Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
01 Jul 25. Mali: Simultaneous attacks underline expanding jihadist presence, increasing spillover risks. Earlier on 1 July, suspected Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) fighters launched co-ordinated attacks on seven towns across Kayes, Nioro and Ségou regions in central and western Mali, including the administrative capital Kayes. Casualty figures have not yet been released, though reports indicate the attacks have been largely repulsed. The attack on Kayes itself is notable; JNIM attacks on large cities are relatively unusual, possibly underlining enhanced freedom of movement and recruitment in the local area (which is proximate to the Senegalese border). The attacks will likely prompt security forces to augment their posture across southern Mali (particularly in Kayes, Nioro and Ségou), increasing staff exposure to stop and search operations and delays at checkpoints. More broadly, JNIM capacity to launch several large-scale attacks across Kayes region underlines an expanding local presence. We assess that this will drive mounting threats of jihadist spillover into neighbouring Mauritania and Senegal, increasing attack and kidnap risks in border areas. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jul 25. Congo (DRC)-Rwanda: Alleged Rwandan command of M23 will sustain conflict, sanctions risks. Earlier on 2 July, Reuters published details of an as yet unreleased UN report, alleging that Rwanda exercised command and control over the M23 rebel group. This includes during its offensive into the eastern Congolese provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu since January 2025. While Rwanda’s connection to the M23 is widely known, the report will further complicate Rwanda’s refusal to acknowledge direct involvement with the group. The terms of the US-backed agreement signed by the DRC and Rwanda on 27 June will increase pressure on Rwanda to demonstrably withdraw all support for the M23 and cede control of Congolese territory. Congolese officials have stated that they want to secure an agreement with the M23 prior to a summit with US President Donald Trump expected later this month. However, given significant financial inducements for Rwanda to ensure the M23 retains control of key mineral deposits, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that Rwanda will continue to claim non-involvement. This would undermine the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement, sustaining the threat of conflict in the eastern DRC and raising the possibility of targeted US sanctions on Rwanda. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Jun 25. Burkina Faso: Insurgent attack highlights sustained threats to life in northern regions. On 29 June, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed to have killed at least 40 security personnel in the Dablo area (Centre-Nord region). Militants reportedly ambushed a convoy moving along the N18 highway towards the regional capital Kaya and later looted numerous weapons, including automatic firearms and RPGs. The military government has not commented on the alleged incident. However, footage shared on social media indicates that militants highly likely killed several members of the security forces during an attack in the Centre-Nord region. We assess that, in the coming months, JNIM will highly likely attempt to consolidate its territorial control in the Sahel region, increasing attack risks in bordering Centre-Nord, Est and Nord regions. The security forces almost certainly lack the capacity to safeguard security within rural areas, sustaining attack, kidnap-for-ransom and sexual violence risks for locally engaged staff, particularly NGO staff engaged in rural development and faith-based projects. We assess that attack risks will be most acute during overland movement, including for staff travelling with security or military escorts. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Jun 25. Congo (DRC)-Rwanda: Peace agreement is unlikely to improve critical security risks. On 27 June, the Congolese and Rwandan governments signed a US-brokered peace agreement aimed at ending the conflict in eastern DRC. According to Reuters, the agreement will involve Rwandan troops withdrawing from eastern DRC within 90 days. The two governments will also launch a joint regional economic integration framework, which will facilitate significant US investment in critical minerals supplies from the region. The agreement will likely moderate direct clashes between the Congolese and Rwandan militaries in eastern DRC in the short term, particularly given the incentive of lucrative US investment. However, stability in eastern DRC will likely also be contingent on a separate, Qatar-brokered peace process with the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels; this is yet to materialise into a tangible process. Even if a deal is concluded, there are several other decentralised ethno-religious militias active across the region, many of which have indicated their unwillingness to cease hostilities. As such, we assess that it is unlikely that the US agreement will substantially improve critical security and sexual violence risks in the medium term in eastern DRC. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Jun 25. China-US: Rare earth supply chain risks will likely persist despite trade agreement. Earlier on 27 June, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced that China and the US had finalised a trade framework agreement reached in Geneva (Switzerland) in May. Under the deal, China will approve export licenses and the US will cancel several restrictive measures. US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick claimed that Beijing will ‘deliver rare earths’, with MOFCOM stating they will ‘lawfully review and approve export applications for controlled items that meet the required conditions’. China has imposed export controls on rare earth elements amid trade tensions with the US, driving global supply chain uncertainty (see Sibylline Special Report – 26 June 2025). Beijing has previously reportedly agreed to expedite the issuance of export licenses for key rare earths, though delays have persisted. Despite the agreement, we assess that China will highly likely continue using its dominance over rare earth supply chains, including through export controls, to increase its geopolitical leverage and achieve self-sufficiency. In the long term, this will increase supply chain risks for industries such as automotives, clean energy, and, particularly, defence. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Jun 25. India: Potential strike in July will drive transportation disruption in Maharashtra state. On 26 June, the Maharashtra state minister of transport, Pratap Sarnaik, stated that the state government was keen to address the concerns shared by transport operators in the state. Transport operators, including those driving private buses and trucks, have threatened to go on indefinite strike from 1 July due to issues related to the e-challan system (online system of issuing tickets and fines for traffic violations). Transport unions claim that there have been many problems with the system, which has allegedly resulted in arbitrary and excessive fines being issued to them. Saranik stated they would form a committee to review and reform the system in co-operation with transport associations. While the state government has indicated that it is taking the concerns seriously, if material progress is not made in the coming days, industrial action from transport operators in Maharashtra state is a realistic possibility. We assess that this would drive transport and supply chain disruption in the state. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Jun 25. Vladimir Putin has announced plans to scale back military spending after Kremlin officials warned that Russia is “on the brink of recession”. The Russian leader said he would reduce defence spending “next year and the year after, over the next three-year period” at an economic summit of five post-Soviet states in Minsk on Friday. Responding to Nato’s plans to raise defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP, Putin said the alliance’s members would spend on “purchases from the USA and on supporting their military-industrial complex”.
“So who is preparing for some kind of aggressive actions? Us or them?” he added.
The comments came after Maxim Reshetnikov, the Russian minister of economic development, last week announced that the country is “on the brink of going into a recession”. Elvira Nabiullina, governor of the Bank of Russia, also warned that the country’s wartime economic momentum – driven by massive state defence sector spending – was grinding to a halt. “We grew for two years at a fairly high pace because free resources were activated,” she said. “We need to understand that many of those resources have truly been exhausted.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-