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19 Jun 25. Congo (DRC)-Rwanda: Peace deal is unlikely to result in lasting ceasefire, sustaining security risks. On 18 June, technical teams from the Congolese and Rwandan governments announced they had agreed on a draft peace agreement following US-brokered talks. The agreement will be signed on 27 June and includes provisions that address territorial integrity, the ceasing of hostilities, the disarmament of non-state armed groups and the establishment of a joint security mechanism. The peace agreement follows several rounds of talks mediated by both the US and Qatar that will also lead to extensive US investment in critical mineral projects across the region. However, the peace agreement does not include the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels, who currently control substantial territory in North and South Kivu provinces (both DRC) and are actively engaged in conflict with several decentralised ethno-religious militias. Despite the agreement, we assess that both governments likely lack the capability or will to moderate the actions of these militias, rendering peace agreement violations highly likely. As such, critical security, bystander and sexual violence risks will be sustained in the short-to-medium term in eastern DRC. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jun 25. Türkiye KAAN fighter jet deal to accelerate Indonesia’s defense industrial growth, says GlobalData. Indonesia’s decision to acquire 48 KAAN fifth-generation fighter jets from Türkiye marks a major leap in its defense modernization and airpower ambitions. Signed during the Indo Defence Expo and Forum held in Jakarta in June 2025, the agreement includes technology transfer and domestic production collaboration, potentially transforming Indonesia’s aerospace ecosystem, says GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company. GlobalData’s latest Fleet Size dashboard reveals that Indonesia operates a diverse fleet of fixed-wing military aircraft, the majority of which are aging fourth-generation platforms. The induction of the KAAN stealth fighters is expected to significantly lower the average fleet age and enhance the Indonesian Air Force’s deterrence capabilities, particularly in the face of evolving fifth-generation aerial threats from adversarial forces in the Indo-Pacific region. As of June 2025, the countries with operational fifth-generation fighter aircraft include the US, China, and Russia. Meanwhile, India, South Korea, and Türkiye are pursuing their own stealth fighter programmes, with India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae, and Türkiye’s KAAN representing national aspirations to enter the elite fifth-generation club. Harpreet Sidhu, Aerospace and Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Indonesia’s KAAN acquisition demonstrates a strategic intent to leapfrog into fifth-generation capabilities while developing its indigenous defense industrial base. In addition to a set supply schedule, the agreement with Türkiye incorporates technology transfer and the use of Indonesian production lines, both of which are essential components of long-term self-reliance.” Indonesia is also parallelly engaging with South Korea in procuring another combat aircraft of a similar category, namely the KF-21 Boramae. Recently, Indonesia has reduced its financial and technical commitment to South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae program. Initially expected to fund 20% of the development cost (around $1.2 bn), Indonesia has now revised its remaining commitment to approximately $440 m, having so far invested $290 m. Though Indonesia still aims to acquire 50 KF-21 fighters, the decrease in funding signals a more limited involvement in the programme than originally planned.
Sidhu adds: “The concurrent signing of the KAAN agreement with Türkiye introduces new variables into Indonesia’s fighter jet roadmap. With a defense budget still under 1% of its GDP, it’s becoming harder to see how the country can realistically fund two major fighter programmes at once. This dual-track strategy could reshape Indonesia’s broader defense procurement and industrial participation ambitions.”
