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15 May 25. India-Myanmar: Clashes with militants near border highlight elevated security risks in Manipur state. On 14 May, the Indian Army claimed that the Assam Rifles unit killed ten militants in a firefight in Chandel district (Manipur state) near the border with Myanmar. The encounter occurred after the security forces initiated an operation in the area based on intelligence. The operation is ongoing. The developments follow the arrest of ten members of alleged insurgent groups in Manipur last week. The state, which suffers from instability due to a spike in ethno-religious tensions, has experienced an influx of militant groups that previously fled to Myanmar in the past year. These groups are now better equipped after having obtained weapons used in Myanmar’s civil war. We assess this trend will drive security risks in areas near the border with Myanmar, along with incidents of extortion as militant groups attempt to raise funds. (Source: Sibylline)
15 May 25. Cambodia-China: Largest-ever joint drills highlight deepening military co-operation. On 14 May, Cambodia and China began their largest-ever joint military exercises, which are scheduled to run until 28 May. The drills form part of an annual joint exercise series, dubbed Golden Dragon, which was first held in 2016. This year’s exercises involve nearly 900 Chinese military personnel and more than 1,300 Cambodian soldiers, according to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF). The drills are taking place at the Ream Naval Base and the Cambodia-China Joint Logistics and Training Centre (Preah Sihanouk province, Cambodia). The Ream Naval Base, located on the Gulf of Thailand, has been renovated by China, which is also set to deliver two warships to Cambodia. Alongside growing military co-operation, China remains Cambodia’s largest investor and trading partner. In this context, the recent cuts to US development funding and the potential imposition of a 49% tariff on Cambodian exports are likely to undermine US influence in Cambodia, and to accelerate Phnom Penh’s strategic alignment with Beijing. (Source: Sibylline)
15 May 25. African military expenditure up slightly to $52bn in 2024 as global spending hits record. Military expenditure in Africa totalled $52.1bn in 2024, which was 3% more than in 2023 and 22% more than in 2015, according to new research from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which also found world military expenditure reached a record $2.7trn last year – the steepest year-on-year rise since at least the end of the Cold War. Giving a breakdown of African military expenditure in a new report released in April, SIPRI said that North African military spending reached $30.2 bn in 2024, up by 8.8% from 2023 and by 43% from 2015. Algeria and Morocco accounted for 90% of the subregional total. Fuelled by hydrocarbon revenues, Algeria’s spending went up by 12% to $21.8bn in 2024 and it remained Africa’s largest military spender. Algeria’s military budget accounted for the biggest share of all government expenditure (21%). After two consecutive annual decreases, Algeria’s rival Morocco increased its military spending by 2.6% in 2024, to $5.5bn. The increase was mainly due to rising personnel expenditure. Military expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa totalled $21.9bn in 2024, down by 3.2% from 2023 and by 13% from 2015. The overall drop in 2024 was primarily due to falling spending in South Africa, Nigeria and Ethiopia, which are among sub-Saharan Africa’s largest spenders. Military spending by South Africa, the biggest spender in the subregion, fell for the fourth consecutive year, to $2.8bn, which was 6.3% less than in 2023 and 25% less than in 2015. This reduction aligns with South Africa’s fiscal strategy to prioritise economic growth and social services over military spending, SIPRI said.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have been under military junta rule since coups in 2021, 2022 and 2023 respectively. Taken together, they allocated a total of $2.4bn to their militaries in 2024. All three have severed security cooperation with France and increased military spending substantially since the military takeovers. Mali’s military expenditure grew by 38% in the period 2020–24, Burkina Faso’s rose by 108% in 2021–24, and Niger’s went up by 56% in 2022–24. Chad also announced the end of military cooperation with France in 2024 and increased its military spending by 43% over the year, to $558 m. This raised its military burden by 0.9 percentage points—the largest year-on-year increase in burden in Africa—to 3.0% of GDP.
