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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Mar 15.

*US: Short-term policy stagnation risks will ease after Speaker signals likely approval of aid bill. According to reports on 14 March, House Speaker Mike Johnson told Republican senators that they should expect the House of Representatives to approve legislation on aid for Ukraine. Johnson signalled that the funding will likely come in the form of a loan or lend-lease programme to minimise financial losses for US taxpayers. On the same day, Johnson announced that the House will hold a vote on a stand-alone bill to reauthorise Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the week beginning 8 April. Section 702 would authorise the collection of electronic communication content stored by US internet providers of non-US citizens outside the US who are deemed to be national security threats. In the short term, sustained policy risks will likely hinder a swift passage of Section 702 due to sizable Republican opposition within the House over privacy concerns. However, Johnson’s legislative agenda signals decreased policy stagnation risks in the near term, particularly for national security initiatives.

Mar 14.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • OFFENSIVES: Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief has warned that there is a threat of Russian forces advancing ‘deep into our battle formations’ at various unspecified locations
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian drone strikes remain intense across European Russia, with oil sector assets the most likely to be targeted in the run-up to the 15-17 March Russian presidential election
  • AID: The US House Speaker has signalled a possible policy shift on Ukraine aid following a USD 300m package announcement, though the future bill will possibly be heavily watered down
  • FORECAST: Various pro-Ukraine Russian armed units conducted a raid into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts (Russia), though it remains unclear how much territory (if any) they still control
  • OFFENSIVES: On 13 March, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi warned that there is a threat of Russian forces advancing ‘deep into our battle formations’ at various unspecified locations. Syrskyi noted that the situation is gradually becoming more difficult across the eastern frontlines and announced that Ukraine is reinforcing frontline units and deploying additional equipment to these areas as part of a wider rotation of forces (which are likely currently exhausted). However, given widespread reporting from the frontlines of extensive shortages, particularly artillery ammunition, the reinforcement of under-pressure areas is highly likely to be at the expense of other areas, which will now be weaker and more vulnerable to Russian advances.
  • OFFENSIVES: Russian forces retain the operational initiative at present; while they have taken significant casualties throughout the current winter offensive, they likely retain sufficient capacity to attempt to exploit Ukrainian weaknesses as and when they see them. Russian forces likely retain a notable concentration of forces that are currently reconstituting following the fall of Avdiivka in February. As such, when Russia redeploys these forces, further Russian advances remain likely, both around Avdiivka and other high priority areas, as well as lower-priority areas which are currently less well defended by Ukrainian forces.
  • BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 12 March indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Klishchiivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Bakhmut.
  • DONETSK: On 13 March, Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lukhoviy stated that Russian forces maintain a high offensive tempo, with one-third of all clashes along the frontline currently occurring in the Donetsk sector. On 13 March, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) corroborated Lukovhiy’s statements by reporting that Russia has focused 60% of its attacks to the west of Avdiivka and Marinka over the past four weeks.
  • DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 12 March indicates that Russian forces progressed on the eastern outskirts of Berdychi, north-west of Avdiivka, and along Pershotravneva Street in Pervomaiske, located six miles (10km) south-west of Avdiivka. Additional footage from 11 March shows that Russian forces progressed east of Nevelske, south-west of Avdiivka. Meanwhile, according to geolocated footage posted on 12 March, Russian troops made advances on the north-eastern outskirts of Novomykhailivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Donetsk City.
  • KHERSON: Russian sources claimed that on the night of 12-13 March their forces conducted a limited raid on the right (west) bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson oblast – the first such cross-river raid in many months. While the raid remains unconfirmed, Russian sources, including the Russian-installed governor of Kherson oblast, Vladimir Saldo, claimed that all volunteer service personnel returned following the raid. Such raids are unlikely to reflect Russian intentions to establish a permanent beachhead of the right bank of the river in the short term, particularly given that they still cannot dislodge Ukraine’s own beachhead on their side of the river bank near Krynky.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
  • SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 13-14 March, Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted 22 of 36 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russian forces. Five drones were destroyed over Dnipropetrovsk oblast and two over Mykolaiv oblast. Local reports indicate that drones hit civilian infrastructure in Sumy oblast. On the same day, Russian forces launched S-300 missiles that damaged an administrative building in Kharkiv’s Shevchenkivskyi district (Kharkiv oblast). Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) also reported that air defences intercepted an unspecified guided missile over the Black Sea on 13 March; it was targeting Odesa oblast.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 12-13 March, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reportedly co-ordinated drone attacks against oil refineries in Leningrad, Rostov and Ryazan oblasts (Russia). The attack caused a fire at Rosneft’s largest refinery, located in Ryazan oblast; the authorities were forced to halt operations at the primary oil refining units. Operations resumed after being temporarily suspended at the Rostov facility. The drone attack targeted the Kirishi Petroleum Organic Synthesis (KINEF) refinery in Kirishi (Leningrad Oblast), Russia’s second-largest refinery.
  • STRIKES: The SBU’s attack also reportedly targeted military airbases in Buturlinovka and Voronezh City, both located in Voronezh oblast (Russia). Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that its air defences intercepted 58 Ukrainian drones overnight over Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk and Voronezh oblasts.
  • STRIKES: On 12 March, a Ukrainian drone attack caused major damage to Russia’s Lukhoil Norsi refinery in Nizhny Novgorod oblast. Unnamed sources stated that the attack damaged the main distillation unit, disrupting half of the refinery’s production. The attack also targeted an oil depot in Oryol (Oryol oblast). Russia’s MoD stated that it intercepted 25 drones over Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Moscow, Oryol, St Petersburg and Tula.
  • STRIKES: The high tempo of Ukrainian attacks clearly illustrates Kyiv’s intentions to ramp up attacks against Russia ahead of and during the presidential elections on 15-17 March, in particular against the oil sector (see ECONOMY below for further analysis).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • AID: The US announced on 12 March a new military aid package to Ukraine worth USD 300 m. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that unexpected savings from Pentagon contracts would fund the assistance, underscoring that this package is not ‘new’ Congressional funding. Sullivan acknowledged that the package, which is considerably smaller than the USD 60 bn earmarked for Ukraine that is stalled in Congress, is nowhere near enough to meet Kyiv’s battlefield needs. While the package will likely modestly alleviate immediate materiel shortages, this is unlikely a sustainable way of providing future aid for Kyiv. It was most likely intended to be a one-off occurrence to provide additional assistance while aid is stalled. However, US House Speaker Mike Johnson did state on 14 March that he is prepared to approve spending legislation for Ukraine, but that the upcoming package will look ‘substantially different’ to the original USD 60 bn aid package promoted by the Biden administration. This reflects a shift in Johnson’s stance, though it remains to be seen how watered down the legislation will be, or whether Democrats and pro-Ukrainian Republicans will back the bill.
  • AID: According to the US Department of Defense (DOD), the confirmed USD 300 m package includes stinger anti-aircraft missiles, additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), artillery rounds and other capabilities. Politico reported on 12 March that the US is planning to send additional Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) as part of the package, citing unspecified US officials. ATACMS did not appear on the official list of capabilities to be sent to Ukraine. However, Politico reported that officials did not disclose that they were providing ATACMS in last summer’s first shipment due to operational security concerns.
  • ECONOMY: Bloomberg reported on 13 March that Ukraine’s targeting of Russian oil facilities impacted almost a fifth of Russia’s crude-processing capacity in February alone. Drone attacks have struck numerous refinery sites across European Russia; this is set to continue in the coming months. However, despite these attacks, the industry was showing signs of recovery by early March. Russia’s seaborne crude exports surged to their highest level so far this year in the week to 10 March at 3.7 m barrels per day (bpd). The Ukrainian leadership has attempted to justify such strikes by claiming that Ukraine targets facilities that finance Russia’s war effort. As such, these attacks will highly likely continue in the coming months with the goal of undermining Russia’s ability to generate revenue.
  • NUCLEAR: President Vladimir Putin implied in an interview with state-controlled media on 13 March that Moscow is ready to use nuclear weapons if the existence of the Russian state is under threat; this essentially reiterates Russian nuclear doctrine. Putin said that Russia is always in a state of nuclear readiness, but that he does not perceive the threat of a nuclear war to be imminent. The Russian president stated that Moscow would treat the deployment of US troops on Russian territory or to Ukraine as an ‘intervention’ and implied that Ukraine is a matter of ‘life and death’ for Russia, hinting at the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons in response – though this was not made explicitly.
  • NUCLEAR: White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre stated later on 13 March that the US interpreted Putin’s remarks as re-emphasising Russia’s nuclear doctrine. Jean-Pierre added that Washington DC sees no reason to adjust its own nuclear posture, nor has it seen any indication that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon against Ukraine. Ultimately, we assess that Moscow remains highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons against the West or Ukraine for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, such comments are highly likely aimed at heightening Western concerns of a nuclear escalation to deter support for Ukraine and for Russia’s domestic audience’s consumption ahead of the presidential election on 15-17 March.
  • NUCLEAR: In a separate development on 14 March, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that it had received reports of an ‘attack’ against the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), though this is unconfirmed. At time of writing, Russian sources have claimed that a Ukrainian drone dropped an explosive device on the site. As we have previously assessed, even if a major conventional attack was launched against the nuclear plant (which remains highly unlikely), it would be extremely unlikely to result in a major nuclear incident. Please see Sibylline Special Report – Ukraine – 19 July 2023 for further analysis.
  • MOBILISATION: The Financial Times (FT) reported on 13 March that Ukraine needs 500,000 military recruits and that an estimated 3.7 m men out of Ukraine’s 11.1 m male population are eligible for mobilisation. However, Ukraine’s MoD commented that 400,000-500,000 men is a general estimate that will be adjusted depending on the situation at the front. The MoD also said that it does not expect that 500,000 men will be mobilised immediately. The comments were highly likely aimed at dispelling concerns about an impending mass wave of mobilisation given that legislation to allow for this has proven to be contentious across Ukrainian society (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 8 February 2024).

