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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

May 16.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS :

  • KHARKIV: Russian forces continue to make tactical gains in northern Kharkiv oblast, though the overall tempo of operations has slowed in recent days
  • AID: US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced a ‘first of its kind’ USD 2bn defence enterprise fund for Ukraine
  • ESTONIA: Western troop deployments to Ukraine remain highly unlikely despite comments from the national security advisor to Estonia’s president over ‘non-direct combat rear roles’
  • FORECAST: A speech by the new Russian defence minister, Andrei Belousov, underscores Moscow’s commitment to maximising its military-industrial output and ‘technocratic’ approach to the war
  • BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage posted on 12 and 13 May indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal advances to the north-east and east of Chasiv Yar, though the pace of these advances remains extremely slow. Additionally, geolocated footage released on 12 May indicates that Ukrainian forces recently seized a Russian-held position in south-western Bohdanivka, located to the north-east of Chasiv Yar. A Ukrainian commander in Chasiv Yar reported that Russia is using ‘Storm B’ units alongside ‘Storm V’ units for infantry assaults.
  • DONETSK: On 14 May, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces advanced in unspecified locations towards Pokrovsk, located to the north-west of Avdiivka. Similarly, the General Staff also reported unspecified limited Russian advances in the direction of Kurakhove, a settlement located to the west of Donetsk city. Meanwhile, geolocated footage posted on 14 May indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Umanske, located to the west of Avdiivka. Additional footage from 15 May shows that Russian forces made limited advances within Kranohorivka, located to the south-west of Avdiivka.
  • KHARKIV: Russian forces have continued to make tactical gains in northern Kharkiv oblast since their offensive operation began on 10 May, though the overall tempo of the offensive has likely decreased. On 15 May, Dmytro Lazutkin, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian defence ministry, acknowledged that some Russian troops had entered the city of Vovchansk, located to the north-east of Kharkiv city, a focal point of the Russian offensive effort. Earlier on 16 May, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that fighting was ongoing in the northern portion of the city but also stated that the situation was under control. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian deputy head of the Lypetsk village military administration, Serhiy Kryvetchenko, stated on 14 May that Russian forces had entered numerous villages in the vicinity of Lukyantsi, located to the north of Lyptsi.
  • KHARKIV: Despite the decreasing tempo of Russian offensive operations, further advances remain likely as persistent shelling has reportedly complicated Ukrainian defences. Kharkiv oblast administration officials reported on 15 May that shelling by Russian forces has rendered the construction of a first line of defence at 1.8 to 3 miles (3-5km) from the international border ‘impossible’. As such, the first and second lines of defence are reportedly being built around 12 miles (20km) south of the international border.
  • KHARKIV: Nonetheless, we continue to assess that Russian operations in northern Kharkiv are geared primarily towards drawing Ukrainian forces away from critical sectors of the frontline, as well as possibly towards establishing a so-called ‘sanitary zone’ along the international border.
  • KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: The Russian news agency TASS reported that Ukrainian forces launched at least three Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) missiles at an industrial zone in Luhansk oblast. Ukrainian sources claimed the attack hit an ammunition depot in Sorokyne (Luhansk oblast), located around 81 miles (130km) from the frontline. The attack underscores Kyiv’s continued efforts to degrade Russian military logistics in Luhansk, which serves the purpose of impeding Russia’s offensive along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 14 May confirmed limited Russian advances south-east of Stelmakhivka, located to the north-west of Svatove.
  • SOUTHERN: On 16 May, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian General staff, Dmytro Lykhovii, denied a claim made by the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) on 15 May that Russian forces had seized full control of the town of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Lykhovii stated that Russian forces had attacked Ukrainian positions four times over the past day, but that no positions had been lost. Russian forces currently control most of the town. Furthermore, the Russian operation in northern Kharkiv will possibly place further strain on the remnants of Ukrainian-held portions of the town.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 13-14 May, Russian forces launched 18 Shahed-136/131 drones and one Iskander-M ballistic missile. Ukrainian forces intercepted all 18 drones over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The Russian strikes reportedly hit infrastructure facilities in Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk). Later on 15 May, Ukrainian forces reportedly intercepted a Kh-59/69 missile.
  • STRIKES: On 14 May, Ukrainian forces reportedly launched a drone strike against a railway line in Russia’s Volgograd oblast. The attack reportedly derailed a train transporting fuel, pointing to the ongoing success of Kyiv’s efforts to degrade Russian military transport facilities.
  • STRIKES: Russia’s MoD reported that its air defences intercepted ten Ukrainian-launched long-range ATACMS over Crimea on 15 May. Mikhail Razvozhayev, the Russian governor of annexed Crimea, stated that the missiles were intercepted over Sevastopol’s Belbek Airfield. Concurrently, the MoD stated that its air defences intercepted a drone over the Republic of Tatarstan. The attack prompted Russia’s Federal Air Transport Agency to suspend flight operations at Kazan International Airport (KZN) and Begishevo Airport (NBC) near Nizhnekamsk (Republic of Tatarstan). Earlier on 16 May, the MoD reported that Ukrainian forces carried out drone attacks against Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga and Tula oblasts (all Russia), as well as Crimea.
  • STRIKES: On 15 May, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that Washington DC has not ‘encouraged or enabled’ strikes against Russia. Blinken further explained that Ukraine ultimately decides ‘how it is going to conduct the war’. His statements come as Kyiv is pressing the US to lift its ban on the use of US-made weapons to strike Russian territory. Ukrainian officials stated that the ban prevented Ukrainian forces from launching pre-emptive strikes to undermine Russian preparations for the recent offensive into northern Kharkiv.
  • STRIKES: On 15 May, the US Helsinki Commission called on the US authorities to allow Kyiv to target Russian border areas amid the ongoing Russian offensive into northern Kharkiv. Similarly, at the start of May, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron stressed that Ukraine has the right to use UK-provided weapons to target Russian territory. However, we assess that Washington DC will remain reluctant to support such attacks in the short term due to concerns around escalation.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • ENERGY: On 15 May, Ukraine’s national power grid operator, Ukrenergo, announced power restriction schedules for industrial consumers on 16 May. Ukrenergo explained that the measures are necessary due to both a cold spell driving energy consumption and the impact of Russian attacks against Ukraine’s energy system. Rolling blackouts are also expected across the country on 16 May for household and industrial consumers, underscoring the persistent energy instability within Ukraine.
  • SANCTIONS: International media reported on 15 May that the US Treasury warned Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank that its access to the US financial system will possibly be curtailed due to its Russia dealings. Meanwhile, reports emerged on 14 May that France and the Netherlands are pushing for EU sanctions against any financial institution that helps the Russian military to pay for the necessary goods or technology for making weapons. The move would prohibit anyone in the EU from doing business with any global financial institution that the bloc has identified as having directly or indirectly aided the Russian military in obtaining dual-use goods and technologies.
  • SANCTIONS: Unspecified EU officials stated that the European Commission would likely co-ordinate such sanctions with the US. A co-ordinated approach would highly likely increase the incentive for banks to halt transactions benefiting the Russian military, as such a move would possibly disrupt access to US financial markets as well. Any such decision would almost certainly increase compliance and due diligence requirements for financial institutions. For our analysis on Western sanctions and their impact on Russia’s financial relations with other countries, see Sibylline Sanctions Quarterly Review – 16 April 2024.
  • DIPLOMACY: On 15 May, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky postponed all upcoming trips abroad amid the ongoing Russian offensive in Kharkiv. In a statement, Serhiy Nykyforov, Zelensky’s press secretary, implied that the Russian offensive was the reason for the cancellation. Nykyforov called for new dates to be arranged. Reports state that Zelensky was due to travel to Spain and Portugal. Spanish media reported on 13 May that the Ukrainian president was due to visit the Spanish capital Madrid in the coming days to sign a bilateral security agreement with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez.
  • AID: On 15 May, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a USD 2 billion fund designed to help Ukraine bolster its defence-industrial base. Blinken described the support as a ‘first-of-its-kind’ defence enterprise fund that would enhance Kyiv’s capacity to produce the equipment that it requires. The initiative would also enable Ukraine to use the funds to purchase arms from other countries, which would possibly increase the pool of weapons Kyiv is able to procure.
  • AID: Bloomberg reported that the US is considering sending another Patriot air defence battery (and radars) to Ukraine. The outlet reported that Ukraine’s European partners are also working to send additional air defence systems. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen assessed on 13 May that Ukraine needs another five or six Patriot systems from European allies. While an additional Patriot battery would moderately improve Ukrainian air defences, deficiencies in the quantity of air defence systems will likely remain a persistent concern for Ukraine in the coming months.
  • ESTONIA: The Estonian government is reportedly ‘seriously’ considering sending troops into western Ukraine to take on non-direct combat rear roles; this would hypothetically free up Ukrainian manpower for frontline fighting. In an interview with Breaking Defense published on 13 May, Madis Roll, Estonia’s national security advisor to the president, stated that discussions on the matter were ongoing. Roll did not offer further insight into what roles Estonian troops would assume. Nevertheless, Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur appeared to downplay Roll’s comments on 14 May, insisting that Tallinn will not act alone and that there is no Estonian initiative on the matter.
  • ESTONIA: Ukraine’s Western allies are highly unlikely to dispatch troops in such a capacity in the foreseeable future. Russia would almost certainly view such action as confirmation of NATO’s involvement in the war, which would in turn increase the risk of escalation between the bloc and Moscow. Varying levels of concern over the threat of a Russia-NATO confrontation are among the key factors that will prevent the open deployment of Western personnel to Ukraine in the coming months. For further analysis, please see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 29 February 2024.

