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20 Feb 25. RoK: Risk of unrest remains elevated as president’s criminal trial commences. Earlier on 20 February, the first preliminary session of President Yoon Suk-yeol’s criminal trial took place at the Central District Court in the capital Seoul. This follows Yoon’s indictment on 26 January on insurrection charges related to his declaration of martial law in December 2024. Yoon could face life imprisonment if found guilty. Around 500 pro-Yoon protesters gathered outside the court in the capital’s Seocho district. The police deployed more than 3,200 officers and set up barricades; no clashes were reported. A second preparatory hearing is scheduled for 24 March, with the trial proceedings set to begin in April. Yoon’s criminal trial will run alongside his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court, which will reportedly deliver a verdict by mid-March. A presidential election must take place within 60 days if Yoon is impeached. We assess that pro- and anti-Yoon protests are likely to take place outside court buildings in Seoul and other urban centres on hearing days, driving moderate travel disruption. Most protests will pass off peacefully, though scuffles between rival demonstrators are possible. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Feb 25. Congo (DRC)-Chad: Request for military support is unlikely to improve short-term security conditions. On 18 February, a Congolese special envoy met with Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby and reportedly requested military support for the Congolese security forces’ (FARDC) counter-insurgency campaign against the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group. The meeting comes as the M23 continues to advance rapidly through South Kivu province (DRC). M23 militants entered Kamanyola (South Kivu) on 19 February and will likely continue advancing southwards towards Uvira (South Kivu) in the coming days. The DRC’s reported request for Chadian military support reflects significant concerns regarding the FARDC’s capacity. It is highly unlikely that the FARDC will meaningfully counter the M23’s offensive in the coming days, increasing the risk of a significant deterioration in law and order conditions in population centres along the RN5 highway. Staff will face increased risks of exposure to petty and violent crime, including looting, arson attacks and sexual violence. We assess that the M23’s advance will also likely exacerbate a morale crisis within the FARDC, increasing threats to government stability and likely triggering clashes over control of weapons supplies with allied local militias (known as Wazalendo). (Source: Sibylline)
20 Feb 25. Defenceless: South Africa’s military capability eroded by chronic issues, warns SCOPA. The South African Department of Defence and Military Veterans (DMV) is facing numerous challenges prohibiting it from being able to defend the country, say members of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). During a parliamentary meeting on 18 February, the Minister of Defence, Deputy Minister, and senior officers, were challenged by members of the parliamentary committee, who laid bare the severity of these issues. The discussion spanned audit findings, governance failures, underfunding, Denel’s uncertain status, and concerns about South Africa’s military readiness. The committee identified chronic challenges which have persisted for years and worsened under current leadership. Thes include continued underfunding, a failed and ineffective procurement processes, and an overstretched, unfunded mandate. The Minister of Defence, Angie Motshegka, acknowledged the department, like many others, has been crippled by austerity measures, which have negatively impacted its ability to fulfil its obligations. Major challenges were noted in maintaining and repairing essential equipment, training soldiers, and ensuring operational readiness. The department highlighted its HR intensive nature, which has made it particularly vulnerable to budget cuts.
Underfunded deployments
Underfunding further affects the department’s ability to respond to unplanned deployments. When emergencies arise, such as supporting police operations or deploying troops abroad, there is no corresponding adjustment in the defence budget. This practice of unfunded operations has resulted in overspending and increased unauthorised expenditure, creating legal and operational risks.
Deployments for which there is no allocated funding have placed enormous financial strain on the department. While such missions are often necessary for national security and regional stability, there is no formal financial process to account for them after deployment, parliament heard. This failure to regularise budget allocations has created a pattern of unauthorised expenditure and financial mismanagement. A recent court ruling emphasised that committing resources without funding is illegal, creating further pressure on the department.
Procurement failures
Additionally, SCOPA heard that the department has faced significant failures in strategic procurement, resulting in delayed delivery of equipment. Prime examples, according to Committee member Carl Niehaus, are the protracted delays in Project Hotel and Project Hoefyster. Despite bns spent on contracts, zero Badger Infantry Fight Vehicles (IFVs) have been delivered under Project Hoefyster. Further, the Auditor General noted that poor procurement practices have left essential equipment, including spare parts and rations, unavailable or expired.
Dysfunctional Denel
Denel, a critical state-owned enterprise responsible for providing defence equipment, remains in a state of dysfunction. Once a strategic national asset, Denel has been plagued by financial mismanagement, corruption, non-delivery of contracts, and leadership instability.
The transfer of Denel from the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) to the Department of Defence was highlighted by the Committee as a critical issue. Despite the transfer being approved, there remains significant administrative confusion. The Minister of Defence explained that Denel is technically still under the Presidency’s oversight, due to delays in the process of transfer.
