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20 Mar 25. Moldova-Russia: Heightened regional tensions will drive Russian destabilisation risks. On 19 March, Moldovan law enforcement cordoned off the area proximate to the Russian embassy in the capital Chisanu due to a bomb threat that was later confirmed to be false. Russia’s Foreign Ministry issued a protest regarding the operation, claiming it violated diplomatic protocol by blocking access to the embassy and stating that the embassy had not received any notification concerning the bomb threat. The Moldovan police did not provide further details on the incident. False bomb threats occur relatively regularly in Moldova, including at Chi?in?u International Airport (RMO). Although the perpetrators are seldom identified, we assess that such incidents likely form part of Russia’s destabilisation toolkit. This latest incident will moderately increase the already tense relations between Moldova and Russia. We assess that in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections in autumn, Russia will highly likely intensify its destabilisation campaign. This will likely involve inflating incidents that could be portrayed as anti-Russia or threatening to pro-Russian elements within Moldovan society. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Mar 25. Sudan: Army’s advancing offensive in Khartoum will highly likely trigger further clashes. Earlier on 20 March, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) claimed to be close to re-taking control of the Presidential Palace in the capital Khartoum from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The announcement comes after the SAF reportedly intensified airstrikes targeting RSF positions in the surrounding Khartoum 1 neighbourhood on 19 March. The SAF’s efforts to retake the palace will almost certainly continue intensifying in the coming hours and will likely succeed in the coming days. Amid broader efforts to consolidate its territorial holdings in Khartoum, the SAF will likely attempt to link its positions in Al-Remila and Khartoum 1 in the coming weeks. These efforts will highly likely trigger intense clashes with RSF militants in Khartoum 2, Khartoum 3 and the Khartoum Light Industrial Area. Running battles, widespread use of sniper fire and indiscriminate airstrikes will significantly elevate security risks for locally engaged staff. Additionally, we assess that the RSF’s likely retreat from positions within Khartoum 1 will increase risks of looting and sexual violence, including for NGO staff. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Mar 25. Australian Coalition hints at Defence spending jump, pending budget situation. The federal opposition has hinted at a marked increase in the nation’s defence spending, aiming to bring it up to 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2029, with just one catch – it all hinges on the budget position. In recent years, Australia’s defence spending has been a focal point of political debate, reflecting the nation’s response to evolving global security dynamics. Under the Gillard government (2010–13), defence expenditure was reduced to 1.6 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) – the lowest since the 1930s – amid efforts to achieve a federal budget surplus.
The subsequent Abbott and Turnbull governments (2013–18) sought to reverse this trend, committing to increase defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP by 2020. This commitment was driven by concerns over regional security and the need to modernise Australia’s military capabilities.
Meanwhile, the Morrison government (2018–22) maintained this trajectory, emphasising the importance of a robust defence posture in light of strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.
In 2021, the AUKUS trilateral security partnership was established with the United Kingdom and the United States, marking a significant shift in Australia’s defence strategy. A central component of this partnership is the acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, aimed at enhancing the Royal Australian Navy’s capabilities and blowing traditional defence budget quantums out of the water.
The Albanese government, elected in 2022, commissioned the Defence Strategic Review, released in April 2023. The review highlighted worsening security challenges and recommended restructuring the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to focus on protecting the nation from military threats. This included transitioning from a “balanced force” to a “focused force” and expanding long-range strike capabilities. The government accepted most of these recommendations, underscoring a commitment to adapt to the changing security environment.
Despite these initiatives, debates persist regarding the adequacy of current defence spending. Critics argue that the planned increase to 2.34 per cent of GDP by 2034 is insufficient, especially when compared to allies like the United States, which allocates 3.4 per cent of its GDP to defence. Recent geopolitical developments, such as Chinese naval activities near Australian waters, have intensified calls for increased investment to uphold commitments under alliances like ANZUS.
