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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

January 26, 2024 by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 26.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

* DONETSK: Russian forces are seemingly altering their tactics in Avdiivka; they have likely temporarily abandoned efforts to encircle the city and are instead pressing forward with block-by-block frontal infantry assaults

* RECRUITMENT: The BBC has reported that the Kremlin is no longer pardoning prisoners who fight in Ukraine and changing the terms of their service, though coercive recruitment of convicts will likely continue

* SANCTIONS: Bloomberg has reported that Russia imported more than USD 1bn of advanced US and European chips in 2023, underscoring the porous nature of Western sanctions

* FORECAST: Reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin has allegedly signalled interest in ending the war remain highly uncertain and contingent upon Russia negotiating in good faith, which remains highly unlikely

* BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report

* DONETSK: On 25 January, Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk reported that Russian forces are changing offensive tactics in the Avdiivka sector. Russian operations reportedly involve fewer armoured vehicles and increasingly depend on small infantry units conducting assaults and reconnaissance operations. This change in tactics likely indicates that the Russian command has abandoned its initial goal to encircle Avdiivka with mechanised assaults from the north and west, which have achieved very little in recent weeks.

* DONETSK: Russian forces have clearly made progress in the southern outskirts of the city over the same period, indicating that Russian forces will likely resort to highly attritional frontal infantry assaults through the settlement. They will likely fighgt block by block akin to its advances in other major urban settlements, including Bakhmut. As previously assessed, this might be in part due to the fact that the proliferation of drones means it is extremely difficult for Russian forces to concentrate sizeable forces, including armoured vehicles, without being spotted and interdicted (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 24 January 2024).

* DONETSK: On 26 January, the Ukrainian General Staff reported a renewal of Russian offensive activity in the Marinka sector, where 25 attacks were recorded over the past 24 hours. On 25 January, Ukrainian military Kostyantyn Mashovets claimed that Ukrainian forces progressed between 0.3 and 1 mile (0.5 to 1.5 km) south-west Novomykhailivka, located south-west of Donetsk City. Mashovets also asserted that Ukrainian forces made limited progress around the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant area, where Russian sources reported a recent intensification of Ukrainian counter-attacks. However, such claims remain unconfirmed. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 25 January indicates that Russian forces made advances south-west of Stepove, located north-west of Avdiivka.

* KHERSON: Nothing significant to report

* OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 25 January, the military spokesperson of a Ukrainian unit operating along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline said Russian forces continue to maintain pressure near Synkivka, located around five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk. However, the official said that Russian assaults yield limited results and come at the cost of high casualty rates. He reported that over the span of 24 hours, Russian forces lost 360 soldiers and 81 units of equipment, including seven armoured vehicles, though this cannot be confirmed. According to the official, the Russian command operates weekly rotations of forces, though this does not increase the number of personnel in the sector as the additional transfers are likely aimed at compensating for the heavy losses incurred. The spokesperson noted that Russian strikes, including shelling and air strikes, remain intense.

* SOUTHERN: On 25 January, various Ukrainian sources claimed that their forces had made small advances along the southern axis, but these remain unconfirmed. Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainians successfully counter-attacked along the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk oblast border region, pushing the Russians back by 150m north-east of Zavitne Bazhannya, located eight miles (13km) south of Velyka Novosilka. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have reportedly also made limited advances further west, allegedly advancing up to 0.6 miles (1km) south-west of Myrne, located 10 miles (17km) west of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). However, none of these advances can be confirmed.

* STRIKES: Ukraine’s Air Force reported that air defences intercepted a Kh-59 missile over Mykolaiv oblast on 26 January.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* RECRUITMENT: The BBC reported on 25 January that the Kremlin is no longer pardoning prisoners who fight in Ukraine and changing the terms of their service. The BBC stated that the Russian authorities had sent prisoners to fight in Ukraine by enticing them with the prospect of being pardoned and the expungement of their criminal records. However, it said prisoners are now only granted conditional release and are now being sent to serve until the end of the war, rather than six months.

* RECRUITMENT: Meanwhile, iStories reported on 25 January that former Russian prisoners who were recruited into Storm-Z units addressed an appeal to President Vladimir Putin complaining of unfulfilled promises. They stated they did not receive their promised salaries or compensation for injuries and that their criminal records were not wiped. While reports of unfulfilled promises and contract changes could realistically make it harder for the military to recruit Russian prisoners to fight in Ukraine, the Russian authorities will likely continue to use coercive measures to recruit convicts to replenish manpower.

* INFIGHTING: On 25 January, a Moscow court sentenced former Federal Security Service (FSB) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officer, Igor Strelkov (Girkin) to four years imprisonment on extremism charges. Strelkov was detained in July 2023; while he has been a strong supporter of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, he frequently criticised Russia’s strategy and Putin himself. In August 2023, Strelkov announced while in prison that he wanted to run for president in the upcoming March elections. The timing of Strelkov’s sentencing is likely in part intended to limit criticism of how the war is being conducted ahead of the vote. For further analysis, please see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 21 July 2023.

* SANCTIONS: Bloomberg reported on 25 January that Russia imported more than USD 1 bn of advanced US and European chips in 2023. Classified Russian customs service data reportedly indicates that more than half of imported semi-conductors and integrated circuits in the first nine months of last year were manufactured by US and European corporations. However, Bloomberg noted that there is no evidence to suggest these companies breached sanctions laws and that the data does not specify who exported the technologies to Russia, nor where they were shipped from and when the goods were manufactured.

* SANCTIONS: The outlet noted that the vast majority of restricted technologies are re-exported to Russia from third countries, including China, Turkey and the UAE. The West has issued punitive measures aimed at curtailing Moscow’s ability to procure technology to aid the war effort, including through targeting trade backchannels in third countries. Western governments will highly likely continue efforts to disrupt such networks for the duration of the war, underscoring the importance for proper due diligence and compliance practices for manufacturers and exporters. However, further punitive measures are unlikely to fully eradicate lucrative trade channels, particularly in countries with close ties to Russia.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: International media reported on 25 January that Russian President Vladimir Putin is allegedly sending signals to the US via indirect channels to sense if the latter is ready to engage in talks on ending the war in Ukraine. According to two insiders close to the Kremlin, the hints were conveyed to unspecified senior US officials in December 2023 through an intermediary that they declined to name. However, it remains highly unlikely that Moscow is willing to enter into negotiations in good faith in the near term, as we have previously assessed (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 23 January 2024).

The people familiar with the matter alleged that Putin may be willing to consider dropping demands for Ukraine’s neutrality and even eventually abandoning his opposition to Kyiv aspirations to join NATO. However, this would allegedly be conditional on Kyiv accepting Moscow’s control over Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, including regions seized since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. However, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov denied earlier on 26 January that Moscow would be ready to shift its stance on Ukraine’s neutrality and NATO membership. While the veracity of the reports cannot be confirmed, such signals could realistically form part of a Russian information operation designed to cast doubts in the West amid stalling debates over aid for Ukraine ahead of the US presidential elections in 2024, which will be pivotal in determining the trajectory of long-term assistance for Kyiv.

Russia would almost certainly be unwilling to alter its position on Ukraine’s ambitions to join NATO given NATO’s enlargement was a principal reason for the invasion in the first place. Moreover, even in the highly unlikely scenario that Moscow had suggested this, Kyiv would be highly unlikely to agree to territorial concessions in any case. Kyiv almost certainly also recognises that certain Ukraine-sceptic NATO member states, such as Hungary, could block its efforts to join the military bloc indefinitenly. Given the fact that Kyiv is almost certain to distrust any and all security guarantees provided by Russia, without rapid accession to NATO, any agreement to freeze the conflict would still render Ukraine vulnerable to renewed Russian aggression and the threat of Russia seizing more territory in the future.

On 23 January, Czech President Petr Pavel assessed that Ukraine is unlikely to be in a position to completely remove Russian forces from all of its territory for the foreseeable future. Pavel insisted that Kyiv’s allies should therefore try to help it achieve the best result possible, amid wider calls for Western states to commit more resources to Ukraine over the longer term. The Czech President stated that he expects Russian military pressure will intensify in the coming weeks as Russia looks to make further territorial gains ahead of the presidential election in mid-March.

Jan 25.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

* STRIKES: Ukrainian forces continue to launch long-range drone attacks against Russian oil and gas infrastructure, with an attack against Tuapse (Krasnodar Krai) temporarily halting flights at Sochi International Airport

* AID: German media has reported that the UK has proposed Germany transfer Taurus cruise missiles to the UK in exchange for sending more Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine

* AID: US Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell weighed the possibility of splitting Ukraine funding from border security changes, but such a compromise remains uncertain amid gridlock on Ukraine aid

* FORECAST: NATO has began its largest military exercise in decades, Exercise Steadfast Defender 24; limited GPS jamming across eastern Europe remains likely amid ongoing electronic warfare (EW) exercises

* BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report

* DONETSK: Nothing significant to report

* KHERSON: Nothing significant to report

* OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 25 January, a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Terny, located around nine miles (15km) north-west of Kreminna. The milblogger explained that Terny is an important logistical node for Ukrainian forces. However, such claims remain visually unconfirmed.

* SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report

* STRIKES: Ukrainian media Suspline reported a fire at a Russian oil depot in the Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai. The depot is located 89 miles (144km) north of Sochi International Airport (AER), where authorities temporarily suspended flight operations. Suspline said that the fire was a result of a drone attack orchestrated by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU). The attack comes days after a similar attack against an oil facility in Leningrad oblast, thus reflecting Kyiv’s increasing willingness to target oil infrastructure. For further analysis on how Ukrainian drone operations are impacting civilian aviation and airports in European Russia, see Sibylline Situation Update – Russia – 22 January 2024.

