NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 19.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

BAKHMUT: The Russian Ministry of Defence has claimed their forces had taken the village of Vesele, north-east of Bakhmut, though this remains unconfirmed
STRIKES: Ukrainian sources indicate Russian forces fired an antiquated P-35 anti-ship missile at Ukraine for the first time; however, such outdated missiles are almost certainly being used as decoys to overwhelm and degrade Ukrainian air defences
ELECTIONS: The US State Department has warned that Russia will conduct ‘information operations’ aimed at changing opinion in Europe on Ukraine ahead of pivotal elections in 2024
FORECAST: The US and France launched a new ‘artillery coalition’ for Ukraine on 18 January in Paris, which will likely aim at reducing critical artillery shell shortages that are constraining Ukrainian operations
BAKHMUT: On 18 January the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that Russian forces had captured the village of Vesele, located roughly 13 miles (21km) north-east of Bakhmut. However, this remains unconfirmed. Russian sources have been consistently reporting on incremental advances in this sector over the last two weeks, indicating that it does remain plausible that they have taken the village. If accurate, however, the frontline in this direction now places Ukrainian defensive positions along an elevated ridge north of the village, providing the defending Ukrainians with an advantage.
BAKHMUT: Over the last year, Russian forces have approached the open saliet around the town of Siversk on three sides, located 18 miles (30km) north of Bakhmut (Donetsk oblast). However, they have made little progress towards the town in well over six months. As such, the possible capture of Vesele is unlikely to represent in and of itself a major opportunity to make rapid gains in this direction. Nor does it necessarily improve Russia’s chances of advancing along the key T-05-13 highway that runs between Soledar and Siversk, given efforts to advance along this road have proven unsuccessful for months. Instead, Russian forces are likely to continue their grinding ‘creeping’ offensive along a large frontage, though further incremental gains remain likely.
BAKHMUT: Further south, geolocated footage from 17 January indicates that Russian forces have advanced into the residential area on the north-eastern outskirts of Bohdanivka, located around four miles (6km) west of Bakhmut.
DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 17 January indicates Russian forces took control of a position east of Nevelske, south-west of Avdiivka. Meanwhile, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk group of forces, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, explained on 18 January that Russia has lost 41 armoured vehicles, including 17 tanks, in the Avdiivka sector in three days. This cannot be confirmed. Moscow typically uses armoured vehicles to support and deploy dismounted infantry, with such tactics increasing the exposure of vehicles to Ukrainian strikes and artillery shelling.
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 18 January confirms that Russian forces had marginally advanced along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border, though this is unlikely to have been a recent advance. Russian frontline positions have now moved marginally north-west of Staromaiorske, located roughly nine miles (15km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Overall, this stretch of the southern front has remained broadly static for months, with Russian forces prioritising offensive operations elsewhere.
STRIKES: On 18 January, a Ukrainian media outlet reported that Russia has recently fired an antiquated P-35 anti-ship missile in Ukraine. The P-35 was originally developed in the 1950s and deployed in the 1960s, with subsequent upgrades in the 1970s. While the missile is an extremely old and outdated system, it is highly unlikely to have been deployed as a genuine strike weapon. Instead, the deployment of antiquated missiles, such as the extremely large P-35, will almost certainly serve as decoys, which alongside drones and other low-cost cruise missiles, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences rather than seriously attempting to hit ground targets. Russia’s stockpile of such P-35 missiles is unknown. However, for every old missile fired, Ukrainian air defences will have to expend precious anti-air munitions to prevent even these archaic systems from reaching their targets.
STRIKES: Russian Bryansk oblast governor Alexander Bogomaz stated that a drone was electronically intercepted over the region early on 19 January. Falling debris reportedly caused a fire at the Klintsy oil depot. Drone attacks have increasingly targeted oil facilities in recent weeks, likely underscoring Ukraine’s efforts to degrade key Russian logistics.
STRIKES: On 18 January, Russian state media outlet TASS reported that Moscow is developing the Hawk drone, a cheaper version of the Iranian-made Shahed-136/131 drones. The Hawk drone reportedly has a 217-mile (350-km) range and can carry an explosive warhead with a payload of 16kg. TASS explained that the drone will be used as a ‘pseudo-cruise missile’, that is, a decoy projectile aimed at overwhelming Ukrainian air defences and create opportunities for more potent Russian missiles to penetrate Ukrainian defences and successfully reach their targets. Flight tests will reportedly be completed by the first half of 2024.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

ELECTIONS: The head of the US State Department’s office for disinformation warned on 18 January that Russia will conduct ‘information operations’ aimed at changing opinion in Europe on Ukraine ahead of pivotal elections in 2024. James Rubin, the special envoy and co-ordinator for the Global Engagement Center (GEC) claimed Russia and China are attempting to disguise state propaganda as independent journalism by hiding its true source on a global scale. Rubin did not specify countries which are particularly vulnerable to Russian information operations, but said the main threats this year were across Europe.
ELECTIONS: Several notable elections will take place in 2024 worldwide which will likely prove highly influential in determining the trajectory of long-term support for Ukraine. European parliamentary elections will take place in June, while the UK is expected to hold a general election in the second half of the year. Moldova, which has repeatedly warned of Russian destabilisation efforts over the past year, will hold presidential elections this autumn. Outside of Europe, Russia will almost certainly monitor the US presidential elections in November closely given how critical it will likely prove to the West’s strategy to continue aiding Ukraine. Russian state-media outlets and officials will likely endorse Ukraine-sceptic sentiment and candidates in upcoming elections as part of these operations. We assess that Russian information operations are highly likely ahead and during key votes, with governments likely to increase efforts to identify Russian mis-and disinformation.
AID: On 18 January, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s chief of staff, Gergely Gulyás, said the positions of Budapest and the European Commission (EC) on EUR 50bn in financial support for Ukraine remain distant. Gulyás claimed while Hungary is negotiating with the Commission, an agreement on the matter is uncertain. Separately on 18 January, Ukraine’s ambassador to the EU, Vsevolod Chentsov, stated there are alternatives for providing aid to Ukraine if Hungary continues to block the proposed four-year EU funding. Chentsov stated one option is an extrabudgetary fund to which EU member states can contribute. Other ways include the EC lending aid under its guarantee or macro-financial assistance through periodic loans from the Commission.
AID: Chentsov assessed that the initially proposed funding will be adopted, but added that periodic reviews may be included as safeguards. He noted that the initial plan is cheaper and more convenient, and is therefore the preferred option. The option of an extrabudgetary fund could possibly result in certain member states contributing disproportionately to others, or risk Kyiv not receiving the originally earmarked EUR 50bn. While the EU will almost certainly seek to mitigate unpredictability for Kyiv in receiving the funds, Budapest will highly likely remain an obstacle for approving the aid in the coming weeks.

FORECAST

AID: A US- and France-led ‘artillery coalition’ for Ukraine was launched on 18 January in the French capital Paris. Some 23 countries are involved in the initiative. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD), members of the coalition are countries that possess advanced technology for the production of artillery systems and ammunition. The Ukrainian MoD said representatives of the participating countries developed a consolidated position on meeting the Ukrainian armed forces’ needs for certain types of artillery weapons during the launch.

On 18 January, Ukrainian defence minister Rustem Umerov said ammunition shortages represent a very pressing problem that Ukraine’s armed forces are currently facing. Umerov disclosed that Russian artillery fire exceeds that of Ukraine’s at ratios between five-to-one and ten-to-one depending on the area of the frontline and combat intensity. As such, the coalition’s primary goal is offsetting this ongoing disparity to support both Ukrainian defensive and offensive operations – as such shortages are likely forcing Ukrainian forces to ration artillery, limiting the scope for major operations.

Nevertheless, Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin reported on 17 January that Ukraine has doubled its domestic production of NATO-calibre artillery systems, most likely 155mm shells. It is unclear how many such shells Ukraine produces domestically, and despite efforts to improve Ukraine’s self-sufficiency in this respect, Kyiv will remain disproportionately reliant upon Western 155mm imports for the foreseeable future.

Jan 18.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) assesses that Russia does not have sufficient reserves to conduct large-scale offensives in multiple directions at once; attritional ‘creeping offensives’ are set to continue
STRIKES: Ukraine announced that its forces successfully used a ‘FrankenSAM’ hybrid air defence system for the first time on 17 January; if the FrankenSAM programme is deployed at scale, this will likely moderately alleviate pressure on Ukraine’s air defence network
AID: US Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell stated that he expects the Senate will consider a deal on further funding for Ukraine and US border security next week
FORECAST: The German federal parliament rejected a motion to deliver long-range Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, despite support within the ruling coalition

MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

OFFENSIVES: On 17 January, the deputy chief of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Vadym Skibitskyi, stated that Russia does not have sufficient reserves to conduct large-scale offensives in multiple directions at once. Earlier on 15 January, Skibitiskyi assessed that Russia currently recruits around 30,000 personnel a month, and that this offsets losses at the front and enables the creation of reserve regiments. However, Skibitiskyi’s latest assessment indicates that Russia does not have sufficient reserves (despite its current recruitment rate) to launch multiple offensives simultaneously. Russian forces are likely to continue their current ‘creeping offensive’ at multiple points (namely along the Oskil-Kreminna line around Bakhmut and Avdiivka). However, it remains unclear if Russia’s operational reserves will be able to launch major mechanised offensive operations as the ground freezes.
BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Earlier on 18 January, a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have broken through Ukrainian defences in the Lyman direction near Terny. Terny is located around nine miles (15km) north-west of Kreminna. However, such claims remain visually unconfirmed. At the same time, Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Volodymyr Fityo stated on 17 January that Russia is shifting its offensive focus from Kupiansk to the vicinity of Lyman. Ukrainian officials have noted a decrease in Russian offensive operations in the Kupiansk sector in recent weeks.
SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
STRIKES: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that its air defences intercepted two Ukrainian drones over Moscow and Leningrad oblasts earlier on 18 January. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin stated that the drone was destroyed over Podolsk. Ukrainska Pravda, a Ukrainian online newspaper, claimed that a drone targeted the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal in Leningrad. Recent reports point to an uptick in unclaimed Ukrainian attacks targeting oil facilities and logistic infrastructure across Russia. The latest attack likely prompted the Russian authorities to suspend flights at Moscow’s Vnukovo Airport (VKO) and to curtail flight operations at St Petersburg’s Pulkovo International Airport (LED). Ukraine’s growing ability to carry out strikes deep into Russian territory will sustain travel disruption risks at Russian airports.
STRIKES: Overnight on 17-18 January, Ukrainian air defences destroyed 22 of 33 Shahed drones launched by Russia. The drones were intercepted over Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and Sumy oblasts. Local reports indicate that the strikes damaged a warehouse in Sumy. Russia also reportedly launched two S-300 missiles at Kharkiv oblast (Kharkiv city has been frequently targeted in recent weeks).
STRIKES: Ukrainian Strategic Industries Minister Oleksandr Kamyshin announced that Ukrainian forces successfully used a ‘FrankenSAM’ hybrid air defence system for the first time on 17 January. The air defence system was reportedly used to intercept a Russian-launched Shahed-136/131 drone. FrankenSAM systems are part of a US-funded programme combining Western and Soviet-era systems to address Ukraine’s growing air defence needs. For instance, in October 2023, reports indicated that the programme adapted Soviet-era Buk air defence launchers to fire RIM-7 missiles, which the US possesses in large stocks. The programme will reportedly also combine US-made Sidewinder missiles with Soviet-era radars, which are readily available in Ukraine. If the programme is successfully rolled out at scale, this will go some way to alleviating the current strain on Ukraine’s limited air defence network, optimising available resources.
STRIKES: GUR Deputy Chief Skibitskyi claimed that Russia’s missile production is evolving, noting that the Kh-101 missiles used by Russia in 2024 are different from those launched in 2022. In particular, the latest missile version is able to counter electronic warfare systems. Recent reports also indicate that Russia has been adding new features to its Shahed-136/131 drones to improve their ability to avoid Ukrainian air defences. Moscow’s continued efforts to improve its missiles and drones will challenge Ukraine’s ability to counter Russian attacks effectively, likely increasing the lethality of Russian strikes in the absence of the development of Ukrainian countermeasures.POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
AID: US Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell disclosed on 17 January that he expects the Senate will consider a deal on further funding for Ukraine and US border security next week. McConnell assessed that negotiators will likely unveil a deal on border security in the coming days, while Senate majority leader Chuck Schumer also expressed confidence that the likelihood of reaching a deal in the Senate has increased. However, McConnell acknowledged that Senate Republicans are uncertain as to whether a bipartisan deal would also pass the Republican-controlled House.
AID: Separately on 17 January, US House Speaker Mike Johnson stated that he told US President Joe Biden that substantive border changes are still needed, insisting that the border must be the top priority. Johnson emphasised that Republicans also need assurances from the White House about the strategy of helping Ukraine’s war efforts and the war’s end game; however, he also noted that he believes that maintaining assistance is important. While McConnell and Schumer signalled a potential breakthrough towards approving the supplemental package, which includes over USD 60bn in aid for Ukraine, divisions within the House will likely continue to impede its passing in the near term.
SANCTIONS: Credit rating agencies Moody’s and S&P Global stated on 17 January that countries whose sovereign bonds were purchased by Russia would not be considered to be in default if the West moves to confiscate frozen Russian reserves. This will possibly offset Western concerns about the risk of default, though the risk of retaliatory confiscations of Western assets in Russia will almost certainly remain. According to insiders familiar with the matter, the Russian authorities are prepared to initiate legal challenges and to retaliate strongly to the confiscation of the country’s frozen reserves. Moscow will highly likely seek to challenge any confiscation of its frozen assets legally, though any such process would likely last several years.
STRATEGY: On 17 January, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev implied that the risk of recurrent wars with Ukraine will remain indefinitely. Medvedev claimed that the presence of an independent state on ‘historical Russian territory’ will be a constant trigger for the resumption of hostilities. Medvedev did not specify what he considers to be historical ‘Russian territory’, though the remarks underscore that Moscow highly likely maintains expansionist aims in Ukraine, as well as possibly in other ‘historical’ Russian territories across the Former Soviet Union.
STRATEGY: According to Medvedev, there is a ‘100% probability’ of a new war irrespective of the security arrangements Kyiv signs with its Western partners. He claimed that neither Ukrainian membership in the EU or NATO would prevent another conflict, assessing that such an eventuality could materialise in ten or fifty years. Medvedev’s comments are highly likely aimed at weakening Western resolve by attempting to convey that offering long-term security commitments, or even accession into NATO, will be futile in preventing renewed Russian aggression. While we assess that it is unlikely that Russia wants a direct conflict with NATO, Medvedev’s comments highly likely reflect the Kremlin’s thinking, namely that it is unwilling to withdraw from Ukraine. Any kind of deal to partition Ukraine would highly likely be deemed by the Kremlin as a temporary measure. Furthermore, such a scenario would provide Russia with an opportunity to rearm and reconstitute its military for future interventions aimed at dismembering Ukraine to its advantage.

FORECAST

AID: On 17 January, the German federal parliament, the Bundestag, rejected a motion by the conservative opposition (the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union – CDU/CSU) calling on the government to deliver long-range Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine. The motion was rejected in a roll-call vote with 485 lawmakers voting against it and 178 voting in favour; there were three abstentions.

AID: The bill’s failure comes despite numerous Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Green Party lawmakers being in favour of supplying the missiles. Chancellor Olaf Scholz is currently opposed to the move. While there is a realistic possibility that Scholz will change his position in the coming year, a policy change is unlikely in the near term. However, Berlin continues to supply other military aid to Kyiv. Notably, the German government announced on 16 January that it has supplied ammunition for Leopard 1 tanks, as well as 16 Zetros tanker trucks, eight armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and five border protection vehicles, among other assets.

AID: Earlier on 18 January, French Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu stated that France will produce 78 Caesar self-propelled howitzers for the Ukrainian army this year. Lecornu explained that the manufacturer of the equipment managed to half the production time of the howitzer to 15 months. The minister stated that Ukraine had purchased six Caesar howitzers with its own money, but noted that Paris is encouraging its European partners and allies to share the cost of the 78 artillery systems. Lecornu stated that there are currently 49 Caesar howitzers in Ukraine, adding that these have allowed for unspecified tactical successes.

Jan 17.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

NEGOTIATIONS: Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Ukrainian statehood may receive an ‘irreparable blow’ if the war continues, indicating that the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine have not changed
BELARUS: The new Belarusian military doctrine provides for the potential use of nuclear weapons for the first time; however, Russia remains in control of all such weapons in Belarus, and our nuclear risk assessment remains unchanged
BORDERS: Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service reported that the partial blockade of the Dorohusk-Yahodyn crossing with Poland had ended
FORECAST: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz told US President Joe Biden that Germany will unilaterally supply Ukraine with over USD 7bn in security assistance and humanitarian support in 2024; but this has raised tensions with the EU
BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 15 January indicates that Russian forces have marginally advanced north of Klishchiivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Bakhmut, but progress remains very slow.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 17 January, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have not conducted any ground attacks over the past 24 hours. Ukrainian Kharkiv oblast governor Oleh Synyehubov noted on 17 January a decrease in Russian offensive operations over the past three weeks is due to deteriorating weather conditions. Synyehubov said offensive operations will resume when temperatures reach sub-zero levels, with frozen ground facilitating the movement of heavy armoured vehicles. In the meantime, however, Russian forces are reportedly conducting rotations in the sector, likely in preparation for further offensives.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 15 January indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Dibrova, located around four miles (7km) south-west of Kreminna (Luhansk oblast). On 17 January, a Russian milblogger claimed that according to unspecified Ukrainian sources, Russian forces advanced up to 1.37 miles (2.2km) in width and 1 mile (1.7km) in depth towards Makiivka, located around 14 miles (22km) north-west of Kreminna, respectively. However, such claims remain unverified.
SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
STRIKES: Early on 17 January, Russia launched 20 Shahed-136/131 drones, 19 of which were shot down by Ukrainian air defences. Air defences were active in Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. 11 drones targeted Odesa, with local reports indicating the strike damaged a residential building and caused multiple fires.
SABOTAGE: On 17 January, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that opponents to the Kremlin have been sabotaging railway tracks in Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov and Yaroslavl oblasts. According to the GUR, such railway tracks are crucial for Russia’s military logistics. Ukrainian media claimed in early December that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) orchestrated the explosion of the Baikal-Amur railway line in Russia’s far eastern Buryatia Republic. Such reports likely indicate Kyiv’s continuing efforts to degrade Russian military logistics in Russian territory, likely with the assistance of pro-Ukrainian partisan groups.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

NEGOTIATIONS: On 16 January, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Ukrainian statehood may receive an ‘irreparable blow’ if the war continues, indicating strongly that the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine have not largely changed. Putin has long maintained his ‘demilitarisation’ and ‘denazification’ objectives in Ukraine, which effectively means the installation of a Kremlin-approved government. Putin also stated that negotiations are ‘an attempt to encourage us to abandon the gains that we have realised over the past year and a half’, noting that this is ‘impossible’. These latest statements align with our assessment that the Kremlin is currently uninterested in a compromise deal and is committed to fighting the war for the foreseeable future to achieve further territorial conquests and set conditions for an eventual peace agreement more favourable to Moscow.
SECURITY: French President Emmanuel Macron announced on 16 January that he plans to sign a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine next month during a visit to the country. Macron also announced the delivery of 40 SCALP (also known as Storm Shadow) long-range missiles and ‘several hundred bombs’ to Kyiv in the coming weeks. Separately, media reports from 16 January indicate that Denmark and the Netherlands are preparing to jointly deliver the first two of 14 pledged Leopard 2A4 tanks. The Dutch defence ministry said the remaining 12 tanks will be prepared in the coming months, noting that according to the current schedule, they will be delivered to Ukraine with spare parts and ammunition this summer.
BELARUS: Belarusian defence minister Viktor Khrenin stated on 16 January that Belarus’ new draft military doctrine includes the possibility of using Russian tactical nuclear weapons stationed in the country for the first time. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in March 2023 that Russian nuclear weapons would be stationed in Belarus for the first time (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 27 March 2023). The doctrine is to be presented for approval to the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly. However, the updated doctrine unlikely indicates an elevated risk of nuclear escalation in the coming months, and our overall nuclear threat assessment for the conflict has not changed – i.e. nuclear weapon use remains highly unlikely. Additionally, Russian nuclear weapons stationed inside Belarus are almost certain to remain under tight Russian command and control, meaning the Belarusian government will have little to no influence or ability to use nuclear weapons without Moscow’s approval.
BORDERS: Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service (DPSU) reported on 16 January that the partial blockade of the Dorohusk-Yahodyn crossing with Poland had ended and that the movement of trucks had resumed. Polish truckers also agreed to end their protest at two other checkpoints on 16 January, Rava-Ruska-Hrebenne and Krakivets-Korczowa, after an agreement was struck with the government. Polish infrastructure minister Dariusz Klimczak said the protest will be suspended until 1 March, adding that further talks were ongoing. As such, the blockade will likely alleviate supply chain disruption in the short term. However, the resumption of protests will hinge on the success of the ongoing talks, meaning that the blockade could realistically restart at short notice.

FORECAST

AID: On 16 January, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz told US President Joe Biden that Germany will unilaterally supply Ukraine with over USD7bn in security assistance and humanitarian support in 2024. Germany is the largest donor of military aid among EU member states; it has committed EUR17.1bn (USD18.7bn) from 24 January 2022 through to 31 October 2023 as per the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Germany will also likely continue calls for other EU states to step up their contributions to enhance support for Ukraine (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 9 January 2023).

However, on 15 January, the EU’s internal market commissioner, Thierry Breton, accused Germany of inadequately supporting the bloc’s common efforts to provide military support to Ukraine. Breton claimed that Berlin is instead focusing on sending unilateral assistance to Kyiv. According to Breton, Germany is trying to stop supporting the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-budget funding mechanism that aims to enhance the EU’s ability to directly assist partners in military and defence matters. On 1 December 2023, the Telegraph reported that it had obtained a confidential paper in which Germany stated that it is seeking to reduce the amount it provides for fund, arguing that the EPF should take into account the significant share of military aid it has donated to Kyiv bilaterally. Nevertheless, Scholz’s recent announcement means that Germany will continue to one of the biggest supporters of Ukraine, despite apparent issues with the EPF.