As we head towards an election campaign that will be tinged with khaki, the state, scale and scope of Australia’s defence spending will play an important part in both sides’ campaigns, as they seek to respond to the emerging challenges presented by a rising China and a United States eager to see its allies and partners step up to the plate and take more responsibility over their own spending. Now, the federal opposition, led by former defence minister Peter Dutton has hinted at a rapid and sizeable increase in the nation’s defence spending, aiming to bring it up from the (about) 2 per cent (or AU$56bn) mark to 2.5 per cent by 2029, with an important caveat, telling Neil Mitchell, “It depends on how much money is in the bank and the state of the books, as we find them after the election.”
Bringing into question what we can expect when the Treasurer, Dr Jim Chalmers, hands down the federal budget next week, while setting the stage for an election that will no doubt see defence and national security figure prominently even amid the ongoing cost-of-living crisis.
Seeking to provide more clarity, without promising too much, opposition defence spokesman Andrew Hastie said, “A Dutton Coalition government will increase Defence spending above its current levels to meet the challenging strategic circumstances Australia faces. We will have more to say on our national security commitments in due course.”
In contrast, the Albanese government’s current funding plans are expected to see the nation’s defence spending to hit between 2.3–2.4 per cent of GDP by the end of the decade.
Something Hastie launched a scathing attack on the government for, saying, “Labor has already walked away from their target of increasing Defence spending to 2.4 per cent of GDP with Pat Conroy confirming their ambition is now to ‘get Defence over 2.3 per cent’. Labor is lowering the bar to adjust for their failures in Defence.”
“This weak Albanese government has made $80 bn in cuts and delays to Defence, which is sapping capability,” Hastie added.
If Australia were to reach 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2030, with the International Monetary Fund predicting Australia’s economy to be worth approximately AU$2.18trn (US$1.38trn), this would see a figure of approximately AU$54.5bn (in today’s dollars) on the Australian military, but it is still a far cry short of the expectations of the new Trump administration’s “new” floor of 3 per cent.
Meanwhile, if we were to take AusTrade’s predicted size of the Australian economy, at AU$2.91trn (US$1.85trn) by 2030, we would see approximately AU$72.75bn (in today’s dollars) spent on the Australian Defence Force.
Either way, this coming federal election is shaping up to be a critical one for the nation and its security as we respond to the mounting challenges posed by the new world order. (Source: Defence Connect)
19 Mar 25. Indonesia: Proposed amendments will drive protests, increase military influence in governance. On 20 March, Indonesia’s parliament is scheduled to vote on proposed amendments to a military law. The bill permits armed forces personnel to assume a greater number of civilian roles and expands the list of agencies wherein active soldiers can be appointed, such as the State Secretariat, as well as counter-terrorism and narcotics agencies. Rights groups have urged the parliament to reject the revisions, warning that they signal a return to militarised governance. Since taking office in October 2024, President Prabowo Subianto, a former army general whose allies control the legislature, has broadened the military’s role in government. Rights groups and student organisations have called for demonstrations outside the parliament on 20 March. We assess these protests will likely cause localised transport disruption; they will possibly escalate if the bill is passed without further consultation. If enacted, the law is likely to increase military influence in civilian affairs, contributing to a decline in Indonesia’s human rights protections. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Mar 25. Congo (DRC)-Rwanda: Call for ceasefire is unlikely to de-escalate conflict in eastern DRC. On 18 March, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame released a statement calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in eastern DRC. Kagame and Tshisekedi met in Qatar for mediated talks on resolving the ongoing conflict between the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group. The statement will possibly prompt a temporary de-escalation in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces (both DRC) in the coming days. However, as the M23 did not participate in the talks, the effective implementation of a durable ceasefire remains unlikely in the short term. Efforts to negotiate a ceasefire with the M23 directly are also unlikely to progress in the coming weeks. On 17 March, the M23 declined to participate in an Angolan summit that would have facilitated the group’s first direct negotiations with Tshisekedi’s government. We assess that security conditions in North Kivu and South Kivu are highly unlikely to improve in the coming weeks, sustaining significant security, bystander and sexual violence risks for locally engaged staff. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Mar 25. The Philippines and its allies are trying to expand the Squad grouping of nations to include India and South Korea to counter China in the Indo-Pacific region, the Philippines’ Armed Forces chief Romeo S. Brawner said on Wednesday.