* STRIKES: Overnight on 24-25 January, Russia launched 14 Shahed 136/131 drones. Air defences intercepted 11 drones, including ten over Odesa oblast. According to Odesa governor Oleh Kiper, the attack damaged a residential building and an industrial warehouse in Odesa’s Primorsky and industrial districts, respectively.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* AID: German media reported on 24 January that the UK has proposed Germany transfer Taurus cruise missiles to the UK in exchange for sending more Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine. Government and diplomatic sources claim that London had suggested this to Berlin several weeks ago; the office of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has reportedly been analysing the proposal. The Chancellor has so far been reticent to provide the missiles, despite widespread support from within his own coalition government and the opposition (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 18 January 2024). The alleged proposal could possibly allow the German government a way to work around pressure to send the missiles directly to Ukraine, which Scholz fears would be escalatory. However, there is also a realistic possibility that Scholz could in any case concede in the coming months and provide the Taurus missiles as pressure continues to mount.

* AID: On 24 January, US Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell weighed the possibility of splitting Ukraine funding from border security changes to Senate Republicans. McConnell reportedly acknowledged that border security issues proved to be more complicated than he and other Senate Republicans anticipated when they previously suggested linking the matters together. The issue has prevented any progress towards securing additional funding for Ukraine over the last month. Republican Senator Ted Cruz claimed on 24 January that a Senate package linking funding for Ukraine and border security has a ‘0% chance’ of passing the House. While it is uncertain whether the two issues will be split, issues surrounding border security measures will likely remain a key obstacle in approving supplemental funding for Kyiv in the coming weeks.

* SANCTIONS: The Financial Times (FT) reported on 24 January that the EU is preparing more sanctions against Russia and financial support for Ukraine ahead of the second anniversary of the full-scale invasion. People familiar with the matter said the new restrictive measures will be focused on subjecting more individuals and businesses to asset freezes and travel bans. The FT said the sanctions will unlikely include a ban on Russian aluminium imports as requested by Poland and the Baltic states.

* SANCTIONS: Other unspecified elements of the sanctions package could also be watered down to secure support among member states, which is likely. An unnamed EU diplomat familiar with the matter said the EU is hoping to provide additional funding and military aid to Ukraine, as well as impose further sanctions against Russia. However, the diplomat acknowledged that there are limits to what the bloc can do two years into the war, indicating that the sanctions will likely be more symbolic.

* MOBILISATION: Ukrainska Pravda reported earlier on 25 January that the Ukrainian government has not yet approved and submitted to parliament a revised mobilisation bill, despite earlier reports that they had done so. The Chairman of the parliamentary Committee on National Security, Defence and Intelligence, Oleksandr Zavitnevych, stated publicly on social media that these earlier claims were false. Meanwhile, the Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets stated earlier on 25 January that his team is now consulting with parliament and the Ministry of Defence on the provisions of the bill. The new mobilisation law is clearly still in review, and it remains unclear when the government will submit the revised version to a vote in parliament. For further analysis, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 9 January 2024.

FORECAST

NATO: On 24 January, NATO began its largest military exercise in decades, Exercise Steadfast Defender 24, with a US warship departing the US for transit across the Atlantic for Europe. The alliance said in a statement that the exercise will highlight NATO’s ability to rapidly deploy forces from North America and other allied territories to reinforce the defence of Europe. Steadfast Defender 24 will take place across several locations and will be the first large-scale NATO exercise where new defence plans will be utilised; exercises will run until 31 May.

Earlier on 25 January, the Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov inferred that Moscow knows the military exercises are being held against Russia, with Russian officials perceiving the exercises as ‘provocative’. The exercises are clearly aimed at deterring Russia and reassuring European allies, particularly on the eastern flank, that the alliance remains committed to their collective defence. President Vladimir Putin has arrived in Kaliningrad today (25 January), and given the proximity to the Swalki Gap and the Baltic Fleet exercises, he could realistically make a statement framing the exercises as a threat to Russia. However, despite the rhetoric, the exercises are highly unlikely to elevate regional tensions significantly in the near term that would alter the military situation in eastern Europe.

Media reports on 24 January indicate that anti-aircraft gunners of the Russian Baltic Fleet conducted training to repel strikes from a mock enemy and that electronic warfare (EW) units conducted a special tactical exercise in Kaliningrad oblast. On 23 January, the chairman of the Belarusian General Staff, Viktor Gulevich, announced that Belarus is building up its EW forces on the Western border due to the strengthening of NATO air force groupings in the region. Russia may realistically conduct further EW training in Kaliningrad oblast in the coming weeks given the ongoing NATO drills, which could possibly result in GPS signal disruption over Poland and the Baltic region. On 16 and 17 January widespread GPS interference affected large areas of Poland and the Baltic region. The disruption caused navigation system interference, rather than failures to the systems in their entirety, but further EW exercises will likely sustain risks to GPS services in the region in the coming months.

Jan 24.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • STRIKES: A Russian Il-76 aircraft has crashed in the Belgorod region; The cause remains uncertain, but Moscow claims it was transporting Ukrainian POWs, while Kyiv claims S-300 air defence missiles
  • APPROPRIATIONS: The EU is reportedly unlikely to confiscate Russian central bank assets frozen in their entirety, but rather favours confiscating only the profits generated by these assets
  • BUSINESS: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has announced that the Ukrainian government and business representatives have agreed to establish a business support council, aimed at boosting business confidence
  • FORECAST: The proliferation of drones is constraining Russia’s (and Ukraine’s) ability to concentrate offensive forces, likely contributing to why commanders are resorting to small-scale, dismounted infantry assaults
  • BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
  • DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 23 January indicates that Russian forces progressed in western Stepove, located north-west of Avdiivka, as well as north-east of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).
  • KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage posted on 23 January indicates that Russian forces made limited advances in the direction Yampolivka, located around 12 miles (20km) west of Kreminna.
  • SOUTHERN: On 23 January, Russian occupation deputy head of Zaporizhzhia oblast, Vladimir Rogov, reported that Russian forces counter-attacked west of Robotyne and claimed that they had regained numerous unspecified positions. This remains unconfirmed. The southern Zaporizhzhia frontline has remained broadly static over the last month, though both Russian and Ukrainian forces have been launching sporadic attacks and counter-attacks utilising primarily small dismounted infantry groupings. However, there has been very little change to the frontline in recent weeks.
  • STRIKES: On 24 January, the Russian governor of Belgorod oblast, Vyacheslav Gladkov, reported that a Russian Il-76 aircraft crashed in the Belgorod region, leaving no survivors. The cause of the crash remains unknown, but Russian sources are discussing the possibility of a technical malfunction or that it was shot down. Earlier on 24 January, a Ukrainska Pravda article citing Ukrainian military sources claimed that Ukrainian armed forces were involved in the crash of the plane. The article was later caveated, warning that this information remains unconfirmed. As of time of writing, the causes of the plane crash remain unclear.
  • STRIKES: Ukrainska Pravda, quoting Ukrainian military sources, said that the plane was carrying missiles for S-300 air defence systems; Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that the plane carried 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) who were being transported to the border for a prisoner swap. We cannot yet confirm which of these is accurate. Notably, Andrei Kartapolov, a senior Russian lawmaker and retired general, stated on television that Kyiv deliberately shot down the plane with either German or US-made missiles to sabotage the prisoner exchange. Such statements could realistically be part of a Russian disinformation effort to obfuscate the reasons behind the attack or otherwise undermine efforts to proceed with future prisoner exchanges.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 23 January, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) revealed that it orchestrated the destruction of three Tu-22M3 bombers in August 2023. On 19 and 22 August, Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Russian military bases in Kaluga oblast and Novgorod oblast, housing Russian strategic bombers. The GUR’s statements underscore Kyiv’s commitment to degrade Russian military aviation capabilities.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • APPROPRIATIONS: Reuters reported on 23 January that the EU is unlikely to outright confiscate Russian central bank assets frozen in Europe. An unspecified senior EU official with knowledge of the matter ruled out that the bloc will proceed with such an appropriation, claiming that there is no agreement on this matter among EU member states. European officials are reportedly concerned with the legal implications of such a confiscation of sovereign assets, as well as consequences for the euro as a currency and investor confidence in euro assets.
  • APPROPRIATIONS: EU governments are reportedly more likely to support appropriating just the profits generated by the assets. According to unspecified officials, this could generate an estimated EUR 15-17 bn over four years that could be transferred to Ukraine. On 22 January, the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said foreign ministers had reached a political agreement to finalise the work on transferring revenues from frozen Russian frozen assets to Ukraine. Russia remains highly likely to respond in a tit-for-tat nature, meaning that if the EU only appropriates profits generated by frozen assets, the Russian retaliation against Western assets in Russia will likely also focus on targeting profits, though it remains unclear how Moscow would proceed with such an option.
  • AID: On 23 January, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) spokesperson Illarion Pavlyuk said commitments were made at the 18th meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group to provide Ukraine with unspecified long-range weapons. Pavlyuk said Ukraine will receive weapons from its partners that allow Ukraine to effectively strike Russian forces on the frontline and in the rear, as well as destroy logistics hubs.
  • AID: German defence minister Boris Pistorius announced at the meeting that Germany will give Ukraine six decommissioned Sea King MK41 multi-purpose military helicopters, spare parts and training for them. The pledge marks Berlin’s first provision of military helicopters to Kyiv. Pistorius stated that the Sea King is a proven and reliable helicopter that will help Ukraine with reconnaissance over the Black Sea and transporting soldiers.
  • AID: In January 2023, Ukraine’s former defence minister Oleksiy Reznikov stated that Sea King helicopters from the UK had arrived in Ukraine. London had previously announced it would send three of the helicopters to Kyiv. The UK’s MOD said in late December 2022 that it had trained ten crews of Ukraine’s armed forces on the equipment to enhance their search and rescue capabilities.
  • BUSINESS: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on 23 January that the Ukrainian government and business representatives have agreed to establish a business support council. The council aims to bring together business leaders from various fields to strengthen the Ukrainian economy and society. However, the Ukrainian president did not specify what the council’s responsibilities would be, though he did state that it will include prominent executives of Ukrainian companies.
  • BUSINESS: Zelensky said the government will also present amendments to the law on the Economic Security Bureau (BEB) and other unspecified laws to limit the potential of any possible pressure on legal businesses. The BEB was created in 2021 to investigate economic crimes and serve as a platform to allow dialogue between the state and the business community. However, since its creation, it has been accused of being an inefficient and corrupt department. As such, the initiatives are likely aimed at strengthening relations between the state and Ukrainian entrepreneurs to bolster the economy and improve business confidence.

