing specifics. She assessed that a Russian attack against these troops would not automatically trigger Article 5 – a clause declaring that an armed attack on one NATO member is an attack against the whole alliance.
• NATO: Any such action would almost certainly divide NATO given the differing risk thresholds within the alliance, meaning a bloc-wide consensus on the matter remains highly unlikely in the short term. However, a coalition of the willing comprising more hawkish members (such as the Baltic states, France, Poland and the UK) will possibly emerge. This would possibly result in the deployment of instructors in the coming months. Nevertheless, Russia would almost certainly consider the presence of NATO trainers as confirmation of the military bloc’s growing involvement in the war, increasing the likelihood of Russian deterrence and hybrid operations in a bid to prevent such deployments.
• AID: Kyiv has reportedly requested the US to help it identify targets in Russia that Ukrainian forces can strike using their own weapons. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on 17 May, citing US and defence officials, that Ukraine also asked Washington DC to allow it to use US-provided weapons to hit military targets inside Russia. The outlet claimed that US officials were reviewing the request; an unspecified White House spokesperson stated that the US’ current policy does not condone providing such assistance to enable attacks inside Russia.
• AID: On 16 May, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated that the US has not changed its position on the matter and that Ukraine cannot use US-supplied weapons to hit targets inside de jure Russian territory. Despite growing pressure, Washington DC is unlikely to change its policy on this issue in the immediate term (nor is it likely to aid in identifying possible targets for Ukrainian strikes) due to concerns that this would increase the risk of escalation with Moscow. European partners, meanwhile, are much more likely to approve such measures, with the UK already having effectively approved the use of British-supplied weapons to strike targets on Russian soil.
• ENERGY: Ukraine will enforce hourly energy shutdowns for industrial and household users across all regions on 20 May from 1800hrs to 0000hrs (local time). Critical infrastructure facilities will not be impacted by the restrictions, according to Ukraine’s national power grid operator, Ukrenergo. The operator explained earlier on 20 May that the main reason for the outages is large-scale Russian strikes against Ukrainian power plants, noting that the attacks have damaged all major thermal and hydroelectric power plants. The facilities are therefore unable to generate as much electricity as before, meaning scheduled restrictions are highly likely to stabilise energy supplies in the near term.
• MOBILISATION: On 18 May, new legislation in Ukraine tightening mobilisation took effect. The Ukrainian foreign ministry also lifted a temporary ban on men aged 18-60 abroad accessing consular services. However, men in this age bracket must provide evidence that they are registered with a military enlistment office to access such services, including the renewal of passports.
• MOBILISATION: According to a Ukrainian lawyer, the updated legislation on mobilisation does not specify where military summons can be served in Ukraine, meaning they can be issued anywhere. Local self-government representatives, as well as heads of enterprises, institutions and organisations, are empowered to hand out summonses, though they must have permission from the military enlistment office. On 18 May, long-haul truckers partially blocked the Kyiv-Odesa highway in Odesa oblast to protest against the mobilisation bill; we assess that low-level domestic unrest in parts of Ukraine is possible in the coming days.
FORECAST
On 20 May, President Zelensky’s first presidential term nominally comes to an end, which Russian information operations are almost certain to exploit in a bid to undermine his legitimacy in the coming months. The Ukrainian constitution precludes elections being held under martial law. As such, scheduled presidential elections due on 31 March have been postponed indefinitely.
Dring a visit to Harbin (China) on 17 May, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated narratives that the current Ukrainian government ‘has its origins’ in a Western-backed coup that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych during the 2014 Euromaidan movement. Putin expressly stated that Ukraine must determine whether Zelensky is considered Ukraine’s legitimate president after 20 May. Ultimately, such rhetoric aligns closely with one of Russia’s key war goals in Ukraine: ‘de-nazificiation’. We assess that this can be seen as Russian code for regime change. Despite setbacks on the battlefield over the last two and half years, it remains highly unlikely that Moscow has abandoned this goal; it will highly likely seek to exploit hybrid and information operation capabilities to undermine Zelensky’s political position so as to set conditions for further destabilisation.
Ukrainian Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence (GUR) Vadym Skibitskyi already assessed on 2 May that Russian efforts to undermine Zelensky’s legitimacy form part of a three-fold strategy to destabilise Ukraine and set the conditions for a military and political victory. Skibitskyi stated that Russian propagandists have been preparing the ground for an intensification of information operations this month known as ‘Maidan 3’ (referring to the previous Maidan Revolution). The key aim of ‘Maidan 3’ is to delegitimise Zelensky. Crucially, it remains our assessment that this Russian information operation is not only aimed at domestic Ukrainian audiences, but also Western audiences that have an increasingly important role in influencing Western governments’ Ukraine policies in the run-up to key elections, including both the European Parliament elections in June and the US presidential election in November.
Zelensky’s approval ratings remain very high, with 65% of respondents to a Rating Group poll in February saying they do not support holding an election during wartime, confirming Zelensky’s legitimacy in the eyes of most Ukrainians. Polling published in early April by the International Republican Institute found that 63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelensky, though this has ultimately declined since his almost universal approval rating of 94% in April 2022 shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion.
Zelensky’s approval rating and support is likely to remain high over the short-to-medium term, though the issue of politics has already started to return to Kyiv as some people begin to question Ukraine’s political future if the war protracts indefinitely. The dismissal of former Commander in Chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi in early 2024 and political infighting in the run-up to Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal highlighted how internal power struggles have the potential to impact the national debate (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 4 December 2023). However, despite nascent political debates, we assess that Zelensky would highly likely win an election if it were held now, and that a serious challenge to his leadership is unlikely to materialise in 2024. However, if Donald Trump wins the November presidential election and US support for Ukraine rapidly reduces, Kyiv will likely face growing international pressure to consider a controversial peace agreement; Zelensky would subsequently likely face growing political pressure in 2025. As such, it remains likely that Zelensky will face increasing challenges domestically as the war protracts; while this is unlikely to jeopardise his position in the short-to-medium term, it will remain a key factor in Ukraine’s government stability during the next phase of the war.
*Russia: Asset seizure risks will increase for European businesses in coming months. Reports from 18 May indicate that a Russian court ordered the seizure of USD 700m worth of assets belonging to three Western banks: Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and UniCredit. These banks were guarantor lenders for the proposed construction of a gas processing plant in Russia, a project conducted by the German multinational Linde and the Russian Gazprom subsidiary RusChemAlliance. The project ended due to Western sanctions, leading RusChemAlliance to initiate legal action that resulted in the Russian court’s seizure order. This is the largest seizure ordered by Moscow since the start of the war in Ukraine and comes as the US is increasingly pressuring EU countries to issue a loan to Ukraine backed by frozen Russian assets ahead of the June G7 summit. However, it is currently uncertain as to whether EU countries will unanimously agree to such a measure. While a growing number of EU countries support the initiative, Hungary would likely veto such a move. Meanwhile, Moscow will likely intensify seizures of Western-owned assets to deter EU countries from agreeing to Washington DC’s proposal.
May 17.
*Russia-China: Joint presidential statement seeks to strengthen ‘no limits’ partnership. On 16 May, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping signed a joint statement proclaiming a ‘new era’ of co-operation between their two countries. The leaders insisted that Moscow and Beijing are determined to oppose any attempts to interfere with the development of Russian-Chinese ties and efforts aimed at limiting the countries’ economic, technological or foreign policy potential. The statement heavily condemned the US while attempting to portray Russia and China as key players in an ‘emerging multipolar world order’. Elsewhere, the statement declared that the two states will further deepen trust and co-operation in their military ties, including expanding the scope of joint exercises and combat training, as well as economic and industrial co-operation. Putin and Xi declared a ‘no limits’ partnership in February 2022 before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The recent statement has almost certainly sought to reinforce this relationship; we assess that it likely signals a deepening of the two countries’ co-operation and mutual reinforcement of their efforts to counter Western interests. (Source: Sibylline)