Sidhu concludes: “The KAAN program has the potential to become a competitive alternative to Chinese and American fifth-generation fighters in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) defense market if it is expanded and bolstered by efficient diplomacy and industrial cooperation. Over the next ten years, it is anticipated that the spread of stealth technology will reshape aerial combat doctrines, regional alliances, and defense supply networks as tensions continue throughout Asia and the rest of the world. Indonesia, by diversifying its fighter fleet and participating in multiple international programmes, positions itself as a key player in the region with formidable air power. However, its long-term influence will depend on consistent investment, clearer strategic alignment, and the ability to balance ambitions with budgetary realities.” (Source: GlobalData)
19 Jun 25. Defence and security are glaring omissions from Ramaphosa’s National Dialogue. Last week’s announcement of a “National Dialogue” and an eminent persons group to “champion” it by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, ostensibly to put the country back on track by “confronting its challenges”, excludes the wider defence and security sector. On defence, the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) faces a triple challenge – finance and personnel as well as ageing equipment. The country’s security and law enforcement entities – the SANDF, South African Police Service, and Border Management Authority – face a range of security issues from porous borders to crime and conflict. One who is doubtful about whether the “National Dialogue” will even see defence and security on the agenda is Helmoed Heitman. The long-time defence and military analyst with, among others, close involvement in the 2012 Defence Review and its updating three years later, told defenceWeb “no one in government cares about defence and, given how they have treated the police, I suppose no one cares about them either”. He sums up South Africa’s seventh administration and the second under Ramaphosa – this time around as a GNU (Government of National Unity), the country’s second since 1994 – as one which “clearly doesn’t care about the people in the first place”. The only name on the Ramaphosa eminent persons’ list with defence knowledge is Roelf Meyer. He did a two-year stint as defence minister starting in 1992, and was then Defence and Military Veterans Minister Lindiwe Sisulu’s choice to head up the 2012 Defence Review. His career is now centred around politics, negotiation and business. With no depth in defence and security among Ramaphosa’s eminent persons, Heitman took a wider look telling defenceWeb he sees only three people with business experience and none with small business experience – businesses that create employment.
“That,” he said, “is major weakness. A country sinks or swims on the back of its economy and our economy is on a downhill slide. Add to that youth unemployment is arguably the biggest security challenge we face. Similarly, is there anyone there who understands the realities of foreign trade and the trading partners our economy depends on – not Russia, Iran or Cuba, they are irrelevant and not China, with a negative trade balance and imports almost only raw materials from South Africa”.
The absence of policing experience, according to Heitman, “is a clear gap given the crime situation and the state of the police and that they are under-strength for the size of the country and its population”. Pulling these observations together he asks “who is there in the [eminent persons] group who understands international relations, geopolitics, geostrategy, et al?” In summary he has it the eminent persons are “all nice people who care about the country and I am equally sure none of them are stupid, but where is the expertise in critical areas? They are probably well chosen to address socio-economic and racial tensions – the problems created by government and weird parties on the far left fringe”. Overall, his lasting impression is the eminent persons group reminds him of what is called “a self-licking ice cream cone” – a self-perpetuating system that has no purpose other than to sustain itself. The National Dialogue will open with the first of two National Conventions on 15 August 2025. This will be followed by discussions across the country in various sectors and on issues that citizens feel deserve national attention. A second convention will be scheduled for some time next year. The conventions will address issues such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, crime, gender-based violence, and corruption.
“It is anticipated that the National Dialogue will drive progress towards our Vision 2030 and lay the foundation for the next phase of South Africa’s National Development Plan,” Ramaphosa said.
The president has assembled an Eminent Persons Group of 31 members to “guide and champion the National Dialogue”. It contains celebrities, sportspeople, religious leaders, artists, unionists, activists, retired politicians and officials, and businesspeople. Columnist Ivo Vegter wrote that if he were to assemble an Eminent Persons Group to address South Africa’s challenges, he would start with people who have spent their lives thinking about this sort of thing. “I’d invite the heads of a dozen think tanks; half a dozen economists, split evenly between working economists and academics; a few political scientists; several engineering-adjacent infrastructure specialists; an expert or two on local government and public administration; an organisational efficiency expert or auditor; and some retired judges, prosecutors, and advocates.”