FORECAST

BELGOROD: On 12 March, various pro-Ukrainian Russian armed units conducted a raid into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts (Russia). Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) confirmed that elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) and Siberian Battalion took part in the incursion, though at time of writing it remains unclear how far these forces have penetrated inside Russia and whether they still control a small area along the border of both Belgorod and Kursk oblasts.

The LSR claimed on 13 March that it had seized part of the border town of Tetkino, located around 85 miles (137km) west of Kursk city, though footage published by the group to prove its claim has seemingly been geolocated to Ryzhivka (Sumy oblast), just across the border from Tetkino inside Ukraine. Russian sources and officials meanwhile claimed that their border guards successfully repulsed all cross-border incursions. The groups also issued a joint statement on 13 March encouraging civilians to leave the region; on 14 March they warned that their forces will open fire on ‘military targets’ in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts. Further unconfirmed drone footage published by the RDK and LSR claims to show Russian forces surrendering inside Russia, though it remains unclear whether this footage is genuine.

The timing of the cross-border raids is almost certainly aimed at undermining Russian President Vladimir Putin’s position ahead of this weekend’s presidential election, which runs between 15 and 17 March. Voting is already underway in the occupied territories. Pro-Ukrainian all-Russian forces have previously launched raids into Russia amid claims that they were setting conditions for mass opposition to Putin’s government. The latest raids are likely aimed at promoting a similar anti-Kremlin narrative and will likely be accompanied by high-intensity Ukrainian drone strikes against military and industrial targets across Russia during the election period. Putin himself acknowledged the RDK and LSR raids as an attempt to disrupt the elections and seize territory in a bid improve Ukraine’s negotiating position during future peace talks. For further analysis on earlier all-Russian Ukrainian raids.

 *Moldova: Pro-Russia actors will likely increase hoax threats ahead of presidential vote. The press secretary of Moldova’s General Police Inspectorate, Diana Fetco, stated on 11 March that an unknown individual falsely reported the presence of landmines at a school in the capital Chișinău. Fetco disclosed that the security services inspected the Gheorghe Asachi Lyceum, where no mines were found. According to preliminary findings in the investigation, an unidentified caller from the pro-Russia breakaway region of Transnistria made the hoax alert. The Moldovan authorities announced in February that reports about impending ‘terror attacks’ against educational institutions in Bălți, the country’s second-largest city, were false. Nevertheless, the recent incident comes amid particularly heightened regional tensions between the central Moldovan authorities and Transnistria (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 27 February 2024). The hoax alert aligns with our assessment that false bomb scares and attack threats are likely to increase ahead of the presidential election this autumn to invoke public panic.

*Poland: Warsaw will remain steadfast supporter of Ukraine, leading European defence actor. On 12 March, Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Andrzej Duda jointly called on their NATO allies to increase defence spending during a visit to Washington DC (US). They urged the US to end the political impasse over aid to Ukraine. The rare display of unity between the two political rivals underscores the extent to which there is bipartisan support for pro-Ukraine foreign policy in Poland. Warsaw is on track to spend 4% of its GDP on defence in 2024, the highest contribution within NATO measured by share of real GDP. As we forecasted, the Tusk administration has so far committed to honouring large defence contracts signed by the previous government. On 15 March, Tusk is set to meet his German and French counterparts under the so-called ‘Weimar Triangle’; the meeting will aim to showcase European unity in support of Kyiv following a French-German diplomatic spat in recent weeks.

