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25 Jun 25. Pakistan: Army deployment will limit risk of communal violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. On 25 June, it was announced that at least 10,000 members of the army, police and other agencies would be responsible for security in Kohat division (Kurram district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) during the religious month of Muharram, which is expected to begin on 27 June. The administration of Kurram will also be handed over to the army during this period. The decision was made at a meeting of the Kohat divisional jirga (a meeting of local leaders). This comes after significant communal unrest in the district at the end of 2024, as a result of which approximately 60,000 people are at risk of intermittent tribal clashes and a shortage of food, medicine and fuel. We assess that the deployment of the security forces will likely help to mitigate against the risk of possible tensions between Shia-majority and Sunni-minority communities from escalating into clashes. There is also a realistic possibility of militants attempting to stoke communal tensions through targeted attacks during Muharram. However, we also assess the presence of the security forces will likely limit the frequency and scale of any such attacks. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Jun 25. Togo: Anti-government protests will increase risk of clashes with security forces, disruption. On 26 June, numerous opposition coalitions are scheduled to begin a three-day anti-government protest campaign. In the capital Lomé, protesters will gather at the Colombe de la Paix at 0700hrs (local time) and march to the National Assembly via Rue de France and Avenue du 24 Janvier. The demonstration will possibly be well attended, substantially disrupting overland movement through the capital and elevating the risk of operational, travel and supply chain disruption. This risk will possibly be moderated by fears of repression. Activists have called for simultaneous nationwide demonstrations, which will likely trigger smaller-scale protests targeting government buildings in Atakpamé (Plateux region), Dapaong (Savanes region) and Sokodé (Centrale region). Local media sources report that the security forces have started to augment their posture (particularly in Lomé) in anticipation of significant attendance. As the authorities have banned protests since 2022, the police are highly likely to employ heavy-handed dispersal tactics, including tear gas and rubber bullets, elevating the risk of clashes and broader unrest. The authorities will also possibly institute curfew measures and rest. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Jun 25. Canada: New EU defence, security partnership will sustain elevated regional tensions. On 23 June, Prime Minister Mark Carney signed a strategic defence and security partnership agreement with the EU. The agreement allows Canadian firms to participate in the ReArm Europe programme. The agreement also allows the Canadian government to work towards partnering with other allied countries to buy military equipment under the SAFE programme. Other components of the agreement include boosting co-operation on maritime security, combating dis-information, co-operating on defence procurement and increasing defence industrial co-operation. As Canada spends almost 70% of its military procurement budget on US-made equipment, the agreement aims to reduce reliance on the US. Efforts to strengthen partnerships, excluding the US, will likely increase regional tensions in the near term. In the short term, Canada will likely continue to seek economic and defence partner diversification, increasing investment opportunities in multiple export sectors, including artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure, critical minerals and digital trade, as well as defence. We assess that this trend will decrease socio-economic health risks in the longer term. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jun 25. South Korea’s new leaders seek continuity on key defense issues. After winning this month’s snap elections, South Korea’s President Lee Jae-myung appointed lawmaker Ahn Gyu-back as defense minister in a role historically held by retired military generals. Ahn has been a lawmaker since 2008 and leads the parliamentary special committee that investigates former President Yoon Suk Yeol, whose brief December declaration of martial law led to his arrest and subsequent impeachment. Ahn’s appointment also marks a significant shift in the civilian-military balance in the South, analyst Kim Ju Hyung, President of Seoul-based Security Management Institute, told Defense News. Kim specializes in U.S.-Korea relations and SMI is a think tank affiliated with the National Assembly. Ahn has “deep legislative and defense oversight experience,” says Kim, and being chosen to lead the ministry of defense means pushing reforms and transparency. It also signals “continuity and reliability” to Washington since Ahn is “not anti-alliance.”
“Rather, he’s a reform-minded moderate who may emphasize technological upgrades and alliance coordination without being overly deferential,” Kim said.
