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01 May 25. Colombia: Sustained assassinations of security force personnel underscores risk of violence. Between 15 and 30 April, armed individuals killed 15 police officers and 12 military personnel across Colombia. President Gustavo Petro claims that armed groups are carrying out a ‘Pistol Plan’ of ‘systematic murders’ of security force personnel. Petro attributed the deaths primarily to the Gulf Clan (AGC) organised crime group (OCG), as well as dissident guerrillas of the demobilised Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-D). The attacks have mostly taken place in Antioquia, Bolívar and Córdoba departments. In the near term, and as the Pistol Plan continues, future attacks are highly likely to occur in the vicinity of police stations, military infrastructure and security force patrols. In response, Petro has pledged to intensify the government’s offensive against the AGC, increasing the risk of armed clashes; airstrikes against AGC positions are a realistic possibility, elevating bystander risks. In the longer term, we assess that meaningful peace negotiations between the government and the AGC are highly unlikely, sustaining the risk of armed conflict and violence. (Source: Sibylline)
01 May 25. Guinea-Sierra Leone: Shooting in border town increases bilateral tensions, unrest risks. On 29 April, Guinean security force personnel reportedly discharged their weapons near Yenga (Kailahun district, Sierra Leone). In response, the Sierra Leonean security forces have adopted an elevated posture in the Kissi Teng area (Kailahun), while local media reports stated that Guinean forces have restricted access to several border crossings. The incident comes amid a long-standing border dispute between Guinea and Sierra Leone. Despite a 2012 demilitarisation and border demarcation agreement, Guinean troops frequently enter the area, triggering periods of elevated bilateral tensions. These tensions will almost certainly remain elevated in the coming days, likely disrupting cross-border movement and supply chain continuity in the Guinea-Liberia-Sierra Leone tri-border area, particularly via Koindu (Kailahun). Wider issues with discipline within the Guinean security forces will sustain the risk of further shooting incidents in the coming weeks, though we assess that rapid escalation into armed conflict remains unlikely in the short term. Even so, sustained border disputes will likely moderately aggravate anti-government sentiment in Sierra Leone, possibly triggering limited protests and unrest in the capital Freetown and Kailahun. (Source: Sibylline)
01 May 25. Kenya: Opposition MP’s assassination will possibly trigger unrest in Homa Bay. On 30 April, two gunmen killed MP Charles Ong’ondo Were in the capital Nairobi. Were was a member of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and represented Kasipul (Homa Bay county). The gunmen reportedly followed Were’s car before shooting him at close range in what the police labelled a ‘targeted and premeditated’ attack. In February, Were claimed his life was in danger after a series of incidents in his constituency, including one where protesters blocked Were’s car after he left a funeral. Several Kasipul residents claim that Were had orchestrated a series of attacks on local political opponents. As such, we assess it is likely that Were’s assassination stemmed from a violent dispute with political opponents within his constituency. In response, there is a realistic possibility of demonstrations in Kasipul, which will possibly trigger retaliatory attacks by Were’s supporters against his perceived political opponents, elevating bystander security risks therein. In Nairobi, the security forces will likely adopt an elevated posture and intensify the security details of other MPs, likely driving sporadic spikes in travel disruption around government buildings. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Apr 25. A strategic approach for PPPs in the South African defence industry. As funding shortfalls in the Department of Defence (DOD) become increasingly apparent, and Treasury fails to deliver a meaningful budgetary increase, the necessity of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in sustaining and modernising the military is no longer a question of “if, but how.”
Andries van Wyk, in his presentation at the recent PPPs in Defence & Security Conference, highlighted the urgent need for innovative financing models, industry collaboration, and strategic defence planning to ensure the long-term viability of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). “We are not discussing if Triple P. We are discussing how Triple P,” he stated.
The effects of underfunding within the SANDF are now undeniable. The unrest in KwaZulu-Natal and difficulties in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have made it clear that maintaining a capable military force requires a departure from traditional funding methods. As Van Wyk pointed out, “The military is standing before a stark choice, either we become innovative with our funding, or potentially we will have to revise the missions that the SANDF aspires for”.