FORECAST

OFFENSIVES: On 23 January, prominent Russian milblogger Starshe Eddi (‘Elder Edda’) assessed that Russian forces are currently unable to break the current ‘positional stalemate’ on the battlefield. He argues that the proliferation of Ukrainian drones and accompanying technological innovations mean that Russian forces are unable to concentrate forces of any size larger than battalions. Even small Russian groups of one-to-two infantry companies supported by 10 armoured vehicles are regularly attacked by Ukrainian forces in rear areas, preventing these groups from even reaching Ukraine’s forward defensive positions. As a consequence, he argues, Russian forces have been forced to attack with groups of 10-20 dismounted infantry, supported by armoured vehicles at ‘extreme range’ from the rear.

This is borne out in the proliferation of footage from Ukrainian forces showing first person view (FPV) drones and other munitions targeting small concentrations of Russian troops and armoured vehicles. The proliferation of drones has undoubtedly made it harder for both sides to concentrate significant offensive forces, even behind the frontline. Given the lack of air superiority and limited artillery and counter-battery capabilities for both sides, this has likely played a significant part in commanders resorting to small-scale, dismounted infantry assaults. Nevertheless, in recent weeks Russian forces have still been able to successfully make various tactical gains across eastern Ukraine even in this current ‘positional’ environment, and they are likely to continue grinding forwards throughout the winter.

Jan 23.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • BAKHMUT: Russian sources have claimed that Russian forces have advanced into the centre of the village of Bohdanivka, amid wider reports of ongoing artillery ammunition shortages for the defending Ukrainians
  • STRIKES: Russian launched its latest missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, with large numbers of Iskandr-M ballistic missiles and Kh-22 cruise missiles accounting for the relatively low overall interception rate over the capital Kyiv
  • APPROPRIATIONS: The EU’s foreign policy chief has disclosed that the bloc’s foreign ministers have made progress towards transferring the proceeds from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine
  • FORECAST: Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry has doubled down that there can be no territorial concessions, as Russian Foreign Minister effectively acknowledges that regime change remains a key war goal of Russia
  • BAKHMUT: On 22 January, numerous Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have advanced into the centre of the village of Bohdanivka, located around four miles (6km) west of Bakhmut. While this remains unconfirmed, Russian sources are claiming that Ukrainian forces only control around a third of the settlement. The Commander of Ukraine’s Ground Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on 22 January that the situation along the Bakhmut front remains ‘extremely tense’ due to intensive Russian artillery fire, attack drones and assault operations.
  • BAKHMUT: A CNN report published on 23 January filmed Ukrainian artillery operators near Bakhmut, who are reportedly suffering from extreme shortages of artillery rounds. One artillery commander stated that the current ratio of Russian to Ukrainian artillery fire remains ten to one. This is the latest indication that Ukrainian forces are struggling amid widespread ammunition shortages, forcing them to husband their resources as Russian attritional frontal assaults continue.
  • DONETSK: Geolocated from 22 January shows that Russian forces advanced beyond the section of a railway line south of Avdiivka. Additional footage from 21 January indicates Russian advances around the Trudovska mine, south of Kranohorivka, located west of Donetsk city.
  • KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
  • SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 22-23 January, Russia launched a large-scale missile strike targeting Kyiv, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The attack included four S-300/S-400 missiles, 15 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles, eight Kh-22 missiles, two Kh-59 guided missiles and 12 Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted 15 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles, one Kh-59 missile and five Iskander-M ballistic missiles. Local authorities reported that the missile attack struck buildings in the capital’s Pecherskyi, Solomianskyi and Sviatoshynskyi districts and Bucha (Kyiv oblast), injuring at least 20 people and killing one person. The attack also disrupted electricity and water supplies in the capital. The missiles also hit public squares in Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast). The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said the strike targeted military production facilities. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the attack possibly struck Ukraine’s military Myrhorod Air Base (Poltava oblast).
  • STRIKES: The damage caused to Kyiv, where the best air defences are concentrated, indicates the relative effectiveness of Kh-22 missiles and Russia’s evolving strike tactics. The high number of Iskandr ballistic missiles and Kh-22 missiles reflects the lower interception rate, given Ukrainian air defences have consistently struggled to intercept these types of missiles throughout the war. Launching various types of missiles aims at overwhelming air defences to create opportunities for the most lethal projectiles, such as ballistic missiles and Kh-22s, to hit their targets. Following the latest attack, Yuriy Ihnat, Ukraine’s Air Forces spokesperson, stressed that the attack underscores Kyiv’s growing need for air defence systems capable of countering Russian ballistic missiles.
  • STRIKES: On 23 January, the independent Astra media reported on Telegram that Russian authorities have begun installing S-300 air defence systems around St Petersburg. We previously assessed that Russia would aim to reinforce air defences in Leningrad oblast following recent Ukrainian drone attacks against an oil terminal at the Ust-Luga port Leningrad oblast, which is one of Russia’s main Baltic energy export outlets. Reports indicate that the strike partly contributed to a slowdown of oil exports, already impacted by deteriorating weather conditions.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • AID: A new meeting will take place today (on 23 January) of the Contact Group on Ukraine’s Defence (Ramstein format). US Deputy Pentagon press secretary Sabrina Singh said on 22 January that the meeting will focus on Ukraine’s longer-term needs, adding that air defence systems and munitions remain top priorities. Singh noted that even though Washington DC is not able to provide security assistance right now, its partners are continuing to do so. For further analysis on stalled US aid to Ukraine, please see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 18 January 2023.
  • AID: On 22 January, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced that Poland has joined the G7’s declaration to provide security guarantees for Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky described the negotiations with Tusk as very productive and thanked Warsaw for a new military aid package for Kyiv, as well as a new form of co-operation aimed at facilitating larger-scale weapons purchases for Ukraine’s needs. Zelensky noted that they discussed opportunities for future joint arms production without providing further details. Tusk’s visit to Kyiv marks his first official trip to Ukraine after his election and was therefore likely aimed at strengthening bilateral relations with the new ruling party following the Polish elections in October 2023.
  • APPROPRIATIONS: On 22 January, the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell disclosed that the bloc’s foreign ministers have made progress towards transferring the proceeds from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. Borrell said he was confident that the initiative would be finalised soon, adding that discussions will continue at an ambassadorial level. EU ambassadors are expected to approve a decision on 24 January to first set aside the proceeds into a separate account and then use them to support Ukraine. Borrell said the EU aims to make the decision officially before the next meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, scheduled for 19 February.
  • APPROPRIATIONS: Russian-state media reported on 21 January that the West stands to lose assets and investments worth at least USD 288 bn if it confiscates frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine’s reconstruction. RIA Novosti cited data which it claimed showed that direct investment from the EU, G7 member states, Australia and Switzerland in the Russian economy at the end of 2022 totalled this sum. While the exact figure cannot be verified, around EUR 300 bn of Russian Central Bank reserves are estimated to be blocked in the EU and other G7 states. RIA’s calculations are therefore highly likely aimed at increasing Western concerns of retaliatory confiscations from Moscow, the risk of which will remain elevated in the coming months.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: On 22 January, the spokesperson of Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry, Oleh Nikolenko, doubled down that there can be no compromise regarding Ukraine’s territorial integrity. His remarks come after Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said both Kyiv and Moscow would have to make compromises to end the war, noting that for Ukraine this could mean ceding territory to Russia.

In an interview on 20 January, Fico claimed that it was unrealistic for Kyiv to expect that Russia would leave Crimea and Donbas. Nikolenko reiterated that Ukraine and its partners continue efforts to liberate Russian-occupied Ukrainian regions so that Russian forces do not advance further into other European countries, including Slovakia. The spokesperson’s remarks indicate that Ukraine’s leadership remains publicly committed to reclaiming all Ukrainian territory before entering into negotiations with Russia to end the war. This stance is unlikely to change in the coming months, with Moscow also highly unlikely willing to cede its territorial gains for peace.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 22 January. Lavrov claimed that Western support for Ukraine undermines the path towards a peace settlement, adding that Russia has always remained ready for negotiations. However, he subsequently said that Moscow is not interested in discussions on how to keep the current Ukrainian leadership in power, underscoring that regime change in Ukraine highly likely remains a key war goal for Russia.