24 May 24. Biden Administration Announces New Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a significant new security assistance package to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s fifty-eighth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021 using Presidential Drawdown Authorities. It is the fifth security assistance package the President has authorized since signing the national security supplemental last month, and the third package the President has using Presidential Drawdown Authorities. This Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package, which is part of our efforts to help Ukraine repel Russia’s assault near Kharkiv, has an estimated value of $275 million. It will provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent battlefield needs, such as: additional precision strike rockets for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); artillery rounds; air-launched munitions; and anti-tank weapons.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

Ammunition for HIMARS;
155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
60mm mortar rounds;
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
Precision aerial munitions;
Small arms and additional rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades;
Demolitions munitions;
Anti-armor mines;
Tactical vehicles to recover equipment;
Helmets, body armor, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment; and
Spare parts, maintenance, and other ancillary equipment.

The United States will continue to work together with some 50 Allies and partners to ensure Ukraine’s brave defenders receive the critical capabilities needed to fight Russian aggression.

(Source: U.S. DoD)

25 May 24. Zelenskiy says Ukrainian forces now control area where Russia pushed into Kharkiv region. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Friday that Ukrainian forces had secured “combat control” of areas where Russian troops staged an incursion this month in northern parts of Kharkiv region.

“Our soldiers have now managed to take combat control of the border area where the Russian occupiers entered,” Zelenskiy said in his nightly video address.

Zelenskiy’s comments, after holding a meeting of military and regional officials in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city, appeared to be at variance with comments by Russian officials.

Viktor Vodolatskiy, a member of Russia’s State Duma lower house of parliament, was quoted by Tass news agency as saying Russian forces controlled more than half the territory of the town of Vovchansk, 5 km (three miles) inside the border.

Vodolatskiy was quoted as saying that once Vovchansk was secured, Russian forces would target three cities in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region — Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and Pokrovsk.

Reuters was unable to verify independently battlefield accounts from either side.

Russian forces pushed into border regions of Ukraine’s Kharkiv region this month and Russia’s Defence Ministry said they had secured control of about 12 settlements.

Zelenskiy and other Ukrainian officials had been reporting success in “stabilising” the area.

The Ukrainian military’s General Staff, in its evening report on Friday said the situation in Vovchansk was “tense but controlled by the defence forces”.

“The Russian army today launched air terror against this town — eight guided bombs hit the town,” it said. Attacks were launched on at least two other settlements north of Kharkiv.

A late-night report by the General Staff said Ukrainian forces had repelled 10 Russian attacks in the area, including around Vovchansk.

It also noted Russian forces had achieved “partial success” in areas near Kupiansk, further east in Kharkiv region, and the Pokrovsk sector where heavy fighting has been taking place further south in Donetsk region.

Ukrainian military bloggers said Ukrainian troops had been holding their ground around Vovchansk and Russian forces were using less infantry in the area and instead firing from a distance, with limited accuracy. (Source: Reuters)

24 May 24. Viktor Orbán’s Hungary is holding up legislation that would enable Ukraine to receive up to €2bn for weapons from the EU, in a blow to efforts to mobilise profits from Russian assets frozen under sanctions. After months of debate, EU countries this month agreed to use profits arising from about €190bn stuck in Belgian central securities depository Euroclear to buy weapons for Ukraine. But Hungary’s envoy has objected to fast-tracking payments by forgoing a requirement for unanimous EU27 backing for each disbursement to Ukraine, said five people briefed on a meeting of EU ambassadors on Wednesday. “For the time being they are blocking everything connected to the military support to Ukraine,” said one of the people, suggesting Budapest’s reservations would remain until at least next month’s European elections. Orbán has long argued that the west cannot win the war in Ukraine, and Hungary has held up numerous European decisions relating to the conflict. But Budapest has ultimately relented under diplomatic pressure from the EU and Washington, including over a €50bn aid package to Kyiv. To secure an agreement over using profits from frozen Russian assets, EU officials offered Hungary a deal whereby their share of the Brussels funds would not be used to purchase weapons for Ukraine, a second person said. That convinced Budapest not to veto the scheme but it is holding up the implementation of the terms by failing to back the necessary legislation. Budapest is not opposed in principle but has concerns about making payments automatic, said people familiar with its thinking. (Source: FT.com)

24 May 24. US-supplied Himars ‘completely ineffective’ as Russia jams skies with new tech.

Ukraine forced to stop using many arms supplied by the West because of Putin’s electronic warfare strategy

Himars rocket launchers supplied to Ukraine by the US have been left “completely ineffective” because of Russian electronic jamming systems.

The launchers, which are capable of firing US-made rockets up to 50 miles at Russian targets, are among the casualties of an electronic warfare strategy used by Vladimir Putin’s forces.

A confidential Ukrainian weapons assessment, obtained by The Washington Post, found that Ukraine has been forced to stop using many of the arms supplied by the West because of problems with targeting.

They includes the Excalibur GPS-guided artillery shells, which are no longer able to fire reliably at targets.

The Russian jamming system operates from the ground, projecting a “cone” of interference into the sky that prevents weapons from communicating with satellites to guide them towards targets.

The assessment said that Ukraine stopped using the Excalibur shells last year after the weapon “lost its potential” and effectiveness fell to just 10 per cent.

The Himars system, hailed early in the war for its ability to destroy targets with a single shot, has now become “completely ineffective,” according to one Ukrainian military source.