Global defence spending hits all-time high
SIPRI’s research showed a global increase in military expenditure over the last decade. While this trend concerns almost all regions of the world, it is particularly marked in the most powerful economies. In 2024, defence expenditures totalled $2.718 trillion, an increase of 9.4% year on year (37% since 2015). It is the highest year-on-year rise since the end of the Cold War. This amount represents $334 per person, and 2.5% of GDP, an increase from 2.3% in 2023. The five biggest spenders were the USA, China, Russia, Germany and India. The USA by itself represents 37% of the world’s total defence expenditure, while the top five accounts for 61% and the top 15 for 80%. The latter is also responsible for 79% of the year-on-year increase. For the second year in a row, military spending grew Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, Europe, and the Americas. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is by far the main spender (number seven worldwide), with $80.3bn spent last year. Generally speaking, tensions in the region have led to increased military spending. This is highlighted by Israel which spent $46.5bn in 2024, at its highest since the Six-Day War in 1967. The only exception is Iran, which saw its expenditure decrease by 10% year-on-year.
SIPRI explains “the year-on-year decrease was mainly due to the effects of persistently high inflation on Iranian spending, partly stemming from US economic sanctions on Iran, which have had an impact on oil exports, Iran’s main source of export revenue.”
In Asia and Oceania, military spending has increased every year since 1989. China, the region’s heavyweight (it accounts for half of the zone’s total spending) with its $314bn of expenditure (+7% year-on-year), has seen its military budget increase every year for the past 30 years, the longest such streak in the world. Taiwan, South Korea and Japan all increased their expenditures as well, amid tensions with Beijing and Pyongyang on the East China Sea and Korean Peninsula. Military spending in Europe is driven by the full scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia. It increased by 17% year-on-yar and by 87% between 2015 and 2024, to reach a level ($693 bn) higher than what it was at the end of the Cold War. The countries that are at risk of the Russian threat are also those which spend the most. For example Sweden, which joined NATO in 2024, increased its expenditure by 34%. Concerning Ukraine, the country spent $64.7bn on defence, accounting for 54% of Kyiv’s government spending. SIPRI points out that in 2024 “all Ukraine’s tax revenues were fully absorbed by its military spending, while all non-military socio-economic spending was funded by foreign aid.” However, the $64.7bn only represents 43% of what Russia is estimated to have spent ($149bn). The reason is that “SIPRI includes military aid in the spending estimate of the donor country and not the beneficiary country, which means that $60 bn is not included in the total for Ukraine. If it were included, Ukraine’s military spending would have totalled $125 bn in 2024, which would have made it the fourth biggest spender in the world.”
“The rapid spending increases among European NATO members were driven mainly by the ongoing Russian threat and concerns about possible US disengagement within the alliance,” said Jade Guiberteau Ricard, Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. “It is worth saying that boosting spending alone will not necessarily translate into significantly greater military capability or independence from the USA. Those are far more complex tasks.”
The USA and its $997bn worth of military expenditure unsurprisingly accounting for the near entirety of defence spending in the Americas. However, a focus on trends shows that “military spending in Central America and the Caribbean more than doubled between 2015 and 2024 (+111%).” This evolution is mainly due to Mexico (+39% in 2024 alone), which increased its funding to the Guardia Nacional to fight against criminal gangs and drug trafficking.
Conflicts, catalysts for the increase
The conclusion that can be drawn from this report is that the rising tensions across the world and the increase of armed conflicts is fuelling the rise in military expenditure.
