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26 Feb 25. New Zealand Defence Force takes delivery of aerial and remote ground systems. New Zealand’s Ministry of Defence has taken delivery of uncrewed aircraft systems and remote ground sensor systems.
The new systems are currently undertaking operator training, following a period of completed testing. The new systems will have the primary purpose to extend and improve situational awareness beyond line of sight.
The military grade systems are expected to improve the New Zealand Defence Force’s ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities in environments that are difficult to access, such as combat zones or cyclone damaged regions.
“The new systems will be used by New Zealand Army units deployed on stability and security operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, and search and rescue deployments,” said Sarah Minson, Deputy Secretary, Capability Delivery.
“The remotely operated systems are expected to reduce the risk to soldiers operating in challenging environments by providing timely and accurate information that enhances risk assessments and decision making in the field.”
The uncrewed aircraft systems are being delivered as part of the ministry’s Network Enabled Army program, which is moving the New Zealand Army’s planning, intelligence and communications functions to modern, interoperable and digital-based systems.
The four systems that have been delivered and are being introduced into service include Quantum Systems Inc’s small uncrewed aerial system fixed wing vector systems for 16th Field Regiment.
Vectors have a wingspan of three metres when assembled and can fly up to 35 kilometres over a period of three hours. They have vertical take-off and landing capability, are backpack portable and can be operational within three minutes. (Source: Defence Connect)
26 Feb 25. Japan targets weapons sales through Indo-Pacific, as industrial ties lag strategic ones. In the last year Japan has moved from making its first appearance at an international air show, the 2024 Singapore event, to providing radars to the Philippines and engaging in a full court press to sell the Mogami frigate to Australia. Japan is in talks with Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines and other countries as part of a push to export weapons and subsdystems throughout the Indo-Pacific, according to a senior defense official here, part of a campaign to increase defense industrial ties regionally.
The US ally’s main thrust is the high-profile effort to sell Australia the Mogami-class frigate, which has attracted unprecedented support from the highest reaches of the Japanese government and industry. The official, who spoke to Breaking Defense on the condition of anonymity, also pointed to a long-simmering attempt to provide technology to Indonesia for what had been described as a destroyer program. The official said Friday there were talks with other countries but declined to name them.
As for the Philippines, the Japanese defense minister publicly pledged closer defense cooperation on Feb. 24 in the wake of the persistent and aggressive pressure from China on Manila to give up some of its internationally recognized waters in the South China Sea.
Defense Minister Gen. Nakatani said during his first visit to the Philippines that the two countries believe they must “further enhance defense cooperation and collaboration in order to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific” because of the difficult security situation. That cooperation will include increased sharing of technology and the provision of weapons like the radar systems Japan recently has gifted to the Philippines. The air defense radar were installed at Wallace Air Station on the island of Luzon. Nakatani said nothing specific about weapon systems marked for eventual sale or transfer.
Taken together, Tokyo’s moves appear to be indicative of a lag between defense policy — where relations with Australia, South Korea, the Philippines and other regional players have grown substantially closer in the last two years — and weapons exports, perhaps the most concrete proof of closer cooperation between two countries.
“The defense relationship is not catching up with other areas of defense cooperation between the two nations [Australia and Japan],” the senior defense official said. “The defense cooperation has been pushed up so much, but equipment cooperation — we’ve done some joint research projects — but not this big deal yet.”
To catch up, Japan has moved swiftly to make good on its policy to begin exports. In the last year it moved from making its first appearance at an international air show, the 2024 Singapore event, to providing radars to the Philippines and engaging in a full court press to sell the Mogami to Australia, in what could be a turning point for Japan-Australia defense industry relations specifically. The Japanese government also created a joint board of senior government officials and of industry leaders late last year to coordinate policy and actions and ensure Australia, in particular, is as well informed about Japanese intentions and capabilities as possible.
Japan has proposed a $10bn AUD ($6.6bn USD) sale to Australia of the Mogami frigate to answer Australia’s request for bids for surface vessels to supplement the Hunter class, which are most focused on anti-submarine warfare. The Mogami, built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, is competing against a German offering from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (KTMS), builder of Australia’s current Anzac-class frigates. KTMS is offering the Meko A-200, an upgraded version of the 30-year-old Anzacs.
Selling the Mogami to Australia could “open up the doors to other industrial cooperation, which is attracting more and more Japanese industries interested in the Australian market,” the official said.
