NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 02.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Russian forces are making slow, but steady, incremental advances around Avdiivka, though its seizure is unlikely in the short term
• STRIKES: Senior Russian lawmaker acknowledges that the MoD does not have enough air defence assets to fully protect St Petersburg from Ukrainian drone attacks
• ELECTION: Imprisoned Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny called for Russians opposed to President Vladimir Putin to head en masse to voting stations on 17 March at 1200hrs (local time)
• FORECAST: Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi has published an essay outlining the need for Ukraine to adapt a new strategy in order to seize the initiative on the battlefield and set conditions for victory
• BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
• DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 1 February indicates that Russian forces have made limited advances in the northern outskirts of Avdiivka. Russian forces are broadly been focusing on frontal assaults in southern Avdiivka, but these recent advances indicate that Russian forces have not totally abandoned offensive efforts at the flanks of the city, but the majority of resources are seemingly being prioritised in the south at present. Additional footage from 1 February indicates that Russian troops also made limited progress north-east of Heorhiivka, a settlement located immediately north-west of Marinka to the south.
• KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from February shows that Russian troops advanced east of Tabaivka along the P-07 Kupiansk-Svatove highway. Overall, operations remain on trend along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline, where Russian forces have made only limited gains over the past few weeks.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 1 February indicates that Ukrainian forces have marginally advanced south-west of the village of Staromaiorske, located roughly nine miles (15km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast).
• STRIKES: On 2 February, Ukrainian air defences intercepted 11 of the 24 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia. The projectiles were intercepted over Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson and Kirovohrad. Local authorities indicate that three drones hit Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), causing power outages that affected around 40,000 residents. At the same time, around 100 miners were trapped in two mines due to lack of electricity. On Telegram, Ukrainian authorities said that the attack targeted critical infrastructure facilities.
• STRIKES: On 31 January, Andrei Kartapolov, a senior Duma official, admitted that the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) does not have enough air defence resources to protect St Petersburg (Leningrad oblast) fully against drone attacks. Kartapolov’s statements come after a Ukrainian drone hit an oil depot 12 miles (20km) south-east of St Petersburg’s Kolpino district. On 21 January, Leningrad oblast was the target of another prominent drone attack damaging an oil facility in the port of Ust-Luga, near St Petersburg. Kartapolov’s statements align with our assessment that these attacks have revealed shortcomings in the region’s air defence coverage (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 22 January 2024). Authorities are likely already attempting to offset these limitations ahead of the presidential elections, but limited numbers of S-300 air defence systems will likely limit their ability to do so entirely, and require them to relocate such systems from other regions.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• ELECTION: On 1 February, imprisoned Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny called for Russians opposed to President Vladimir Putin to head en masse to voting stations on 17 March at 1200hrs (local time). Navalny explained that given the Kremlin encourages people to vote for the presidential elections, this would be the safest way for anti-Kremlin critics to showcase their opposition to the regime and the war in Ukraine. His supporters labelled such calls for peaceful protests as ‘Noon Against Putin’, which gained significant traction on social media and media coverage. Amid the ongoing crackdown on potential dissent, Russian authorities will closely monitor the activities of Navalny supporters. The risk of pre-emptive detention of these supporters will increase ahead of the presidential elections to minimise the display of anti-Kremlin sentiment on 17 March. A heavy security presence will be expected around voting stations on that day; with any small-scale anti-Kremlin demonstrations likely to be rapidly dispersed, increasing bystander risks.
• CORRUPTION: Earlier on 2 February, UK Defence Intelligence (DI) assessed that corruption within the Russian military likely significantly undermines its effectiveness and that major progress to reduce graft is unlikely. Russian opposition media reported on 30 January that Russian servicemen can pay bribes to obtain a new rank, time off, a pay rise and avoid punishment for using a smartphone or drunkenness. Although corruption has long been a problem in Russia’s armed forces, the outlet Verstka noted that new services available through bribery have emerged since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, underscoring an endemic corruption problem.
• CORRUPTION: Verstka claimed to have examined over 1,000 verdicts in bribery cases and spoke with military personnel about corruption in the Russian army. Verstka reported that the rate for an injury certificate can be as high as RUB 1 million (just over USD 11,000), while a bribe to avoid being sent to the front can be worth RUB 40,000 (USD 440). Corruption within the Russian armed forces will highly likely to remain an endemic and cultural problem throughout the duration of the war, which will continue to undermine morale, discipline and combat effectiveness.
• CHINA: On 1 February, China reportedly demanded that Ukraine immediately remove several Chinese companies from a list of firms designated as ‘international sponsors of war’ in order to eliminate unspecified ‘negative impacts’. An unspecified Ukrainian official said that the list, which includes corporations Kyiv claims indirectly assist or contribute to Russia’s war efforts, could negatively affect bilateral ties with Beijing. The official stated that Beijing had not set any conditions for Kyiv to remove the 14 Chinese entities, but it remains unclear what Kyiv means by ‘negative impacts’. While the ‘sponsors of war’ list technically has no legal implications for designated companies, it can modestly elevate reputational risks, about which Beijing is likely concerned.
• CHINA: A second unspecified Ukrainian official said China could link the list to Chinese purchases of Ukrainian grain, without providing further specifics. Under the now-suspended Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), China was the largest single buyer of Ukrainian grain, importing 8 million metric tonnes out of a total 33 million. Some 30% of Ukraine’s maritime exports, including food, metals and ore, were shipped to China under a Ukrainian-established Black Sea shipping corridor in August 2023 following the collapse of the BSGI.
• CHINA: Beijing remains highly unlikely to cease close co-operation with Moscow, and it therefore remains uncertain how and if Kyiv will respond in the near term given the importance of Chinese involvement in future peace talks. Ukraine may realistically consider delisting some companies to strengthen relations with China and encourage Beijing to support Kyiv’s conditions for peace when negotiations eventually come to end the war.
• AID: On 1 February, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen disclosed that the EU and its member states have mobilised EUR 28 billion (USD 30.4 billion) worth of military equipment for Ukraine thus far. Von der Leyen also pledged additional tanks, helicopters, air defence systems and missiles, without providing specifics. She said that member states are working to deliver ammunition to Ukraine through various means. However, on 31 January, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, announced that the bloc will supply just over half (524,000, some 52%) of the promised one million artillery shells to Kyiv by March, with a further 630,000 to be delivered by the end of 2024. For further analysis on artillery ammunition shortages, please see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 31 January 2024.
FORECAST
On 1 February, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi published an essay via CNN outlining his strategy for how Ukraine can regain the initiative and prevent the war transitioning into a positional stalemate. Drawing on Soviet military thinkers such as the Odesa-born Alexander Svechin, Zaluzhnyi argues that each war is ‘unique’, and requires a unique strategy to achieve victory. As such, in the essay Zaluzhnyi argues that ‘new innovative approaches can turn this war of position into one of manoeuvre’, and sets out three key priorities the Ukrainian military must focus on in 2024:
1. Creating a system to provide the armed forces with ‘high-tech assets’;
2. ‘Introducing a new philosophy of training and warfare which takes account of restrictions in assets and how they can be deployed’;
3. And ‘mastering new combat capabilities as soon as possible’.
The essay, entitled ‘On the Modern Design of Military Operations in the Russo-Ukrainian War: In the Fight for the Initiative’, builds on Zaluzhnyi’s ideas set out in an Economist article in November 2023 (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 2 November 2023). Specifically, the latest essay sets out the need to adapt to not only the changing conditions on the battlefield, but also the international political situation, which will require Ukraine to prepare for a potential reduction of aid from its Western partners.
Zaluzhnyi placed significant emphasis on rapid technological advancement on the battlefield, including the proliferation of drones, unmanned systems and electronic warfare developments, and the need to maintain the technological advantage in these areas. These new technologies, Zaluzhnyi argues, are ‘almost the only tool’ available to Ukraine to break the current positional form of fighting, which is seeing highly attritional fighting result in few territorial advances. Given the current nature of such positional fighting, Zaluzhnyi argues that Ukraine cannot utilise conventional warfighting methods due to Russia’s advantages in human resources and raw industrial output.
Zaluzhnyi essentially advocates for a strategy based around force multipliers that enable Ukrainian forces to maximise the effect of limited resources and thereafter seize the initiative. In this regard, Zaluzhnyi argues that the creation of a ‘completely new state system of technological re-equipment to utilise these technologically advanced assets must be created’, which he believes is possible within five months.
The essay was reportedly submitted to CNN prior to the circulation of rumours that President Volodymyr Zelensky was looking to dismiss Zaluzhnyi. There is no evidence to indicate that the publication of the essay was timed in response to Zaluzhnyi’s expected dismissal, which could come as early as this week. However, Zaluzhnyi did effectively acknowledge ongoing societal and political issues within Ukraine that are undermining the Ukrainian war effort. Specifically, he contrasts Russia’s ‘significant advantage’ in mobilising human resources with the ‘inability of state institutions in Ukraine to improve the manpower levels of our armed forces without the use of unpopular measures’. This is almost certainly an allusion to the ongoing debate over Zaluzhnyi’s calls to mobilise an additional 500,000 Ukrainians for the war effort; calls which the presidential administration has resisted due to the unpopularity of mobilisation
Such analysis and the timing of the essay’s publication will nevertheless reinforce tensions with the presidential administration given Zaluzhnyi has emerged as an influential intellectual as well as military leader that seeks to influence international opinion on Ukraine’s strategy. Given Zaluzhnyi’s uncertain future, it remains unclear whether his strategy will be adopted, particularly if and when a new pro-Zelensky Commander-in-Chief is appointed. For further analysis on Ukrainian civil-military relations and the prospect of Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal.
Feb 01.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian Defence Minister wrote to his European counterparts this week warning that Ukrainian forces are experiencing a ‘critical’ shortage of artillery shells, which will continue to undermine Ukrainian operations in 2024
STRIKES: Ukrainian forces likely struck various Russian targets near the Belbek Airfield of Sevastopol in Crimea, and have reportedly destroyed a Black Sea Fleet corvette in the latest illustration of Ukraine’s potent maritime drone capabilities
KYIV: Between 1-3 February, military exercises will take place in the Buchansky district on the outskirts of the capital Kyiv
FORECAST: The European Council President announced that EU leaders unanimously agreed on a EUR 50bn financial support package for Ukraine for 2024-2027, marking a major breakthrough for EU aid
OFFENSIVES: According to Bloomberg, Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov wrote to his European counterparts this week warning that Ukrainian forces are experiencing a ‘critical’ shortage of artillery shells. Umerov reportedly confirmed that Ukrainian forces are barely able to fire 2,000 shells per day across the entire 930-mile (1,500km) frontline – less than a third of the weight of fire sustained by Russian forces are present. The critical shortages are only worsening day by day, and will continue to undermine Ukrainian operations and Kyiv’s ability to hold back grinding Russian offensives.
OFFENSIVES: As we had previously forecast, the EU publicly acknowledged on 31 January that it would not meet its pledge to provide Ukraine with one m shells by 1 March 2024. The bloc admitted that it will only be able to provide 600,000 shell. EU leaders stated during a meeting on 31 January that the bloc will soon have the capability to produce one m shells per year and intends to double production to two m shells annually in 2025. However, ongoing production delays and in some instances lacklustre investment to increase military production will continue to undermine Europe’s ability to meet its own goals of military support, even as European leaders seek to increase output to offset any potential reduction in US aid if Donald Trump wins the 2024 US presidential election.
BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 31 January shows that Russian forces made limited advances along the Sportyvna Street, in Avdiivka’s southernmost residential area. Ukrainian Avdiivka authorities have reportedly already evacuated a hundred residents from Avdiivka’s outskirts, where intense fighting is taking place.
KHERSON: Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk reported on 31 January that Russian forces have intensified infantry assaults on the eastern (left) bank of the Dnieper River, where Ukrainian forces retain a bridgehead. Humenyuk also reported that Russian forces are increasing their use of first-person view (FPV) drones. 70 such Russian drone sorties are being made per day, though Humenyuk claims that Ukrainian forces can target half of this number with small arms fire and electronic warfare capabilities. Russian sources also assessed on 1 February that they estimated as few as 80 Ukrainian service personnel are operating in Krynky, the principal Ukrainian beachhead located around 22 miles (36km) to the north-east of Kherson city.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Russian sources claimed on 31 January that their forces advanced some 500m along a 1.3 mile (2.1km) stretch of the frontline north of Pryyutne, located around 11 miles (18km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). However, this has not been confirmed.
STRIKES: Early on 1 February, Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted two of the four Russian-launched Shahed-136/131 drones over Kharkiv oblast.
STRIKES: Geolocated footage confirmed by Ukrainian military officials shows that Ukrainian forces struck Russian targets near the Belbek Airfield of Sevastopol in Russian-controlled Crimea on 31 January. The Russian MoD claimed that the strike did not cause any damage to aircraft in the Belbek airfield. However, local reports indicate that a fire broke out at the airfield, which, according to pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels houses a Russian military communication centre. Explosions were also recorded across Crimea, including at Rozdolne, Yevpatoria and Saky, which houses another prominent military airfield that has been frequently struck by Ukrainian forces. Russia’s MoD reported that air defences intercepted six Ukrainian missiles near the Belbek airfield and, overall, 20 missiles over the Black Sea and Crimea.
STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine’s MoD reported on 1 February that a Ukrainian maritime drone destroyed the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s missile corvette ‘Ivanovets’. Whether the vessel was destroyed or merely damaged cannot be confirmed at time of writing. The attacks clearly reflect Kyiv’s commitment to degrading Russian defence capabilities in Crimea and building on the success of the 2023 counter-offensive in the Black Sea.
STRIKES: On 31 January, Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), stated that Ukraine could realistically plan to intensify strikes against major Russian critical and military facilities. Budanov’s statements come amid an uptick in drone strikes against oil facilities across various Russian oblast, including Bryansk, Krasnodar, Leningrad and Oryol oblasts. Such attacks have clearly demonstrated Kyiv’s growing long-range drone capabilities as well as the vulnerability of Russian oil infrastructure to attacks. Increasing attacks against critical infrastructure, particularly oil facilities, will aim to undermine Russian not only military logistics but also socio-economic resilience, given how crucial oil revenues remain to the Russian economy.
STRIKES: On 1 February, Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov pledged to ramp up domestic drone production in 2024. Umerov said that Kyiv aims to be able to produce several hundred thousand drones of different types. The Ukrainian defence procurement agency has reportedly signed several long-term production contracts with Ukrainian manufacturers for that purpose. Drones have proven to be a increasingly key element in the war, and in contrast to other conventional military systems, Ukraine retains the industrial potential to become broadly self-sufficient in small drone production in the coming years.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