“Over 100 countries around the world raised their military spending in 2024. As governments increasingly prioritise military security, often at the expense of other budget areas, the economic and social trade-offs could have significant effects on societies for years to come,” said Xiao Liang, Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
15 May 25. Strategic review of the SANDF ahead of Parliamentary debate. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) finds itself at a critical juncture, with Parliament poised to scrutinise the current state of its transformation, readiness, and overall performance. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) has tabled a detailed Mid-Term Strategic Review, originally compiled under the 6th Parliament but scheduled for debate only now on Thursday, 15 May by the newly elected 7th Parliament. Although the report was adopted in March 2023, the 6th Parliament did not prioritise it for debate before the end of its term. The decision by the 7th Parliament to place the report on its agenda reflects both a renewed focus on defence issues and the growing concerns about the SANDF’s capacity to meet its constitutional mandate amid expanding domestic and international obligations. The review draws from policy frameworks and oversight conducted between July 2019 and December 2022, assessing SANDF performance across five strategic areas: transformation, integration, equity, morale, and defence readiness. The evaluation is grounded in the 1996 White Paper on Defence, the 1998 Defence Review, and the 2015 Defence Review documents which consecutively sought to chart the intended direction for South Africa’s post-apartheid military force.
Transformation: Policy vs. Practice
Transformation has long been at the centre of South Africa’s defence reform agenda, yet the report reveals a widening gap between intent and execution. While both the 1998 and 2015 Defence Reviews provided strategic direction for a modern, accountable, and representative military force, implementation on the ground has been cumbersome. Key transformation components such as career management, personnel development, and succession planning are not being consistently applied across the Department of Defence (DOD). The JSCD notes that while policies have been developed to address these areas, structural and institutional inertia has undermined effective execution. The Defence Review of 2015 introduced clear goals for standardised career pathing, skill transfer, and succession frameworks, but these have yet to be translated into an institutional culture that supports long-term human resource sustainability. The transformation of the Reserve Force remains a particular area of concern. Despite longstanding recognition of the strategic importance of a balanced force comprising both regular and reserve components, the review points out that the Reserves have suffered from chronic underinvestment. Without revitalising this arm of the SANDF, the force’s ability to scale up rapidly in times of national or regional crisis remains severely limited. The formal integration of statutory and non-statutory forces, which gave birth to the SANDF in 1994, was legally concluded by the Termination of Integration Intake Act in 2001. However, the report indicates that unresolved legacies from the integration period continue to manifest in the form of disparities in promotion pathways, unequal access to career development, and perceived institutional bias. While there is no legislative provision for reopening the integration process, some groups such as the Khoisan Nation Self Defence Unit have repeatedly attempted to seek entry into the SANDF. These appeals have been deemed outside the scope of the law. Nonetheless, their persistence illustrates the enduring symbolic and practical implications of the post-1994 integration effort. Internal oversight and feedback mechanisms have surfaced complaints, particularly among former members of non-statutory forces, who argue they are overlooked in selection processes for training and leadership positions. The Defence Force Service Commission (DFSC) has recommended reforms to neutralise institutional biases, such as scrapping the legacy-based force number allocation system. However, the DOD has declined to implement this suggestion, citing risks to historical record integrity. The JSCD acknowledges that South Africa is now entering a new phase termed the “Consolidation Phase” where the emphasis is shifting from structural integration to operational diversity and professionalisation. Nevertheless, without resolving lingering perceptions of unfairness, these legacy issues continue to impact internal cohesion and morale.
The report identifies meaningful progress in aligning the demographic profile of the SANDF with South Africa’s broader population. African personnel now account for approximately 76% of the force, a substantial increase from 38% in 1994. White representation has declined to 11%, while coloured and Indian figures have remained largely unchanged or decreased slightly. A more pressing concern is the representativity of the Military Skills Development System (MSDS) intakes. In recent years, the demographic balance of MSDS cohorts has skewed heavily, with African recruits constituting over 85% of intakes in 2020/21. Coloured and white representation has dropped to below 6% combined. If this pattern continues, it may challenge the SANDF’s long-term goal of achieving demographic balance, especially at leadership levels.
