Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
27 Mar 25. South Sudan: Vice president’s arrest will significantly increase armed conflict risks. On 26 March, state security forces placed First Vice President Riek Machar, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), under house arrest. The arrest comes amid rapidly escalating tensions between the SPLM-IO and President Silva Kiir’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. At the time of writing, the SPLM-aligned security forces have reportedly adopted an elevated posture in the capital Juba; this likely reflects pre-emptive efforts to secure the city against a potential SPLM-IO re-mobilisation. Such a re-mobilisation would almost certainly trigger intense clashes in and around Juba, increasing threats to life for locally engaged staff; clashes between the army and SPLM-IO forces at a cantonment camp in Rejaf (Central Equatoria state), located seven miles (12km) south of Juba, also reportedly broke out on 26 March. In the coming hours, the authorities will likely implement a city-wide curfew, limiting the mobility and capacity of staff to evacuate at short notice. Following Machar’s arrest, the UK and US embassies in Juba announced they would operate with minimal staff, almost certainly restricting access to consular services. In the coming days, embassies will likely issue evacuation notices for foreign nationals, increasing pressure on commercially available evacuation routes, particularly from Juba International Airport (JUB). (Source: Sibylline)
27 Mar 25. Zimbabwe: Military chief’s removal will elevate government stability, coup risks. On 25 March, President Emmerson Mnangagwa removed the head of the army, Anselem Sanyatwe, and re-assigned him as sports minister. The move likely reflects Mnangagwa’s attempts to consolidate power. This comes amid opposition within the army (and factions of Mnangagwa’s ZANU-PF party) to the president’s proposed constitutional amendments that would allow him to rule until 2030 (the ED2030 Campaign). Sanyatwe’s removal will likely entrench tensions between Mnangagwa and liberation war veterans within the military, elevating threats to government stability. The threat of a coup attempt will increase if Mnangagwa arrests or removes other high-profile figures within the military in anticipation of protests on 31 March demanding his resignation. These gatherings are being organised by the prominent ZANU-PF member (and former war veteran) Blessed Geza. The police will likely employ heavy-handed dispersal tactics during the protests, significantly elevating the likelihood of violent clashes and bystanders’ exposure to tear gas and possibly even live ammunition. We assess that well-attended protests or repeated protest action will possibly trigger a coup that aims to remove Mnangagwa and to install Vice President Constantino Chiwenga as president. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Mar 25. Russia soon to begin to build road bridge to North Korea. Russia and North Korea will soon begin construction of a road bridge over the Tumen river between the two countries, Russia’s ambassador to Pyongyang was quoted as saying by state news agency RIA. The bridge was agreed during a visit by President Vladimir Putin to North Korea in 2024 when the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. The road bridge will be built near the existing “Friendship Bridge” rail bridge which was commissioned in 1959 after the Korean war. An ancient wooden bridge used to cross the border in the early 20th century but it was destroyed, according to Russian media. (Source: Reuters)
26 Mar 25. Moldova: Detention of regional leader will elevate separatist sentiment, protest risks. On 25 March, Moldovan law enforcement detained the leader of Moldova’s pro-Russia Gagauzia region, Evgenia Gutul, at Chisinau International Airport (RMO). Moldova’s Anti-Corruption Centre said she was being held in the capital Chisinau for 72 hours in connection with a criminal case concerning the illegal financing of her election campaign in 2023 to govern the region. In April 2024, a Moldovan court opened a trial against Gutul on accusations that she was involved in channelling funds from Russia to the now-banned pro-Moscow or party. Reports indicate that Gutul was possibly due to be sentenced soon. While we cannot confirm this, it likely explains her attempt to leave the country. Gutul’s arrest and possible sentencing will highly likely provide Gagauzian officials and Russia grounds to stir up separatist sentiment (though the risk of genuine secession remains low). We assess that domestic unrest risks will likely be heightened in Comrat. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Mar 25. Mozambique: Agreement with opposition leader will mitigate unrest, socio-economic health risks. On 24 March, opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane confirmed an agreement with President Daniel Chapo to end the wave of protests following October’s disputed presidential election. The agreement includes provisions to grant pardons to detainees, guarantee medical assistance for those injured during the protests and provide compensation for affected families. We assess the agreement will likely de-escalate tensions in the short term, mitigating unrest and government stability risks. A reduction in protest activity will likely reduce supply-chain continuity and operational disruption risks for locally engaged firms. The agreement will also increase the likelihood of the government securing further disbursements from the IMF under its Extended Credit Facility arrangement, easing budget deficit and socio-economic health concerns. However, accusations from Mondlane that the government has reneged on the deal will likely trigger a renewed wave of protests in major cities, including the capital Maputo. We assess that such protests would highly likely induce an elevated posture from the security forces, driving the risk of clashes with protestors and bystander exposure to tear gas. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Mar 25. North Korea leader Kim Jong Un touts AI suicide drones, early-warning aircraft.