KYIV: The Kyiv City Administration has confirmed that between 1-3 February, military exercises will be taking place in the Buchansky district on the outskirts of the capital Kyiv. During this time, the city warns that loud noises will be heard, including during the night, and that this should not be cause for panic. It remains possible that Russian long-range strikes will occur at the same time as these drills, however.
INFIGHTING: CNN reported on 31 January that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is set to dismiss the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valeriy Zaluzhnyi in the coming days. According to an unspecified insider, a presidential decree on the matter is expected by the end of the week. CNN claimed that two candidates in particular are being discussed as potential successors; Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) and Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces. According to a poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in December 2023, 92% of Ukrainians trust Zaluzhnyi, while confidence in Budanov and Syrskyi is lower at 60% and 33% (respectively).
PRISONERS: Zelensky announced on 31 January that 207 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) had returned to Ukraine, with Ukrainian officials reporting that this was the 50th such exchange of prisoners since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The group consisted of 180 privates and sergeants, as well as 27 officers from the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said 195 Russian servicemen were returned from Ukraine and claimed that Ukraine received the same number of POWs back, contradicting the number Zelensky provided. It marks the first prisoner swap since the crash of a Russian Il-76 transport aircraft that Moscow claimed was carrying Ukrainian POWs (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 24 January 2024). A Ukrainian official said none of those exchanged on 31 January were named on the preliminary list for the POW exchange planned for 24 January, which did not take place.

FORECAST

AID: Earlier on 1 February, European Council President Charles Michel announced that EU leaders unanimously agreed on a EUR 50bn (USD 54bn) financial support package for Ukraine for 2024-2027. The agreement comes after weeks of resistance from Hungary, which vetoed the assistance in December 2023.

Michel stated that the package locks in steadfast, long-term funding for Ukraine, noting that the bloc is taking leadership and responsibility in support for Kyiv. According to unspecified EU diplomats, the deal includes a yearly discussion of the package, as well as the option to review it in two years if required, but notably does not provide Budapest veto rights. Politico reported in early January that Budapest had signalled that it was prepared to lift its veto on the condition the funding is subject to review annually. While the approval of the aid will highly likely assist in bolstering Ukraine’s macro-financial stability, if the package is indeed subject to yearly consideration, this will render further uncertainty ahead of renew periods. However, the decision to not grant Budapest veto rights will likely mitigate that ability for Hungary to delay aid deliveries for long.

Meanwhile, on 31 January, Hungarian media reported what it claimed were the true reasons for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s opposition to Ukraine’s EU accession. Hungary has cited corruption and minority rights issues as reasons for its opposition to Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations. However, at a closed-door meeting in the Hungarian parliament on 20 March 2023, Orbán reportedly claimed that Ukrainian accession would increase US influence in the region and would therefore change the balance of power in Europe. The Prime Minister reportedly stated that Budapest would insist that Kyiv improve minority rights for ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine, claiming that this was a position that was easy to portray in public.

Orbán reportedly acknowledged that while Hungary may achieve some unspecified ‘results’ in this regard, it would not be able to mount substantial obstacles to Ukraine’s accession. Orbán reportedly added that the Hungarian government would not accept any new Ukrainian proposals on the matter of minority rights. Orbán claimed that despite his objections, Kyiv’s membership would be pushed through ‘relatively quickly’, though we assess that Ukrainian accession remains unlikely in the medium term.

Jan 31.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) assesses that the ongoing Russian winter offensive will culminate in the Spring; but Ukraine’s own capability to launch large-scale counter-offensive operations thereafter will remain limited
AID: French President Emmanuel Macron stated that the EU must be ready to support Ukraine with or without military assistance from the US, amid wider efforts by European leaders to bolster long-term aid to Kyiv
MOBILISATION: Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has confirmed that the amended bill on mobilisation has been submitted to parliament, with a vote expected on 6 February
FORECAST: The FT has reported that President Zelensky does indeed intend to dismiss Commander-in-Chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, which would represent the most significant military reshuffle of the war thus far

MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

OFFENSIVES: On 30 January, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov stated that the Russian ‘winter’ offensive has been ongoing since November 2023, but is likely to culminate and be ‘exhausted’ by the beginning of Spring 2024. Budanov maintains that the objectives of the ongoing Russian offensive are to reach the Zherebets River (along the Oskil-Kreminna line west of Kreminna) and administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk oblast. This aligns with our assessment that these remain the principal medium-term objectives of the Russian war effort. However, despite recent incremental advances over the last month, given the overall slow progress of Russian offensive operations over the last 12 months, this is highly unlikely to be achieved in the short term.
OFFENSIVES: Budanov did state that when Russia’s offensive is ‘exhausted’ in Spring, Ukraine’s ‘move’ will begin – though it remains highly unlikely that Ukraine retains the capability to conduct large-scale counter-offensive operations so soon. Ukraine highly likely needs to reconstitute its forces following the losses during the 2023 counter-offensive, meaning a more defensive strategy is likely in early 2024. However, given speculation that Commander-in-Chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi will soon be dismissed from his post, President Volodymyr Zelensky is more likely to push for an ‘active defence’ strategy in 2024 (see FORECAST below for more analysis). This would likely see more proactive Ukrainian counter-attacks across the frontline during the Spring/Summer, but would risk spreading resources too thin to allow Kyiv to generate major counter-offensive forces for operations in 2025.
OFFENSIVES: Artillery ammunition shortages and uncertainty over Western military aid will continue to constrain Ukraine’s ability to launch major counter-offensive operations in the near term. Russia currently retains a distinct artillery fires advantage, with the Russian-to-Ukrainian ratio of shells fired up to five-to-one at places along the frontline. The current impasse in the US Congress over fresh military aid, major production delays across Europe that mean the EU is highly unlikely to meet its 2023 pledge to provide one m artillery shells by 1 March, and the wider global shortage of 155mm artillery ammunition means this is likely to remain an issue in the short-to-medium term. This will inevitably constrain Ukrainian operations in H1 of 2024, with both sides likely to focus on smaller-scale attacks and counter-attacks during what will likely amount to an operational pause ahead of further Russian offensive efforts in the Summer.
BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 29 January indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced along the south-western outskirts of Bakhmut near the T-0504 highway that connects the town to the village of Ivanivske.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 31 January, a prominent Russian milblogger reported heavy fighting around Tabaivka, located 12 miles (20km) south-east of Kupiansk. Intense fighting has been reported in this settlement over the past week. Russian sources claimed that Russia captured Tabaivka, but Ukrainian officials have dismissed this claim. On 31 January, military spokesperson Ivan Shevtsov reported that despite the uptick in offensive operations in the Tabaivka sector, the settlement is not a priority objective for the Russian command. Instead, according to Shevstov, Russian forces are still focused on reaching Kupiansk via Synkivka, located around five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk. However, there is no indication that Russian troops are likely to make a major breakthrough in the direction of Kupiansk in the coming weeks.
SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
STRIKES: Overnight on 30-31 January, Ukrainian air defences intercepted 14 of the 20 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia. The drones were destroyed over Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. A drone reportedly damaged a building and an agricultural warehouse in Mykolaiv oblast. Russian forces also reportedly launched Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, which were likely not intercepted. There is no information on the trajectory or target of the ballistic missiles at time of writing.
STRIKES: Local media outlets reported that on 31 January at 0420hrs (local time), air defences intercepted a Ukrainian drone over St Petersburg’s Kolpino district (Leningrad oblast). Falling debris caused a fire at the Nevsky oil refinery located 12 miles (20km) south-east of Kolpino. Authorities suspended flight operations at St Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport (LED) between 0353hrs and 0511 (local time). The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) did not comment on the attack but reported that the drone was intercepted in Pskov oblast. Ukraine has been increasingly striking oil facilities over the past week, likely to increase oil supply chain disruption risks slightly.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: On 30 January, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that the EU must be ready to support Ukraine with or without military assistance from the US. Macron insisted that Europe should take the lead on guaranteeing its own security and not delegate this matter to ‘big powers’ even if they are significant allies. The President also said that the bloc must accelerate its support to Kyiv, adding that this is a decisive and testing moment for Europe and its security.
AID: Macron’s comments were almost certainly aimed at encouraging European countries to bolster their military commitments to Ukraine while some USD 60bn in supplemental funding remains stalled in the US Congress. However, as per the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the US is by far Ukraine’s largest military donor, having provided EUR 43.86bn in assistance between 24 January 2022 and 31 October 2023. Meanwhile, EU institutions have provided just EUR 5.6bn across the same period. As such, it is unlikely that the bloc would be able to sustain similar levels of assistance to Ukraine that Washington DC has provided.
AID: CIA Director William Burns stated in an article in Foreign Affairs on 30 January that the US’ failure to support Ukraine at this moment of the conflict would be a failure of ‘historic proportions’. Burns added that aid for Ukraine is a relatively modest investment at less than 5% of the US’s defence budget, but with significant geopolitical advantages for Washington DC and notable returns for American industry. The German Marshall Fund of the US reported in September 2023 that a large portion of assistance for Ukraine is re-invested in the US, bolstering the domestic defence industry and sustaining manufacturing jobs therein.
AID: According to Burns, continued Western aid will strengthen Ukraine’s position if and when an opportunity for serious negotiations to end the war emerge. The CIA stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to perceive that time is on his side and that he can wear down Ukraine’s Western supporters. We continue to assess that this is highly likely part of Russia’s strategy, with the US elections this November and the prospect of a Ukraine-sceptic Republican candidate’s victory likely representing a considerable factor.
AID: Ukraine could receive a batch of new-longer range weapons from the US as early as today (31 January), according to media reports. Politico reported on 30 January that the Pentagon had successfully tested the brand-new Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB) co-developed by Boeing and Saab. An unspecified US official said that the new bomb, which can travel approximately 90 miles (144.8km), is expected to enhance Ukraine’s deep strike capabilities and complement its long-range fire arsenal. The GLDSB can be launched using the US-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) which Kyiv already has in its arsenal.
AID: However, Pentagon Press Secretary Patrick Ryder refused to confirm on 30 January specific timelines for providing the GLSDBs due to operation security reasons. It remains unclear how many will be delivered. Reports indicate that the new glide bombs are cheaper, smaller and easier to deploy than the US-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), though not as powerful.
MOBILISATION: Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced on 30 January that the amended bill on mobilisation had been submitted to the parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. The revised legislation retains a number of key provisions from the original draft, such as the introduction of electronic call-ups and punishments for those who defy mobilisation rules. Attempts to avoid the draft could prompt punitive measures from courts, including the freezing of bank accounts and assets, travel restrictions and on the use of a vehicle. It also allows certain people previously convicted of crimes to serve.
MOBILISATION: Under the bill, mobilisation terms are to be limited to 36 months, with the updated version setting out that service personnel will be granted annual leave in instalments for up to 15 days during martial law. Reports indicate that citizens who have gone abroad and withdrawn from military registration in Ukraine must register abroad within 30 days after the Cabinet of Ministers adopts the relevant bill. Registered citizens will reportedly be granted unhindered entry and exit to Ukraine. Ukrainian lawmakers are expected to consider the updated bill on 6 February, which could realistically mean that further readings will take place before it is passed. While some aspects of the legislation were toned down, likely to avoid further political backlash, certain provisions will ultimately still be met with pushback from within the Rada and wider Ukrainian society.

FORECAST

INFIGHTING: On 30 January, the Financial Times reported that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is indeed preparing to dismiss the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valeriy Zaluzhnyi. The general had reportedly been offered a new role as defence adviser, but had refused. According to multiple people familiar with the matter, Zelensky reportedly made it clear that Zaluzhnyi would be dismissed whether he accepted the role or not. It is unclear when he will be formally dismissed and the sources indicated that he may not be removed ‘for some time’ given the outcry amid reports on 29 January. For further analysis, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Report – 30 January 2024.

The removal of Zaluzhnyi would mark the most significant Ukrainian military reshuffle of the war thus far, and highly likely indicates that President Zelensky will take control of the strategic direction of the country in 2024. Zaluzhnyi had tacitly (and publicly) criticised the effective failure 2023 counter-offensive in an essay in the Economist in November. It is understood that Zelensky favoured a broader counter-offensive, rather than focusing on a single push in the south, and had prioritised the defence of Bakhmut in early 2023, despite the high cost of doing so. Zaluzhnyi meanwhile had favoured the West’s preferred strategy of focusing on a single push to the south to create a land bridge to Crimea. This difference of strategic approach has highly likely played a major role in the ensuing tensions and deterioration in civil-military relations, and if and when Zaluzhnyi goes, it will allow Zelensky to appoint an officer more aligned with his strategic vision.

Nevertheless, Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal would almost certainly be a highly unpopular move across Ukrainian society and within the military, and his removal is likely to have an impact on the morale of Ukrainian personnel given his overwhelming popularity.

Jan 30.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

STRIKES: Ukraine’s air force reported that it destroyed 15 of 35 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia overnight on 29-30 January; Russia’s growing focus on targeting frontline areas is reducing interception rates
APPROPRIATIONS: Ambassadors of EU member states agreed unanimously on 29 January to set aside profits from Russian central bank assets frozen in Europe
CORRUPTION: Transparency International (TI) released its 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which saw Ukraine’s score improve by three points
FORECAST: Rumours and contradictory reports emerged that Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valeriy Zaluzhnyi had been dismissed, only for the presidential administration to deny these claims
BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 29 January shows that Russian forces made limited advances in the south-eastern outskirts of Avdiivka. Meanwhile, earlier on 30 January, a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have been counter-attacking in the ‘Tsarska Okhota’ restaurant area (south of Avdiivka) over the past week. Another Russian milblogger claimed earlier on 30 January that Russian forces are advancing north-east of Novomykhailivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Donetsk City. He claimed that similar advances were made near Nevelske, directly west of Donetsk. However, such claims remain visually unconfirmed.
KHERSON: A spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, Nataliya Humenyuk, reported on 29 January that Russian forces have significantly increased their use of drones along the Kherson frontline. Humenyuk assessed that Russian forces are making growing use of first-person view (FPV) drones, but are constantly changing their tactics in a bid to bypass Ukrainian air defence systems, including by launching drones from the Kinburn Spit towards Mykolaiv oblast. She also reported that Russian forces are forming new groups to reinforce units that have suffered heavy casualties on the east (left) bank of the Dnieper River. Ultimately, Russian forces are continuing their efforts to push Ukraine from the left bank; geolocated footage from 29 January indicates they made an extremely limited advance of around 50m in Krynky, the principal Ukrainian beachhead located around 22 miles (36km) to the north-east of Kherson city. Such is the slow pace of Russian offensive operations on this axis.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past 24 hours, Russian milbloggers amplified statements made on 29 January by the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) that their forces captured Tabaivka. Tabaivka is located around 12 miles (20km) south-east of Kupiansk. However, there is currently no visual evidence corroborating such claims.
SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 28-29 January indicates that Russian forces made very minor advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border region. Russian forces have seemingly advanced slightly north of Pryyutne, located around 11 miles (18km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast).
STRIKES: Ukraine’s air force reported that its air defences destroyed 15 of 35 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia overnight on 29-30 January. The drones were intercepted over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv and Sumy oblasts. The remaining drones reportedly damaged an electrical substation in Dnipropetrovsk and caused a blackout in a settlement in Chernihiv oblast.
STRIKES: Ukraine’s air force noted that Russia is increasingly launching drones against frontline areas, targeting energy infrastructure, including oil facilities. Recent reports indicate that the latest Russian Shahed-136/131 drones are equipped with Russian-made BST-52 warheads, the charges on which include incendiary elements. Such characteristics likely enhance the drones’ thermal effect upon detonation, increasing the lethality of the projectile against oil storage facilities. Given that Ukrainian air defence networks are less dense along the frontline, Russia’s growing focus on these areas will likely increase the ratio of successful drone strikes.
STRIKES: Russia’s MoD claimed that its air defences intercepted 21 Ukrainian drones over Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga and Tula oblasts, as well as Russian-annexed Crimea.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