The Squad is a multilateral grouping made up of Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States, whose defence forces have conducted joint maritime activities in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone since last year. (Source: Reuters)
18 Mar 25. Russia: Likely large-scale privatisations will boost revenues, ensure loyalty among business elites. Earlier on 18 March, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced his department is preparing proposals for large-scale privatisations. This proposal was initially floated in late 2023 when Siluanov suggested selling shares in 30 major state-owned enterprises while still retaining a controlling stake. Siluanov indicated that privatisations would intensify in 2025, including via court decisions on seized assets. Selling seized assets is expected to yield approximately USD 1.2bn in revenues. The renewed focus on privatisation is likely due to the increasing pressure on Russia’s economy as the country enters the fourth year of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Financing the war has led to a deterioration of the country’s public finances and a depletion of available financial resources, including those in Russia’s National Wealth Fund. As such, privatising large state-owned enterprises will likely boost government revenues, ensuring Russia can economically withstand the war in the coming year. Simultaneously, we assess that the Kremlin will highly likely redistribute privatised assets to close allies as part of a broader strategy to ensure loyalty among business elites. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Mar 25. South Sudan: Withdrawal from security mechanisms underscores rising tensions. On 17 March, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – in Opposition (SPLM-IO) withdrew from a series of joint security mechanisms amid rising tensions with the government following an escalation of violence in Upper Nile state (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 14 March 2025). The withdrawal undercuts a core component of the 2018 peace agreement, likely entrenching division between the SPLM-IO and President Salva Kiir’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), elevating conflict risks. This comes after the South Sudanese Air Force (SSAF), possibly in conjunction with the Ugandan military (UPDF), killed at least 21 people in an airstrike on Nasir town (Upper Nile) on 16 March, targeting the ethnic-Nuer, White Army militia. In the coming days, we assess there is a realistic possibility the attack will prompt ostensibly demobilised SPLM-IO personnel to augment the White Army to conduct retaliatory attacks on South Sudanese Armed Forces (SSPDF) positions in Upper Nile. This would jeopardise the 2018 peace agreement and significantly elevate conflict risks, driving critical security risks for NGO staff. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Mar 25. China-Taiwan: Increased military activity will drive cross-strait tensions. Earlier on 18 March, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported that 43 Chinese aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait in the previous 24 hours. This is the highest count since 15 October 2024 when 111 aircraft crossed the median line. The ‘joint combat readiness patrols’ also included People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy assets. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) confirmed these operations, referring to them as ‘resolute punishment’ for the ‘continuous promotion of separatism’ by Taiwan and the US. This is likely in reference to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s recent labelling of China as a ‘foreign hostile force’ and the US State Department’s removal of language stating it does not support Taiwan’s independence from its website. In response to recent grey zone activity from China, Taiwan launched five-day ‘Immediate Combat Readiness Drills’ on 17 March, including defensive and infrastructure protection exercises along the Tamsui River. We assess that China is increasingly using military drills as retaliation against policies it deems hostile. Although such drills increase the risk of accidental escalation, we assess it is highly unlikely that China is seeking to initiate an armed conflict at this moment. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Mar 25. SANDF needs to be rebuilt in a world where hard power matters most. The world is becoming less stable, less orderly, and far more dangerous, putting South Africa at risk of being pushed around by both major powers and minor continental ones. South Africa and other nations cannot rely on alliances, meaning the country needs to rebuild its hard power capabilities, including the SA National Defence Force (SANDF). This is according to African Defence Review Director Darren Olivier, who is calling for a substantial investment in defence to meet the new challenges facing South Africa and the world. Following the election of Donald Trump and the ramifications of his foreign policy, “these have been the weeks when decades happen,” Olivier stated. He believes the post-World War II global order is collapsing, “and with it the rules-based structure that allowed South Africa to focus on diplomacy and peace operations. From here on, hard power matters more.”