*Lithuania: Assault underscores elevated risks facing Russian dissidents ahead of presidential vote. On 12 March, a prominent Russian opposition figure, Leonid Volkov, was attacked and hospitalised in the capital Vilnius. The assault reportedly took place outside his home at around 2200hrs (local time); he has since been discharged from hospital. The assault was likely part of an attempt to crack down on Russian dissident activity ahead of the Russian presidential election on 15-17 March, against which Volkov had issued calls to protest. Lithuania has a significant Russian minority population – elements of which Moscow will likely leverage for illicit activities. Lithuania is likely to experience further disruptive incidents similar to the hoax bomb alerts at Vilnius (VNO) and Kaunas (KUN) airports in November 2023. Ultimately, the assault underscores the elevated physical security threats facing Russian dissidents across Europe, particularly in the lead-up to 15-17 March. We assess that the risk of Russian influence operations, including sabotage and intimidation, will remain heightened in 2024.

*Armenia-Russia: Moscow will likely increase destabilisation efforts if Yerevan distances itself further. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan warned again on 12 March that Armenia will leave the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Pashinyan stated that the bloc must clarify its ‘zone of responsibility’ in the country and pledge to defend Armenia against military aggression. He stated that if the CSTO’s answers correspond to Armenia’s expectations, Yerevan’s issue with the military organisation will cease. However, Pashinyan did not specify when Armenia would withdraw from the organisation. The prime minister also announced that the work of Russian border guards servicing the capital Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport (EVN) will end on 1 August. Tensions between Armenia and its traditional strategic partner Russia have been particularly heightened in recent months. Yerevan’s growing pivot away from Moscow will likely increase the risk of Russian destabilisation efforts in the coming months, particularly if the Armenian leadership advances to leave the CSTO.

Mar 11.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • DONETSK: Russian advances west of Avdiivka have slowed, as Ukrainian forces claim they have stabilised the frontline amid increased efforts to build fixed defences
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian forces have launched a large-scale drone attack this week, including strikes against a likely key aircraft refurbishment site in Rostov oblast
  • AVIATION: The Ukrainian Infrastructure Ministry has submitted proposals to European and US regulators to restore air travel in Ukraine; Lviv and Kyiv airports would be the most likely to reopen, but this is unlikely to be realised in the short-term
  • FORECAST: The German Foreign Minister has indicated she is open to UK proposals to send Taurus long-range cruise missiles to the UK, to allow the transfer in turn of additional Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine
  • BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 10 March indicate that Russian forces have advanced into the centre of Ivanivske, located due west of Bakhmut. Russian sources have claimed in recent days that Russia now controls over 80% of the settlement, though this cannot be confirmed – it remains likely that Russian forces currently control at least half of the settlement.
  • DONETSK: Russian forces have made further marginal advances along the Orlivka-Tonenke-Berdychi line to the west and north-west of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage posted between 8 and 10 March indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the east and south of Berdychi, located five miles (8km) north-west of Avdiivka. Footage also shows that Russian forces have advanced within Tonenke and in central and western Orlivka, both located around four miles (6km) west of Avdiivka. On 8 March, Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyki insisted that these advances were highly localised and that the situation west of Avdiivka had broadly stabilised.
  • DONETSK: On 10 March, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that intensified Ukrainian defence construction efforts are highly likely to reduce Russia’s ability to advance. It noted that these efforts include anti-tank dragon teeth and ditches, minefields and fortified defence positions (akin to Russian fortifications in Zaporizhzhia oblast). Although the DI did not specify the location of these defences, which are likely being constructed across key frontlines, they are almost certainly being built to the west of Avdiivka. The city itself was among Ukraine’s most fortified frontline strongholds and defences immediately to the rear are relatively less secure. The capture of the Donetsk oblast (and by extension, the entirety of the Donbas region) remains one of the key Russian war aims in 2024, necessitating increased focus on constructing highly fortified defences in this sector.
  • KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage posted on 8 March shows that Russian forces likely recently advanced east of Terny, located around nine miles (15km) north-west of Kreminna. Otherwise, positional engagements are ongoing across the frontline, in line with the recent trend.
  • SOUTHERN: Russian sources claimed on 8-9 March that their forces have advanced up to 0.6 miles (1km) north-west of Verbove (Zaporizhzhia oblast), though this remains unconfirmed. Russian forces have been steadily attacking around Robotyne, located six miles (10km) west of Verbove, in a bid to reverse the gains Ukraine made in its 2023 counter-offensive. While Russian forces are steadily advancing, reports of increased Ukrainian drone operations and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities are likely constraining Russian advances.
  • SOUTHERN: Ukrainian and Russian sources have reported over the last week that Russian forces are making greater use of off-road all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to transport infantry on the soythern axis. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi claimed on 8 March that Russian forces are increasingly relying on ATVs because Ukrainian forces are destroying standard military vehicles. It remains unclear whether this increased use of ATVs is due to shortages of military armoured vehicles, but it could also realistically reflect Russian experimentation with faster vehicles designed to present a more difficult target for Ukraine first-person view (FPV) drones and other munitions.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 9-10 March, Russian forces launched four S-300 missiles and 39 Shahed drones at targets in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Odesa, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that it intercepted 35 of the drones and that most of the targets were destroyed, though the omission of data on the S-300s indicates that they were likely not intercepted. This attack was preceded by a smaller Russian drone strike overnight on 8-9 March, during which Ukraine intercepted 12 of 15 drones fired toward Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Poltava oblasts.
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted large-scale drone strikes against Russia’s Kursk and Rostov oblast overnight on 8-9 March. Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that it intercepted 41 drones. Geolocated footage posted on 9 March indicates that the Beriev Aircraft Plant in Taganrog (Rostov oblast), reportedly dedicated to refurnishing A-50 aircraft was struck, though we cannot confirm this. Given the recent downing of two A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, if the site was indeed hit, it would indicate Ukrainian efforts to try to undermine Russia’s AEW&C capability even further – an important operational objective given the recent uptick in Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) operations over the battlefield.
  • STRIKES: Separately, Pulkovo International Airport (LED) in St Petersburg temporarily suspended operations on 10 March following a reported Ukrainian drone attack near the city. Leningrad oblast governor Aleksandr Drozdenko reported that the drone was downed in the village of Fornovoso, though the authorities in neighbouring Novhorod oblast also reported the downing of three drones in that region.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • AVIATION: Earlier on 11 March, Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov disclosed that Ukraine has submitted proposals to European and US regulators to restore air travel in Ukraine. He said Ukraine has sent over its suggestions of how air travel could resume under martial law, risk assessments and different approaches. Kubrakov added that negotiations are ongoing with three unspecified Ukrainian airlines who want to restart operations, noting that Irish low-cost airline Ryanair has also expressed interest in resuming flights once Ukraine’s airspace is reopened.
  • AVIATION: Kubrakov did not specify how many or which airports could potentially reopen. The airports most likely to reopen would highly likely be ones far removed from the frontline and at the lowest risk of being impacted by Russian strikes, namely Lviv Danylo Halytskyi International Airport (LWO), though Boryspil International Airport (KBP) in the capital Kyiv has also conducted flight safety tests in recent months in preparation for a potential resumption of flights (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 20 December 2023). However, even if Ukraine were to resume commercial air travel, the country is still an active warzone and air travel will therefore remain a high risk.
  • AID: CNN reported earlier on 11 March that Russia is producing nearly three times more artillery shells than Europe and the US. The outlet claimed that Russia manufactures around 250,000 artillery munitions per month, or around 3 m annually. Meanwhile, an unnamed senior European intelligence official estimated that Europe and the US have the collective capacity to produce about 1.2 m munitions a year for Ukraine. An unspecified NATO official claimed that Russia is running artillery factories ‘24/7’ on rotating 12-hour shifts while importing supplementary ammunition from its allies, such as Iran and North Korea.
  • AID: However, unspecified Western officials claimed that Russian efforts to ramp up artillery production are still not enough to meet battlefield needs. Overall, Ukraine’s Western-supplied artillery systems are much more accurate than Russia’s, meaning Russian forces will require more ammunition to maintain artillery parity or an advantage than Ukraine. Nevertheless, the officials also assessed that Russian factories will likely reach peak production capacity ‘sometime’ in the next year. While the precise numbers CNN reported cannot be verified, the report aligns with our assessment that ammunition shortages will remain a critical disadvantage for Ukraine in the coming months.
  • NUCLEAR: The New York Times (NYT) reported on 9 March that the US was preparing for the scenario of Russia using nuclear weapons against Ukraine in October 2022. The outlet reported that intelligence revealed that there were frequent conversations within the Russian military about potentially using such weapons during the latter half of 2022. While an unspecified official said some discussions were just ‘chatter’, one intercept detailed that a senior Russian military commander was discussing the logistics of detonating a weapon on the battlefield.
  • NUCLEAR: However, US President Joe Biden was reportedly briefed that there was no evidence of Russia moving weapons, likely indicating that Russia’s military leadership made nuclear threats to deter Ukrainian advances and Western support for Ukraine. Moscow frequently relies on nuclear rhetoric during particularly heightened tensions (such as amid advanced Western aid pledges for Ukraine) and military setbacks. Nevertheless, the CIA later warned that a scenario in which Ukrainian forces looked as if they might attempt to retake Russian-annexed Crimea would elevate the possibility of nuclear use to 50% or higher. Ultimately, the situation in late 2022 was very different to the current situation on the battlefield. As such, we have not changed our assessment of a Russian nuclear escalation and nuclear use on the battlefield. This remains highly unlikely, particularly given that Ukraine is on the backfoot and its capability to conduct large-scale counter-offensive operations remains limited.

