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22 May 25. North Korea: Missile tests underscore trend of regular launches, do not signal major armed conflict. Earlier on 22 May, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced that North Korea had fired several cruise missiles into the Sea of Japan at around 0900hrs (local time). The missiles were reportedly launched from the Sondok area of South Hamgyong province (North Korea), though further details, such as the number of missiles launched, were not released. The development comes a day after the failed North Korean launch of a new 5,000-ton naval destroyer, which was reportedly damaged in the incident. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un publicly acknowledged the ‘serious accident’, calling it a ‘criminal act caused by absolute carelessness’. The following missile launches are possibly an attempt to project confidence in their military capabilities following the accident. Regular missile testing will highly likely continue, with multiple short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) launched into the Sea of Japan on 8 May. However, we continue to assess that Pyongyang likely does not currently intend to initiate a major armed conflict. (Source: Sibylline)
22 May 25. SANDF budget increases by R1.2bn for SAMIDRC withdrawal. The re-tabled 2025 budget vote, delivered by Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana on Wednesday 21 May, has seen the Department of Defence (DoD) allocated an additional R1.2bn for the withdrawal of soldiers from the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC). The revised 2025/26 defence budget now stands at R57.1bn, versus R55.9bn in February’s draft budget. Long-term spending plans have changed as well, with a reduction to take into account money not being spent on SAMIDRC. The new budget allocates defence R56bn in 2026/27 (R58.5bn in the old budget) and R59.1bn for 2027/28 (R60.6bn in the old budget). In February, Godongwana said over the three-year medium term, R5bn was allocated to the Department of Defence to support South Africa’s participation in SAMIDRC and to supplement existing peace keeping activities, but these spending plans changed following the 13 March termination of the mission following the deaths of over a dozen SADC soldiers in fighting around Goma and Sake. In his budget speech on Wednesday, Godongwana announced “reconfiguring funding for the troop deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is in light of the announcement of South Africa’s phased withdrawal from the East African country. In this regard, the R5bn we had proposed to allocate to the Department of Defence for its participation in the SADC mission in the DRC is reduced.” The subsequently reduced amount “will cover the immediate costs of an orderly and safe withdrawal of our troops and mission equipment.”
There are slight changes to SANDF spending. For example, R113bn of the R173bn defence budget over the next three years will go to the compensation of employees (65%), versus R115 bn of R175bn for the February budget. And instead of cutting 4 000 personnel through early retirement to save money, the DoD now plans to exit at least 2 200 eligible members over the next two years. Defence expert Dean Wingrin noted that the defence budget is approximately 0.78% of GDP and that the real increase in defence funding after inflation, from 2024/25 to 2025/26, is only 0.21%, meaning the budget is flat in real terms. Military inflation is even more.
“This limited real growth constrains the SANDF’s ability to even maintain capabilities, never mind expand,” he stated. “It also highlights the ongoing squeeze between strategic commitments and fiscal realities, suggesting that any significant new operational demands would require either reprioritisation or additional allocations outside the current framework.”
According to Wingrin, the revised budget also shows sharp cuts to Force Employment allocations for 2026/27 and 2027/28, as a result of future drawdowns in operations (SADC and UN missions in the DRC). The SANDF, meanwhile, continues to shoulder significant strategic responsibilities, including border protection (of over 4 471 km of South Africa’s border); support to the South African Police Service (elections, power stations, illegal miners, etc.); and regional peacekeeping (UN in the DRC). “Thus, a real mismatch between mandate and means,” Wingrin said.
The flat budget cannot offset rising costs in logistics, fuel, tech, etc. Unavoidable costs can only be addressed through mid-year adjustments or reallocation from other programmes, he warned. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
22 May 25. UK secures future of vital Diego Garcia Military Base to protect national security. The long-term agreement secures future of joint UK-US military base at Diego Garcia.