Lavrov also called for the international community to listen to Russia’s position on resolving the conflict without outlining what this involves. He claimed that Ukraine’s conditions for peace are futile, stating that the sooner Kyiv’s Western partners realise this the better it will be for Ukraine and the West. As such, Lavrov’s remarks almost certainly indicate that Russia will not enter negotiations to end the war in good faith in the short to medium term, despite Lavrov’s claims that Russia remains open to negotiations.

Jan 22.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • OFFENSIVES: The Financial Times has reported that the US is lobbying Ukraine to take a ‘conservative’ approach to military operations in 2024, with the aim of marshalling resources in anticipation of a major counter-offensive in 2025
  • STRIKES: Ukraine special services are highly likely behind a growing number of drone strikes against strategic oil sites in Russia’s rear, exposing weaknesses in Russian air defences
  • NUCLEAR: The IAEA has confirmed mines along the perimeter of the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) that had previously been removed have been re-installed
  • FORECAST: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he fears that if former US president Donald Trump returned to office he could make unilateral concessions to Russia that disadvantage Ukraine
  • OFFENSIVES: On 19 January, the Financial Times (FT) reported that the US is lobbying Ukraine to take a ‘conservative’ approach to military operations in 2024, with the aim of marshalling resources in anticipation of a major counter-offensive in 2025. Unnamed US officials cited by the FT have reportedly encouraged Kyiv to adopt an ‘active defence’ strategy, whereby Ukrainian forces will seek to exploit vulnerabilities in Russian defences and launch limited counter-attacks this year, while simultaneously creating units and capabilities for offensives in 2025.
  • OFFENSIVES: There is an active debate in Kyiv as to what Ukraine’s strategy should be in 2024 considering the effective failure of the 2023 counter-offensive, but a transition to an ‘active defensive’ strategy would allow Russia to regain the operational initiative. Numerous Ukrainian officials have warned against ceding the initiative to Russia and have expressed support for continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations. However, such an approach will place significant strain on Ukraine’s limited resources and personnel reserves. Without a significant uplift in Western military aid this year, particularly US support, continual Ukrainian counter-attacks and localised offensive operations this year will highly likely drain capabilities and resources, limiting the scope for a major counter-offensive that could push the Russians back in 2025.
  • OFFENSIVES: On 19 January, CNN cited numerous unnamed Western intelligence and military sources who anticipate that the war in Ukraine is likely to last at least two more years, with some forecasting fighting for up to five further years. This ultimately aligns with our base case forecast for the war; namely that it remains likely that the war will protract into a semi-stable attritional conflict that will last well beyond 2024. As such, a war-ending military offensive by either side remains unlikely in the next three to six months, though the FT did report that the Ukrainian security services are working under the assumption that Russian forces a preparing for a large-scale offensive for the summer. Even amid the ongoing debates around the US’ long-term support to Ukraine, this remains unlikely to achieve an operationally significant breakthrough, though tactical gains remain likely as Russia’s gruelling attritional offensives continue throughout the winter.
  • BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
  • DONETSK: Geolocated footage posted on 21 January indicates Russian forces progressed south of Avdiivka along Soborna Street in the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant area. The footage also shows that the Russian troops advanced along the treeline south-west of Avdiivka. On 21 January, Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun said Russia will likely intensify offensive operations in the Avdiivka sector, where it has reportedly amassed around 40,000 troops.
  • KHERSON: UK Defence Intelligence (DI) reported on 20 January that forcing Ukraine to withdraw from the left (east) bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson oblast remains an operational priority for Russian forces, but it has so far failed to do so. Russian efforts to dislodge the Ukrainian beachhead near Krynky, located around 22 miles (36km) to the north-east of Kherson city, have proven ineffective for months, despite the advantages Russia posseses. The FT reported an unnamed Ukrainian soldier operating near Krynky that Russian forces have at least four to five times the personnel than Ukraine maintains in the area. However, the soldier also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces defending the beachhead are suffering from logistical issues and are unable to transport heavy equipment across the river. According to the soldier, Ukraine’s goal on this flank is to create opportunities for Ukrainian strikes deeper into Russian-controlled southern Ukraine, but it remains unlikely that they will be able to do so in the short term given enduring logistical restraints and the balance of forces on the left bank.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 20 January confirmed that Russian forces have taken the village of Krokhmalne, located 12 miles (20km) north-west of Svatove. On 21 January, Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Volodymyr Fityo confirmed that Russia had captured the settlement. Nevertheless, Fityo explained that this does not provide Russian forces with an operational advantage in the sector. Additional footage shows that Russian troops made marginal progress east of Ivanivka, located 12 miles (20km) south-east of Kupiansk. Fityo noted that Russia lost 7,055 soldiers along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline in January alone, underscoring the high attrition rate of Russian operations, though this cannot be confirmed.
  • SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
  • STRIKES: Early on 21 January, Russian authorities reported explosions at a terminal of Russia’s Novatek natural gas company located in the port of Ust-Luga in Leningrad oblast near St Petersburg. Subsequently, authorities halted operations at the plant where Novatek, Russia’s largest independent gas producer, conducts gas condensate-processing operations. Ust-Luga is one of Russia’s main Baltic energy-export ports. Ukrainian media, citing Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), said that Ukrainian special forces orchestrated the attack. Over the past weeks, Ukraine has been reportedly carrying out attacks against Russian oil infrastructure, likely to degrade energy logistical infrastructure. The latest attack reflects such efforts and Kyiv’s ability to co-ordinate attacks against strategic energy export hubs increasingly far from Ukraine.
  • STRIKES: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that drones were destroyed over Oryol, Smolensk and Tula oblasts early on 21 January. However, a Ukrainian media outlet reported that the Shcheglovskiy Val plant (Tula oblast), producing Russian Pantsir air defence systems, was hit. Another outlet, quoting Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) said that in Smolensk, the attack hit the Smolensk Aviation Plant, which produces Kh-59 cruise missiles. The latest attacks are part of Kyiv’s efforts to degrade Russian military capabilities, though the extent of damage caused during these attacks remains unclear.
  • STRIKES: Following the latest attacks, on 21 January, the VChK-OGPU Telegram reported that there are ongoing deficiencies in Leningrad oblast’s air defence coverage. According to the Russian source, which has connections to the Kremlin, air defences are reportedly not positioned to intercept strikes from the south, but rather to counter attacks from the north-west and west (i.e. from NATO). Meanwhile, on 20 January, Yuriy Ihnat, Ukraine’s Air Force spokesperson, explained that Russian forces have reinforced air defences in Crimea with equipment from other Russian regions. As such, efforts to reinforce Crimea’s air protection have likely resulted in air defence shortages in other areas, possibly including Leningrad oblast. The latest attack will likely result in Russian authorities repositioning air defences along likely Ukrainian striking routes and around strategic targets. However, authorities will likely be forced to deploy additional air defence systems from other regions, which in turn will become more vulnerable to Ukrainian attacks.
  • STRIKES: Early on 22 January, Ukrainian air defences destroyed all eight Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia against Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Kherson and Mykolaiv regions. Also overnight on 19-20 January, Russia launched Shahed-136/137 drones and three S-300 missiles. Air defences were active in Cherkasy, Donetsk, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv and Odesa and intercepted four drones. Ukrainian authorities reported that the S-300 missile struck Novohrodivka in Donetsk oblast.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • NUCLEAR: On 19 January, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, said mines along the perimeter of the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) that had previously been removed have been re-installed. Grossi stated that these mines were in a buffer zone between the facility’s internal and external fences, adding that this is a restricted area inaccessible to operational plant personnel. The IAEA did not specify when or why the mines were placed there again. However, we continue to assess that a major nuclear incident at the plant remains highly unlikely in the coming months.
  • CITIZENSHIP: Earlier on 22 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that he will submit draft legislation allowing Ukrainians to hold multiple citizenships. Zelensky said it would allow ethnic Ukrainians and their descendants from different countries to have Ukrainian citizenship, with the exception of Russian citizens. The Ukrainian president also said foreign soldiers who have fought for Ukraine will receive Ukrainian citizenship. Ukraine’s constitution currently stipulates that only single citizenship is permitted.
  • CITIZENSHIP: Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba said in October 2023 that he supports allowing multiple citizenship to preserve and develop the global Ukrainian community. While it is uncertain when the proposed changes would be approved or when they could enter force, they could likely be aimed at incentivising foreign nationals to fight and invest in Ukraine to receive citizenship without having to compromise any other held citizenships.
  • AID: Reports emerged on 21 January that the EU is preparing a new plan that would allocate USD 22 bn in military aid for Ukraine. The plan envisions disbursing the funding back to the bloc’s member states for the assistance that they provide Kyiv over the next four years. It would reportedly allow smaller member states with lower munitions stocks to combine their resources in joint procurement and make it easier for countries to work collectively with Ukraine on what equipment it needs most. The design of the fund could also avoid single member states (principally Hungary) from blocking regular disbursements, which would allow for a more consistent and predictable flow of aid. However, the plan requires unanimous approval from member states, which Hungary and Slovakia could realistically oppose without significant concessions.
  • BORDERS: Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service (DPSU) reported on 20 January that the movement of truck traffic through the Dyakove-Halmeu checkpoint on the Ukrainian-Romanian border was unblocked. Earlier on 20 January, the DPSU reported the unblocking of another border crossing – Porubne-Siret; traffic resumed through a third checkpoint, Vicovu de Sus-Krasnoilsk, the day prior.