FORECAST

RESHUFFLE: On 14 May, Russia’s incoming defence minister, Andrei Belousov, set out his priorities for the Russian MoD, underscoring Moscow’s commitment to maximising military-industrial output to sustain a long-term protracted war. Aligning with our previous forecast, Belousov stated that the MoD must optimise defence spending, acknowledging that it is already at 6.7% of GDP (though the real proportion is likely to be higher when taking into account informal revenue and expenditure). Belousov stated that his priorities are to equip the military with the key modern equipment required to achieve the objectives of the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine – a clear indication that the Kremlin’s war goals have not changed. He did, however, note that there is currently no need to discuss ‘emergency measures’ to achieve these objectives, including new rounds of mobilisation.

Belousov’s speech underlined his technocratic and economical approach to supporting Russia’s war machine, though wider developments underscore that factional infighting also likely played a role in Belousov replacing Sergei Shoigu. On 13 May, the Russian opposition media outlet Meduza, citing unnamed Russian government sources, claimed that Shoigu’s alleged criticism of Sergei Chemezov (the head of the state-owned defence conglomerate Rostec) for failing to provide sufficient modern weapons for the Russian military played a role in his dismissal from the MoD. While this remains unconfirmed, the allegation supports our earlier assessment that factional infighting between Shoigu’s and Chemezov’s factions were undermining military procurement efforts – the optimisation of which is almost certainly a principal reason for the government reshuffle.

If Meduza’s reports are accurate, they possibly indicate that Chemezov’s faction successfully lobbied Putin to curtail Shoigu’s influence. The resignation and dismissal of additional Shoigu affiliates in the MoD in recent days further supports this assessment – particularly the arrest of the deputy defence minister and head of the MoD’s personnel directorate, Yuri Kuznetsov, on 13 May. Nevertheless, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has confirmed that under his new role as Secretary of the Security Council, Shoigu will be a ‘curator’ of the Russian Military-Industrial Commission, but confirmed that he will not lead it. While Shoigu is likely to retain significant influence over Russia’s security policy in his new role, it is clear that his oversight over military-industrial production (and the opportunities for self-enrichment that this provides) has been severely curtailed.

On 14 May, the Kremlin also confirmed that Shoigu’s predecessor as Secretary of the Security Council, the hawkish Nikolai Patrushev, has been appointed as a presidential assistant overseeing the strategic development of the Russian shipbuilding sector, among ‘other areas’. This is likely to be seen as a demotion, given Patrushev no longer acts as Russia’s de facto National Security Advisor. However, the nature of Russia’s informal government and influence system means that an official’s formal title and role often bear little resemblance to their true jurisdiction or level of influence. As such, Patrushev now has direct access to Putin on a much more formal and regular basis; his ultra-hawkish position vis-à-vis the West is therefore likely to continue to influence Russian security and foreign policy heavily.

The former governor of Tula, Alexei Dyumin, has also been appointed as a presidential assistant, overseeing issues related to Russia’s military-industrial base and sports policy. Dyumin has emerged as a largely popular figure among various factions and within the military. His effective promotion will likely increase his influence over Kremlin policy and likely reflects Putin’s wider efforts to rebalance factional interests and promote figures who enjoy strong support to positions of influence within the military-industrial complex. For further analysis regarding the MoD reshuffle, see Sibylline Ukraine Report – 13 May 2024.

Europe: Baltic Region Will Remain A Key Russian Focus.

Key points

  • Russia has likely intensified grey zone and destabilisation operations in Europe as part of a wider deterrence campaign to pressure the West and erode support for Ukraine.
  • GPS interference is set to continue in the Baltic region, sustaining low-to-moderate risks to commercial aviation and shipping companies.
  • Transport and defence nodes will remain a key focus of Russian destabilisation efforts in the Baltic region and Poland; other key supporters of Ukraine and other eastern flank NATO states also face an elevated risk.
  • The possible deployment of NATO assets to the Swedish island of Gotland stands as a key trigger for a potential increase in tensions between Russia, Sweden and the wider Baltic region.

Context

On 2 May, NATO released a statement expressing concern over an ‘intensifying campaign’ of malign Russian activities across the Euro-Atlantic area. This was prompted by a proliferation of Russian attacks, hybrid activities and grey zone operations that are almost certainly part of a wider destablisation campaign in Europe. These include a plot to attack military sites in Germany, an assault on a Russian dissident in Lithuania, attacks on Ukrainian-linked commercial property in the UK, cyber attacks on the Czech railway system and persistent GPS interference in the Baltic region. Moscow has likely augmented its intelligence networks across Europe in a bid to divide and pressure the West over its support for Ukraine. The Baltic region is likely to remain a key focus of this campaign in the coming months.

