Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
06 Mar 25. China increases defence spending for the third year in a row. Sensing a perceived threat from the US, China’s State Council’s decision to raise defence spending by 7.2% is unfounded. China has raised defence spending by 7.2% again – the third year in a row – amid an uncertain and fractured security climate. This spike will increase the country’s defence expenditure up to 1.8trn yuan ($246bn) according to a draft budget report presented during the 14th session of the National People’s Congress, where nearly 3,000 delegates attended the forum in Beijing on 5 March 2025. The State Council, the nation’s governing authority, styled its decision as a response to American animosity. The Party compared its own defence spending – which they emphasise is kept below the 1.5% proportion of its GDP – to what they say is the US government’s ‘pledge’ to keep defence spending no lower than 3% of its GDP. Contrary to this assertion, the United States has no specific domestic minimum spending target besides the Nato guideline of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence – a guideline that has no legal mandate. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the US currently chooses to spend 4.2% of its GDP on defence. Despite being the largest military spender in the world in real terms, as a percentage of GDP the country currently ranks tenth according to GlobalData intelligence.
“China upholds a national defense policy that is defensive in nature,” the State Council maintained in a press release, “with its military spending mainly focusing on protecting its sovereignty, security and development interests.”
This thinly veiled posture refers to the country’s One China policy. The government claims sovereignty over Taiwan – an island 112 miles (180 kilometres) from China by sea, and hotbed for geopolitical tensions – and vast swathes of neighbouring territories from the Line of Actual Control on the Sino-Indian border to the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. China’s so-called Nine-Dash Line encompasses, the US says, approximately two million square kilometres of maritime space, an area equal to about 22% of China’s land area.
A closer comparison of the rivals’ defence spending
A closer look at comparative defence spending would acknowledge that other major countries – namely China and Russia – have significant purchasing power parity advantages that allow them to field larger numbers of personnel and equipment for a smaller overall price. Although it remains safe to say the US military remains the most technologically dominant force in the world today. Moreover, largely due to the substantial increase in spending supporting Ukraine in its war against invading Russian forces, US defence spending grew by more than 10% year-on-year. However, on account of the recent drama playing out in US-Ukraine relations over the past several weeks, this figure is likely to reduce considerably going forward. A reality that ought to alleviate Chinese concerns over America’s “Cold War mentality” alluded to by the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Lin Jian, a day before China’s decision to raise defence spending. Another stinging provocation that has prompted the spending surge, the State Council suggested, is US President Donald Trump’s pressure on Europe to raise their defence spending to at least 5% of their respective GDPs. However, on a political level, what may prove to be far more disruptive to China’s global strategy is the thawed – perhaps even friendly – relations between the US and Russia. The latter has, since it waged its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, been debilitated by Western sanctions and fallen increasingly into China’s control. (Source: army-technology.com)
06 Mar 25. Colombia: Explosives attack in Antioquia department underscores sustained physical security risks. On 5 March, the National Liberation Army (ELN) detonated explosives on National Route 25 between Puerto Valdivia and Tarazá (both Antioquia department). The explosion caused no casualties, though the road was temporarily rendered unusable. Media reports indicate the ELN’s intended target was an armed forces unit travelling along the highway. Governor of Antioquia Andrés Julián Rendon posted to the social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter) following the attack, calling on Defense Minister General Pedro Sánchez to deploy military assets to combat the ELN in the region. The ELN retains a strategic presence in Antioquia to facilitate drug trafficking and illegal mining operations, often clashing with rival groups such as the Gulf Clan. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) highlighted a 14% increase in violence targeting civilians by armed groups in Antioquia between 2023 and 2024. As violence has steadily increased year-on-year in Antioquia, the 5 March attack underscores sustained physical security risks for personnel and companies operating in the region in the medium term. We assess that further explosive attacks on key highways will highly likely increase operational disruption and supply chain risks in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Mar 25. RoK-US: Regional tensions will intensify amid joint military drills risks next week. Earlier on 6 March, two South Korean fighter jets mistakenly dropped eight 500-pound MK-82 bombs on civilian infrastructure in Nogok village (Gyeonggi province) during a training exercise with the US military. 15 people have been injured, though reports indicate that none of the injuries are life-threatening. The military has suspended live-fire drills while it carries out an investigation; it initially claimed that the wrong co-ordinates were used by one of the jets, leading to the bombs being released 4.87 miles (8km) away from the training area. This comes ahead of the annual joint South Korea-US ‘Freedom Shield’ military exercises between 10 and 20 March. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) confirmed that these would go ahead despite the accidental bombing. On 4 March, Kim Yo-jong (the sister of North Korea’s supreme leader, Kim Jong-un) pledged a ‘threatening’ response to the arrival of a US aircraft carrier in South Korea. We assess there is a realistic possibility that North Korea will conduct a missile test over the coming weeks or launch balloons filled with rubbish over the border. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Mar 25. Somalia: Attack risks in Mogadishu will increase following recent al-Shabaab offensive. On 4 March, the US embassy in the capital Mogadishu issued an alert claiming credible information of potential imminent attacks against multiple locations across Somalia, including Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport (MGQ). The warning follows shortly after a series of co-ordinated al-Shabaab attacks against towns across Middle Shabelle and Hiraan regions since 20 February. Most recently, on 27 February, al-Shabaab at least temporarily captured Balcad (Middle Shabelle region), located approximately 22 miles (36km) to the north of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab is currently attempting to exploit stalling government counter-offensives (amid ongoing disputes between federal and regional authorities) to restore influence and territorial control in central Somalia. As such, attacks designed to undermine command and control operations within Mogadishu are highly likely, driving the risk of attack against facilities utilised by political and military figures and international forces. We assess that this will elevate the risk of attacks on and proximate to MGQ and Villa Somalia (the presidential residence), as well as local hotels often frequented by Mogadishu’s political elite, through the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Mar 25. Mali: Prospective rebel-jihadist alliance will increase risk of attacks in northern areas. On 3 March, senior members of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebel group based in northern Mali confirmed that they are in negotiations with the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) to conduct joint operations. Disagreements are allegedly ongoing over the scope of unified operations. The FLA wishes to constrain operations to northern Mali while JNIM wants to extend its influence across the country and into neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger. Regardless, such negotiations will increase the likelihood of localised co-operation between FLA and JNIM forces around Kidal and Tombouctou regions, driving attack risks during overland movement, particularly around government checkpoints. An agreement will possibly increase JNIM’s access to modified civilian drones used by the FLA. The latter claims to have downed a military helicopter with a drone near Tessalit (Kidal) in February. Access to such assets would increase the lethality of JNIM’s attacks and the risk of the group expanding. We assess negotiations will also elevate the risk of increased government repression of Tuareg communities, substantially raising threats to NGOs in rural areas. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Mar 25. South Sudan: Arrests of military figures will increase conflict, government stability risks. On 4 March, troops from the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) arrested Lieutenant General Gabriel Doup Lam, a senior military official allied with First Vice President Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). Reports indicate the SSPDF also detained other SPLM-IO members and surrounded Machar’s residence in the capital Juba. The arrests come as the ‘White Army’, a militia of the Nuer community (the community most associated with the SPLM-IO), captured Nasir town (Upper Nile State; after weeks of instability. While the SPLM-IO has stated it remains committed to the peace agreement, the arrests will increase the likelihood of a backlash among the Nuer community, which the SPLM-IO will be unable to mediate effectively. As such, there is a realistic possibility of further Nuer militia groups resuming the conflict. This would drive outbreaks of violence, particularly around SPLM-IO strongholds in Upper Nile and Jonglei states, increasing the risk of unrest in Juba over the coming weeks. We also assess this would substantially elevate the threat to NGOs based in rural areas and increase the likelihood of a security clampdown in Juba, disrupting citywide movement. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Mar 25. Pakistan: Attack on military site underscores heightened security risks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On 4 March, militants rammed two explosives-laden vehicles into the cantonment gates of a military camp in Bannu district (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) in an attempt to breach the high-security zone. At least 12 people were killed and over 30 others were injured, with several civilians trapped under rubble caused by the explosion. Militants attempted to infiltrate the camp following the blast, leading to a shoot-out with the security forces. The attack has since been claimed by Jaish-al-Fursan, a group affiliated with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The incident marks the third attack since the start of the month of Ramadan and comes days after a suicide bombing targeted a Taliban-linked religious school in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The attack also follows an uptick in militant activity, and comes amid counter-terrorism operations in the province that have intensified in recent months. Given the ongoing month of Ramadan, we assess there is a realistic possibility of further such attacks targeting security sites, mosques and religious gatherings, significantly elevating security risks for bystanders. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Mar 25. Ecuador: Security force deployment will likely decrease violent crime, attack risks in short term. On 3 March, the authorities deployed approximately 1,000 security personnel to Playa Canton and Posorja (both Guayas province) as part of a counter-organised crime group (OCG) operation (‘Cobra’). The armed forces and police personnel took part. At the time of writing, the authorities have arrested at least eight people; they also seized ammunition, drug shipments, explosives and various firearms. Both the ‘Los Lobos’ and ‘Los Choneros’ OCGs operate in the area. In September 2024, the authorities declared a 60-day State of Emergency (SoE) in Playa due to gang-related violence. The extensive deployment of the security forces will likely limit OCG operations in Playa and Posorja in the short term. However, arrests and seizures are unlikely to have a long-term impact on the operational capacity of OCGs in the area. The enhanced security force presence will similarly likely decrease violent crime and attack risks in the immediate term. However, we assess that potential clashes between the security forces and armed OCG members will highly likely increase bystander risks. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Mar 25. Gabon: Interim president’s candidacy will increase governance concerns, unrest risks. On 3 March, interim President Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema announced his candidacy for the presidential election on 12 April. In the coming weeks, Nguema will highly likely mobilise state resources, including the security services, to bolster his campaign; as such, we assess Nguema will highly likely win the election. Opposition figures have until 8 March to formally register their candidacy. The authorities will highly likely obstruct this process and escalate repression of opposition candidates, particularly those affiliated with former president Ali Bongo Ondimba (such as former vice president Pierre Claver Maganga Moussavou). Such measures will drive risks of arbitrary detention for opposition-aligned staff when attending campaign events or opposition meetings and raise the likelihood of protests in major cities (including in the capital Libreville) over the coming weeks. In response, the security forces will likely adopt an elevated posture proximate to government buildings and major intersections. In the event of large-scale protests, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the authorities will re-introduce daily curfews, increasing the risk of overland movement disruption to staff and assets. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Mar 25. Russian missile experts flew to Iran amid clashes with Israel.