Closer cooperation could include the Lucky Country’s guided weapons enterprise known as GWEO (Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance). Japan has invested heavily in missile systems and has “much industrial expertise,” the senior defense official told Breaking Defense.
Outside Australia, the nascent discussions with Indonesia about supplying technology — some reports from Indonesia said the Mogami frigate was discussed — are clearly in the early stages after years of on and off talks with the previous government. With the election last year of Prabowo Subianto, the former defense minister, those discussions have restarted, the official said. But they are less focused on a destroyer than on what the official called “maritime security.”
As Prabowo’s team reviews its acquisition plans, Indonesia’s plans will come into clearer focus. “We’ll discuss maritime security with them and we’ll find out what capabilities they want and what capabilities we could provide to them,” the senior defense official averred. (Source: Breaking Defense.com)
26 Feb 26. South Africa’s defence policy is misaligned and needs reform, Parliament told. South Africa’s defence policy is at a critical crossroads. Academic experts and policymakers alike raised their growing concerns during a recent sitting of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, on 21 February 2025. The hearing saw valuable insight shared by experts about the misalignment between national security priorities, budget constraints, and military capabilities.
As Parliament and defence officials debate the future of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), questions about the role of the military, funding challenges, and the effectiveness of regional deployments have taken centre stage. The lack of a clear strategic direction has left the country’s defence sector underfunded, overstretched, and in urgent need of reform, Parliament heard.
South Africa’s defence policy has remained largely unchanged since the 1996 White Paper on Defence, despite significant shifts in the security landscape, argued Dr Evert Kleynhans. While the 2015 Defence Review attempted to provide a roadmap for the future, it has remained largely unimplemented due to a lack of funding. This misalignment has resulted in a force structure that does not match operational requirements, with the SANDF continuing to prioritise a conventional military approach even though its most frequent deployments involve peacekeeping, border security, and crime prevention. Additionally, the military budget has steadily declined, dropping to 0.7% of GDP, leaving little room for modernisation or maintenance of existing equipment.
Personnel costs have also become a major concern, accounting for over 60% of the SANDF budget, leaving inadequate resources for operations and procurement. The result is an overstretched and under-equipped force struggling to fulfil its mandate while attempting to meet ambitious foreign policy commitments, the JSCD was told.
A critical question during the hearing is where and how the SANDF should be deployed. Professor Annette Seegers of the University of Cape Town differentiated between wars of necessity, which are essential for defending national sovereignty and protecting citizens, and wars of choice, which involves military engagements driven by political or diplomatic interests.
Wars of necessity include border security, countering transnational threats, protecting critical infrastructure and regional stability. However, much of South Africa’s military focus has been diverted towards international peacekeeping operations, most recently in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
South Africa’s involvement in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province was driven by concerns over regional stability and economic interests, particularly in securing gas reserves. However, Seegers noted the mission ended with mixed results, as the Mozambican government showed little commitment to resolving the underlying causes of instability.
Similarly, the SANDF’s deployment in the DRC as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) peacekeeping force has raised concerns about mission effectiveness and long-term viability. With a collapsing state structure and increasing influence from foreign actors such as Rwanda, the mission faces uncertain strategic outcomes.
While regional peacekeeping can be an important foreign policy tool, the lack of clear political direction and long-term strategy has weakened the effectiveness of these operations. With limited resources and growing domestic security concerns, many are questioning whether South Africa should continue prioritising these engagements over domestic defence needs.
To address these challenges, South Africa needs a comprehensive realignment of its defence policy. Policymakers must take decisive steps to modernize the SANDF, redefine its strategic objectives, and ensure that budget allocations match operational priorities, the JSCD was told.
First, defence policy must be updated to reflect current security threats, and a new defence review must prioritise practical needs, rather than maintaining an outdated force structure that is no longer relevant. One approach that should be heavily considered is the adoption of an irregular warfare approach, which involves the proactive use of limited force to assist regional allies in combating the rising asymmetric threats to regional stability.
Second, budgetary discipline is essential and non-negotiable. The SANDF must restructure its personnel costs, reduce unnecessary expenditures, and reallocate resources to critical areas such as equipment, training, and technological development. Greater investment in modern defence systems, including drones, intelligence and cybersecurity capabilities, will ensure that South Africa’s military remains relevant in a rapidly evolving security landscape, Seegers stated.