* Summary
* State media show drones striking targets
* Radar early warning aircraft also unveiled
* Pyongyang under sanctions for nuclear, missile programme
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un supervised the test of suicide drones with artificial intelligence (AI) technology and said unmanned control and AI capability must be the top priorities in modern arms development, state media reported on Thursday.
Kim inspected new upgraded reconnaissance drones that are capable of detecting various tactical targets and enemy activities on land and at sea, KCNA state news agency said. (Source: Reuters)
26 Mar 25. Cameroon-Nigeria: Boko Haram attack highlights increasing capabilities, threats to staff. On 25 March, Boko Haram militants killed at least 20 soldiers in an attack in the Wulgo area (Borno state, Nigeria), 5 miles (8km) from the Cameroon-Nigeria border area. Militants employed explosive drones to attack and overrun a military base staffed by Cameroonian soldiers deployed under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) regional counter-terrorism body. This marks one of the first instances of Boko Haram employing drones to target MJTF positions and underscores the group’s evolving insurgent capabilities. In the coming months, Boko Haram militants will highly likely continue leveraging positions in the Lake Chad area to conduct attacks in Borno state (Nigeria) and Extreme North Region (Cameroon). This will highly likely include the use of rudimentary explosive drones targeting security force positions and convoys, increasing collateral and bystander risks for locally engaged staff, particularly during overland movement. We assess that Boko Haram militants will also highly likely continue conducting attacks targeting civilians, sustaining attack and kidnap-for-ransom risks in the Cameroon-Chad-Nigeria tri-border area. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Mar 14. Hegseth Addresses Indo-Pacom Partnerships During First Trip to Region. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth discussed his strategic vision for the Defense Department, as it relates to the Indo-Pacific region, while delivering remarks to alumni of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu yesterday. Founded in 1995, the DKI APCSS is a DOD institute that offers a forum for military and civilian leaders from the region to come together and discuss local and global security matters. Noting this was the first time he was able to address military and civilian leaders in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility since being sworn in, Hegseth told the virtual and in-person audience that it was important for him to address that group first.
“Many of you graduated from our premier forum for studying the Indo-Pacific, and for building ties among national security leaders who are engaged in this region,” Hegseth told the audience.
“Our relationships — and our teamwork — form the foundation of achieving peace through strength,” he added.
To that end, Hegseth said achieving peace through strength will be attained by adhering to the three core tenets he listed in his Jan. 25, 2025, message to the force: restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military and reestablishing deterrence.
“By restoring the warrior ethos, U.S. forces assigned to the Indo-Pacific will be the best trained and best equipped forces in the world,” Hegseth said, adding recruiting numbers are up throughout the armed services, and “our opponents are taking notice.”
Regarding rebuilding the military, Hegseth said DOD will work with the defense industrial base to “rapidly and responsively deliver the right tools to our warfighters in real time.”
He also noted that DKI APCSS has been focused on supply chain security for U.S. weapons systems, as well as studying the potential for coproduction and sustainment of U.S. military platforms and munitions with international partners.
“Please keep up the great work; we need it, it is more important than ever,” Hegseth said.
Regarding reestablishing deterrence in the region, Hegseth said the U.S. will stand with its allies and partners to deter China’s aggression, and that he believes each ally, partner and friend in the region contributes their own unique manner of deterrence.
Hegseth finished his remarks by encouraging allies in the region to recommit to the partnership and to doing their part to reestablishing deterrence and, ultimately, peace through strength.
“No one should question the resolve of the United States of America to defend our interests in the Indo-Pacific and beyond,” Hegseth said.
“We will do this through the deterrent power of the strongest, most effective, most lethal fighting force in the world … supported by — and in partnership with — capable, like-minded allies and partners,” he added.