FORECAST

AID: On 10 March, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock disclosed that she is open to a proposal from her UK counterpart Lord Cameron that would bolster Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. The scheme envisions Berlin transferring its Taurus cruise missiles to London in exchange for the UK in turn sending Kyiv British Storm Shadow missiles, which Ukraine already has in its arsenal.

Baerbock said such exchanges have already occurred with other materiel, including tanks, which could realistically assuage German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’ concerns of transferring the weapons to Ukraine. Nevertheless, the deputy head of the opposition Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) faction, Johann Wadephul, rejected the idea of an exchange on 10 March. Wadephul insisted that Germany must provide the Taurus missiles directly to Ukraine, adding that no swap can replace their range, precision and penetration. Taurus missiles have significantly longer range than Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles, and as such their transfer to the UK would not actively increase Ukrainian capability.

Scholz will reportedly answer questions from lawmakers in the German parliament, the Bundestag, on 13 March on his reluctance to send the missiles to Ukraine. A vote on a CDU/CSU motion on transferring the capability is expected on 14 March, though we assess that it will likely be unsuccessful. Ultimately, domestic and international pressure will continue to mount on Scholz to provide the equipment, though we assess that he will likely remain reluctant to do so in the coming weeks on the back of recent intelligence lapses and disagreements with NATO allies on providing direct support to Ukraine.

In this respect, Politico reported on 8 March that France is building an alliance of countries that are not against potentially sending Western troops to Ukraine. French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné met with his Baltic and Ukrainian counterparts on 8 March in Lithuania to discuss the possibility that foreign troops could help Ukraine with issues such as demining. Séjourné said that it is not Russia’s prerogative to set red lines or dictate how the West should aid Ukraine in the coming months or years, including how Kyiv’s allies deploy their ‘actions’. Meanwhile, Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis echoed his French counterpart’s remarks and insisted that no form of support for Ukraine can be excluded.

The development underscores France’s efforts to fashion itself as an assertive actor in European security through strategic ambiguity and increasing support for Ukraine amid concerns over the trajectory of the US (dis)continuing its support. The Baltic states remain considerably more hawkish in support for Kyiv, which could realistically mean that Paris will bolster its engagement with them in the coming months. Differing risk thresholds for possible escalation with Russia among NATO members will highly likely persist across the course of the war, preventing a consensus across the alliance. As such, this is likely to mean that support for Ukraine at any level will continue to be organised among ‘coalitions of the willing’, rather than forming a united NATO approach.

*Kazakhstan-Russia: IS affiliates will likely continue to pose credible threat to Russian urban centres. Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee confirmed on 9 March that two Kazakh citizens were killed in an anti-terrorism operation that reportedly prevented an attack against a synagogue in Moscow (Russia). Reports on 8 March indicate that the two men arrived in Russia on 28 February. In addition, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) reported on 7 March that its officers neutralised members of an Islamic State (IS) cell in Kaluga oblast who were planning to attack an unnamed synagogue in Moscow. The US embassy in Moscow later reported that unspecified ‘extremists’ had ‘imminent plans’ to target large gatherings in the following 48 hours in the Russian capital (see Sibylline Alert – Russia – 8 March 2024). While it remains unclear if the raid and warning were connected, no terror attack took place in Moscow during the timeframe specified, indicating the FSB raid likely thwarted any such plot. Nevertheless, the development underscores the continual threat of IS-affiliated individuals travelling to Russia (including Moscow) from Central Asia to carry out attacks.