“The Russians deployed electronic warfare, disabled satellite signals, and Himars became completely ineffective,” they said.

The Pentagon and weapons manufacturers are now understood to be looking for a fix that would allow the systems to avoid Russian jamming.

A Ukrainian Defence Ministry spokesman told The Washington Post: “We work closely with the Pentagon on such matters. In the event of technical problems, we promptly inform our partners to take the necessary measures to solve them in a timely manner.

“Our partners from the USA and other Western countries provide constant support for our requests. In particular, we regularly receive recommendations to improve the equipment.”

Other systems, including the Storm Shadow missile and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) are less susceptible to jamming.

It comes after Russia successfully disrupted the Starlink satellite network, run by a company owned by Elon Musk, which Ukrainian troops rely on for connection to the internet.

Ukrainian forces have experienced outages on the front line in recent weeks as Moscow has stepped up its electronic warfare operations.

Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s digital minister, said in an interview this week that Starlink had previously been resistant to Russian jamming, but that its technology appeared to have become more sophisticated.

He said Putin’s forces had been “testing different mechanisms to disrupt the quality of Starlink connections” using “powerful” electronic weapons.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

24 May 24. Putin wants Ukraine ceasefire on current frontlines.
• Summary
• Russian sources indicate Putin ready to halt conflict at front
• Putin to take more land to pressure Kyiv to talk: sources
• Does not want another national mobilisation: sources
• Putin has no designs on NATO territory: sources
• Russia concerned about nuclear escalation: sources
Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready to halt the war in Ukraine with a negotiated ceasefire that recognises the current battlefield lines, four Russian sources told Reuters, saying he is prepared to fight on if Kyiv and the West do not respond.
Three of the sources, familiar with discussions in Putin’s entourage, said the veteran Russian leader had expressed frustration to a small group of advisers about what he views as Western-backed attempts to stymie negotiations and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s decision to rule out talks.
“Putin can fight for as long as it takes, but Putin is also ready for a ceasefire – to freeze the war,” said another of the four, a senior Russian source who has worked with Putin and has knowledge of top level conversations in the Kremlin.
He, like the others cited in this story, spoke on condition of anonymity given the matter’s sensitivity.
For this account, Reuters spoke to a total of five people who work with or have worked with Putin at a senior level in the political and business worlds. The fifth source did not comment on freezing the war at the current frontlines.
Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov, in response to a request for comment, said the Kremlin chief had repeatedly made clear Russia was open to dialogue to achieve its goals, saying the country did not want “eternal war.”
Ukraine’s foreign and defence ministries did not respond to questions.
The appointment last week of economist Andrei Belousov as Russia’s defence minister was seen by some Western military and political analysts as placing the Russian economy on a permanent war footing in order to win a protracted conflict.
It followed sustained battlefield pressure and territorial advances by Russia in recent weeks.
However, the sources said that Putin, re-elected in March for a new six-year term, would rather use Russia’s current momentum to put the war behind him. They did not directly comment on the new defence minister.
Based on their knowledge of conversations in the upper ranks of the Kremlin, two of the sources said Putin was of the view that gains in the war so far were enough to sell a victory to the Russian people.
Europe’s biggest ground conflict since World War Two has cost tens of thousands of lives on both sides and led to sweeping Western sanctions on Russia’s economy.
Three sources said Putin understood any dramatic new advances would require another nationwide mobilisation, which he didn’t want, with one source, who knows the Russian president, saying his popularity dipped after the first mobilisation in September 2022.
The national call up spooked part of the population in Russia, triggering hundreds of thousands of draft age men to leave the country. Polls showed Putin’s popularity falling by several points.
Peskov said Russia had no need for mobilisation and was instead recruiting volunteer contractors to the armed forces.
The prospect of a ceasefire, or even peace talks, currently seems remote.
Zelenskiy has repeatedly said peace on Putin’s terms is a non-starter. He has vowed to retake lost territory, including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. He signed a decree in 2022 that formally declared any talks with Putin “impossible.”
One of the sources predicted no agreement could happen while Zelenskiy was in power, unless Russia bypassed him and struck a deal with Washington. However, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, speaking in Kyiv last week, told reporters he did not believe Putin was interested in serious negotiations.
SWISS TALKS
Ukraine is preparing for talks hosted by Switzerland next month aimed at unifying international opinion on how to end the war. The talks were convened at the initiative of Zelenskiy who has said Putin should not attend. Switzerland has not invited Russia.
Moscow has said the talks are not credible without it being there. Ukraine and Switzerland want Russian allies including China to attend.
Speaking in China on May 17, Putin said Ukraine may use the Swiss talks to get a broader group of countries to back Zelenskiy’s demand for a total Russian withdrawal, which Putin said would be an imposed condition rather than a serious peace negotiation.
The Swiss foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
“We are ready for discussion. We never refused,” Putin said in China.
The Kremlin says it does not comment on the progress of what it calls its special military operation in Ukraine, but has repeatedly said Moscow is open to the idea of talks based on “the new realities on the ground.”
In response to questions for this story, a U.S. State Department spokesperson said any initiative for peace must respect Ukraine’s “territorial integrity, within its internationally recognised borders” and described Russia as the sole obstacle to peace in Ukraine.
“The Kremlin has yet to demonstrate any meaningful interest in ending its war, quite the opposite,” the spokesperson said.
In the past, Kyiv has dismissed Russia’s purported readiness to talk as an attempt to shift the blame onto it for the war.
Kyiv says Putin, whose team repeatedly denied he was planning a war before invading Ukraine in 2022, cannot be trusted to honour any deal.
Both Russia and Ukraine have also said they fear the other side would use any ceasefire to re-arm.
Kyiv and its Western backers are banking on a $61 billion U.S. aid package and additional European military aid to reverse what Zelenskiy described to Reuters this week as “one of the most difficult moments” of the full scale war.
As well as shortages of ammunition after U.S. delays in approving the package, Ukraine has admitted it is struggling to recruit enough troops and last month lowered the age for men who can be drafted to 25 from 27.
TERRITORY
Putin’s insistence on locking in any battlefield gains in a deal is non-negotiable, all of the sources suggested.
Putin would, however, be ready to settle for what land he has now and freeze the conflict at the current front lines, four of the sources said.
“Putin will say that we won, that NATO attacked us and we kept our sovereignty, that we have a land corridor to Crimea, which is true,” one of them said, giving their own analysis.
Freezing the conflict along current lines would leave Russia in possession of substantial chunks of four Ukrainian regions he formally incorporated into Russia in September 2022, but without full control of any of them.
Such an arrangement would fall short of the goals Moscow set for itself at the time, when it said the four of Ukraine’s regions – Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson – now belonged to it in their entirety.
Peskov said that there could be no question of handing back the four regions which were now permanently part of Russia according to its own constitution.
Another factor playing into the Kremlin chief’s view that the war should end is that the longer it drags on, the more battle-hardened veterans return to Russia, dissatisfied with post-war job and income prospects, potentially creating tensions in society, said one of the sources, who has worked with Putin.
‘RUSSIA WILL PUSH FURTHER’
In February, three Russian sources told Reuters the United States rejected a previous Putin suggestion of a ceasefire to freeze the war.
In the absence of a ceasefire, Putin wants to take as much territory as possible to ratchet up pressure on Ukraine while seeking to exploit unexpected opportunities to acquire more, three of the sources said.
Russian forces control around 18% of Ukraine and this month thrust into the northeastern region of Kharkiv.
Putin is counting on Russia’s large population compared to Ukraine to sustain superior manpower even without a mobilisation, bolstered by unusually generous pay packets for those who sign up.
“Russia will push further,” the source who has worked with Putin said.
Putin will slowly conquer territories until Zelenskiy comes up with an offer to stop, the person said, saying the Russian leader had expressed the view to aides that the West would not provide enough weapons, sapping Ukraine’s morale.
U.S. and European leaders have said they will stand by Ukraine until its security sovereignty is guaranteed. NATO countries and allies say they are trying to accelerate deliveries of weapons.
“Russia could end the war at any time by withdrawing its forces from Ukraine, instead of continuing to launch brutal attacks against Ukraine’s cities, ports, and people every day,” the State Department said in response to a question about weapons supplies.
All five sources said Putin had told advisers he had no designs on NATO territory, reflecting his public comments on the matter. Two of the sources cited Russian concerns about the growing danger of escalation with the West, including nuclear escalation, over the Ukraine standoff.
The State Department said the United States had not adjusted its nuclear posture, nor seen any sign that Russia was preparing to use a nuclear weapon.
“We continue to monitor the strategic environment and remain ready,” the spokesperson said. (Source: Reuters)