As part of his first official visit to the Indo-Pacom AOR, Hegseth is spending his time in Hawaii primarily meeting with civilian and military leaders. Following his stay in Hawaii, Hegseth is scheduled to travel to Guam, the Philippines and Japan to meet with senior U.S. military and civilian leadership. He also intends to participate in a series of international bilateral meetings, with a goal aimed at strengthening U.S. alliances and partnerships toward a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. (Source: U.S. DoD)
25 Mar 25. Indonesia: Revision of military law will drive unrest risks, undermine democratic standards. On 24 March, approximately 1,000 students and activists protested outside a government building in Surabaya (East Java province) in response to recent amendments to the country’s military law. The police used water cannons to disperse the protesters and detained several participants. The protest follows the passage of military law reforms by the House of Representatives (DPR) on 20 March, unanimously approved under President Prabowo Subianto’s ruling coalition. The reforms include the allocation of more civilian posts for military officers, prompting protests in cities across the country. On 20 March, the police deployed tear gas against several hundred protesters in the capital Jakarta who attempted to enter the parliament building. We assess that further protests by activists, students and religious groups are highly likely over the coming weeks countrywide. However, with Prabowo’s allies holding a parliamentary majority, his efforts to expand the military’s role in government are highly likely to proceed. This will likely undermine democratic standards, human rights protections and supervision quality. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Mar 25. South Sudan: Rising armed conflict risks increased threats to staff, assets. On 24 March, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) warned that the country is ‘teetering on the edge’ of civil war amid escalating violence, rising ethno-religious tensions and stalling diplomatic efforts. Rising tensions between factions aligned with President Silva Kiir and First Vice President Reik Machar will highly likely compound risks of armed conflict in the coming weeks, increasing threats to locally engaged staff (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 14 March 2025). On 22 March, Germany announced the temporary closure of its embassy in the capital Juba due to security concerns; the US Embassy evacuated all non-essential staff from Juba on 8 March due to similar concerns. In the coming weeks, escalating security concerns will likely prompt further embassy closures and staff evacuations, restricting access to consular services for foreign nationals. We assess that airlines will also possibly limit services to South Sudan’s major airports, including Juba International Airport (JUB) and Malakal Airport (MAK), restricting the availability of commercially available evacuation routes in the event of significant conflict escalation. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Mar 25. Australian Federal Budget 2025: Chalmers closes the door on last-minute defence reprieve. Treasurer Jim Chalmers has confirmed that there will be no defence spending surprises under the newly announced Federal Budget. Chalmers delivered his third federal budget on March 25, resoundingly close the door on a speculative increase to percent of defence spend. The Federal Government had previously announced last year that an additional $50.3bn would be funded into the Australian Defence Force over the next decade, with an additional $10.6 bn invested over the forward estimates. The percent defence spend roughly equating to a diminutive 2.1 percent, and rising to 2.3 percent into the 2030s. The funding potentially sending international indications that Australia is uninterested in pulling its own weight militarily. In addition, earlier this week Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles announced a tidy sum of $1bn would be brought forward from 2028/29 to 2025-26 to enable Defence to acquire capabilities faster. The Federal Government instead took the Federal Budget opportunity to throw the previous 2022 Liberal Government ‘under the bus’ regarding defence prepareness.
“When we came to office in 2022, we inherited a mess in Defence. There was $42bn worth of programs with zero dollars behind them,” according to a statement published by the Prime Ministers Office.
“During a wasted decade, six Liberal Defence Ministers over nine years, including Peter Dutton, presided over 28 projects running 97 years behind schedule.
“During a time of challenging strategic conditions, Australia’s Defence Force was shrinking. Almost $20 bn was secretly ripped out of Defence.
“The Albanese Government has made significant investments in cutting-edge Defence capabilities. This has seen investment hit record levels over the past few years.
“We are also backing Australian defence industry. Almost 80 per cent of Defence’s annual budget is spent in Australia. Local investments deliver jobs and economic opportunities for Australia and Australians.”
