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09 Oct 25. Mali: Military purge underscores increasing pressure on government stability amid fuel blockade. On 7 October, interim President Assimi Goïta signed decrees dismissing 11 high-ranking military officers due to their alleged involvement in an attempted coup. In August, the authorities arrested eight of the dismissed individuals during a purge of the military personnel allegedly involved in a coup attempt that involved a French national. These new decrees underscore President Goïta’s efforts to remove any challenges to his leadership, amid increasing pressure on the military government’s stability. Since the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) instituted a blockade on fuel imports in early September, fuel shortages have emerged in major cities nationwide, undermining energy security conditions and exacerbating anti-government sentiment. Regional media reports indicate that the government has engaged in ad hoc negotiations with JNIM units to secure periodic access to fuel in exchange for prisoner releases. We assess that such negotiations are highly unlikely to restore full commercial access to fuel imports and will possibly aggravate tensions within the government, triggering further pre-emptive purges of high-ranking military personnel in order to mitigate the risk of a coup. These purges will likely further undermine the security forces’ capacity in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Oct 25. New Zealand launches defence industry strategy. The New Zealand Ministry of Defence (MoD) has released a strategy to strengthen its defence industrial base and support the capability development of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF).
The new 44-page Defence Industry Strategy – published in early October 2025 – lists three objectives: provide greater clarity about defence requirements; harness local industry and support its development; and integration with Australia.
The strategy also outlines actions to be taken over the coming four years to deliver capability to the NZDF more quickly and resiliently. As Defence Minister Judith Collins said, “We’re not the biggest provider … but we can be the smartest.”
The government hopes to mature the local defence industry, which consists of about 800 companies, by presenting opportunities to partner with the NZDF or to act as subcontractors to international primes. This goal is supported by new government procurement rules that state primes must develop and submit industry capability plans to maximise local participation in procurements and sustainment.
In this vein, the Defence Industry Strategy supports implementation of the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) that was published in April and details the MoD’s plan to invest NZD12 bn (USD7 bn) over the ensuing four years on NZDF capability. The MoD will also explore utilising local businesses as ‘thin primes’, where a local enterprise assumes total contract responsibilities to the NZDF, while subcontracting work out to larger original equipment manufacturers. The government believes this approach will engender more competition and allow domestic businesses to ascend the value chain. (Source: Janes)
09 Oct 25. China tightens rare earth export controls, targets defence, semiconductor users.
• Summary
• China tightens controls ahead of Trump-Xi meeting
• Expands restrictions on some processing technology
• Foreign defence, semiconductor users targeted
China tightened its rare earth export controls on Thursday, expanding restrictions on processing technology and spelling out its intention to limit exports to overseas defence and semiconductor users.
The Ministry of Commerce’s announcement, which follows a U.S. lawmakers’ call on Tuesday for broader bans on the export of chipmaking equipment to China, expands sweeping controls Beijing announced in April that caused shortages around the world before a series of deals with Europe and the U.S. eased the supply crunch. (Source: Reuters)
08 Oct 25. Pakistan: Attack underscores elevated militant threat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Late on 7 October, militants ambushed a military convoy near the Afghan border in Orakzai district (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province), killing 11 military personnel, including a lieutenant colonel. The militants targeted the convoy with roadside bombs before attacking with firearms. According to the military’s media wing, the security forces were conducting an intelligence-based operation in the area. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) group has reportedly since claimed the attack. This comes as the TTP has ramped up attacks against the military in recent months amid Pakistan’s strained ties with Afghanistan, which Pakistan accuses of providing safe heavens for the TTP. We assess that, given the deadly attacks, Pakistan will intensify counter-terrorism operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, particularly in districts bordering Afghanistan. This will increase the risk of retaliatory TTP attacks and drive localised market closures. This will in turn possibly disrupt cross-border overland trade. Additionally, persistent militant activity will increase the risk of Pakistan conducting air strikes inside Afghanistan, further straining bilateral ties. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Oct 25. Colombia: Attack on military facility will sustain physical security risks in Arauca. On 5 October, suspected National Liberation Army (ELN) personnel attacked a military base in Puerto Jordán (Arauca department), killing one soldier and injuring seven military personnel. Reports indicate the attackers used explosives and firearms, while also damaging several buildings. The Colombian military has accused the ELN’s Domingo Laín Sáenz Front (FDL) of conducting the attack. Previously on 9 September, the ELN’s political leader and chief negotiator Israel Ramírez Pineda (alias ‘Pablo Beltrán’) announced that the group was open to resuming peace talks with the Colombian government. These talks have been suspended on multiple occasions, largely due to Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s assertions that the ELN continues to conduct attacks against military and civilian personnel; talks were most recently suspended in January following an ELN offensive in Catatumbo (Norte de Santander department). In the near term, we assess that ELN factions are likely to continue targeting military facilities using firearms and explosives, sustaining elevated physical safety risks near military infrastructure. Peace negotiations are unlikely to make significant headway as long as the ELN continues attacking such infrastructure, sustaining long-term organised crime risks in ELN strongholds such as Arauca, Chocó and Norte de Santander departments. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Oct 25. Venezuela-US: Military strikes on suspected drug traffickers will sustain elevated regional tensions. On 5 October, US President Donald Trump stated that the US military had carried out a strike on a suspected drug trafficking vessel off Venezuela’s coast. Meanwhile, on 3 October, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that the US had struck a suspected drug trafficking vessel earlier that day. It is unclear whether President Trump and Hegseth were referencing the same strike. Regardless, this would mark at least the fourth military strike on suspected drug trafficking boats across the Caribbean Sea since 2 September. The Trump administration has determined that the US is engaged in a ‘non-international armed conflict’ with foreign drug cartels, granting authorisation for military action. The strikes come amid a significant US military deployment to the southern Caribbean Sea, including at least eight warships and support vessels, a nuclear-powered attack submarine and several F-35 fighter jets. We assess that further strikes on suspected drug trafficking vessels are likely in the short term, increasing the risk of disruption to maritime trade in the Caribbean Sea, possibly impacting supply chains. Furthermore, sustained strikes will sustain elevated bilateral tensions between the US and Venezuela, though armed conflict risks remain low. (Source: Sibylline)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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