APPROPRIATIONS: Ambassadors of EU member states agreed unanimously on 29 January to set aside profits from Russian central bank assets frozen in Europe. Reports indicate that the agreement will undergo legal and language checks before the bloc’s ambassadors formally adopt it. An unspecified insider from Belgium, which currently holds the six-month presidency of the EU, stated that this would take place as soon as possible. The European Commission (EC) would then be expected to propose transferring the funds set aside to the bloc’s budget and subsequently to Ukraine, though it is unclear when Kyiv would receive the money. It also remains unclear whether all legal hurdles have been cleared for the EU to move forward with the actual process of appropriating the profits.
APPROPRIATIONS: The agreement marks the first step towards the bloc handing over windfall profits from Russian central bank assets to aid Ukraine’s reconstruction. However, further progress on transferring the assets will highly likely elevate risks of tit-for-tat appropriations of European assets by Moscow in the coming months. For further analysis, please see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 24 January 2024.
PRODUCTION: Ukrainian Strategic Industries Minister Oleksandr Kamyshin acknowledged in an interview published on 29 January that Ukraine cannot out-produce Russia in terms of conventional weapons. According to the minister, Ukraine needs to utilise advanced technology to find a new approach; he implied that Ukrainian officials will continue with their efforts to attract foreign partners with whom to develop arms.
PRODUCTION: Kamyshin noted that nearly all the recent strikes against targets in Russia involved equipment manufactured in Ukrainian factories and workshops rather than Western-donated stockpiles. Despite efforts and pledges to bolster its domestic defence industrial base, Kyiv will almost certainly remain highly reliant on its partners donating military aid to sustain its war effort in the long term. However, concerns over stalled assistance (particularly from the US) will likely provide Ukrainian officials with more impetus to increase domestic production.
PRODUCTION: On 29 January, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that Washington DC can already see the impact of stalled military aid on the frontlines in Ukraine, but did not provide specific details. Blinken urged Congress to pass supplemental funding, claiming that without it, Ukrainian gains will be jeopardised. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that he would meet with US lawmakers on 30 January to discuss assistance to Ukraine, though it is uncertain whether this will result in a significant breakthrough.
CORRUPTION: Earlier on 30 January, Transparency International (TI) released its 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which saw Ukraine’s score improve by three points. The CPI ranks countries by their perceived levels of public sector corruption, with 0 measuring highly corrupt to 100 (very clean). Ukraine scored 36/100, while Russia scored 26, losing two points since 2022. TI outlined that Ukraine’s focus on justice system reforms, including restructuring judicial self-governance bodies and increasing judicial independence, have been key steps in targeting corruption. Meanwhile, it noted that efforts to strengthen the capacity and independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agency (NABU) and the anti-corruption prosecution body (SAPO) have provided a solid foundation for ongoing efforts to tackle graft.
CORRUPTION: However, TI acknowledged that the significant number of high-level corruption cases remains a major concern, adding that sustained and comprehensive anti-corruption measures are still needed. Ukraine’s CPI has continued to improve over the last 11 years; further efforts to tackle corruption are likely in the coming months as part of Kyiv’s efforts to join the EU.

FORECAST

INFIGHTING: On 29 January, rumours and contradictory reports emerged that the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, had been dismissed; the presidential administration later denied these claims. Unconfirmed reports, including those provided by unnamed senior European diplomats, initially claimed that Zaluzhnyi had either been dismissed, resigned and/or had refused an offer of an ambassadorial post in Europe. The defence ministry then stated that none of these developments had taken place. However, numerous senior European diplomats seemingly accepted the initial reports that a major military reshuffle was about to take place.

It remains unclear what precisely occurred. However, if the Zelensky administration intended to dismiss Zaluzhnyi, the resultant backlash to the rumours across Ukraine as well as in Western capitals has possibly dissuaded Kyiv from following through with its reshuffle plans. We previously discussed the extent of the political tensions between Zelensky and Zaluzhnyi following the end of the 2023 counter-offensive. Recriminations and disagreements have undermined civil-military relations in recent months, and it remains likely that Zaluzhnyi and Zelensky have differing visions for Ukraine’s 2024 military strategy. This possibly led the Zelensky administration to gauge the response to Zaluzhnyi’s potential dismissal, though we cannot confirm this.

Zaluzhnyi remains overwhelmingly popular among the general population and, crucially, within the military itself. As such, replacing Zaluzhnyi would be an extremely risky move both politically and militarily. Polling over the last six months has consistently showed that Zaluzhnyi outperforms Zelensky in approval ratings (though the president still retains extremely high approval ratings).

Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi is likely to be the Zelensky administration’s preferred candidate in the event of Zaluzhnyi’s departure (or dismissal), though he does not enjoy the same level of support within the military as Zaluzhnyi. There has also been speculation that Zaluzhnyi intends to launch a future presidential bid, given his almost universal approval ratings. However, while there has been no evidence of this from within Zaluzhnyi’s own team, the rumours are possibly driving tensions and catalysing plans within Zelensky’s administration to remove the general. Ultimately, the episode remains unclear. However, the fact that these rumours surfaced at all indicates the extent to which tensions between the presidential administration and the General Staff have increased. We assess that these rumours/tensions are almost certainly contributing to instability at a time when Kyiv is formulating its strategy for 2024.

Jan 29.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

OFFENSIVES: Between 24 February 2022 and 25 January 2024, Russian Ground Forces have lost approximately 2,600 main battle tanks and 4,900 armoured combat vehicles, but current loss rates likely remain broadly sustainable
STRIKES: Russian attacks over the weekend have resulted in high interception rates of Shahed-136/131 drones, but all ballistic missiles successfully penetrated Ukrainian air defences
INTERNET: 4G internet in three Russian oblasts (Leningrad, Pskov and Novgorod) is currently down at night in order to finetune anti-drone systems, underscoring concerns over Ukrainian attacks and attendant disruption
FORECAST: The Financial Times has reported that the EU has outlined a strategy to undermine Hungary’s economy if it vetoes financial aid for Ukraine at a summit on 1 February
OFFENSIVES: On 29 January, UK Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that between 24 February 2022 and 25 January 2024, Russian Ground Forces have lost approximately 2,600 main battle tanks and 4,900 armoured combat vehicles. DI assesses that Russian Ground Forces likely lost 40% fewer vehicles in 2023 compared to 2022, largely due to Russia’s broadly defensive stance last year and the positional nature of fighting. More recently, since Russia resumed offensive operations in October 2023, Russian forces are estimated to have lost uup to 365 main battle tanks and 700 armoured combat vehicles. Notably, however, Russia is likely capable to producing at least 100 main battle tanks per month, and under current attrition rates is therefore likely to be able to replace battlefield losses and continue the current tempo of attritional offensive operations.
BAKHMUT: On 26 January, Ukrainian commander of Ground Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations along the Bakhmut and Siversky axes (Donetsk oblast). Russian sources in recent days have claimed that their forces are making slow progress west of Bakhmut, including advancing along the T-0504 highway west of the city. However, these advances remain unconfirmed.
DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 28 January indicates that Russian forces progressed north of Stepove, located southwest of Avdiivka.
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 29 January, Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Volodymyr Fityo stated that Russian forces have not achieved any important tactical successes despite recent reports of limited advances. Fityo also dismissed Russian claims that Russian troops have captured Tabaivka, located 12 miles (20km) south-east of Kupiansk. Geolocated footage from 28 January shows that Russian forces advanced east of Yampolovka (west of Kreminna). Additional geolocated footage from 27 January shows Russian advances east of Makiivka, located around 14 miles (22km) north-west of Kreminna, but overall, Russia’s progress remains slow in this sector.
SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 27 January indicates that Russian forces have made minor advances west of Robotyne. Russian sources furthermore claimed on 28 January that their forces had reclaimed several positions west of the town, but these remain unconfirmed. Fighting along the southern Zaporizhzhia frontline has remained broadly positional in recent weeks, with Russian forces making only very slight advances.
STRIKES: Early on 29 January, Russian forces launched eight Shahed-136/131 drones, one Iskandr-M ballistic missile and three S-300 missiles. Ukrainian air defences intercepted all eight drones and were active in Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv and Rivne oblasts. On 28 January, Russia carried out a similar attack involving eight Shahed-136/131 drones, two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles and three S-300 missiles. Ukrainian air defences destroyed four drones. Local reports indicated damage to civilian and critical infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Poltava and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Poltava oblast authorities reported that one missile hit an industrial area in Kremenchuk for the second time since 27 January. Moscow launched four Shahed-136/131 drones on 27 January and one Iskandr-M missile; all four drones were intercepted. Falling drone debris reportedly damaged unspecified infrastructure facilities in Zaporizhzhia.
STRIKES: The latest attacks adopted a similar strike pattern, launching a limited number of drones and Iskandr-M and S-300 drones. Despite the lower intensity of the attacks, Ukraine’s air defences failed to intercept the missiles, underscoring the threat posed by ballistic missiles.
STRIKES: Meanwhile in Russia, independent media reported on Telegram that early on 29 January, a drone targeted an oil refinery facility in Yaroslavl (Yaroslavl oblast). A fire reportedly broke out at the site following the attack, leading to a temporary suspension of operations. The oil refinery is operated by Slavneft, one of Russia’s ten largest oil companies. Over the past few weeks, there has been an uptick in drone attacks against oil facilities located on Russian territory. The latest attacks include a drone strike against the oil export facility in the port of Ust-Luga (Leningrad Oblast), one of Russia’s two main Baltic Sea energy export hubs. The attack reportedly contributed to a slowdown of oil exports, already impacted by deteriorating weather conditions.
STRIKES: The intensification of strikes against oil facilities since the start of 2024 underscores Kyiv’s long-range drone capabilities and efforts to degrade Russian oil infrastructure. Oil export revenues account for the largest share of Russia’s federal revenues, especially given that international sanctions increasingly constrain exports of other commodities and industrial goods. As such, further attacks would moderately threaten such revenues, though they are unlikely to undermine Moscow’s macro-financial stability. However, should Ukraine start targeting facilities processing oil products for domestic markets and intensify attacks against transport infrastructure, like railways, such attacks could realistically reignite the fuel crisis Russia experienced during the summer of 2023. Ultimately, these strikes will force Russian authorities to reinforce defences around key oil facilities, further stretching Russian air defence capabilities and creating opportunities for successful Ukrainian strikes.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