Members of the Eminent Persons Group are:
- Dr Brigalia Bam, former Independent Electoral Commission Chairperson,
- Mr Robbie Brozin, entrepreneur and business person,
- Judge Edwin Cameron, former Constitutional Court judge,
- Mr Manne Dipico, former Northern Cape Premier,
- Dr Desiree Ellis, Banyana Banyana coach,
- Ms Ela Gandhi, peace activist,
- Prof Nomboniso Gasa, researcher and rural activist,
- Mr Bobby Godsell, business leader,
- Dr John Kani, actor,
- Mr Siya Kolisi, Springbok captain,
- Ms Mia le Roux, Miss South Africa 2024,
- His Grace Bishop Barnabas Lekganyane, leader of the Zion Christian Church,
- His Grace Bishop Engenas Lekganyane, leader of the St Engenas Zion Christian Church,
- The Most Reverend Thabo Makgoba, Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town,
- Prof Tinyiko Maluleke, Chairperson of the National Planning Commission,
- Dr Barbara Masekela, poet, educator and stalwart,
- Ms Lindiwe Mazibuko, former Member of Parliament,
- Mr Roelf Meyer, former Minister and constitutional negotiator,
- Ms Gcina Mhlope, storyteller, writer and actor,
- Ms Nompendulo Mkhatshwa, student activist and former Member of Parliament,
- Ms Kgothatso Montjane, Grand Slam tennis champion,
- Prof Harry Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, former activist and educationist,
- Mr Bheki Ntshalintshali, unionist and former COSATU General Secretary,
- Hosi Phylia Nwamitwa, traditional leader,
- Kgosi Thabo Seatlholo, chairperson of the National House of Traditional and Khoi-San Leaders,
- Dr Gloria Serobe, business leader,
- Dr Imtiaz Sooliman, founder of the Gift of the Givers,
- Prof Derrick Swartz, academic,
- Ms Lorato Trok, author and early literacy expert,
- Mr Sibusiso Vilane, mountaineer and adventurer,
- Mr Siyabulela Xuza, rocket scientist.
A Steering Committee, comprised of representatives of various sectors of society, will be established to set strategic priorities and coordinate implementation of the National Dialogue process. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
19 Jun 25. Budget constraints force SANDF to scale back ambitions. SA Army soldiers detached to the now terminated SADC mission in DR Congo. As South Africa’s security environment becomes increasingly complex and uncertain, the Department of Defence (DoD) finds itself on the defensive, not from external threats, but from within its own institutional, financial and operational limits. This week’s presentation of the re-tabled Strategic Plan (2025–2030) and Annual Performance Plan (APP) for 2025/26 to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) revealed the extent to which the military’s strategic ambitions have been curtailed by shrinking budgets, unresolved governance failings and declining combat readiness. While the Department insists its revised plans reflect a more honest and achievable posture, members of the Committee voiced serious concerns about what they see as a strategy of retreat, not reform. The most significant challenge confronting the DoD is an unsustainable and deteriorating funding model. The Department confirmed that it faces a R41.2 bn shortfall, with its estimated baseline requirement of R98.3 bn far exceeding the allocated R57.2 bn for the 2025/26 Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. The shortfall is not just a fiscal inconvenience, it is a strategic constraint that limits every operational, technological and human resource decision the SANDF makes. In response, the Department has redrafted its plans to focus only on “mission-critical” areas. Key priorities now include border safeguarding, limited force deployment for internal disaster and conflict response, and maintaining a rapid reaction capability for regional obligations. What has effectively been dropped, or indefinitely deferred, is large-scale force rejuvenation, comprehensive prime mission equipment modernisation, and sustained global military cooperation. Committee members were quick to point out that this financial retreat is being rebranded as strategic focus, masking what is essentially a downgrading of the Defence Force’s ability to deliver on its constitutional and regional mandates. Democratic Alliance (DA) member Maliyakhe Shelembe described the shift as budget-driven realism masquerading as reform. Another warned that continued underinvestment in defence risks eroding not just military capabilities, but also South Africa’s diplomatic and strategic credibility in a region increasingly shaped by transnational crime, climate disruption and foreign military influence. The Committee acknowledged that the DoD cannot operate outside the state’s broader fiscal policy, but pushed back on the notion that budget constraints absolve the Department of the need to clearly define trade-offs and defend core capabilities. Simply doing less with less, in their view, is not a sustainable national defence policy.