- Long-term agreement secures future of joint UK-US military base at Diego Garcia
- Vital capabilities protected to counter growing global threats, keeping us secure at home and strong abroad
- Deal is backed by strong support from the US and key international allies
The UK has today (22 May) signed a landmark agreement with Mauritius to secure the future of the strategically critical UK-US military base on Diego Garcia, one of our most significant contributions to the transatlantic defence and security partnership. The base has played a vital role in defending the UK and its allies for over 50 years. This new deal ensures its continued operation for at least the next century, protecting capabilities essential to UK intelligence and counter-terrorism. The base plays a key role in operations that support UK forces and our allies across the Middle East, East Africa and South Asia. Its deep-water port, airfield, and advanced communications and surveillance capabilities give the UK and its allies crucial strategic capabilities, which have played a key role in missions to disrupt high-value terrorists, including Islamic State threats to the UK. The legal necessity of this deal has been recognised by successive governments. The previous government started these negotiations over two years ago, and they held 11 out of the 13 rounds of talks that underpin the deal, that this government has concluded. Crucially, all Five Eyes partners – the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand – back the agreement, along with India, recognising the critical role Diego Garcia plays in upholding global stability and deterring adversaries. The base is a cornerstone of the Government’s Plan for Change, with operations there deterring threats to our nation and protecting our economic security.
Defence Secretary, John Healey MP said: “As the world becomes more dangerous, our military base on Diego Garcia becomes more important. Today’s Treaty secures full operational control, strengthens our UK-US defence partnership and keeps British people safe at home for the next 99 years and beyond. Without this base, our ability to deter terrorists, defend our interests and protect our troops around the world would be at risk. This agreement will safeguard our national and economic security for generations to come. Critically, the deal ensures the UK retains full operational control of Diego Garcia, including management of the electromagnetic spectrum satellite used for communications – vital for countering hostile interference.”
There will also be robust provisions to keep adversaries out, including:
- A 24 nautical mile buffer zone where nothing can be built or placed without UK consent – meaning we can protect UK interests.
- A rigorous process, including joint decision-making, to prevent any activities on the wider islands – some over 100 nautical miles away – from disrupting base operations. Joint decision-making means there can be no development unless we agree.
- A strict ban on foreign security forces on the outer islands, whether civilian or military.
- A binding obligation to ensure the base is never undermined.
Both countries have also agreed to a ban on the presence of foreign forces across the wider territory and a binding guarantee that base operations cannot be undermined. Without this deal, international legal proceedings could have rendered the base inoperable, affecting UK national security in the process with our adversaries being allowed to capitalise on this – building outposts near the base. Within a matter of weeks, with no deal, the UK could face legally-binding provisional measures through an Arbitral Tribunal under the Law of the Sea Convention – affecting the ability of the Armed Forces to patrol the waters around the base.
Foreign Secretary David Lammy MP said: “This treaty secures the Diego Garcia military base for generations to come, protecting national and global security. Without this deal, the land, sea and air operations of the base would become inoperable – doing nothing was not an option. The US, Australia, Canada and India all back this deal because they understand its importance for global security. This government has always been clear that we will act in the national interest, not gamble with our national security like those who oppose this deal. It was clear that this agreement was the only route to securing the future of the base and preventing the UK’s adversaries from establishing a presence in the region. It is a clear demonstration of the UK’s commitment to act decisively in defence of its interests and ensure that the base continues to support operations that keep British citizens safe, now and in the decades to come.”
- The cost per year is £101m and the net present value of payments under the treaty is £3.4bn. All costs have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department.
- Further details will be laid out in Parliament.
Diego Garcia Capabilities
Diego Garcia is the largest island of the Chagos Archipelago, located in the central Indian Ocean. The joint UK-US military base on Diego Garcia has a strategic location which makes it vital to UK and US power projection in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The base provides a unique shared platform with irreplaceable security capabilities that enable a UK and US military presence across the Middle East, Indo-Pacific and Africa. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
22 May 25. North Korea said its new 5000-ton destroyer was partially ‘crushed’ at launch due to a mishap as Kim Jong Un watched.
- A new North Korean naval destroyer had part of its hull smashed after a disastrous launch.
- State media wrote that the ship’s stern slid off a ramp too early, causing the vessel to become stuck.
- Kim Jong Un, who watched, slammed the mishap as a “criminal act” and censured the officials involved.