On 16 January, German media reported that the country’s main opposition party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), is pushing for a vote in the Bundestag (the federal parliament) on the transfer of Taurus cruise missiles. CDU faction leader Friedrich Merz announced plans to table a corresponding motion for 17 January; the vote is expected to follow a report by Germany’s defence policy spokesperson. Berlin has so far remained reticent to supply the long-range missiles. While it could in theory pass with the support of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Green party, these governing parties will likely avoid handing a victory to the main opposition party (CDU); Scholz would also have to alter his stance and agree to their transfer. Nevertheless, there is a realistic possibility Scholz could later soften his stance on the transfer despite previous opposition, though recent discussions in the Bundestag about the Taurus’ capability to destroy the Kerch Strait Bridge could reinforce Scholz’s concerns that the transfer would escalate tensions with Russia.

Separately, on 16 January, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that the bloc will find a way to bypass Hungary’s veto and approve the EUR 50bn aid package for Ukraine. Von der Leyen said her priority is to have an agreement of 27 member states, though if this is not possible, the bloc is prepared for an agreement of 26. While this could realistically improve the chances of the aid being approved in the coming weeks, it would almost certainly further drive tensions between the EU and Hungary in the medium-to-long term. The upcoming European Council summit on 1 February will be the key issue to watch in the coming weeks, and will indicate the extent to which a compromise is or isn’t likely to be made.

Jan 16.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

KHERSON: Russian forces have made slight advances along the shoreline of the Dnieper River, where Ukrainian forces retain a beachhead on the left bank
STRIKES: Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) reported that Russia’s monthly production of missiles for strategic strikes has not increased, and noted that Shahed drones are being increasingly deployed against frontline positions
NEGOTIATIONS: The Swiss president has reportedly agreed to start preparations for holding a Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, though this process will not include Russia and is highly unlikely to represent a major step towards an end to the war
FORECAST: G7 nations are proceeding with pledges to draw up security ‘guarantee’ agreements with Ukraine amid the Davos summit of world leaders this week, but the UK remains the first and so far only state to do so
BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: On 16 January, the UK Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that despite recent progress in the Marinka sector, Russian forces have been unable to achieve significant advances towards Kurakhove and Novomykhailivka. Both settlements are located west and south-west of Marinka, respectively. The UK DI further explained that Russia has made highly limited gains in the Avdiivka sector, where its troops have experienced significant material and personnel losses. Ukrainian forces still control Stepove, which secures supply routes to Avdiivka. Geolocated footage from 15 January nevertheless indicates Russian advances in the eastern outskirts of Heorhiivka, west of Donetsk city.
KHERSON: Geolocated footage published on 15 January indicates that Russian forces have marginally advanced along the shoreline near the Ukrainian bridgehead along the eastern (left) bank of the Dnieper River in Krynky, located around 22 miles (36km) to the north-east of Kherson city. Ukrainian forces nevertheless retain positions on the east bank, though Russian sources reported on 15 January that ice has begun to form on the river, which has complicated Ukrainian efforts to bring reinforcements ashore after some boats got stuck. However, as the river continues to freeze, this will also provide Ukraine with additional opportunities to reinforce their position across the ice, albeit remaining vulnerable to Russian attacks.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
STRIKES: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that air defences intercepted eight Ukrainian drones targeting Voronezh oblast early on 16 January. Local reports indicate that drones damaged a building in the city of Voronezh, where the mayor, Vadim Kerstin, announced a state of emergency.
STRIKES: On 15 January, Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) Deputy Chief, Vadym Skibitskyi, said that Russia’s monthly production of missiles for strategic strikes has not increased. He reported that in October 2023, Russia produced between 115 and 130 missiles, its highest production rate in the last few months. He explained that international sanctions are restricting Moscow’s missile production capacity, especially for Kh-101, Kinzhal cruise missiles and Kinzhal ballistic missiles, which require foreign components. Recent reports indicate that Russia is likely attempting to procure ballistic missiles produced in Iran and North Korea. In contrast, Kh-29, Kh-31, Kh-35 and Kh-59 missiles are mainly produced domestically, with domestically-available components. According to the Ukrainian official, Russian forces primarily use Kh-31 and Kh-59 missiles against Ukrainian air defence systems and radar stations at the onset of large-scale strikes.
STRIKES: According to Skibitskyi, Russia produces between 330 and 350 drones monthly. Moscow’s drone production varies and depends on Mocow’s ability to procure electronic components. Russian forces have increasingly been using drones to target frontline areas, where the Ukrainian air defence coverage is less dense, thus resulting in a lower drone interception rate lately.
STRIKES: Skibitskyi also notably reported that Russia has increasingly deployed long-range Shahed drones against frontline positions in recent months. This likely reflects the reduction in Ukrainian interception rates of Shahed drones since late December 2023, given frontline areas are less saturated by air defences than major cities, such as the capital Kyiv, or at least are not designed to intercept drones so close to the frontline.
STRIKES: Skibitskyi explained that recent Russian strikes prioritised Ukraine’s defence-industrial facilities rather than energy facilities. He noted that Russian strikes, especially those involving Kinzhal ballistic missiles, are highly inaccurate and have often missed their targets and are causing increasing civilian casualties. While the latest strikes reflect Moscow’s efforts to degrade Kyiv’s defence production capabilities, energy infrastructure will remain a priority target for future strikes.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

NEGOTIATIONS: On 15 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with his Swiss counterpart Viola Amherd, the leaders of both chambers of the Swiss parliament and other parliamentary leaders. Zelensky disclosed that the two presidents agreed to start preparations for holding a Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, though no further details were provided on when or where in Switzerland the event would take place. The Ukrainian president said he would like Global South nations to attend, but noted that Kyiv is open to all countries which respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty participating.
NEGOTIATIONS: Amherd announced on 15 January that Switzerland plans to allocate more than USD 1.7bn for Ukraine’s recovery from 2025 through to 2028. Amherd and Zelensky also discussed humanitarian demining in Ukraine and food security. Amherd said a conference on humanitarian demining will be held in Geneva (Switzerland) in October 2024. The recent engagements underscore Bern’s efforts to assist Kyiv outside of military support given its long-standing policy of neutrality.
RECRUITMENT: On 15 January, Deputy Chief of Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) Vadym Skibitskyi assessed that Russia currently recruits around 30,000 personnel per month, which they use to replenish losses and form reserve regiments. This aligns with our assessment that Russia is currently likely recruiting sufficient numbers of personnel to offset losses and therefore continue attritional offensive operations for the foreseeable future. Skibitskyi also stated that Russia is highly unlikely to conduct any formal mobilisation ahead of the March 2024 presidential election, which aligns with our assessment.

FORECAST

SECURITY: G7 nations are proceeding with pledges to draw up security ‘guarantee’ agreements with Ukraine amid the Davos summit of world leaders this week. The UK is the first and only country so far to officially ink a final agreement with Ukraine, which happened on 12 January. This follows the G7’s pledge to organise bilateral, long-term security commitments to Ukraine in July 2023 at the NATO summit in Vilnius (Lithuania, see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 13 July 2023). Some 24 states have subsequently joined the G7’s joint declaration.

Ukraine’s presidential office disclosed on 12 January the main components of the security commitments provided by London to Kyiv. These include the provision of comprehensive assistance to Ukraine for the protection and the restoration of its territorial integrity, the reconstruction of its national economy and protecting its citizens. Other notable elements involve supporting Ukraine’s future integration into ‘Euro-Atlantic’ institutions, as well as the prevention and active deterrence of, and counter-measures against, any military escalation and/or renewed Russian aggression.

The agreement outlines that in the event of a future Russian armed attack against Ukraine, London and Kyiv will consult within 24 hours to determine the necessary measures to counter or deter the attack. In such circumstances, the UK would provide Ukraine with swift and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment across all domains as needed, among other things, in accordance with its legal and constitutional requirements. The agreement stipulates that the UK will work with its own domestic defence industry and Ukraine to contribute to the development of Ukraine’s defence industrial base. It also states that both countries will promote the exchange of information on their respective defence related research and development efforts.

However, Ukrainian media reported on 12 January that British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky differed on whether the signed agreement provides security ‘guarantees’. Sunak reportedly emphasised repeatedly that the treaty offers ‘assurances’, rather than ‘guarantees’. Notably, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum outlined security ‘assurances’ for Ukraine in exchange for the country’s denuclearisation, which Kyiv views as wholly insufficient and ultimately failed to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression. As such, Kyiv is likely to push London and other G7 nations currently negotiating security agreements to provide clearer ‘guarantees’ given their desire to deter renewed Russian aggression.

On 15 January, Canada’s ambassador to Ukraine, Natalka Cmoc, disclosed that Ottawa has sent a draft of its own plans for security assurances to Kyiv. Cmoc said Canada has already pledged long-term assistance for Ukraine, noting that the document finalises the commitment on paper. The ambassador noted that more detailed negotiations will take place in the coming weeks. There is a realistic possibility that Kyiv will seek to make the assurances more concrete, but it remains unlikely that any country will unilaterally provide legal guarantees given uncertainty around the US’s long-term position on Ukraine and perceived risks of escalation in the coming decades with Russia.

Jan 15.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS (click on each to navigate below):