Olivier pointed out that with three United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members (China, Russia and the United States) now openly embracing power politics, and a seeming return to imperialism and even colonialism, over international law, the Council is being “neutered” as a guarantor of global stability—echoing the League of Nations’ collapse before World War II.
“Meanwhile, in Africa, South Africa has just learnt the very painful lesson in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that the African Peace and Security Architecture has failed,” Olivier stated in reference to Rwandan-backed M23 rebels capturing Goma and Bukavu in the eastern DRC after SADC troops – including those from South Africa – failed to stop them.
“Neither the African Union, Southern African Development Community, the East African Community, or the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region have been able to stop what’s happening or free trapped SADC troops,” he said.
“The same is going to be true globally, soon. South Africa cannot rely on appealing to the International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, or UNSC, if things go as I fear and believe they will. South Africa will find them rendered irrelevant, their decisions unenforceable, and the major powers uninterested in protecting South Africa.”
He believes that South Africa cannot rely on its alliances, as none provide the necessary guarantees. The United States is no longer a reliable partner for anyone, while Russia and China provide only minimal support and have dropped South Africa when it mattered. The European Union has been steadfast, but it will be forced to turn inward for a bit, Oliviers predicts, as the EU reacts to the loss of US support.
“South Africa started the millennium in the best position of any sub-Saharan African country for a new multipolar realist exercise of hard power, both economically and militarily. In the 25 years since it has allowed the former strength to flounder and almost destroyed the latter,” Olivier cautioned.
“The way things are progressing, both globally and continentally, the odds of South Africa being forced to become involved in a serious war not of its own choosing within the next 20 years is becoming not just more possible, but increasingly likely. Yet South Africa is far from ready.”
He believes South Africa needs to be a lot more serious and clearsighted about the risks facing it in this new, less stable, less orderly world. “It is not in a strong position to handle it, and will be pushed around by not only major powers but minor continental ones too if nothing changes.”
“This is the time to rebuild South Africa’s hard power capabilities, both economic and military, ensuring that it’s militarily strong enough to protect itself and its interests in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. This is going to require substantial investment in defence.
“And in a new world dominated by realism, South Africa can no longer rely on alliances shaped by shared values or trade. It will have to win and retain friends by being strong enough to be useful to them, whether as a regional hegemon ensuring stability or an ally in coalitions.
“To survive in this new world, South Africa has to start now. Rebuilding the SANDF to even just the same level of capability it had in the mid-2000s, which was already understrength, will take hundreds of bns of Rand and at least 15-20 years. There’s no time to wait,” he urged.
Olivier suggests investing in core multi-role capabilities; building up ordnance, parts, and consumables supply lines and stocks; investing in training and professional development; and building institutes and processes that help the SANDF to adapt rapidly to new technology or threats. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
17 Mar 25. Burkina Faso: Jihadist attack highlights sustained pressure on security forces, human rights risks. On 14-16 March, militants likely associated with the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) attacked multiple military bases in Tandjari and Yamba (both Est region) and Séguénéga (Nord region). Militants reportedly overran the bases, stole heavy weapons and killed numerous security personnel. The attacks highlight the security forces’ limited capacity to defend peripheral positions in rural areas, underscoring critical threats to locally engaged staff. In the coming months, the junta will highly likely continue to focus primarily on defending positions proximate to the capital Ouagadougo while relying on pro-government militias, untrained paramilitary forces and private military contractors to supplement the security force capacity in rural areas. This will drive the risk of indiscriminate vigilante violence against civilians, such as the alleged killing of over 55 civilians in a ‘massacre’ in Solenzo (Boucle du Mouhoun region) from 10 to 11 March by pro-government militias (reported by Human Rights Watch). We assess that the employment of such indiscriminate counter-insurgency techniques over the coming months will exacerbate human rights concerns and risk escalating intercommunal violence along ethno-religious lines. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Mar 25. Congo (DRC): Peace talks are unlikely to produce lasting agreement, sustaining conflict risks. On 16 March, the Congolese government confirmed it would send a delegation for talks with the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in Angola, in the capital Luanda, on 18 March. Congolese participation in the talks represents a change in government strategy; President Félix Tshisekedi has previously refused to negotiate directly with the M23. We assess that, while there is a realistic possibility that talks will produce a temporary ceasefire, a lasting resolution to the conflict in eastern DRC is highly unlikely, with breaches and resumption of fighting likely in the weeks following any agreement. The M23 will likely seek to legitimise its influence over captured territory in North and South Kivu provinces, possibly by integrating its armed wing into the security forces, formalising ownership over key mineral deposits and registering itself as an official political party in the DRC. However, the DRC will highly likely reject this as it would formalise the M23 (and thereby Rwanda’s) control of captured territory while severely undercutting Tshisekedi’s position. Any perception that the government is making concessions to the M23 (and Rwanda) will likely act as a flashpoint for protests, particularly in the capital Kinshasa. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Mar 25. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Alleged provocations are likely part of Baku’s efforts to delay treaty signing. On 16 March, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on three separate occasions that units of the Armenian armed forces shot at Azerbaijani positions. The Armenian MoD has refuted each reported (but unconfirmed) provocation. The EU’s civilian monitoring mission in Armenia stated that it observed no unusual activity along the two countries’ shared border on 16-17 March, effectively denying that the incidents occurred. Armenia and Azerbaijan announced on 13 March that they had finalised the terms of a long-awaited peace treaty. While Yerevan expressed its readiness to sign the treaty without any pre-conditions, Baku has emphasised that Armenian constitutional changes are a prerequisite for the signing of the accord. We assess that there is no evidence to confirm the incidents took place. Baku will nevertheless likely use them to portray Armenia as the party undermining peace prospects so Azerbaijan can justify delaying (or abandoning) the signing of the agreement. Baku will likely issue similar reports in the coming days and weeks, though armed conflict risks will likely remain low. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Mar 25. Taiwan: New measures against Chinese interference will drive cross-strait tensions. On 14 March, President William Lai announced 17 measures to counter Chinese ‘infiltration’ in Taiwan. These include reinstating military courts, tightening immigration controls for applicants from China, Hong Kong and Macau and strengthening Taiwan’s counter-disinformation efforts. The initiative is a response to China’s increasing use of espionage and military pressure to influence Taiwan. In 2024, 64 people were charged in Taiwan for Chinese espionage, three times more than in 2021. Lai stated that the government ‘has no choice but to take a more aggressive approach’ in order to address these threats. Lai also emphasised the necessity of ensuring Taiwan’s economic security by reducing reliance on China, supporting domestic industries and strengthening global trade partnerships. While these measures, if successfully implemented, will likely improve Taiwan’s resilience in the face of foreign interference, they are highly likely to face opposition from the Kuomintang (KMT)-controlled Legislative Yuan. We assess the assertive framing of the measures, with China labelled as a ‘foreign hostile force’, is likely to exacerbate cross-strait tensions, increasing the risk of retaliatory actions such as military drills around Taiwan in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Mar 25. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Regional tensions will remain elevated despite nominal peace treaty finalisation. On 13 March, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to the terms of a long-awaited peace treaty. This marks a significant breakthrough in the path towards peace. The development was largely unexpected given previous occasional statements in recent years indicating that a deal has been close. Nonetheless, a significant reduction in regional tensions is unlikely in the short term, as the implementation of the agreement remains unclear. The agreement reportedly does not address several of the most contentious bilateral issues, including the status of various exclaves. Baku will possibly seek to delay signing the treaty in the coming weeks. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has stated that amendments to the Armenian constitution are a ‘prerequisite’ for the signing of the text. This approach differs from that of the Armenian side, which stated that it is ready to co-ordinate with Azerbaijan on where and when to sign the agreement; we assess this indicates that Baku likely maintains additional demands for the signing of a peace treaty. Even if the two sides do sign a deal in the short term, low levels of trust will likely mean that any such agreement would be at risk of collapsing. (Source: Sibylline)
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