Despite the cancellation of the Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan (SCAMP), new methods have emerged to allow for capital expenditure with added governance and oversight. Treasury has endorsed these new funding mechanisms, paving the way for large-scale projects outside the constraints of SCAMP. Importantly, the military has also calculated the funding required for the first ten years of its “Journey to Greatness,” presenting a clear roadmap for defence modernisation.
The resilience of South Africa’s defence industry has been remarkable. Van Wyk acknowledged that “the industry must export to survive, and you are doing so increasingly successfully, especially in Africa,” with South African defence companies operating in 35 countries. However, this success comes with risks. International financiers are “sucking the intellectual capital out of this industry” as South African innovation increasingly falls under the control of foreign investors.
The military and industry must collaborate to keep local research and development (R&D) within national borders. To achieve this, PPPs can play a pivotal role in strengthening local defence manufacturing and fostering innovation. By aligning with SANDF’s operational needs, these partnerships can enhance the exportability of defence products, making them more competitive in international markets. Additionally, PPPs provide an avenue to secure financing from both local and international investors, ensuring sustained growth and technological advancement in the sector.
One of the most pressing concerns is the modernisation of South Africa’s defence review. “The Defence Review is actually really old, it’s a teenager,” Van Wyk remarked, noting the need to align military strategy with contemporary threats and technological advancements.
Van Wyk’s presentation outlined several key force structures required to maintain national and regional security:
Internal Security and Stability
This force must “contain insurgency, support nation-building, assist local government, and protect critical infrastructure”. Van Wyk stresses that social instability, such as severe weather crises and economic hardship, can lead to unrest, making military support in these areas crucial.
Regional Operations
South Africa’s long-term stability is tied to economic development in the region. A second force structure must “contain unruly behaviour in the region that hinders economic development” and “ensure functional regional infrastructure”.
Modernised Hard Power
A highly adaptable conventional force is required to deter threats and protect South African interests. However, the approach must be modernised. “If we received additional funding today, we cannot fund those projects. Some of those requirements are 25 years old,” Van Wyk pointed out, highlighting the need for a fresh strategic outlook.
Special Operations Forces (SOF)
The real capacity for rapid response lies in SOF, which must be “highly agile, mission-tailored, and capable of operating in air, land, and sea domains”. The key to success in this domain is technology: “The perception of a Special Operations Force is not determined by the size of the force; it’s a combination of doctrinal agility and technology”.
For PPPs to be successful, a balanced relationship must exist between the government, industry, and financiers, with each stakeholder contributing distinct value. The government, including SANDF and Armscor, must provide strategic direction, policy support, and operational guidance. The industry plays a crucial role in delivering innovative, export-driven solutions that enhance defence capabilities. Meanwhile, financiers must offer sustainable funding models to ensure long-term viability and growth within the sector, according to Van Wyk.
The key challenge is aligning the differing interests of these groups. “The financiers, they work with Excel. They work with risk. And that risk becomes the cost of financing. We must acknowledge that it’s outside the comfort zone of the average general,” Van Wyk noted, illustrating the complexity of integrating financial models with military planning.
One of the most ambitious proposals is the creation of Battle Labs, specialised units that bring together military expertise, industry innovation, and financial investment. Organised into six functional areas, sensing, command and control, mobility, firepower, sustainment, and protection, these Battle Labs could serve as incubators for cutting-edge defence technology.
Lessons from India and South Korea underscore the importance of creating a dedicated coordinating body to oversee PPP initiatives. In India, it took ten years to resolve bureaucratic conflicts, while South Korea established DAPA (Defence Acquisition Programme Administration) to streamline partnerships and accelerate defence modernisation. South Africa must learn from these experiences to avoid unnecessary delays.
The opportunities presented by PPPs are significant. Defence planning has become pragmatic, stable, and vertically aligned, making it easier to integrate new strategies. The defence industry has shown remarkable adaptability and continues to offer valuable technological solutions. Historic examples demonstrate that defence investments can yield high returns; in one case, a project generated a 300-times return on investment after successful exports, Van Wyk noted.