SOUTHERN: It is highly likely that a Russian A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft was shot down over the Sea of Azov; this would undermine Russian preparations for the arrival of F-16s in Ukraine
STRIKES: Russian forces launched a large missile and drone attack on 13 January, with Ukrainian air defences intercepting a lower proportion of missiles than in late 2023
MOLDOVA: Moldovan President Maia Sandu warned that Russia will attempt to destabilise Moldova in the coming months amid an uptick in Russian rhetoric and Transnistrian information operations; false-flag operations and provocations remain possible
FORECAST: Security officials from over 80 countries participated in a meeting in Davos (Switzerland) aimed at building support for Ukraine’s conditions for peace, though progress towards a stable peace remains extremely limited
BAKHMUT: A prominent Ukrainian milblogger reported on 13 January that Russian forces have advanced 2.2 miles (3.6km) towards Bohdanivka (north-west of Bakhmut) and just over a mile (2.1km) towards Ivanivske (due west of Bakhmut) since late October 2023. Russian forces stepped up offensive operations two and a half months ago as Ukraine’s own counter-offensive began to draw down; yet despite committing significant forces, the rate of Russian advances has remained slow.
BAKHMUT: Russian forces have also stepped up operations north-east of Bakhmut in recent weeks, and are likely making slow but steady progress east of the village of Vesele, located roughly 13 miles (21km) north-east of Bakhmut. Russian sources claimed on 14 January that their forces had made a tactical breakthrough in the area, but this remains unconfirmed. Russian forces are highy likely to continue their current ‘creeping offensive’ west of Bakhmut. The freezing of the ground in the coming days and weeks is likely to encourage renewed Russian offensive operations, though it remains unlikely that Russian forces will achieve an operational breakthrough in the short term.
DONETSK: On 15 January, Donetsk oblast governor Vadim Filashkin stated that Russian forces dropped 250 aerial bombers on Avdiivka in the first two weeks of January. Moscow’s intense air campaign likely aims to degrade the city’s defensive fortifications as the ground assault (which is ultimately aimed at closing a cauldron around the city) continues to grind forward extremely slowly. Meanwhile, on 13 January, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk group of forces, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, reported that Russian forces have intensified their use of drones and shelling along the Donetsk frontline amid a renewed intensification of offensive operations in the sector.
DONETSK: The intensification of Russian operations is unlikely to result in a major breakthrough in the sector in the coming weeks given the slow pace of advances and strong Ukrainian defences. Since Russia’s wider offensive push began along the Donetsk frontline in October 2023, its limited territorial gains in the sector have come at a high attrition rate; this will continue to strain Russian forces. Nevertheless, geolocated footage posted on 13 January shows Russian advances near Stepove, located nearly two miles (3km) north-west of Avdiivka. However, the rate of advance remains extremely slow. It nevertheless remains a realistic possibility that the grinding offensive will eventually lead the Ukrainians to begin withdrawing from the city in the coming months in order to preserve personnel – a scenario which Ukraine’s commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhnyi tacitly acknowledged himself in December 2023.
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage posted on 13 January shows that Russian forces advanced east of Torske, situated about nine miles (15km) west of Kreminna. Over the past few days, the frontline has otherwise remained stable, with mostly positional fighting occurring along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline.
SOUTHERN: In recent days, Russian sources have claimed that their forces are advancing both south-west of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast) and west of Verbove, located around six miles (10km) east of Robotyne. While Russian forces are maintaining offensive operations in this direction, the full extent of these advances cannot be confirmed – though geolocated footage from 12 January does indicate tactical advances west of Robotyne, including evidence of Russian forces taking a Ukrainian trench line. Some Russian sources have claimed that their forces have advanced up to 1.1 miles (1.9km) in width and 0.3 miles (0.5km) in depth west of Verbove.
SOUTHERN: It is highly likely that a Russian A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft was shot down over the Sea of Azov on 14 January, though the cause remains unclear. An additional Il-22-M was also damaged in the area, but was reportedly able to land safely. Ukrainian officials have claimed their forces downed the aircraft. While Russian sources have acknowledged that an A-50 has been lost, some have speculated whether Russia’s own air defences accidently shot down the aircraft. A-50s are long-range radar detection and command aircraft; they have been responsible for co-ordinating targets for Russian strike aircraft.
SOUTHERN: The UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported on 23 November 2023 that Russia was likely (and for the first time) utilising upgraded A-50s (A-50Us) to identify targets for S-400 air defence systems. Such integration with Russia’s ground-based air defence network would likely indicate preparations for the deployment of F-16s in Ukrainian airspace. It remains unclear if the downed A-50 was an upgraded A-50U. However, given the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) only possesses a limited number of active A-50s, the loss of any A-50 is highly notable and will impact Russia’s AEW&C capabilities as well as their readiness to risk further aircraft close to the frontlines to identify ground-based air defence targets.
STRIKES: Early on 13 January, Russian forces launched a large missile and drone strike against Ukraine. The attack included 37 missiles in total: seven S-300/S-400 missiles, six Kinzhal ‘hypersonic’ air-launched ballistic missiles, 12 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh55 missiles, six Kh-22 cruise missiles, two Kh-31P missiles and four Kh-59 guided missiles. Russia also launched three Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences intercepted seven Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh55 missiles and one Kh-59 missile, while 20 projectiles were electronically jammed or failed to reach their targets. This latter claim by Kyiv is highly significant as Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures have until now primarily jammed drones, rather than missiles. If accurate, this is a strong indicator that Ukraine’s EW capabilities are improving; it possibly reflects recent advances following the acquisition of over 100 gigabytes of Russian classified data that reportedly include missile and drone blueprints and information on Russia’s EW systems, as we previously assessed (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 9 January 2024).
STRIKES: The lower Ukrainian interception rate following the latest Russian strike likely indicates the effectiveness of Moscow’s innovative striking tactics. These include launching a diverse combination of projectiles from different directions to facilitate the penetration of Ukraine’s air defence network. The use of such tactics also diminishes Ukraine’s ability to prioritise the interception of Russian ballistic missiles. The limited number of US-made Patriot air defences and the accompanying ammunition (which have proven to be effective in countering ballistic missiles) will remain the single biggest indicator as to whether the lethality of ballistic missile strikes will increase in the coming months. On 13 January, Ukraine’s air force noted that the latest attack used a package similar to the strikes launched at the beginning of the year, thus indicating Ukraine’s improving capabilities in identifying Russian striking patterns.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: On 11 January, US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed that the US has now suspended security assistance to Ukraine and will not resume aid until a new funding package is approved by Congress. On 6 December 2023, Senate Republicans blocked an emergency spending bill that earmarked USD 61bn for Ukraine, as well as funding for Israel. They insisted that any further military aid is conditional on introducing tougher domestic border security measures. However, on 13 January, US President Joe Biden stated that Republicans will have an ‘awful lot to pay for’ if they do not pass further aid for Ukraine.
AID: Biden stated on 13 January that he is prepared to make significant changes along the US border, adding that negotiations on the issue have been taking place for the past five weeks. Biden’s remarks were almost certainly aimed at pushing Republicans to pass additional funding for Ukraine in the near term, though it remains unclear how close the legislature is to reaching a compromise. If negotiations protract, the military aid gap will widen at a crucial time for Ukraine and its increasingly strained air defences.
BORDERS: Earlier on 15 January, Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service (DPSU) reported that Romanian farmers renewed ther efforts to block the movement of trucks at the Siret checkpoint near the border with Ukraine. It reported that the farmers also began blocking the Vicovu de Sus-Krasnoilsk crossing point. On 14 January, the DPSU announced that Romanian farmers once again blocked the passage of trucks at the Siret-Porubne checkpoint; they staged a similar protest at the checkpoint for six hours on the previous day.
BORDERS: However, the DPSU stated there was no significant queue of cargo vehicles bound for Ukraine at the time. It also stated that car and bus traffic was not impacted. Romanian farmers are demanding their government to provide assistance (including subsidies) to counter high insurance rates and to compete with Ukrainian products entering the EU. It is uncertain how long protests will continue, though they will likely remain sporadic, causing moderate supply chain disruption.
MOLDOVA: On 13 January, Moldovan President Maia Sandu warned that Russia will attempt to destabilise Moldova in the coming months. Sandu explained that Russia’s destabilisation campaign will rely on corrupt Moldovan politicians undermining the country’s democratic values and constitutional order to obstruct the government’s pro-EU efforts. Meanwhile, on 12 January, the authorities in the Russian-backed breakaway region of Transnistria claimed that Western-backed ‘combat groups’ from Ukraine are preparing to carry out attacks against critical infrastructure and military facilities in the territory.
MOLDOVA: The Transnistrian authorities further alleged that such attacks will include kidnappings of senior Transnistrian officials. The allegations possibly signal an intent to stage a false-flag attack to blame on Ukraine or the central Moldovan government. However, such rhetoric is unlikely to indicate an imminent and/or major military escalation in the short term, given the relatively limited capabilities Russia possess in the breakaway region. Nevertheless, ahead of the Moldovan presidential election this autumn, Russian destabilisation risks are likely to increase. They will possibly include isolated border incidents, sporadic shelling, airspace violations, bomb threats in the capital Chișinău and Russian-backed anti-government protests.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: On 14 January, security officials from over 80 countries participated in a meeting aimed at building support for Ukraine’s conditions for peace in Davos (Switzerland). Russia was not invited, while representatives from China were not present. Ukrainian representatives stated that the talks were open and constructive, though the summit did not result in a major breakthrough towards achieving peace.

The head of Ukraine’s presidential office, Andriy Yermak, stated that all participants of the meeting share a common vision vis-à-vis the general principles of Kyiv’s peace formula, which relate to independence and Ukraine’s territorial integrity. However, he noted that countries have different opinions and ideas about how to end the war and establish peace. Yermak announced that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss matters such as an eventual Russian troop withdrawal and how the war might be declared as being over, among other elements. For further analysis of Ukraine’s peace formula, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 15 November 2022.

Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis stated that Russia will have to be included ‘one way or another’ in negotiations to end the war. However, it remains our assessment that Moscow is highly unlikely to engage in negotiations in good faith to stop the conflict in the near term, or to agree to almost any points within Ukraine’s peace formula, given its requirements for Russian troops to withdraw from Ukraine. The Swiss intervention does, nevertheless, reflect growing calls among certain countries, particularly non-aligned and Global South nations, to include Russia in negotiations aimed at securing a peace settlement. However, such talks remain highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term.

Yermak reiterated that the current Ukrainian leadership will not agree to freeze the conflict following the discussions. Yermak also insisted that Kyiv’s allies are not pushing for territorial concessions to Moscow, to which Ukrainian society remains largely opposed. As per polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in mid-December 2023, 74% of Ukrainian citizens are against ceding territory. Nevertheless, the share of Ukrainians willing to relinquish territory has grown from 10% (May 2023) to 19% (December 2023). However, the Ukrainian government will almost certainly remain publicly opposed to ceding territory or freezing the conflict in the coming months due to plausible concerns that Russia could reattack Ukraine. It remains our assessment that any effort to freeze the war in the next 12 months will merely provide Russia with an opportunity to rearm and reconstitute its forces, given almost all indicators point to the Kremlin maintaining its maximalist war objectives in Ukraine.

On 14 January, Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov stated that he proposed establishing an international working group to focus on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. Umerov revealed that he suggested creating the group at the defence minister and national security advisor level. No further information was provided on how the group would operate, or how it would seek to achieve this aim, which remains a highly unlikely prospect for the foreseeable future. (Source: Sibylline)

19 Jan 24. Russia equips T-80BVM tank with new C-UAS. A new counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) known as Saniya, developed by Russian company 3MX, has been equipped on one of Russia’s T-80BVM tanks.

The system was seen onboard a Russian 1st Army Corps T-80BVM tank operating near Pervomayskoye, Ukraine in a video posted by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on Telegram on 14 January.

Tests of the C-UAS were scheduled to be completed by the end of 2023, after which the company said it would begin to scale up production.

Saniya automatically detects and suppresses first person vehicles (FPVs) from ranges of up to 1.5 km and 1 km respectively. The system encompasses a passive detector, featuring two small vertical antennas, and a distinct suppressor, comprising eight approximately 0.5 m antennas (two vertical and six diagonal).

Saniya can be deployed to protect stationary positions or be operated on-the-move, enabled with added vibration pads to absorb shocks from armoured vehicles. (Source: Janes)

19 Jan 24. Russia has lost 90% of its equipment in Krynky due to shortage of EW, UK MoD says. Russia is said to have lost approximately 90% of its military equipment in Krynky, Kherson, likely because of a shortage of Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems in the area, according to a UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) intelligence update on 12 January.

The equipment is being destroyed by Ukrainian munition-equipped first-person view (FPV) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) alongside artillery on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River, the update added.

Videos from Ukrainian military bloggers and the 501st Separate Marine Infantry Battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine depict Russian equipment being destroyed in Krynky, such as BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), as well as what appears to be a T-series main battle tank and possibly a TOS-1 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) because of the size of the explosion. (Source: Janes)

20 Jan 24. Former Nato chief: ‘If Ukraine loses, our enemies will decide the world order.’

Lord Robertson says these are ‘dangerous’ times, but talk of freezing the conflict with Russia will be self-defeating.

The first thing Lord George Robertson asks of visitors to his office is to look at a painting showing a cross-section of topsoil. At the top, red poppies flutter against a blue sky. In the earth below lies a layer of human bones.

“Pretty gory, I know. But it was in storage for years and when I moved into this office I thought no, it deserves putting up. The Serb paramilitaries had rounded up 20 odd kids and their families, put them in a house and then threw grenades in, burnt the house down. I went back [to Kosovo] 20 years later and they presented me with that.”