Forecast

Russian GPS interference will likely continue in the Baltic region, though overall risks to aviation and shipping will remain low-to-moderate overall

The Baltic region has experienced increased GPS jamming (blocking or interfering with GPS signals) since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The jamming is almost certainly being conducted by Russia, likely from the Kaliningrad exclave situated between Poland and Lithuania, as well as from mainland Russia itself. The jamming is likely being conducted for a variety of goals, including testing Russian electronic warfare capabilities in the event of a (highly unlikely) escalation with NATO, mitigating the threat posed by Ukraine’s expanding drone strike capabilities and causing disruption in a region home to Europe’s most ardent supporters of Ukraine. The jamming has proliferated in recent months, elevating safety risks for commercial, aviation and shipping companies.

The most notable disruption has been at Tartu Airport (TAY) in Estonia, which, unlike most larger airports, relies solely on GPS for plane landings. The Finnish airline carrier Finnair suspended flights to Tartu Airport between 29 April and 1 June, after jamming forced two flights from Helsinki to Tartu to redirect. As most larger airports have alternative navigation systems if GPS signal is lost, similar disruption is unlikely to occur elsewhere. However, in March, a British Royal Air Force (RAF) plane carrying UK defence secretary Grant Shapps had its GPS signal jammed while flying over Poland. While this did not endanger the safety of the aircraft, it could realistically have been a targeted incident against the defence secretary. Given that GPS systems are the only form of navigation for some private jets, such incidents highlight the potential risks for executive protection.

Rear Admiral Ewa Skoog Haslum, Sweden’s navy chief, has stated that GPS interference could increase insurance costs in the Baltic Sea. Haslum warned in April that ships are increasingly turning off their automatic identification systems (AIS) due to increased interference rendering GPS unreliable. This results in uncertainty over the precise purpose of some vessels in the sea. As such, Haslum has called for NATO allies to increase their Baltic Sea presence and for NATO assets to support merchant vessels with navigation. Ultimately, however, current GPS jamming capabilities will present only a low-to-moderate threat to maritime operations in the area.

The Baltic region and Poland face a moderate risk of Russian sabotage operations; transport and defence sites are likely high-priority targets

The Baltic region and Poland face a moderate risk of Russian grey zone operations over the coming year. Russia has consistently run operatives in these countries (indicating capability) which stand among the most ardent supporters of Ukraine (providing intent). For example, the Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO) apprehended 10 suspected Russian agents between December 2023 to February 2024, some of whom smashed windows of cars belonging to the interior minister and journalists in a likely intimidation campaign.

Transport and defence nodes are likely targets of Russian efforts, given the Kremlin’s intent to disrupt weapon supplies to Ukraine and based on trends established by thwarted Russian plots to date. For instance, the Russian Chief Intelligence Office (GRU) network that was uncovered in Poland in 2023 was tasked with reconnaissance and sabotage of transport infrastructure, including the placement of cameras at Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport (RZE), which has become an essential logistics hub for the supply of arms to Ukraine. A Polish national detained in mid-April for alleged involvement in a plot to assassinate President Zelensky was likewise tasked with collecting information on the airport. Critical undersea energy and telecommunications assets are also potential targets, given Russia’s advanced submarine capabilities and the relative remoteness of such infrastructure.

Additionally, in April, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry’s intelligence directorate (GUR) claimed to have disabled a Russian vessel, the Serpukhov, moored at the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad oblast (Russia), an area which has hitherto been shielded from the conflict with Ukraine. While we cannot confirm the veracity of the claim, if it is true, it is possible the Kremlin would seek to retaliate by activating intelligence and/or sabotage networks to deter further attacks of this nature. Such a move would represent moderate spillover risks to the Baltic region. Lithuania and Poland face the highest risk, as adjacent states that could realistically be accused of facilitating Ukrainian operations in the Baltic. That said, direct kinetic attacks against their sovereign territory remain unlikely.

Major supporters of Ukraine and eastern flank NATO states also face an elevated risk of sabotage and other destablisation efforts

While the Baltic region and Poland are likely to remain key focuses of Russian destabilisation operations, major backers of Ukraine and other countries along NATO’s eastern face also face an elevated risk of Russian sabotage and destabilisation campaigns over the second half of 2024.

Germany, which is Ukraine’s largest European military supplier, arrested two German-Russian nationals (‘Russlanddeutschen’) in April for working with Russian intelligence services to plan attacks on military sites used by Germany and the US. One of the suspects notably fought in Donetsk on the side of Russia-backed separatists between 2014 and 2016. Meanwhile, the head of the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) in Vestland County (western Norway) recently issued a public warning of Russian intelligence activity in the region, which is home to important military and oil and gas infrastructure.

The possible NATO reinforcement of the Swedish island of Gotland would represent a key flashpoint for tensions in north-east Europe

Shortly after Sweden’s NATO accession in March, the country’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson indicated that bolstering the strategically significant island of Gotland would be a priority in discussions with NATO allies. Russia’s foreign ministry has indicated that any construction of a NATO base on the island would be considered a provocation that increases risks of confrontation and elevates risks to shipping. The Kremlin has demonstrated a willingness to respond to NATO expansion over the past year, including by orchestrating an irregular migrant crisis on Finland’s eastern border in response to a deal allowing the US military access to 15 Finnish military bases. We assess that if Sweden officially announces such plans, it is likely that Russia will respond.

Russia would likely react by increasing its probing of NATO airspace and intensifying GPS interference in the Baltic Sea region, sustaining risks to aviation and shipping. A retaliatory campaign could also realistically involve an increase in ships belonging to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet loitering outside Sweden’s territorial waters east of Gotland, driving the risk of not only reconnaissance and sabotage, but also of environmental damage. Vessels belonging to the shadow fleet are ageing, lack full insurance and have complex ownership structures to obscure their role in transporting Russian oil.

In April, reports emerged that these ships began conducting risky ship-to-ship oil transfers near Gotland, which increases the risk of a serious oil spillage in the Baltic Sea. While we assess that a deliberate spillage is unlikely – not least due to Gotland’s proximity to Kaliningrad oblast – Russia almost certainly caused a major environmental disaster in Ukraine by breaching the Nova Kakhovka dam (Kherson oblast), indicating a trend. In this context, the practice of ship-to-ship transfers next to Gotland is likely partly intended as an intimidation tactic. The ships, which regularly turn off their automatic identification systems (AIS), are also suspected of being equipped with military surveillance equipment, posing nascent espionage risks. Given the

Balticconnector pipeline has previously been damaged in what was likely a Russian operation, further undersea sabotage operations remain a realistic possibility in the coming months.

*Europe: New backdoors highlight security, espionage risks from Russian state-sponsored actors. On 15 May, the software company ESET reported on two new backdoors, ‘LunarWeb’ and ‘LunarMail’, attributed to the Russian state-sponsored group ‘Turla’. The backdoors were used in an espionage campaign to target a yet unnamed European ministry of foreign affairs and its diplomatic missions in the Middle East. Although the initial attack vector remains unclear, Turla is likely to have exploited misconfigured networks or used spear phishing to download both backdoors on the victim’s system. Both payloads distinguish themselves through the unique ways they communicate with actor-controlled servers to exfiltrate information, highlighting the sophistication of the group’s tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Turla has previously targeted government, diplomatic, military, research and pharmaceutical sectors in espionage operations to collect strategic intelligence. This recent attack underscores the sustained security and cyber espionage risks posed by Russia-affiliated actors in the medium-to-long term, especially in the context of the upcoming European Parliament elections.

