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23 Jan 25. Kazakhstan: Attack on security forces is unlikely to indicate deteriorating security environment. On 22 January, the Kazakh security forces detained three suspects following an attack against a police special forces unit in the capital Astana on 21 January. The motive and identities of the suspects remain unclear, particularly due to conflicting reporting. Several sources claim that the individuals are possibly junior employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which we cannot confirm. Other reports indicate that the suspects are on a special watchlist related to the criminal underworld. If the latter is the case, there is a realistic possibility that the incident is linked to the government’s ongoing campaign against organised crime and drug trafficking. Notably, earlier this month, the authorities conducted large-scale arrests of organised criminal group (OCG) members involved in drug trafficking and toughened the country’s anti-drug legislation. Ultimately, we assess that the incident is unlikely to indicate a deterioration of the security environment in Kazakhstan. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jan 25. Brazil-Venezuela: Military exercise will sustain risk of regional tensions, elevate supply chain risks. On 22-23 January, the Venezuelan military (FANB) is holding a nationwide exercise called ‘Bolivarian Shield’. The drills involve approximately 150,000 security force personnel. A portion of the exercise simulates ‘protection’ operations in the vicinity of the Venezuela-Brazil border checkpoint near Pacaraima (Roraima state, Brazil). The Venezuelan authorities suspended border crossings between 22 and 23 January. Meanwhile, the Brazilian military has deployed police units to monitor the exercise. Transit disruption is highly likely to impact travel near the border given these respective reinforcements. As such, there will highly likely be elevated supply chain and operational disruption risks for the agriculture and extractive sectors in the coming days. On 10 January, the Venezuelan authorities briefly closed the border with Brazil alleging security concerns during the presidential inauguration. Although there is a remote chance of armed conflict, we assess that the location and nature of the exercise likely points to the increased and prolonged militarisation of Venezuela’s frontiers. As such, regional tensions will likely be sustained in the medium-to-long term. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jan 25. Philippines: Attack against security forces highlights possibility of renewed tensions in Mindanao. At around 1600hrs (local time) on 22 January, gunmen ambushed an army truck carrying soldiers deployed to secure a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) project in Sumisip town (Basilan province). The attackers killed two soldiers and injured at least 12 others. The soldiers managed to kill two of the assailants. The military has pledged to pursue the remaining attackers, whom it claims are linked to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF signed a peace agreement with the government in 2014, leading to the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in 2019. The peace deal facilitated the disarmament of approximately 40,000 MILF fighters. However, delays in delivering promised funds to former fighters and stalled preparations for the region’s first regular parliamentary elections have led to widespread dissatisfaction. The attack highlights the risk of renewed tensions in the region. We assess that the run-up to scheduled elections in May 2026 will possibly entail further incidents if the aforementioned issues cannot be resolved. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jan 25. Sudan: Expiry of ultimatum will likely lead to more attacks, elevated security risks for NGO staff. On 22 January, a 48-hour Rapid Support Forces (RSF) ultimatum for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and other armed groups to withdraw from El Fasher (North Darfur state) expired. The RSF has sporadically attacked the city since May 2024, though it is now likely to intensify its operations to capture the final SAF stronghold in Darfur and consolidate control over eastern Sudan. Recent RSF losses in Wad Madani (El Gezira state) have likely intensified pressure to capture the city to facilitate the re-deployment of RSF forces northwards to reinforce their positions in the capital Khartoum. Increased RSF attacks on the city are likely to prompt an uptick in indiscriminate shelling on civilian areas, driving bystander and security risks for NGO staff based in El Fasher. RSF advances in the city will also elevate the risk of looting, kidnap, torture and sexual violence. If the RSF takes control of the city, ethnically motivated abuses against the Zaghawa community are almost certain, raising government stability risks in Chad over the government’s complicity in the UAE’s arming of the RSF. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jan 25. Hanwha today announced a strategic partnership with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Korea Foundation (KF) to establish the Korea Chair at IISS. The signing ceremony took place at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore. The initiative will fund a full-time Senior Fellow for Korean Security Studies—the IISS Korea Chair in Advanced Technologies, National Security, and Defense—at IISS’ London headquarters, Arundel House. The Chair will engage with governments, the private sector, and global expert communities, contributing research and expertise to major international security forums, including the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. Founded in 1958 in the United Kingdom, IISS is a globally recognized think tank specializing in nuclear deterrence, arms control, and international security. It is best known for hosting the Shangri-La Dialogue and the Manama Dialogue, two of the world’s most influential defense summits. The partnership underscores Hanwha’s commitment to fostering industry dialogue and expanding its global presence in the defense and security sectors, particularly in Europe and the Middle East.