Pressures Mount on Personnel
The JSCD underscores that morale remains a significant challenge across the SANDF. Although members continue to perform their duties under often difficult conditions, various structural and material issues have taken a toll on motivation and performance. The Defence Force Service Commission has repeatedly flagged problems related to inadequate infrastructure, ageing vehicle fleets, and a lack of career mobility. Members of the SANDF have expressed concern over their working and living conditions during oversight visits, particularly in remote or under-resourced units. Reports of perceived favouritism, especially in promotions and access to courses, have further exacerbated frustrations. The report notes that morale is not merely a matter of welfare, but a critical determinant of operational effectiveness. Without focused investment in wellness programmes, infrastructure maintenance, and career support, the SANDF risks attrition and reduced institutional cohesion.
Defence Readiness: A Force Under Pressure
Perhaps the most urgent findings of the review concern the SANDF’s defence readiness. Over the review period, the SANDF was called upon to perform a wide array of functions beyond its core military mandate. These include domestic deployments for COVID-19 pandemic response, border safeguarding, crime prevention, and natural disaster relief. While these roles are constitutionally sanctioned, they come at a cost. The SANDF’s operational tempo has increased, but the budget to support these activities has not. The report indicates that equipment wear and tear, unscheduled deployments, and delayed reimbursements from government departments have placed additional strain on resources. Crucial systems such as the airlift fleet and naval assets face severe maintenance backlogs. At one point, none of the SANDF’s Gripen fighter jets were serviceable, and currently only one C-130 transport aircraft is semi-operational. Training targets have also suffered. Sea and flight hours have declined steadily due to reduced fuel budgets, delays in refits, and equipment availability. The JSCD concludes that readiness levels are falling below the minimum needed to meet current mandated obligations, let alone new ones. Budget constraints have further exacerbated these issues. Although the Department of Defence’s nominal budget increased slightly from R47.8 bn in 2018/19 to R49.1 bn in 2022/23, in real terms this represents a decline. The portion of the budget allocated to compensation of employees has risen to over 68%, crowding out spending on operations, training, and capital acquisition. This imbalance has had a knock-on effect on the local defence industry. With fewer acquisitions from the SANDF, firms such as Denel have struggled, triggering broader supply chain disruptions and threatening sovereign capability retention. The JSCD has acknowledged recent efforts to address budget inefficiencies. National Treasury has approved a R1.8 bn allocation to facilitate the Mobility Exit Mechanism, aimed at reducing the force size and aligning spending. However, structural reforms remain incomplete, and the long-term sustainability of the SANDF is in question. The upcoming debate in the National Assembly represents an important opportunity for the 7th Parliament to evaluate the state of South Africa’s military institution. The JSCD’s Mid-Term Strategic Review offers a frank, evidence-based analysis of the SANDF’s progress and challenges over the last three years. While gains in equity and policy formation are acknowledged, the report highlights serious structural constraints most notably in readiness and personnel management. The debate will allow Members of Parliament to assess the effectiveness of defence governance, consider budgetary realignments, and determine whether current policies are fit for purpose in a changing regional and global security environment. The SANDF remains a critical institution in South Africa’s democratic architecture. Whether it can continue to fulfil its constitutional obligations in the face of growing demands and shrinking resources will depend heavily on the political, strategic, and fiscal decisions taken in the months and years ahead. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
14 May 25. India-Pakistan: Tit-for-tat measures highlight ongoing tensions despite ceasefire. On 13 May, Pakistan declared a member of the Indian High Commission in the capital Islamabad as ‘persona non grata’ for ‘engaging in activities incompatible with his privileges’. The Indian Charge d’Affaires was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a démarche, where this message was conveyed to him; the staff member was then given 24 hours to leave the country. This development comes after a Pakistani diplomat at the embassy in India, in the capital New Delhi, was asked to leave for ‘indulging in activities not in keeping with his official status’. Separately, Pakistan and India successfully exchanged an Indian Border Security Force (BSF) official, who had been in Pakistan’s custody since 23 April, for a member of the Pakistan Rangers at the Wagah-Attari border. These developments come amid elevated tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi following major strikes in both countries over the past week. We assess that such tit-for-tat diplomatic measures, along with sporadic exchanges of fire along the Line of Control (LoC), will likely sustain tensions between the two countries, but remain below the threshold necessary to break the ceasefire. (Source: Sibylline)