*Armenia: Proposed EU application will elevate Russian destabilisation risks in coming months. In an interview with Turkish media published on 8 March, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan disclosed that Armenia is considering applying for EU membership. However, Mirzoyan stated that while Armenians have ‘European aspirations’, there is significant uncertainty as to whether Yerevan will join the bloc. Armenian media reported on 5 March that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan wants Yerevan to apply for EU membership by the autumn at the latest. The development comes amid particularly strained relations between Yerevan and Russia – Armenia’s traditional strategic partner. In recent months, Armenia has sought to increase co-operation with Western partners, principally France. We assess that Yerevan’s growing pivot away from Moscow will increase the likelihood of Russian destabilisation efforts in Armenia in the coming months, particularly if progress is made towards securing EU membership – which Moscow will likely seek to prevent. In the worst-case scenario, Moscow would possibly support or facilitate a coup attempt to derail Yerevan’s ambitions to align itself closer with the West, though we assess that this remains unlikely in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

15 Mar 24. Portugal pledges $109m to Czech scheme on ammunition for Ukraine. Portugal will contribute 100m euros ($109m) to a Czech-led initiative seeking to deliver ammunition to Ukraine from third nations, the country’s defence ministry said.

The ministry said the initiative aimed to quickly deliver the largest possible quantity of ammunition of various calibres, particularly 155mm..

“The use of these munitions on the battlefield has reached extremely high levels, which makes it vital and urgent for Ukraine to obtain additional munitions to respond to Russia’s continued and more intense attacks,” it said in a statement late on Thursday.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on Thursday that Ukraine was running out of ammunition in its war against Russia’s invasion and that the allies were not doing enough to help Kyiv.

Ammunition supplies have become a critical issue for Ukraine as fighting against Russia’s invasion has entered its third year, descending into grinding artillery battles. ($1 = 0.9185 euros)  (Source: Reuters)

 

14 Mar 24. Europe will lose all credibility if Russia wins in Ukraine, warns Macron.

Europe’s credibility will be destroyed if Russia is allowed to win in Ukraine, Emmanuel Macron has warned, as he defended his refusal to rule out sending troops to the country.

“If Russia wins the war in Ukraine, Europe’s credibility would be reduced to zero,” he said in a prime-time interview on his stance on the conflict.

The French president invoked Winston Churchill’s call to maintain the “sinews of peace” as he defended his earlier comments suggesting Western ground troops could be deployed to Ukraine.

Churchill famously called on the UN to keep Russia in check in 1946 “supported by the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections”.

‘Ukraine war is existential for Europe’

The war in Ukraine is “existential for our Europe and for France”, Mr Macron said in the interview on France 2 and TF1.

“Do you think that the Poles, the Lithuanians, the Estonians, the Romanians and the Bulgarians could remain at peace for a second [in the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine]?” he asked. “If Russia wins this war, Europe’s credibility would be reduced to zero.”

Asked to clarify his stance on sending ground troops, the French president said: “We will never go on the offensive, we will never take the initiative.

“France is a force for peace … Today, in order to have peace in Ukraine, we must not be weak, and so we must look at the situation lucidly and say with determination, strong will and courage that we are ready to use all the means at our disposal to achieve our objective, which is that Russia should not win.”

The French leader reiterated his position that sending Western troops into Ukraine should not be ruled out, but said that today’s situation does not require that.

‘All options are possible’

“We’re not in that situation today,” Mr Macron said, but added that “all these options are possible”.

“There is an escalation on the part of Russia and we are simply saying regarding that escalation we are prepared to respond,” he said.

Mr Macron said anybody advocating “limits” on aid to Ukraine “chooses defeat”.

He said there had been “too many limits in our vocabulary” since the Russian invasion in February 2022.

“Two years ago we said we would never send tanks. We did. Two years ago, we said we would never send medium-range missiles. We did,” he said.

In a post-interview statement, the French president said Russia would not halt its territorial ambitions if it wins its war in Ukraine, posing a threat to the neighbouring countries of Moldova, Romania and Poland.

“Russia has become a power that wants to expand and it’s clear that it will not stop there,” Macron posted on X. “If we abandon Ukraine, if we let Ukraine lose this war, Russia will surely threaten Moldova, Romania, Poland.”

The live interview, to be broadcast by TF1 and France 2, came after the French parliament debated the country’s Ukraine strategy.

Both the National Assembly and the Senate approved in symbolic votes the 10-year bilateral security agreement signed last month between Mr Macron and Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president.

Mr Macron is set to meet Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, and Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, in Berlin on Friday in a summit meant to show unity.

The French president appeared isolated on the European stage after his remarks at a Paris conference on Ukraine prompted an outcry from other leaders.

‘We will not abandon Ukraine’

Mr Scholz, in particular, appeared to contradict his French counterpart, saying participants had agreed there would be “no ground troops” on Ukrainian soil sent by European states.

French officials later sought to clarify Mr Macron’s remarks and tamp down the backlash, while insisting on the need to send a clear signal to Russia that it cannot win in Ukraine.

Speaking at the National Assembly, Gabriel Attal, the prime minister, said Mr Macron’s message “has been very clear: we will not abandon Ukraine and we are not ruling out any option on principle”.

France is not “waging war against Russia” and “rejects any escalation”, Mr Attal said, and he added: “We don’t set ourselves limits against Russia, which doesn’t set any [limits] for itself.”

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

13 Mar 24. Vladimir Putin has said Russia is prepared for a nuclear war, delivering a crude warning to the west as his army advances on the Ukrainian battlefield more than two years into its full-scale invasion. The Russian president boasted that his nuclear forces were on “constant alert”, claimed that Russia had surpassed the US in developing a new generation of nuclear-capable weapons and said testing could resume in a state television interview broadcast on Wednesday. “From the military-technical point of view we are, of course, prepared,” Putin said. “[The US is] developing their components. So are we. That doesn’t mean, in my view, that they are prepared to start this nuclear war tomorrow. If they are — what can we do? We’re prepared.” Putin, who is expected to cruise to victory in elections this weekend that will extend his 24-year rule until at least 2030, resumed his blunt threats about Moscow’s readiness to use nuclear weapons and expressed confidence that Russia was winning the war in Ukraine. Though Putin said there had “never been the need” to use a tactical nuclear weapon, he added that he could do so if there was a threat to the “existence of the Russian state” or “damage to our sovereignty and independence”, as outlined in Russia’s nuclear doctrine. “Weapons are there to be used,” Putin said.

The comments underscore how Russia’s military has trained to potentially use tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield at remarkably low thresholds in the early stages of a conflict, including against major world powers, according to leaked classified files seen by the Financial Times. Putin also claimed that he had not considered using a tactical nuclear weapon at Russia’s lowest point in Ukraine in the autumn of 2022 when his forces made humiliating retreats in the eastern regions of Kharkiv and Kherson. Then, the US, UK, and France were sufficiently worried Putin could do so that they delivered a joint message to Russia vowing to retaliate to a tactical nuclear strike in Ukraine with conventional weapons. Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who has given Russia an economic lifeline against western sanctions and offered his tacit backing for the invasion, also warned Putin against using nuclear weapons in Ukraine during a visit to Moscow last year. In the wake of the warnings, Putin abandoned his rhetoric and did not mention tactical nuclear weapons publicly for several months. According to people close to the Kremlin, he had projected scenarios resulting from the use of tactical nuclear weapons and independently decided they would not give Russia an advantage. Instead, Russia halted its participation in the New Start treaty and deratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban treaty, moves experts say are aimed at using Russia’s nuclear arsenal for political pressure without explicitly threatening to use it. Putin said Russia could resume nuclear testing in response to a test by the US. “I’d have to think some more, but I can’t rule out that we would do the same,” he said. “We are always ready. These aren’t regular arms, these are forces that are on constant alert.” (Source: FT.com)

 

12 Mar 24. DOD Able to Send Additional Assistance to Ukraine Using Unexpected Army Savings. The Defense Department today announced additional security assistance for Ukraine. Included in this assistance are artillery rounds and rockets for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. The package totals $300 m.

