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12 Jun 25. Pakistan announces defence budget increase. Pakistan has announced a defence budget of PKR2.55trn (USD9bn) for 2025–26. According to documents released by the country’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) on 10 June, the new allocation is a 17% increase compared with the revised defence budget in 2024–25 and a 20% rise against the original allocation in that year. The 2025–26 defence budget includes PKR704.4 billion for operating expenses for the Pakistan Armed Forces, a 29% increase over the revised allocation for 2024–25. This hike reflects Pakistan’s growing tensions with India following their three-day border conflict in May. Other key appropriations in the new defence budget include PKR846bn for employee-related expenses, which is an increase of 2% over the revised expenditure; PKR663 billion for physical assets, a 20% increase; and PKR336.5bn for civil works, a rise of 30%. A separate pensions appropriation in the federal budget also provides PKR742bn for the military. Another separate allocation is the Armed Forces Development Programme (AFDP), which is thought to augment military procurement. News reports in Pakistan said the AFDP would receive PKR300bn in 2025–26. In addition, Pakistan’s state-run defence industrial enterprises receive PKR1.7bn in the 2025–26 federal budget. The money supports the continued development of Pakistan’s naval shipbuilding facilities, including those operated by Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW). (Source: Janes)
10 Jun 25. Sudan: Rising levels of conflict will increase likelihood of further strikes on Port Sudan. On 9 June, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conducted drone strikes on El Obeid, the regional capital of North Kordofan state; meanwhile, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) shelled RSF formations in Babanusa (West Kordofan state). Following the recapture of the capital Khartoum in March, the SAF has launched a southern offensive towards RSF strongholds in the Darfur region, driving a substantial escalation in conflict in the adjoining Kordofan region. This offensive is being heavily resisted, with both the RSF and SAF trading positions and control over population centres in recent weeks, increasing civilian exposure to conflict. It is increasingly likely that the RSF will suffer further losses in the coming weeks. Reports have emerged outlining mounting internal tensions with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), currently supporting RSF forces in the Kordofan region. If the SPLM-N withdraws support, the risk of further SAF advances towards Darfur will increase. We assess that this will likely prompt the RSF to attempt further drone strikes on Port Sudan (Red Sea state) to disrupt SAF supply lines and operational planning, substantially elevating threats to NGOs utilising this key logistics hub. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Jun 25. Ecuador: Reform will decrease scrutiny of security forces, elevating police lethality risks. On 7 June, the National Assembly passed a security reform backed by the recently re-elected President Daniel Noboa. The ‘National Solidarity Law’ passed with 84 votes of 151. The reform will grant the security forces enhanced powers and resources to combat armed organised crime groups (OCGs) and crack down on OCG financing. Furthermore, the reform will allow Noboa to grant presidential pardons to security force members for their actions during operations. The reform also increases prison sentences for OCG-related crimes, including fuel theft. Since January 2024, Noboa has consistently used states of emergency and decrees to empower the security forces. In the immediate term, OCGs will likely increase their rate of attacks targeting the security forces in retaliation to the National Solidarity Law, elevating physical security risks. In the longer term, we assess the pardons for security personnel who use excessive force during operations will possibly increase the lethality of the police, driving bystander safety risks in the vicinity of security deployments. Additionally, diminishing scrutiny of the security forces will possibly increase arbitrary detention and therefore human rights risks. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Jun 25. Spain: Protests over military spending point to fragile government stability. On 8 June, Spain’s main opposition party, the centre-right Popular Party (PP), led a large demonstration in the capital Madrid against Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s left-wing government. The PP’s leader, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, demanded new elections, accusing Sánchez’s administration of corruption. The PP claimed that 100,000 attendees gathered in and around Plaza de España; official estimates put the turnout closer to approximately 50,000. This marked the sixth anti-government protest organised by the PP since 2023, and the second-largest in terms of participation, highlighting the persistent political pressure facing Sánchez’s minority government. Government stability risks were more acutely highlighted during a smaller protest in Madrid on 7 June, when roughly 1,000 demonstrators from left-wing parties – such as Podemos, Izquierda Unida (IU) and Sumar – rallied against Sánchez’s plans to increase military spending by EUR 10.5bn (USD 12bn) to reach NATO’s target of 2% of GDP. We assess that tensions between Sanchez’s Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and its coalition partner Sumar will likely increase ahead of the NATO summit in The Hague (Netherlands) on 24-25 June. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Jun 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Troop withdrawals, bilateral dialogue highlight easing armed conflict risks. On 8 June, Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra announced that Cambodia and Thailand had agreed to adjust both countries’ military postures in conflict-prone areas along their shared border. Bilateral tensions escalated after a skirmish in an undemarcated border zone on 28 May, which resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier. Over the weekend, Bangkok reduced operating hours at checkpoints along the border with Cambodia, including one of the busiest (located in Sa Kaeo province). This will possibly marginally reduce trade flows in the immediate term. Both sides have since returned their troops to the positions agreed in 2024. They will hold further talks on 14 June through the Joint Border Mechanism (JBM) to ease bilateral tensions. These steps highlight that neither side currently seeks to escalate the dispute. However, we assess that the longstanding nature of the dispute means that further flare-ups in military tensions and trade restrictions remain possible over the coming years. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Jun 25. Wagner Group Declares Mission Complete, Withdraws from Mali After 3.5 Years. Russia’s Wagner Group has formally announced its withdrawal from Mali, concluding a controversial three-and-a-half-year military campaign in the West African nation. The mercenary organization declared its mission accomplished and said its fighters were returning to Russia. In a statement posted Friday to its official Telegram channel, Wagner said it had operated “side by side with the people of Mali against terrorism,” claiming responsibility for eliminating “thousands of militants and their commanders” and restoring government control over all regional capitals.
“We helped local patriots build a strong and disciplined army capable of defending their homeland,” the group wrote. “All regional capitals have returned under the control of the legitimate government. Mission accomplished. Wagner PMC returns home.”
Wagner’s deployment in Mali began shortly after the military junta, which seized power through two coups in 2020 and 2021, expelled French and United Nations forces who had spent a decade combating Islamist insurgents. Seeking new partners, the junta turned to Russia, which supplied weapons, training, and Wagner contractors to fill the security vacuum.
The group’s exit comes amid ongoing insecurity in Mali and follows a deadly ambush last year in which Tuareg rebels reportedly destroyed a Wagner convoy near Tinzaouaten, close to the Algerian border. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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