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10 Apr 25. Top General Says North Korea Continuing Weapons Development, Becoming More Isolated. During a Senate Armed Services Committee posture hearing today in Washington, U.S. Forces Korea’s commander testified that North Korea is continuing to develop its weapons program while growing more isolated. Army Gen. Xavier T. Brunson told the committee that, in 2024, North Korea launched 47 ballistic missiles while focusing on advancing its cruise missile and hypersonic glide vehicle research and development programs.
“In the coming year, we expect [North Korea] to further develop hypersonic and multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle capabilities to complete [their government’s] goals,” Brunson testified.
He also said North Korea is continuing to build its nuclear weapons program and that the country boasts a 1.3-million-man military force that is being equipped, modernized and augmented by Russia.
Many of those munitions and troops have been exported to Russia over the past year and a half, which demonstrates North Korea’s ability to provide external support to other countries while advancing domestic capabilities at home, Brunson added.
He said North Korea also poses an increasingly sophisticated cyberthreat and recently stole approximately $1.5bn in cryptocurrency.
Additionally, Brunson said North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s leadership has shifted from a focus on the reunification of the Korean peninsula to declaring a position of sovereignty.
“This change is evidenced by the hardening of [North Korea’s] southern border, the rejection of reunification discussions, and the destruction of unification monuments and buildings,” he said.
When asked whether everyday North Koreans are cognizant of the oppression by the current regime under Kim, Bruson said that — based on recent observances in Ukraine — he doesn’t believe so.
“I would fully answer that by looking at the forces [North Korea] sent to Ukraine … [They are] absolutely, dyed-in-the-wool ideologues who are tied to — and believe in — that regime that exists there,” Brunson said, adding he doesn’t believe most North Koreans are aware of the situation due to the government’s strict control on outside communications.
Brunson said that it would be unwise to reduce the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula in the face of North Korea continuing to develop its conventional and nuclear weapons programs. Reducing the force would be problematic, Brunson told lawmakers, noting that what U.S. Forces Korea provides “is the potential to impose cost in the East Sea to Russia, the potential to impose cost in the West Sea to China, and to continue to deter against North Korea as it currently stands.” He said his focus is now on the capabilities necessary to prepare for, deter and then prevail in conflict, should it occur. (Source: U.S. DoD)
11 Apr 25. Australia wants AUKUS submarines for deterrence, stealth, says. Australia is buying nuclear-powered submarines as a deterrent, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said on Friday, adding that the AUKUS treaty that has come under scrutiny amid President Donald Trump’s trade policy was also in the United States’ interests. The U.S. sale of three nuclear-powered submarines to Australia under AUKUS is facing new doubts as Trump’s tariffs take hold, and amid concern in Washington that providing the subs to Canberra may reduce deterrence to China. The U.S. Navy in September set a deadline of 2027 for its forces to be prepared for a conflict with China. Reuters reported, citing U.S. defence experts and documents, consternation that Australia’s reluctance to even discuss using the attack submarines against China means transferring them out of the U.S. fleet in 2032 could hurt deterrence efforts. Campaigning for a May 3 election in the northern garrison town of Darwin, Albanese told reporters he was “confident about AUKUS”. (Source: Reuters)
10 Apr 25. AUKUS nuclear submarine sale under scrutiny as Trump tariffs rattle Australia. The sale of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia under the AUKUS treaty faces new doubts as U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs take hold, and amid concern in Washington that providing the subs to Canberra may reduce deterrence to China. Whether the United States can boost submarine production to meet U.S. Navy targets is key to whether Australia can buy three Virginia-class submarines starting in 2032, Defence Minister Richard Marles said last month, after talks with his U.S. counterpart, Pete Hegseth. Australia faces a previously unreported 2025 deadline to pay the United States $2bn to assist with improving its submarine shipyards. The Trump administration has asked for more funding, Marles said in March. (Source: Reuters)
10 Apr 25. Kyrgyzstan: Alleged preparations for coup attempt unlikely to reduce government stability. On 9 April, Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) claimed that it had prevented what it described as preparations for mass riots aimed at overthrowing the government. According to the GKNB, it launched a criminal case at the beginning of the year to identify the group that had planned to stage incidents of unrest. The committee claimed that all of its participants were detained (without providing more specific information). The GKNB periodically releases statements that it has thwarted coup preparations, though we are unable to verify the authenticity of such allegations (including the most recent claims). However, the timing is notable as Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov signed a law on 9 April pardoning 41 people, including activists who had been convicted of allegedly calling for mass unrest. As such, we assess that the latest claims of a coup plot do not reflect weakened government stability in Kyrgyzstan and likely reflect the government’s consolidation of its repressive security apparatus. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Apr 25. Parliamentary committee raises alarms over SANDF budget cuts, security readiness. Chairperson of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, Malusi Gigaba, has delivered a candid assessment of the state of South Africa’s defence capability, warning that persistent underfunding threatens not only the country’s ability to defend its borders but also its international credibility and economic growth potential. Speaking during a media briefing in Parliament on Thursday 10 April, Gigaba laid out an ambitious oversight agenda for the newly constituted committee. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence holds a unique and far-reaching mandate that goes beyond typical parliamentary portfolio oversight. The committee is tasked with investigating and making recommendations on matters relating to the budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale, and state of preparedness of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). While acknowledging that the committee is still in the early stages of orientating its members to this complex and strategic brief, Gigaba was unequivocal about the urgency of confronting the challenges facing South Africa’s defence apparatus. He expressed grave concern over the continued erosion of the SANDF’s budget. While the recent national budget included a nominal increase in defence allocations, this was insufficient to keep pace with inflation, amounting effectively to a real-term reduction in funding. He underscored the problematic nature of this decline, noting that defence spending has fallen from over 2% of GDP in 1996 to 0.7% at present.
“The inability to adequately fund the SANDF is not only counterproductive from a national security perspective, but also undermines the broader defence industry’s potential to drive industrial growth, technological innovation, and job creation,” Gigaba warned.
He said the lack of funding restricts the SANDF’s capacity to acquire critical combat capabilities, modernise equipment, and respond effectively to both internal and international obligations. Without intervention, he cautioned, the consequences would be dire, not only in terms of operational readiness but also in the country’s ability to support peacekeeping efforts, fulfil regional commitments, and sustain its defence industrial base.
Problems at 1 Mil continue
One of the most pressing domestic concerns for the committee remains the protracted refurbishment of 1 Military Hospital in Tshwane. Originally initiated in the 2005/06 financial year, the upgrade has been plagued by delays, ballooning costs, and operational disruptions. Over R1 bn has already been expended, while rising costs of medical outsourcing are draining an already constrained budget.
“This is an outrageous waste of public funds and a disservice to the members of our armed forces who depend on military health services,” Gigaba remarked.
Between 2016 and 2020 alone, the Department of Defence spent hundreds of ms on outsourced medical services due to the hospital’s limited functionality. The committee said it intends to closely scrutinise a forensic report commissioned by the former Minister of Defence and to assess the SANDF’s plans to use its own Defence Works Formation to finalise the project. The Special Investigating Unit (SIU) and other relevant agencies will be invited to brief the committee in May 2025.
Morale a focus
Gigaba emphasised that morale and working conditions within the SANDF would remain a strategic focus of the committee. He expressed concern over the slow pace of implementing the recommendations of the Defence Force Service Commission, as well as the ongoing ambiguity between its role and that of the Military Bargaining Council.
“We must ensure that our men and women in uniform are well-supported, well-compensated, and not demoralised. A professional defence force begins with dignified working conditions,” he said.
Peacekeeping deployments need to be resourced
The SANDF’s role in international peacekeeping remains a source of pride, but Gigaba warned that these deployments must be matched with proper resourcing. The committee will closely monitor the upcoming withdrawal from the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) and ensure the safe return of personnel and equipment in a highly volatile environment.
The committee is also seeking a detailed assessment of the impact of the eventual withdrawal from MONUSCO, the UN’s stabilisation mission in the DRC, and is planning a site visit to SANDF border deployments in June.
Gigaba reiterated that military interventions should support, not replace, diplomatic efforts.
“We must not view the SANDF as the first line of peace-making. Political solutions must be prioritised. Our soldiers must play a supportive, not substitutive, role in diplomacy.”
Defence debate needed
In a call for a broader strategic reassessment, Gigaba urged Parliament to hold a comprehensive debate on the future of the SANDF, including its posture, missions, and funding requirements. He acknowledged the historical undercurrents that have shaped current perceptions of the military in post-apartheid South Africa. The decision to significantly reduce defence funding in the early democratic era was informed by the desire to transform the military from an instrument of repression into a people’s defence force. However, Gigaba argued that this approach has not kept pace with the evolving role of the military, both domestically and internationally.