24 May 24. Babcock International Group (Babcock), the defence company, is strengthening its continued commitment to Ukraine’s military by establishing an in-country engineering facility that will deliver engineering support including repair and overhaul for Ukraine’s military vehicles. In partnership with Ukraine Defence Industries (UDI), Ukraine’s state-owned defence holding company, Babcock will ensure that critical military assets are available when and where they are needed most. Work is underway to establish this new capability and to help ensure that we are able to deliver even more military assets to service, enhancing Ukraine’s defence capabilities. Babcock already provides the maintenance, repair and asset management for the majority of the British Army’s vehicles and equipment and has been delivering technical and engineering support to Ukraine’s military from the wider region since July 2023.
Babcock Chief Executive Officer, David Lockwood said: “Getting military equipment and assets back to Ukrainian armed forces in the most efficient way possible is why we are making this in-country investment in an armoured vehicle engineering facility. This will enable even faster turn-around times on repair and restoration of critical military assets to the front line.”
Babcock established Babcock Ukraine in 2023 and is already supporting Ukrainian naval assets and training of the next generation of Ukrainian Air Force fighter jet pilots.

23 May 24. Ukraine’s long-range glide bomb blunted by Russian jamming. Russian jamming has kept many of Ukraine’s relatively new long-range GLSDB bombs from hitting their intended targets, three people familiar with the challenges told Reuters.
Ukraine over the last year sought weapons with longer ranges than the 43 miles (69 km) of U.S.-provided GMLRS rockets so Kyiv could attack and disrupt Russian supply lines and muster points.
To answer that call, Boeing Co (BA.N), opens new tab offered a new weapon to the Pentagon with a 100-mile (161-km) range, the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB). The glide-bomb has small wings that extend its reach, and it is comprised of the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) and the M26 rocket motor, both of which are common in U.S. inventories and relatively inexpensive.
But the GLSDB’s navigation system, which enables it to be steered around obstacles like mountains and known anti-air defenses, has been targeted by Russian jamming, the three people briefed on he matter said.
While Boeing has said the weapon can defeat some jamming, one of the sources said it would take Boeing months to fix.
Boeing and Ukrainian authorities did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The bomb is made jointly by SAAB AB (SAABb.ST), opens new tab and Boeing, and it was in development well before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Jamming happens when huge amounts of energy are broadcast into an area, overwhelming a device’s signal. Russia has used the tactic on Ukrainian radios, drones and even GPS-guidable Excalibur 155 millimeter artillery munitions.
Ukraine has been using GLSDBs since earlier this year and experts have noted that it has not performed well on the battlefield because of jamming.
Ukraine has also been using both short and long range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) which have a range up to 180 miles (300 km).
Jamming on the battlefield in Ukraine is “simply a reality, and numerous weapon systems have had to contend with these and other countermeasures,” said Tom Karako, a weapons expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“Whether such challenges are in turn countered with technical upgrades or simply alternative methods of employment, the utility of long range fires is going to persist.” (Source: Reuters)

23 May 24. Russian forces may have seized first Estonian ground robot in Ukraine. Two years after a Russian defense industry think tank announced a cash reward for the seizure of an Estonian-made unmanned ground vehicle operating in Ukraine, Russian forces appear to have captured one of the robots, according to analysts and photos posted on social media.
Earlier this month, Russian Telegram channels published pictures of what they claimed showed a badly damaged model of the THeMIS vehicle, made by Estonia-based and United Arab Emirates-owned Milrem Robotics.
A Milrem spokesman declined to comment, saying only that the company is aware of the images.
Federico Borsari, a fellow at the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis think tank, told Defense News the pictured vehicle “very much resembles” the THeMIS model. “There is also a visible part of the printed Ukrainian flag on the upper right front corner, confirming this was one of the systems provided to Kyiv.”
The Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) said in 2022 that any military personnel capable of capturing a THeMIS robot would get one million rubles, or roughly $11,000.
In February of this year, the reward was upped to two million rubles, or almost $22,000, according to a statement given by the center’s director, Ruslan Pukhov, to Russian media.
Regarding the implications of Moscow getting its hands on a vehicle, Borsari says the technology isn’t particularly sensitive. Still, there are some risks, he added.
“Accessing Western technology can certainly be useful as it offers Russia alternative ideas or concepts on the engineering and design, and most importantly access to the type of sensors and communications-encryption technologies the system uses,” Borsari said.
Although most manufacturers have mechanisms in place to prevent technology theft, the retrieval of any sophisticated components could allow for Russia to attempt to develop “tailored countermeasures or simply improve its own systems,” he added.
The analyst noted that in the event that there was encrypted data or stored information found in the vehicle’s systems, this could pose an immediate threat to the Ukrainian operators by potentially revealing their location.
“A big, immediate risk could be Russia trying to exploit encryption info or other stored data, provided there is any, to breach Ukrainian secure communications or track Ukrainian operators and strike their location,” Borsari said.
As of February, Milrem had provided 15 THeMIS unmanned vehicles to Ukraine, according to a Jan. 11 company statement. Company executives have said the robots are popular for demining and cargo transport missions in the embattled country.
The company announced May 23 that it was increasing its production capacity fivefold with the addition of new facility next to the company headquarters in Tallinn, Estonia. The new space is expected to pump out 500 THeMIS units per year, officials said.
(Source: Defense News)