A new North Korean naval destroyer was badly damaged during a botched shipyard launch that caused part of its hull to be “crushed,” Pyongyang state media reported.
The Korean Central News Agency reported on Thursday morning local time that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was attending the ceremony at the Chongjin Shipyard when the “serious accident” occurred.
Blaming “inexperienced command and operational carelessness,” KCNA wrote that the stern of the 5000-ton ship started sliding down a ramp too early and that a flatcar meant to support its weight didn’t move with the vessel.
This report said this caused the ship to lose balance, leaving “some sections of the warship’s bottom crushed” while the rest of the ship was stuck.
Per KCNA, Kim blasted the disastrous launch, saying it was “out of the bounds of possibility and could not be tolerated.”
He also called the launch a “serious accident and criminal act caused by absolute carelessness, irresponsibility, and unscientific empiricism,” state media wrote.
It reported that Kim censured the officials responsible for the ship and its launch, including the country’s munitions department and ship designers, and said their mistakes would be “dealt with” at a party meeting next month.
The North Korean leader was further cited as saying that the mishap “brought the dignity and self-respect of our state to a collapse in a moment.”
The failed launch is a blow to Kim’s military agenda, given his emphasis over the last two years on building up North Korea’s maritime forces.
“A new historic time is coming before our naval forces,” Kim said during a 2023 speech, declaring North Korea would focus on capabilities for projecting naval power beyond its own waters.
The same year, Pyongyang launched a ballistic missile submarine, the Hero Kim Kun Ok, which is a redesigned Soviet model equipped to fire cruise missiles. Last month, North Korea launched the largest warship it had ever built, a 5000-ton “multipurpose” destroyer, which it said was a new class of armed vessel. That was at Nampo, a different shipyard. However, its tonnage could indicate that the vessel that failed to launch on Wednesday was in the same class. State media didn’t provide further details about the damaged ship at Chongjin. In March, North Korea said it was also building its first nuclear-powered submarine. (Source: News Now/https://uk.news.yahoo.com/)
21 May 25. India: Intensified security operations will further undermine Maoist militant capabilities. Earlier on 21 May, more than 26 Naxalites (Maoist militants) were killed in an encounter with the security forces in the remote Abujhmad area of Narayanpur district (Chhattisgarh state), according to Indian officials. Reportedly, Basava Raju, general secretary of the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist), was among those killed in the operation; this would likely prove a major setback for the group. The security forces have intensified the crackdown on Maoist militants in 2025, intending to eliminate Naxalism by 31 March 2026. In April, the security forces launched ‘Operation Blackforest’, a three-week-long operation in the Chhattisgarh-Telangana border area, which reportedly resulted in the deaths of 31 Naxalites. As a result of the continuous pressure, Naxalite activity has become increasingly limited to remote areas of affected districts. We assess that this trend, which will likely continue, will limit the Maoist threat and their ability to conduct significant attacks. (Source: Sibylline)
21 May 25. Pakistan: Explosion targeting school bus underscores ongoing militant threat, expansion of targets. Earlier on 21 May, a blast targeting a school bus killed five people (including three children) and injured dozens in Khuzdar (Balochistan province). While no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has been responsible for conducting militant activity in the province, often targeting security forces as well as Chinese investment and development infrastructure. However, Pakistan military’s media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), has blamed India, stating that the attack was ‘planned and orchestrated by the terrorist state of India and executed by its proxies in Balochistan.’ The attack follows heightened tensions with India, which resulted in missile strikes on each other’s territories in early May. It also comes amid elevated levels of militant activity in Balochistan. We assess that the attack targeting school children signals a potential expansion of targets, which will prompt intensified counter-terrorism operations by the security forces in the province in the coming weeks. Additionally, allegations of India’s involvement will also likely contribute to bilateral tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