May 13.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

  • OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian Commander in Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that the situation ‘is changing rapidly’ across the frontline as Russian forces attempt to break through at multiple points; the Russian summer offensive is highly likely now underway
  • KHARKIV: Russia’s new operation in northern Kharkiv oblast is unlikely aimed at surrounding Kharkiv city in the short term, though it will likely stretch the already weakened Ukrainian frontline
  • KHARKIV: The possible objective of the new Kharkiv operation is to begin creating a so-called ‘sanitary’ buffer zone along the international border
  • FORECAST: Long-time Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has been replaced by a technocratic economist; this likely indicates a genuine effort to improve military-industrial production to prepare Russia for a long-term confrontation with the West
  • OFFENSIVES: On 12 May, Ukrainian Commander in Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that the situation ‘is changing rapidly’ across the frontline as Russian forces are attempting to break through at multiple points, including to the north of Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces have reportedly ‘halted’ Russian attempts to break through up until now. The newly opened front to the north of Kharkiv (see KHARKIV below) is increasing pressure across the frontline, though pressure is also mounting in the Kupiansk and Lyman directions (along the Oskil-Kreminna line), in the Siversk direction (to the north of the Bakhmut line) and in the Pokrovsk direction (to the north-west of Avdiivka).
  • OFFENSIVES: Given the intensity of fighting at present, it remains highly likely that the expected Russian summer offensive is essentially now underway. This reflects the pattern of previous Russian offensives that have slowly built up over a period of weeks, rather than commencing all at once. Additionally, the passage of the USD 60 bn military aid package in the US Congress has possibly also accelerated Russia’s timeline for its planned offensive, given the need to exploit current Russian advantages for as long as possible before ammunition and equipment arrive at scale. To that end, Russian offensive operations are likely to continue at a high intensity for several months, with Ukrainian Commander of Ground Forces Oleksandr Pavlyuk stating on 10 May that the next two months will be a ‘critical’ phase of the war. Pavlyuk also announced that Ukraine plans to create 10 new brigades to prepare for future Russian offensives. While he insisted that Ukraine needs more equipment than people, it is clear that Ukraine is suffering from growing personnel shortages, even as Western aid steadily makes its way to the frontline.
  • BAKHMUT: Ukrainian sources indicated on 9 May that the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces is currently regrouping in preparation for a renewed assault against Chasiv Yar, which will possibly seek to exploit the pressure the Kharkiv operation is currently generating across the frontline. Geolocated footage from 10 May indicates that Rusisan forces have marginally advanced along the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar, though progress has remained very limited over the last two weeks.
  • DONETSK: Russian forces continue to make tactical gains to the west and north of Avdiivka; these are likely part of a wider offensive operation to reach the major logistical hub of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on 9 and 10 May shows that Russian forces have advanced in eastern, southern and central Krasnohorivka (to the north of Avdiivka). Additional footage from 10 May shows recent Russian advances within central and southern Netaylove, a settlement located to the south-west of Avdiivka. These Russian advances underscore that Ukraine is finding it increasingly difficult to hold positions in the Avdiivka sector, especially in light of the new front opened in Kharkiv oblast (which will likely strain Ukrainian forces along the entire frontline).
  • KHARKIV: On 10 May, Russia’s Northern Grouping of Forces launched a series of offensive operations across the international border into northern Kharkiv oblast, where they have achieved some tactical advances and seized numerous frontline villages. At present, Russian operations appear to be relatively limited in scale, employing seemingly under-equipped and under-manned units; this indicates that the goal is unlikely to be a push towards Kharkiv city in the short term. Earlier on 13 May, the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Russian forces have enjoyed ‘tactical success’, but that efforts to break through have thus far been contained. Russian forces have successfully taken numerous settlements to the north of Lyptsi, located 14 miles (23km) north of the Kharkiv city E-40 ring road. Further to the north-east, Russian forces have taken a section of territory over eight miles (13km) wide north of the city of Vovchansk, located over 32 miles (50km) north-east of Kharkiv city.
  • KHARKIV: Short of a Ukrainian military collapse, which we assess remains highly unlikely, Russian forces are unlikely to be able to (or even aiming to) surround Kharkiv city in the short term. Moscow almost certainly still wants to capture Kharkiv city, but it is unlikely to attempt to do so in the immediate term. Russian forces have likely concentrated between 35,000 and 50,000 troops along the international border in Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk oblasts (all Russia); this estimate will possibly increase to around 70,000. Additional reserves are possibly also ready to exploit any potential success. However, Russian opposition media previously reported in March that the Russian military believes 300,000 additional personnel will be needed to launch an operation to encircle Kharkiv city. As such, the current Northern Grouping of Forces is unlikely to be planning such a move, particularly given that the sizes of forces committed to the offensive remain in the low thousands at present and enjoy limited armoured vehicle support. Nevertheless, the grouping is likely being tasked with setting conditions for future offensive operations against Kharkiv city itself. It also remains unlikely that Russian commanders would deprioritise their current offensives in Donetsk oblast to support a major attempt to encircle Kharkiv city in the short term.
  • KHARKIV: Russian forces are currently focusing most of their efforts towards Vovchansk, located to the north-east of Kharkiv city. Vovchansk is notably located on the eastern side of the Siverskyi-Donets River, meaning major gains in this location would not necessarily support an imminent Russian push towards Kharkiv city itself. Instead, this effort possibly aims to support ongoing Russian offensive operations along the Oskil-Kreminna line further east, including around Kupiansk. Geolocated footage published on 11 May showed Russian forces striking a bridge over the Vovcha River, located to the west of Vovchansk. This possibly reflects Russian efforts to begin isolating eastern Kharkiv oblast and to support an offensive against Kupiansk. Nevertheless, Ukrainian officials have cautioned that the current Russian focus on Vovchansk is possibly diversionary in nature and aimed at committing Ukrainian forces to the east of the Siverskyi-Donets River before launching a larger offensive effort directly north of Kharkiv city around Lyptsi.
  • KHARKIV: While Ukraine has been constructing fortifications across Kharkiv oblast in recent months, there are serious questions surrounding their quality and effectiveness. For example, the head of Vovchansk’s military administration, Tamaz Gambarashvili, acknowledged earlier on 13 May that while fortifications have been built around the frontline city, they are ‘not so dense’, namely due to the difficulties that come with building within the range of Russian artillery. As such, further Russian tactical advances in the area remain likely.