“We created a false dichotomy between defence and social spending. But the SANDF is not a burden on society, it is a pillar of it,” he said.
He argued that funding the SANDF should be viewed as part of broader efforts to safeguard social and economic development, especially in light of increased domestic deployments, such as in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and illegal mining operations.
Gigaba concluded with a rallying cry for a more coherent and long-term defence funding strategy, suggesting that additional revenue streams must be identified to bolster military capability and ensure South Africa is not left vulnerable in an increasingly uncertain world.
“We must equip our defence force with the resources, skills, and tools necessary to back up our international commitments, protect our people, and project stability in the region,” Gigaba stated. “A strong SANDF reflects a strong and sovereign South Africa.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
10 Apr 25. Tanzania: Opposition leader’s arrest underscores growing authoritarianism, human rights concerns. On 9 April, the police arrested the leader of the opposition Chadema party, Tundu Lissu, during a rally in Mbinga (Ruvuma region). The police also arrested numerous attendees and deployed teargas to disperse the rally. In recent weeks, Lissu has convened nationwide anti-government rallies to call for electoral reforms. Lissu’s arrest underscores the governing Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party’s escalating efforts to repress the opposition ahead of the October general election. In the coming months, the security forces will likely continue targeting high-profile opposition figures with abduction, assassination attempts and violent attacks, compounding human rights concerns. Individuals associated with opposition activity, including NGO and media outlet personnel, will also face elevated risks of arbitrary detention, increasing threats to locally engaged staff. The authorities will also likely continue cracking down on opposition demonstrations and rallies, increasing bystander exposure to tear gas and possibly live ammunition. However, we assess that the sustained use of authoritarian tactics will likely undermine Chadema’s capacity to mobilise large-scale demonstrations, moderating risks of sustained operational disruption. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Apr 25. Indonesia: Armed insurgency, environmental activism highlight persistent risks in Papua region. Earlier on 10 April, the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) claimed responsibility for killing more than 17 people in Dekai town (Yahukimo district) since the weekend of 6 April. The group alleged that the victims were Indonesian military personnel disguised as gold miners. This claim is denied by Indonesia’s Defence Ministry, which maintains that the victims were civilians. The incident highlights the enduring conflict in Indonesia’s Papua region, where separatist sentiment remains strong. This development sustains the risk of further violence targeting civilians and suspected state affiliates, particularly in more remote, mountainous areas. In addition to the armed insurgency, the region is also marked by environmental activism. In March, over 90 Papuan tribes and political organisations called for a boycott of products containing palm oil sourced from Papua, citing links to deforestation. We assess that this will likely elevate the risk profile for companies operating in the region, particularly those linked to extractive or agribusiness operations in Papua. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Apr 25. South Sudan: Opposition party factionalism will increase risk of clashes in Jonglei, Upper Nile states. On 9 April, a faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – In Opposition (SPLM-IO) voted to replace First Vice President Riek Machar as party leader with Stephen Par Kuol. The SPLM-IO’s deputy chairman, Oyet Nathaniel Pierino, previously suspended Kuol from the party on 7 April, alleging that he had conspired with President Silva Kiir to replace Machar. The vote comes amid significantly elevated risks of armed conflict between factions aligned with Kiir and Machar. As Machar remains under house arrest and several of his deputies (including Pierino) are in hiding, his ability to control disparate SPLM-IO factions is highly limited. In the coming days, Kiir will possibly appoint Kuol as First Vice President to exacerbate divisions within the SPLM-IO and undermine the party’s mobilisation capacity. We assess that this will likely prompt Machar to attempt to mobilise loyalist SPLM-IO militant factions and associated ethnic-Nuer militias to assert control over the party, increasing risks of inter-faction clashes in SPLM-IO strongholds, particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile states. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Apr 25. China’s Military Buildup Threatens Indo-Pacific Region Security. China is undertaking an unprecedented military buildup, developing a large and advanced arsenal of nuclear, conventional, cyber and space capabilities, said John Noh, performing the duties of assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, who testified today at a House Armed Services Committee hearing in Washington. China aims to dominate the Indo-Pacific region and displace the United States as the world’s most powerful nation, Noh said, noting Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Noh said to counter this growing threat, the U.S. must reestablish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region with combat-credible military forces, rebalance burden sharing with allies and partners and invest in the U.S. defense industrial base.
“Stronger allies lead to stronger alliances, and stronger alliances deter aggression and create dilemmas for our adversaries,” he said.