14 May 25. Trump says US to lift Syria sanctions, secures $600bn Saudi deal.
- Summary
- Trump says will lift all Syria sanctions
- Major investment expected from Gulf states
- Trump not visiting Israel during the trip
- Offers brighter future to Iran but warns of maximum pressure if no new nuclear deal
President Donald Trump kicked off his trip to the Gulf on Tuesday with a surprise announcement that the United States will lift long-standing sanctions on Syria, and a $600bn commitment from Saudi Arabia to invest in the U.S. The U.S. agreed to sell Saudi Arabia an arms package worth nearly $142bn, according to the White House which called it the largest “defense cooperation agreement” Washington has ever done. The end of sanctions on Syria would be a huge boost for a country that has been shattered by more than a decade of civil war. Rebels led by current President Ahmed al-Sharaa toppled President Bashar al-Assad last December. Speaking at an investment forum in Riyadh at the start of a deals-focused trip that also brought a flurry of diplomacy, Trump said he was acting on a request to scrap the sanctions by Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
“Oh what I do for the crown prince,” Trump said, drawing laughs from the audience. He said the sanctions had served an important function but that it was now time for the country to move forward. (Source: Reuters)
13 May 25. Peru: Clashes between security forces, domestic terror group will sustain physical security risks. On 12 May, military personnel clashed with armed militants belonging to the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL) terror organisation in Alto Mantaro (Junín region). The assailants damaged a military helicopter using a PKM general-purpose machine gun. No fatalities were reported. Reports indicate that the perpetrators belong to SL’s ‘Quispe Palomino’ faction, which retains influence in the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro Rivers Valley (VRAEM). The VRAEM is an important drug trafficking hub used to facilitate the movement of narcotics towards Brazil and Bolivia. The Peruvian military continues to conduct anti-terrorism operations targeting suspected SL areas of influence, particularly in the VRAEM, despite the group’s declining influence and capabilities. Consequently, continued security force operations in the VRAEM will sustain elevated physical security risks in the medium term. However, SL does not routinely target civilian communities. We therefore assess that the risks facing civilians stemming from attacks by domestic terror groups will remain low overall in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
13 May 25. Ethiopia: Rising tensions with TPLF will increase risk of protests, unrest. On 13 May, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE)’s deadline for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to call a general assembly meeting and maintain its registration as a recognised political party expired. The NEBE suspended the TPLF’s political activities for a three-month period in February, stating that the party had violated electoral laws by failing to convene a general congress for several months prior. As the TPLF has not called a general assembly since the suspension, the NEBE will likely initiate proceedings to revoke the party’s registration in the coming days. The TPLF will almost certainly contest this decision, which would likely trigger protests in major cities in Tigray region, particularly Mekelle. Disputes over the TPLF’s status will highly likely increase tensions with the federal government and undermine ongoing efforts to implement the 2022 Pretoria Agreement. We assess that delays to the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are likely to sustain socio-economic health concerns within Tigray, while long-standing territorial disputes with ethnic-Amharan populations will also sustain the risk of protests, unrest and intercommunal clashes in western Tigray and the broader Amhara region. (Source: Sibylline)
13 May 25. Nigeria: Attack in Borno state highlights increasing militant capabilities, sustained risk of attacks. On 12 May, unidentified militants attacked a military base in Marte district (Borno state) and captured an unknown number of soldiers. The security forces then re-took the base following an initial retreat. The attack was highly likely conducted by either Boko Haram or Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP), both of which are highly active in the region. The attack reflects a recent uptick in militant activity in north-eastern Nigeria, underpinned by evolving aerial capabilities. In the coming months, militants will highly likely continue leveraging the use of explosive drones in attacks against security force positions, increasing collateral and bystander risks for locally engaged staff. Such attacks are highly likely to trigger an augmented security response in Borno, possibly including the use of airstrikes by the Nigerian Air Force (NAF); we assess this would increase mis-identification risks. However, we also assess that the Nigerian security forces’ limited capacity to maintain rural positions will dilute the effectiveness of any such operations, sustaining the risk of attacks and kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) in north-eastern Nigeria. (Source: Sibylline)