This “limbo status” has created accountability challenges, as the Department of Defence cannot exercise full oversight over Denel’s finances or operations, leaving the enterprise essentially “in no man’s land.” In the meantime, Denel’s failure to deliver on contracts has further hampered the military’s readiness, resulting in grounded aircraft, drydocked ships, and few available armoured vehicles. The committee emphasised the urgency of formalising the transfer, warning that delays could have catastrophic consequences for South Africa’s national security.
Poor state of the military
One of the most alarming revelations from the hearing was the state of South Africa’s operational military capability. The Committee expressed grave concerns about the military’s ability to protect the country in the event of an attack or other national security threats.
One of the most pressing issues is the lack of operational hours for the South African Air Force (SAAF) and Navy. SCOPA Chairperson Songezo Zibi highlighted the audit report, which indicated that flying hours for pilots have dropped by over 80% in recent years, while naval ships have seen an 85% reduction in sea time. This drop in training time has led to pilots and mechanics losing their certifications and operational currency. Without these certifications, personnel are not legally or practically capable of conducting missions, said Zibi.
The Minister and Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Michal Ramantswana argued that they have partnered with other countries for simulator training to keep pilots somewhat prepared. However, the committee was not convinced, stating that simulators cannot replace real-world training. The committee warned that if spare parts, fuel, and maintenance funding are not restored, South Africa could be left defenceless in the event of a national crisis.
The discussion further highlighted reports of soldiers being forced to stretch one-day food rations over several days, and multiple instances of troops receiving expired ration packs. The Chief of Staff implied that if soldiers were allowed to create their own ration packs, the problem could be solved. However, the Committee strongly disagreed with the notion.
Equipment failures have also contributed to low morale and operational humiliation, believes the Committee, with it being noted that the remains of the 14 soldiers killed in the eastern DRC returned on a Tanzanian Air Force Y-8 aircraft, due to a lack of aircraft from the SAAF.
A recent incident where South African peacekeepers had to raise a white flag of surrender due to inadequate supplies and weaponry was further cited as a “national embarrassment.” The committee demanded immediate reforms to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Poor governance and leadership
The Parliamentary Committee did not mince words in its critique of the department’s governance and leadership. Chronic mismanagement has resulted in repeated adverse audit outcomes, unauthorised expenditure, and irregular procurement, stated the Committee.
Despite repeated warnings from the Auditor General and the Special Investigating Unit (SIU), there has been little progress in holding individuals accountable for governance failures. Several committee members emphasised that there needs to be stronger “consequence management”, and individuals responsible for financial mismanagement and procurement failures must be dismissed or prosecuted.
The issue of expired medical equipment at 1 Military Hospital was highlighted as an example. Equipment purchased during renovations became obsolete due to project delays, and despite ms in losses, no one has been held accountable.
A significant issue raised was the lack of cooperation between military leadership and civilian oversight bodies. The Secretary of Defence Dr Thobekile Gamede (Acting) explained that while the military formally acknowledges civilian oversight, there are often delays and resistance when it comes to sharing information with auditors or investigators. This lack of transparency has created an environment where the military leadership is able to operate with impunity.
The SIU highlighted instances where investigators were refused access to procurement records, which was condemned by the Committee as behaviour that is “unconstitutional” and demanded a formal investigation into any obstruction of oversight.
The Committee expressed frustration with the department’s tendency to deflect blame onto budget constraints, acknowledging that while underfunding is a legitimate issue, many of the failures in the Department of Defence are due to poor planning, corruption, and weak leadership.
In a particularly stern exchange, committee members warned the Minister and military leadership against providing vague or overly optimistic answers. “The correct answer is not to say we are prepared when the facts clearly show otherwise,” one member stated.
The South African Department of Defence and Military Veterans now stands at a crossroads. Chronic underfunding, governance failures, Denel’s limbo status, and operational shortcomings have eroded the country’s military capability. Unless immediate reforms are undertaken to address accountability, and leadership failures, South Africa risks becoming a vulnerable state. The parliamentary committee’s message was clear: time is running out, and the nation’s security depends on decisive action. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
20 Feb 25. Australia, Papua New Guinea begin talks on full defence treaty. Australia and Papua New Guinea said on Thursday they would begin talks on a full defence treaty between the two countries. Australia and Papua New Guinea already have a defence cooperation agreement, but the talks were aimed at helping their armed forces operate more closely together, Australia defence minister Richard Marles said.
“This will enable our two defence forces to walk down a pathway of increasing integration and increasing interoperability,” Marles told a news conference with his counterpart Billy Joseph.
The new treaty is one of a number of agreements Australia has signed or plans to sign with Papua New Guinea, with China pushing to expand its role in the country.