Navy Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said Indo-Pacom faces a confluence of challenges.
“Foremost among them is China’s increasingly aggressive and assertive behavior. Their unprecedented military modernization encompassing advancements in artificial intelligence, space-based capabilities, among others, poses a real and serious threat to our homeland, to our allies and to our partners,” he said.
In 2024, the PLA demonstrated growing capabilities through persistent operations against Taiwan, escalating by 300%, Paparo said. China’s aggressive military actions near Taiwan are not just exercises; they are rehearsals. While the PLA attempts to intimidate the people of Taiwan and demonstrate coercive capability, these actions can backfire, drawing increased global attention and accelerating Taiwan’s own defensive preparations, Paparo said. China is outproducing the United States in air, maritime and missile capability while also accelerating its space and counter-space capabilities, he said, adding that it poses real and serious challenges to U.S. military superiority but also presents opportunities for reform and for establishing enduring advantage.
There are also other threats in the region, Paparo said.
“North Korea’s development of advanced nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles — including a new intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States — poses a direct threat to our homeland and to our allies,” he said.
Regarding Russia’s influence in the region, Paparo noted that North Korea is receiving military support and assistance to advance its own military capabilities, and the growing military cooperation between Russia and China has added another layer of complexity and created a compounding challenge. He said that Indo-Pacom is tasked with deterring threats and aiding regional stability while ensuring the ability to prevail in conflict. Last year, the command conducted 120 joint exercises, 20 of which were significant exercises with allies and partners.
“Though we face serious challenges, the joint force remains confident, resolute and determined to prevail. Deterrence remains our highest duty,” Paparo said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
09 Apr 25. Hegseth Says U.S. Partnering With Panama to Secure Canal, Deter China. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth today announced an expanded partnership between the U.S. and Panama to secure the Panama Canal in order to counter “China’s maligned influence” in the region.
“The era of capitulating to coercion by the communist Chinese is over,” Hegseth said while delivering prepared remarks earlier in the day.
” growing and adversarial control of strategic land and critical infrastructure in this hemisphere cannot and will not stand,” he added.
Hegseth, who has been in Panama City for a three-day security conference with the host nation, later made the expanded partnership announcement during a joint press conference with Panamanian Public Security Minister Frank Abrego.
“The Panama Canal is key terrain that must be secured by Panama, with America, and not China,” Hegseth said.
He added that, just prior to the news conference, the U.S. and Panama signed a memorandum of understanding related to cooperative security activities in the region and that the signing of an additional declaration related to the security and operation of the Panama Canal would be forthcoming.
That declaration, Hegseth said, would provide a framework for U.S. warships and auxiliary ships to travel “first and free” through the canal.
“These documents reaffirm historic ties and outline how we will deepen our relationship and strengthen bilateral canal security cooperation,” Hegseth said.
He added that the signed MOU would pave the way for an increased level of joint training exercises between the two countries and improve overall interoperability between both nations’ military forces by reestablishing a rotational joint presence at a handful of previously operational U.S. military installations. Those installations include Rodman Naval Station and Howard Air Force Base, as well as Fort Sherman, where plans are underway to revive the jungle operations center so that U.S. and Panamanian troops can train side by side.
Hegseth said the expanded security relationship between the two countries would also include information sharing, enhanced cyber cooperation, bilateral security dialogues and canal infrastructure improvements.
“Our countries reaffirmed our shared commitment to protecting Panamanian sovereignty from maligned influence, and we recognize the foundational importance of our constitutional governments — including respect for our neutrality treaty,” Hegseth said.
Signed Sep. 7, 1977, the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal stipulated that the U.S. would relinquish control of the canal by the year 2000 while also ensuring open and secure waterway access to all nations.
When asked whether the U.S. still recognizes Panama’s sovereignty over the canal, Hegseth said that protecting Panamanian sovereignty from maligned influences in the region is essential.
“When President Trump says, ‘We’re taking back the Panama Canal from Chinese influence,’ that involves partnership with the United States,” Hegseth said, adding that the U.S. is grateful that Panama has welcomed American troops onto Panamanian soil through the joint rotational exercise invitation.
“And that’s what you’ll see in the memorandum of understanding: it’s an opportunity to revive … locations where U.S. troops can work with Panamanian troops to enhance capabilities and cooperate in a rotational way,” he said.