However, the risks are equally substantial. South African innovation faces the threat of becoming the intellectual property of international investors. To maintain long-term competitiveness, defence R&D expertise must be rejuvenated. Additionally, PPPs must demonstrate success quickly to build confidence and attract further investment.
The future of South Africa’s defence sector hinges on its ability to embrace PPPs effectively. By fostering collaboration between government, industry, and financiers, the country can enhance its defence capabilities while ensuring economic sustainability. “If we take all the SANDF ideas, and there are many, the argument is: don’t sort this out at the level below the top. The SANDF has got types of value,” Van Wyk argued, stressing the importance of high-level strategic alignment.
The question is no longer whether PPPs should be implemented, but how quickly and effectively they can be executed. Rapid demonstration of successful ventures will be crucial in securing stakeholder buy-in and ensuring the long-term stability of South Africa’s defence industry, Van Wyk believes. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
28 Apr 25. Pakistan-India: Concerns regarding imminent Indian strike underscore increasing threat of escalation. Earlier on 30 April, Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar stated that ‘Pakistan has credible intelligence that India intends to launch a military strike within the next 24 to 36 hours using the Pahalgam incident as a false pretext’. The minister did not provide specific intelligence or information to support his claims or detail what form the strike could take. This comes after Pakistani Minister of Defence Khawaja Muhammad Asif also stated that a military incursion by India was ‘imminent’. Separately, on 29 April, a US Department of State spokesperson (quoting a statement by Secretary of State Marco Rubio) stated that they are ‘reaching out to both parties and telling them not to escalate the situation’. Rubio is reportedly expected to speak to both countries. These developments follow a militant attack in Pahalgam (Jammu and Kashmir union territory, India), which killed over 20 people on 22 April (see Sibylline Alert – 24 April 2025). Despite third-party mediation efforts, we asses that, given the heightened tensions, a military response by India is highly likely in the coming days, increasing the risk of armed conflict. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Apr 25. Meanwhile, Iran’s military spending decreased by 10 percent to reach $7.9bn in 2024. The Middle East’s share of global defense spending increased 15 percent in 2024, driven in part by a multi-bn jump by Israel amid a multi-front conflict, according to new data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
“Military expenditure in the Middle East reached an estimated $243 bn in 2024, an increase of 15 [percent] from 2023 and 19 [percent] more than in 2015,” a SIPRI report issued Monday said.
Military spending in Israel increased by 65 percent or equivalent to $46.5 bn in 2024, which marks the highest annual increase since 1967, a product of conflicts in which Jerusalem is engaged from Gaza, to Yemen, to Lebanon and Syria.
“Its military burden rose to 8.8 [percent] of GDP, the second highest in the world,” the report specified.
Meanwhile Lebanon, which is reeling from Israeli strikes both at the southern border and recently in the southern suburb of Beirut itself, also dramatically increased spending. While its starting budget is much smaller relatively, its spending went up 58 percent to a total of $635 m.
“Despite widespread expectations that many Middle Eastern countries would increase their military spending in 2024, major rises were limited to Israel and Lebanon,” said Zubaida Karim, a researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme, in the report.
She added that other countries in the Middle East didn’t “significantly increase spending in response to the war in Gaza or were prevented from doing so by economic constraints.”
Meanwhile, Iran’s military spending decreased by 10 percent to reach $7.9 bn in 2024, even though its affiliated arms groups like Lebanese Hezbollah and Yemeni Houthis were directly involved in various conflicts. “The impact of sanctions on Iran severely limited its capacity to increase spending,” the report justified.
In 2023, Iran was the fourth largest defense spender in the Middle East with a total of $10.3 bn.