Lee’s recent victory raised uncertainties over the continuity of South Korea’s security and defense policies. Former President Yoon has taken a hardline stance against the North while Lee’s Democratic Party pushed for peaceful unification talks. As a lawmaker, Lee lamented the breakdown of negotiations with North Korea, openly criticized security ties with the U.S. and Japan, and panned increases in cost-sharing agreements that sustained the U.S. Forces Korea footprint on the peninsula. Despite these, Lee will keep existing defense and security mechanisms, including the landmark Camp David trilateral summit talks and the nuclear-sharing pact with the U.S., Kim said.
“Initially, Lee will very likely pursue a status quo strategy since he needs to reassure South Korean conservatives,” Kim said. North Korea remains “antagonistic” even with Lee in office, he added.
This month, North Korea relaunched a 5,000-ton destroyer named Kang Kon, the first in a series of warships Pyongyang plans to build and deploy in the Pacific. The North also fired 10 rounds of rockets into the Yellow Sea last week after South Korea held air drills with the U.S. and Japan.
“Any major departures from Yoon-era security policy would be politically risky at this stage, especially without clear shifts in North Korea’s behavior,” Kim said.
This means Lee will keep the three-axis defense system, a comprehensive chain of counteroffensive military operations against a North Korean first strike. He is also expected to maintain real-time data sharing and missile defense coordination with the U.S. and Japan despite Seoul’s plans to renew economic ties with Beijing and revive peaceful unification talks, Kim said. While Lee will not attend the NATO Summit this week, he is expected to meet with President Donald Trump to discuss tariffs, a negotiation that may also include defense spending and the cost of keeping 28,000 American troops in the Korean peninsula. Washington has pushed allies to double defense spending to address threats from China, Russia and North Korea. South Korea already spends 2.7% of its GDP on defense — and the increase will be a fiscal burden, Kim said.
“Domestically, a leap to 5% would be politically contentious and fiscally difficult,” Kim said.
“The Lee administration may rhetorically align with the broader rationale — especially given the dual contingency threat from China and North Korea — but actual movement will be cautious.”
Washington is also reportedly reassessing defense cost-sharing agreements with South Korea, and Trump wants significant increases to Seoul’s contributions under the Special Measures Agreement. In 2024, Seoul and Washington sealed the deal for a new five-year term with payment on the first year amounting to $1.41bn (1.51trn won) beginning in 2026. Lee’s Democratic Party has voiced concerns over the South’s overdependence on the United States, including the presence of American troops there. Lee will likely follow this playbook and approach the negotiations with caution, Kim said.
The two countries could also open renegotiations, Kim said, but Seoul should handle it with deft, quiet diplomacy since it will likely negotiate to reduce costs or restructure payment terms.
“Although they haven’t publicly called for a formal revision of the most recent SMA, a change in administration could open the door to soft renegotiation — such as seeking more flexibility in implementation, redirecting funds toward mutually beneficial projects like joint AI or space-based capabilities, or slowing the pace of ROK [Republic of Korea]’s financial increases,” Kim said.
Seoul, however, should also reframe the agreement as a “joint strategic investment” rather than burden-sharing, and include defense exports, overseas deployments, and tech and infrastructure contributions in the negotiations, Kim said.