SABOTAGE: On 28 January, UK Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that increased attacks against Russian military enlistment offices is highly likely due to growing disagreement with the war among the Russian population. The DI claimed that such sentiment is most likely prevalent among men who would be mobilised if a second wave of mobilisation was announced. On 22 January, a representative of Russia’s Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) said 220 attacks against military registration and enlistment offices and government facilities have been recorded since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Independent Russian media reported in July 2023 that at least 113 military enlistment offices, administrative buildings and offices of security forces had been attacked since 24 February 2022.
SABOTAGE: According to the DI, these statistics suggest a doubling of attacks on enlistment offices over the last six months, which highly likely indicates a lack of confidence in promises that there will not be further mobilisation. On 14 December 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that there will not be a second wave of partial mobilisation. We assess that the Russian authorities will remain reluctant to order such a wave of mobilisation in the coming months, particularly ahead of the presidential elections in March, to avoid societal backlash. For further analysis on Russian societal opinion on mobilisation, see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 16 November 2023.
BUSINESS: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on 26 January the creation of a new platform that will represent small, medium and large Ukrainian enterprises. Zelensky said the new Ukrainian Economic Platform intends to unite a large community of Ukrainians working in businesses who found enterprises and create job opportunities. He said the government, the presidential office, regional state administrations and experts will organise how the platform will operate. Its main task is to provide effective communication between the state and businesses, likely to ensure more transparency and mutual confidence. On 24 January, Ukraine’s Deputy Economy Minister, Nadiya Bigun, said almost UAH 40 bn (USD 1.055bn) of various incentives for businesses has been budgeted this year to bolster the economy.
INTERNET: Earlier on 29 January, Russian media reported that 4G internet in three Russian oblasts (Leningrad, Pskov and Novgorod) is turned off at night to finetune anti-drone systems, underscoring concerns over Ukrainian attacks. Outlet The Insider reported that the authorities of these regions had announced that LTE mobile internet would be switched off at night from 25-30 January for ‘technical work’. However, other outlets reported that the measures were required to ensure the security of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who visited St. Petersburg (Leningrad oblast) on 26-28 January. While the reported shutdown is only short term and at night, reports indicate that communication interruptions and emergency internet jamming are permitted in these regions during the day if required. GPS jamming, internet outages and other digital disruption will become increasingly common across Russia amid increases in domestic security procedures and Ukrainian attacks.

FORECAST

AID: The Financial Times (FT) reported on 28 January that the EU has outlined a strategy to undermine Hungary’s economy if it vetoes financial aid for Ukraine at a summit on 1 February. The FT claimed to have obtained a confidential document detailing the bloc’s plan to target Budapest’s economic weaknesses, imperil its currency and weaken investor confidence in a bid to hurt jobs and growth. If Hungary does not agree on the provision of aid, other heads of state and government will reportedly publicly declare that they cannot imagine that EU funds would be provided to Hungary. The plan stated that financial markets, as well as European and international companies, might be less interested in investing in Hungary without that funding.

However, earlier on 29 January, the chief political aide of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Balasz Orbán, signalled Hungary’s readiness to use the EU’s budget to finance the EUR 50 bn Ukraine aid package. He said Budapest had sent a proposal to the EU showing it was open to using the bloc’s budget for the financial support and issuing common EU debt to finance it if other ‘caveats’ were added. While the EU has used financial leverage against member states before, an attempt by the EU to actively undermine one of its own member states on this scale would be unprecedented, and reflects the extent to which relations between Budapest and the European institutions have deteriorated over the Ukraine issue. There is a realistic possibility this strategy could prompt Budapest to approve the aid, though it will likely sustain intergovernmental tensions within the union in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)

03 Feb 24. Ukrainian Forces Employ ‘Flock’ FPV Drones in Innovative Tactics Against Russian Soldiers. Ukrainian forces have adopted a novel approach in their conflict with Russian forces, employing “flocks” of first-person-view (FPV) drones directed by a leading “queen” drone, as described by a Russian serviceman. This strategy involves the use of a central drone that coordinates the movement of smaller drones, enabling precise attacks on Russian positions. These drone swarms allow for a more efficient use of resources, with the smaller drones able to conserve battery power by landing and waiting for commands from the “queen” drone. Once targets are identified, these kamikaze drones are launched from close proximity, increasing the effectiveness of their strikes. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

03 Feb 24. Canada ‘offers 83,300 CRV7 air-to-surface missiles’ to Ukraine. There’s an intriguing proposition emerging from the political quarters of Ottawa, presenting a solution that resolves two problems at once. Here’s the issue: since the 1980s, Canada has been storing a cache of old CRV7 air-to-surface missiles. According to local sources and open-source references, the number of these decommissioned units is a staggering 83,300.

Maintaining these out-of-service relics since 2000 costs taxpayers a substantial amount in disposal or destruction expenses. To address this issue, Pierre Poilievre, the leader of the opposition Conservative Party of Canada, proposed the idea of transferring these missiles to Ukraine.

If Justin Trudeau’s administration takes this proposal seriously, Ukraine could immediately receive 8,000 functional CRV7 missiles. Local sources confidently suggest these missiles are operational, with their warheads still intact. The potential provision of the remaining 75,300 spare parts to Ukraine could prove beneficial. Assuming transport to Kyiv is managed adequately, these spare parts might facilitate the repair of each operational missile, further maximizing their usefulness.

Two-in-one problem solved

By policy, this “two-in-one” solution appears most judicious. It not only provides an enhancement to the Ukrainian military forces via additional missiles but also spares Canadian taxpayers from bearing the cost of missile disposal.

Canada ranks among the Western nations that have been actively supporting the regime in Kyiv since the outbreak of the Ukrainian armed conflict. It must be noted that Canada is home to a substantial Ukrainian diaspora, which significantly includes descendants of Ukrainians who fled in the aftermath of Nazi Germany’s collapse during the 1940s and 1950s.

You may be interested to know that BulgarianMilitary.com previously reported a delay in Canada shipping NASAMS anti-aircraft missile systems to Ukraine due to a missing agreement with the US. Analysts have observed that Ukrainian nationalists have a robust base in Canada and are thus urging the government to expedite the delivery of further military aid to the regime in Kyiv.

About CRV7

Allow me to introduce you to the CRV7, or as it’s affectionately known, the Canadian Rocket Vehicle 7. This air-to-surface missile, a product of Bristol Aerospace in Winnipeg, Manitoba, truly stands out in its category. It’s a favorite weapon of the Royal Canadian Air Force and has been warmly adopted by military forces worldwide.

You might be curious about what makes the CRV7 so formidable. Get ready to be impressed! It boasts a trim 2.75-inch diameter and extends to a neat 6.6 feet in length. And don’t be fooled by its unloaded weight of 32 pounds. When it’s battle-ready with a warhead and propellant on board, its weight can increase to around 45 pounds. Its body, an innovative mix of fiberglass and epoxy, gives it a light yet incredibly robust structure.

Never underestimate the versatility of the CRV7’s warhead—it seamlessly adapts based on the target. When the target is enemy infrastructure, a high-explosive warhead is the weapon of choice. When confronting personnel and light vehicles, a fragmentation warhead is selected. When armored targets emerge, a shaped-charge warhead steps up to the plate. Quite the adaptable warrior, wouldn’t you say?

CRV7’s engine and operational range

Powering the CRV7 is a highly dependable solid-fuel rocket motor. The appeal of this type of engine lies in its simplicity and reliability – it’s free of any moving components and demands minimal to no maintenance for prolonged periods. The speed at which it propels the missile exceeds Mach 2, which means it’s twice as fast as sound, making the CRV7 one of the fastest air-to-surface missiles currently available.

What sets the CRV7 apart is its remarkable operational range. It can engage targets as distant as 8 kilometers, although its true effective distance is around the 4-kilometer mark. Owing to the combination of its exceptional speed and range, it can swiftly eliminate targets before the launching aircraft gets a chance to enter the range of most ground-based anti-aircraft systems.

A variety of warplanes are capable of launching the CRV7. Originally designed for the CF-104 Starfighter, it’s now compatible with several other aircraft, such as the CF-18 Hornet and the CH-146 Griffon helicopter. On a global scale, other aircraft like the British Harrier GR.7 and the American A-10 Thunderbolt II are also equipped to deploy the CRV7.

Integration

Without a doubt, adapting such weaponry to the Western concept requires its integration with Soviet fighter jets. The Su-25, a strike aircraft ideally designed for this type of weaponry, could be one option. Similarly, the Su-27 and MiG-29 may also serve the purpose.

Integrating the Canadian CRV7 missile with the Soviet Su-25 and Su-27 aircraft is a formidable task that involves countless steps. It starts with an in-depth compatibility analysis between the CRV7 and the hardpoints and weapon systems of the aircraft. This requires careful examination of the technical details of both the missile and the aircraft to determine the feasibility of physically connecting the missile to the aircraft’s hard points.

Moving on to the next phase, it would be necessary to modify the aircraft’s weapon control system to recognize and deploy the CRV7 efficiently. This might require system reprogramming or the introduction of new software. It’s crucial to perform rigorous tests to certify that the system can accurately aim and launch the missile.

Additionally, one must analyze the aerodynamics of the aircraft when the CRV7 is mounted. The size and weight of the missile could potentially affect the aircraft’s performance and maneuverability. Therefore, carrying out wind tunnel tests and test flights would be essential to assess these impacts and apply any required modifications.

However, it’s crucial to emphasize that such a process would likely require collaboration between the Canadian and Ukrainian governments. Potential involvement from the manufacturers of the CRV7 and the aircraft could also be necessary. Moreover, there might be legal and political challenges to surmount in facilitating this integration, owing to the differing military alliances and export control laws of the two nations.

What about the F-16?

Have you ever wondered if the F-16, an upcoming addition to Ukraine’s air force, can accommodate the Canadian missile beneath its wings? The likelihood is high, particularly the potential for the F-16 to carry the CRV7 air-to-surface missile, a formidable weapon generously supplied by our neighbors to the North.