FORECAST

US: In an interview on 19 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he fears that if former US president Donald Trump returned to office he could make unilateral concessions to Russia that disadvantage Ukraine. He also invited Trump to visit Kyiv if the latter is confident that he can stop the war in ‘24 hours’, a claim which Zelensky said is ‘very dangerous’.

Zelensky said that even if Trump’s idea for ending the war, which no one has heard yet, is unsuitable for Ukraine and its people, Trump will do anything to implement the idea irrespectively. The remarks underscore the viable concerns in Ukraine’s leadership of a Trump victory in the 2024 presidential elections, which will almost certainly determine the trajectory of Washington DC’s long-term support for Kyiv. After winning the Iowa caucuses on 15 January, Trump again claimed that he would be able to end the war ‘very quickly’. Trump added that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin have very good relations and said he also knows Zelensky ‘very well’.

Earlier on 22 January, the Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov said that the Russian leadership does not know how Trump promises to quickly end the conflict. Peskov also stated that Russian diplomats had not been in contact with Trump regarding the matter. Both Moscow and Kyiv will almost certainly remain opposed to entering negotiations in the near term. However, a rushed peace settlement could likely provide conditions that would allow Russia to attack Ukraine again at a later date, or counter Ukraine’s interests, such as territorial concessions. On 21 January, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis suspended his presidential campaign and subsequently endorsed Trump. In mid-March 2023, DeSantis described Russia’s war in Ukraine as a ‘territorial dispute’ that was not of vital strategic interest to the US. DeSantis claimed that a majority of Republican primary voters wanted to give Trump another chance at being elected. As such, DeSantis’ withdrawal from the presidential race increases the likelihood of Trump’s nomination as Republican 2024 candidate.

*RUSSIA: Shortages Undermine Aviation Sector

Key points

  • The Kremlin’s efforts to boost the production domestic aircraft and spare parts are unlikely to mitigate the short-to-medium-term challenges within the aviation sector.
  • Growing shortages of aviation spare parts will increase the risk of aircraft malfunctions and accidents.
  • Ukraine’s increasing ability and willingness to carry out strikes deep into Russian territory will elevate the security risks for Russian airports and airspace, raising the likelihood of travel disruption.

Context

Since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government has injected an estimated USD 13.3 bn into propping up the country’s ailing civilian aviation sector. After major Western aircraft manufacturers pulled out of the Russian market, the industry has faced growing challenges not only to remain competitive, but also simply to maintain existing services. Growing difficulties in maintaining Western-produced and -designed passenger aircraft operated by Russian airlines have led to an increased rate of malfunctions, system failures and emergency landings; this trend has been compounded by sporadic airport closures during Ukrainian drone strikes. International sanctions have led Western aircraft manufacturers to halt maintenance services and the supply of aircraft spare parts to Russia. While President Vladimir Putin advocated for boosting the production of aircraft and spare parts on live national television on 14 December 2023, he implicitly acknowledged Russia’s dependence on Western aviation industry.

Forecast

Sustained shortages of Western-made spare parts will drive the risks of aircraft malfunctions and aviation accidents

Russia’s domestic aviation fleet comprises around 1,300 aircraft, including roughly 500 Western planes manufactured by Airbus and Boeing. International sanctions have resulted in a shortage of spare parts to maintain this fleet. In 2023, a Russian aviation expert, quoted by the Russian newspaper Kommersant, pointed to the growing difficulties in maintaining the airworthiness of foreign aircraft operated in Russia. Due to the shortage of spare parts and the suspension of maintenance of Western passenger planes, we assess that Russia will realistically experience a significant increase in aviation accidents similar to Iran, which underwent a surge shortly after being hit by international sanctions. Such accidents are already taking place in Russia. For example, on 8 December 2023, a Boeing 737 belonging to the Russian airline S7 made an emergency landing in Siberia due to an engine malfunction. Similarly, on 7 December 2023, a Tu-204 cargo plane made an emergency landing in Russia’s far-eastern Republic of Buryatia due to a malfunction.

The shortage of Western-made aviation spare parts and ‘aircraft cannibalisation’ will likely result in Russia downsizing its fleet of Western-made civilian aircraft

The ongoing shortage of Western-made spare parts will likely force Russian airlines to suspend the operations of other Western-made aircraft; it will also likely pressurise the authorities to prioritise certain aircraft and routes when distributing increasingly scant and outdated spare parts. Due to the growing difficulties in maintaining aircraft, the Russian government adopted a bill in December 2022 authorising Russian airlines to dismantle aircraft and to use their parts to repair other aircraft. Reports indicate that by mid-2023, around 35% of Russian aircraft had undergone this practice, which is known as ‘aviation cannibalisation’. We assess that growing aviation cannibalisation will result in more Russian airlines downsizing their fleets; this will increasingly impact lower-priority aircraft and routes. Rural air routes are currently the most at risk. However, as the situation persists, major domestic routes (such as those linking cities) will also be at increased risk.

Import substitution policies are unlikely to address short-to-medium-term operational challenges facing Russia’s aviation sector

Since 2022, Russia’s federal government has heavily subsidised the aviation sector by launching ambitious import substitution programmes to address the shortage of aircraft spare parts. In February 2023, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishutin signed a decree allocating RUB5bn (USD56m) to ramp up the production of domestic aircraft (and spare parts) for 2023 alone. Mishutin also pledged that federal funding would reach RUB 376bn (USD4.2bn) by 2036 as part of an effort to ramp up aircraft production. Notably, on 14 December 2023, Putin pledged that Russia plans to produce over 1,000 aircraft by 2030. In October 2023, Anna Panina, Director of the Aviation Industry Department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, stated that Russia aims to produce 50% of its largest air carrier needs by 2030.

We assess that these ambitious programmes are highly unlikely to alleviate the major issues in the short-to-medium term given that Russia retains limited domestic production capacity for aircraft components and remains cut off from international aviation markets.

Ukraine’s growing ability and willingness to carry out long-range strikes will increase the security risks facing Russian airports, driving travel disruption risks

Since the summer of 2023, Ukraine has been carrying out an increasing number of long-range strikes deep into Russian territory. Notable strikes include attacks against the capital Moscow; these have forced the authorities to suspend operations and flights to and from Moscow’s main airports temporarily, including Domodedovo (DME), Sheremetyevo (SVO), Vnukovo (VKO) and Zhukovsky (ZIA) airports. We assess that striking Russia’s military aviation will almost certainly remain a key priority for Ukraine, with recent strikes against oil infrastructure in Leningrad oblast on 21 January also illustrating the threat posed to regions even further from Ukraine. Earlier, on 18 January, another drone attack targeting Leningrad oblast resulted in St Petersburg Pulkovo airport (LED), delaying flights, including from Armenia.

While Kyiv is unlikely to target civilian aircraft overtly, its growing willingness and ability to strike the capital and other major cities will sustain security risks for all other major airports in western Russia within Ukraine’s increasingly growing striking range. Major Russian international airports vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes include: St Petersburg Pulkovo International Airport (LED), Krasnodar International Airport (KRR) and Sochi International Airport (AER, both Krasnodar Krai). This will also increase the risk of major disruption to key Russian flight paths connecting Moscow, St Petersburg and Sochi to key international destinations including Ankara and Istanbul (Turkey), Cairo (Egypt), Dubai (United Arab Emirates), Tbilisi (Georgia) and Yerevan (Armenia), among others. As such, some airlines have already announced restrictions and warnings.

On 1 August 2023, Turkmenistan’s main airline, Turkmenistan Airlines, announced the suspension of flights to Moscow, citing the ‘situation’ in the Russian capital’s airspace. Likewise, on 31 August 2023, Kazakhstan’s aviation authorities warned about the risks facing air travel in Russia due to an increasing number of drone attacks, some of which have prompted delays and cancellations at airports serving Moscow in recent weeks. Astana instructed Kazakh airlines operating regular and charter flights to conduct robust risk and threat assessments to maximise flight safety. Given that Ukraine’s long-range drone capabilities are only increasing, we assess that severe disruption to civilian flights will remain likely during intense periods of Ukrainian drone strikes. (Source: Sibylline)

 

26 Jan 24. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces Eliminate Russian Observation Posts in the South. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces have successfully destroyed Russian observation posts in the southern direction, as reported by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Facebook. The operation, involving the use of a thermal imaging drone and a direct assault by Special Operators, resulted in the elimination of enemy positions and personnel. During a reconnaissance mission in the south, the 73rd Marine Special Operations Center of the Ukrainian Armed Forces identified and targeted Russian observation posts using a UAV equipped with a thermal imaging drone and a drop system. This initial attack was followed by a ground assault by Special Forces, who braved heavy artillery fire to close in on and neutralize the enemy positions. The operation culminated in the destruction of the observation posts and the elimination of five Russian soldiers, enhancing Ukrainian control over the area. Meanwhile, the Zhytomyr City Council reported that local businessmen donated two fully equipped Volkswagen Transporter trucks to the military, sourced from Denmark, to aid in transportation and logistics efforts on the frontline. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

26 Jan 24. Rheinmetall Italia touts Ukraine deployment of Skynex air-defense gun. The deployment in Ukraine of the Skynex air defense system built by Rheinmetall is raising the product’s profile and sparking new orders from around the world, the company has said.