In a case of possible troubles on the horizon, prospective US under-secretary of defence for policy at the Pentagon, Elbridge Colby, has previously outlined that the new US Government would advocate for a 3 per cent of GDP for defence spending minimum among western allies. (Source: Defence Connect)
24 Mar 25. South Korea: Domestic unrest, security risks are elevated ahead of president’s impeachment verdict. Earlier on 24 March, South Korea’s Constitutional Court dismissed an impeachment motion against Han Duck-soo, reinstating him as prime minister and acting president. Prime Minister Han became acting president in December 2024 after the National Assembly (NA, unicameral parliament) impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol over his short-lived declaration of martial law. Han was subsequently impeached for blocking the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court. Domestic unrest risks remain elevated ahead of the Constitutional Court’s verdict on Yoon, which is expected within weeks. On 22 March, hundreds of thousands of people joined nationwide pro- and anti-Yoon protests. We assess that the risk of political violence will be heightened over the coming weeks. The authorities have logged over 600 online calls for riots and the opposition Democratic Party (DP) has reported anonymous assassination threats. Several foreign embassies have advised citizens to avoid protest hubs. The police plan to deploy around 14,000 officers in the capital Seoul and to raise its emergency status to the highest level on the day of the verdict. Significant travel and operational disruption is almost certain on the day. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Mar 25. Congo (DRC): Attack claims underscore sustained conflict risks. Earlier on 24 March, the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group claimed the Congolese military (FARDC) attacked its positions in Walikale (North Kivu province). This follows pledges from the M23 on 22 March that it would withdraw from Walikale in support of peace efforts. While we cannot verify the M23’s claims, they underline the group’s reluctance to follow through with its pledge to withdraw, as well as the likely maintenance of its positions around Walikale in the coming days, sustaining conflict risks. Later on 24 March, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and East African Community (EAC) will hold a joint virtual summit to address the conflict. However, the M23 will be excluded from the talks. We continue to assess that any peace initiative that excludes the M23 is highly unlikely to produce a durable ceasefire. In addition, the M23 continues to demonstrate limited interest in direct talks with the Congolese government, sustaining conflict and critical security risks for NGO staff throughout North and South Kivu provinces. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Mar 25. Kenya: Al-Shabaab ambush highlights sustained attack, kidnapping risks in western regions. On 23 March, al-Shabaab militants killed six police force personnel in an attack on a reservist camp in Biyamadhow (Garissa county). Local media reports indicate the militants raided weapons caches and kidnapped several reservists before retreating across the Kenya-Somalia border. Al-Shabaab militants routinely conduct cross-border raids in Garissa, Lamu, Mandera and Wajir counties (all Kenya), though the frequency of attacks has decreased since 2023. However, amid an escalating counter-insurgency campaign in Somalia, al-Shabaab militants will possibly increase the frequency of cross-border raids to target weapons and ammunition stores in Kenya in the coming months. Attacks will likely primarily target security force positions in rural areas in western Kenya, increasing collateral risks for installations in close proximity to police stations, reservist camps and weapons depots. The risk of ambushes targeting vehicles during overland movement through rural areas will also moderately increase, particularly near the Boni National Reserve (Garissa). Such attacks will increase security and kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) risks for locally engaged staff, including those travelling with police escorts. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Mar 25. Anatomy of SADC’s failure in eastern DRC. On 13 March, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) announced the termination and phased withdrawal of its military deployment in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This followed a series of setbacks for the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), culminating in the January seizure of Sake and Goma by the Rwandan-backed M23. Since its deployment in December 2023, the regional force has failed to push back M23 and has suffered several casualties. SAMIDRC’s withdrawal is the second SADC deployment that has ended inconclusively – the first being the bloc’s mission in Mozambique. Why are these military interventions failing, and what does this mean for future regional operations? SAMIDRC’s failure in eastern DRC can be attributed to several military and political factors. From a military perspective, the mission was outgunned and outmanoeuvred by M23 and Rwanda in Sake and Goma.
The SADC troops were meant to fight alongside the Congolese army, but instead found a demotivated national force with limited combat readiness. SAMIDRC’s own capability constraints were also a major limiting factor. The lack of sustainable funding and equipment, particularly aerial power, and a weak road network undermined mandate implementation. The DRC requested SAMIDRC, hoping to repeat the 2012-13 success of the United Nations’ (UN) Force Intervention Brigade in the east of the country. However, the South African forces’ operational strength – the backbone of the brigade – has significantly deteriorated compared to other armies in the region (see graph At the political level, SAMIDRC suffered from a lack of cohesion within SADC. Between 2022 and 2024, few member states wanted to fund a mission that didn’t align with their national interests. Strategic ambiguity also undermined the force. The military deployment wasn’t anchored in a political process and worse still, there was some competition between SAMIDRC (backed primarily by South Africa and to some extent Tanzania) and the African Union (AU)-mandated Luanda Process, led by Angolan President João Lourenço. Given that Angola is a SADC country, the bloc could have handled the military track, while Luanda focused on the political process.