“We have many friends and we treat as friends uniquely under different levels, but with Australia… we are tied to the hips, we are very close,” Joseph said. (Source: Reuters)
19 Feb 25. Brazilian defence exports continue to rise. The Brazilian defence industrial base exported USD1.8bn in products and solutions in 2024, the Brazilian government said on 12 February. This is a 22% increase over 2023, in which USD1.5bn was exported, and a 123% growth over 2022, according to the government. The Brazilian defence industrial base contributes 2.9m direct and indirect jobs and represents 3.58% of Brazilian GDP, Minister of Defence José Múcio Monteiro Filho said. Export growth in 2024 was fuelled by orders booked by Embraer Defense & Security for 11 C-390 Millennium multimission transport aircraft and 28 A-29 Super Tucano light attack and training aircraft. In 2024 Embraer signed contracts with Portugal, Paraguay, and two undisclosed countries for A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and with the Netherlands, Austria, Czechia, and one undisclosed country for C-390 Millennium airlifters. Embraer sees further opportunity in 2025, with potential deals for C-390s with Slovakia, South Korea, and Sweden. The company is also pitching the airlifter to India, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, among others. The Brazilian aerospace firm has started the year off well, signing a contract with Uruguay for five A-29 Super Tucanos in January. On the ground front, the Brazilian operation of Italian vehicle maker IDV is negotiating with several countries, including Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Malaysia for potential sales of its Guarani 6×6 armoured vehicle, the company told Janes. The vehicle has already been procured by Brazil, Ghana, Lebanon, and the Philippines. Brazilian companies have also exported significant quantities of unguided general-purpose bombs, unguided rockets, and 155 mm artillery rounds. (Source: Janes)
19 Feb 25. Russia: Security environment in North Caucasus will continue to remain volatile. On 18 February, an unidentified individual opened fire at a former traffic police officer in the Republic of Ingushetia, located in Russia’s North Caucasus region. The victim was seriously wounded; however, the perpetrator was not apprehended. The motives of the attack remain unclear. This is the second time a security official has been attacked in the restive republic recently; on 15 February, the former deputy police chief of Karabulak (Ingushetia) was wounded in a shooting by an unidentified assailant who was able to escape the crime scene. These incidents underscore the restive nature of Russia’s North Caucasus, where attacks against security officials are more frequent than elsewhere in Russia. Elsewhere in the North Caucasus, in the Republic of North Ossetia (Russia), Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) detained an individual attempting to travel to the Middle East to join an international terrorist organisation on 18 February; this organisation was most likely an Islamist terror group. We assess that these developments underscore the persistent volatility of the security environment in Russia’s North Caucasus, a hotspot for radicalisation risks and separatist violence. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Feb 25. Colombia: Guerilla-led armed strike elevates violent crime, attack risks across Chocó department. On 15 February, the National Liberation Army (ELN) armed group announced a 72-hour armed strike (paro armado) in Chocó department. Armed groups typically use the ‘paro armado’ to reinforce areas and prohibit transit across the affected region. The measure will run from 0000hrs (local time) on 18 February to 0000hrs on 21 February. The strike is in response to the ‘serious humanitarian situation’ and ‘paramilitary advances’ in the region. Chocó’s Governor’s Office said the ‘paro armado’ risks encroaching on civilian’s basic rights, either through forced displacement or confinement. Since 5 February, clashes between the ELN and the Gulf Clan in Chocó have displaced approximately 3,400 civilians. The reinforcement of ELN personnel across Chocó likely increases the risk of violent clashes with the Gulf Clan, sustaining attack and violent crime risks in the immediate-to-short term. We assess that prospective violence during the ‘paro armado’ will highly likely drive internal migration, increasing extortion and opportunistic crime risks for displaced civilians in surrounding areas. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Feb 25. Congo (DRC): Capture of Bukavu will increase security, regional conflict risks. As of earlier on 17 February, the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group continues to consolidate control of Bukavu (South Kivu province). This follows M23 advances into central Bukavu on 16 February, when the rebels captured administrative buildings and the Place de l’Indépendence. Congolese (FARDC) and Burundian troops (FDNB) have largely withdrawn from the city, driving a breakdown in law and order with looting of aid stores and business premises likely in the coming days, increasing staff exposure to petty and violent crime. In the coming days, the M23 will likely continue to expand south to consolidate the Rwandan border, driving conflict with the FDNB. This comes as Rwandan media reported on 16 February that hundreds of Rwandans have been arrested in the Burundian capital Bujumbura. Further, such reports will likely elevate regional conflict escalation risks and will possibly be used as a pretext for increasing hostility towards Burundi. We assess this will likely trigger intensified Rwandan support for the RED-Tabara rebel group, increasing attack risks in western Burundi and raising ethnic tensions across the region. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Feb 25. Brazilian government approves package to support domestic defence industrial base. The Brazilian government on 12 February formally approved an ambitious effort to strengthen Brazil’s defence technological and industrial base, and support local research, development, and innovation activities. The government is allocating BRL112.9bn (USD19.5bn) by 2026 to support domestic defence industry under the ‘New Industry Brazil’ action programme, the Brazilian government said on 12 February. “Mission 6” of the programme covers technologies for “national sovereignty and defence”.