13 May 25. India-Pakistan: Tensions will persist; contentious issues are unlikely to be resolved in short term. On 12 May, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that India has only ‘paused’ its military action against Pakistan and will ‘retaliate on its own terms’ in the event of another attack against India. These remarks were made during Modi’s first public address following a ceasefire brokered by the US. He also stated that ‘terror and talks can’t go together, nor can terror and trade’. While no major hostilities have taken place since the announcement of the ceasefire, drone sightings were reported by Indian media in Samba district (Jammu and Kashmir union territory, India), while precautionary blackouts were enforced in several border areas, including Amritsar (Punjab state, India). Separately, at least three militants were killed during encounters with the security forces in Shopian district (Jammu and Kashmir), according to the Indian army. These developments come amid ongoing operations by the security forces against militant groups in the Kashmir region following last month’s attack against tourists in Pahalgam (Jammu and Kashmir). Given Modi’s comments, we assess that tensions will likely remain elevated despite the ceasefire. Additionally, significant progress in potential talks with Pakistan is unlikely in the near term, particularly as key issues remain unresolved; we assess this will sustain the risk of renewed hostilities. (Source: Sibylline)
12 May 25. Ecuador: Attack against security force personnel sustains long-term physical security risks. On 9 May, the government accused the Border Command organised crime group (OCG) of killing 11 soldiers in Alto Punino (Orellana province). The group allegedly used firearms and grenades to attack soldiers who were conducting anti-illegal mining patrols in the area. On 10 May, Border Command representatives denied their involvement in the attack. Traditionally, Border Command operates in southern Colombian states and in northern Ecuador. The attack demonstrates that OCGs are likely to attack security force personnel perceived to be encroaching on their illicit economies, such as illegal mining or drug trafficking. Consequently, physical security risks in the Colombia-Ecuador border regions will be sustained in the medium-to-long term, particularly for security force personnel. We similarly assess that long-term attack and violent crime risks will remain high for extractive sector personnel and associated infrastructure in areas with extensive mining activity (such as Alto Punino). (Source: Sibylline)
12 May 25. Pakistan: Alleged militant activity highlights attack risks in western Pakistan amid elevated tensions. On 11 May, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed that it had carried out a series of attacks across 51 sites in Balochistan province; it also claims to be preparing for Operation Herof 2.0, originally launched in August 2024. Targets reportedly included police stations, military convoys and infrastructure on major highways. The organisation also claimed to have taken control of the Hoshab area of Kech district. The BLA, which calls for independence for Balochistan, is almost certainly seeking to take advantage of the recent heightened tensions between India and Pakistan. Its activity also risks undermining the recently agreed ceasefire. Pakistan has long alleged that the Indian government supports the group. We assess that there is a high likelihood of militant attacks in the restive provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (where Tehreek-e-Taliban remain active) in the short term, driving security and bystander risks. The BLA’s use of blockades and the setting up of checkpoints on highways also drive transport disruption risks in Balochistan. A heightened security force and military presence across both provinces, including at city entry and exit points, is highly likely. (Source: Sibylline)
12 May 25. Burkina Faso: Capture of town by militants highlights increasing capacity, threats to staff. On 11 May, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) took control of Djibo (Sahel region) after overrunning security force positions in and around the town. Although the military government has not announced any casualties, footage of the attacks indicates that militants killed dozens of security force personnel and civilians while also conducting numerous arson attacks. JNIM has held Djibo under siege since early 2022. Although militants have routinely raided livestock holdings and conducted kidnap-for-ransom attacks, the town’s capture marks the first successful assault on security force positions therein. During the offensive, militants reportedly struck a military aircraft with gunfire, highlighting JNIM’s increasing capacity in northern Burkina Faso. In the coming months, JNIM will highly likely attempt to continue expanding territorial control in Sahel region, increasing attack risks in bordering Centre-Nord, Est and Nord regions. We assess that the security forces are highly unlikely to have the capacity to safeguard security within these regions, sustaining attack, kidnap-for-ransom and sexual violence risks for locally engaged staff. (Source: Sibylline)