Third, Parliament must strengthen its oversight role to ensure greater transparency and accountability in military spending and decision-making. The monopolisation of defence procurement by entities such as Armscor and Denel must be reassessed, with an emphasis on local manufacturing and private-sector partnerships to improve efficiency and reduce costs.
Finally, South Africa must redefine its approach to military engagements abroad. Future international deployments should be carefully assessed based on strategic value, financial feasibility, and long-term impact. South Africa cannot afford to engage in wars of choice while neglecting pressing domestic security challenges, argues Seegers.
Without urgent policy reforms, the SANDF risks complete collapse, and will be unable to meet its commitments either at home or abroad. By aligning defence policy with national security needs, implementing responsible budget management, and redefining its strategic focus, South Africa can build a modern, capable, and efficient military. The future of national defence depends on political will, strategic vision, and a commitment to long-term planning, the JSCD heard. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
26 Feb 25. China-Taiwan: Live-fire training zone will drive cross-strait tensions. Earlier on 26 February, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that China had established a live-fire training zone 46 miles (74km) off the coast of south-western Taiwan without providing adequate prior warning. Taiwan responded by deploying sea, air and land forces to monitor Chinese activity in the area. Last week, China’s navy conducted two live-fire exercises in international waters between Australia and New Zealand, causing dozens of flights to be diverted due to the lateness of the notices issued by China. On 24 February, China conducted live-fire exercises in the Gulf of Tonkin after Vietnam published a map detailing its maritime claims. The latest exercises are possibly in response to Taiwan’s detention on 25 February of a Chinese-crewed cargo ship suspected of damaging an undersea cable in the Taiwan Strait. We assess that Beijing is now highly intent on using live-fire exercises as a means of retaliating against policies it deems hostile. Although such drills increase the risk of accidental escalation, we assess it is highly unlikely that China is seeking to initiate an armed conflict at this moment. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Feb 26. North Korea’s Kim calls for building modern army to brace for war. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for building a strong, modern army to cope with any war during a visit to a military academy, state media KCNA said on Wednesday.
Kim’s trip to the Kang Kon Military Academy comes after North Korea has sent thousands of troops to Russia to support its war against Ukraine. This week Kim also visited the Kim Il Sung University of Politics, another elite cadre training institution, calling for military loyalty and sacrifice. South Korea’s intelligence agency has said Kim’s previous inspections of military units and training might be part of preparations for an additional dispatch of soldiers to Russia.
During the latest visit to the military academy, Kim criticised the school’s poor management and operation of educational facilities, saying it failed to meet the ruling party’s pursuit of “modernity and advanced character” in building a powerful army, KCNA said.
He laid out tasks to refurbish the facilities and intensify education focusing on practice so that the students would learn about the “actual experiences of modern warfare”, and to master advanced weapons and technical equipment, it said. (Source: Reuters)
25 Feb 25. Russia-US: Rare earth exploration proposal aims to ease Western economic isolation. On 24 February, President Vladimir Putin announced his readiness to offer the US joint exploration of Russia’s rare earth metal deposits. Putin clarified that this proposal would be extended not only to US administrative and government structures but also to companies if they showed interest in working together. Notably, Putin stated that a deal between Ukraine and the US on mineral resources is near completion; he claimed that Russia boasts significantly more rare earth resources than Ukraine. According to the US Geological Survey (USGS), Russia possesses the world’s fifth-largest reserves of rare earth metals. Evaluations from 2022 estimate that Russia had occupied 63% of Ukraine’s coal mines as well as half of its caesium, manganese, tantalum and rare earth deposits. We assess that the offer is indicative of attempts to ease Russia’s economic isolation amid early bilateral US-Russian discussions aimed at ending the war. It will likely also form part of Russia’s strategy to retain control over the Ukrainian territories it has claimed by attempting to attract foreign investment and development interest therein. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Feb 25. Samoa: Government stability, policy risks remain elevated despite failed no-confidence vote. Earlier on 25 February, Samoan Prime Minister Fiame Naomi Mata’afa survived a vote of no confidence, with 34 votes against and 15 in favour. It was requested by the opposition Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP), which argued that Fiame no longer commanded a parliamentary majority. In January, Fiame’s FAST party voted to remove her as party leader amid an intraparty power struggle. Despite this, all ruling party members voted against the no-confidence vote, seemingly because they did not want the government to collapse. Separately, the HRPP has sought a constitutional ruling on whether Fiame’s leadership is legitimate given that she is no longer the leader of the FAST party. A hearing is set to take place on 27 February. The HRPP’s legal challenge will drive further government stability risks in the short term. Furthermore, we assess that internal divisions within the FAST party will continue to impact its ability to govern effectively, driving risks of policy stagnation. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Feb 25. China-Taiwan: Further undersea cable incidents are likely amid heightened cross-strait tensions. Earlier on 25 February, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) detained the Togolese-registered vessel Hongtai 168 and its eight-member Chinese crew on grounds of possible sabotage. This followed the severing of the No.3 telecommunications cable between Taiwan and its outlying Penghu Islands at approximately 0300hrs (local time) 9.1 miles (14.7km) off the coast of Tainan city. Communication between Taiwan and Penghu was unaffected as services were rerouted. The CGA stated that Chinese ‘grey-zone’ activity ‘could not be ruled out’ as Hongtai 168 had been anchored near the damaged cable. This marks the fifth telecommunication cable malfunction in Taiwan in 2025. We assess that China was highly likely responsible for at least some of these cases given its intent to undermine Taiwan’s security (see Sibylline Special Report – 23 January 2025). Further incidents are likely over the coming months, particularly during periods of heightened cross-strait tensions. We assess that most incidents are unlikely to cause significant disruption to internet services in Taiwan and will likely focus on cables connecting Taiwan’s outlying islands. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Feb 25. Senegal: Peace agreement is unlikely to significantly alter operating environment. On 23 February, Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko signed a peace agreement with a faction of the Movement for the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC). The agreement will see MFDC fighters demobilise and commit the authorities to organising the return of displaced communities. The agreement follows several other accords since 2022 that aim to resolve the protracted low-level conflict over the independence of Casamance province. However, the agreement only concerns the Southern Front of the MFDC; the MFDC more generally remains highly fractured, with numerous groups heavily engaged in organised criminal activity. As such, we assess the agreement is unlikely to significantly alter the operating environment in Casamance province, with high levels of organised and violent crime associated with rosewood and narcotics smuggling likely to persist. The threat of kidnap and armed robbery along the Gambia-southern Senegal border will also likely persist. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Feb 25. Hegseth Welcomes Saudi Defense Minister to Pentagon, Underscores Partnership. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth today highlighted the importance of the partnership between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia while hosting that country’s defense minister during a bilateral engagement at the Pentagon. After formally welcoming Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud and his delegation, both men delivered prepared remarks in the secretary’s office.
“As you know, made clear in his administration we’re going to pursue peace through strength and put America first,” Hegseth said.
“But that does not mean ignoring partnerships; and, in fact, it requires greater attention to the ones that matter most,” he continued, adding that the U.S. partnership with Saudi Arabia “matters a great deal.”
Referencing the cooperation that took place between the countries during Trump’s first administration, Hegseth pointed out that both nations worked together to pursue security and stability in the Middle East, as well as to combat terrorism in the region and increase mutual prosperity.
He also highlighted the long-standing cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, noting that it dates back 80 years to when President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Saudi King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on the U.S. Navy cruiser USS Quincy.
“Since then, we’ve worked to take on terrorism and all its manifestations today, with groups like the Houthis,” Hegseth said.
“Today, our relationship is a critical center of gravity in a very turbulent world,” he added.
Stating that ending the war in Ukraine is one of the president’s top priorities, Hegseth said he wanted to thank the Saudi Kingdom for hosting conversations between top U.S. and Russian officials in Riyadh, Feb. 18, 2025.