A reminder, perhaps, of just how bad Kosovo could have become if Lord Robertson, then Tony Blair’s Defence Secretary, had not teamed up with other European ministers to push for a controversial Nato intervention.

Lord Robertson of Port Ellen has seen his fair share of international crises. As Tony Blair’s Secretary of State for Defence and later the Secretary General of Nato between 1999 and 2003, he presided Nato’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the alliance’s enlargement to include former Warsaw Pact members in eastern Europe, and its only ever invocation of Article Five, the North Atlantic Treaty’s self-defence clause, in the aftermath of the Sept 11 attacks.

Unlike many retired politicians and generals, he is still viewed by serving defence officials and thinkers as a credible elder statesman. Now, he has a warning: we are living through a period of global volatility “unlike anything in history, and we are not rising to the occasion”.

“If they [Ukraine] lose, we lose…because otherwise the world order will be written by the Chinese and the Russians and the Iranians and the North Koreans. And that will make a very, very uncomfortable world for my grandkids.”

It is not a reassuring prediction. The war in Ukraine is about to enter its third year, the Middle East is aflame, and Western nerves jangle over Xi Jinping’s plans for Chinese “unification” with Taiwan.

And by the end of the year, Donald Trump, who is on record telling European officials that “Nato is dead,” may once again be president-elect of the United States.

Some officials are openly warning that Britain may be involved in a peer-to-peer conflict within a decade. Some people say the world has never been so dangerous as it is in 2024. Can Lord Robertson reassure us it isn’t?

“Oh, it’s bad,” he says. “People say it’s an incredibly dangerous time. Well, it is. We have never had such a volatility of events, so many things simultaneously happening in politics of both democracies and autocracies. Is it the most dangerous period? No.”

Lord Robertson left Nato in 2003, but never really retired. At the age of 77 he is a frantically busy peer, commuting weekly between Westminster and his home in Dunblane where he lives with his wife Sandra (he also has three grown-up children).

His one concession to the quiet life is amateur photography – the other end of his office hangs landscapes of his native islands, and he has published a book, Islay and Jura, of his photographs.

But most of his time is taken up lecturing newly promoted army majors, reviewing books, and – above all – the House of Lord’s day job of scrutinising legislation passed in the Commons. He’s currently exercised by the wording of the Government’s Rwanda Bill, which effectively declares Rwanda a safe country – despite Britain itself accepting asylum seekers fleeing persecution there.

“Have you read it?” he asks with a mix of incredulity and amusement. “It’s like saying there’s a dog, but we’ve got a law here that says it’s a cat, so it is a cat.” But it is his status as an elder statesman of international security that his advice is mostly sought. It is Lord Robertson’s hypothesis that the current era is about much more than the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.

It is, he argues, about a seemingly infinite succession of surprises. There is a rapid velocity of technological, scientific and environmental change. That in turn is creating new vulnerabilities, from pandemics to cyber war. On top of that is a crisis of values in the West and a startling vacuum of leadership.

“It’s unlike anything in history this period we’re living through,” he says. “It is almost a battle of alliances. The Global South is taking sides and they don’t seem to recognise that they’ve got a dog in the fight – that if you can change borders by the use of force then anarchy is the eventual outcome. The Western alliance is there, but maybe endangered by Donald Trump coming in. We cannot afford to be taken by surprise again.”

It is the vacuum of leadership that bothers him most. Yes, he concedes, the Westerners, including his own generation of leaders, became complacent in the aftermath of the Cold War.

“Even now, when there is a land war in Europe, when we’ve got Ukraine and some other problems – the Prime Minister was reminding us on Monday of how important it was that [Ukraine] gets the equipment. And he still doesn’t say when we will give them a multi-year commitment.”

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

19 Jan 24. Deceived and Dispatched: Cuban Mercenaries Reportedly Killed in Ukraine Following Deceptive Recruitment Schemes. Hacked documents and various reports indicate a concerted effort by Russia to recruit Cubans, exploiting economic vulnerabilities and offering incentives like fast-track citizenship. An amendment to Russian Law in April 2023 made it easier for foreigners fighting with Russian forces to acquire citizenship, creating a pathway for Cubans to join the Russian military. The recruitment process has been facilitated by offering a one-time cash payment of about $2,000 and monthly payments starting at approximately the same amount, depending on rank, along with spousal and family benefits.

The Cuban Foreign Affairs Ministry’s response to these events has been ambiguous, acknowledging awareness of a human trafficking network facilitating the recruitment of Cubans into Russian military operations but denying direct involvement. Despite historical ties and alignment with Russia on various international matters, Havana has publicly denounced mercenarism and human trafficking. It has stated efforts to dismantle human trafficking networks involved in recruiting Cubans for the war in Ukraine.

An article from Havana Times paints a darker picture, reporting that some individuals were led to believe they were signing labor contracts for non-military work in Russia. Accounts emerged on social media about young Cubans like Alex Vegas Diaz and Andorf Velazquez Garcia. The young men reportedly responded to Facebook ads posted promising construction jobs in Russia. However, upon arrival, they were met by a soldier of Cuban origin, stripped of their documents, and sent to Ukraine.

Adding to the grim narrative, reports from Cubanos Pro El Mundo highlight the deaths of two young Cubans in Ukraine. Yansiel Morejón (26), and Raibel Palacio Herrera (21) have become the latest victims of what appears to be a ruthless recruitment scheme. Morejón was reportedly killed in action on January 10, while Palacio Herrera lost his life in the city of Kherson following a drone attack by Ukrainian forces. His family received the news through a WhatsApp message, informing them that Herrera was a casualty of a Ukrainian drone attack. The Russian authorities promised to repatriate his body, yet communication with the Cuban embassy in Moscow has been non-existent, leaving the family in a state of uncertainty. The families of these young men, misled by false promises, are left to mourn their losses, with the financial compensations promised in the recruitment contracts yet to materialize. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

17 Jan 24. France Launches Artillery Coalition for Ukraine. The Artillery Coalition is Launched. The Minister of the Armed Forces, Sébastien Lecornu, and his Ukrainian counterpart Roustem Oumerov launched on Thursday, January 18 the “Artillery for Ukraine” coalition. It aims to strengthen military support for Kyiv, both in the short and the long term. The minister also announced that France would deliver six Caesars in the coming weeks and was capable of producing 72 additional ones in 2024 for Ukraine.

What is the artillery coalition?

Sébastien Lecornu launched the “Artillery for Ukraine” coalition in order to support Ukraine for as long as necessary. The fifty states of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, also called “Ramstein format”, organized themselves into coalitions for more effective support in the short, medium and long term. Five capability coalitions have thus emerged: ground-air defense, armor, air forces, maritime security and, since Jan 18, artillery.

Alongside the United States, France, with its recognized industrial and operational expertise in this area, co-chairs the artillery coalition.

The objective of this coalition is to provide the Ukrainian armed forces with capabilities in the short term in this key segment for the defense of Ukrainian territory. In the long term, it also aims to build the future Ukrainian artillery through ambitious and innovative industrial partnerships.

Sustainable support for Ukraine

Sébastien Lecornu also took the opportunity to announce the delivery of six new Caesar cannons by France to Ukraine in the coming weeks, thus demonstrating once again France’s enduring support. Above all, the acceleration of production rates at the Nexter company will make it possible to produce 72 additional Caesars for Ukraine in 2024 (i.e. 78 in total with the first six to be delivered soon).

Exchanges within the artillery coalition should make it possible to finance this support with the mobilization of all willing countries. In this context, France will use 50 m euros from its Support Fund for Ukraine to provide 12 of these 72 cannons. “There are therefore 60 left to finance. This is the appeal that I am making to all allies as part of our “Ramstein format” cooperation,” said Sébastien Lecornu.

Concerning the 155mm shells used by the Caesars, Sébastien Lecornu indicated that France would be able to provide 3,000 per month to the Ukrainian army from the end of January, compared to 2,000 per month currently and only 1,000 per month at the start of the war. “Either because we produce faster, or because we are able to recycle powders into munitions,” he underlined, welcoming the acceleration in production rates made possible by the transition to the “war economy”.

On the other hand, on Tuesday, the President of the Republic announced the delivery in 2024 of around forty long-range SCALP missiles to Kiev, missiles which are in addition to the transfers made in 2023. He also confirmed the delivery of several hundreds of AASM powered bombs, which offer the capability for precision remote strikes on targets in the rear of the Russian combat system. (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ French Armed Forces Ministry; issued Jan 18, 2024)

17 Jan 24. Fighting intensifies in Ukraine’s east as Russia steps up offensive action. Ukrainian artillery forces fighting near the Russian-occupied city of Bakhmut say Russian troops are constantly making offensive assaults as fighting intensifies and Kyiv waits for more military aid from the West.

Ukrainian forces have taken up a more defensive stance in many areas of the snow-bound front after a counteroffensive last year was unable to break through heavily-defended Russian lines in the occupied south and east.

“Now because of the weather, we switched to defensive actions. The enemy constantly tries to conduct offensive actions,” said Mykhailo, a fighter for Ukraine’s 92nd separate assault brigade.

The Ukrainian General Staff’s daily readout on the war with Russia reported 98 combat clashes in the last 24 hours on Wednesday, double the figure given at the end of last week.

Ukrainian forces, it said, were holding the line and inflicting significant losses, repelling attacks on the fronts near the towns of Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka and several other smaller eastern settlements.

Mykhailo’s unit, which was firing off rounds from a self-propelled howitzer on Tuesday, was focused on counterbattery fire at Russian artillery, mortars, anti-tank cannon, tanks as well as infantry being moved for rotation, the soldiers said.

“Foreign weapons were not designed to work under such weather conditions,” Mykhailo said, adding that vehicles were getting stuck in swamps.

“We saw the howitzer skidding while trying to drive out of the positions, it skidded on the ice,” he said.

Another of the unit’s soldiers, Pavlo, said Ukrainian troops would not be able to move forward unless they received more ammunition and more manpower.

Political wrangling in the United States and European Union has held up two major packages of military and financial support for weeks, although Kyiv has said it hopes the assistance will eventually materialise.

“In order to advance, to move the front line, we need ammunition, we need more man power, we need weapons.

“If the enemy understands that we have zero resources, it can easily put pressure on us. If other countries help us and provide us with ammunition, manpower and weapons, we will be successful.

He said their unit had a shortage of ammunition and that it had been a “while” since they had fired as many as 20 shells in a day. (Source: Reuters)

17 Jan 24. Russia Claims to Have Conducted a Strike Against French Mercenaries in Kharkiv. On January 17, 2024, the Russian Defence Ministry stated that they conducted a precision strike on a temporary deployment point of foreign militants in Kharkiv, Ukraine, primarily consisting of French mercenaries. The ministry claimed the attack killed dozens of foreign fighters and injured many more but did not provide concrete evidence to support these claims. This strike led to significant damage to a multi-storey building in central Kharkiv, resulting in civilian injuries and further escalating the ongoing conflict.

Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city near the Russian border, has faced persistent shelling since the onset of large-scale hostilities by Russia in February 2022. The region’s governor, Oleg Synegubov, refuted Russia’s claims, stating that there were no military targets in the area affected by the strike.

