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06 Feb 25. Congo (DRC): Malawian troop withdrawal will likely aid M23 advances, drive regional conflict risks. On 5 February, Malawi’s president ordered its troops to begin preparations for the withdrawal of its forces from the Southern Africa Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). The SAMIDRC forces are fighting alongside the Congolese army (FARDC) against the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. The withdrawal of Malawian forces underscores limited regional commitment to the SAMIDRC. This will likely undercut attempts to strengthen the force to substantially challenge the M23 and repel its advances. Also on 5 February, the M23 captured Nyabibwe town (South Kivu province), located 40 miles (65km) north of the provincial capital Bukavu (in violation of an M23-imposed ceasefire on 4 February). In the coming days, we assess further ceasefire violations are almost certain and the M23 will likely capture further settlements along the RN2 highway towards Bukavu. This will likely drive protests by civil society groups in the capital Kinshasa. Continued M23 expansion and reduced SAMIDRC capacity will likely increase FARDC dependence on Burundian troops stationed in South Kivu, elevating the risk of bilateral tensions between Rwanda and Burundi. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Feb 25. Ramaphosa will be at Dar es Salaam summit on DRC as SAMIDRC faces uncertain future. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa will be in Dar es Salaam on Saturday for the jointly hosted summit on the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the future of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the DRC will be high on the agenda.
Confirmation of his attendance comes at the same time reports have it Malawi, one of three SADC troop contributing countries (TCCs) to the regional bloc mission SAMIDRC, will be withdrawing its military contingent. When this takes place it will leave South Africa and Tanzania as the lone TCCs to the mission, now extended to December this year after an initial 12 month mandate that started on 15 December 2023.
Malawian President Lazarus Chakwera “has ordered the MDF (Malawi Defence Force) commander to begin preparations for the withdrawal of Malawian troops… to honour the declaration of a ceasefire by the warring parties there and to pave way for their planned negotiations towards a lasting peace,” a Malawian government statement said.
At least 20 peacekeepers, including 14 South Africans and three Malawians, were killed as the M23 rebels captured the key city of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, last week.
The Dar es Salaam summit will see the eight nation East African Community (EAC) and its 16 member southern African counterpart attempt to “find workable solutions to the longstanding impasse [in DRC]” as stated by Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) Co-chair Malusi Gigaba. He acknowledged efforts to date by both regional blocs to halt fighting in the eastern DRC, with deaths in the ranks of all three SAMIDRC TCCs.
Briefing media in Cape Town ahead of today’s State of the Nation Address (SONA), Presidency spokesman Vincent Magwenya confirmed Ramaphosa’s attendance at Saturday’s Dar es Salaam summit. The joint summit, according to a Magwenya statement, follows extraordinary summits of both regional blocs and will “deliberate on the way forward regarding the security situation in eastern DRC”.
Rwandan President Paul Kagame – accused of backing M23 rebels in the DRC – and his DRC counterpart Felix Tshisekedi are also due to attend Saturday’s summit.
Malawi’s withdrawal from SAMIDRC puts pressure on Tanzania and South Africa to follow suit, but Ramaphosa has vowed to keep South African troops in the DR Congo, saying they are subject to the SAMIDRC mission “which has operational timeframes and an end date”.
The SAMIDRC mission was authorised by the southern African bloc to have 5 000 troops from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania, with South Africa mandated to deploy up to 2 900, although it is believed less than half of that number is actually in the DRC.
In South Africa, Parliament will on Monday (10 February) debate the DRC situation specifically as regards the 14 recent soldier deaths and an apparent lack of logistic support for South Africa’s commitment to the SADC peacekeeping mission. The debate was called for by Chris Hattingh, Democratic Alliance (DA) point man on defence and military veterans and acceded to by Speaker Thoko Didiza. The debate will take place in Parliament’s second temporary “home” – the massive marquee used for the Nelson Mandela funeral in December 2013 and christened “The Dome” – now erected on the Nieuwmeester parking ground opposite the Parliamentary precinct and the Parliamentary chamber for the just starting first sitting of the year and beyond.
Tuesday’s Parliamentary briefing to two of its three defence oversight committees saw an appeal for a closed session follow up on specifically, the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) in the eastern DRC. It came from both the JSCD and Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) wanting detail on “operational issues that could not be traversed in an open meeting to protect the security of those deployed” a Parliamentary Communication Services statement read, in part.