Built in Italy by the firm’s Italian subsidiary, Rheinmetall Italia, a Skynex battery was delivered to Ukraine on Dec. 31 in a deal funded by the German government and is now operational, said CEO Alessandro Ercolani.

Under a contract worth around €160 million ($174 million), which was signed in December 2022, a second battery will also be delivered in March this year.

Launched eight years ago, Skynex has previously been sold to Qatar, while last December, Romania signed for two batteries and Austria bought seven.

“The signing of the Ukraine contract was an important factor in winning the Austrian and Romanian deals,” said Ercolani.

The claim puts the system on a list of defense products which have seen their profile raised by deployment in Ukraine, from Turkish Bayraktar drones to the American HIMARS rocket launcher.

Ercolani told Defense News that new Skynex contracts would be finalized in coming weeks with a Middle East state and a NATO member.

“We have been told Skynex is working well in Ukraine, and feedback to further improve the system will be really important,” he said.

“The quality of the product had to be the best because you know it is going to be used,” he added.

An evolution of the firm’s Sky Guard system, which has been sold to 60 countries, Skynex features a 50km range radar, a command post and four guns, each equipped with electro-optical sensors and a tracking radar, which are able to fire 1,000 35mm rounds a minute, hitting a target four kilometers away.

“We started designing Skynex a decade ago to counter asymmetric threats like mortars, which meant it was ready to be used against more recently evolving threats like drones and loitering munitions,” said Ercolani.

“It’s advantage is that it was conceived to counter small, low and slow threats, and it is cost effective compared to using a missile worth millions to take out a drone,” he added.

When they approach their target, the system’s 35mm shells open, disbursing hundreds of small tungsten cylinders which form a destructive cloud.

To ensure the shells open at the right moment, their speed is checked by a sensor as they leave the gun’s barrel, with electronics in the barrel programming the opening time of the shell accordingly.

Austria will be the first customer to order the fixed face, active electronically scanned array radar Rheinmetall Italia is now offering with the system, while the Middle East customer is mulling whether to integrate missiles into the system for an extra layer of defense.

(Source: Defense News)

 

26 Jan 24.  Putin says Ukraine shot down plane, not clear if deliberately or in error. Russian President Vladimir Putin said a Russian military plane that crashed near the border with Ukraine on Wednesday was shot down by Ukrainian air defences, whether on purpose or by mistake.

Moscow accuses Kyiv of downing the Ilyushin Il-76 plane in Russia’s Belgorod region and killing 74 people on board, including 65 captured Ukrainian soldiers en route to be swapped for Russian PoWs. It has not presented evidence.

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Ukraine has neither confirmed nor denied that it shot down the plane and has challenged Moscow’s account of who was on board and what happened.

“I don’t know if they did it on purpose or by mistake, but it is obvious that they did it,” Putin said in televised comments, his first on the crash.

“In any case, what happened is a crime. Either through negligence or on purpose, but in any case it is a crime.”

Ukraine disputes Russia’s assertion that it was warned in advance that a plane carrying Ukrainian prisoners of war would be flying over Russia’s southwestern Belgorod region at that time.

It has also said there were discrepancies in a list published by Russian media of the 65 Ukrainians alleged to have been on the aircraft.

Putin said the plane could not have been brought down by Russian “friendly fire” because Russia’s air defence systems have safeguards to prevent them attacking their own planes.

“There are ‘friend or foe’ systems there, and no matter how much the operator presses the button, our air defence systems would not work,” he said.

Putin said the missiles fired were mostly likely American or French, but this would be established with certainty in two to three days.

An adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said Putin’s comments amounted to a “classic disinformation” campaign.

“First of all, look at it. We are fighting but (for Putin) Ukraine is doing something wrong in terms of the rules and customs of war,” Mykhailo Podolyak told Ukrainian television.

“And secondly, there is something much more important for the Russians. They want to take away our right to receive missiles from our partners for our air defence systems.”

Russia’s Investigative Committee earlier reported that Ukrainian identity documents and tattooed body parts had been recovered from the site of the crash.

(Source: Reuters)

 

25 Jan 24. Malaysian Mercenaries in the Donetsk Region, Reports National Resistance Centre. The Ukrainian National Resistance Centre, controlled by the Ukrainian government’s Special Operations Forces, has reported the presence of Malaysian mercenaries fighting alongside Russian forces in the Donetsk region. This development is indicative of a broader strategy by Russia to recruit mercenaries from around the world to sustain its military campaign in Ukraine.

According to the Centre, “The Russians continue to collect mercenaries from all countries in the world to continue their aggressive policy.” This strategy has been a feature of the conflict since its inception, with the engagement of multiple foreign nationals in the war. Reports have consistently highlighted the presence of fighters from Cuba, Nepal, Belarus, and Serbia within the ranks of the Russian forces.

The involvement of these international mercenaries in the conflict is aligned with previous reports that the Russian government has been offering incentives to attract foreign fighters, including expedited citizenship. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

25 Jan 24. German defence minister: Not aware of cruise-missile swap offer. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said on Thursday he was not aware of a swap offer that would see German Taurus cruise missiles going to Britain and Ukraine receiving British Storm Shadow systems in return.

“I am not aware of this offer. If there are talks about it, then not in my house,” he said in an interview with daily BILD, broadcaster WELT TV and news outlet Politico.

Britain has offered Germany a swap of cruise missiles that could allow the German government a way of overcoming concerns over a suggested delivery of missiles to Ukraine, German newspaper Handelsblatt reported on Wednesday.

Kyiv has been pushing Berlin to supply its Taurus missiles, which could give Ukraine the ability to cause significant damage deeper within Russian-occupied territory, but the German government is hesitant due to concerns it could escalate the conflict.

“With Taurus, we are talking about a highly technical system, not comparable with the products of other nations. And that’s why we have to weigh up very carefully the conditions under which we do this,” Pistorius said.

The head of Germany’s parliamentary defence committee criticized the idea of a swap and instead called on both countries to supply their systems to Ukraine.

“Our European partners must think we are completely bonkers,” Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann told Reuters. “Are we in kindergarten here on a merry-go-round?” (Source: Reuters)

 

24 Jan 24. Ukraine SOF eliminated 3 Tu-22 bombers over 300 miles into Russian territory. In a significant operation executed deep in Russian territory, a Ukrainian special operations unit successfully destroyed a Russian Tupolev Tu-22M3 bomber and disabled two others, as reported by the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU). The operation, conducted on August 30, 2023, saw Ukrainian intelligence officers traverse over 600 kilometers through enemy territory to carry out this mission.

The operation was commanded by Colonel Oleh Babii. Throughout his service, Colonel Babii conducted nine successful reconnaissance missions behind Russian lines and led twelve special operations to organize and support resistance movements in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and Russian territory.

Babii’s team, after accomplishing their mission in enemy territory, faced an ambush by Russian forces during their return to Ukrainian-controlled territory. During the firefight, Colonel Babii was mortally wounded while covering the retreat of his team. His heroism and sacrifice earned him the posthumous title of Hero of Ukraine and the Order of the Golden Star.

The Tupolev Tu-22M, a supersonic, variable-sweep wing, long-range strategic and maritime strike bomber developed by the Tupolev Design Bureau, has been a key component of Russian military operations. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

24 Jan 24. Germany to gift Sea King helicopters and Leopard tanks to Ukraine, train 10,000 troops. Germany which has already donated $6.5bn to Ukraine, and committed to $5.4bn by 2028, announced at the latest meeting a further $8.2bn. More than doubling its outstanding donations, Germany will send six of its 21 in service Sea King multi-purpose helicopters and 80 Leopard tanks to Ukraine as part of the $8.2bn (€7.5bn) in new commitments coming out of the 18th Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) meeting held on 23 January 2024.

Signalling a commitment to a long-term engagement, Germany has also agreed to train 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Germany.

“The fact that Putin still accepts the infinite suffering of Ukrainians for his war of aggression must not leave us cold,” said German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius. “Therefore, there can be two conclusions, for me in particular: For the protection of the Ukrainian population and infrastructure, air defence remains the number 1 priority. In addition, we need more speed in arms production.”

At the UDCG, Pistorius highlighted the Sea King helicopter’s status as a proven and robust rotary aircraft with capabilities for reconnaissance over the Black Sea and troop transport.

With a range of 1,500km, Sea King Helicopter is a workhorse airframe for German naval pilots that has been in service since the 1970’s, mainly in the service of search and rescue missions in maritime areas, but also for the transport of troops. Armed with a 12.7mm heavy machine gun, the 22.1m long airframe can carry up to 20 passengers in addition to a crew of four. For self defence, it is equipped with a chaff dispensing countermeasure set, the AN/ALE-37A, externally mounted.

Pistorius also reiterated Germany’s commitment to supporting Ukraine through action as the joint-leader of the Air Defence capability coalition, in conjunction with France.

Previous standing commitments from Germany to Ukraine amount to approximately $5.4bn, expected to be delivered by 2028. The new commitment announced for 2024, is an additional $8.2bn, more than doubling the military aid still to come, and making Germany the largest military supporter in Europe and the world’s second largest behind the USA.

Since the war in Ukraine began in February 2022, the value of German military deliveries to Ukraine have amounted to $6.5bn, with completed deliveries of anti-aircraft and air-defence systems having a total value of over $2.4bn alone.