The Canadian CRV7 missile isn’t your run-of-the-mill armament. Its versatility allows for use across various platforms. Hypothetically speaking, with the right modifications and adjustments, integrating this missile with the F-16 – a fighter jet renowned for its multirole capabilities – is feasible.

As indicated by experts, integrating this missile into the F-16 would likely follow a similar process to its past incorporation with Soviet warplanes. (Source: Google/https://bulgarianmilitary.com/)

02 Feb 24. Ukraine’s Zelenskiy hails arrival of new air defence systems. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy welcomed the arrival on Friday of two new air defence systems that he said could “shoot down anything”.

Zelenskiy also said that he and his top commanders had discussed conditions along the 1000-km (600-mile) frontline of the war against Russia, singling out the situation in the beleaguered town of Avdiivka as “extraordinarily difficult”.

In his nightly video address, the president pointedly said he could give no details of the newly arrived air defence systems but described them as the culmination of “working tirelessly at various levels for months”.

“But these are systems that can shoot down anything,” he said. “We will be protecting the regions. And while the systems are not yet sufficient for the complete defence of Ukraine, we are working towards that goal every day.”

Beefing up air defence has been one of the key priorities for defending cities, towns and infrastructure against Russian missile and drone attacks.

Zelenskiy has previously lauded the U.S.-made Patriot air defence system as critical to safeguarding Ukrainian skies and able to down all types of Russian missiles.

And U.S. Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland said in Kyiv this week that a new “small-diameter” bomb able to hit targets at greater distances would soon arrive in the country.

Zelenskiy’s account of Friday’s command meeting said one of the reports was presented by Armed Forces Commander in Chief Valery Zaluzhnyi. Unconfirmed news reports have suggested this week that the president intended to fire the commander.

(Source: Reuters)

02 Feb 24. Finland joins NATO operations with fighter jets, mine clearing vessel. Finland will send up to eight fighter jets and a mine hunting navy vessel to take part in NATO’s joint operations in 2024, the country’s defence ministry said on Friday.

The Nordic nation last year joined the Western military alliance in a historic security policy U-turn in response to neighbouring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“Allies participating actively in NATO’s peacetime collective defence missions sends a message of unity and reinforces deterrence,” Defence Minister Antti Hakkanen said in a statement.

One of Finland’s Katanpaa class vessels will join NATO’s mine countermeasure unit in the Baltic Sea in April and May, clearing old sea mines, participating in exercises and protecting underwater infrastructure, the statement said.

The fighter jets will participate in regular air patrolling and “creating deterrence by show of military force” in Romania and Bulgaria, including in the Black Sea, during June and July, the defence forces added.

(Source: Reuters)

02 Feb 24. Russian drone strikes hit Zelensky’s hometown. A Russian drone strike cut off electricity in Volodymr Zelensky’s hometown of Kryvyi Rih in the early hours of Friday, the national grid operator Ukrenergo said. The power outages overnight trapped 113 miners underground but they were rescued by the early hours of Friday morning, the city’s mayor Oleksandr Vilkul said. Ukraine’s air defence said they shot down 11 out of 24 Russian drones targeting critical infrastructure in the southeast overnight.

Mr Vilkul said on Telegram that three drones were shot down and there had been a “blow to the critical infrastructure of our city”. He said around 100,000 people in the Saksagan, Dovhyntsiv, and Pokrovsky districts of the city were left without electricity, including some of the city’s hospitals, kindergartens, and schools. Mr Vikul said the situation was under control by 7am all hospitals had electricity again. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

01 Feb 24. Ukraine deploying new indigenous C-UAS. Ukraine is deploying a new locally developed, portable counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) that blocks first-person view (FPVs) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The system – AD Counter FPV – is manufactured by Ukraine company Kvertus and is designed to disrupt FPVs operating in the 850–940 MHz radio frequency (RF) range.

According to Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov in late January, the system is in service with the Ukrainian military and is proving very effective with soldiers. Its weight (3 kg) is an advantage that enables it to be conveniently installed on vehicles, he added.

AD Counter FPV can disrupt FPVs within a 150 m radius of the equipment, if the FPV is at least 1,500 m from its controller, the manufacturer detailed on its website. The device encompasses a tripod, two antennas, and one 12–220 V inverter. (Source: Janes)

01 Feb 24. The EU has agreed a €50bn financial support package for Ukraine within the bloc’s shared budget, the president of the European Council said on Thursday. “We have a deal,” said Charles Michel in statement on X. “All 27 leaders agreed.” The statement suggests Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has rescinded his veto against the package. “This locks in steadfast, long-term, predictable funding for Ukraine,” Michel added. (Source: FT.com)

31 Jan 24. Ukraine’s cyber specialists disrupt Russian industry backbone.

Defence Intelligence of Ukraine reveals a successful cyberattack on IPL Consulting, a key player in Russian Information Systems Implementation.

In a recent operation, the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) has dealt a blow to Russia’s technological infrastructure.

The target of the cyber offensive was IPL Consulting, a company responsible for implementing information systems crucial to various sectors, including aviation, heavy engineering, and defence.

The DIU specialists executed a meticulous infiltration, breaching IPL Consulting’s internal network and executing an attack. The aftermath witnessed the obliteration of IPL’s entire IT infrastructure, comprising over 60 terabytes of data, numerous servers, and databases. The repercussions of this digital assault are reverberating across Russia as the full extent of data loss is still being calculated.

The Russia-Ukraine war is the first large-scale conflict in which cyber warfare was expected to play a significant role, according to “Thematic Research: Cybersecurity in Defense (2022)” report.

Concentrated attacks such as this against Russian industry have demonstrated the vulnerabilities of Russian cyber infrastructure and will spur investments in strengthening and further isolating its cyber infrastructure against further attacks, according to GlobalData’s intelligence on the Russian defence market.

This cyber offensive comes at a critical juncture amid heightened global sanctions against Russia. The inflicted damage strikes a particularly sensitive nerve, affecting not only IPL Consulting but also causing collateral damage to numerous Russian companies intricately linked to the defence industrial complex.

This development will not be welcome, as this time last year, Russia was also facing a setback in meeting the Kremlin’s military demands as its military-industrial output fell short.

At the beginning of 2024, the State Security Service of Ukraine successfully repelled a series of Russian cyber attacks on the national mobile operator Kyivstar.

As Ukraine navigates geopolitical challenges, this cyber operation underscores its commitment to defending its interests and striking back against aggressors.

The Netherlands recently pledged €10m ($10.9m) to Ukraine to enhance cybersecurity defences. The cybersecurity allocation aims to fortify online infrastructure targeted by hacking attempts since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

This recent cyber success adds a new dimension to the ongoing conflict, demonstrating that modern warfare is not confined to traditional battlefields but extends into the digital realm, where strategic cyber operations can be as impactful as boots on the ground. (Source: army-technology.com)

01 Feb 24. Strong European backing for Ukraine leaves “little space” for exploitation of pro-Russian politics, study shows. Strong support for Ukraine means there is “little space” for European politicians to exploit pro-Russia foreign policy messages, a new study shows.

Researchers have found widespread backing for Ukraine across the continent, and for policies that help the nation, such as imposing sanctions on Russia.

But public opinion is more mixed on the approach NATO should take and whether Ukraine should become a member.

Experts found European nations can be classified into three distinct groups. Citizens of Germany, France and Spain were ‘solid supporters’ of Ukraine. Those in Italy and Hungary were ‘nearer the fence’ while residents of Estonia, Finland, Poland, Sweden and the UK were ‘staunch supporters’.

The study, by Catarina Thomson, Matthias Mader, Felix Münchow, Jason Reifler and Harald Schoen, is published in the journal International Affairs. Researchers analysed public opinion data about the Ukraine war collected in February 2023 in France, Germany, the UK, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Finland and Sweden, Italy and Spain.

People in the UK were among the staunchest supporters of Ukraine, together with Eastern European nations and Finland and Sweden, who applied for NATO membership following the Russian invasion.

In a second group of countries, which includes France, Germany, and Spain, citizens also blamed Russia for the war and were strongly in favour of standing by Ukraine. A minority of voters believed Ukraine should be urged to accept territorial losses that could help end the war or that economic sanctions against Russia should be lifted.

In this second group of countries researchers found some pockets of pro-Russian sympathy in far-right populist parties, as well as among some groups of leftist parties with a history of close relations with the Soviet Union. Around half of supporters of Germany’s Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) attributed some responsibility for the war to Ukraine, and 56 per cent said they would urge Ukraine to concede some territory to Russia.

In a third group of countries – Italy and Hungary – people supported Ukraine but remained ‘nearer the fence’. More than 40 per cent of Italians attributed some responsibility for the war to Ukraine, as did 55 per cent of Hungarians. In contrast, 20 per cent or less attributed some responsibility to Ukraine in the UK, Eastern European countries, Finland and Sweden, as did between 25 per cent to 35 per cent in France, Germany and Spain.

In all countries older people were more supportive of increasing NATO’s troop presence in eastern Europe and admitting Ukraine to the alliance than are younger age groups.

People were more divided regarding policy options for NATO. In some countries, majorities supported both increasing NATO’s presence in eastern Europe and Ukraine’s admittance to NATO, while in others, majorities opposed these policies. This may reflect perceptions that such steps may lead to a deeper involvement of their country in the Russia–Ukraine conflict.

Dr Thomson said: “European citizens remain united in supporting the Ukrainian war effort. Failure to achieve military successes could however undermine this support. This might be particularly problematic in countries like Germany where the public is more sceptical, and where long-held non-militarist and isolationist sentiments remain.

“Russia may now be ‘playing for time’, hoping war-weary publics will demand a conclusion to the war. There are reasons to think that such an approach on Russia’s part is unlikely to work. Our findings suggest admitting Ukraine as a NATO member would be politically difficult.”

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31 Jan 24. Russia’s Shoigu urges faster artillery production, no ‘fooling around.’ Russia’s Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has told military manufacturers to “stop fooling around” and further increase the production of self-propelled artillery systems.

Shoigu visited arms-producing factories in the Urals industrial city of Yekaterinburg on Tuesday and said Russia was increasing production of air defence missiles after a series of Ukrainian drone attacks that have targeted cities and energy infrastructure.