22 May 24. Sweden plans $7bn more military support for Ukraine to 2026. The Swedish government has agreed on additional military support to Ukraine totalling 75bn crowns ($7.01bn) over three years, it said on Wednesday. The minority government said military support under the framework agreed with its supporting party could include donations of defence equipment, financial contributions and financial support for the procurement of defence gear.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on X the decision “demonstrates Sweden’s practical solidarity with Ukraine in our struggle for freedom”.
The 75bn crowns will be equally divided over the three years. Including the proposed addition, Sweden’s total planned military and other support to Ukraine will amount to over 100 billion crowns.
“To strengthen the Swedish support to Ukraine, and increase the long-term perspective, the government and the Sweden Democrats have agreed to introduce a framework for the military support to Ukraine for the years 2024–2026,” the government said.
It said the framework agreement may weigh on the Nordic country’s public finances beyond 2026.
Ukraine’s Defence Minister Rustem Umerov said Swedish-made weapons had “already proven themselves on the battlefield”.
“Archers and CV-90s help Ukrainian defenders drive the enemy out of our land,” he said on X. ($1 = 10.6914 Swedish crowns) (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Reuters)

23 May 24. Blinken backs plan to allow US missiles to be fired into Russia. The US Secretary of State is reportedly backing a plan to allow US missiles donated to Ukraine to be fired into Russia
Anthony Blinken is pushing for strict White House rules to be relaxed following a visit to Kyiv last week in the wake of a new invasion from the northern border, the New York Times reported.
Joe Biden has argued that US weapons used inside Russia would be seen as a major escalation in Moscow. Britain has relaxed its rules in recent weeks. But the US has come under pressure to adapt its policy, particularly after Russian troops and military equipment gathered openly on the border before launching its latest attack north of Kharkiv on May 10. Volodymyr Zelensky has been arguing for weeks that the US must change its rules to save Ukraine from another major assault on Kyiv.
“This is part of our defense,” Mr. Zelensky told The New York Times. “How can we protect ourselves from these attacks? This is the only way.”
(Source: Daily Telegraph)

23 May 24. Identifying radiological sources with one wag of a tail. Equipped with the D3S ID, eight dogs in Ukraine are helping to enhance early-warning capabilities in radiation detection and identification, providing troops with the information they need to keep themselves and their canine companions safe.
Kromek’s radiation detectors have been mounted on drones, UAVs, vehicles, and now, dogs. Eight dogs equipped with D3S IDs have been deployed in Ukraine, supplying troops with key early warning capabilities in radiation detection and identification. The real-time isotope ID and gamma and neutron alerts allow handlers and their canine companions to respond rapidly to the radiological or nuclear threat at hand and keep themselves safe in high-risk environments.
Staying safe amidst radiological and nuclear threats in Ukraine
Early warning capabilities are essential for supplying rapid, reliable data to inform preventative action. Such innovations in radiation detection are necessary to avoid repeats of Chernobyl 1986 and Fukushima 2011.
Risks to nuclear security are of ever-present concern globally, but are especially significant with the ongoing geopolitical unrest in Ukraine. With Ukraine’s prolific nuclear industry and fighting in such close proximity to reactors, such an early warning capability is imperative to safeguard its people and infrastructure; avoiding a repeat of catastrophic events and its severe short and long-term consequences.
A D3S ID is a dog’s best friend
Facilitating the implementation of early warning capability in high-risk environments is Kromek’s versatile portfolio of high-performance radiation detectors.
Kromek’s radiation detectors have been mounted on drones, UAVs, vehicles, and now, dogs.
Eight dogs equipped with D3S ID radiation detectors, the size of mobile phones, have just been deployed in Ukraine.
This innovative solution significantly enhances the early warning capabilities of those protecting and monitoring the field, delivering real-time isotopic ID along with gamma and neutron alerts to users, enabling troops to take the appropriate responses rapidly to the radiological threat at hand. Widespread situational awareness is supported by spectral data made available from large focal areas, four times faster than the RIID standard.
Handlers and their canine companions are kept as safe as possible, with the high sensitivity of the D3S ID ensuring even the lowest levels of radiation don’t go undetected. The dogs on patrol can immediately be moved from danger when the distanced handler receives a real-time alert from the detector on their paired mobile phone.

21 May 24. Ukrainian Missiles Destroy Russian Black Sea Fleet Minesweeper. A Ukrainian missile strike has reportedly destroyed the Russian minesweeper Kovrovets in occupied Crimea, according to Ukraine’s military. While the Ukrainian Navy did not specify the details of the attack, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that US Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) were used.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense shared a photo of the Kovrovets in a targeting sight on X (formerly Twitter), captioned, “Another bad day for the Russian Black Sea Fleet.”
The US supplied Ukraine with ATACMS missiles, which are mobile surface-to-surface missile systems with a range of up to 190 miles, in April after persistent requests from Kyiv. Ukraine first utilized these missiles three weeks ago, targeting various locations in occupied Donbas and Crimea, including logistics bases, troop centers, and airfields.
Russia’s Ministry of Defense denied that the minesweeper had been destroyed, asserting that their air-defense systems intercepted all incoming missiles.
“By air-defense duty systems, nine ATACMS operational-tactical missiles and one drone were destroyed over the territory of the Republic of Crimea,” stated the Russian Ministry of Defense.
The reported sinking of the Kovrovets adds to the mounting pressure on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which has faced substantial losses since the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Ukrainian forces have managed to sink or severely damage over a dozen of the Black Sea Fleet’s original complement of around three dozen large warships. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