Significant deliveries include the levies of 18 battle tanks Leopard 2 A6, 20 Marder 1 A3 infantry fighting vehicles, 14 howitzers 2000 tanks , 5 MARS II multiple launch Rocket systems, and 500 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.

There were also another 60 Marder infantry fighting vehicles and 52 Cheetah anti-aircraft tanks from industrial stocks, financed through the training budget for military aid to partner states.

These direct exchanges do not include the stocks put forward as part of ring exchanges, reciprocal arrangements where the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Greece received armaments from Germany and in turn quickly contributed to the support of Ukraine at the beginning of the war. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

23 Jan 24. Russia probing for Ukraine weaknesses as US funding stalls.

Russia’s military is carrying out probing attacks with barrages of missiles and drones in an attempt to find weaknesses in Ukraine’s military as U.S. funding for security assistance is tied up in Congress, a senior Pentagon official said on Tuesday.

The efforts include use of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones, and Russia has also sought to force Ukraine to expend precious ammunition, and air defenses, to counter the attacks.

“They’ve not succeeded so far. Ukrainians have a lot of experience over the last few years on how to cope with these kinds of Russian assaults,” Celeste Wallander, an assistant secretary of defense, told reporters.

Earlier on Tuesday, Russia fired 41 missiles at Ukrainian cities, according to Ukraine’s air force, which said it destroyed 21 of them.

Wallander’s remarks came as Republicans in Congress have blocked emergency funding that President Joe Biden has requested for Ukraine and threaten to force a partial shutdown of the government in an effort to push new security policies along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Biden has requested $61.4bn in additional funding to help supply Ukraine with weapons and replenish U.S. stocks as it nears the two-year mark of its war with Russia. The funds sought for Ukraine are part of a “supplemental” request that also includes $14.3bn for Israel and $13.6bn for border protection.

Asked about whether the aid was creating shortfalls for Ukraine, Wallander said that U.S. allies have stepped up to help bridge some shortfalls. But she also acknowledged concerns inside Ukraine.

“They believe that units do not have the stocks and stores of ammunition that they require,” Wallander said.

“And that is one of the reasons we have been focusing on the need to answer Congress’ questions so that they are able to move forward on (a) decision to pass the supplemental.”

Russia has carried out regular air strikes on cities and civilian infrastructure far behind the front lines since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Its troops, meanwhile, are attacking in several parts along the sprawling eastern front and seeking to seize the initiative, Ukraine’s military says. (Source: Reuters)

 

23 Jan 24. Austin Urges Continued Support for Ukraine. The U.S. remains determined to work alongside its allies to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III said today as he convened the 18th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. The secretary praised the continued support among Ukraine’s allies and implored the international community not to drop its guard as war enters its third year.

“Let’s be clear: Our support for Ukraine’s struggle makes all of our countries more secure,” Austin said as he kicked off the virtual meeting from Washington. “If we lose our nerve, if we flinch, if we fail to deter other would-be aggressors, we will only invite even more bloodshed and more chaos.”

“A sovereign and secure Ukraine is critical to global security,” he said. “And we must not waver in our support for Ukraine.”

In December, the U.S. announced its 54th drawdown security assistance package for Ukraine valued at up to $250 m, including air defense capabilities, artillery and anti-tank weapons and other equipment.

The announcement came amid negotiations on Capitol Hill over President Joe Biden’s supplemental request to Congress to continue critical funding for military and humanitarian aid for Ukraine.

As those negotiations continue, the U.S-led coalition of nearly 50 countries that comprise the Ukraine Defense Contact Group remain committed to meeting Ukraine’s immediate battlefield needs and supporting its long term security.

Austin commended recent announcements by Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom to send packages totaling bns of dollars in military assistance to Ukraine since the last meeting of the contact group.

But he warned that as fighting continues throughout the winter, Russia will seek to demoralize Ukraine’s defenders who remain steadfast in their fight for their sovereignty.

“Putin continues to sacrifice staggering numbers of Russian troops in his rash and reckless war of choice,” Austin said. “And Putin hopes that missiles and drones will demoralize the Ukrainian people and break the fighting spirit of Ukrainian military.

“So, I urge this group to dig deep to provide Ukraine with more lifesaving ground-based air defense systems and interceptors.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

23 Jan 24. German drone maker helps Ukrainian forces own the night. German drone maker Quantum Systems has recorded a three-fold increase in aircraft deliveries to Ukraine, with demand driven by the need of Kyiv’s forces to find the enemy after dark, according to company officials.

The Munich-based vendor made the first delivery of long-range Vector surveillance drones to Ukraine in 2022, starting with roughly 40 systems.

“This was around the time when Russian troops were trying to cross rivers and bodies of water to advance into Ukraine and beginning to make wider-use of jamming,” Sven Kruck, chief sales officer at Quantum Systems, told Defense News in a recent virtual interview while on a trip to Kyiv.

“The Vector had his baptism of fire during the famous battle of Siverskyi Donets in May 2022, where it was capable of directing fire through a thick layer of smoke in an electronic-warfare environment,” Matthias Lehna, business development manager at Quantum, added.

After that, fresh orders, paid for by the German government, kept coming: one last January, for 105 drones, and another in May, for a third batch of 300 Vectors.

The Vector is a mid-range reconnaissance drone with an endurance of three hours that can reach a speed of 72km per hour. A mock-up was on display here at the UMEX 2024 exhibition that runs Jan. 23-25.

“From December 2022 to January 2023, we started seeing a major increase in Russian jamming attempts, so we established a Signal channel for Ukrainian users, which currently has 200 operators in it where they exchange and provide direct feedback on what they need,” Kruck said, referring to the messenger app that advertises itself as security conscious.

Executives declined to identify which elements of the Ukrainian military operate the drones, citing operational security, saying only that the units are well known in the Ukrainian Special Forces community for their night-time capabilities.

As operators were sharing lessons learned, the vendor made improvements along three lines of effort, Kruck said: software updates, increased battery life by one hour, and hardware changes.

The latter have helped to stabilize the drones’ vertical-take-off-and-landing capabilities, enabling them to land safely in various conditions.

“We are also working on enhancing the AI capabilities of the Vector so it can better connect and integrate to battle management systems and strike drones as well as working on more sensors and radar elements so they can better detect artillery fire,” Kruck said.

Quantum Systems already has a training and logistics facility in Ukraine, where 200 operators so far have been trained with the help of 15 Ukrainian trainers. The company has plans to increase the number of local trainers to 40 in 2024.

Executives now want to take the next step, finalizing agreements to create a spare parts plant in Ukraine. The local presence would accelerate maintenance for the Vector drones and speed up the development cycle for new features, according to the company. (Source: Defense News)

23 Jan 24. Germany to send Ukraine six ‘Sea King’ helicopters for air defence. Germany will send six helicopters to Ukraine out of Germany’s military inventory to be delivered from the second quarter of this year, its defence minister Boris Pistorius announced on Tuesday, the first delivery of its kind from Germany.

The helicopters, called “Sea King” helicopters, should help Ukraine with everything from surveillance of the Black Sea to transporting soldiers, Pistorius said.

The minister was speaking at a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, where over 50 states and organisations plan capabilities on Ukraine’s frontline. Germany and France have led the coalition for air defence together since November.

“For the protection of the Ukrainian people and infrastructure, air defence continues to be the number 1 priority. We also need more speed with arms production,” Pistorius said. (Source: Reuters)

 

23 Jan 24. Russia’s war in Ukraine has turned into “a battle of ammunition”, Nato’s head has warned, as supply shortages have forced Kyiv’s military to ration artillery rounds. “Increased production of ammunition is an absolute necessity to enable us to continue to provide support to Ukraine,” Nato secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg said on Tuesday, as the alliance signed a €1.1bn deal to procure more ammunition its members can use to arm Ukrainian forces or to replenish their own stocks. “With the consumption of ammunition we see in Ukraine, with the needs we see. …we need to ramp up production,” Stoltenberg added. His comments came hours after Ukraine was hit by another Russian barrage, with officials in Kyiv growing increasingly concerned their forces could run out of munitions by the time allies in the US and EU finally agree on further military assistance for this year. Faced with dwindling supplies, Ukrainian soldiers on the frontline have told the Financial Times in recent days that they are forced to ration munitions while Russian troops step up their attacks.  “Indeed there is really not enough ammunition,” said a senior Ukrainian artillery brigade officer. Ukraine went from firing 8,000 shells per day during its counteroffensive in the summer to just 2,000 in recent weeks, according to a platoon commander.  Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, Ukraine’s commander of operations in the south-east, told reporters in December that his forces faced a shortage of artillery shells due to the lack of western military assistance, forcing troops to scale back some operations along the 1,000km frontline. EU partners last spring vowed to send Ukraine 1mn artillery rounds, which are crucial to the country’s frontline defence. But as of late December, Ukrainian officials said that only about 300,000 shells had been provided. Nato on Tuesday signed a contract for “hundreds of thousands of rounds” of 155mm artillery ammunition, which allies will be able to send on to Ukraine or replenish their own inventories. Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly urged western allies whose support has been critical to repelling Russia’s invasion to step up supplies of air defence systems as well as offensive capabilities. White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said on Monday that the next few months would be “critical for Ukraine”, whose commanders are faced with “difficult decisions” about what weaponry to deploy “because they don’t know when the next shipment is going to come”.  “That’s a horrible place to put the Ukrainian military in,” Kirby warned, “as the Russians certainly aren’t suffering under that same uncertainty, as they reach out to North Korea for ballistic missiles?.?.?.?and drones from Iran and [continue] producing on their own.” Posting a video on social media platform X of residential buildings in the northeastern city of Kharkiv which were bombed by Russia’s overnight missile attacks, Zelenskyy’s chief-of-staff Andriy Yermak stressed the urgency for Kyiv’s backers to swiftly approve more military assistance. “The world must understand that this terror can only be stopped by force,” Yermak wrote. Zelenskyy said that at least six people were killed and more than 70 injured in the attacks, with rescuers still searching for people trapped under the rubble of their homes. Only half of Russia’s 41 missiles fired overnight were intercepted, according to Ukrainian army officials. Vitaly Klitschko, the mayor of Kyiv, said a residential building was being evacuated after an undetonated warhead was found in one of the apartments. Russia’s defence ministry confirmed the attacks on Tuesday but denied targeting civilians. (Source: FT.com)

 

22 Jan 24. “Ukrainian drones attack Russian air defence/C-UAS Pantsir manufacturing plant.” Ukrainian drones have struck the Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft system manufacturing facility in the Russian city of Tula, according to the Ukrainian defence department.