  • KHARKIV: We previously assessed that supplementary offensives in Kharkiv oblast were a realistic possibility, and that Russia’s primary aim is to draw off Ukrainian reserves and to stretch the already weakened Ukrainian frontline. The Kharkiv operation is likely designed to force Ukraine to redeploy forces from other critical frontlines in eastern Ukraine and to maximise the likelihood of facilitating a Russian breakthrough somewhere (anywhere) along the frontline. Wherever they are successful, Russian forces will likely seek to reinforce that success. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how many reserves Russia currently possesses given the new offensive in Kharkiv is likely drawing in a significant component of Russia’s reserve force.
  • KHARKIV: As such, the principal objectives of the ongoing operation are likely to draw off Ukrainian forces from other critical points and possibly to establish a so-called ‘sanitary zone’ along the international border. Russian President Vladimir Putin previously confirmed his intention to create such a zone in order to push Ukrainian forces back and to place de jure Russian territory beyond the reach of Ukrainian and Western weapons. Ukrainian officials assessed on 10 May that Russia intends to establish a six-mile (10km) buffer zone along the northern border of Kharkiv oblast. This would likely serve to push Ukrainian tube artillery out of range of Belgorod, a major Russian logistics hub, and in turn place Russian tube artillery within range of Kharkiv city. However, given that Russian forces are unlikely to place tube artillery directly on the frontline, it is likely that any ‘sanitary’ zone would aim to establish a larger zone closer to around 18.6 miles (30km) in depth. Please see the main map above for an overview of a possible 30km Russian ‘sanitary’ zone across the international border. While efforts are currently focused on northern Kharkiv oblast, Sumy oblast has also been under significant bombardment in recent months. Russian forces will possibly seek to launch other cross-border incursions further north in the coming month.
  • KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 11 May points to Russian advances west of Kolomyichykha, a settlement to the west of Svatove. Meanwhile, geolocated footage confirms that on 10 May, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an oil depot in Rovenky (Luhansk oblast). The head of Luhansk oblast, Artem Lysohor, stated that the attack caused significant damage to the storage facility, claiming that fuel reserves are now fully depleted. The attack likely underscores Kyiv’s efforts to target frontline oil storage facilities to impede Russian advances in the sector.
  • SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
  • STRIKES: Early on 10 May, Ukraine intercepted all ten Russian-launched Shahed-136/131 drones over Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. Russia also launched two S-300/S-400 missiles. There is no indication that Ukrainian air defences intercepted the missiles. Later on 10 May, Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted a Kh-59/69 missile over Dnipropetrovsk oblast. On 11 May, Ukrainian forces destroyed five reconnaissance drones over Kherson and Mykolaiv.
  • STRIKES: On 9 May, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reportedly co-ordinated drone strikes against oil depots and refineries in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai and the Republic of Bashkortostan. Ukrainian media outlets claimed that the strikes damaged several oil tanks. Meanwhile, geolocated footage shows that the attack targeted the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat oil refinery in Salvat (Bashkortostan). Ukrainian media outlets reported that the attack hit the catalytic cracking unit used to refine crude oil. The attack in Bashkortostan was conducted around 932 miles (1,500km) from Ukraine’s border, thus underscoring Kyiv’s ability to conduct strikes deep into Russian territory.
  • STRIKES: On 10 May, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reportedly orchestrated a drone attack against the Perviy Zavod refinery in Kaluga oblast (Russia); the site was previously targeted by a drone attack in March. Ukrainian media outlets reported that the attack caused a fire at the facility. The Perviy Zavod refinery is the largest Petrochemical complex in Kaluga oblast. The complex was previously attacked on 14-15 March. Concurrently, the GUR conducted a successful drone attack against an oil refinery in Russia’s Volgograd oblast, which was previously targeted on 3 February.
  • STRIKES: Repeated Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian oil refineries highlight the ongoing vulnerabilities of the air defences protecting Russian oil infrastructure. However, while these attacks have disrupted around 16% of Russia’s refined oil production, they are unlikely to disrupt Russia’s economy or its war effort profoundly. Moscow retains significant over-production capacity. Additionally, only around 40% of Russia’s refineries fall within the range of Ukrainian drones, a range which extends up to 756 miles (1,200 km). At the same time, Russia is able to rely on supplies from its allies Belarus and Kazakhstan to mitigate against the risk of fuel shortages. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s striking strategy has succeeded in decreasing Russian refined oil exports to unprecedented levels.
  • STRIKES: Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that its air defences intercepted 31 Ukrainian drones and 16 missiles targeting Belgorod, Kursk and Lipetsk oblasts overnight on 12-13 May. Projectiles also targeted Russian-annexed Crimea. The strikes destroyed a building in Belgord (Beolgord), killing 15 people. The Lipetsk regional authorities reported that the strikes also damaged an electrical substation in the region.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • VICTORY DAY: On 9 May, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused the West of attempting to distort the ‘truth’ about the Second World War during celebrations commemorating the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in 1945. He claimed that Western elites use revanchism and mock history to encourage the ‘current followers of Nazism’ to incite regional conflicts, as well as inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions. Putin is almost certainly pushing these narratives to align with his stated goal of ‘de-nazifying Ukraine’ – which he used to justify his full-scale invasion in 2022.
  • VICTORY DAY: Putin attempted to frame the war in Ukraine as a ‘difficult transitional period’ for Russia. This rhetoric is likely intended to persuade domestic audiences that Russia must also make sacrifices in this conflict, much like the Soviet Union in the Second World War. Notably, Putin claimed that Russia will do ‘everything’ to avoid a global conflict, but also insisted that Moscow would not be threatened by anyone (i.e. the West). He also reiterated that Russia’s ‘strategic forces’ are always on combat readiness, issuing yet another thinly veiled nuclear threat.
  • AID: On 10 May, the administration of US President Joe Biden announced a fresh aid package for Ukraine worth around USD 400 m. The package includes additional munitions for Patriot air defence systems, extra High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition, 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. Separately, reports emerged on 10 May that Kyiv expects to receive the first F-16 fighter jets from its Western partners in June or July, though it is unclear which country will supply them (or how many they will supply). While their provision would highly likely aid Ukraine to better control its airspace, they are unlikely to be a ‘game-changer’ in the immediate term, especially if a limited number of fighter jets are provided.