21 May 25. Russia: Digital profiling, geolocation of foreigners will increase already elevated surveillance risks. On 20 May, the State Duma adopted a bill introducing geolocation tracking for foreigners entering the capital Moscow and the wider Moscow oblast. These rules will apply only to foreigners who do not require a visa to enter Russia, with exceptions for diplomats and their family members, citizens of Belarus and minors. Foreign nationals will be required to download a mobile application that automatically transmits their location data to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Failure to comply with this new requirement will result in their inclusion in a register of controlled persons, followed by potential expulsion from the country. The measures, which will come into effect on 1 September, also require foreigners to undergo fingerprinting and biometric photography as well as to disclose their place of residence. The measures likely primarily aim to monitor foreigners from Central Asia. While other foreigners who require a visa are currently only subject to digital profiling measures, there is a realistic possibility that geolocation tracking could be extended to them in future. We assess that the latest measures underscore the growing surveillance risks faced by foreigners in Russia. (Source: Sibylline)
21 May 25. Iran parliament approves strategic pact with Russia. Iran’s parliament approved a 20-year strategic partnership on Wednesday between Moscow and Tehran, state media reported. The agreement represents a deepening of bilateral ties including closer defence cooperation. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian signed the strategic partnership document on January 17. The Russian legislative branch approved the pact in April. While the agreement does not include a mutual defence clause, it says both countries will work together against common military threats, develop their military-technical cooperation, and take part in joint exercises. Since the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022, Iran and Russia have deepened military ties, with Western countries accusing Iran of providing missiles and drones for Russian attacks on Ukraine. Tehran denies providing weapons for Russian use in Ukraine. The strategic pact also includes several clauses aimed at boosting economic partnership, notably by strengthening direct interbank cooperation and promoting their national financial products. A free trade deal between Iran and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union went into effect last week, cutting down tariffs to boost trade between the two economies, which are both under heavy Western sanctions. (Source: Reuters)
21 May 25. South Korea spent $222bn on defense from 2021 to 2025, reveals GlobalData. The rising tensions with North Korea, coupled with China’s increasing assertiveness, have necessitated South Korea to bolster its military capabilities and readiness. These strategic enhancements include investments in advanced weapons systems, military preparedness, and fortification of cybersecurity infrastructure. In light of these developments, the country has allocated $222bn for the period from 2021 to 2025, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company. GlobalData’s latest report, “South Korea Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2025–30,” reveals that as part of its modernization drive, the country has undertaken significant acquisitions, including the KF-21 Boramae Multirole Aircraft, the K239 Chunmoo Multiple Rocket Launch System, and the K9 Self-Propelled Artillery Systems. Notably, all these military platforms are indigenously manufactured.
Akash Pratim Debbarma, Aerospace & Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Over the years, South Korea has successfully diminished its reliance on imports and enhanced the capabilities of its armed forces through the indigenous development of several advanced military systems. The country’s allocation of funds toward acquisition and research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) underscores its commitment to addressing the evolving security challenges within the region.”
The successful flight of the KF-21 prototype by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) in 2022 marks a significant stride toward self-reliance in combat aircraft production. While the induction of the KF-21 is slated for 2028, it is expected to considerably enhance South Korea’s aerial combat capabilities with advanced onboard avionics and near-stealth performance. Debbarma concludes: “As North Korea continues its nuclear-capable missile tests, South Korea remains steadfast in enhancing its deterrence strategies, bolstering its air, naval, and missile defense capabilities. However, South Korea is still mainly dependent on the 28,500 US troops to maintain a credible deterrence against potential hostilities from North Korea.
“With looming uncertainties about the continuance of its reliance on US support following Trump’s return to office, South Korea will likely redirect most of its defense budgets into indigenization efforts. While supporting its armed forces, South Korea will also try to achieve economy of scale to keep the cost down for its domestic defense systems by exporting them to its allies worldwide.