21 May 24. War of resources in Ukraine central to Future Artillery 2024. At Future Artillery 2024 conference in Paris, counter-battery fire and survivability have a prominent role in discussions, reflecting a war of resources in Ukraine.
Speaking on changes and continuity for artillery following from the Ukraine War, Oliver Fort, artillery marketing director at KNDS, bore witness to artillery warfare as a war of resources, in an address to the Future Artillery 2024 conference in Paris on 21 May.
Fort emphasised the need for sustainable and cost-effective solutions, discussing the evolution of artillery systems and the importance of optimising ammunition supply and logistics.
“So it’s a war of resources. That is, for me, the overarching theme. As a war of resources, it’s so explained to us that every little duel is a part of the bigger game, and very often what they consider is that the Western equipment is too expensive compared to the Russian equipment,” said Fort.
At the conference this year, counter-battery fire and survivability held an unusually prominent position in discussions, reflecting technological and tactical advances spurring the attention, and the reality of a prolonged and highly attritional military conflict on Nato’s Eastern Flank.
Fort highlights a major advance in the modern state of counter-battery fire; it is no longer directed by counter battery radar, but instead by Uncrewed Arial Vehicles (UAV) or loitering munitions. The prevalence, utility and significance of these systems poses a problem of resources for commanders seeking to neutralise the drones with conventional anti-aircraft and air defence systems. “Whenever you have, for example, the Lancet [UAV], that can you can destroy with a SHORAD missile that cost €1m – while the lancet is €30,000. Yes, you have destroyed the UAV, but in the long-run you may not be able to sustain the war over many years.”
Fort did identify an alternative with a lower cost in resources than anti-aircraft and air defence systems. The use of a decoy, worth €20,000, compares favourably when employed against more expensive drones systems. “We have worked with a company in the Czech Republic that does decoys, and they do decoys that are cheap enough, because they are cheaper than the Lancet. But, I know that there are decoys that are more expensive than the Lancet. Anytime you put [out] a decoy try to make it not more expensive than the enemy ammunition.” (Source: army-technology.com)

20 May 24. Austin Underscores Unity Among US-led Ukraine Defense Coalition Amid Russian Offensive. The U.S.-led coalition backing Ukraine will not waver in the face of Russia’s recently launched offensive, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said today.
The nearly 50-nation-strong Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which convened virtually today during what Austin called a “challenging moment for Ukraine,” remains laser-focused on arming Ukraine with critical capabilities as Russian President Vladimir Putin attempts to capture new ground in Ukraine’s northeast near Kharkiv.
Ukrainian defense leaders briefed the coalition during the meeting on defensive operations across the frontlines.
Ukraine’s forces are in a “hard fight,” Austin said, against Russian invaders who are “obliterating Ukrainian villages, killing innocent civilians and bombarding civilian infrastructure, including dams and power plants.”
But he said Russian troops are also paying a high cost for Putin’s aggression.
“Ukraine is fighting for its life — which gives it the huge strategic advantage of a just cause,” he said. “Meanwhile, Putin is trying to wage a 19th-century war of imperial aggression in the world of 2024. That’s a terrible idea and a terrible strategy.”
Ukraine’s air defense was a central topic during today’s meeting, noting Russia’s continued barrage of air attacks.
We’ll continue to push to ensure that Ukraine owns its skies — and can defend its citizens and its civilian infrastructure — far from the frontlines. … The United States and our allies and partners worldwide remain laser-focused on Ukraine’s near-term requirements in Kharkiv and elsewhere.”
Earlier this month, the U.S. announced a $400m security assistance package for Ukraine containing critical air defense and artillery munitions to meet Ukraine’s top priority requirements.
The latest package was in addition to $7bn in U.S. military assistance provided to Ukraine following Congress’ passage of President Joe Biden’s national security supplemental budget request in April.
Collectively, the nations comprising the UDCG have committed more than $95 bn in security assistance to meet Ukraine’s most pressing needs since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., who also briefed reporters at the Pentagon following the meeting of the contact group, said the coalition’s support is not “merely an act of solidarity,” but a “strategic necessity that reinforces broader international security.”
“If unchecked, Russian aggression could embolden other authoritarian regimes to challenge international norms and violate the sovereignty of their neighbors,” he said. “This highlights the importance of a robust and unified response.”
Austin said that the U.S. and its allies and partners will keep pushing to find “swift solutions” to arm Ukraine.
In addition to discussions focused on Ukraine’s near-term requirements, the coalition also focused on ensuring the country can defend itself for the long term.
The UDCG has undertaken initiatives aimed at bolstering Ukraine’s long-term defense through the formation of targeted capability coalitions.
Thirteen members of the contact group are leading eight separate capability coalitions designed to drive Ukraine’s long-term force development. Those coalitions focus on critical capabilities ranging from air defense to artillery.
Today’s meeting of the UDCG included updates from the maritime and integrated air-and-missile defense coalitions.
Taken together, the capabilities are “providing a sturdy, flexible structure to meet Ukraine’s security requirements over the long haul,” Austin said.
Austin and Brown said the U.S. and its allies remain united in their commitment to Ukraine’s enduring security.
“The outcome in Ukraine is crucial for European security, for global security and for American security,” Austin said. “None of us would want to live in a world where dictators redraw borders by force and launch wars of aggression to try to revive yesterday’s empires.
“So let me be clear, Ukraine’s partners are united,” he said. “We’re determined. And we’re not going anywhere.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

20 May 24. Czech ammunition buy for Ukraine nears first delivery, faces headwinds. Three months after kickstarting a bulk ammunition purchase for Ukraine, Czech officials share divergent assessments of how it’s going.
“The Czech-led initiative to fund and procure urgently artillery ammo for Ukraine is progressing steadily – the first 180,000 shells have been contracted and should arrive by June,” František Šulc, the first Deputy Minister of Defense of the Czech Republic told Defense News during the IDEB defense fair, held here May 14-16.
Prague is actively engaged with partner nations to secure additional financial resources and ensure a “steady supply of ammunition” to Ukraine in the coming months, Šulc added.
However, not all officials appear to share the same optimistic view of the state of the audacious proposal, which entails of sourcing much-needed 122mm and 155mm artillery shells on the global market.
In a recent interview with the German news service Tagesschau, Czech President Petr Pavel said the initiative was not advancing as rapidly as envisaged partly due to the Russian government knowing details of the operation.
“The more people know about the initiative, the more competition there is – on the one hand it was necessary to make it public to gain the support of other countries, but on the other we also revealed our cards, which Russia is of course now exploiting,” Pavel said.
“This is another reason why the initiative is not progressing as quickly as we would have liked,” he added.
Navigating the fine line between transparency and discreetness has been challenging for Kyiv’s allies. Throughout the war in Ukraine, some have struggled with reconciling concerns over revealing too much of their plans to Moscow with being as accountable as possible.
There have also been growing worries about the possibility of Russia intercepting operational details of Ukraine-related procurement efforts since the leak of a German Air Force teleconference about possibly sending Taurus cruise missiles to Kyiv.
According to Šulc, more than 16 European Union and NATO countries have joined the ammunition initiative and contributed money. The group is now working through coordination snags, especially with procuring from non-European vendors.
“One of the challenges is the need to source products outside the European defense industry due to time constraints – this necessitates negotiating with partner nations for sufficient funding and navigating regulatory environments in third countries,” Šulc said.
Meeting the security and specific requirements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is also “very time consuming,” he added.
Slovakia, host of the arms fair Šulc was visiting last week, has declined to join the initiative, though citizens here organized a private fundraiser campaign raising $1.6m in donations.
Šulc said his government respects nations’ decisions to partake or not. But, he added, “It is essential to convey the urgency of the situation in Ukraine and the critical need for support.” (Source: Defense News)