Audit Findings Prompt Governance Overhaul
Closely linked to the funding crisis is the Department’s persistent failure to meet basic standards of governance and financial control. The Auditor-General has repeatedly flagged serious deficiencies in asset management, contract compliance, unauthorised expenditure and internal audit processes, many of which have gone unresolved for multiple years. In response, the re-tabled APP includes revised performance indicators that are more specific, time-bound and purportedly easier to monitor. There is now direct reference to Audit Action Plans, consequence management mechanisms, internal audit reinforcement and risk-based performance oversight, all of which the Department claims will reduce audit repeat findings and restore credibility. However, the Committee was unconvinced that governance reform has taken root at an institutional level. MPs questioned whether the Department’s senior leadership had the will, or the internal culture, to implement genuine reform. One member noted that while structures such as audit committees and compliance units are now in place, the absence of disciplinary action, accountability for failed procurement projects and poor project execution continues to undermine public trust. The DoD has promised to address these concerns through what it calls combined assurance, a layered approach to governance involving internal auditors, external oversight and operational command structures. Whether this system can survive the entrenched bureaucracy, procurement inefficiencies and political inertia that have characterised the Department for over a decade remains an open question.
Strategic Alignment or Strategic Drift?
In both its Strategic Plan and APP, the DoD has gone to great lengths to demonstrate alignment with the Government of National Unity’s broader developmental agenda and the Medium-Term Development Plan for 2024 to 2029. The Department now presents its outcomes through the lens of state capability, inclusive economic growth, gender equity, transformation and service delivery.
On paper, this alignment with national policy priorities appears constructive. It reflects a willingness by the defence establishment to be part of whole-of-government solutions to South Africa’s socio-economic challenges. Yet, within the Committee, this shift raised alarms. Critics questioned whether the Department had sacrificed strategic clarity for political convenience. With the SANDF now more deeply embedded in support roles such as assisting South African Police Service (SAPS) operations, disaster relief, infrastructure protection and youth development, MPs voiced concern that the military’s primary function, to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity, is being diluted. There was also frustration that this alignment had come at the cost of long-term defence planning, doctrine development and international military cooperation. A defence force that is responsive to political priorities but neglects its own operational viability, they warned, risks becoming irrelevant, a symbolic entity with little ability to project force or deter threats. This critique is not without foundation. The Department itself admits in its own narrative that it is operating below baseline in several key areas, and is essentially managing a shrinking footprint. The worry, voiced repeatedly in the hearing, is that this alignment may not be a sign of strategic agility, but one of institutional drift, with the SANDF slowly being redefined as a domestic security utility rather than a national defence force.
Force Readiness and Capability
Nowhere is the impact of underfunding and strategic ambiguity more visible than in the SANDF’s current force posture. The revised Strategic Plan introduces a new concept, the interim force design, which effectively acknowledges that the existing Defence Force structure is unaffordable, unsustainable and partially obsolete. The plan outlines efforts to consolidate operational units, rotate mission-critical capabilities and delay or downscale equipment acquisitions. Border safeguarding, cyber defence and regional peacekeeping have been retained as operational imperatives, but even these are being scaled to fit financial ceilings rather than defence intelligence assessments. Committee members expressed deep concern over what they described as a managed decline of military capacity. Delays in replacing ageing prime mission equipment, such as armoured vehicles, surveillance systems and air platforms, were highlighted as especially dangerous in a rapidly evolving threat landscape. With airlift, maritime patrol and infantry deployment assets in varying states of disrepair, MPs questioned whether the SANDF could realistically fulfil even its scaled-back mandate. The SANDF’s combat readiness, force rotation capacity and logistical sustainability are all under pressure. Even with the introduction of the Journey to Greatness reform pathway and model unit pilot projects, there was a strong sense that these measures are too little, too late, and unlikely to arrest the broader decline in readiness.
Conditional Support from Parliament
Despite these deep concerns, the Portfolio Committee did not reject the re-tabled plans outright. Rather, it adopted a stance of conditional support, signalling that while the revised strategy may be a better reflection of current constraints, its success will be judged by tangible results and measurable delivery.