“The Lee administration should adopt a dual-track strategy: proactively demonstrate Seoul’s value as a high-capability security partner in the Indo-Pacific, while quietly negotiating terms that avoid abrupt shifts or public confrontation,” he said. (Source: Defense News)
23 Jun 25. Colombia: Kidnapping of military personnel underscores organised crime risks in Cauca department. On 21 and 22 June, the Colombian armed forces said 57 soldiers had been kidnapped in the Micay Canyon region near El Plateado (Cauca department). The military alleged that local civilians had conducted the kidnappings under pressure from the Estado Mayor Central (EMC)’s Carlos Patiño faction. The armed forces subsequently announced plans to deploy reinforcements to the area. The incident is similar to the kidnapping of 29 soldiers on 7 March, also in El Plateado, which the armed forces accused of being ordered by the Carlos Patiño faction. We assess that the Carlos Patiño faction likely coerced civilians into the act, sustaining elevated extortion and organised crime risks against local communities in El Plateado. Continued coercion will increase regional supply chain and kidnapping risks in the medium term. We assess that the deployment of reinforcements will likely increase the risk of violent clashes between the security forces and the EMC in the short term, heightening physical security and bystander safety risks in the vicinity of El Plateado. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jun 25. Russia: Returning foreign businesses will face significant regulatory framework, policy risks. On 20 June, Russia’s Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov announced that the authorities will closely monitor foreign businesses that attempt to re-enter the Russian market. Krasnov further warned that their return would be subject to conditions that prioritise the interests of Russian businesses. The official has led the asset seizure campaign, which was initiated after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. His statements align with previous statements made by Kremlin officials regarding the challenges foreign businesses will face in re-entering the Russian market, emphasising that the regulatory environment would systematically favour domestic businesses. For instance, foreign businesses would reportedly not be allowed to repurchase their Russian assets at the low prices for which they had previously sold them. Furthermore, we assess that companies seeking to regain control of their former franchises will likely be resisted or denied by new Russian owners. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jun 25. Belarus: Limited US sanctions relief is realistic possibility after release of opposition figure. On 21 June, the Belarusian authorities freed leading opposition figure Syarhey Tsikhanouski after more than five years in prison, alongside 13 other prisoners. His release coincided with a visit from US special envoy Keith Kellogg, who met Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka on 20 June. According to Lukashenka’s press secretary, they discussed a range of issues, including Western sanctions against Belarus. Tsikhanouski was arrested in 2020 when planning to run for president against Lukashenka that year; he was also convicted in 2021 of organising mass unrest and inciting social hatred. He was initially sentenced to 18 years in prison. Given Tsikhanouski’s prominence in Belarus’ opposition movement, Minsk highly likely released him with the hope of extracting sanctions relief (or other concessions) and beginning the process of resetting relations with the US. It remains a realistic possibility that the US will unilaterally relax certain sanctions against Belarusian individuals and entities in the near term. However, we assess that any easing of sanctions will most likely be limited and more symbolic in nature. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jun 25. Pakistan: Militant attack underscores elevated security risks in Balochistan. Earlier on 23 June, government officials stated that, during the past 24 hours, armed men attacked a Levies (provincial paramilitary) post and took personnel hostage after an exchange of fire in the Kirdgab area (Balochistan province). The attackers also set fire to the offices of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), as well as a judicial magistrate and an assistant commissioner. In addition, the attackers blocked the Quetta-Karachi highway in the Khadkocha area of Mastung district. Reportedly, attackers checked the identity cards of travellers in vehicles travelling in the Khadkocha and Kirdgab areas. While no militant group claimed responsibility, this comes amid increased militant activity targeting the security forces and various ethnic groups by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in recent months. We assess that BLA activity will highly likely continue in the coming weeks; there is a realistic possibility of BLA members residing in Iran crossing into Pakistan, elevating the likelihood of further militant activity in the province. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jun 25. Côte d’Ivoire: Likely confirmation of president’s candidacy will elevate unrest risks. On 22 June, President Alassane Ouattara said he will decide ‘in the coming days’ whether to stand in October’s presidential election; this comes after the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) party formally endorsed his candidacy during their party conference. Despite Ouattara’s apparent uncertainty, we continue to assess that he will highly likely confirm his candidacy amid a perceived lack of credible alternative candidates within the RHDP (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 June 2025). The confirmation of Ouattara’s candidacy will likely act as a flashpoint for protests by opposition activists, who will likely characterise it as an attempt to secure an unconstitutional fourth term. Unrest risks will likely be exacerbated by the recent pact between the two largest opposition parties, which will likely bolster efforts to mobilise supporters to participate in unified anti-government demonstrations. The largest protests will likely occur in opposition strongholds such as Abidjan (Abidjan district), Daloa (Sassandra-Marahoué district) and the capital Yamoussoukro, driving sporadic disruption to movement through central areas and temporary supply chain disruption. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jun 25. China-Taiwan: Taiwanese president’s speech will drive tensions; Chinese military drills are possible. On 22 June, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te stated that ‘of course Taiwan is a country’ during a speech in New Taipei City (New Taipei special municipality). This was the first in a series of ten speeches that Lai is scheduled to give under the slogan ‘unite the country’. Since taking office in May 2024, Lai has adopted a confrontational policy towards China and hardened official rhetoric regarding Taiwan’s status. Lai’s speech was also likely domestically focused, ahead of a vote on 26 July to recall 24 of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party’s lawmakers. While China is highly unlikely to attempt to militarily seize Taiwan in the medium term, it remains intent on deterring action and rhetoric by Taiwan (and the US) of which it disapproves. As such, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that Beijing will view Lai’s speeches as a pretext for military exercises similar to the ‘Strait Thunder–2025A’ drills in April. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jun 25. China-Taiwan: Chinese air, naval deployments in Taiwan Strait will drive regional tensions. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) detected 50 Chinese military aircraft and six vessels around the island during the 24-hour monitoring period between 0600hrs (local time) on 19 June and 0600hrs earlier on 20 June. This was the highest daily count of aircraft sorties since China’s live-fire exercises around Taiwan in April. It comes after China criticised the UK for deploying a warship through the Taiwan Strait on 18 June for the first time in four years. On 19 June, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te ordered increased monitoring and intelligence efforts, noting the presence of two Chinese aircraft carrier groups in the first and second island chains (a series of strategic island groupings in the Western Pacific). Over the coming months, China will almost certainly continue to increase its military presence and aircraft sorties in the Taiwan Strait to pressure the island’s authorities and deter military deployments by Taiwan’s partners. However, we assess that China is highly unlikely to initiate a conflict with Taiwan in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Jun 25. Rebuilding the SANDF – Why South Africa needs a strong defence force and how to achieve it. South Africa’s security and influence hinge on a capable National Defence Force, yet the SANDF’s collapse, as detailed in Part 1, leaves the nation vulnerable. A robust defence force is essential to protect sovereignty, secure 80% of trade through maritime routes, support domestic stability, lead African peacekeeping, and counter emerging threats like cyberattacks.
This article explores why South Africa needs a strong SANDF, the financial barriers to reform, and a practical plan to restore its capabilities. Drawing on open-source intelligence, it outlines urgent steps to rebuild a defence force that safeguards South Africa’s future, ensuring it can meet both current and evolving challenges.
Why South Africa Needs a Strong SANDF
South Africa’s strategic position demands a functional defence force. Its 2 798 km coastline and 1.5 m km² exclusive economic zone are vital for trade, contributing to a $405bn GDP. Without naval or air capabilities, these assets risk piracy, illegal fishing, and trafficking, threatening economic stability. For instance, a single piracy incident could disrupt shipping, costing industries ms and deterring investors. Sovereignty also requires secure borders and airspace, currently exposed with limited radar and jets, leaving South Africa vulnerable to smuggling or unauthorised incursions.
As a leader in the African Union and Southern African Development Community, South Africa must support regional stability, particularly in conflict zones like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A weakened SANDF undermines this role, reducing influence compared to powers like Nigeria or Ethiopia while leaving it vulnerable to destructive regional forces. Domestically, the SANDF supports police during crises, such as the 2021 riots, and aids disaster response, like flood relief. Emerging threats, including cyberattacks that could target critical infrastructure (for example the Transnet cyberattack of 2021) or climate-driven conflicts over resources like water, demand modern capabilities.