In video published by news site RBC on Wednesday from Shoigu’s factories tour, he chided the management of one plant for not producing enough self-propelled artillery.

“Listen, stop fooling around here, guys. We got busy with this in 2022. We should have had these machines operating at full capacity in 2023,” he told the plant’s bosses.

“I’d like to receive within a week a specific proposal on how we’ll reach the indicators set by the president (Vladimir Putin) … this must be done, because all these orders are connected with the performance of very specific work on the battlefield,” he said.

The director said the factory had already increased production six-fold in the last two years.

Russia has placed its economy on a war footing and shifted defence plants to round-the clock production to meet the needs of its forces in Ukraine.

Its defence industry will supply the army with “several times” more military equipment this year than in 2022 and 2023, Interfax news quoted Deputy Defence Minister Alexei Krivoruchko as saying this month.

(Source: Reuters)

31 Jan 24. EU will only supply half of promised shells to Ukraine by March – Borrell. The European Union will fall far short of its target of sending one m artillery shells to Ukraine by March, it said on Wednesday, adding that just over half that number would be delivered by the deadline. Speaking after an EU defence ministers’ meeting in Brussels, the bloc’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, said around 52% of the promised rounds would be delivered by March, with the original target to be reached by the end of the year. The target was set in response to Ukraine’s need for 155-mm artillery shells, which have become a key element in its fight against Russia’s 2022 invasion as the conflict descends into an intense war of attrition.

“There was some initial inertia, but then once things get set in motion, they can speed up,” Borrell said by way of explanation as to why the EU will not meet its own deadline.

According to the EU’s foreign policy chief, the production capacity for artillery shells in Europe has gone up 40% since the start of the war and is expected to reach 1.4 m rounds a year by the end of 2024.

The European Defence Agency has signed 60 framework contracts for the joint procurement of 155-mm ammunition alone, Borrell told reporters.

“These contracts have the remaining spare capacity for an estimated volume of 1.5m (shells),” he said, adding he had encouraged countries to place orders.

“Ukraine needs more support, and that is a message I passed on to member states: You have to do more and quick, because in the frontline, the battle is fierce.”

The EU ministers had also agreed to train another 20,000 Ukrainian soldiers, Borrell said, on top of 40,000 already trained. (Source: Reuters)

01 Feb 24. Questions swirl over future of Ukraine’s popular ‘Iron General.’ For Ukrainian armed forces commander General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, even his status as national hero for leading the war effort against Moscow’s invading forces is not enough to quash questions over whether he will keep his job.

A series of Western and Ukrainian media reports this week said that President Volodymyr Zelenskiy had asked Zaluzhnyi to step aside this week, a request he declined.

A source familiar with the matter told Reuters on Wednesday that ground forces commander Oleksandr Syrskyi had been offered Zaluzhnyi’s job but turned it down.

The Ukrainian General Staff and president’s office did not respond to requests for comment on the approach to Syrskyi.

Ukrainian forces are currently struggling in the battlefield.

A much-anticipated summer counteroffensive made little headway in the south and east, and Russian forces are inflicting small but costly defeats along the 1,000-km front.

Western military and financial support is increasingly hard to come by, leaving Kyiv more exposed to regular attacks by Russian drones and missiles that are sapping its energy.

The state of the war is not down to Zaluzhnyi alone, but given his popularity and proven ability as an inspiring commander, the fact that Kyiv may be seeking to replace him may reflect the desire for a fresh approach to the conflict.

A HERO TO MANY

Defying overwhelming odds, Ukraine’s soldiers used stealth and speed to thwart Russia’s advance on Kyiv, helping to ensure that, even now, Russian President Vladimir Putin remains a long way from conquering Ukraine.

As the war progressed, Zaluzhnyi’s stock only rose, and he won praise at home and abroad when his forces launched counteroffensives in the northeast and south that recaptured huge swathes of land and raised hopes of an unlikely victory.

A portrait of him smiling and flashing the peace sign was spray-painted on walls after the liberation of the southern city of Kherson, under the slogan “God and Zaluzhnyi are with us”.

Since then, Ukraine’s battlefield momentum has stalled, yet polling indicated that Zaluzhnyi was still trusted by 92% of Ukrainians late last year, significantly above Zelenskiy’s 77%.

Reported frictions burst into the open in November after Zaluzhnyi was quoted by the Economist as saying the war as at a “stalemate”, in a gloomy assessment that jarred with Zelenskiy’s more optimistic vision.

The 50-year-old four-star general, who rarely speaks in public but is occasionally shown on news bulletins poring over maps and addressing commanders in fatigues, argued that better technology is the key to breaking the impasse.

The president’s office rebuked him, and one of Zaluzhnyi’s senior officers said he had been sacked by Zelenskiy over the general’s head.

Were he to be removed and go into politics – though he has never voiced political ambitions – the “Iron General” could prove a formidable rival to anyone.

THE BURLY ‘VOLUNTEER’

Zaluzhnyi began his military training in the 1990s, after Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union, graduating with honours and rising up the ranks.

He got a taste of real conflict in 2014 when he served in an area of eastern Ukraine where Russian-backed militants had seized territory.

Tall and burly with cropped hair, Zaluzhnyi, whose military call sign is “Volunteer”, has a reputation for having a good rapport with his subordinates and allowing local commanders to make their own decisions on the battlefield.

To many, he felt like a breath of fresh air among Ukraine’s older Soviet-style generals, and embodied Kyiv’s desire to break with the Soviet military practices it had inherited.

His warning in November that the war was sliding into an attritional phase that suited Russia was out of kilter with Kyiv’s official rhetoric, but for many of his soldiers it was recognition of the painful reality on the battlefield.

Russia had been building up fortifications since late 2022 after suffering humiliating defeats in Kharkiv and Kherson regions, with more recent Ukrainian advances thwarted.

Tens of thousands of soldiers have been killed and wounded on both sides, although there are no reliable official figures.

Ukraine desperately needs to replenish its overstretched and exhausted ranks, but the government has been unable to amend call-up laws to help recruit up to half a m more soldiers.

Kyiv is also struggling to maintain Western support that has been vital to its war effort. Both the United States and the European Union have in the last two months failed to deliver hefty aid packages that they had promised. It all means that, as the deadliest conflict in Europe since World War Two enters its third year, Zaluzhnyi’s boots would be very hard to fill. (Source: Reuters)

30 Jan 24. Ukraine’s new 100-mile bomb from Boeing is ready, sources say. After successful testing in the U.S., Ukraine will soon receive it first big batch of long-range missiles made by Boeing (BA.N), opens new tab that promise to extend its range deep into Russian-held territory, according to sources familiar with the matter.

They could arrive “on the battlefield” as soon as Wednesday, Politico reported.

Ukraine needs Boeing’s Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB) to augment the limited number of 100-mile range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) rockets the U.S. has sent.

The glide-bomb will allow Ukraine’s military to hit targets at twice the distance reachable by the rockets it now fires from the U.S.-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and could force Russia to move supplies even farther from the front lines.

Tests of newly built GLSDB occurred on Jan. 16 at the Eglin Air Force Base test range in Florida, a person familiar with the test and two people briefed told Reuters, enabling shipments to begin. The people briefed on the test said six rockets were fired as a part of the early morning test over the Gulf of Mexico.

The plan was for launchers and dozens of warheads to move to Ukraine via an air transport, the person familiar with the test and one of people briefed said.

The timing of the delivery and their ultimate deployment has been secret to preserve the element of surprise. A Pentagon spokesperson declined to comment.

For the Biden administration, the decision to send the GLSDB to Ukraine represents an alternative ATACMS missile, which the administration has so far provided in only small numbers.

Ukraine’s supply of ATACMS has been depleted by use.

The new glide bombs, while not as powerful, are much cheaper, smaller and easier to deploy than ATACMS, making them well suited for much of what Ukraine hopes to accomplish: disrupting Russian operations and creating a tactical advantage.

“It’s long past time to finding creative means to provide the capability and capacity needed to strike deep and often behind Russian lines,” said Tom Karako, a weapons and security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

When Boeing pitched the weapon to commanders last year, they presented an “expedited nine-month option” for delivery that required exempting the contractor from an in-depth review that ensures the Pentagon is getting the best deal possible.

The Pentagon said publicly that funding was approved in February, a contract to begin production was inked the following month, U.S. officials have told Reuters. Because GLSDB has already been paid for, the weapon can avoid the recent Congressional funding dispute over continued weapons shipments to Ukraine.

Boeing, the prime contractor for the weapon, did not respond to a request for comment. (Source: Reuters)

30 Jan 24. Russia says increasing air defence missile production. Russia is increasing production of air defence missiles, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said in video footage released on Tuesday, adding there were “key issues” that needed to be addressed.

The release of the footage by the defence ministry follows hits by drones launched from Ukraine on Russian cities and energy infrastructure while Moscow presses on with its military campaign against Kyiv.

Shoigu was shown inspecting defence industry facilities in the Urals industrial city of Yekaterinburg and touring factories producing sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles and air defence systems.

“There has been a significant increase in the volume of production. We have more than doubled production of the missiles we need for air defence,” he said at one factory.

“But there are some key issues we need to address. And we need to address them quite vigorously. There is the question of engines, and there is the question of the establishment of launcher production.”

The defence ministry published the videos on its Telegram messenger channel.

Russian officials have in recent months flagged rapid improvements in the country’s military industrial capacity, aimed at bolstering Russia’s military in its deadlocked campaign against Ukraine.

Over the recent weeks, attacks, some of which have been claimed by Ukrainian officials or blamed on Kyiv by the Kremlin, have hit Russian cities and oil and gas facilities. (Source: Reuters)

30 Jan 24. Three NATO allies sign deal to speed up military deployments to eastern flank. Germany, the Netherlands and Poland signed a deal on Tuesday aimed at cutting red tape hampering swift cross-border movement of troops and weapons along one of the main corridors leading from the North Sea to NATO’s eastern flank.

As a result of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both NATO and the European Union have started to speed up preparations in case a military conflict with Moscow erupts.

In such a scenario, the U.S. and other NATO allies would be expected to send major military reinforcements via North Sea ports across Germany and Poland to the eastern front.

NATO is currently conducting its largest military drills since the end of the Cold War in the exercise Steadfast Defender 2024 involving some 90,000 troops.