This latest round of presidential drawdown authority, or PDA, is the first this year and was made possible after the Army negotiated a lower price for replacing supplies already sent to Ukraine. With that finding, additional funds became available.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, the U.S. has provided some $44.2bn in security assistance to Ukraine. That assistance has come through either PDA, where with presidential approval equipment can be withdrawn from existing U.S. military inventory and then shipped to Ukraine, or through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, where the U.S. commits to buying new equipment for Ukraine from defense contractors.

Funds for USAI have run out, and the U.S. can no longer buy equipment for Ukraine unless Congress provides more money.

With PDA, equipment taken from U.S. inventory must eventually be replaced with new equipment paid for with replenishment funds that must also be authorized by Congress. While the Defense Department has been authorized by the president to pull even more equipment from its inventory for Ukraine, Congress has not agreed to provide additional funds to replace that equipment. Sending more equipment without the promise of funds to replace it would be risky for DOD and would affect national security.

As a result of USAI funding running out and inadequate replenishment funding to replace equipment sent to Ukraine through PDA, DOD had stopped sending support to Ukraine. The latest round of PDA was made possible when the Army found additional funds after renegotiating contract costs to replace equipment that’s already been sent to Ukraine.

This PDA package is unique in that regard, and a senior defense official said Tuesday that the DOD can’t expect to continue assisting Ukraine using cost savings.

“We had savings come in that will allow us to offset the cost of a new drawdown package,” said a senior defense official today. “The savings that have come in here are going to help square the circle of what the secretary said of needing to have new funding come in to be comfortable doing any more drawdown. We have funds come in that can cover the cost of one more package. But this is a bit of an ad hoc or one-time shot. We don’t know if or when future savings will come in. And we certainly can’t count on this as a way of doing business.”

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said the security assistance announced today will provide much-needed ammunition to help the Ukrainians, but unless Congress acts to appropriate more funding, the U.S. will no longer be able to help.

“This ammunition will keep Ukraine’s guns firing for a period, but only a short period,” Sullivan said. “This package does not displace and should not delay the critical need to pass the bipartisan national security bill.”

Without additional funding from Congress, Sullivan said, the U.S. cannot continue to support Ukraine’s fight against Russia without impacting its own readiness.

“Congress must act, the House of Representatives must pass the bipartisan national security supplemental as soon as possible,” Sullivan said. “The House has got to pass the supplemental as soon as possible to allow us to continue the flow of vital security … assistance to Ukraine, to replenish the U.S. military’s munitions stocks, to invest in our industrial base, and to support jobs in 40 states across the United States. The world is watching, the clock is ticking, and we need to see action as rapidly as possible.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

12 Mar 24. Biden Administration Announces Urgent Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance as an extraordinary measure to address some of Ukraine’s most pressing security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s fifty-fifth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package is valued at up to $300m and includes capabilities to support Ukraine’s immediate air defense, artillery, and anti-tank requirements.

With a lack of replacement funds available to replenish DoD inventories, the Administration had been forced to pause PDA packages since December 2023. DoD is able to support this extraordinary package after identifying contract savings from previously appropriated supplemental funding that can be applied to replace DoD stocks. Today’s announcement provides a short-term stop gap, but it is nowhere near enough to meet Ukraine’s battlefield needs. Without supplemental funding, DoD will remain hard-pressed to meet Ukraine’s capability requirements at a time when Russia is pressing its attacks against Ukrainian forces and cities.

The capabilities in this announcement include:

  • Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
  • Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
  • 155mm artillery rounds, including High Explosive and Dual Purpose Improved Cluster Munitions rounds;
  • 105mm artillery rounds;
  • AT-4 anti-armor systems;
  • Additional rounds of small arms ammunition;
  • Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing; and
  • Spare parts, maintenance, and other ancillary equipment.

U.S. leadership is essential to sustaining the historic efforts of some 50 allies and partners from around the globe that have committed more than $87bn in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia launched its unprovoked, full-scale invasion in February 2022 – a war of choice that continues to undermine global security and stability.

Security assistance for Ukraine remains a smart investment in our national security. It deters potential aggression elsewhere in the world, while strengthening our defense industrial base and creating highly skilled jobs for the American people. The current supplemental request includes over $50bn that could be invested in the United States. Funding from previous supplementals has enabled DoD to invest over $30 bn across nearly 40 states. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

14 Mar 24. Ukrainian Drones Damage Russian Oil Refineries in Second Day of Attacks. Ukraine struck Russian oil refineries in a second day of heavy drone attacks on Wednesday, causing a fire at Rosneft’s biggest refinery in what President Vladimir Putin said was an attempt to disrupt his country’s presidential election this week.

Russia and Ukraine have both used drones to strike critical infrastructure, military installations and troop concentrations in their more than two-year war, with Kyiv stepping up attacks on Russian refineries and energy facilities in recent months.

A day after seriously damaging Lukoil’s NORSI refinery in Nizhny Novgorod, Ukrainian drone attacks hit refineries in the Rostov and Ryazan regions, Russian officials said.

In Ryazan 180 kms (110 miles) from Moscow, a drone attack caused a fire at Rosneft’s refinery, Russia’s seventh largest and there were initial reports of injuries, governor Pavel Malkov said. In a later update he said the fire had been extinguished.

Two sources familiar with the situation told Reuters that the refinery had been forced to shut down two primary oil refining units. Rosneft did not reply to a request for comment.

In Rostov, there were no casualties but the Novoshakhtinsk refinery was forced to halt operations and damage was being assessed, regional governor Vasily Golubev said.

A Ukrainian source told Reuters the drone attacks were conducted by Ukraine’s SBU security service.

“We are systematically implementing a detailed, calculated strategy to reduce Russia’s economic potential,”

the source said.

Ukrainian defence forces, the source added, also conducted overnight drone attacks on a Russian airbase in Buturlinovka and a military airfield in Voronezh region.

Strikes on oil refineries – a key source of Russia’s income – have the potential to reduce the country’s output of gasoline and diesel and push up prices. Russia imposed a six-month ban on gasoline exports on March 1.