“A local Telegram channel reported the explosions in Tula,” said the ministry in a press statement.  “On the morning of January 21, 2024, drones attacked the Shcheglovsky Val military plant. The plant manufactures Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft systems. The systems manufactured by Shcheglovsky Val are provided for the Russian Armed Forces as well as for exports. In addition to anti-aircraft missile and gun systems, the plant also manufactures other military products, such as guided weapons, air defense systems, and more.

The Telegram channel referenced in the report is Ukraine’s Militarnyi Videonews.

“Old models of military equipment are also being modernized at the company’s facilities,” said the defence ministry. “The company’s products have been used in the full-scale war in Ukraine since 2022. According to local residents, they’ve heard the sounds of flying drones. It was also reported about the operation of air defense systems deployed in the region.” For more information:/

https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukrainian-drones-hit-pantsir-s1-production-plant-in-russian-tula/ (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

16 Jan 24. 3D Battlefield printing in Ukraine. Given that Ukraine has received a diverse fleet of military equipment from dozens of nations, 3D printing in the field enables them to create parts on demand that are usually in limited supply or which haven’t been manufactured in decades.

The war in Ukraine has seen the first widespread application of 3D printing on the battlefield, primarily by Ukrainian forces.

Militaries worldwide, especially in the US, Europe, China, and India, have closely monitored these developments. The US and China’s large military investments give them an edge in further leveraging military 3D printing developments, although Europe’s proximity to Ukraine, which enabled the training of Ukrainian forces in military 3D printing applications within Poland and other regional hubs, also offers a distinct competitive advantage.

3D printing in the military context has the potential to reduce supply lines in critical circumstances. As Ukraine has received military donations from many different nations, it operates a uniquely diverse fleet of platforms and capabilities. Ukraine’s fleet consists of more than 40 different armoured platforms, ranging from older models inherited from the Soviet Union to newer Western tanks and armoured fighting vehicles. General inconsistencies in the accessibility of spare parts and critical components across the fleet pose a major challenge to Ukrainian force readiness and maintenance operations.

Australia sends 3D printing aid to Ukraine

Spee3D, an Australian 3D printing company, has been a leader in 3D printing industrial aid to Ukraine). It’s WarpSPEE3D printers were first trialled by the Australian Army’s 1st Brigade. The company is now successfully exporting the technology, including to Ukraine, and since 2023, they have sent three of their WarpSPEED3D metal 3D printers to Ukraine, as part of a military donation jointly funded by the Australian government. These advanced metal printers enable forces to create custom machine tools and parts for tanks, APCs, and other type of armoured vehicles.

The WarpSPEED3D is small enough to fit into compact ISO shipping containers, facilitating their transportation to key areas along the frontlines. Furthermore, Ukrainian troops have gone to Poland to be trained by Spee3D employees in how to operate and maintain their metal 3D printers, including under adverse combat conditions.

3D printing aids maintenance of ‘legacy systems’

Given that Ukraine has received a diverse fleet of military equipment from dozens of nations, 3D printing in the field enables them to create parts on demand that are usually in limited supply or which haven’t been manufactured in decades.

For example, Ukraine received 28 units of the Australian variant of the M113 armoured fighting vehicle. This variant was manufactured more than 40 years ago and has unique modifications to its cargo bed and gun platform that make it incompatible with standard M113 spare parts. 3D printing enables Ukrainian forces to manufacture the specific hinges needed to maintain these M113s, which have not been mass manufactured for a very long time.

In another important example, since just over half of Ukraine’s donations come from the US and the remainder from Europe, unit measurement conversions between metric and US imperial pose a major complication. If a US manufactured vehicle needs a half inch (12.7 mm) wrench, Ukrainian mechanics with metric tools could not use their standard 12mm wrench.

As imperial sized tools are not common outside the US, 3D printing enables such tools to be made immediately rather than be shipped from the US market. The same rules apply for screws, washers, and any other small components which can be efficiently manufactured by 3D field printers.

These examples demonstrate that although 3D printing is not intended to replace standard manufacturing processes, which currently remain more efficient, it can be used to manufacture specialist parts that are needed immediately and are otherwise unavailable, filling critical gaps in supply lines. The ability to rapidly move 3D printers across the front to coordinate with maintenance units ensures these critical parts can be delivered even faster.

Increasingly mobile solutions

The next step for 3D printing in the aerospace and defense industry is making increasingly mobile solutions which can be deployed and operated more flexibly than current bulkier systems. Militaries are looking to field this technology in future forward deployment bases, where it is hoped 3D printers could manufacture spare parts, weapons, ammunition, equipment and even UAVs for forces deployed along the front lines of a conflict. Although 3D printing is currently more expensive than conventional manufacturing and is expected to remain so in the near future, military commanders and frontline troops improve their combat abilities from these immediate tailor-made products.

Regulation as a dual use technology

As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the practicality of this concept, state militaries will continue to invest in 3D printing technology over the coming decades. Similarly in the commercial sector, aviation and space firms are investing 3D printing to produce parts on location, reducing strain on logistical centers and reducing delays.

Considering its clear military and civilian applications, 3D printing may eventually become regulated as a dual-use technology so as to ensure rogue nations or terrorist entities cannot derive military value from civilian technological advances. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

 

22 Jan 24. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has pledged to make his country the “most reliable” backer of Ukraine, as western allies struggle to approve further financial and military assistance nearly two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion. “It is very important to build the feeling that Poland is the most reliable, most stable ally of Ukraine in this deadly clash with evil,” Tusk said during a visit to Kyiv on Monday. “There is nothing more important than supporting Ukraine in its war effort against the Russian attack. This is absolutely number one.” The Polish premier’s highly anticipated trip comes after relations with Kyiv deteriorated during the past year in office of the nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party, which engaged in trade disputes and mutual recriminations with Ukraine’s government. Tusk took office last month pledging to repair the relationship and place Poland at the heart of EU policymaking. Tusk’s show of support was welcomed by Ukrainian officials, who have been calling on EU and US allies to set aside their domestic political differences and agree on new financial and military aid together worth about $110bn, as Russia has intensified its aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities. Poland and Ukraine are ready to finalise talks on investments to jointly produce ammunition and weapons, Tusk said on Monday after talks with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, who posted a video of both leaders laying wreaths at Kyiv’s memorial wall for fallen soldiers, said: “Our fight against the Russian aggressor is a fight for freedom and values ??of the entire democratic world.” Initially a strong ally of Ukraine in the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the PiS government changed course last spring and adopted a protectionist stance to defend Polish farmers and other economic sectors that rebelled against cheap Ukrainian imports and services. In the run-up to the October election, Polish President Andrzej Duda, a PiS nominee, ratcheted up tensions by comparing the war-torn country to a drowning person clinging to their rescuer and endangering their life. Tusk’s visit comes days after his government negotiated a suspension of a border blockade by Polish truckers, backed by farmers. But the PM has indicated he would keep in place a unilateral import ban on Ukrainian grain, which Brussels is now expected to allow capitals to impose when flooded by cheaper imports from Ukraine. Tusk vowed to resolve all remaining disputes “in the spirit of friendship” and “not to maintain or multiply them”, according to a statement published on the social media platform X.

(Source: FT.com)

 

22 Jan 24. Russia takes village in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region. Russian forces have taken control of the village of Krokhmalne in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, Russia’s Defence Ministry said on Sunday, and a Ukrainian military spokesman confirmed that Kyiv’s forces had withdrawn.

The small advance follows a similar statement on Thursday from the defence ministry saying its forces had taken control of a settlement named Vesele in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region.

Russia has been ramping up offensive pressure around eastern Ukrainian towns such as Kupiansk, Lyman and Avdiivka though its gains have been modest so far. Moscow says its forces have regained the initiative in many areas after a failed Ukrainian counter-offensive last year against Russia’s 2022 invasion.

Ukrainian military spokesperson Volodymyr Fitio played down the latest news and told national television that Russia’s capture of Krokhmalne had no impact on the overall situation.

“Our main goal is to save the lives of our defenders and they were moved to pre-prepared positions where they are now holding defences to prevent the enemy from advancing further,” Fitio said.

He said Krokhmalne had five houses and before the war was home to only 45 people. The “several hundred metres” captured by Russian troops were of no consequence, he said, calling the event a “temporary phenomenon”.

(Source: Google/Reuters)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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