Tanzania’s shifting stance added to the confusion. Tanzania chose not to participate in the East African Community Regional Force deployed to eastern DRC before SAMIDRC. Although initially supportive of SAMIDRC, it gradually moved towards a neutral position. With October’s elections approaching, Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan has prioritised economic development and regional stability over military entanglements. Maintaining good relations with Rwanda and Uganda appears crucial. Rwanda relies on the Dar es Salaam port for its goods supply, and Uganda plans to transport crude oil from the Lake Albert oilfields to the Tanga port in Tanzania via the East African Crude Oil Pipeline. Tanzania is also concerned about the spread of violent extremism from northern Mozambique into its territory. A Rwandan military contingent currently supports Mozambican forces in the area, making an open confrontation between Tanzania and Rwanda in east DRC less likely. Tanzania’s lukewarm engagement in SAMIDRC weakened the mission and contributed to its demise. Countries involved in eastern DRC are driven by competing strategic interests. In pushing for SAMIDRC’s deployment, South Africa appeared primarily motivated by economic factors and a desire to preserve its regional prestige, despite lacking the required military capabilities. As important as the DRC may be, it isn’t a key interest for South Africa. In contrast, Uganda and Rwanda consider the eastern DRC vital due to their geographical proximity, security concerns and economic stakes. This explains their unwavering commitment to a long-term military presence, including through supporting M23 and other armed groups. SADC’s failure in the DRC and its premature exit from Mozambique raise questions about the effectiveness of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. Despite being framed by South African officials and the SADC Secretariat as a peacekeeping mission, SAMIDRC didn’t meet the standard definition of peacekeeping.
Its mandate was focused on counter-insurgency, aimed at ‘assisting the DRC government in restoring peace and security in the eastern region’. That amounts to a combat mission rather than a peacekeeping operation. The absence of a political strategy – the backbone of traditional peacekeeping – further underscores this. Against this background, South African government statements alluding to a phased withdrawal aimed at giving way to mediation efforts are little more than face-saving. As SADC’s ability to fulfil its mutual defence mandate weakens, it appears increasingly focused on shielding incumbent presidents following highly contested elections. As a regional organisation, it struggles to help secure its member states and promote democratic norms. Regional organisations were originally designed for economic integration, and have consistently battled to transform into effective collective security and defence structures. Before SAMIDRC, the East African Community Regional Force was expelled from eastern DRC following Kinshasa and that bloc’s diverging interpretations of the mission’s mandate. Central African peace support operations have often been more effective – even though this region lags behind regarding integration. The military setbacks experienced by SADC and the East African Community suggest a need to reassess the AU’s subsidiarity principle. The principle gives precedence to actors closer to a situation (countries or regional economic communities) over those further removed (AU or UN). Implementation of the principle reveals that member states in the same regional bloc may have divergent – if not competing – interests in crisis situations, making coordinated security responses difficult and sometimes impossible. This issue is among those topping the priority list of the newly sworn-in AU Commission Chair, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. However, meaningful reform will only be possible if regional bodies examine their structural weaknesses. Otherwise, future military interventions are doomed to fail. Written by Paul-Simon Handy, Regional Director East Africa and Representative to the African Union, ISS Addis Ababa. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
21 Mar 25. Congo (DRC): Capture of Walikale underscores sustained conflict risks. On 20 March, the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group captured Walikale town (North Kivu province). Walikale is connected to both the R529 and N3 highways; this will allow the M23 to link its forces across North and South Kivu provinces while consolidating control over mineral deposits and supply routes. The M23 will also likely advance further westwards along the N3 towards Lubutu (Maniema province), though the group will likely be aware of the risk of over-extending its supply lines. The advance comes despite calls for a ceasefire by Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. We previously assessed that, without the M23’s participation, such calls were unlikely to de-escalate the conflict. Walikale’s capture ultimately reinforces our assessment. We also assess the implementation of any durable ceasefire is unlikely in the coming weeks, as the M23 maintains its momentum and demonstrates limited interest in talks. As such, the expanding scope of conflict will drive further displacement, increasing pressure on humanitarian resources and exposing NGO staff to crime and unrest. (Source: Sibylline)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-