Putin, in remarks published on Wednesday, accused Kyiv of attempts to interfere with the March 15-17 presidential election through its attacks.

“The main goal, I have no doubt about it, is to – if not to disrupt the presidential elections in Russia – then at least somehow interfere with the normal process of expressing the will of citizens,”

Putin told Russia’s RIA state news agency and Rossiya-1 state television in a wide-ranging interview.

Putin, who launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago, is nearly certain to win the vote.

DRONE WAR

“I think everyone can see our drones in action. Particularly in long-range action,”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in his nightly address on Tuesday.

Russian media said around 60 drones had been destroyed over Russian sovereign territory over just several hours on Wednesday.

Russia’s RIA state news agency said four Ukrainian drones attacked the Ryazan plant in the early hours, leading to a 175 square metre blaze.

Unverified video footage posted on social media showed a plume of black smoke soaring above flames at the plant, which refines about 12.7 m metric tons of oil a year, or 4.6% of the Russian total, according to industry sources.

It accounts for about 6.4% of Russia’s gasoline production, 4.1% of diesel, 7.7% of fuel oil and 8% of aviation fuel, according to the sources. Full Russian production figures are no longer published.

A drone was destroyed by air defences on its approach to the Kirishi refinery, Russia’s second largest, in the north of Russia, Alexander Drozdenko, the Leningrad region’s governor, said. There was no impact on the refinery’s work, he said. (Source: UAS VISION/yahoo! news)

 

12 Mar 24. Artillery ammunition in US package for Ukraine to last a matter of weeks. The US Department of Defense identified savings from contract negotiations that were pooled together to create new $300m package for Ukraine.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) has announced a new $300m military security package for Ukraine drawn from funds saved from US stock replenishment contract negotiations, with artillery ammunition at the centre of resources provided.

With the multi-bn-dollar supplemental budget for Ukraine still waiting to pass through Congress as Republican lawmakers seek domestic concessions from their Democrat counterparts, US funding ground to a halt at the back end of 2023. However, in a round of contract negotiations to replenish US inventory, savings were identified and set aside to produce another security package for Kyiv.

Equipment and items contained in the now 55th US security assistance package to Ukraine include HIMARS munitions and 155mm artillery rounds, as well as an undisclosed number of Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM).

The DPICM is a cluster munition – classified as the M77 munition when such capabilities were permitted in US Army service – and can be fired by the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

A US DoD spokesperson said that it had “unexpectedly” been able to put together the military assistance package for Ukraine, with the munitions to sustain Ukrainian forces “in the weeks” timeframe.

Ukraine is critically short of ammunition, particularly for its 155mm and other artillery calibres, as Russian forces reportedly continue to make gains westwards following the fall of Avdiivka in February.

The DoD spokesperson added that the method for securing funding for the new package was an “unsustainable” way to support Ukraine “in the long run”, repeating calls for the approximate $60bn supplementary budget request to be approved.

“I don’t foresee we are going to be able to do future [Presidential Drawdown Authority] like this, certainly not in any sustainable [way],” the spokesperson said.

Outlining US packages for Ukraine since 2022

The new security package comes around two-and-a-half months after the last announcement was made, on 27 December 2023, when the DoD stated it would be providing around $250m worth of military equipment, including artillery ammunition, anti-tank weapons, and other critically needed materiel.

By 27 December last year, the US had provided to Ukraine more than $44.2bn in security assistance since Russia’s large-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. Along with significant quantities of heavy armour and artillery systems, the DoD had provided in excess of two m 155mm artillery rounds and more than 800,000 105mm artillery shells.

Of armour and other vehicles provided to Ukraine, this included 31 M1A1 Abrams tanks, 45 T-72B tanks, 186 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, 189 Stryker armoured personnel carriers (APC), 300 M113 APCs, 250 M1117 armoured security vehicles, over 500 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs), and more than 2,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), commonly known as the Humvee. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

12 Mar 24. US proposes lowest Ukraine FMF package since 2018. The provision of FMF was used as a key lever to generate security assistance to Ukraine, but the latest US commitment for FY2025 is the lowest for nearly a decade.

The administration of US President Joe Biden has proposed a FY2025 provision to Ukraine of the lowest Foreign Military Financing (FMF) package since 2018, as part of his national Presidential Budget Request intended to address a range of domestic and foreign policy targets.

Whilst at its core a humanitarian crisis, the Russian invasion of Ukraine risks adding materially to existing global economic and supply challenges. We are likely heading into a period in which geopolitics will become a regular part of boardroom…

Released on 11 March 2024, the White House revealed that the FY2025 Presidential Budget will commit just $95m in FMF aid to Kyiv. Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, is used by the US State Department as a foreign policy tool to promote US interests with “coalition partners and friendly foreign governments”, providing military training and equipment.

Not since 2016, when the US provided FMF assistance to Ukraine of $85m, has Washington provided a lower package to Kyiv.

A statement release by the Office of the Spokesperson of the US State Department stated that $482m had been requested for Ukraine. However, when broken down much of this is committed to non-military programmes such as economic recovery efforts and assistance to Kyiv’s planned EU accession.

Less than 20% of the planned assistance will go on funding directed towards military requirements.

“With the support of its partners, Ukraine can and will defend its sovereignty and democracy,” the State Department’s Office of the Spokesperson stated.

According to the latest data from the US Congressional Research Service (CRS), the US used FMF assistance to Ukraine heavily in 2022, the year of Russia’s invasion, committing $1.3bn to Ukraine. In 2023, the US committed $325m as other funding routes, such as the Presidential Drawdown Authority packages, came online to provide tens of bns of dollars in military financial aid to Ukraine.

US military assistance funding to Ukraine has now dried up, with a late-2023 additional supplemental package still being held up by Republican lawmakers looking to extract concessions from the incumbent Democrat administration.

In effect, the US is no longer able to sustain Ukraine’s fight against Russia, with the latter country having achieved notable successes on the battlefield in recent months, recently seizing the symbolic town of Avdiivka in eastern Ukraine. Moscow’s forces are continuing to push westwards, with Ukraine’s forces starved of much-need ammunition amid wider battlefield shortages.

Earlier, on 6 March 2024, in a statement seemingly disassociated with the realities of the Ukraine-Russia war, the US State Department announced the creation of a “Ukraine Cities Partnership for Sustainable Urban Recovery”, a new public-private partnership intended “to help Ukrainians redesign and rebuild sustainable, inclusive, and resilient cities”.

The Ukraine war has so far seen over 500,000 military casualties and the near complete destruction of dozens of towns and villages in the east of the country. In November 2023 the United Nations estimated that nearly 30,000 civilians had been killed or injured in the Ukraine-Russia war.