“And I also want to continue deepening and strengthening our partnership to pursue security and prosperity for both Americans and Saudis. So, I’m very much looking forward to a great discussion,” Hegseth said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
24 Feb 25. Colombia: Armed attacks, explosions sustain violent crime risks in Norte de Santander department. Between 19 and 20 February, suspected National Liberation Army (ELN) personnel attacked civilian targets and the security forces with explosives and assault rifles in Cúcuta (Norte de Santander department). In Villa del Rosario (in Cúcuta’s metropolitan outskirts), a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) destroyed a toll both. In Cúcuta, suspected ELN personnel attacked the La Parada police station with assault rifles. At least six people were injured (three civilians and two security forces personnel). The authorities subsequently imposed a 48-hour curfew in Cúcuta until 0600 hours (local time) on 22 February. Villa del Rosario connects Cúcuta and Venezuela; the area is disputed by the ELN and dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). As such, attack, organised crime and violent crime risks will highly likely be sustained in the short term in Cúcuta, particularly in areas adjacent to the Venezuelan border. Meanwhile, we assess that the potential implementation of curfews will likely drive supply chain and transit disruption risks in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Feb 25. Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Border delimitation will reduce armed conflict, border dispute risks. On 21 February, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the final protocol delimiting their shared border. Senior Kyrgyz and Tajik security officials noted that the two countries had also prepared several other documents, including an agreement between their respective governments on energy facilities and water resources (as well as regional connectivity). The presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan must now sign the corresponding border delimitation document; we assess that this will highly likely happen in the near term. Periodic clashes have previously erupted across the Kyrgyz-Tajik border over access to land and water resources, resulting in casualties. The signing of the final border delimitation protocol will highly likely reduce border dispute risks significantly over the longer term along with the risk of renewed armed conflict along their shared frontier. Additionally, we assess that further agreements on energy, water and regional communication will likely aid in improving bilateral ties and resource sharing, which will serve to stabilise regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Feb 25. Bangladesh: Incident targeting airbase underscores fragile security environment. Earlier on 24 February, the Bangladesh Armed Forces’ Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a notice stating that a Bangladesh Airforce (BAF) base in Cox’s Bazar (Chattogram division) came under attack by ‘miscreants’. According to Cox’s Bazar Deputy Commissioner Mohammad Salahuddin, an altercation occurred between locals and Air Force personnel following a stone-pelting incident at the under-construction section of the base. The development prompted the Air Force personnel to take defensive action. Reportedly, one person was killed and several others were injured. In response, the authorities have heightened security measures in the area. The exact cause behind the incident remains unclear. Salahuddin stated that the ‘exact cause of the clash will be investigated through discussion with both parties’. The incident, which comes amid frequent sporadic protests as well as instances of clashes with the security forces, underscores an overall deteriorating security environment. We assess that there is a realistic possibility of similar incidents in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Feb 25. China-New Zealand: Foreign ministers’ meeting will seek to ease tensions amid provocative activity. On 25 February, New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Winston Peters will arrive in the capital Beijing (China) for a three-day visit amid heightened bilateral tensions. Last week, the Cook Islands (a self-governing country in ‘free association’ with New Zealand) signed a comprehensive strategic partnership and a deep-sea minerals agreement with China without prior consultation with New Zealand. Separately, on 21 and 22 February, China’s navy conducted two sets of live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea, between Australia and New Zealand, forcing commercial airlines to adjust flight paths. Peters will almost certainly raise these issues in his scheduled meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. However, China remains New Zealand’s largest trading partner and last week, Peters emphasised that the country is one of its ‘most significant and complex relationships’. Given its close security ties with the US and concerns over China’s expanding influence, we assess that New Zealand will likely adopt a cautious approach towards further economic co-operation with China. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Feb 25. Congo (DRC): Formation of unity government highlights increasing government stability concerns. On 22 February, President Félix Tshisekedi announced his intention to form a national unity government. Although Tshisekedi did not clarify when or how he would create the unity government, the announcement likely forms part of efforts to pre-empt leadership challenges from within his Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) coalition. The announcement comes amid increasing domestic criticism of Tshisekedi’s leadership given the security forces’ failure to repel the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group’s rapid advance in eastern DRC. Since taking control of the provincial capital Bukavu (South Kivu province, DRC) on 16 February, M23 rebels have continued to advance southwards along the RN2 and RN5 highways. We assess that M23 militants will likely launch an offensive targeting Uvira (South Kivu) in the coming days, exacerbating threats to staff and assets therein. Although further M23 advances will likely continue acting as a flashpoint for criticism of Tshisekedi’s leadership, the formation of a national unity government will likely moderate the risks of a successful challenge to his presidency in the coming weeks, decreasing imminent threats to government stability. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Feb 25. Defence and security a growing focus for CSIR. Defence and security is one of the key focus areas of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and is expected to continue to grow, with many research projects underway and others in production or undergoing trials with the South African National Defence Force, Department of Correctional Services, law enforcement, and other entities.