FORECAST

RESHUFFLE: On 12 May, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Andrei Belousov, a technocratic economist, as Russia’s new defence minister, replacing the long-serving Sergei Shoigu, who has now been appointed Secretary of the Russian Security Council. The fate of the previous secretary of the Security Council, the hawkish Nikolai Patrushev, remains unclear, though he is likely to retain a position of some informal influence at the very least. While nominally seen as a sideways move or even a demotion for Shoigu, the former defence minister will highly likely retain significant influence over Russia’s security and foreign policy as Secretary of the Security Council, a position which Patrushev built over the last 16 years into one of the most powerful policy players in Russia. Nevertheless, the reshuffle marks a significant turning point in the administration of Russia’s war effort and has numerous key implications.

The appointment of the technocratic Belousov as the new defence minister strongly indicates that the Kremlin is seeking to overhaul the process of military procurement and to limit corruption in a bid to prepare Russia for a protracted war in Ukraine and a long-term confrontation with the West. Belousov (like Shoigu before him when he was appointed) has no military experience and his role will be primarily administrative and focused on securing provisions for the war effort. Shoigu is known to have extorted vast amounts of military spending over his 12 years at the helm of one of Russia’s largest ministries.

Corruption within Shoigu’s factions has undoubtedly severely compromised the quality of Russia’s military capabilities, as well as the entire war effort to date. As recently as 24 April, Shoigu’s deputy, Timur Ivanov, also infamous for his outlandish corruption, was arrested on bribery charges. Together, Shoigu’s move and Ivanov’s arrest likely reflect a Kremlin-approved effort not only to limit Shoigu’s network, but more crucially to contain corruption (or at least give the impression of doing so). Irrespective of the factional infighting, the appointment of a highly motivated economist to oversee the defence ministry likely indicates a genuine effort to maximise military-industrial output and to sustain a long war effort. It also possibly aims to limit the detrimental impact of infighting between Shoigu’s faction and that of Sergei Chemezov on military procurement.

As a technocrat, Belousov will not oversee military operations and will almost certainly have a much-diminished brief and remit compared to Shoigu, who likely exercised influence over operations via Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Conventionally, at least during peacetime, a new defence minister appoints a new Chief of the General Staff. It therefore remains unclear whether Belousov has the mandate to change commander, which would allow Belousov to begin building his own powerbase and to appoint a commander who would owe his position to Belousov. Gerasimov, like his patron Shoigu, has become deeply unpopular within the military. Both men were the primary targets of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023. As such, replacing Gerasimov with a more popular (and competent) Chief of the General Staff would likely improve Russia’s operational performance, as well as morale among Russian forces. Possible candidates include the head of the Airborne Forces (VDV) Mikhail Teplinsky or even the former Russian theatre commander Sergei Surovikin, who is rumoured to have returned to Russia. Such an appointment would likely have the most immediate impact on the battlefield, with wider military-production reforms implemented by Belousov likely to manifest over the medium-to-long term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

16 May 24. Ukraine launches massive drone attack on Russian naval bases. Ukrainian drones struck naval bases and oil facilities overnight in one of Kyiv’s largest attacks of the war.

Russian officials claimed to have intercepted more than 100 air and sea drones, but footage from the attack showed oil refinery and storage facilities ablaze.

One clip showed a drone diving into a target in the Russian port of Novorossiysk, where Russia’s Black Sea Fleet had relocated from Crimea under threat of Ukrainian missile strikes.

Another drone struck a family driving near the border in Russia’s Belgorod region, killing a mother and her four-year-old son, the region’s governor Vyacheslav Gladkov said.

In the coastal town of Tuapse in the southern Krasnodar region, two drones hit an oil refinery, sparking a large fire.

The Russian-controlled port of Sevastopol on the annexed Crimean peninsula suffered a “partial blackout” after debris from downed drones fell on an electrical substation, the city’s Russian-installed governor Mikhail Razvozhayev said.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

15 May 24. Putin backs China’s Ukraine peace plan, says Beijing understands the conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in an interview published early on Wednesday, said he backed China’s plan for a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine crisis, saying Beijing had a full understanding of what lay behind the crisis.

Putin, speaking to China’s Xinhua news agency ahead of his visit to Beijing this week, said Russia remained open to dialogue and talks to solve the more than two-year-old conflict.

China’s plan and further “principles” made public by President Xi Jinping last month took account of factors behind the conflict, Putin said.

“We are positive in our assessment of China’s approach to solving the Ukrainian crisis,” Putin said, according to a Russian-language transcript on the Kremlin website. “In Beijing, they truly understand its root causes and its global geopolitical meaning.”

And the additional principles, set down by Xi in talks with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, were “realistic and constructive steps” that “develop the idea of the necessity to overcome the cold war mentality”.

Beijing put forward a 12-point paper more than a year ago that set out general principles for ending the war, but did not get into specifics.

It received a lukewarm reception at the time in both Russia and Ukraine, while the U.S. said China was presenting itself as a peacemaker but reflecting Russia’s “false narrative” and failing to condemn its invasion.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov last month called the proposal a “reasonable plan that the great Chinese civilization proposed for discussion.”

Xi’s additional principles call for a “cooling down” of the situation, conditions for restoring peace and creating stability and minimising the impacts on the world economy.

Russia views the conflict as a struggle pitting it against the “collective West” which took no account of Moscow’s security concerns by promoting the eastward expansion of NATO and military activity close to its borders.

Russia calls its actions in Ukraine a “special operation” to disarm Ukraine and protect it from fascists. Ukraine and the West say the fascist allegation is baseless and that the war is an unprovoked act of aggression.

Russia and China proclaimed a “no limits” relationship just days before Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but Beijing has so far avoided providing actual weapons and ammunition for Russia’s war effort.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s peace plan calls for a withdrawal of Russian troops, the restoration of its 1991 post-Soviet borders and bringing Russia to account for its actions.

A “peace summit” is scheduled for Switzerland in June. But Russia is not invited, dismisses the initiative as meaningless and says talks must take account of “new realities”.

China has attended some preparatory talks for the summit and Ukraine has deployed great efforts to persuade it to attend. (Source: Reuters)

 

14 May 24. Belousov says Russia must win in Ukraine while minimising casualties.

  • Summary
  • Putin nominee stresses need to minimise human losses
  • Belousov says military sector needs innovation, efficiency
  • He takes over a ministry embroiled in corruption scandal

Russia’s main task is to achieve victory on the battlefield in Ukraine with the minimal loss of troops, incoming defence minister Andrei Belousov said on Tuesday.

Belousov, an economist whom President Vladimir Putin unexpectedly nominated on Sunday to replace Sergei Shoigu, said the military sector needed more efficiency and innovation in order to achieve its goals.

“The key task, of course, remains achieving victory. Ensuring the achievement of the military-political goals of the special military operation, set by the president. At the same time – I want to specifically emphasise this – with minimal human losses,” he told a parliamentary hearing.

His comments were striking because Russian officials rarely discuss casualties in the war except to praise the heroism of fallen soldiers.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine publishes details of their dead and wounded. But Western military analysts say Russia, with a population more than three times larger than Ukraine’s, has shown itself much more willing to incur heavy casualties for the sake of even incremental gains. Russian officials say such analysis, as it comes from the West, is neither objective nor accurate.

Belousov presented himself as a man of integrity, telling parliamentarians: “I have always been, and will be, guided by the reinforced concrete principle ‘You can make mistakes (but) you can’t lie’.”

That was a pointed comment, given that he is taking charge of a ministry embroiled in a major corruption investigation that damaged his predecessor Shoigu. The scandal widened on Tuesday with the arrest of another senior official suspected of bribery.

Belousov, who has no military experience, has been tasked by Putin with maximising efficiencies in Russia’s war economy as its troops, having regained the initiative, attempt to push deeper into Ukraine.

He said defence spending needed to be optimised so that “every rouble of budget money, which is ultimately paid by our citizens, brings maximal effect”.

“Everything in the country that is effective and advanced – everything must work to achieve victory, to ensure the armed forces can complete their tasks,” he said. (Source: Reuters)

 

15 May 24. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has cancelled his upcoming visits abroad as Ukraine’s military leadership races to thwart Russia’s new offensive. The Ukrainian president “has instructed that all international events involving him scheduled for the coming days be postponed and new dates co-ordinated,” his press secretary Serhiy Nykyforov said on Wednesday. Russia opened a new front last week in the north-eastern Kharkiv region with the aim of stretching Ukrainian forces, which are already struggling because of recruitment issues and delays to the delivery of US military aid. Russian forces have occupied around 110 sq km of territory, forcing Ukraine to urgently dispatch reinforcements while simultaneously fending off a bigger offensive in the eastern Donetsk region. Zelenskyy’s announcement indicates the increasing concern in Kyiv over the latest Russian attacks. In his address on Tuesday evening, he said the situation was “difficult”, particularly in Donetsk and Kharkiv, but “under control”. “Our warriors are destroying the occupier who is trying to advance. It is all quite tense,” adding that all contested areas where Russia is carrying out large-scale offensives have been “reinforced”. While the Russians’ advance south of the border village of Pylna appears to have slowed, maps published on Wednesday by Ukrainian open-source intelligence group Deepstate showed they had made further encroachments into Vovchansk and had occupied an area in the west of the town.