20 May 25. Azerbaijan: Proactive counter-terrorism posture will mitigate against international terrorism risks. On 19 May, Azerbaijan’s State Security Service (DTX) announced the detention of four Azerbaijani citizens on terrorism charges. The suspects were apprehended in Pakistan and transferred to Baku (Azerbaijan). They reportedly left Azerbaijan in 2024 to join terrorist groups operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. According to the DTX’s official statement, the individuals participated in combat exercises and received weapons training. Concurrently, underground shelters for militants were also discovered in northern Azerbaijan. In February, the Azerbaijani security forces neutralised eight members of a terrorist organisation in the north of the country (they also detained six others). While the DTX did not specify the affiliation of the four investigated suspects, we assess they are most likely part of an Islamist organisation. Islamist terrorist attacks remain rare in Azerbaijan. However, due to Baku’s historically close ties with Israel, Israeli assets have often been priority targets for Islamist terrorist groups. Nonetheless, the country’s proactive counter-terrorism posture is likely to continue mitigating against its exposure to international terrorism risks. (Source: Sibylline)
20 May 25. India-Pakistan: Long-term tensions will remain elevated despite ceasefire. Earlier on 20 May, Pakistani media reported that the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) from India and Pakistan are co-ordinating in order to pull back troops from positions at the Line of Control (LoC) and international border. They aim to return these troops to the positions they occupied before tensions spiked. This procedure will reportedly be carried out in a phased manner. According to unnamed officials, 30 May is the targeted completion date. The ceasefire has largely held since it was announced on 10 May; the latest development is likely to reduce the risk of violations further if it is successful. However, despite the ongoing military-to-military engagement and the continued observation of the ceasefire, tensions between India and Pakistan remain significantly elevated. Consequently, a resumption of hostilities is a realistic possibility in the long term; we assess that issues such as the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) and allegations of state-sponsored terrorism remain potential flashpoints. (Source: Sibylline)
20 May 25. South Sudan: Opposition factionalism will sustain elevated attack risks in Jonglei, Upper Nile states. On 19 May, 18 senior members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition (SPLM-IO) issued a statement disowning the leadership of Stephen Par Kuol and reaffirming their allegiance to the detained former leader, Riek Machar. The SPLM-IO remains highly divided following Machar’s arrest on 26 March, undermining its mobilisation capacity and ability to maintain a united offensive against the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF). This has also driven an elevated rate of defections by localised SPLM-IO units (more than 400 soldiers have reportedly defected in Western Equatoria state since March). While this dynamic will mitigate against the risk of a full-scale civil war, it likely also undermines the SPLM-IO’s ability to consolidate the opposition to negotiate a restoration of the 2018 peace agreement. As such, we assess that factionalism within the SPLM-IO will sustain attack and armed conflict risks in Nuer-dominated states (such as Jonglei and Upper Nile) in the coming weeks. The likely use of indiscriminate airstrikes by the SSPDF against residential areas will also compound threats to life and increase pressure on humanitarian resources therein. (Source: Sibylline)
20 May 25. Decisive action needed to save the SANDF from collapse. Saving the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from collapse requires bold, decisive action, including new leadership, a doubling of the defence budget, and improved soldier welfare, amongst others. This is according to the Economic Freedom Fighters’ (EFF’s) Carl Niehaus, who represents the EFF on the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD). Following a 15 May parliamentary debate on the Midterm Strategic Defence Review, tabled on 23 March 2023, Niehaus said the SANDF is “collapsing, threatening our sovereignty and safety.”
“The Strategic Review lays bare a SANDF crippled by corruption, maladministration, and a shocking lack of strategic vision. The two-year delay by Parliament in addressing this crisis reflects a shameful failure to prioritise defence. The review, grounded in the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 and 2015 Defence Reviews, shows progress in African representation — rising from 38% in 1994 to 76% today — but this achievement is undermined by systemic rot. A staggering 69% of the defence budget is consumed by salaries, far exceeding the 40% target, leaving equipment maintenance and acquisition starved. The Department of Defence’s unfunded organogram is a mockery of accountability, betraying our troops,” Niehaus said.
He called the absence of strategy a “travesty,” with the SANDF’s “Road to Greatness” document, intended for President Ramaphosa in October 2024, remaining secret.
“Our soldiers’ disastrous deployment in the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—ill-equipped and unsupported—proves the SANDF is incapable of executing foreign missions or ensuring troop safety in its current state. Overextension is killing the force. Beyond defending our borders, the SANDF is burdened with untrained roles like fighting crime, tackling illegal mining, and disaster response, draining resources and eroding readiness.”