Speaking at an event at the EU’s European Defence Agency in Brussels, Dutch Defence Minister Kajsa Ollongren said it was crucial to have in place conditions allowing for swift military deployments before any possible conflict arose.

“The geography is what it is. That means you have to be able to move quickly from the Netherlands through Germany to Poland,” she said before the three countries signed a letter of intent for closer cooperation in what the EU calls military mobility, a project open to additional partners.

NATO has warned its members that too much red tape is hindering troop movements across Europe, a problem that could cause major delays were a conflict with Russia to erupt.

“We are running out of time. What we don’t get done in peacetime won’t be ready in case of a crisis or a war,” the chief of NATO’s logistics command JSEC, Lieutenant-General Alexander Sollfrank, told Reuters late last year.

NATO forces still need to navigate a variety of differing regulations, stretching from the advance-notice required before ammunition can be shipped to the permissible length of military convoys. (Source: Reuters)

30 Jan 24. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is preparing to replace his top general in what would be the biggest shake-up of Ukraine’s military command since Russia’s full-scale invasion began two years ago. Zelenskyy on Monday offered Valeriy Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, a new role as a defence adviser but the general refused, according to four people familiar with the discussions. Two of them said Zelenskyy had made clear to Zaluzhny that regardless of whether he took the role, he would be removed from his current position. The four people said that while a decision had been made in Zelenskyy’s office to dismiss Zaluzhny, he may not be ousted for some time after reports of the plans appeared in Ukrainian media. The president’s offer of a new role to the general follows months of speculation about his fate, fed by reports of tension between the two men. Their strained relationship spilled into the open in November after Ukraine’s much-hyped counteroffensive failed to achieve its ambitious goals of retaking lost territory and cutting off Russia’s land bridge to Crimea. At the time, Zaluzhny said the war had reached a “stalemate”, leading the president’s office to castigate him for using the term. (Source: FT.com)

31 Jan 24. New counter-offensive coming in spring, says Kyiv spy chief.

Ukraine will launch a new counter-offensive in the spring, its army spy chief has suggested.

Kyrylo Budanov, head of the HUR military intelligence agency, said on Tuesday night that Russia’s current offensive would be “completely exhausted” by “early spring”.

“We make a move, the enemy makes a move,” he said. “Now is the enemy’s turn. It will end, and then ours will start.”

Mr Budanov added that Russia’s ongoing offensive had planned to conquer the remaining unoccupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk but that it was “not even close” to achieving those objectives. The spy chief has been tipped in recent days to succeed Gen Valery Zaluzhny as commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces.(Source: Daily Telegraph)

30 Jan 24. UK MoD: current Russian tank loss rate in Ukraine war sustainable. Russia is able to produce at least 100 MBTs per month according to the UK’s Defence Intelligence, which means Moscow’s losses over the past quarter can be replaced. Despite an increase in Russian main battle tank (MBT) and other armoured combat vehicles (ACV) losses over the past three month of fighting in Ukraine, Moscow’s ramping up of its industrial capacity means that it can maintain its current level of offensive activity “for the foreseeable future”, stated the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD).

In a 29 January 2024 post on the social media platform X, the UK MoD’s Defence Intelligence stated that since early October 2023 Russian ground forces have been on the offensive in eastern Ukraine. During this period, Russian losses have increased with its forces likely losing up to 365 MBTs and 700 ACVs, achieving “minor” territorial gains.

“However, Russia can probably generate at least 100 MBTs per month and therefore retains the ability to replace battlefield losses and continue this level of offensive activity for the foreseeable future,” the UK Defence Intelligence stated.

In addition, UK Defence Intelligence stated that from 24 February 2022 to 25 January 2024, Russian ground forces likely lost around 2,600 MBTs and 4,900 other ACV in Ukraine. Russia losses of combat vehicles in 2023 was around 40% fewer than in 2022.

“It is highly likely that the reduction in armoured vehicle attrition rates was due to the increasing positional nature of the conflict in 2023 and because Russia spent a significant proportion of the year in a defensive posture,” UK Defence Intelligence wrote.

Russia losing around 12 MBTs per week since mid-November

In mid-November 2023, the UK MoD estimated that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had cost Moscow more than 2,400 MBTs – equivalent to around 15% of its pre-war inventory – at the time.

The figures, released on 13 November 2023 as a UK parliamentary written response, also detailed Russian equipment losses to be “over 7,117 armoured vehicles”, including 2,475 MBTs and 1,300 artillery systems.

The latest estimate of Russian tanks losses, compared to those provided in mid-November last year, indicate an approximate loss of 125 MBTs over the past 10 weeks of combat.

According to GlobalData, Russia’s land inventory prior to its invasion of Ukraine indicate a potential fleet of 16,970 tanks, comprised of 550 1990s era T-90s, 3,450 T-80s and 8,950 T-72s from the 1970s, with a further 2,000 T-64s and 2,400 T-62s, originating from the 1960s. Of the new T-14 Armata MBTs, Russia was thought to hold around 20 in its order of battle.

Earlier GlobalData research conducted in December 2022 calculated that Russia’s equipment loss in the first ten months of the war in Ukraine had cost Moscow more materiel than was seen in both Chechen wars combined.

The industrial capacity of Russia and its ability to replace current battlefield losses, as well as maintain production of in-demand artillery ammunition, is in stark contrast to Ukraine, which is reliant on Western support to maintain its forces with materiel. A halt to Ukraine of military funding assistance from the US and EU at the end of 2023, combined with a lack of artillery ammunition being provided to Kyiv, indicate a difficult start to 2024 as the war nears its third year. (Source: army-technology.com)

29 Jan 24. EU member countries have backed a plan to set aside billions of euros of profits arising from the freezing of assets of Russia’s central bank in a first step towards their possible use for Ukraine’s reconstruction. The unanimous decision on Monday — which has yet to be formalised in coming weeks — is part of the bloc’s show of support for Kyiv ahead of the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion. It also comes in the run-up to a summit on Thursday where EU leaders are expected to sign off on €50bn in financial support for Ukraine. Of the €260bn of Russian foreign reserves immobilised in 2022 in response to Moscow’s invasion, €191bn is sitting in Belgium’s Euroclear, a central security depository, and is generating billions as securities reach maturity and are reinvested. Under the agreement struck on Monday, profits generated by Euroclear will be booked separately and not be paid out as dividends to shareholders until EU countries unanimously decide to set up a “financial contribution to the [EU] budget that shall be raised on these net profits to support Ukraine”, according a draft text seen by the Financial Times. That levy will be “consistent with applicable contractual obligations, and in accordance with [EU] and international law”, the text added. There is no timeline for when such a separate proposal should be made. The proposal only targets future profits and will not apply retrospectively. Member nations will also determine what amount central security depositories will be able to keep, on top of amounts needed to cover legal and management costs. The European Commission’s proposals on handling the assets in December stopped short of seizing the profits and transferring them to the EU common budget, given concerns from the European Central Bank and critical capitals that doing so might trigger financial instability and provoke retaliatory measures from Russia. A separate push led by the US and backed by the UK, Japan and Canada to confiscate Russia’s assets fully, rather than just the profits, is facing resistance from European G7 members, notably Germany, Italy and France. (Source: FT.com)

30 Jan 24. Ukrainian forces kill nearly 1,000 Russian troops and destroy 30 artillery systems and Su-34 fighter jet over past 24 hours. The Ukrainian Defence Forces have killed over 900 Russian soldiers, destroyed 10 tanks and 31 artillery systems and downed a Russian aircraft over the past 24 hours, the Ukrainian General Staff has reported.

Source: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Facebook

Details: The total combat losses of the Russian forces between 24 February 2022 and 30 January 2024 are estimated to be as follows [figures in parentheses represent the latest losses – ed.]:

approximately 384,140 (+960) military personnel;
6,300 (+10) tanks;
11,725 (+29) armoured combat vehicles;
9,144 (+31) artillery systems;
972 (+0) multiple-launch rocket systems;
663 (+3) air defence systems;
332 (+1) fixed-wing aircraft;
324 (+0) helicopters;
7,084 (+35) strategic and tactical UAVs;
1,846 (+0) cruise missiles;
23 (+0) ships and boats;
1 (+0) submarines;
12,191 (+42) vehicles and tankers;
1,448 (+5) special vehicles and other equipment.

Update: Andrii Kovalov, spokesman for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, specified on air during the national joint 24/7 newscast that the Russians lost a Su-34 fighter jet in Luhansk Oblast. (Source: News Now/https://www.pravda.com.ua/)

29 Jan 24. Ukraine ‘strikes oil refinery north of Moscow.’ A Ukrainian drone struck a Russian oil refinery 155 miles north of Moscow on Monday morning, it has been claimed.

Prominent Russian Telegram channels Baza and 112 said a drone attacked the Slavenft-Yanos oil refinery in Yaroslavl at 7am local time (4am GMT).

They claimed there were no casualties and did not comment on the damage caused by the attack. Russian officials are yet to comment and Ukraine has not claimed responsibility. Ukraine has launched a wave of attacks on Russian oil facilities in recent weeks. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

29 Jan 24. Ukraine’s SBU Security Service Arrests 5 People Involved in $40m Defense Corruption Scheme. Ukraine’s main intelligence and security agency, the SBU, reported the discovery of a fraudulent arms procurement scheme aimed at embezzling approximately $40m. The scandal, involving senior defence ministry officials and corporate executives, revolves around a bogus contract for purchasing mortar rounds for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The contract, signed with Lviv Arsenal in August 2022, led to the transfer of funds to a foreign commercial entity that failed to deliver any artillery shells.

The implicated individuals include current and former heads of the defence ministry’s Department of Military and Technical Policy, Development of Armaments and Military Equipment, and the head of Lviv Arsenal. One suspect was detained while attempting to flee Ukraine and is currently in custody. Ukraine’s prosecutor general confirmed that the stolen funds have been seized and will be returned to the defence budget.

This revelation is part of a series of corruption scandals within Ukraine’s defence ministry. In August 2023, President Volodymyr Zelensky initiated a major purge, dismissing officials in charge of military equipment across regions to combat systemic corruption and evasion of conscription duties. The European Union, considering Ukraine’s membership, has emphasized the need for robust anti-corruption measures. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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