Presently, there are two U.S. Navy guided-missile cruisers, one U.S. Coast Guard cutter, four F-18 fighter jets, and over 1,000 U.S. service members — including a U.S. Marine Corps infantry company — training and exercising with the Panamanians, Hegseth said.
He added that the U.S. Navy would send the hospital ship USNS Comfort to Panama this summer to provide medical care and deepen bilateral relationships between the two countries.
In addition to partnering to secure the Panama Canal, Hegseth said the two countries are also working in tandem to counter violent cartels and criminal enterprises throughout the Americas, as well as securing their respective countries’ borders. As an example of the latter, Hegseth credited Panama with reducing illegal border crossings at the Darién Gap — a 60-mile land bridge connecting Central and South America — by 99% in the past year. Calling the expanded partnership with Panama “a golden age of clear-eyed Americanism,” Hegseth said that the U.S. and its partner nations throughout Central and South America seek a hemisphere that is secure and prosperous for its sovereign nations.
“We want this to be a golden age for our countries, together, and for this hemisphere,” Hegseth said. “We want — in short — not only to make America great again, but to make the Americas great again.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
09 Apr 25. New Zealand: Defence spending rise will boost military capabilities, constrain fiscal budget. On 7 April, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon announced plans to increase defence spending by NZD 9 bn (USD 5 bn) over the coming four years as part of the government’s new Defence Capability Plan. The investment aims to address capability gaps and high attrition rates in the military following cuts to defence spending in recent years. Luxon stated that the country is ‘no longer in a benign environment’, a likely reference to growing Chinese military assertiveness in the region. In February, China’s navy carried out two live-fire exercises in international waters in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand, causing nearly 50 flights to be diverted. We assess that the defence budget rise is unlikely to drive regional tensions significantly due to New Zealand’s relatively limited military size and comparatively cordial relations with China and the US. However, we assess the additional spending commitments will possibly create fiscal pressure, limiting spending in other sectors, including social welfare and infrastructure. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Apr 25. Congo (DRC): Former president’s return would likely elevate government stability, unrest risks. On 8 April, the former president, Jospeh Kabila, announced that he would imminently return from self-imposed exile due to the ongoing conflict with the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces (both DRC). Kabila’s return is likely to trigger anti-government protests in major cities, including the capital Kinshasa, as well as Katanga province (Kabila’s home), increasing the risk of unrest. Also on 8 April, the period of national consultation to form a unity government ended. Incumbent President Félix Tshisekedi launched the consultation period to incorporate opposition figures into the government, though approximately 90% of participants come from the governing Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) coalition. Consequently, the consultation is unlikely to moderate criticism of Tshisekedi or threats to government stability amid rising anti-government sentiment. In recent months, Kabila has held talks with prominent opposition figures, including Moïse Katumbi and Claudel Lubaya, which possibly indicates an attempt to form a unified opposition to challenge Tshisekedi’s government. If Kabila is able to form effective partnerships with high-profile opposition figures (particularly those excluded from the consultation process), we assess that threats to government stability would increase.
09 Apr 25. Ethiopia: Replacement of Tigrayan leader will sustain risk of factionalism, clashes. On 8 April, President Abey Ahmed appointed Tadesse Werede as the president of the Tigray Regional Interim Administration, replacing Getachew Reda. The announcement follows months of deadlock within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which leads the regional interim administration. The TPLF began proceedings to dismiss Reda in October 2024, amid significantly elevated tensions between factions aligned with Reda and TPLF chairperson Debretsion Gebremichael. Although Werede previously served in Reda’s administration, he is generally perceived as a neutral figure within the TPLF; this will possibly facilitate progress towards resolving the long-standing political deadlock. However, the federal government’s appointment of Werede will possibly trigger allegations of partisanship from Gebremichael-aligned factions. In the coming weeks, Werede will likely reshuffle the interim administration’s cabinet, with ministerial appointments likely exacerbating tensions between Reda- and Gebremichael-aligned TPLF factions. We assess this will increase the risk of organisational splintering and that militant factions will revert to insurgency-style operations; clashes between factions would substantially elevate security risks for civilians and business assets, including those in Mekelle (Tigray region).(Source: Sibylline)
08 Apr 25. Joint Statement Between President Mulino, Panama Canal Authority Administrator, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Following April 8th, 2025 Bilateral Meeting. President José Raúl Mulino and Panama Canal Authority Administrator Ricaurte Vazquez welcomed U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to Panama on April 8, 2025. During this visit, the leaders reaffirmed the historic security relationship between the Republic of Panama and the United States of America. They agreed our two nations must stand shoulder-to-shoulder in their mutual commitment to address shared security challenges. The leaders recognized the robust foundation and legacy of bilateral security cooperation, including over $230m in U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State security assistance to Panama in the past five years. Secretary Hegseth strongly welcomed President Mulino’s commitment to make Panama the first country in our hemisphere to exit the Belt and Road Initiative, and to reduce China’s problematic presence in other areas. Secretary Hegseth also congratulated President Mulino for Panama’s efforts to reduce illegal immigration and for closing the border in the Darién. Mindful of these bilateral obligations, President Mulino, Administrator Vazquez and Secretary Hegseth committed their joint resolve to strengthen bilateral Canal security cooperation. In coordination with the Panama Canal Authority and in recognition of the constitutional framework of the Panamanian state, the statutory relationship with the Panama Canal Authority, and the obligations of the Treaty, the expedited transit of warships and auxiliary vessels of the Republic of Panama and the United States is guaranteed.