17 May 24. Russia says US ‘playing with fire’ in ‘indirect war’ with Moscow. A top Russian diplomat said on Friday the United States had long since entered into a state of indirect war with Moscow and was playing with fire over Ukraine by behaving in such a way that the situation could spin out of control.
The comments by deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov in an interview with state TASS news agency reflect growing Russian concern over what Moscow casts as dangerous Western escalation in Ukraine as Russian forces advance in several places.
“We warn that they are playing with fire. They have long been in a state of indirect war with the Russian Federation,” Ryabkov told TASS, referring to the United States.
“They somehow fail to realise that, in order to satisfy their own geopolitical ideas, they are approaching a phase in which it will be very difficult to control what is happening and to prevent a dramatic crisis.”
Ukraine and the West accuse Russia of waging an unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine aimed at seizing land. Moscow says what it calls its “special military operation”, launched in February 2022, is defensive and aimed at bolstering Russian security against a hostile West.
Russia has interpreted recent comments from Western diplomats as an aggressive shift in position and the Russian defence ministry said this month that President Vladimir Putin had ordered drills to rehearse using tactical nuclear weapons in what officials said was a response to Western rhetoric.
British Foreign Secretary David Cameron, during a visit to Kyiv on May 3, said Ukraine had a right to use the weapons provided by Britain to strike targets inside Russia, and that it was up to Kyiv whether or not to do so.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken made similar comments about U.S.-supplied weapons during a visit on Wednesday to Kyiv, where he accused Putin of “ramping up yet another offensive against Ukraine” in the east.
Blinken said Washington had “not encouraged or enabled strikes outside of Ukraine, but ultimately Ukraine has to make decisions for itself about how it’s going to conduct this war.”
Ukraine has targeted military and energy targets across Russia, which is bombarding targets inside Ukraine in attacks that have killed thousands of civilians, to try to degrade Moscow’s military capacities. (Source: Reuters)

17 May 24. Ukrainian strike on Crimea airbase destroys three Russian warplanes, satellite firm says. A long-range Ukrainian strike on the Moscow-controlled Belbek airbase in occupied Crimea destroyed three Russian warplanes and a fuel facility near its main runway this week, U.S. commercial satellite company Maxar said.
The company cited satellite imagery taken on Thursday as showing that two MiG-31 fighter jets and an Su-27 fighter jet had been destroyed. It said one MiG-29 fighter aircraft also appeared to have been damaged.
Ukraine has not publicly claimed responsibility for striking the airbase.
The Russian defence ministry said on Thursday that Ukraine had staged an overnight attack on Crimea and that its air defence forces had intercepted five long-range missiles known as ATACMS.
On Wednesday, it said Russia had intercepted 10 long-range ATACMS also launched at Crimea. It did not report any damage to military facilities in either attack.
Ukraine has increasingly resorted to using long-range drones and missiles to strike strategic targets far behind the front line, including in Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula which Russian troops seized and annexed in 2014. (Source: Reuters)

17 May 24. German minister: Ukraine needs long-range weapons to defend Kharkiv. Ukraine needs more long-range weapons to fight off Russian advances in the northern Kharkiv region where the situation around the country’s second-largest city remains “highly dramatic”, Germany’s foreign minister said on Friday.
Russian forces have made inroads of at least several kilometres in the region in recent days, forcing Kyiv’s outmanned troops to try to hold the line on a new front as Moscow mounts more pressure on the front in the east.
It is important to cut off Russian supply routes and give Ukraine weapons “that can be used over medium and long distances,” Annalena Baerbock said on the sidelines of a meeting of the foreign ministers in Strasbourg.
“We are also working with other partners on this.” Overall, it is an “extremely difficult situation,” she added.
Germany has become Ukraine’s second-biggest supplier of weapons since the Russian invasion in 2022 but Chancellor Olaf Scholz has so far balked at equipping Kyiv with long-range Taurus missiles. (Source: Reuters)

17 May 24. Germany, Slovakia work to extend repair hub for Ukraine beyond 2024. Negotiations are underway between the German and Slovak governments to extend the lease of a KNDS repair hub in Slovakia for German- and French-made combat vehicles damaged in Ukraine, according to the manufacturer.
In 2022, the Franco-German joint venture KNDS, formed by defense companies Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Nexter, established a Slovakia base to perform rapid maintenance on vehicles donated to Ukraine.
While the initial lease was expected to expire at the end of this year, as it was always intended to be a temporary infrastructure, government officials and industry executives are now working to prolong activities at the site.
“The parties involved in this project have all shown a willingness to continue operating this base beyond 2024 and negotiations are ongoing on this matter to see how to go about doing this,” a KNDS executive told Defense News at the IDEB defense fair here.
Since becoming operational in December 2022, the hub has served as a strategic location for patching up Ukraine’s KMW and Nexter-provided vehicles, which make their way to Slovakia by trucks.
These include the self-propelled howitzers PzH 2000, CAESAR wheeled howitzers, Dingo armored transport vehicles and more. According to a company press release, six vehicles can be serviced simultaneously in the 800 square meters area.
The future of the repair base, much as Slovakia’s military support to Ukraine, has been uncertain over the last few months.
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Bratislava has been an important supplier of military equipment to the embattled country, having provided a dozen of MiG-29A fighter jets, air-to-air missiles, ammunition and more.
However, since the election of pro-Russian Prime Minister Robert Fico in October, Slovakia’s stance on arming Ukraine has been somewhat ambiguous, given that the politician had pledged to end military support during his campaign.
“We are not changing that we are prepared to help Ukraine in a humanitarian way… We are prepared to help the reconstruction of the state, but you know our opinion on arming Ukraine,” he told reporters after his election victory.
Since then, the leader has tempered his initial anti-Ukraine rhetoric and has allowed defense industry cooperation between Slovak and Ukrainian companies to continue.
A vehicle-maintenance facility also exists in Lithuania, where damaged Leopard 2 A6 and A5 tanks used in Ukraine are repaired by Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture set up two years ago between Rheinmetall and KMW.
Under the current contract, the maintenance operations there are expected to continue until the end of this year. (Source: Defense News)