Oleksii Kharkivskyi, head of the police force in Vovchansk, said in a video posted to Facebook on Wednesday that police-led evacuations of the remaining civilians continued as Russian soldiers took up positions in the town. Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov, has discussed the possibility of Russia opening an additional front in Sumy. The region, west of Kharkiv, has suffered a huge surge in shelling in the past week. On the defence of the Kharkiv region, he said the reinforcements were stabilising the frontline and the situation was currently “not catastrophic”. However, Budanov and other Ukrainian military officials have previously suggested that Kyiv lacked the reserves to resist the latest offensive in the Kharkiv region because of its need to repel Russian advances in Donetsk. On a visit to Kyiv on Tuesday, US secretary of state Antony Blinken appeared to express a shift in Washington’s view on Ukraine using American weapons in strikes on Russian territory. Speaking next to Ukraine’s foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba, Blinken said: “We have not encouraged or enabled strikes outside of Ukraine, but ultimately Ukraine needs to make decisions for itself on how it conducts this war . . . and we will continue to back Ukraine with the equipment it needs to win” (Source: FT.com)

 

14 May 24. Zelenskiy lauds U.S. aid package, asks Blinken for air defences. A new U.S. weapons package is going to have an impact on the battlefield in Ukraine, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Tuesday, visiting Kyiv at a time when Ukrainian forces have faced setbacks at the front after a long delay in U.S. aid.

Washington finally passed a bill in late April to provide military aid to Ukraine, held up for months by opposition from some Republicans in the U.S. Congress while Russian forces took advantage of their superior firepower to launch an offensive.

“…In the near term the assistance is now on the way, some of it has already arrived and more of it will be arriving,” said Blinken, during a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. “And that’s going to make a real difference against the ongoing Russian aggression on the battlefield.”

Zelenskiy lauded the “crucial” U.S. aid, and thanked Washington for bipartisan support.

He said Ukraine’s biggest deficit for now was in air defence, telling Blinken Kyiv needs two Patriot air defence batteries for the northeastern region of Kharkiv, being pummelled by Russian air strikes.

“Civilians, warriors, everybody — they are under Russian missiles,” Zelenskiy said.

The Ukrainian president said he also wanted to discuss security guarantees with the U.S., in addition to asking Blinken to rally support from more countries at an upcoming high-level peace summit set to take place in Switzerland in June.

Ukraine repelled Russian troops from the outskirts of Kyiv and seized back swathes of occupied land in the first year following Russia’s 2022 invasion.

But a counter-offensive launched in 2023 fizzled, and recent months have seen Moscow make slow but steady gains at the front. Kyiv says it hopes renewed commitments of Western arms will allow it to reclaim the initiative on the battlefield and recapture some of the fifth of its territory still occupied by Russia.

“We’re equally determined that over time, Ukraine stands strongly on its own feet: militarily, economically, democratically,” said Blinken. “A strong, successful, thriving, free Ukraine is the best possible rebuke to Putin.” (Source: Reuters)

 

15 May 24. Russia ‘downs 10 Atacms missiles over Crimea.’ The Russian defence ministry claimed its air forces destroyed 10 long-range missiles known as ATACMS that Ukraine’s military launched overnight at Crimea. The ministry did not say in its statement on the Telegram messaging app whether there was any damage as a result of the attack, but the Russia-installed governor of the Crimean port of Sevastopol said that missile debris fell onto a residential area. According to preliminary information, no one was injured, Mikhail Razvozhayev, the governor, said on his Telegram messaging channel. A US official said on Tuesday that ATACMS and air defence interceptors approved by Joe Biden on April 24 were already reaching the Ukrainian forces. It came as the head of Kyiv’s military intelligence warned Russia’s shock new frontline offensive in the northeastern put Ukraine “on the edge”, with Moscow troops storming towards Kharkiv. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

14 May 24. Ukraine, Russia race to shield battle tanks from exploding drones. Ukrainian and Russian forces are scrambling to field countermeasures for protecting tanks against one-way attack drones, which experts say are a growing challenge even for vehicles traveling at speed.

In the large category of unmanned aerial vehicles, the class of first-person-view drones, essentially steerable miniature warheads, have emerged as a ubiquitous threat.

“One-way attack drones such as FPV or loitering munitions provide a beyond-line-of-sight capability that enable the operator to follow tanks to their concealed staging areas or departure points and strike them 24/7,” Federico Borsari, a fellow at the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis think tank said.

“These systems can also chase and strike moving tanks in their most vulnerable points, especially the rear exhaust of the engine,” he added.

The threat posed by these weapons has reportedly led U.S. officials to request that donated Abrams main battle tanks no longer be used on the front lines until commanders come up with new tactics.

Samuel Bendett, a research analyst at the U.S.-based Center for Naval Analyses think tank, said tanks used as “breaching vehicles in frontal attacks” have proven to be especially vulnerable.

In the last two months, a number of Russian tanks were spotted sporting unusual types of armor, including improvised metal roofs layered with metal grills. Ukrainian social media channels have nicknamed these vehicles turtle tanks, while Russian telegram accounts have referred to them as “Tsar Mangal” or tsar’s BBQs.

The purpose of these countermeasures is to set off drones’ explosive charge early in order to decrease the chance of projectiles penetrating the hull. Results have been mixed, however.

In the case of the turtle tank, “add-on log armor and metal plates, installed to create a full-fledged metal shell completely covering three sides and the top of the tank, make it impossible to rotate the turret and significantly limit the vehicle’s visibility,” Borsari said.

Russian and Ukrainian forces have also made extensive use of different electronic warfare capabilities, including mounting multi-frequency jammers on the roof of tanks to disrupt or jam the radio-frequencies of adversary drones.

While many analysts consider electronic warfare to be the most promising defense against small drone variants, Borsari said that both sides are also trialing novel workarounds, creating a “constant cat and mouse game.”

Footage has emerged on Telegram showing FPV drones damaging and immobilizing combat vehicles in Ukraine, but experts highlight that destroying a tank requires the deployment of several of these weapons by experienced pilots.