According to Niehaus, the SANDF’s equipment crisis is a “national disgrace” with grounded aircraft and naval vessels going without midlife upgrades. “The Armscor Dockyard is in shambles, and Project Hoefyster for infantry vehicles is stalled, risking bns in wasteful expenditure. Training has collapsed—Air Force flying hours have plummeted with barely any operational planes. The state of 1 Military Hospital, a dysfunctional construction site for over 15 years, mired in legal disputes over corrupt tenders, is a deadly failure. On 14 April 2025, Warrant Officer M P Mncube was denied admission to 1 Military Hospital and tragically passed away. His death, and the loss of heroic soldiers in the DRC, underscores the human cost of this crisis,” he said.
Niehaus called the defence budget, 0.76% of GDP, an “insult” compared to the global 2% norm. Force rejuvenation is stalled, he said, with the average soldier’s age now over 40.
“Without bold intervention, the SANDF will collapse, leaving South Africa defenceless,” the EFF representative stated, but suggested a number of solutions to turn the situation around. These include the removal of the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, her two deputies, the Chief of the SANDF, and senior command — to be replaced by capable, accountable leaders.
Niehaus also called for an independent anti-corruption unit within the Department of Defence, reporting to Parliament, to ensure transparent procurement; and an increase in defence spending to 1.5% of GDP within five years, restoring the 40:30:30 budget ratio for salaries, operations, and capital investment.
Other suggestions are a national defence summit to revise the 2015 Defence Review and develop a 10-year modernisation plan; improved soldier welfare (better salaries, housing, and healthcare — and a Military Skills Development System aligned with equity targets) as well as increased training funds, multinational exercises with BRICS partners, and support for Denel to ensure self-reliance in defence manufacturing.
“We must act now to honour our soldiers and secure our future, or face consequences far worse than the disastrous DRC deployment. The hour is upon us — South Africa must rise with courage and do what is right,” Niehaus concluded. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
19 May 25. Somalia: Al-Shabaab attack underscores elevated attack risks in capital, southern regions. On 18 May, an al-Shabaab suicide bomb attack killed at least 20 people and injured 30 others at a Somali National Army (SNA) recruitment event at the Damanyo military base in the capital Mogadishu. The attack underscores the increasing momentum of a renewed al-Shabaab offensive in central and southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab now control key supply arteries such as the Mogadishu–Balcad road (Middle Shabelle region) and several Shabelle river crossings, disrupting key SNA supply lines and undercutting the SNA’s ability to defend Mogadishu from attacks. In addition, significant funding gaps and disagreements between stakeholders in the African Union mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), in addition to entrenched disputes between federal forces and regional authorities, continue to undercut SNA counter-offensive efforts. As such, we assess further al-Shabaab attacks on government officials and military sites in Mogadishu, and the Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions are likely in the coming weeks. Such attacks will likely include suicide bombers and vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attacks, significantly elevating bystander attacks therein. (Source: Sibylline)
19 May 25. Russia: Foiled terror plot underscores persistent online radicalisation risks. Earlier on 19 May, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that it had prevented a series of attacks targeting law enforcement personnel in Stavropol Krai (North Caucasus region), which were planned for the Victory Day parade on 9 May. The perpetrators were reportedly a group of minors recruited online by an unnamed international terrorist organisation. The suspects have been detained. A similar plot was reportedly foiled by the FSB in the neighbouring Republic of Dagestan (Russia) on 2 May, where the perpetrators were planning an attack against law enforcement personnel on Victory Day. Although Stavropol Krai is not predominantly Muslim, it borders several North Caucasian republics, such as Chechnya and Dagestan, which have historically experienced significant Islamist activity. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the international terrorist organisation was an Islamist group. We assess that the latest incident underscores the persistent risk of online recruitment by radical groups, including Islamist terrorist organisations; minors are particularly at risk of being targeted. (Source: Sibylline)