12 May 25. Nigeria: IPOB attack highlights elevated violence, bystander risks during leader’s trial. On 9 May, militants from the separatist Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) group killed at least 30 civilians and set more than 20 vehicles alight after erecting roadblocks on the Okigwe-Owerri highway (Imo state). The attack coincided with the appearance of the IPOB’s leader, Nnamdi Kanu, in court in the capital Abuja on terrorism charges. Kanu’s trial is ongoing; developments in his case will likely act as further flashpoints for increased violence by IPOB-affiliated groups in south-east and southern Nigeria. Such violence will likely primarily target the state security forces, elevating risks of bystander exposure to crossfire in proximity to police stations and other facilities. Developments in the case will also possibly trigger protests and unrest in major towns and cities, particularly in Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo states. We assess there is a realistic possibility that hardline IPOB factions will attempt to enforce ‘sit-at-home’ protests (entailing the suspension of all business activity), increasing labour flexibility concerns and risks of harassment targeting staff active in affected cities on protest days. (Source: Sibylline)
12 May 25. India-Pakistan: Ceasefire will limit conflict risk; risk of resumption will persist. Earlier on 12 May, India announced that it was reopening 32 airports, including Srinagar International Airport (SXR) and Chandigarh International Airport (IXC), which it had previously stated would remain closed until 15 May. The Pakistan Airport Authority (PAA) also announced the reopening of its airspace to all types of traffic. This comes after US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan on 10 May, which was later confirmed by the two countries. Both countries have indicated their intention to adhere to the ceasefire, while also warning each other of the consequences of any violations. There were reports of violations along the Line of Control (LoC) on 10 May, though hostilities have since seemingly eased to an extent. Separately, a meeting between both countries’ Directors of Military Operations (DGMOs) is expected to take place later on 12 May to decide on the next steps. Given the elevated tensions, we assess that there is a realistic possibility of continued ceasefire violations, particularly along the LoC. That said, a major violation would likely have to be necessary for a complete breakdown in the ceasefire and a resumption of hostilities. (Source: Sibylline)
12 May 25. US-China: Reciprocal tariff suspension will decrease regional tensions, socio-economic health risks. On 12 May, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced a US-China trade deal for a 90-day pause on trade measures after negotiations in Switzerland, in the capital Geneva, over the weekend. Bessent also announced that both nations’ reciprocal tariffs would decrease by 115%, leaving reciprocal tariff rates at 10% (the reciprocal tariff rate currently faced by most US trading partners). However, 20% tariffs on Chinese imports relating to fentanyl trafficking will remain in place, meaning that US tariffs on China stand at 30%. This deal comes weeks after the US imposed 145% tariffs on Chinese goods, prompting China to respond with 125% tariffs on US goods alongside non-tariff measures. These developments underscore the US’s willingness to negotiate trade deals, likely decreasing regional tensions in the near term. Since the dispute had halted approximately USD 600 bn in trade, we assess that the tariff suspension will decrease supply chain disruption and socio-economic health risks (reducing the risk of a recession) in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
11 May 25. Indian air force says losses are part of combat but all pilots back home. The Indian Air Force said on Sunday that “losses are a part of combat” without giving details but added that all its pilots were back home after fighting with Pakistan this week, responding to a question on whether the force suffered losses. A Pakistani military spokesperson told Reuters on Wednesday that five Indian aircraft had been shot down, but the claim was not confirmed by India. Also on Wednesday, four government sources in Indian Kashmir told Reuters that three fighter jets crashed in the federal territory, hours after India said it struck nine Pakistani “terrorist infrastructure” sites across the border. (Source: Reuters)
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