19 May 24. Ukraine Modifies Soviet-Made SA-8 Air Defense Systems to Fire R-73 Missiles Following Delays in Military Aid. To meet the need for more air defense systems in the face of numerous air attacks by Russian forces and delays in military aid from Europe and the United States, Ukrainian forces have reportedly adapted their 9K33M Osa (Sa-8B) Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems to fire R-73 Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs). This innovative modification, revealed through a picture shared on X Account OSINTtechnical on May 18, 2024, signifies a strategic enhancement of Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The SA-8 Gecko, also known by its Russian designation 9K33 Osa, is a highly mobile, short-range, tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM) system developed by the Soviet Union. The system can engage aircraft, helicopters, and drones to provide air defense for ground forces. It is mounted on an amphibious, wheeled vehicle, making it highly maneuverable across various terrains.
Initially, it was equipped with 9M33 missiles housed in canisters, capable of engaging targets at altitudes up to 5 km and ranges up to 10 km. The system features an integrated radar for target acquisition and tracking, enabling autonomous operation without the need for external radar support. It can operate in various weather conditions and is equipped for rapid deployment and redeployment. Typically, the SA-8 is operated by a crew of four, including the driver, commander, gunner, and radar operator.
According to the image, each modified SA-8 Osa system now holds a pair of rail-launched R-73 missiles, replacing the standard canisterized 9M33 missiles. The R-73, known for its high maneuverability and infrared homing capabilities, is originally part of the Ukrainian Air Force’s arsenal, typically deployed by fighter aircraft.
The R-73, known by its NATO reporting name AA-11 Archer, is a highly maneuverable, short-range, air-to-air missile developed by the Soviet Union and later Russia. It was introduced into service in the early 1980s and remains used today. The R-73 is designed to engage enemy aircraft in close combat and is renowned for its agility and advanced infrared homing capabilities.
Key characteristics of the R-73 include its ability to lock onto targets after launch (LOAL), allowing it to engage highly maneuverable and fast-moving aerial targets. The missile has a thrust-vectoring system, which enhances its maneuverability, making it highly effective in dogfights. It has an operational range of up to 30 kilometers and can engage targets at altitudes from 500 meters to 20 kilometers. The R-73 is equipped with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead and an infrared seeker, providing all-aspect targeting capability, allowing it to strike targets from any angle.
The R-73 can be mounted on various aircraft, including fighters and interceptors, and is compatible with helmet-mounted sight systems. This enables pilots to target enemy aircraft simply by looking at them, making the R-73 a formidable weapon in short-range aerial engagements.
The integration of R-73 AAMs into the Osa platforms is a strategic move that showcases the resourcefulness of Ukrainian forces. By utilizing existing military assets, they are bolstering their air defense systems. This adaptation could potentially enhance the effectiveness of Ukraine’s short-range air defense, providing a versatile and mobile solution against aerial threats. (Source: Google/https://armyrecognition.com/)

16 May 24. US announces $2bn to help Ukraine make its own weapons. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Wednesday announced a $2bn aid package for Ukraine largely intended to help the embattled country grow its indigenous defense capabilities and move away from Soviet-era equipment. The $2bn in Ukraine Foreign Military Financing mostly comes from the $60bn economic and security aid for Kyiv Congress passed in April after months of delays. The State Department said the $2bn will be used to establish a Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program.
Blinken, during a trip to Kyiv, said the new fund would “assist Ukraine in acquiring” additional weapons while “investing in Ukraine’s defense industrial base, helping to strengthen even more its capacity to produce what it needs for itself but also to produce for others.”
“Finally, using this fund [will] help Ukraine purchase military equipment from other countries, not just the United States, for Ukraine’s use,” he added.
Most U.S. Foreign Military Financing in previous Ukraine aid packages has gone to eastern European countries supporting Kyiv in its war effort against Russia’s invasion. The $2 bn tranche is the largest amount of Foreign Military Financing the U.S. has ever given Ukraine.
Foreign Military Financing is cash assistance the State Department gives to friendly countries to allow them to purchase military equipment from U.S. defense contractors. Israel and Taiwan are the only two recipients who have previously been granted permission to use some Foreign Military Financing on their own defense companies through a special mechanism called offshore procurement.
The State Department said the $2bin Foreign Military Financing for Ukraine “may also facilitate co-production between Ukrainian and U.S. industry and help support Ukraine’s defense industrial base to strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to produce weapons to defend itself.”
The Biden administration scaled up an effort to help Ukraine build defense equipment on its soil in December with the Commerce Department hosting a U.S.-Ukraine defense-industrial base conference.
Lockheed Martin and RTX, formerly Raytheon Technologies, signed a memorandum of understanding in September to produce Javelin anti-tank missiles in Ukraine.
Most U.S. assistance has come in the form of arms transfers from existing U.S. weapons stockpiles and through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which allows the Pentagon to place contracts on additional weapons systems for Kyiv.
But the Biden administration has not allowed Kyiv to use long-range U.S. weapons to strike military assets in Russian territory, citing escalatory risks. The U.K. recently reversed a similar restriction on Ukraine’s use of long-range British weapons.
Those restrictions do not apply to Kyiv’s indigenous capabilities. For instance, Ukraine has used its own drones to strike Russian oil facilities — drawing protests from the Biden administration.
A group of Ukrainian parliamentarians visited Washington this week in a bid to get the U.S. to lift its ban on using American weapons to strike inside Russia, Politico reported Tuesday. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)

17 May 24. Top NATO Commander Says Russia’s New Offensive Won’t Succeed. General Christopher Cavoli, NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, stated on Thursday that Russia’s ongoing offensive in Ukraine lacks the capacity for a strategic breakthrough. Cavoli asserted that Russia does not have the necessary numbers, skill, or capability to achieve significant strategic gains, although they can still make local advances.
Cavoli’s remarks came after a meeting of NATO defense chiefs at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels. He emphasized that despite recent Russian attacks near Kharkiv, there is no evidence to suggest a full-scale summer offensive from Moscow. Cavoli noted the absence of large reserves being mobilized by Russia, indicating that the offensive might be losing momentum.
Following the approval of a $61bn military aid package for Ukraine by the U.S. Congress, Cavoli highlighted the extensive support being provided to Kyiv. This includes large quantities of ammunition, short-range air defense systems, and armored vehicles. He expressed confidence in the Ukrainian military’s ability to hold the line, supported by close cooperation with Ukrainian colleagues. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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