The Committee has placed the Department on a form of performance probation. It expects quarterly updates that address the following core areas:
- Progress in resolving repeat audit findings and achieving clean audit outcomes
- Implementation of consequence management and internal governance controls
- Demonstrable improvement in combat readiness and logistical capability
- Tangible outputs in digital transformation and ICT modernisation
- Execution of restructured force design with clear operational metrics
- Effective transformation outcomes that do not compromise force effectiveness
- Concrete industrial partnerships with Denel and SMMEs, supported by contracts and funding flows
The message from Parliament is clear. The time for abstract strategies and revised wording is over. What matters now is whether the Department of Defence can restore its credibility through delivery, not just alignment. The Committee will continue to exercise oversight with a sharper focus on results, warning that failure to show meaningful progress could lead to deeper intervention, including budget ring-fencing and external audits.
A National Defence Policy on the Edge
South Africa’s defence establishment finds itself at a turning point. Confronted with fiscal austerity, institutional underperformance and strategic drift, the re-tabled plans represent a last opportunity to stabilise a system under stress. While the Department has shown greater willingness to be transparent and adaptive, its ability to protect national interests, let alone rebuild core capabilities, remains in serious doubt. Unless the Department can convert its revised strategy into concrete results, the SANDF risks becoming a symbolic force, overstretched domestically and underprepared for external threats. The re-tabled plans may be more honest than their predecessors, but honesty alone will not be enough to secure South Africa’s sovereignty in a world where defence capability still matters. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
16 Jun 25. Sino/South African military co-operation to expand. The People’s Republic of China and South African national flags denote the recent top level military meeting between the two countries. Ahead of being part of the government contingent welcoming home SA soldiers returning from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Africa’s senior soldier, SA National Defence Force (SANDF) Chief, General Rudzani Maphwanya, was in China wearing his military diplomat hat. He met with Chinese Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun in Beijing on 10 June where, according to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) National Defence Ministry, under the strategic guidance of the heads of state of the two countries, co-operation between the two militaries in various fields has flourished in recent years, with a special bond forged through “the tests of the international situation”. Dong is reported as saying: “China is willing to work with South Africa to practice the true multilateralism and jointly oppose the hegemony, bullying, power politics, and division and confrontation.” He added both countries should enhance exchanges, strengthen strategic communication, optimise cooperation mechanisms, expand pragmatic co-operation and promote deeper, wider military-to-military relations to contribute to building a high-level community with a shared future for China and South Africa. Responding, Maphwanya is reported as saying: “South Africa highly values its relations with China and firmly adheres to the one-China principle. The militaries of South Africa and China enjoy long-term friendship and are sincere friends and partners.” Maphwanya added that South Africa is willing to work with China to strengthen practical cooperation in such fields as joint exercises and training, military education, personnel training, and maritime security, and continuously improve the level of military cooperation. Maphwanya’s visit to China was for the tenth meeting of the China-South Africa Defence Committee – Maphwanya has undertaken other visits to China for Committee meetings. South Africa in November/December last year hosted the ninth edition. The first meeting of the China–South Africa Defence Committee, a forum created in 2000 with the Pretoria Declaration, was held in April 2003. Only a year later a formal agreement was signed allowing for the training of South African soldiers and a donation of electronic equipment to the South African National Defence Force, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) reported. The SANDF enjoys close ties with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), notably hosting Exercise Mosi II with the PLA Navy and Russian Navy in February 2023. China’s military ties with South Africa go back many decades, as China supported the African National Congress in its fight against apartheid, with the first batch of six uMkhonto weSizwe fighters being sent for military training in China in November 1961. As a consequence of this support during the liberation era, South Africa recognized the People’s Republic of China in January 1998 with the ending of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, it is only in recent years that South African-China defence cooperation has notably increased. In June 2014, for example, three vessels comprising the 16th Escort Task Group of the Chinese PLA Navy visited Cape Town and subsequently numerous naval task groups have made a stop in the Cape. This culminated in the first multinational maritime exercise (known in South Africa as Exercise Mosi) between China, Russia and South Africa in November 2019. In August 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy hospital ship Peace Ark visited Cape Town, where it treated thousands of people. During the visit, the Peace Ark provided medical services for 3 700 visitors and successfully performed surgeries such as uterine fibroid removal and cataract restoration. During the Covid-19 pandemic, China provided personal protective equipment, vaccines and other essential items to South Africa and other African countries. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