- Additionally, in recognition of the Treaty obligation regarding the payment of tolls and other charges under the Neutrality framework, the Republic of Panama and the United States of America will work, as established, on a mechanism to compensate for the payment of tolls and charges, in accordance with the legal and constitutional frameworks of both countries: First and Free.
- Collaborating to enhance and strengthen Panama’s security capabilities, including through a Memorandum of Understanding that will enable increased bilateral activities between the U.S. military and Panamanian security forces and will support mission needs at joint-use locations;
- Reinvigorating the High-Level Security Dialogue toward achieving a robust agenda of bilateral planning and preparedness that prioritizes Canal security and defense, to include discussion of issues related to commercial shipping;
- Signing of a Joint Statement of Understanding between Minister Abrego and Admiral Holsey for enhanced security cooperation through professional education and capacity-building between Panamanian security forces and the U.S. military;
- Reconcentrating bilateral training and exercises in Panama, including through commitments to resume regular joint jungle operations training and to reestablish the 2026 PANAMAX exercise for Canal defense in Panama;
- Leveraging Department of Defense expertise and resources to advise the Government of Panama to strengthen its strategic, cyber security, and maritime security planning;
Advancing arrangements between the United States and the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) toward the continued safe, secure, and neutral operation of the Panama Canal, including through the recent signing of a Cyber Cooperation Arrangement between U.S. Southern Command and the ACP to identify areas for enhanced bilateral cyber cooperation; and through a recent U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Memorandum of Understanding with the ACP that will continue to provide its expertise and technical support to ensure the long-term sustainability of the Canal. (Source: U.S. DoD)
07 Apr 25. UK-Kenya defence partnership deepened during Defence Secretary visit to Nairobi. Defence Secretary met with Agnes Wanjiru’s family to offer condolences, fulfilling his commitment and making him the first UK Minister to meet with them.
- Focus of the visit was meeting Agnes Wanjiru’s family to offer condolences, fulfilling his commitment from July 2024, making him the first UK Minister to meet them, 13 years since her murder.
- Defence Secretary becomes first UK Cabinet Minister under the new Government to visit Kenya, reaffirming critical role of defence partnership in maintaining regional peace and security.
- Defence Secretary also met the Cabinet Secretary for Defence and British troops, reaffirming the bilateral defence relationship.
Defence Secretary John Healey has met the family of Agnes Wanjiru on a visit to Kenya, who was killed in 2012, becoming the first UK Government Minister to do so.
During the meeting, the Defence Secretary heard the concerns of the family in their pursuit of justice. He expressed his condolences and his determination that the UK support the Kenyan investigation into the case. The meeting, which took place at the British High Commissioner’s Residence in Nairobi, marked the first time a UK Government Minister has met Ms Wanjiru’s family, and comes shortly after the 13th anniversary of her death.
The Defence Secretary’s visit underlines the UK Government’s commitment to transparency in the case of Agnes Wanjiru.
Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said: “The purpose of my visit to Kenya was to meet Agnes Wanjiru’s family, who have shown unimaginable strength since losing her in the most horrendous circumstances 13 years ago. I reiterated that the UK Government stands with them in their fight for justice. I welcome the confirmation this afternoon that the case file has been handed over to the Director of Public Prosecutions for a charging decision. This is a really significant step in resolving this case; we will continue to work closely with the Kenyan authorities to push for progress and secure the justice the family deserve.”