“Hanwha’s strategic partnership with IISS, a leading global think tank in defense and security, represents a significant milestone for South Korea’s defense industry,” said Jae-il Son, President and CEO of Hanwha Aerospace. “We will continue to engage with policymakers through various channels and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with global defense companies.”
Bastian Giegerich, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive said, “Advance technology, national security and the defense industry are evolving faster and becoming more critical than ever. The research outcomes of the Korean Chair will make a significant contribution in this field.”
Gheewhan Kim, President of the Korea Foundation, who facilitated the partnership between Hanwha and IISS, said the initiative marks an important expansion of Korea-focused research beyond U.S.-based think tanks. “This will broaden understanding and foster a positive perception of East Asia’s geopolitical issues and South Korea’s defense industry across the EU, NATO, and the Middle East,” he said.
22 Jan 25. Two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a crucial chemical ingredient for missile propellant will sail from China to Iran over the next few weeks, according to intelligence from security officials in two western countries. The Iranian-flagged ships — the Golbon and the Jairan — are expected to carry more than 1,000 tonnes of sodium perchlorate, which is used to make ammonium perchlorate, the main ingredient for solid propellant for missiles. Two of the officials said the sodium perchlorate could produce 960 tonnes of ammonium perchlorate, which makes up 70 per cent of the propellant for solid-fuel missiles. That amount of ammonium perchlorate could produce 1,300 tonnes of propellant, enough to fuel 260 mid-range Iranian missiles such as the Kheibar Shekan or Haj Qassem, the officials added. Ammonium perchlorate is among chemicals controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime, an international anti-proliferation body. The chemicals were being shipped to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the elite arm of the Iranian military, two of the officials said. The two officials said 34 20-ft containers containing the chemical had been loaded on to the Golbon, which departed the Chinese island of Daishan on Tuesday. The Jairan is expected to depart China with 22 containers in early February. Both ships, which are owned by Iranian entities, were expected to make the three-week voyage to Iran without making any port calls, the officials said. The officials said the chemicals were loaded on to the Golbon at Taicang, a port just north of Shanghai, and were destined for Bandar Abbas, a port in southern Iran on the Persian Gulf. Based on data from vessel tracker Marine Traffic, the Golbon spent at least several days off Daishan island before leaving on Tuesday. Marine Traffic showed the Jairan about 75km south of Daishan off the coast of Ningbo in China’s Zhejiang province early on Wednesday. The officials could not say if Beijing was aware of the shipments. The US and its allies have frequently criticised China for providing support to regimes from Tehran to Moscow. The Chinese embassy in Washington said it was “not familiar” with the situation and that Beijing was committed to “maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East and Gulf region and actively promoting the political and diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue”. The Iranian government declined to comment. Dennis Wilder, a former top CIA China analyst, said China had carried out extensive arms sales to Iran dating back to 1979, including supplying “Silkworm” anti-ship missiles in 1986 during the Iran-Iraq war. “Since the early 1990s, China has assisted the Iranian military extensively with its ballistic missile development programme and has provided expertise, technology, parts, and training,” said Wilder, who is now at Georgetown University. “China’s motivation for secretly assisting Iran today includes clandestinely helping Iran produce missiles for the Russian war effort [in Ukraine], cementing common cause against perceived US hegemonism . . . and Beijing’s purchase annually of large amounts of discounted Iranian crude oil.” Washington has also criticised China for violating US sanctions by purchasing Iranian petroleum, but critics of Joe Biden’s administration say it did not do enough to enforce the sanctions. The US has also increased pressure on Beijing over the past two years for not doing more to stop the shipment of dual-use items to Russia that have helped Moscow in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But the volume of shipments has shown little sign of falling. (Source: FT.com)