Without a strong SANDF, South Africa cannot deter threats, protect trade, or maintain its global standing in a multipolar world.
Financial Barriers to Reform
The SANDF’s 2025/26 budget of R55.94bn, up R400m, provides a mere 0.21% real-term increase, insufficient to address its crisis or fund reforms. With 68% (R38bn) allocated to salaries, only R17.94 bn remains for equipment, maintenance, and operations, far short of needs for aircraft repairs, radar restoration, or naval modernisation. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) deployments, costing R5 bn over three years (R1.8bn in 2025/26), further strain resources. Doubling the budget to R100-110bn, as some suggest, is unlikely with South Africa’s 1-2% GDP growth and competing priorities like health and education.
Reforms, estimated at R10-15 bn over five years for repairs and drones, exceed current discretionary funds. Without a VAT increase for 2025/26, alternative strategies are critical to bridge the gap:
Financial Accountability: Transparent budgeting with public audits, overseen by a parliamentary committee, can curb salary bloat and prioritise maritime security.
Merit-Based Appointments: Select leaders with military expertise, like the UK’s recruitment model, to improve asset prioritisation decisions.
Oversight: A defence oversight board, modelled on police accountability reforms, with civilian and military experts, can prevent mismanagement.
Minister with Military Knowledge: Appoint a minister with defence experience, as seen with cybersecurity-focused leaders, to align policies with operational needs.
Interdepartmental Cooperation: Share resources with Home Affairs (R13.9 bn budget) and Police (R120.8bn) for border security and domestic stability.
Non-Aligned Partnerships: Collaborate with the Southern African Development Community for training and cost-sharing, as discussed with the DRC. Engage non-aligned nations like India for affordable technology, preserving neutrality.
Streamlining personnel and leveraging partnerships can fund reforms within the R55.94bn budget, ensuring the SANDF meets its strategic roles.
Corrective Action Plan
To restore the SANDF’s ability to protect sovereignty, secure economic interests, support domestic stability, lead regionally, and counter future threats, a five-point plan is proposed:
1. Budget Reallocation
Shift 20-30% of the budget to equipment and maintenance within five years through voluntary retirements and hiring freezes, as R17.94bn non-salary funds are inadequate. Public-private partnerships, like those discussed at the 2025 PPPS for Defence and Security Conference, can fund radar and naval repairs, securing 80% of South Africa’s trade. These steps ensure economic stability and sovereignty.
2. Asset Modernisation
Repair aircraft and ships, targeting 50% operational capacity in three years to protect borders. Invest in cost-effective drones and modular radar for affordability. Phase out obsolete equipment for versatile platforms, safeguarding trade routes and airspace critical for economic security.
3. Deployment Reform
Prioritise high-impact DRC missions to restore regional leadership. Partner with the Southern African Development Community to share costs, reducing strain, as discussed with the DRC. Enhance training to improve pre-determined and measurable outcomes, aligning with South Africa’s African Union role and strengthening diplomatic influence and regional security.
4. Governance and Accountability
Form an independent oversight committee to align spending with goals like economic security. Publish annual readiness reports to build public trust. Hold leaders accountable for mismanagement, addressing demands for reform.
5. Long-Term Strategy
Develop a 10-year plan for cyber capabilities to counter emerging threats and climate-resilient systems for future conflicts. Launch a youth reserve programme to ensure sustainability for domestic and regional roles, preparing for evolving challenges.
These reforms, supported by accountability and partnerships, will rebuild a SANDF capable of securing South Africa and leading in Africa.
Call to Action
The SANDF’s collapse threatens South Africa’s sovereignty, economy, and influence. Reforms, backed by accountability, merit-based leadership, and strategic partnerships, can restore a defence force to secure trade, support stability, and counter threats like cyberattacks. Policymakers, citizens, and the defence community must act urgently to rebuild a resilient SANDF for South Africa’s future.
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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