On the Gulf side, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has been one of the largest defense importers throughout recent years, increased its defense spending to $80.3 bn, which is a 1.5 percent rise only in 2024. That makes it the seventh highest defense spender worldwide, a drop from fifth in 2023, but ranking as the leading Middle East country. (Source: Breaking Defense.com)
29 Apr 25. Burkina Faso: Risk of hostility facing foreign entities will rise during 30 April pro-government protest. On 28 April, numerous government-aligned civil society associations called for large-scale pro-government protests in the capital Ouagadougou on 30 April. Demonstrations will begin outside the US embassy at 0730hrs and at the Place de la Revolution at 0800hrs (all times local). The development comes after the military government claimed to have foiled an attempted coup on 16 April, underscoring the junta’s increasing anxiety over its stability. The military government frequently mobilises pro-government demonstrations by employing nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric to augment its legitimacy and to deter challenges to its authority. The pro-government protest will highly likely disrupt movement through Ouagadougou’s Koulouba area, increasing the risk of supply chain disruption and possibly delaying transport via Ouagadougou Thomas Sankara International Airport (OUA). Although clashes with the security forces remain unlikely, protesters will possibly aim to attack US- and French-linked entities (such as embassies, businesses and NGOs) with vandalism, arson and violence, increasing threats to locally engaged staff. In the coming months, we assess the junta will likely continue to mobilise more protests, compounding broader hostility to foreign investment risks. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Apr 25. SAMIDRC withdrawal from DR Congo underway. Withdrawal of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), terminated in mid-March, is finally underway.
Equipment and personnel from the three SAMIDRC troop contributing countries (TCCs) – Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania – are being withdrawn from bases in Goma and Sake.
The regional bloc mission was deployed to the eastern DRC in December 2023 with a 12 month mandate, later extended by a further year before calling a halt to operations in the wake of a fatality and casualty filled January.
Business Day reports sources in the South African contingent saying the order to start packing came just ahead of last weekend. The publication further reports equipment and personnel will move in multiple convoys via Burundi and Rwanda to Chato in north-western Tanzania. The Lake Victoria port town, 500 km from Goma and Sake, will be the staging point ahead of force contingents splitting for repatriation to their respective home countries.
“We are leaving nothing behind,” a South African soldier is reported as saying, with another on record as saying “As far as we know, the group’s quick reaction force (QRF) will leave last to provide protection for the tail of the entire convoy.”
The QRF was reportedly in the vanguard of the January battle to maintain control of Goma airport. The QRF, again according to Business Day, “sowed havoc” among M23 (Mouvement du 23 Mars) rebels killing more than 700 in “fierce fire fights” at and around the airport.
There was at the time of publication no update from either SADC, the East African Community (EAC) or the Directorate Corporate Communication (DCC) of the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) on the withdrawal. This was further illustrated by an unidentified South African soldier saying “as far as we know, we will be flown out of Chato to Bloemfontein”. He had no information on movement of armoured vehicles and heavy equipment.
“Our orders say by May 30 everyone and everything needs to be out of Goma and on its way. It was chaos over the weekend, but nobody is complaining because we’re finally going home,” one soldier is reported as saying.
defenceWeb understands that the move has begun, with artillery being moved as from Tuesday 29 April. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebels controlling Goma and Sake have apparently been inspecting outgoing SAMIDRC equipment, much to the irritation of soldiers.
The pack up and go orders correspond with the plan the defence chiefs of the three SAMIDRC TCC proposed at an 11 April meeting in Dar es Salaam with SADC representatives. The chiefs voiced frustration about the delay in SADC repairing and preparing the Goma airport runway still held by the rebels.
They proposed the withdrawal, earlier agreed to by M23 senior military hierarchy, continue by road. The SADC secretariat had to obtain Rwandan approval for safe passage through the country. It was later reported in Rwandan media that President Paul Kagame approved secure passage for SAMIDRC.
A technical advance team from the three TCCs was assembled to ensure which route troop convoys were to take as the safest and fastest. The team included operations, intelligence and logistic experts who also had to provide reconnaissance while the withdrawal was under way. According to soldiers, a contingent of South African and other forces is in Chato to co-ordinate repatriation of troops and equipment.
Seventeen SAMIDRC soldiers, including 14 South Africans, died in what has become known as the Battle for Goma in late january. Numerous own forces were seriously injured in the three-day battle.