22 Jan 25. Syria’s new rulers plan to privatise state-owned ports and factories, invite foreign investment and boost international trade in an economic overhaul designed to end decades as a pariah state, the country’s foreign minister told the Financial Times. “[Assad’s] vision was that of a security state. Ours is of economic development,” said Asaad al-Shaibani in a wide-ranging interview in Damascus, his first with international press. “There needs to be law and there need to be clear messages to open the way for foreign investors, and to encourage Syrian investors to return to Syria.” Shaibani spoke to the FT ahead of an appearance at the World Economic Forum in Davos on Wednesday, the first time Syria will participate in the annual meeting of global decision makers. He will use the trip to renew calls to lift punishing Assad-era sanctions, which he says will prevent Syria’s economic recovery and thwart other countries’ “clear readiness” to invest. While western nations have been quick to engage with the new authorities, many say they are waiting to see if they will act on their lofty promises before easing sanctions. The 37-year-old minister is one of the key figures in the new caretaker government and is close to the country’s de facto ruler Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. Sharaa’s Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham led the offensive that toppled former dictator Bashar al-Assad in December. In the weeks since, Shaibani said technocrats and former Assad-era civil servants have worked to uncover the damage done to the country and its coffers by the regime, which ran a closed socialist economy. This includes the discovery of $30bn in debt to former Assad allies Iran and Russia, non-existent foreign reserves at the central bank, a bloated public sector payroll and the decline of industries like agriculture and manufacturing, neglected and undermined by corrupt Assad-era policies. Shaibani acknowledged that the challenges ahead were enormous and would take years to address. He said authorities were setting up a committee to study Syria’s economic condition and infrastructure and would focus on privatisation efforts, including of oils, cotton and furniture factories. He also said they would explore public-private partnerships to encourage investment into airports, railways and roads. The challenge, however, will be finding buyers for entities that have been in decay for years in a shattered country cut off from foreign investment.
“We don’t want to live off humanitarian aid, nor do we want countries to give us money as if they’re throwing the investment in the sea,” he said. The key, he said, was easing US and European sanctions on the Assad regime and on HTS, a former al-Qaeda affiliate that many western governments still classify a terrorist group. While the US has issued several limited sanctions waivers, including for states who are seeking to help Syria in the interim, officials argue this is not enough. “Open the door for these places to start working,” Shaibani said. While some western capitals like Berlin appear open to easing some sanctions, they are waiting to see the new Islamist-led government’s approach to issues such as women and minority rights. The EU is due to discuss the bloc’s sanctions at a meeting of foreign ministers on January 27. Sanctions relief “must follow tangible progress in a political transition that reflects Syria in all its diversity”, the EU’s chief diplomat Kaja Kallas said this month. Shaibani said Syria’s new leadership was working to reassure Gulf Arab and western officials that the country does not pose a threat. Some in the region, notably the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, are wary of a resurgence of Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, while other Arab states worry the rebels’ success could revive revolutionary sentiment in their own countries. Shaibani said his new government was not planning to “export the revolution and start getting involved in other states’ affairs”. The new government’s priority was not to pose a threat to others, he said, but to build regional alliances that pave the way for Syrian prosperity. He said Syria’s “special relationship” with Turkey, the most active backer of rebels in their 13-year war against Assad, would allow the country to benefit from Ankara’s technology, regional weight and European relations. But he pushed back against concerns that this would give its northern neighbour undue influence or amount to “Turkish expansion”. “There will not be nor is there subjugation,” he said. One important challenge facing the new government is the fate of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, Washington’s partner in combating Isis, which Ankara considers an extension of Kurdish separatists who have long fought the Turkish state. Ankara has threatened a military operation in Syria’s north-east if Kurdish militias are not disbanded. Since taking office, Syria’s new leaders have strived to disband the SDF and integrate its fighters into the state, invoking the need for Syrian unity, but the SDF has so far refused. Shaibani said discussions with the SDF were under way, adding that Damascus was also ready to take over SDF-controlled prisons that hold thousands of captured Isis fighters. “The existence of the SDF no longer has justification,” Shaibani said, adding that authorities pledged to guarantee Kurdish rights in the new constitution and ensure their representation in the new government. (Source: FT.com)