17 Jun 25. Boost to UK defence and trade as Carrier Strike Group arrives in the Indo-Pacific. Port visits to Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, and Republic of Korea will boost UK trade and defence cooperation. UK security and growth has received a boost as the UK-led international Carrier Strike Group (CSG25) began operations in the Indo-Pacific. Led by the aircraft carrier, HMS Prince of Wales, CSG25 has undertaken a joint exercise with the Indian Navy, deepening the UK’s defence relationship with a key strategic partner ahead of a port visit to India later this year. The deployment, known as Operation Highmast, includes ships from Canada, Norway and Spain, and has now been joined by a New Zealand Frigate, HMNZS Te Kaha, after entering the Indian Ocean, having passed through the Red Sea. The task group, which left the UK in April, previously completed exercises in the Mediterranean. With two F-35B squadrons embarked, the RAF and Royal Navy are set to redefine the landscape of naval air power, in a move to warfighting readiness in support of NATO, while reinforcing Britain’s commitment to security in the Indo-Pacific region. Port visits to Singapore, Indonesia, Japan and the Republic of Korea will showcase British defence capabilities through trade demonstrations and fairs, directly supporting the Government’s Plan for Change through economic growth. A port visit to Darwin, Australia, provides an opportunity to further develop the AUKUS partnership between Australia, the UK and the United States. The Carrier Strike Group will also host the prestigious Pacific Future Forum in Japan, bringing together defence, security and technology leaders from across the region to discuss shared challenges. The deployment follows the Prime Minister’s historic commitment to increase defence spending to 2.6% of GDP, demonstrating the Government’s commitment to keep the UK secure at home and strong abroad. Keeping the country safe is the Government’s first priority and is the foundation of its Plan for Change. The strength, capability and global reach of the Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force, demonstrated through Operation Highmast, is critical to the security and stability of the UK, supporting the delivery of the Government’s five missions. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
16 Jun 25. Nuclear arms race to intensify amid control crisis, says SIPRI. Russia and the US collectively hold approximately 90% of the world’s nuclear arsenal. Global nuclear weapon stockpiles are expanding and being modernised, indicating the onset of a “dangerous” arms race coinciding with a decline in arms control measures, says the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In the 56th edition of the ‘SIPRI Yearbook 2025’, the think tank said that the nine nuclear-armed nations namely, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the UK and the US had persisted in upgrading their nuclear capabilities in 2024. Some of these nations also deployed new weapon systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads in the year. The estimated global inventory of nuclear warheads stood at 12,241 in January 2025. Of these, about 9,614 were considered active military stockpiles ready for potential use, which is an increase from the previous year by approximately 29 warheads. An estimated 3,912 of these warheads were deployed with operational missile and aircraft systems, mirroring the numbers from January 2024. The rest were stored centrally. The yearbook notes that close to 2,100 of the deployed warheads were on high alert status on ballistic missiles, which are predominantly owned by Russia or the US. A smaller number of high-alert warheads are believed to be maintained by France, the UK, and potentially China. SIPRI has assessed that China’s nuclear arsenal now comprises at least 600 warheads. SIPRI Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) associate senior fellow Hans Kristensen said: “The era of reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in the world, which had lasted since the end of the cold war, is coming to an end.
“Instead, we see a clear trend of growing nuclear arsenals, sharpened nuclear rhetoric and the abandonment of arms control agreements.”
The global count of nuclear warheads is on a downward trend, but this reduction is solely attributable to Russia and the US decommissioning their obsolete warheads, according to the yearbook.
“It seems likely that the rate at which retired warheads are dismantled may soon be outpaced by the rate at which new warheads enter global stockpiles each year” says a statement in the yearbook.