- Summary
- Russians all have senior military backgrounds, records show
- Include specialists in air defence, rocketry, artillery
- Flights came amid Iran’s tit-for-tat conflict with Israel
Several senior Russian missile specialists have visited Iran over the past year as the Islamic Republic has deepened its defence cooperation with Moscow, a Reuters review of travel records and employment data indicates. The seven weapons experts were booked to travel from Moscow to Tehran aboard two flights on April 24 and September 17 last year, according to documents detailing the two group bookings as well as the passenger manifest for the second flight. The booking records include the men’s passport numbers, with six of the seven having the prefix “20”. That denotes a passport used for official state business, issued to government officials on foreign work trips and military personnel stationed abroad, according to an edict published by the Russian government and a document on the Russian foreign ministry’s website. Reuters was unable to determine what the seven were doing in Iran. A senior Iranian defence ministry official said Russian missile experts had made multiple visits to Iranian missile production sites last year, including two underground facilities, with some of the visits taking place in September. The official, who requested anonymity to discuss security matters, didn’t identify the sites. (Source: Reuters)
03 Mar 25. Haiti: Police use of explosive-laden drones has increased physical security risks in capital. On 1 March, the Haitian National Police (PNH) deployed a newly created task force to conduct an anti-gang operation in Bas Delmas in the capital Port-au-Prince. Local media reports indicate that the PNH used explosive-laden drones for the first time during the operation, marking an evolution in its counter-gang strategy. Bas Delmas is the stronghold of Jimmy Chérizier (the leader of the ‘Viv Ansanm’ inter-gang coalition). Chérizier responded to the operation via social media by threatening to use similar methods in reprisal attacks against the security forces and the authorities. Since mid-February, ‘Viv Ansanm’ has conducted a co-ordinated offensive against civilians and the security forces in the Delmas 30 neighbourhood, as well as the communes of Gressier, Kenscoff and Pétion-Ville (all Port-au-Prince). The direct attack on Chérizier’s stronghold indicates that the task force will likely focus on conducting proactive and targeted operations against high-profile gang leaders. We assess that such operations would risk provoking gangs into conducting reprisal attacks, sustaining attack and violent crime risks in the short term. Further PNH operations using explosive-laden drones will increase short-term physical security risks. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Mar 25. Russia: International terrorism threat will increase ahead of attack anniversary. Earlier on 3 March, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that its officers had shot dead a would-be terrorist in Moscow oblast. The suspect reportedly intended to detonate IEDs at an undisclosed Jewish religious institution and a metro station in the oblast. As per the FSB, officers discovered components and chemical substances that are needed for making an IED, as well as firearms, during a search of the individual’s residence. The alleged foiled plot comes ahead of the anniversary of a large-scale Islamist terror attack against a concert venue in Moscow on 22 March 2024, which killed 145 people. While the FSB claims to have thwarted a terror plot in the latest development, we assess that would-be terrorists will likely continue to attempt to exploit perceived Russian security weaknesses stemming from the war in Ukraine. Terrorism threats will likely be moderately elevated across Russia ahead of and around the anniversary; Jewish places of worship are likely to be among the potential targets for any would-be attackers. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Mar 25. The U.S. aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson arrived at the southern port city of Busan in South Korea on Sunday as a show of force against North Korea, South Korea’s navy said. It is the first U.S. aircraft carrier to dock at a South Korean port since U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term in office began in January. The visit was part of the “ironclad” commitment of the United States to extended deterrence and to show readiness by the military alliance between Seoul and Washington against North Korea, according to the South’s navy. The nuclear-powered vessel belonging to Carrier Strike Group One was joined by the guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton and the USS Sterett, a guided-missile destroyer, it said.
“Clearly our presence here in Busan shows the strong alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States, and our opportunity to train and operate together with our allies,” U.S. Rear Admiral Michael S. Wosje, Commander of Carrier Strike Group One, said on Monday.
“Every opportunity we have to sail together and fly together makes us stronger together,” Wosje added in comments to media. (Source: Reuters)
28 Feb 25. Denel’s sale of Hensoldt and RDM shares no longer taking place. An Argos II gimbal manufactured by Hensoldt Optronics South Africa. The selling off of stakes in non-core assets is a key part of Denel’s turnaround strategy, but the divestment of Hensoldt and Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM) is no longer taking place. This emerged during a Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa) meeting on 25 February in which Denel board chairperson Gloria Serobe provided an update on Denel and its turnaround. Denel has a 49% stake in RDM, a 30% stake in Hensoldt Optronics South Africa, and a 49% stake in Barij Dynamics in the United Arab Emirates. As part of its turnaround, Denel was to sell its shares in Hensoldt and RDM, and sell non-core properties as well as Denel Gear Ratio. However, “the sale of non-core assets was not supported,” the state-owned defence conglomerate informed Scopa, and the sale of Hensoldt and RDM shares “is no longer taking place” as this is not supported by the Department of Defence.