The ‘New Industry Brazil’ project was launched in January 2024 to advance national development. The government will provide BRL79.8 bn of the BRL112.9 bn, including BRL31.4bn for the ongoing local production of aircraft, wheeled armoured vehicles, submarines, and frigates, among others. BRL42.1bn was already allocated for the programme in 2023 and 2024. The remaining BRL37.7bn will finance local projects in 2025 and 2026 with funding from the Ministry of Defence, the Brazilian Development Bank, and the Funding Agency for Studies and Projects. The private sector will contribute BRL33.1bn, including BRL23.7bn for aerospace and defence projects, BRL8.6bn for nuclear activities, and BRL787m for security equipment. In the land sector, the local operation of Iveco Defence Vehicles (IDV) is supplying the Brazilian Army and foreign customers with Guarani 6×6 armoured vehicles. The company is set to launch assembly of 420 LMV 2 4×4 light armoured tactical vehicles for the Brazilian Army in 2025. (Source: Janes)
17 Feb 25. Op Aspides Red Sea protection tasking will continue to February 2026. operating in African waters and concentrating on the Red Sea has provided support and close protection to over a thousand vessels. In the course of executing its mandated protection duties for merchant and other shipping using the Red Sea, including the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, Operation Aspides (Greek for “shield”) has 24 “kills” to its credit. These are listed as two USVs (unmanned surface vehicles), four ballistic missiles and 28 UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). “Close protection” was provided for 370 vessels with a further 640 vessels given what the operation terms “support”. Additionally, assets assigned to Aspides have been part of rescuing 50 seafarers. The operation is headquartered in the Greek city Larissa and is commanded by Hellenic Navy Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis. Ahead of its mandate expiring on Wednesday, 19 February, the EU Council extended it until 28 February 2026 with what a statement terms “a reference amount” in excess of 17m euros. The extension decision follows an operation review. To ensure and improve maritime security in its area of operation (AoO), Aspides will now collect information on arms trafficking and “shadow fleets” (deceptive shipping practices) to share with EU member states, the European Commission (EC), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interpol, the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Co-operation (EUROPOL) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Aspides’ mandate is that of a defensive maritime security operation with the objective of restoring and safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Arabian and Red seas as well as the gulfs of Aden, Oman and the Persian Gulf. It has, according to the Operation website, three “naval units” attached as well as a force headquarters aboard a frigate. Other EU naval operations in African waters are Atalanta (western Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa) and Irini (Mediterranean Sea). (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
14 Feb 25. Ethiopia: Suspension of TPLF political activity will raise threats to peace process in Tigray region. On 13 February, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) suspended the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) from all political activities for three months. The NEBE stated that the TPLF has breached election laws by failing to hold a general assembly or internal elections in the past six months. Disputes between TPLF factions aligned with Tigray’s regional interim president, Getachew Reda, and TPLF chairperson Debretsion Gebremichael have triggered deadlock within the party in recent months, preventing internal elections from taking place. The suspension is unlikely to resolve leadership disputes within the TPLF; rather, it will likely exacerbate risks of factionalism and sustain deadlock within the party. Escalating internal divisions within the TPLF will compound risks of organisational splintering in the coming months, driving risks of militant factions reverting to insurgency-style operations. We assess that a resurgence in violence would substantially elevate threats to staff and assets throughout Tigray region; violence in western Tigray would also likely exacerbate unrest in neighbouring Amhara region. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Feb 25. Mali: Jihadist attack in Ségou region will likely elevate security, kidnapping risks. On 13 February, local media reported that unidentified militants killed at least 16 people in an attack on Berta village (Ségou region) on 12 February. Although no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, it was highly likely conducted by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which maintains a strong presence in northern Ségou. In the coming weeks, JNIM militants are highly likely to continue conducting attacks to consolidate and expand the group’s territorial control in the region. As the security forces lack the capacity to safeguard security in rural areas consistently, locally engaged staff will almost certainly continue to face an elevated threat of attacks, including kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) attacks, in the coming months, particularly during overland movement along the RN6 and RN34 highways. Proliferating JNIM activity will possibly trigger intensified counter-terrorism operations in the coming months, which will likely involve Russian Africa Corps personnel. We assess that counter-terrorism measures will likely involve indiscriminate operations targeting communities tangentially associated with jihadist activity, exacerbating security, bystander and broader human rights risks therein. (Source: Sibylline)
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