The SAMIDRC deployment was criticised by military specialists and soldiers for the seeming haphazard and ill-prepared way in which South African forces, as the leading country, were sent to eastern DRC, without air support and proper logistics. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
28 Apr 25. India-Pakistan: Ongoing cross-border fire highlights sustained tensions, risk of armed conflict. Earlier on 28 April, the Pakistan army initiated unprovoked firing along the Line of Control (LoC) at Kupwara and Poonch districts, according to an Indian defence official. This marked the fourth consecutive night of cross-border firing between the two sides. No casualties were reported. The Indian security forces have intensified search operations in Jammu and Kashmir union territory for the perpetrators of last week’s militant attack, destroying several houses suspected of belonging to alleged involved militants and raiding the homes of alleged supporters. Separately, on 26 April, The Resistance Group (TRF), an alleged affiliate of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), has denied involvement in the attack, describing the initial online claim as a breach by Indian cyber intelligence. These developments come after a militant attack in Pahalgam (Jammu and Kashmir union territory), which killed over 20 people on 22 April (Sibylline Alert – 24 April 2025). Given the elevated tensions, we assess that intermittent cross-border fire will likely continue along the LoC, with a military response from India remaining a realistic possibility in the coming days, sustaining the risk of armed conflict. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Apr 25. China-Philippines: Competing claims over reef in South China Sea will drive regional tensions. Earlier on 28 April, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) released a photo of Filipino sailors on Sandy Cay reef in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. This was seemingly in response to Chinese state media reports on 26 April that the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) had ‘implemented maritime control’ over the reef earlier in the month. Sandy Cay lies near Thitu Island, where a Philippine military outpost and PCG base are stationed. China’s actions are likely an attempt to put pressure on the Philippines as the annual US-Philippines joint military drills (‘Balikatan’) take place. There remains no permanent presence or military constructions on the reef at present, though Chinese vessels are regularly in proximity to it. Consequently, in the short term, the development alone is unlikely to shift the balance of material military capabilities and is likely an attempt from Beijing to strengthen its own legal justifications for potentially heightened activity in the area. However, the dispute will sustain long-running tensions between the two countries. Heightened naval and coast guard activity in the South China Sea is likely over the coming weeks. We assess that this will drive the risk of close encounters and an unintended escalation. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Apr 25. Niger: Likely militant attack increases operational, travel disruption risks in Tillabéri region. On 25 April, unidentified militants killed 12 military personnel in an ambush on a patrol approximately six miles (10km) north of Sakoira (Tillabéri region). Although no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP) are highly active in the Burkina Faso-Mali-Niger tri-border area and frequently conduct attacks in Tillabéri region. As the attack also occurred approximately 12 miles (20km) north of the regional capital, Tillabéri, the security forces will likely adopt a moderately elevated posture around the city in the coming days. This will likely include additional checkpoints along the RN1 highway, increasing risks of travel disruption and staff exposure to petty corruption. Possible travel restrictions via Tillabéri Airport (DRRL) will also increase operational disruption risks at the nearby Tillabéri Gold Site. In the coming months, we assess that JNIM and ISSP militants will highly likely continue leveraging cross-border positions to expand activity in Tillaberi, sustaining elevated attack and kidnap-for-ransom risks for locally engaged staff. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Apr 25. World military spending hits $2.7trn in record 2024 surge.
• Summary
• Global military spending rose 9.4% in 2024, SIPRI reports
• Europe and Middle East see rapid military spending growth
• Ukraine allocates all tax revenues to military, SIPRI notes
World military expenditure reached $2.72trn in 2024, an increase of 9.4% from 2023 and the steepest year-on-year rise since at least the end of the Cold War, according to a report released by a leading conflict think tank on Monday.
Heightened geopolitical tension saw increased military spending in all world regions, with particularly rapid growth in both Europe and the Middle East, data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) showed.