A committee member, preferring anonymity, pointed defenceWeb to the PCDMV first term programme which provides for a closed meeting on 26 February. Tagged “Closed meeting with the Minister of Defence, Chief of SANDF and the Standing Committee on Appropriations (SCA) on the fiscal challenges of the SANDF”, the committee member said “the DRC/SANDF situation could and should be accommodated as funding is a major part of what happened in and around Goma”.
M23 break ceasefire
While the Congo River Alliance, which includes the M23, on Tuesday declared a ceasefire for humanitarian reasons, rebels on Wednesday launched a new offensive. They seized a mining town in South Kivu province, resuming their advance on the provincial Bukavu – something they earlier said they would not target.
On Wednesday, the M23 and Rwandan forces are reported to have seized Nyabibwe, some 100 km from Bukavu and 70 km from the province’s main airport.
“This is proof that the unilateral ceasefire that has been declared was, as usual, a ploy,” Congolese government spokesman Patrick Muyaya told AFP. The M23 in 2024 had said it was not interested in capturing Goma, yet did so in January.
The rebel group has appointed top officials including a governor of North Kivu to administer Goma and surrounding territory. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
05 Feb 25. India raises defense budget by nearly 10%, pushes local manufacturing. India’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a 9.53% rise in its 2025-2026 defense budget as the country grapples with multiple security challenges, headlined by Pakistan on its western border and tensions with China to the north.
India’s MoD is set to receive a record 6.81trn rupees, equating to US$78.3 bn. However, only 1.8trn rupees – or 26.4% of the budget – will be allocated to new acquisitions. That is because pensions account for 23.6% of the budget, while the armed forces receive 45.8% and 4.2% goes to other defense organizations.
“The primary structural problem of salaries and pensions squeezing fiscal space for capital acquisition remains,” analysts Harsh V. Pant and Kartik Bommakanti, of the Indian-based Observer Research Foundation, wrote in a report.
The MoD described 2025-2026 as a period of reforms.
“In the current geopolitical scenario where the world is witnessing a changing paradigm of modern warfare, the Indian Armed Forces need to be equipped with state-of-the-art weapons and have to be transformed into a technologically advanced combat-ready force,” reads a statement.
Although Delhi says modernization is a priority, funding for capital acquisitions has grown just 4.65% compared to last year. Upcoming big-ticket items include MQ-9B drones, carrier-borne fighters and next-generation submarines and warships.
The government continues to push the objective of self-reliance in defense production. Indeed, 1.12trn rupees is devoted to procurements from domestic industry, representing 75% of the overall modernization budget.
To encourage greater private-sector participation, the MoD noted 25% of this domestic share is “earmarked for acquisition from domestic private industries”.
Elsewhere, there is a 12.4% hike on defense research and development, reaching 268 bn rupees. The MoD noted, “This will financially strengthen the Defence Research and Development Organisation in developing new technologies” via research and building private-public partnerships.
Pant and Bommakanti remarked that “the pattern of allocation on armaments sends a clear signal that the domestic industrial complex is prioritized and will be encouraged.”
However, Antoine Levesques, research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told Defense News that India faces a key challenge “in balancing the urgent requirements of its defense procurement through foreign purchases, versus fulfilling its longer-term goal of upscaling and upskilling its indigenous defense industrial ecosystem.”
India’s “Atmanirbharta” (self-reliance) defense policy is bearing fruit, according to official data. By FY2023-2024, domestic defense production had increased to 1.27trn rupees, up 174% compared to a decade earlier. This year, Delhi expects domestic production to reach 1.75trn, and even 3trn by 2029.