Russia expands process of “Russification” of occupied Ukraine

Domestic politics in the US will have had a significant impact on President Biden’s FY2025 budget request, with a national election due later in the year. According to IPSOS polling data, President Biden is trailing former Republican President Donald Trump, who will campaign for re-election under the Republican banner.

It is widely expected that a US administration under Republican President Trump’s leadership will see military funding to Ukraine ended, providing Russia with renewed emphasis to continue his ambitions to seize the capital Kyiv, and with it, the potential capitulation of Ukraine.

(Source: army-technology.com)

 

13 Mar 24. Ukraine troops will start to get artillery shells under Czech scheme by June. Outgunned Ukrainian troops fighting Russian forces will start to receive artillery rounds under a Czech-led initiative to boost supplies by June at the latest, a senior Czech official said on Wednesday.

“First deliveries from the so-called ‘Czech ammunition initiative’ can be expected in Ukraine in June at the latest,” National Security Adviser Tomas Pojar told Reuters.

The Czech confirmation on the timeline follows a comment on expected ammunition delivery in the “foreseeable future” from Kyiv’s top diplomat earlier on Wednesday.

Prague located 800,000 artillery rounds in third countries earlier this year to supply to Ukraine and says it raised enough funding from allies to purchase a first batch of 300,000 on March 8.

“This week, we are going to contact our Czech colleagues, when they will introduce a detailed supply plan on how this is going to work,” Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told a news conference in Kyiv.

The delivery of the shells under the initiative will be staggered over the year and initial deliveries “will not take many months”, he said. Work was under way to secure funding for similar other initiatives, he added.

“The Czech initiative is great but it’s far from sufficient, said Kuleba. “If, besides the Czech initiative, two more initiatives are implemented this year … the Russian troops in Ukraine will face more significant problems on the front line.”

Kyiv has relied heavily on Western military assistance throughout the full-scale war launched by Russia in February, 2022. But a major new package of U.S. military aid has been held up for months in Congress facing Republican resistance.

Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov said earlier this year that “shell hunger” was a big problem for Ukrainian forces as international partners raced to amp up the production as Russia advanced in the east.

(Source: Reuters)

 

11 Mar 24. Sergey Mironov: “The formation of a military coalition of Russophobes will endanger the whole of Europe; Russia offers an alternative.” Sergey Mironov, chairman of the party and leader of A Just Russia – Patriots – For Truth faction in the State Duma, commented on France’s attempts to form a coalition to fight Russia in Ukraine.

“Every time belligerent statements are heard from Paris, everyone remembers Napoleon. But the current French leader is no match for his predecessor. Macron’s shocking anti-Russian statements are explained not by his Napoleonic ambitions and certainly not by his abilities, but by politicking, PR and a thirst for revenge for Africa, irrevocably leaving French influence. And also by faith in his own impunity, because he is convinced that he will calmly complete his term and retire to an honorable political pension. Believing he would not go, for example, to St. Helena island or to the dock in Nuremberg.

Macron’s dream of putting together a coalition of Russophobes to inflict a decisive defeat on Russia is not new. But all Russophobes do not teach lessons of history well. Otherwise, they would have known that any attempts to deceive or restrain Russia by force ended very badly – Russia always returns, and even stronger than it was. Does Macron think that he will have a small, victorious war somewhere far from the borders of France? In these dreams, he was stuck somewhere in the time of Napoleon, that is, more than a hundred years before the invention of nuclear weapons. At the beginning of the 19th century, it took the Russian army almost two years to reach Paris. Today, the Russian Sarmat missile can reach the capital of France in two minutes.

Russia does not want such a development. And there is a very reasonable alternative to this: to recognize Russia’s legitimate geopolitical and economic interests and build mutually beneficial relations with it, as has happened more than once in our common history. Not to dictate, but to negotiate, not to threaten, but to respect – this is how Russia proposes the West to behave. Fair and square. The well-being of Europe is already being severely tested by politicians like Macron. It is important not to allow the very existence of Europe to be put at risk.”

 

10 Mar 24. Canada’s NASAMS for Ukraine delayed by US funding issues.

Air Defense Canada Military assistance NASAMS Ukraine USA

The NASAMS air defense system, which Canada purchased for Ukraine, is currently stuck in the United States.

This information was reported by the Edmonton Journal.

The $406m order was reportedly made more than a year ago and still hasn’t been completed.

“The Americans have to secure the funding in order to finalize the contracts (with manufacturer Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace),” said Minister of National Defence of Canada Bill Blair.

Without a piggybacked deal to acquire NASAMS as part of the normal procurement process, it would take years, Blair said.

“We’ve tried to expedite that,” Blair said. “Unfortunately the Americans ran into some challenges in their own funding envelope.”

The Canadian Minister of Defense added that all parties understand the importance of implementing this project.

“(Ukraine) said they want us to continue to proceed with the acquisition of those NASAMS missiles as quickly as possible and we’re doing everything as quickly as possible to make that happen.” he said.

Recall that the purchase by Canada of the NASAMS Military air defense system was reported in January 2023.

Then the time frame for the transmission of the system was not specified. Then Militarnyi assumed that given the words about the purchase of these systems in the United States, they would be made from scratch at Raytheon Technologies. In that scenario, production might experience delays because of a backlog in manufacturing.

Recently, it was reported that the Norwegian government was putting forth a proposal to the country’s parliament to approve the acquisition of additional NASAMS air defense systems for Ukraine.

The government proposed the acquisition of ten additional new launchers and four control points from Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace (KDA).

The cost of ordering these elements of the NASAMS air defense system is NOK 3.45 bn. They plan to order equipment in addition to equipment already transferred to Ukraine within the framework of military assistance. (Source: Google/https://mil.in.ua/en)

 

09 Mar 24. Poland’s foreign minister says the presence of NATO forces “is not unthinkable” and that he appreciates the French president for not ruling out that idea.

Radek Sikorski made the observation during a discussion marking the 25th anniversary of Poland’s accession to NATO in the Polish parliament Friday, and the Foreign Ministry tweeted the comments later in English.

They reflect a larger European debate over how to help Ukraine as Russia has gained some momentum on the battlefield and Kyiv is running low on ammunition. The U.S. Congress is withholding aid that Ukraine says it critically needs to hold off the Russians, putting more pressure on Europe to respond to the war that has shattered peace on the continent.

Last month French President Emmanuel Macron said the possibility of Western troops being sent to Ukraine could not be ruled out, a comment that broke a taboo among allies and prompted an outcry from other leaders. French officials later sought to clarify Macron’s remarks and tamp down the backlash, while insisting on the need to send a clear signal to Russia that it cannot win its war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin has warned that if NATO sends combat troops, a direct conflict between the alliance and Russia would be inevitable. Russian President Vladimir Putin said such a move would risk a global nuclear conflict. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/https://apnews.com/)

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