His visit to Kenya also reaffirmed the vital importance of the UK-Kenya defence partnership, which delivers a broad programme of cooperation in training, education and capability development to counter shared security threats together. The Defence Secretary was also able to see first-hand the UK’s contribution to regional peace and security in East Africa. He met the Nairobi-based British Peace Support Team (Africa) who train Kenyan and regional troops preparing to deploy on peace support operations in Africa.
During the visit, the Defence Secretary also met Cabinet Secretary for Defence Soipan Tuya to discuss their shared ambitions for the future of the UK-Kenya defence partnership. The discussions focused on mutual security interests, the role of British forces training in Kenya, and collaborative efforts to address regional security challenges. As set out in the Plan for Change, national security is the first duty of the government.
On the relationship with Kenya the Defence Secretary said: “Kenya is an anchor state in an unstable region, and the UK relies and looks to Kenya for regional security. We share the same concerns over growing threats in the region. UK forces already train over 1,100 Kenya Defence Forces personnel and reinforce Kenya’s regional role in supporting peace and countering insurgency. I look forward to developing this work in the future.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
08 Apr 25. Algeria-Mali: Rising tensions will increase operational disruption risks; clashes remain unlikely. On 7 April, Algeria and Mali banned flights to and from each other’s respective airspaces amid escalating diplomatic tensions linked to Algeria’s interception of a Malian drone near their shared border. On 1 April, the Algerian security forces announced the interception of a Malian-piloted reconnaissance drone within Algerian airspace, approximately one mile (1.6km) from the Mali-Algeria border. The Malian authorities later stated that Algeria had intercepted the drone within Malian airspace during counter-insurgency operations targeting an unidentified ‘terrorist group’ – a likely reference to secessionist Tuareg militants entrenched in Tinzaouaten (Kidal region, Mali). Given the lack of border demarcation, further alleged airspace violations are highly likely in the coming months, particularly as Mali continues to employ drones to target Tuareg militant strongholds along the Algeria-Mali border. Further incidents will sustain elevated bilateral tensions, though direct clashes between Algeria and Mali remain highly unlikely. Rather, we assess that Algeria and Mali will likely maintain airspace closures (and possibly close land border crossings), undermining operational, supply chain and travel continuity for locally engaged firms. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Apr 25. Nigeria: Attack has elevated likelihood of security clampdown, airstrikes in north-western areas. On 6 April, clashes between Islamist Lakurawa militants and a local vigilante defence force killed at least 16 people in Tungan Taura and Tungan Laden villages (both Kebbi state). The Lakurawa group is active across several states in north-western Nigeria, particularly Kebbi and Sokoto states. It is believed to enjoy links to Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP) elements operating across Mali and Niger. While the group is primarily engaged in cattle rustling, which often leads to armed clashes with local defence groups and the security forces, this trend has been exacerbated by efforts to enforce laws and collect revenues from areas under the group’s influence. Given the Nigerian federal government has designated the group as a terror entity, we assess the latest attack will likely prompt an intensified security deployment to the area, driving transit risks and staff exposure to petty corruption at security checkpoints. There is a realistic possibility the military will conduct airstrikes targeting Lakurawa positions across Kebbi and Sokoto in the coming weeks; possible target mis-identification will significantly raise security and bystander risks for staff in rural areas. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Apr 25. Colombia: Surrender of arms to government will decrease violence risks in Nariño department. On 5 April, the Comuneros del Sur (FCS) non-state armed group (NSAG) surrendered military equipment to the government and signed two agreements as part of an ongoing peace negotiation. The surrendered equipment included 585 explosive devices and grenades. Meanwhile, the agreements signed included commitments to control illegal mining and substitute 5,000 hectares of illicit coca crops. The deal marks the most significant progress made thus far in President Gustavo Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ strategy since he took office in 2022. The FCS have between 200 and 300 active members, concentrated primarily in Nariño department. The FCS officially split from the National Liberation Army (ELN) NSAG on 7 May 2024. In the near term, the risk of armed clashes between the FCS and military remains low, given that the ongoing ceasefire will highly likely remain in place. The arms handover and agreements will likely partially decrease violence risks in Nariño in the longer term. Furthermore, we assess there is a realistic possibility that other splinter factions of large NSAGs will engage the government in similar negotiations in the coming 12 months. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Apr 25. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Minefields will remain major threat across border regions, driving tensions. On 6 April, an Azerbaijani border guard died after a mine exploded in the Jabrayil region along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, which also injured an additional individual. The region in the former breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh remains heavily mined. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry reported on 6 April that the total death toll from mines following the 2020 war has now reached 392. On 4 April, Azerbaijan called on Armenia to provide information regarding minefields in the region, though Armenia reportedly provided all the most up-to-date maps of minefields in the area in 2024. However, reflecting Yerevan’s determination to reach a peace deal with Baku, Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that it is ready to verify the accuracy of the minefield maps with the involvement of unspecified international experts. We assess that minefields (including those that remain unmapped) will remain a long-term security threat across the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the international border; debate over the accuracy of the maps will likely further drive bilateral tensions and delay the signing of a peace treaty. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Apr 25. Cambodia-China: Chinese-funded upgrades to military base will drive regional tensions. On 5 April, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Chinese military officials presided over the opening of the expanded Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville province (Cambodia). Chinese-funded upgrades to the base, which began in 2022, include a new China-Cambodia joint logistics and training centre and a pier capable of accommodating large warships, including aircraft carriers (which are not part of Cambodia’s current fleet). This has raised concerns regarding the potential use of the base by China as a strategic outpost in the Gulf of Thailand. While Hun has re-iterated Cambodia’s commitment to neutrality, it is economically dependent on China. Joint military exercises held at the base on 6 April and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s planned visit later this month (the first since 2016) signal deepening bilateral ties. On 6 April, Chinese and Cambodian warships held joint military exercises at the base. While the extent of Chinese influence at the base is unclear, we assess that it will almost certainly facilitate closer military co-operation between the two countries. (Source: ASD Network)
04 Apr 25. Armenia–Iran: Yerevan’s Westward pivot will increasingly threaten co-operation with Tehran. On 3 April, Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Mehdi Sobhani highlighted opportunities to deepen economic and trade ties between Tehran and Yerevan. He noted that Iran could supply energy to Armenia, which could, in turn, facilitate Tehran’s access to markets of countries within the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, Armenia’s current westward pivot under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is increasing uncertainty surrounding the country’s continued participation in Russian-led regional structures (such as the EAEU). On 2 April, Rodion Miroshnik, a senior official at Russia’s Foreign Ministry, stated that Armenia cannot seek EU membership while remaining part of the EAEU and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). EU accession has become an important pillar of Pashinyan’s foreign policy. We assess that Armenia’s efforts to deepen ties with the West will highly likely threaten its participation in the EAEU. If this proves to be a long-term policy shift, Armenia’s capacity to serve as a trade corridor for Iran to EAEU markets would likely be undermined. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Apr 25. New Zealand said on Monday it would boost defence spending by NZ$9bn ($5bn) over the next four years, and aim to nearly double spending to 2% as a share of GDP in the next eight years, at a time of rapidly growing tension worldwide. The details came in remarks by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, who called for more spending on defence to ensure prosperity.
“New Zealand and our allies and partners across the world are no longer in a benign environment,” he told a press conference at the release of the Defence Capability Plan.
“My primary focus is the economic importance of this country. However, there can be no prosperity without security, and defence is one vital component of that picture.”
The Defence Capability Plan maps out new funding of NZ$9 bn over the next four years to boost defence capability. It comes on top of baseline spending set to be announced in May. The new spending is a significant boost to Defence Force spending of just under NZ$5bn in 2024/25. New Zealand’s first national security review in 2023 called for more military spending and stronger ties with Indo-Pacific nations to tackle issues of climate change and strategic competition between the West, and China and Russia. (Source: Google/Reuters)
04 Apr 25. South Korea: Elevated unrest risks will persist after president’s impeachment ahead of election. Earlier on 4 April, South Korea’s Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol over his short-lived declaration of martial law in December. The court’s eight justices ruled that Yoon’s actions were unconstitutional. Yoon is now formally removed from office. Around 14,000 officers were deployed in the capital Seoul as pro- and anti-Yoon rallies took place. Acting President Han Duck-soo will remain in office until a new presidential election is held; this must be held by 3 June and will likely occur in early June. Opposition Democratic Party (DP) leader Lee Jae-myung currently leads in the polls. Further unrest is likely, with a major right-wing protest in support of Yoon scheduled for 5 April in Gwanghwamun Square in Seoul. A heightened security force presence in major cities is likely over the coming days to mitigate the risk of violent protests. Yoon also faces criminal charges for insurrection, with trial hearings due to begin on 14 April. These will likely act as a flashpoint for protests. We assess that the risk of domestic unrest will remain elevated in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)
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