According to previous a previous reports from French sources RTL and Mediapart, there may be roughly 100 French volunteers fighting in Ukraine’s International Legion. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

17 Jan 24. Australia Formally Rejects Request from Ukraine for NH90 Helicopter Fleet. Australia Formally Rejects Request from Ukraine for Troubled MRH-90 Taipan Helicopter Fleet (excerpt). The [Australian] federal government has formally rejected a request from Ukraine to access Australia’s fleet of the now-retired Taipan helicopters.

The 45 Taipan MRH-90 aircraft were retired last year after a crash in Queensland that killed four Defence personnel during a training exercise.

Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy said there are no Taipans that are currently in “flying condition”. “To get any up to flying condition would require a huge investment in taxpayers’ funds, time and resources to do that,” he said.

The aircraft are currently being dismantled and prepared to be buried at a defence site.

After the fleet was grounded, Mr Conroy said the Defence Department worked with Airbus and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Helicopter Industries for a potential buyer of the air frames.

But he said there was “zero interest” at that time, after which a decision was made to disassemble the aircraft and sell any spare parts.

Mr Conroy said the government received the Ukraine request shortly before Christmas last year. “That request came in three months after the disposal strategy began, three months after these aircraft were grounded, three months after maintenance ceased on these aircraft,” Mr Conroy said.

The investigation into the deadly crash is still ongoing.

Mr Conroy defended the decision and said the government would look for other ways to continue providing support, and had offered a briefing to Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia Vasyl Myroshnychenko.

Retired Army Major General Mick Ryan called it a “scandalous” decision. “Rushing to bury useable helicopters rather than transferring them to a nation fighting for its life is shameful and a national embarrassment,” he said in a statement on X. (end of excerpt) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Australian Broadcasting Corp)

16 Jan 24. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has urged allies to boost funding for his country, arguing that Kyiv’s ability to fight back against the Russian invasion is also in their own security interests. Ukraine’s president told the World Economic Forum in Davos on Tuesday that anyone who believed Vladimir Putin’s war was only about Ukraine was “fundamentally mistaken”, adding that the Russian leader embodies war without an end. The solution was not a frozen conflict in Ukraine, he said. “Putin is a predator who is not satisfied with frozen products.” His Davos pitch comes at a time when western aid is running perilously low after decision makers in Washington and Brussels were unable to renew a total of $110bn for the next few years. Russia, meanwhile, has ramped up its aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities, as well as its domestic arms production and imports of drones and missiles from Iran and North Korea. “If anyone thinks this is only about us, this is only about Ukraine, they are fundamentally mistaken. Possible directions and even . . . a new Russian aggression beyond Ukraine become more and more obvious,” Zelenskyy warned. “Strengthen our economy and we will strengthen your security.” Zelenskyy met government and business leaders in the Swiss resort, including JPMorgan Chase chief executive Jamie Dimon, Blackstone Group chair Stephen Schwarzman and Lakshmi Mittal, founder of steel giant ArcelorMittal. He struck a particularly optimistic note regarding the EU’s delayed financing package, saying he had seen positive signs on this front. EU officials are increasingly confident that they can strike a deal on February 1 to allocate €50bn of fresh funding to Ukraine, either through concessions to Hungary that would allow the use of the bloc’s shared budget, or an off-budget “plan B” arrangement that would bypass Budapest. Zelenskyy said his country was still counting on Congress to unlock the latest US financial package, as concerns in Kyiv and allied capitals are mounting about Donald Trump returning to the White House following elections in November. The former president is campaigning on halting support for Ukraine and “ending the war” with Russia. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, who also spoke at Davos on Tuesday, said Ukraine could prevail in the war, but warned that the allies needed to “continue to empower their resistance”. “Ukrainians need predictable financing throughout 2024 and beyond. They need a sufficient and sustained supply of weapons to defend Ukraine and regain its rightful territory. They need capabilities to deter future attacks by Russia.” A Ukrainian counteroffensive last year failed to recapture significant territories occupied by Russia and Nato secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg said that, in terms of the military campaign, “the reality is that, of course, there are reasons to be concerned”. “The big [Ukrainian] spring offensive didn’t give the results we all hoped for,” said the head of the military alliance. “But despite these difficulties, there are reasons for optimism,” he added, calling for countries “to continue to deliver the weapons”. Recommended Timothy Garton Ash What western allies must do for Ukraine — and for themselves A meeting of national security advisers from more than 80 countries met in Davos on Sunday with a Ukrainian delegation to discuss Kyiv’s proposed peace plan to end the war, which includes the demand for Russia to fully withdraw from the country’s territory. While western delegates said the active participation of officials from major developing countries such as Brazil and South Africa was a positive signal, they admitted widespread divergence among delegates on the war, with many non-western states calling for talks with Russia to begin immediately. Zelenskyy has said that his government has begun work on organising a summit of world leaders to discuss his peace plan in Switzerland as soon as possible. Ukraine’s proposal is a non-starter for Moscow, as it calls for the full withdrawal of Russian forces. Putin has recently vowed to press on with the invasion until all of his goals — including Kyiv’s capitulation — are achieved. (Source: FT.com)

16 Jan 24. EU member states have provided to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country, in response to claims that some capitals have failed to send as much as they could. Western military and financial aid to Ukraine has dwindled in recent months, restricting Kyiv’s ability to defend against Russia’s attacks and launch counteroffensive operations and sparking concern that willingness to help Ukraine is ebbing after almost two years of war. The audit comes as Brussels and Washington are struggling to find political consensus that would allow them to sign off on new financial aid packages to Kyiv together worth about $110bn. Bipartisan divisions in the US Congress have prevented the passing of a funding package for Ukraine worth more than $60bn proposed by President Joe Biden. The money is required to continue US military shipments to Kyiv. The EU’s diplomatic service, the External Action Service (EEAS), is conducting the audit of weapons supplied by member states since Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbour in February 2022, three EU diplomats briefed on the plans told the FT. The EEAS aims to present the findings to capitals before a summit of EU leaders on February 1. The audit will rely on submissions from member states in response to requests from the EEAS — which has already met resistance from some countries reluctant to provide complete data, according to one of the diplomats. The decision to conduct the audit follows a demand from German Chancellor Olaf Scholz last week that countries’ military deliveries to Kyiv be tallied up and compared. “The arms deliveries for Ukraine planned so far by the majority of EU member states are too small,” he argued. “We [also] need an overview of what concrete contribution our European partners will make to support Ukraine this year,” Scholz told reporters last Monday. His comments echoed private remarks made by officials from other EU countries over the scale of military supplies being promised by fellow member states. Germany has made the EU’s biggest arms pledges by far in terms of value, according to research by the Kiel Institute for The World Economy. At more than €17bn up to October 31 last year, its commitments are worth about five times the value of Denmark’s, the next biggest contributor. While Scholz’s remarks have been interpreted as a rebuke to other large EU states such as France and Italy whose military pledges are far smaller, his public call for greater transparency was privately backed by senior officials in Brussels who believe some states could provide more weapons to Kyiv at a critical moment in the conflict. Recommended War in Ukraine: military strategies Missiles from Iran and North Korea boost Russia’s onslaught on Ukraine Some EU countries other than Germany, particularly in the east of the bloc, are also pushing for the expansion of the European Peace Facility (EPF), a joint fund that part-finances weapons shipments to Ukraine, to boost supplies and share the cost burden. The EPF, which funds defence-related projects in third counties, has not been bolstered since June 2023, and the bloc’s 27 member states have failed to agree on a move to create a dedicated €5bn per year portion for Ukraine. “We have to make sure that [the EPF] is back on track and we can use it again for further tranches of support for Ukraine,” said a senior EU diplomat. Without the EPF, “some member states . . . will not give any military support”. Most member states were “very concerned about getting as much [military aid] as possible to Ukraine in these critical months, [to] the front where you see critical developments”, the diplomat added. (Source: FT.com)

16 Jan 24. Ukrainian Special Forces Neutralize Russian Reconnaissance Group Near Avdiivka. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces successfully detected and neutralized a Russian military reconnaissance group near Avdiivka, in the Donetsk region. This operation, reported on Facebook by the command of the Special Operations Forces and further covered by Ukrinform, is part of the ongoing defensive actions against Russian advancement in the region. The 8th Separate Special Forces Brigade, operating in the area, has observed consistent nightly attacks by Russian forces along the same route. During a nocturnal surveillance operation, operators from the 8th Separate Special Forces Brigade employed a reconnaissance drone with thermal imaging to identify a five-person enemy group. The Ukrainian soldiers engaged the group with mortar fire, resulting in the death of three Russian servicemen and the wounding of two others. This action is a part of a broader defensive effort by the Ukrainian Defense Forces, who have, as of January 15, reportedly eliminated approximately 370,980 Russian invaders. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

16 Jan 24. Officials declare state of emergency in Russia’s Voronezh city after Ukraine drone attack. The mayor of the southern Russian city of Voronezh declared a state of emergency on Tuesday after what officials said was a Ukraine-launched drone attack that damaged several buildings and wounded a child.

People from at least one apartment building were evacuated to a nearby school after drone debris sparked a small fire and blew out windows, Mayor Vadim Kstenin said on the Telegram messaging app.

Windows in other buildings were also shattered, he said, adding: “The introduced state of emergency in the city will … allow for a prompt implementation of measures to replace them.”

The governor of the region, Alexander Gusev, said on his Telegram channel that a girl was injured when drone debris fell onto her apartment building.

On its Telegram channel, the Russian defence ministry said it had destroyed five drones and intercepted three others overnight over the Voronezh region, which borders Ukraine. Voronezh city is the administrative centre of the region.

The ministry also said that it intercepted four drones in the nearby Russian Belgorod region.

Voronezh, a city of more than 1 m people, lies some 250 kilometres (155 miles) from the border with Ukraine.

There was no immediate comment from Ukraine. Kyiv has intensified its air attacks in recent months in what it says are strikes targeting Russian military infrastructure to undermine Moscow’s war efforts.

Russia has an air base near Voronezh city, where some Sukhoi Su-34s bombers are based, according to Russian media. Russia often deploys the fighter-bomber aircraft during air strikes on Ukraine.

Russian news outlet Shot reported on Telegram that at least 15 blasts were heard near the air base and some drone debris fell nearby onto an apartment building. Reuters could not independently verify the reports.

(Source: Reuters)

15 Jan 24. Ukraine ground commander says his troops, now on ‘active defence’, can still surprise. His demeanour is dispassionate and his message is clear: Ukraine’s ground forces are focused first and foremost on defence along the eastern stretch of the 1,000-km (600-mile) front under his command.

They should not be counted out, however, as an offensive force.

In an interview late last week, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi – a key figure in Kyiv’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion – underlined the shifting realities on the battlefield that have tempered hopes of a major Ukrainian breakthrough.

Despite initial optimism for a much-vaunted Ukrainian summer counteroffensive, Russian defences largely held, limiting early advances to a few kilometres in some spots before Moscow’s forces hit back elsewhere.

“Our goals remain unchanged: holding our positions … exhausting the enemy by inflicting maximum losses,” Syrskyi, Ukraine’s number two commander, told Reuters.

The 58-year-old, wearing combat fatigues and speaking cautiously at an undisclosed location in the eastern region of Kharkiv, noted how Russia was looking to seize the initiative as the invasion neared its second anniversary.

They were pressing in multiple directions along the eastern front, Syrskyi said, with the aim of wresting full control of the industrial Donbas region despite heavy losses in men and supplies.

Russia also hopes to claw back ground it lost in the southern Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, he added.