Many of the CSIR’s defence and security innovations were on display at the recent Africa Aerospace and Defence (AAD) exhibition in Pretoria last year, such as its new Ground-based Surveillance and Classification Radar (GSCR), Inundu electronic test pod, and surveillance cameras, amongst others.
Dr Motodi Maserumule, Divisional Group Executive: Mining Manufacturing, Defence & Security at the CSIR, detailed some of the CSIR’s other contributions to aerospace, defence and security research and development (R&D) during a recent media roundtable.
Maserumule said a major highlight for the Defence & Security division was the development of the Quadome radar with Hensoldt South Africa. This is the biggest radar project in South Africa in many years, and is already attracting customers, with the Royal Navy acquiring the Quadome. For each system that gets sold, the CSIR receives royalties, and manufacturing takes place in South Africa so local jobs are supported.
“It’s a very exciting space in terms of the number of technologies being done,” Maserumule said. On the security front, the CSIR has done well with its Meerkat wide area surveillance system, leading to a drop in poaching incidents where it has been deployed in the Kruger National Park. Now the CSIR is looking at using the Meerkat at active and abandoned mines that need 24/7 security. Other use cases being explored include farm protection and infrastructure protection, particularly rail infrastructure and infrastructure owned by Eskom and Transnet. Maserumule pointed out that the system is cheaper than foreign equivalents (less than R3m).
Maserumule told defenceWeb that the CSIR has developed a cash in transit (CIT) solution that renders cash inaccessible within seconds of a threat being detected, and the organisation is considering applying this to protect batteries in cell phone towers as these are increasingly being targeted by criminals.
Also with regard to money, the CSIR is helping intelligence agencies determine where illicit cashflows are coming from as part of government’s efforts to get South Africa off the Financial Action Task Force’s grey list. “We have the capacity within our cyber security centre to check the sources of illicit cash. This has been every effective in bringing parties to book. It’s a very exciting space,” Maserumule said.
Dr Sandile Malinga, Group Executive: Smart Society, said the CSIR is using digital blockchain to track transactions, and is working with the Reserve Bank and other stakeholders to get South Africa ready for the Financial Action Task Force’s audit this year.
Maserumule sees great potential in the CSIR’s cyber business, which is growing rapidly and “will probably be as big as defence – which is one of the biggest divisions we have.” The CSIR’s cyber centre already works with a multitude of stakeholders, including police and intelligence services, as well as the City of Joburg (the CSIR helped the city with a ransomware attack).
“We have a very capable cohort of people able to support public and private entities including the Reserve Bank in ensuring they are ready and when they get into trouble they are untangled easily,” Maserumule affirmed. “There is serious collaboration within the CSIR and internationally to ensure we stay on top of the game,” he added.
With regard to space technology, the CSIR is developing synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology for satellite and aircraft applications. This can be used for agriculture, mine safety, security etc. “We are partnering with the South African National Space Agency in terms of spaceborne SAR and indeed we are discussing very big opportunities with the Middle East in that regard,” Maserumule said, both on unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites.
Other defence and security highlights include developing a handheld fingerprint device to assist the Department of Correctional Services with offender recognition; integrating manual armoured turrets onto additional Mamba Mk III armoured personnel carriers for the South African National Defence Force; testing a bracelet-mounted Electronic Monitoring System (EMS) for parolees; and rolling out an artificial intelligence-driven crime prediction and prevention app in Mitchells Plain. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
24 Feb 25. Revisit 2015 Defence Review – urgently – for South Africa to avoid another military disaster. In the wake of 14 soldier deaths far from home and a highly critical review of the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) by Parliament’s watchdog public accounts committee, another call has come for a thorough re-assessment of the 2015 Defence Review.
Democratic Alliance (DA) defence and military veterans spokesman Chris Hattingh’s plea was made over the weekend coinciding with a veiled attack from the SA Military Health Service on politicians for ignoring reality and deciding on “a Mickey Mouse defence force”.
The attack was attributed to the officer in command of the only non-combat service in the SANDF – military health – Surgeon General, Lieutenant General Ntshavheni Maphaha. He was speaking at the funeral of one of the 14 soldiers detached to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the United Nations peace mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) killed by M23 (Mouvement du 23 Mars) rebels late in January.
Elaborating on him telling mourners South African politicians should be concerned about the safety of the country, Maphaha was recorded by Newzroom Afriak as saying: “We are not protected. Our borders are porous and they are porous because you as politicians have decided that you want a Mickey Mouse defence force”.