Simultaneously, Indian defense exports surged to 19.4bn rupees in FY2023-2024, up 32.5% from a year earlier. The three top export destinations were the United States, France and Armenia. According to the MoD statement, the defense-export goal by 2029 is 500 bn rupees. (Source: Defense News)
05 Feb 25. Bangladesh: Proposed political signals potential shift in Bangladesh’s political landscape. On 5 February, the Anti-Discrimination Students Movement (ADSM) and Jatiya Nagorik Committee (JNC) announced their intention to establish a new political party within a month. They also launched an initiative to garner public opinion to help shape the party’s direction. The party will likely be a youth-based progressive-leaning party focused on increasing economic opportunities. ADSM and JNC helped to lead the mass protest movement in 2024 which resulted in the ousting of long-time prime minister Sheikh Hasina. The announcement comes amid preparations to hold elections for the first time since Hasina’s resignation, which chief adviser to the interim government Muhammad Yunus claims is likely in late 2025 or the first half of 2026. While the much more established Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) will be best placed to contest the next elections, the newly proposed party has a realistic possibility of becoming a material political factor, especially since the participation of Hasina’s Awami League (AL) is uncertain. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Feb 25. Philippines: Vice President’s impeachment process will likely drive domestic unrest risks. Earlier on 5 February, the House of Representatives impeached Vice President Sara Duterte over her alleged misuse of public funds. 215 out of 306 lawmakers voted in favour of the motion. Duterte will remain in office while the Senate determines whether to confirm the impeachment. If at least 16 out of 23 sitting senators vote to confirm, she will be removed and barred from holding public office. In recent months, a political rift between Duterte and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has polarised public opinion. On 13 January, over one m rallied in the capital Manila in opposition to an impeachment; additionally, on 31 January, thousands of protesters in Manila called for her impeachment. If Duterte’s impeachment is confirmed, large-scale protests in major cities are highly likely. Protests will likely remain largely peaceful, though scuffles between participants and security forces are possible. Overall, the vice president’s position is not integral to the running of the government. If Duterte is removed from office, we assess that President Marcos will appoint a new vice president who would need to be confirmed by both chambers of Congress. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Feb 25. Uganda-Congo (DRC): Troop deployment is unlikely to increase regional conflict risks. On 4 February, Uganda deployed an additional 1,000 soldiers into the Lubero territory of the Congo (DRC, North Kivu province). Ugandan forces have been deployed in the northern regions of North Kivu since 2021, conducting joint operations with the Congolese army (FARDC) against the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). While Uganda has been accused of working with the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels by the United Nations, this was primarily necessitated by the M23 capturing Congolese border posts. It is unlikely that this recent deployment is designed to facilitate greater co-operation between Uganda and the M23 or signals a possible regional expansion of the conflict. Uganda remains unlikely to jeopardise major infrastructure projects designed to create a trade corridor between Uganda and mineral-rich parts of North Kivu by openly supporting the M23. Instead, we assess that the deployment likely aims to compensate for a likely deterioration in FARDC engagement against the ADF in the coming weeks given the FARDC’s preoccupation with domestic military pressures posed by the M23. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Feb 25. Saudi Arabia increases defense spending to $78bn in 2025.
“The Kingdom allocated approximately $78bn to the military sector in the 2025 budget, which constitutes 21% of total government spending and 7.1% of Saudi Arabia’s gross product,” according to a statement from GAMI.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has allocated $78bn for defense spending in 2025, up from $75.8bn spent in 2024, Governor of the General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI) Ahmad Al-Ohali said in a statement Saturday.
“The Kingdom allocated approximately $78bn to the military sector in the 2025 budget, which constitutes 21% of total government spending and 7.1% of Saudi Arabia’s gross product,” he said, according to the statement.
The statement further noted that the Kingdom has witnessed a 4.5 percent annual defense growth since 1960, adding that it has become the fifth largest defense spender worldwide and the largest in the Arab world.
Saudi Arabia, historically one of the largest defense importers worldwide, is concentrating heavily on the Kingdom’s Vision 2030, which was launched in 2016. It aims to decrease the Kingdom’s dependence of the oil sector and boost other sectors based on national production. Vision 2030 has a set goal of localizing 50 percent of all defense spending by 2030, and has been pushing defense firms to open regional headquarters in the Kingdom.
“I am really confident that by 2030 we will reach 50 percent [localization], [even] more than 50 percent,” Al-Ohali told Breaking Defense in February 2024.
The localization rate of military industries reached 19.35 percent at the end of 2023, according to the statement.
“The Authority’s vision is to develop a sustainable military industries sector that enhances the readiness of military equipment and contributes significantly to the national economy,” Al-Ohali said on Saturday, according to a translated post on X.
GAMI, which is the contracting authority for the Saudi MOD, launched in October 2023 “Invest in Saudi Arabia” section on its official website with the goal of pointing international firms to areas of opportunity to invest in the Kingdom.
During his speech on Saturday, Al-Ohali highlighted that there are 74 opportunities within Saudi supply chains for military industries, “identifying 30 opportunities as a priority, representing about 80% of the total future expenditures on supply chains,” per the post on X. (Source: Breaking Defense.com)
04 Feb 25. Philippines shores up defenses with increased military spending. As the Philippines beefs up its defensive posture, pivoting from internal security to territorial defense, the government has lined up a series of acquisitions in line with the new plans.
The Philippine Marine Corps requires roughly 60 armored vehicles, but it is getting the ball rolling with seven vehicles from South Korea’s Kovico, assumed to be the company’s KMPV platform, via a notice of award issued Jan. 15.