Ukrainian troops, for their part, are staging smaller counter-attacks in what Syrskyi described as “active defence”: keeping the enemy on its toes by seeking opportunities to strike while they look to regain the initiative.

Engagements on both sides are on a smaller scale to conserve ammunition and men, he added, suggesting Russia has also learned to react and stem losses.

“Offensives at the level of a battalion are a major rarity,” said Syrskyi, adding that wider use of drones has forced the change in tactic.

Ukraine says it does not have enough ammunition to sustain the desired level of attacks, and has urged Western partners to do more to supply it.

‘CUNNING AND COURAGEOUS’

Syrskyi has commanded troops against combined Russian forces since 2014, when he earned his call sign “snow leopard”. They fought a Moscow-backed insurgency in eastern Ukraine using “tactics that were similar to how this cat hunts,” he explained.

“This creature is very careful, cunning and courageous.”

He burnished his reputation in September 2022, leading a lightning counteroffensive to retake swathes of the Kharkiv region which stunned Russian forces into a retreat.

The operation capitalised on Ukraine’s strengths, particularly nimble units capable of bypassing fortified positions to drive deep into enemy territory.

But Syrskyi’s record as a commander is not unquestioned. Through much of early 2023, he led Ukraine’s defence of the eastern city of Bakhmut, where thousands of soldiers on both sides are widely believed to have been killed in the deadliest battle of the conflict so far.

Some military analysts questioned whether fighting for a ruined city that was ultimately lost was worth so many dead and wounded. Syrskyi said Ukraine harmed Russia’s war effort there by neutralising the Wagner mercenary group.

Moscow still considers him a threat, Syrskyi said, evidenced by more than one assassination attempt.

“Let’s say this: we’re familiar with rocket strikes,” he said.

With artillery and trench warfare yielding few major advances, Syrskyi agreed with Ukraine’s top commander Valery Zaluzhny that technology would likely play a major role if Kyiv wanted to win the war.

Electronic warfare has intensified over the past year, Syrskyi said, as the proliferation of drones and other guided weaponry has created more opportunities for jamming.

To gain an advantage, Ukrainian forces need higher quantities of advanced kit that works across multiple frequencies at once.

But there were still opportunities to advance by creating what Syrskyi called a “artificial advantage”, just as Ukraine had done in the fall of 2022.

“No matter what, there will be certain areas that will be heavily defended, and other areas less defended,” he said.

The key, Syrskyi added, was to concentrate forces at the most vulnerable point at the best time, a principle which “has not lost its relevance”.

(Source: Reuters)

15 Jan 24. Ukraine ‘shoots down £274m Russian spy plane.’ Ukraine has shot down a £274m Russian spy plane, it has been reported.

The aircraft was downed over the Sea of Azov on Sunday night, the RBC-Ukraine news agency cited a source in the armed forces as saying.

The Soviet-era A-50 uses radar to detect missiles and enemy aircraft and can also be used as an airborne command centre.

Russia was reported to have only eight operational A-50s left in its air force prior to Sunday’s incident.

Details about the weapons used to allegedly shoot down the plane have not yet emerged.

It was also reported that an Il-22M command and control aircraft was shot down over Strilkove, Kherson, on Sunday night.

A Russian A-50 based in Belarus was blown up in a partisan drone attack in February last year. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

15 Jan 24. Ukraine’s Ukroboronprom signs deals with Lithuanian defence industry. Letters of Intent to explore potential Ukraine development of military technologies such as thermal imaging, remote detonation systems, electronic warfare, and communications.

Ukrainian defence company Ukroboronprom is seeking to develop partnerships with Lithuanian companies in a bid to boost industrial capabilities that could offset, in part, the ongoing uncertainty over the US and European countries’ ability to support Kyiv in its war against Russia.

Announcing the signing of Letters of Intent with Lithuania’s NT Service, Brolis Semiconductors, RSI Europe and DMEXS, Ukroboronprom stated in a 10 January release that the companies were engaged in the development of capabilities in a range of areas, including thermal imaging, remote detonation systems, electronic warfare, and communications.

The signings took place during an overseas visit by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Vilnius last week.

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Ukraine is struggling for military support and financial assistance from its allies in the US and Europe amid doubts in certain Washington circles that it should continue to aid Kyiv. A key EU support package to Ukraine is also being held up following objections from member state Hungary, which also has close ties to Russia.

In a bid to spin the difficulties, US officials have moved to a different tone in how the US would seek to continue its support of Ukraine, shifting towards building up industrial capabilities within Ukraine rather than rely on the provision of equipment from its own inventory.

Speaking in early January, US State Department spokesperson Matt Miller said that the US would back Kyiv “as long as it takes” but cautioned that support in 2024 would be different to what was provided in 2022 and 2023.

“That does not mean that we are going to continue to support them at the same level of military funding that we did in 2022 and 2023. We don’t think that should be necessary because the goal is to ultimately transition Ukraine… to stand on its own feet and to help Ukraine build its own industrial base and its own military industrial base so it can both finance and build and acquire munitions on its own,” Miller said.

In November 2023 it was revealed that Ukroboronprom had expanded its production of small drones used by the Ukrainian military for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes. In June the same year the company announced that it was worked up capabilities to produce Nato-type 155mm ammunition, which had been provided in significant quantities to Ukraine by its Western allies.

According to GlobalData, state-owned Ukroboronprom is primarily engaged in the design and development of armoured military vehicles, radar technologies, aircraft, air defence, artillery rocket systems and ships, and civil vessels. (Source: army-technology.com)

15 Jan 24. UK launches new tech programme in partnership with Ukraine.

New programme launched to boost trade and innovation between UK and Ukraine.

UK and Ukraine launch new tech initiative to further support Ukraine’s recovery following Putin’s illegal invasion
The UK-Ukraine TechBridge encourages collaboration between UK and Ukrainian tech sectors to boost investment and trade, innovation and skills, to the benefit of both countries
Minister for Industry and Economic Security Nusrat Ghani delivers speech in London to companies and investors as part of the official launch, along with Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation and private sector partners

The UK and Ukraine have today launched a new initiative to facilitate commercially-driven partnerships and growth in both tech sectors and further support Ukraine’s recovery.

The UK-Ukraine TechBridge aims to support economic resilience for Ukraine while bringing benefits to the tech sectors in both countries.

The initiative will seek to facilitate digital trade and investment by supporting relationships between high potential Ukrainian businesses and UK tech firms and investors, and through a series of virtual “missions” in priority sectors such as healthtech, agritech and fintech.

A number of UK-based tech companies have worked together to present a set of free online training opportunities alongside in-person and online expert discussions for Ukrainian businesses looking to develop their skills.

Following an agreement signed last year, Minister for Industry and Economic Security Nusrat Ghani will officially launch the UK-Ukraine TechBridge with Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation Oleksandr Bornyakov, in London today.

Minister for Industry and Economic Security Nusrat Ghani said:

As Minister for Ukraine Reconstruction, I am delighted to be launching this fantastic programme, building connections between the UK and Ukraine tech companies.

Ukraine’s tech sector has provided crucial support throughout the war and is key to the country’s resilience and future recovery.

By building partnerships between British and Ukrainian businesses and promoting innovation, we are demonstrating the power of trade, and are helping lay the foundations for Ukraine’s long-term recovery opening up future opportunities for businesses on both sides.

The programme will ensure that both British and Ukrainian tech businesses sectors have access to each other’s markets for commercial opportunities, making the most of the UK-Ukraine Digital Trade Agreement.

The TechBridge website is accessible as of today, and in-person missions for Ukrainian companies will start as early as March. Organisations or individuals are invited to sign up to receive more information as we continue to build the offer and set up specific events.

Ukraine Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation Oleksandr Bornyakov said:

The UK-Ukraine TechBridge is a platform that brings together the potential and the expertise of both Ukrainian and UK’s tech sectors.

Its launch provides crucial support for Ukraine’s IT industry.

I am confident that, through the UK-Ukraine TechBridge, numerous large-scale joint projects will be implemented, setting an example of successful, mutually beneficial international partnership for other countries.

The UK remains a key partner for Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts and this programme adds to the UK’s commitment to ensure UK companies are well-placed to maximise their contribution to one of the largest infrastructure programmes globally.

Background

More information about the TechBridge can be found on the dedicated website: ukukrainetechbridge.org.
The intention to establish TechBridge was announced by the UK Prime Minister at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London in June 2023. We have developed strong relationships with Ukrainian officials and ministers to identify immediate needs and provide the expertise of UK businesses, as prioritised by the Government of Ukraine.
The UK is supporting private sector engagement with Ukraine through several initiatives including on war insurance, and a CityUK-Ukraine Hub for sharing expertise in financial and professional services. The UK signed the UK-Ukraine Digital Trade Agreement in November 2023, read more on gov.uk. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

17 Jan 24. EU condemns Germany for pledging £6bn Ukraine aid. The European Union has rebuked Germany for unilaterally pledging £6bn ($7.6bn) in aid to Ukraine. Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, made the promise on Tuesday and said the funds would go towards military and humanitarian aid.

But Thierry Breton, the EU’s internal market commissioner, condemned the move because it will not go through the bloc’s multilateral mechanisms.

“Today we see that Germany is trying to go solo, it hasn’t fooled anyone, and in particular it is trying to stop supporting the European Peace Facility,” he said.

The spat came as Emmanuel Macron announced France would sign a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine in February and supply Storm Shadow missiles and “several hundred” bombs.

Germany has repeatedly urged other European countries to step up their support for Ukraine in recent weeks.

“The planned weapons deliveries to Ukraine of most EU member states are not enough,” Mr Scholz said on Jan 9. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

16 Jan 24. Putin says Ukraine’s statehood at risk if pattern of war continues. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday that Ukraine’s statehood could suffer an “irreparable blow” if the pattern of the war continued, and Russia would never be forced to abandon the gains it had made.

Putin made his televised comments a day after Switzerland agreed to host a global summit at the request of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

Putin dismissed “so-called peace formulas” being discussed in the West and Ukraine and what he called the “prohibitive demands” they entailed.

“Well, if they don’t want (to negotiate), then don’t!” he said.

“Now it is quite obvious, not only (Ukraine’s) counter-offensive failed, but the initiative is completely in the hands of the Russian armed forces. If this continues, Ukrainian statehood may suffer an irreparable, very serious blow.”

Putin’s statements about the course of the war have become increasingly confident and aggressive in recent months, with the failure of Ukraine’s counter-offensive to deliver any substantial gains against well entrenched Russian forces.

Russia currently controls 17.5% of the territory of Ukraine.

Putin said talk of negotiation was “an attempt to motivate us to abandon the gains that we have realized over the past year and a half. But this is impossible. Everyone understands that this is impossible.”

A peace formula put forward by Zelenskiy calls for the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Russian troops, among other points.

Russia says any negotiation would have to take account of the “new realities” created by its forces on the ground. (Source: Reuters)

16 Jan 24. Russia jails officer for buying wrong hardware to protect Crimean bridge from Ukrainian attack – TASS. A court on Tuesday sentenced a former senior officer in the National Guard to six years in a prison colony after convicting him of buying equipment unable to protect the bridge which links southern Russia to Crimea, the TASS state news agency reported.

TASS said that Colonel Sergei Volkov had purchased two radar-based air defence systems for 395m roubles ($4.5m) which were meant to be able to bring down Ukrainian attack drones by suppressing their signal.