19 May 25. Congo (DRC)-Uganda: Possible Uganda-backed rebel attacks underscore threats to staff. On 18 May, the Congolese security forces (FARDC) announced it had re-gained control of the Nyamamba area (Ituri province) following four days of clashes with militants associated with the newly-formed Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR). The CPR is led by Thomas Lubanga, a convicted war criminal based in Uganda; he has been a member of several Ugandan-backed rebel groups since the Second Congo War. As such, there is a realistic possibility that CPR’s activity reflects Uganda’s indirect efforts to secure material and security interests in eastern DRC. In the coming weeks, CPR militants will highly likely conduct further small arms attacks in rural Ituri, particularly in the vicinity of Lake Albert (Ituri). Risks of ambush, looting and kidnap-for-ransom attacks targeting convoys during overland movement near Bunia (Ituri) will also remain elevated. Such attacks will increase security and bystander risks for locally engaged staff, particularly NGO personnel engaged in faith-based, medical and rural development projects. We assess that possible allegations regarding Ugandan support would likely increase regional tensions, though direct conflict between the DRC and Uganda remains highly unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
16 May 25. Guyana-Venezuela: Attacks against Guyanese Defence Force will increase risks of regional tensions. On 15 May, the Guyanese Defence Force (GDF) reported that plain-clothed armed assailants had attacked GDF patrols on three separate occasions in the preceding 24 hours. Each incident occurred in the disputed Essequibo region along the Venezuela-Guyana border. The attackers reportedly fired small arms at the GDF from the Venezuelan side of the Cuyuní River between the Eteringbang and Makapa areas (both Cuyuni-Mazaruni region); the GDF sustained no injuries. Venezuela claims sovereignty over Guyana’s Essequibo region; the regime frequently uses the dispute to rally domestic patriotic support ahead of key political junctures. The Guyanese authorities allege that the regime has orchestrated similar attacks in the past, most recently on 17 February. Sustained attacks along the Cuyuní River will increase bystander risks for the extractive sector in the medium-to-long term. Furthermore, the Venezuelan regime will likely claim that the incidents were GDF false-flag operations, increasing regional tensions. However, we assess that there is a remote possibility that Venezuela will launch a full-scale invasion to annex the Essequibo region in the coming 12 months, sustaining low armed conflict risks. (Source: Sibylline)
19 May 25. India extends $200m defence credit to Angola in push for African partnerships. Narendra Modi meets the President of Angola, Joao Lourenco at Hyderabad House, in New Delhi on 3 May. On 3 May, during a visit in New Delhi, Angolan president João Lourenço signed with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi a series of strategic agreements in the field of defence, energy, trade and cultural exchange. One of the most remarkable announcements was a $200m Indian defence credit line to modernize Angola’s Army. During a joint press statement following the meeting, the Indian Prime Minister said both leaders “have also discussed cooperation in repair, overhaul, and supply of defence platforms, as well as training support.” Such announcement is part of the Indian strategy to strengthen its ties with Africa. During the press conference, Modi underscored this rapprochement, declaring: “India and the African Union are pillars of the Global South. We stand united in representing the hopes and aspirations of developing countries.” For example, New Delhi has opened 17 new embassies on the continent over the last decade, and has increased its financial aid with $12bn worth of credit lines dedicated to cooperation projects.
From a military perspective, India conducted its first joint naval maritime exercise with African countries a month ago. Co-organized with Tanzania, the Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) gathered 10 countries neighbouring the Indian Ocean to work on interoperability and combat piracy. The $200m offered to Luanda should be a relief for the Angolan government, as several military industrialisation projects are delayed due to a lack of funding. Moreover, a deal with India for weapons is part of Angola’s strategy to reduce its dependency on Russian military equipment. Angola planned in 2019 to build Russian arms factories in its territory, but everything changed after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The southern African country now seeks new arms providers. To that extent, Angola joined the US Department of Defence’s State Partnership Programme in September 2024.
Lourenço’s visit happened as India and Angola celebrates the 40th birthday of their diplomatic relations. Economically speaking, the balance of trade is in favour of Luanda, New Delhi being its second trade partner (10% of Angola exports) after China, and its second largest oil importer. In 2023/2024, India exported $698m to Angola, and imported nearly $3.5bn, with oil accounting for 90% of this sum. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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