Funding comes from the 2025 national budget that President Ferdinand Marcos signed into law Dec. 30, 2024. It included 271.9 bn pesos (US$4.65 bn) for the Department of National Defense (DND), a 12.3% hike compared to a year earlier.
A total of 138.2 bn pesos goes to the Army, 51.6 bn pesos to the Air Force and 51 bn to the Navy in 2025.
As a downside, modernization allocations for the armed forces received guaranteed funding of just 35 bn pesos, down on the 50 bn the military was expecting. Another 40 bn pesos could be tapped from standby appropriations, but only if the government receives excess revenues.
Marcos had vowed in December that he “remains committed to transforming our armed forces into a world-class force.”
He promised, “We’ll modernize your equipment, enhance your training programs, ensure that you’re equipped to face challenges not just of today, but also of the future.”
Last year, the DND announced its Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept, which aims to defend Philippine territory and its exclusive economic zone.
Crucial to that will be additional combat aircraft. Therefore, expected soon is a deal for 12 FA-50 Block 20 light fighters from Korea Aerospace Industries, effectively doubling the Philippine FA-50 fleet.
This deal will equip a second squadron. However, no decision has yet been made on new multirole fighters, where Saab’s Gripen and Lockheed Martin’s F-16 are contenders.
The Air Force has just contracted for six additional A-29B Super Tucano light attack aircraft too. A notice of award, worth $112.8 m, was issued to Embraer on Dec. 16, 2024, and the company said “deliveries are scheduled to take place in 2026.”
Shedding more light on ongoing procurements, the DND published a procurement monitoring report last month. It listed, for example, a new Bell 412EPX aeromedical helicopter for the Army.
Meanwhile, deliveries of S-70i Black Hawk helicopters continue. Sixteen helicopters were procured in 2019, and a deal for 32 extras was lodged in 2022, of which 10 have been delivered to date.
The Philippine Navy is awaiting two HDC-3100 corvettes from HD Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea, due this year and next. The same shipbuilder is also constructing six offshore patrol vessels for the Philippines.
Also underway is a cyber systems acquisition project worth $613 m to improve cyber defenses and systems integration. As part of China’s “gray zone” tactics against the Philippines, state-backed hacking is reportedly commonplace against government agencies. (Source: Defense News)
04 Feb 25. Ecuador: Border closures, port militarisation will increase supply chain risks in the short term. On 3 February, President Daniel Noboa announced that authorities will close Ecuador’s borders with Colombia and Peru between 8 and 10 February. Ports will also be militarised during this period, ahead of the 9 February general election. Noboa claimed unspecified armed groups were attempting to destabilise the country to influence the upcoming presidential elections. In January, the Peruvian authorities arrested at least six soldiers for allegedly supplying munitions to the ‘Los Choneros’ organised crime group (OCGs) using the Ecuador-Peru border. OCGs routinely use major ports, such as Libertador Simon Bolivar Port (Guayas province), to facilitate drug trafficking operations. The Peruvian government warned that closing the border will restrict the free movement of trade and individuals, increasing supply chain and transit disruption risks, particularly for the extractive sector. We assess that militarising ports will highly likely increase stop-and-search operations and security checkpoints in their proximity, likely increasing operational restrictions and supply chain risks for the shipping sector in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Feb 25. Congo (DRC): Rebel-declared ceasefire is unlikely to hold; conflict intensification is likely. On 3 February, the Rwandan-backed M23 and allied rebel group announced a unilateral ceasefire in the eastern DRC, allegedly commencing earlier on 4 February. The announcement comes amid a renewed M23 offensive; the group has taken control of Goma (North Kivu province) and advanced southwards. However, the Congolese army (FARDC) has repelled advances south of Nyabibwe (South Kivu province). Although there is a realistic possibility that the ceasefire will result in a temporary pause in the M23 offensive, it is unlikely to result in a permanent truce. Additionally, while there remains a low-level possibility that the East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) 8 February joint summit will result in further agreements, in the short term the M23 is unlikely to withdraw from Goma. We assess that ceasefire violations are likely. As such, the FARDC and its allies will likely continue to mobilise in preparation for its promised counter-offensive, driving the risk of substantial conflict escalation and intensification in the coming weeks alongside critical security and bystander risks in eastern DRC. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Feb 25. India announces 9.5% increase in 2025–26 defence budget. India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced on 1 February a 2025–26 defence budget of INR6.81trn (USD78.4bn).