A military court in Moscow had determined that the equipment – which was also meant to protect a gas pipeline running from southern Russia to Crimea – needed modernising and upgrading to be effective and had found Volkov guilty of abusing his position, it said.

Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 in a move that Kyiv and the West do not recognise and say was illegal.

Volkov was reported to deny his guilt, saying he had acted within the law, and that the equipment was in fact intended to protect National Guard troops in various locations.

The Kommersant newspaper reported that Volkov’s oversight had left the bridge being “within range of (Ukrainian) fire.”

The road and rail bridge was a flagship project for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who opened it to road traffic to much fanfare by driving a truck across it in 2018.

After Putin sent tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine in February 2022, the bridge became a prime target for the Ukrainian military and special services.

It was severely damaged in October 2022 by a massive explosion.

Russian officials said the blast was caused by a lorry that exploded while driving over the bridge, killing three people. A few months later, in July 2023, Ukrainian security services claimed responsibility for the explosion. ($1 = 87.6560 roubles) (Source: Reuters)

16 Jan 24. NATO Conducts Secretive Surveillance Flights, Keeping a Close Eye on Russia and Ukraine. As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues, NATO has been intensively monitoring the situation through secretive surveillance flights. These missions are critical in providing real-time intelligence to ground-based commanders and drawing a do-not-cross line in European skies.

The Associated Press obtained exclusive access aboard a French Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, which conducted a 10-hour reconnaissance mission from central France to Romanian airspace and back. The mission involved monitoring activities across southern Ukraine and the Black Sea, extending to Russian-occupied Crimea. Operating at 34,000 feet, this AWACS fed intelligence in real-time to NATO commanders, enhancing the alliance’s situational awareness and preparedness

Additionally, Sky News reports that these flights are equipped with sensors to collect electronic and radio signals in monitored areas. Some are even capable of intercepting voice and text communications, providing insights into Russian military operations and movements. The positioning of these planes also indicates NATO’s areas of interest, especially concerning Russian troop build-ups along the Ukrainian border

These surveillance flights use various aircraft, including unmanned drones and modified Boeing 707s, equipped with advanced radar and surveillance gear. They can detect a wide range of military activities, including missile launches, bombing runs, and ship movements. The French AWACS, for instance, can see for hundreds of kilometers, though precise capabilities remain classified. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

17 Jan 24. Ukraine SSU apprehend Wagner Mercenary who was attempting to facilitate AirStrikes on Energy Grid. The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) has detained a member of the Wagner Group, a notorious private military company, in the Rivne Oblast region of Ukraine. The individual, a 34-year-old Belarusian citizen, was apprehended while attempting to install GPS trackers on energy infrastructure, aimed at enabling precision airstrikes by Russian forces.

The Wagner mercenary, identified as having fought against Ukraine between 2014 and 2017 with illegal armed groups in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, joined the ranks of the Wagner Group during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. His recent involvement included participation in combat actions near Bakhmut in the Donetsk Oblast.

The SSU’s intervention was the culmination of a meticulously planned multi-stage operation. Ukrainian intelligence had been tracking the mercenary’s movements since his time in Belarus, where he received instructions from his handlers. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

17 Jan 24. France to give Ukraine more cruise missiles, plans security pact. France will supply Ukraine with about 40 more Scalp-EG cruise missiles and hundreds of bombs in coming weeks, French President Emmanuel Macron said in a press conference Tuesday evening.

The French defense industry is also working within the framework of a “war economy” to boost production and supplies of equipment to Ukraine, in particular 155mm Caesar howitzers, the president said.

Macron turned to international issues more than two hours into a sprawling press conference in Paris, calling the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine the biggest risk to the security of Europe. He said France is finalizing a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine similar to the one concluded by the U.K. last week.

“We will basically continue to help Ukraine in its needs – for training, to hold on to the front, and to defend its skies,” Macron said. “With the deliveries I mentioned, with the agreements we’re finalizing.”

U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed an agreement on security cooperation in Kyiv on Jan. 12, committing the U.K. to consulting with Ukraine in the event the country is attacked by Russia ever again, and to provide “swift and sustained” assistance for defense. The U.K. also announced military funding of 2.5bn pounds ($3.2bn) for Ukraine in the 2024-2025 financial year.

Macron plans to visit Ukraine in February, by which time he said deliveries of munitions will have started, as France hands over equipment “almost in real time” with announcements.

France received its first Scalp from missile maker MBDA in 2003, and a senate report that year put the cost for a single missile at €860,000. The French started a midlife upgrade in 2016 to keep Scalp operationally effective until at least 2030.

French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecorne is scheduled to host his Ukrainian counterpart Rustem Umerov in France on Thursday, with visits to the KNDS site in Bourges, where the company builds the truck-mounted Caesar howitzer, and MBDA’s production site of Scalp missiles in Selles-Saint-Denis.

France ranks behind Germany and the U.K. in value of military aid provided to Ukraine between January 2022 to October 2023, as well as behind smaller countries including Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, according to data tracked by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. At the same time, some of the equipment supplied by France expanded the long-range fire capabilities sought by Ukraine, including the Caesar cannons and Scalp missiles.

Macron said the world has become unstable, defined by the tension between China and the U.S., which risks upsetting Europe. He repeated calls for a more sovereign Europe that is an ally of the U.S. “but which doesn’t depend on it,” and which can be a hub of stability.

Russia cannot be allowed to win in Ukraine, because that would implicate the security of Europe and all of Russia’s neighbors, the president said.

“We will very clearly, us French and us Europeans, have new decisions to take in the weeks and months to come, precisely not to let Russia win.”

Macron said increased military investment now needs to be complemented by developing European defense, more common programs and investments, standardization of major European industrial programs and a closer military culture with partners. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

17 Jan 24. Russian AI Drone-Killer Destroyed in Ukraine by a Drone.

Last week the Ukrainian Shadow drone group hunted down, and blew up, a very new and very rare RB-109A Bylina electronic-warfare command-and-control system.

Bylina is a set of sophisticated receivers, packed into five trucks, that detects and pinpoints enemy radars and radios and, thanks to a built-in artificial intelligence, automatically cues linked electronic jammers to target the radars and radios. A Bylina’s receivers can sense emitters from hundreds of miles away.

All that is to say, Bylina isn’t a jammer. It’s an A.I.-powered command system that makes jammers more effective. Fifty-percent more effective, according to one assessment.

The electronic front might be the most important front of the wider war right now. That’s because small explosive drones are among the most important weapons, and they hit or miss depending on whether the enemy can jam them.

It’s because of Ukraine’s successful jamming campaign that a small unit of marines hangs onto its narrow bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine. The marines can fly their drones; Russian troops can’t fly their own drones.

And it’s in large part because of the failure of Russia’s jamming campaign that Russian troops haven’t been able to capture the city of Avdiivka in eastern Ukraine. Again, the Ukrainians can fly their drones—and swarm every Russian assault.

So it makes sense that, last fall, the Russian army rushed the first operational Bylinas to the front line following years of increasingly realistic testing. Bylina should have made it “easier to jam enemy signals by selecting the best targeting devices,” according to the Kremlin.

Instead, at least one of the rare Bylinas—they’re brigade-level systems so there probably are only a few in Ukraine—got found out, hit by a drone and burned to the ground, reportedly in Donetsk in eastern Ukraine.

The ironic strike—a drone knocking out a counter-drone system—is consistent with a broader trend.

Ukraine plinked one of Russia’s best GPS-jammers with a GPS-guided bomb. Ukrainian drones blew up Russian drone-jammers. Ukraine’s cruise missiles struck Russian air-defense sites whose missions included, you guessed it, shooting down cruise missiles.

Most recently, in early January, Russian media announced the deployment to Ukraine of Russian forces’ latest high-tech counterbattery radar, which detects incoming artillery. A few hours later in southern Ukraine, the Ukrainians blew it up … with artillery.

The Russians aren’t just losing hundreds of tanks and fighting vehicles and thousands of troops in their costly, but so far failing, winter offensive. They also are losing more and more of their best and hardest-to-replace battlefield enablers. Radars. Jammers. Command-and-control systems such as the Bylina.

The effect of these losses won’t immediately be obvious. But over time, it will become harder for the Russians to defend themselves against Ukraine’s artillery, missiles and drones—and equally more difficult to deploy their own artillery, missiles and drones. (Source: UAS VISION/Forbes)

19 Jan 24. Driver Training on the Marder Armored Personnel Carrier at European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine. The new year 2024 begins with the training of Ukrainian armed forces members to become tracked vehicle drivers at the European Union 99Military Assistance Mission Ukraine. As a basis for further armored infantry training, Ukrainian soldiers have been learning to drive the Marder infantry fighting vehicle since the beginning of January with which they will then be deployed at the front.

Wave tracks, water holes, steps – the driving school area on a military training area in the middle of Germany offers future drivers of the Marder armored personnel carrier, the Dingo all-protection transport vehicle or the Wiesel weapons carrier, among others, many opportunities to learn how to use their vehicle. German military personnel are normally trained here. Now, however, the driving instructors are faced with members of the Ukrainian armed forces who are being trained for their use as drivers on the Marder armored personnel carrier. Around 100 vehicles of this type were delivered by the Bundeswehr and industry last year to support Ukraine in its fight against the aggressor Russia.

Train for what really counts on the front lines

Equipped with a 20mm machine cannon, the MILAN anti-tank system and an MG3 machine gun, the Marder has proven itself as a weapon system for the Panzergrenadiers since the 1970s. But the operational value of the Marder in combat depends primarily on how precisely the Ukrainian armored infantrymen can handle this complex weapon system. “Due to the short duration of training, we have to prioritize and train what really counts for the drivers at the front,” explains the training manager. For the participants, the two-week training course is primarily about gaining driving experience, on and off-road.

From theory to practice

In the first days of training, the future drivers should get to know the Marder: theory lessons and technology are on the roster. In an emergency, they must also be able to solve simple technical problems independently and respond correctly to error messages. Particular attention is paid to the Marder’s emergency running systems, with which the vehicle can be operated even without electricity. In the simulator-based training, participants finally become familiar with the vehicle’s controls and can practice various scenarios under safe conditions. It is then important to put the skills you have learned into practice on the road and off-road.

Practice until the final exam

In conventional driving lessons, the language mediators are particularly important because they have to translate the training staff’s commands quickly and accurately while driving. The basic driving training of German Marder drivers takes place mainly “through Luke”. However, Ukrainian military personnel practice driving “under hatch” as soon as their level of training allows. Their view is severely restricted, and only the angle mirrors are available to the driver. But this is the only way he can be protected from fire in combat, as the driver’s hatch is closed while driving. Day after day, the trainees practice using the vehicle until they finally have to prove their skills in the final exam.

From the driving instructor’s cabin, the trainer can give commands and take control of the Marder at any time.

The driver training of Ukrainian soldiers also requires flexibility and commitment from the trainers with regard to the language and the training process. While some have already been trained on Soviet-designed armored personnel carriers such as the BMP 2, others have little experience with these vehicles. “Despite the different previous knowledge, we do our best to ensure that everyone has the same level of knowledge and approximately the same skills at the end,” explains one company teacher. Immediately afterwards, the drivers will learn the tactical basics for deployment as a Panzergrenadier group or platoon together with their comrades. Only a short time later they will return to the front and fight for their country as Panzergrenadiers. (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Bundeswehr; issued Jan 18, 2024)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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