“Over 100 countries around the world raised their military spending in 2024,” SIPRI said. “As governments increasingly prioritize military security, often at the expense of other budget areas, the economic and social trade-offs could have significant effects on societies for years to come,” it said. (Source: Reuters)
25 Apr 25. India-Pakistan: Continued elevated tensions will sustain risk of military confrontation. Earlier on 25 April, Indian news outlets reported that the Pakistan Army opened fire at multiple locations along the Line of Control (LoC), violating the ceasefire agreement and prompting Indian troops to respond. A Pakistani official told international media that an exchange of fire did take place and that civilian populations were not involved. This incident comes ahead of Indian Army Chief Upendra Dwivedi’s visit to Srinagar (Jammu and Kashmir union territory, India) later on 25 April, where he is likely to assess the security situation in the region. Separately, according to Pakistan media, the Pakistani security forces detained a member of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) on 23 April after he allegedly strayed into Pakistani territory in Kasur district (Punjab province, Pakistan). Security has been significantly heightened in Jammu and Kashmir union territory, with over 1,500 people detained for questioning in connection to the attack on the militant attack on 22 April, which has significantly escalated tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi (Sibylline Alert – 24 April 2025). Given the heightened public anger and reciprocal measures by both sides so far, we assess that tensions will remain heightened, sustaining the risk of military escalation in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Apr 25. Somalia: Al-Shabaab offensive will likely increase attack risks in Mogadishu, southern regions. On 24 April, al-Shabaab militants clashed with the Somali National Army (SNA) at a military base in Wargaadhi (Middle Shabelle region), approximately 124 miles (200km) north of the capital Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab claimed to have captured the base and Wargaadhi town; the SNA claims to have successfully repelled the attack and killed 40 militants. The incident highlights the increasing momentum of al-Shabaab’s renewed offensive in central and southern Somalia. Wargaadhi’s capture would allow al-Shabaab to significantly disrupt the SNA’s supply lines between Mogadishu and bases in Eel-Dheer and Masagaway (both Galmudug region), intensifying military pressure on the SNA. Such pressure will likely further entrench disputes between federal forces, the regional authorities and the African Union mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), undermining co-operation and broader counter-offensive efforts in the coming months. As such, we assess that al-Shabaab will likely continue consolidating control of central and southern Somalia, elevating attack risks targeting government officials and military sites in Hiran and Middle Shabelle amid broader efforts to encircle Mogadishu.
(Source: Sibylline)
25 Apr 25. Congo (DRC)-Rwanda-US: Ongoing mediation will possibly bolster conflict de-escalation prospects. On 25 April, the Congolese and Rwandan foreign ministers will meet in the US, in the capital Washington DC, to sign a Declaration of Principles regarding the de-escalation of conflict in eastern DRC. The meeting comes amid increasing US engagement in efforts to broker a ceasefire between the DRC and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group, which controls substantial territory in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces (both DRC). Although previous agreements between the DRC and Rwanda have failed to establish a durable ceasefire, the meeting comes after the DRC and M23 issued a joint statement on 23 April indicating they would work to establish a ceasefire. Taken together, these declarations indicate possible progress towards conflict de-escalation in eastern DRC amid broader US efforts to sign a strategic minerals agreement with DRC. Although these efforts will possibly result in a temporary de-escalation of clashes between the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and M23, we assess that the proliferation of armed groups and decentralised ethno-religious militias will likely continue undermining security conditions in eastern DRC, sustaining threats to locally engaged staff in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Apr 25. India-Pakistan: Continued elevated tensions will sustain risk of military confrontation. Earlier on 25 April, Indian news outlets reported that the Pakistan Army opened fire at multiple locations along the Line of Control (LoC), violating the ceasefire agreement and prompting Indian troops to respond. A Pakistani official told international media that an exchange of fire did take place and that civilian populations were not involved. This incident comes ahead of Indian Army Chief Upendra Dwivedi’s visit to Srinagar (Jammu and Kashmir union territory, India) later on 25 April, where he is likely to assess the security situation in the region. Separately, according to Pakistan media, the Pakistani security forces detained a member of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) on 23 April after he allegedly strayed into Pakistani territory in Kasur district (Punjab province, Pakistan). Security has been significantly heightened in Jammu and Kashmir union territory, with over 1,500 people detained for questioning in connection to the attack on the militant attack on 22 April, which has significantly escalated tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi. Given the heightened public anger and reciprocal measures by both sides so far, we assess that tensions will remain heightened, sustaining the risk of military escalation in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
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