In the introduction to the yearbook, SIPRI director Dan Smith highlights the difficulties surrounding nuclear arms control and cautions against the potential for a new nuclear arms race. Smith also warned about this emerging arms race. The yearbook also notes renewed discussions within regions such as East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East on nuclear policies and capabilities, which could indicate a possibility for additional countries to pursue their own nuclear weapons programmes. In claims repeated by both Belarus and Russia during 2024, Russia allegedly stationed nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil. Several European Nato members have expressed readiness to host US nuclear weapons within their territories. Additionally, French President Emmanuel Macron reiterated his stance that France’s nuclear deterrent should encompass a ‘European dimension.’ Beyond its comprehensive examination of nuclear disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation, the SIPRI yearbook provides extensive data and insights into global military spending, international arms transfers, weapons manufacturing, multilateral peacekeeping operations, armed conflict dynamics, cybersecurity threats, space security governance, and other relevant topics. A study from SIPRI released in December 2024 revealed sales of arms and military services by the world’s 100 largest companies reached $632bn in 2023, driven by wars, conflicts and rising tensions. (Source: army-technology.com)
16 Jun 25. Pakistan-Iran: Pakistan orders border closures amid Iran-Israel war, will likely not pursue involvement. On 15 June, the Balochistan provincial government ordered the indefinite closure of borders and crossing points with Iran due to the deteriorating security situation. The decision follows a spike in tensions between Israel and Iran (see Sibylline Alert – 15 June 2025). The closures will likely undermine food and energy security in border districts if the restrictions persist, given their reliance on fresh food supplies and smuggled oil from Iran; prices are already reportedly increasing. Pakistan is also co-ordinating the evacuation of its nationals residing in Iran. Despite Islamabad’s public condemnation of Israel’s attacks on Iran, it is unlikely to pursue direct military involvement. Pakistan’s defence minister emphasised that the country’s nuclear weapons are for self-defence only. Instead, we assess that Pakistan will likely focus on preventing potential spillover impacts on Pakistan. This stance reflects its at-times strained relationship with Iran and continued security ties with the US. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Jun 25. US Senate blocks move to halt $3bn military sales to Qatar, UAE. The joint resolutions of disapproval for the arms deals were introduced last month. The US Senate has rejected proposals aimed at stopping foreign military sales exceeding $3bn to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The joint resolutions of disapproval were introduced in May 2025 by Connecticut democratic senator Chris Murphy, a lead sponsor of the resolutions, along with others. The senators, who called for the vote, challenged the deals and perceived them as a misuse of US foreign policy by President Donald Trump. Proposals to obstruct a $1.9bn transaction of armed drones and related equipment to Qatar was dismissed with a 56-39 vote. The Qatar sale included eight MQ–9B remotely piloted aircraft (RPA); 200 KMU–572 joint direct attack munition (JDAM) tail kits for guided bomb unit (GBU)–38 or Laser JDAM GBU–54; 110 AGM–114R2 Hellfire II missiles; 300 BLU–111 500-lb general purpose bombs; 100 MXU–650 air foil groups (AFG) for Paveway II GBU–12, eight M36E9 Hellfire captive air training missiles (CATM) and more. Similarly, the Senate rejected an attempt to impede a $1.6bn sale of helicopters and other materials to the UAE by the same 56 to 39 vote. The UAE sale package included six CH–47F Block II Chinook helicopters with air-to-air refuel probe capability and extended range fuel tanks; 16 T–55–GA–714A engines; 14 embedded global positioning system (GPS)/ inertial navigation system (INS); eight AN/AAR–57 common missile warning systems (CMWS); 20 AN/ARC–231A communications security (COMSEC) radios; 20 M–240 machine guns and more. Prior to voting, Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii) said: “I’m glad to join my colleagues in introducing these resolutions to block arms sales to countries blatantly bribing Trump and making clear that our national security is not for sale.” Senator Jeanne Shaheen, who is a senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, voted in favour of the resolution. Shaheen said: “Our partnerships are key to advancing US interests and must remain free from corruption and abuse.” (Source: airforce-technology.com)
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