Serobe said the Department had raised concerns, especially over RDM as it provides rocket and missile components to Denel. “They could not be in a position to say yes, you can sell RDM to a third party because it actually takes it away from our control.” She added that the Denel board was in agreement about not touching those assets.
Rather than letting go of joint ventures, Denel said it will “attempt to acquire majority control in associated companies.”
Denel’s latest turnaround was supposed to raise R5.2bn to achieve sustainability, with Denel raising R1.8 bn by exiting/selling non-core assets, and government providing the remaining R3.3bn. This was boosted by R1 bn coming from the Denel Medical Benefit Trust, allowing production to restart and salaries to be paid. The R3.3bn from government was only made partially available from the end of March 2023, with the balance conditional on the sale of non-core assets. Not being able to sell stakes in RDM and Hensoldt is a major stumbling block to Denel’s turnaround strategy, but the company said it will continue optimise operations – including by retrenching as well as filling key vacancies – and has completed an exercise to review alternative funding models. It will also explore viable options to commercially use dormant assets such as buildings and land, it said in a presentation to Scopa. To generate new revenue streams, Denel will investigate ‘value-enhancing partnerships’ – new products in the civilian security space, particularly through collaboration with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and universities for new go-to-market products. Although Denel has paid its ‘critical’ debt, liquidity and legacy debt are still a challenge. Other financial challenges include the reluctance by commercial banks to issue guarantees to the defence industry, collecting debt (including from Armscor – primarily for Project Hoefyster), and delays in accessing the balance of recapitalisation funds, which “hampered operations” in 2024/25. Scopa heard that insufficient working capital was hampering revenue generation, repairs and maintenance, and challenges with raising advance payment guarantees and performance bonds was affecting revenue generation. Armscor has R523m in outstanding payments for the development of the Badger Infantry Fighting Vehicle under Project Hoefyster, while there is a R152m outstanding balance for Rooivalk and Oryx helicopter maintenance for the South African Air Force. Other challenges highlighted by Denel include slow progress in upgrading its ICT infrastructure due to working capital constraints, and disruptive breakdowns at Denel PMP that have affected productivity and delivery to clients, although capital investments are being made in PMP and the Denel Overberg Test Range.
On the positive side, Denel reported a R36bn opportunity pipeline. This includes:
Artillery (R15bn): The company submitted a response to a request for information (RFI) and a proposal for localisation. Denel “outperformed competition at the trials in August 2024” and is awaiting a request for proposals (RFP).
Infantry equipment (R4.3bn): Denel is offering vehicles and has submitted proposals.
Missile systems (R192m and R278m): Denel’s offers have been accepted and it is awaiting outcomes.
Ground-Based Air Defence System (R6.7bn): This is in the RFI phase, with an in-country demonstration required.
Missiles (R6bn): This is in the demonstration phase for a possible customer.
Airborne systems (R741m): A capability demonstration for unmanned aerial vehicles has been requested.
Motshekga critical of Denel but sees potential
In another Scopa meeting on 18 February, covering the annual reports and financial statements of the Department of Defence, Denel, and others, Defence Minister Angie Mothshekga said the weaknesses within Denel affect the Department “because they are our arm that is supposed to empower us.”
“With the weaknesses in Denel, we buy overseas, and it takes forever. There have been instances where we ordered spares eight months ago, and they have not arrived. It is another area of great concern, hence I agree that we need to give full attention and support to Denel and make sure it has the capacity to help us,” she said.
Motshekga added that Denel is a national strategic entity that “we need as a country” and the Department of Defence has a responsibility to save Denel because it has huge potential. “It is an important strategic asset, and there are huge contracts we are chasing through Denel,” she said. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–