“At this point, successful FPV attacks against tanks are contingent on pilot experience – it takes a lot to destroy a tank, and only the best and most experienced ones can maneuver their drone at exactly the right spot to strike,” Bendett said. (Source: Defense News)

 

14 May 24. Ukrainian UGV undergoes trials in Estonian exercise. A Ukrainian-made unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), Sirko-S1, is undergoing trials in Estonia during Exercise ‘Spring Storm’, held between 6 and 17 May. The trials will focus on testing the vehicle’s minelaying capabilities in collaboration with ASAX Innovation, the Estonian company said on 11 May. Sirko-S1 is a 4×4 multi-purpose UGV with a 3 hour battery life, 160 mm ground clearance, and 200 kg payload capacity, making it suitable for various tasks. These include transporting cargo, evacuating wounded soldiers, conducting reconnaissance missions, and supporting minelaying and demining operations. The vehicle, backed by Ukraine’s Brave1 defence innovation cluster, has a 3 km operational range that can be extended out to 10 km with a repeater, SkyLab detailed. It is also equipped with a day/night 360° camera. Along with this, the company is exploring the possibility of adding a “combat turret” to the vehicle, Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov previously noted. (Source: Janes)

 

13 May 24. U.S. Aid Reaching Ukraine as Russia Attacks Near Kharkiv. U.S. military aid is reaching Ukraine as that nation’s military strives to blunt Russian attacks in the Kharkiv region, said Sabrina Singh, deputy Pentagon press secretary.

The Russian attacks on Kharkiv — Ukraine’s second-largest city — were not unexpected, Singh said today, and Ukrainian service members are fighting furiously to blunt the Russian incursions.

U.S. systems are again reaching Ukrainian service members after Congress approved a budget supplemental aid package on April 24. President Joe Biden announced a $1bn assistance package at that time to meet Ukraine’s critical security needs. On Friday, the United States announced another tranche of $400m in aid.

The most recent package provides military capabilities to support Ukraine’s most urgent battlefield requirements, including air defense, artillery rounds, armored vehicles and antitank weapons, Singh said.

The Russian attacks in the Kharkiv region have made some gains. “We know that they’ve intensified some of those cross-border fires, and they’ll likely, in the coming weeks, increase that,” she said. “That’s why we’re doing everything we can to make sure Ukraine has what it needs.”

She said the U.S. aid is getting to Ukraine quickly, noting that the Defense Department had pre-positioned aid in advance of Congressional approval of the supplemental aid package. “When the supplemental was passed, we were able to flow that assistance right in,” Singh said. “But, of course, Ukraine is in a real fight, and they’re fighting every single day. And they’re doing it bravely. We’ve seen them able to hold territory, and we’ve seen them able to push the Russians back.”

“The Russians have launched a very aggressive offensive, but we believe that Ukrainians continue to prove themselves on the battlefield,” she said.

The delay in passing the supplemental aid package did have an effect on the battlefield. News reports from Ukraine noted that Ukrainian service members had to ration ammunition to front-line outfits. Ukrainian forces did lose some territory to Russia in Eastern Ukraine.

This could have been worse, but European allies stepped forward to supply Ukraine with what it needed. “During the time that we weren’t able to provide a supplemental, our European allies and partners … were still providing artillery or defenses that the Ukrainians needed,” Singh said.

(Source: U.S. DoD)

 

14 May 24. As Russia enters the early phases of its anticipated summer offensive against Ukraine, “Russia’s aim is not to achieve a grand breakthrough, but rather to convince Ukraine that it can keep up an inexorable advance, kilometre by kilometre, along the front.” That’s the view of Dr Jack Watling, RUSI’s Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare, in the latest RUSI Commentary.

In Ukraine, Russia is Beginning to Compound Advantages

In his commentary, Dr Watling analyses Russia’s strategy across the long front in Ukraine, its numerical superiority, the deterioration of Ukrainian air defences, and the imperative of Western weapons and munitions reaching the front to enable Ukraine to blunt Russia’s offensive.

In particular, Dr Watling notes:

  • “The Russian forces attacking Ukraine have now expanded to 510,000 troops. This means that Russia has established significant numerical superiority over the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).”
  • “The main focus of Russian efforts has been in Donbas, but in the south Russian troops have also been skirmishing along the Zaporizhzhia front and have even conducted amphibious raids across the Dnipro. They have met with little success, but the breadth of their attacks has fixed Ukrainian troops on the line of contact and forced the AFU to spread out its artillery, expending munitions to break up successive Russian attacks.”

“Having stretched the Ukrainians out, the contours of the Russian summer offensive are easy to discern.”

o “First, there will be the push against Kharkiv. Ukraine must commit troops to defend its second largest city, and given the size of the Russian group of forces in the area, this will draw in reserves of critical materiel, from air defences to artillery.”

o “Second, Russia will apply pressure on the other end of the line, initially threatening to reverse Ukraine’s gains from its 2023 offensive, and secondly putting at risk the city of Zaporizhzhia. Ukraine should be able to blunt this attack, but this will require the commitment of reserve units.”

o “Once Ukraine commits its reserves in these directions, the main effort will see the expansion of the Russian push in Donbas. This axis is already making slow but steady progress. The objective is clear: to cut Ukrainian supply lines connecting Kostiantynivka and Kramatorsk.”

He also notes that “in the medium term… turning the present dynamic around is up to Ukraine and cannot be resolved by its international partners. Unless the AFU expands in size then it will continue to be overstretched.”

Dr Watling concludes: “The outlook in Ukraine is bleak. However, if Ukraine’s allies engage now to replenish Ukrainian munitions stockpiles, help to establish a robust training pipeline, and make the industrial investments to sustain the effort, then Russia’s summer offensive can be blunted, and Ukraine will receive the breathing space it needs to regain the initiative.” (Source: RUSI)

 

13 May 24. Nominee for Russian defence minister underlines need to take better care of soldiers. Andrei Belousov, the surprise choice of President Vladimir Putin to become Russia’s new defence minister, said on Monday that soldiers needed better access to housing, hospitals and welfare benefits.

Belousov, an economist who previously served as deputy prime minister, underlined the need to take better care of Russia’s soldiers in comments to a parliamentary committee, his first since Putin named him on Sunday to replace Sergei Shoigu.

State media quoted him as saying there was too much bureaucracy surrounding the payment of benefits to military personnel. There were also issues with housing and medical treatment.

“I think it’s a mess when participants in the special military operation who come back on vacation are driven from civilian medical institutions to hospitals which are often simply overcrowded. This issue needs to be resolved,” Belousov said.

The comments by Belousov, who has no military background, appeared aimed at demonstrating to members of the armed forces that he understands their concerns and will work to improve their conditions.

He was addressing the defence and security committee of parliament’s upper house, the Federation Council, as part of a confirmation process for a new government line-up after Putin started his fifth term as president earlier this month. (Source: Reuters)

 

14 May 24. Ukraine ‘has no reserves’ to push back Kharkiv assault, top general admits. Ukraine is struggling with troop shortages as it tries to repel an advancing Russian offensive on Kharkiv, its top general has admitted.

“All of our forces are either here or in Chasiv Yar,” Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence agency told the New York Times, referring to a Ukrainian stronghold about 120 miles farther south that Russian troops have assaulted in recent weeks. “I’ve used everything we have. Unfortunately, we don’t have anyone else in the reserves.”

The general said that Ukraine was outnumbered as well as outgunned, with the latest US military aid package signed three weeks ago barely beginning to arrive yet.

The coming days would be important, he is reported as saying, with Kyiv believing it can shore up its defensive lines. He believes though that Russia may launch a new attack further north of Kharkiv, in the Sumy region.

Ukrainian troops have been battling the new Russian offensive since Friday, with Moscow claiming that it has already captured nine villages.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

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