“If we are going to play big brother in Africa, what we give to the defence force should symbolise that. I am saying to the politicians, next time you sit and debate, think of whether you are protected or not.”
The Mickey Mouse reference was, to some extent, present in Hattingh’s plea which reads, in part, “our military is in freefall”. He notes further “it is concerning that we do not have a full picture of its decline”.
“The last SANDF strategic review was over a decade ago,” according to a statement that adds, “images of our troops in eastern DRC, while harrowing, were, sadly predictable”.
Hattingh calls for “completion of the re-assessment of the 2015 Defence Review,” saying it must be based on the type and size of defence force South Africa needs and be aligned to national security requirements as well as be fully funded. There are, for him, several non-negotiables in the re-assessment.
They are a full audit of SANDF “assets” including infrastructure to determine operational readiness and cost effectiveness; an in depth review of human resources; a full financial management evaluation; and an assessment of SANDF strategic capabilities. This must examine whether the SANDF is equipped to fulfil its mandate “particularly in foreign [continental] deployments and peacekeeping operations”.
Of the 2015 Defence Review, Hattingh maintains a re-assessment was initiated by former defence and military veterans minister, Thandi Modise, over two years ago and supposed to be completed by the end of October last year – which did not happen. He is critical of the 2015 Review, chaired by Roelf Meyer, which he says was “never funded with not one milestone reached”.
“The SANDF is now burdened with an ageing personnel corps, outdated and poorly maintained equipment, as well as severe mismanagement compounded by corruption. These shortcomings have placed both our troops and the country’s security at significant risk,” the statement has him saying.
Hattingh’s ‘re-assessment’ call is in line with what retired two-star general Bantu Holomisa, then one of two newly appointed deputy defence and military veterans ministers, told the National Assembly during last year’s defence budget debate.
“The 2015 Defence Review is still relevant,” he said, adding “effort was never made to implement it” which he laid at the door South Africa’s financial constraints. Holomisa offered the opinion that “new plans based on an appreciation of current realities can be drawn from it without wasting precious time”.
Elaborating on “current realities” he told Parliamentarians South African troops were deployed on continental peacekeeping missions in “volatile operational theatres” where they were “vulnerable”. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
24 Feb 25. Russian official visits Indonesia and Malaysia to talk defence, Russian agencies report. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, an ally of President Vladimir Putin, has started a working visit to Indonesia and Malaysia on Monday to discuss security and defence issues, Russian news agencies reported. RIA state news agency cited the press office of the Security Council as saying the trip will last until February 28.
“During the visit, talks are planned on current issues of bilateral relations, including security and defence, as well as the development of cooperation in other areas of mutual interest,” RIA reported.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and subsequent punitive sanctions on Moscow by Kyiv’s Western allies have shifted Putin’s geopolitical interests towards Asia, increasing his promotion of ties with the region.
Shoigu, who had been Russia’s powerful defence minister from 2012 until Putin moved him in May of last year, has said the West had tried to use Ukraine to inflict strategic defeat on Russia but had failed.
Indonesia said in October it wants to join the BRICS group of major emerging economies, which accounts for 35% of global economic output, and which Russia has been heavily pushing to become a counterweight to the West. (Source: Reuters)
21 Feb 25. Zimbabwe: Military presence sustains government stability risk, likely does not indicate coup. On 20 February, around 20 military armoured vehicles patrolled parts of the capital Harare for a second consecutive day. Their appearance prompted widespread local speculation of a possible coup, though the government claimed this was part of routine drills. The deployment likely reflects increased tensions within the ruling ZANU-PF party over recent efforts by President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his allies to generate public support for a term extension until 2030 (the ED2030 campaign). The move is heavily resisted by his vice president, Constantino Chiwenga, and his allies in the military. Despite recent attempts by Mnangagwa to placate critics by promising to end his term in 2028, concerns persist that he will covertly ramp up the ED2030 campaign. As such, the military deployment likely does not represent an imminent coup, but instead a demonstration of capability. Tensions over this issue will persist, sustaining elevated threats to government stability and the risk of a sudden replacement of the executive in the event internal tensions escalate. We assess that such action would likely not result in the removal of ZANU-PF from power, moderating policy risk. (Source: Sibylline)
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