The MoD said the new budget represents about 13.5% of total annual government expenditure and a nominal increase (before inflation) of about 9.5% over the defence budget for 2024–25.
The largest proportion of the funding of the new defence budget will be allocated to the armed forces, which receives INR3.1trn (or 46% of the total allocation). Capital outlay for defence services – including acquisitions and research and development (R&D) – receives INR1.8 trillion (26%) and defence pensions is allocated INR1.6trn (24%). The remaining 4% of the budget is ring-fenced for civil organisations under the MoD.
Compared with allocations in 2024–25, the armed forces allocation in 2025–26 increases by about 10%, capital outlay for defence services rises by nearly 5%, and defence pensions increases by about 13%.
From the 2025–26 capital outlay expenditure, about INR1.49trn is allocated for capital acquisitions – termed by the MoD as modernisation budget – and the remaining INR313bn is for R&D and the “creation of infrastructural assets across the country”.
The MoD said that 75% of the modernisation budget – or about INR1.11trn – will be spent on procurement through domestic sources and that the remaining 25% will be allocated for procurements only from local private-sector companies.
Commenting on the modernisation budget, the MoD said the funds will support its plans to enhance military jointness and integration as well as develop new military technologies including cyber, space, artificial intelligence, and robotics. (Source: Janes)
03 Feb 25. Russia: Likely targeted assassination underscores persistent risk of attacks in urban areas. Earlier on 3 February, an explosion occurred in the lobby of a luxury apartment complex in the capital Moscow. At least one person was killed and five others were injured. The victims include Armen Sarkisyan, a pro-Kremlin figure from Ukraine’s Donetsk oblast and the founder of an irregular unit composed of ethnic-Armenians fighting in Ukraine. Russian state media, citing police investigators, reported that the explosion was caused by the detonation of an explosive device as part of an assassination attempt against Sarkisyan. According to some reports, he survived the attack but has been hospitalised with severe injuries. A prominent Russian war blogger suggested that Ukraine likely orchestrated the attack. Although there is no evidence supporting such claims, Ukrainian intelligence services have been linked to several high-profile assassinations in Russia. There is also a realistic possibility that the attack was linked to Sarkisyan’s involvement in criminal activities since violent tactics are increasingly frequent in business dealings in Russia. We assess that the incident underscores the persistent threat of attacks in urban areas across Russia, including in Moscow. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Feb 25. Pakistan: Attack underscores persistent militant threat facing security forces in Balochistan. On 1 February, at least 18 soldiers were killed during a militant attack in Kalat district (Balochistan province). Between 70 and 80 militants targeted a vehicle carrying Frontier Corps paramilitary personnel as they attempted to dismantle roadblocks established by the militants. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist militant group, has claimed responsibility for the attack. 11 militants were reportedly killed during a follow-up ‘clearance operation’ conducted by the security forces. The attack comes amid heightened militant activity by the BLA in recent months which has targeted the security forces as well as Chinese investment and development projects in Balochistan. Data from the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) showed that terror attacks nationwide increased by 42% in January compared to the prior month; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces were the most impacted. There is a realistic possibility of the military escalating its counter-terrorism operations in Balochistan in the coming days, increasing security risks, particularly near military sites. Given the deteriorating security environment, we assess there is a realistic possibility that continued militant activity will deter foreign investments, including in ongoing mineral exploration projects. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Feb 25. Burundi: Escalating tensions with Rwanda drives regional conflict escalation, domestic attack risks. On 31 January, President Evariste Ndayishimiye stated that Rwanda is attempting to annex parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and is ‘preparing something against Burundi’. This comes as Burundian troops are increasingly being employed to counteract the Rwandan-backed M23’s advance into South Kivu province (DRC), driving risks of regional conflict escalation. Burundi maintains approximately 10,000 troops in eastern DRC, primarily to conduct counter-insurgency operations targeting Burundian rebels operating in the area (including the RED-Tabara group). Burundi has repeatedly accused Rwanda of supporting RED-Tabara and has increasingly supported the DRC armed forces (FARDC) in operations targeting the Rwanda-backed M23, exacerbating tensions with Rwanda. As the majority of Burundi’s troops are stationed in South Kivu province, further M23 advances towards the provincial capital Bukavu will almost certainly trigger further direct clashes. In response, Rwanda will likely increase support for RED-Tabara to maximise pressure on Burundi’s military, increasing risks of insurgent attacks along the Burundi-DRC border. We assess that this will increase the risk of bilateral diplomatic sanctions and possible regional conflict escalation. (Source: Sibylline)
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