22 Jan 25. Somalia: Clashes with Islamic State affiliate underscore raised bystander, collateral risks in Puntland. On 21 January, the Puntland Defence Forces (PDF) announced that Islamic State Somalia (ISS) militants killed at least seven security force personnel during clashes in the Ufeyn area (Puntland region). The clashes took place between 19 and 20 January during landmine clearing operations and resulted in at least 15 militant casualties. The clashes come after the PDF launched a renewed counter-insurgency campaign targeting ISS cells in the al-Miskaad mountains on 1 January. In the coming weeks, the security forces will likely continue to intensify operations targeting ISS cells in the region, increasing the risk of clashes, particularly in Iskushuban and Qandala districts (both Puntland). In response to intensified counter-insurgency operations, ISS will likely escalate kamikaze drone attacks targeting PDF bases, increasing collateral and incidental risks facing proximate regional population centres. ISS will also likely target security force convoys moving through the al-Miskaad mountains with kamikaze drone strikes and landmine attacks. We assess this will increase incidental risks for staff and assets during overland movement along thoroughfares linked to Bosaso and its port facilities (both Puntland). (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jan 25. Colombia: Internal displacement amid guerrilla violence points to infrastructural, supply chain risks. As of 22 January, the Ombudsman’s Office reported that approximately 32,000 people have been displaced by ongoing violence in Catatumbo region (Norte de Santander department). Around 15,000 people have fled to Cúcuta, 11,000 to Ocaña and 5,300 to Tibú (all Norte de Santander), while at least 1,000 have crossed the border into neighbouring Venezuela. Since 17 January, the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group has escalated its rate of attacks against community leaders, as well as demobilised guerillas and rival armed groups in the region. Spokespersons for dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) factions have stated that they will increase their attacks against the ELN in retaliation, but will attempt to avoid confrontations with the government and violence against civilians so as not to jeopardise peace negotiations. In the coming days, we assess that risks pertaining to attacks and kidnapping will be significantly elevated in Catatumbo as the violence continues. Additionally, internal migration will likely drive infrastructural strain in surrounding urban centres, as well as supply chain and opportunistic crime risks. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jan 25. Congo (DRC): Capture of Minova will likely increase logistical, operational challenges for NGOs. On 21 January, the M23 rebel group seized Minova town (South Kivu province), a prominent supply hub along the route crossing Lake Kivu to Goma (North Kivu province). The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) announced that approximately 20 NGOs based in Minova have suspended their activities. Minova’s capture has tightened the encirclement of Goma and comes after recent M23 gains cut off overland routes (in DRC) to and from Goma along the N2 highway, threatening supply chains and limiting evacuation routes for NGO staff based in the city. The M23 has demonstrated operational superiority over the DRC’s military (FARDC). As such, we assess the M23 is likely to continue making tactical gains southwards along the N2 highway towards Bukavu (South Kivu). Further fighting in South Kivu is likely to exacerbate logistical challenges for NGOs, disrupting the delivery of aid and elevating the risk of shortages. Increased instability will also elevate attack and kidnap risks facing NGO staff in North and South Kivu. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jan 25. SA defence industry can meet majority of SANDF requirements. The South African defence industry can provide 70% of the logistical requirements to support the Special Operations Force (SOF) envisaged in the 2015 Defence Review, says Sandile Ndlovu, CEO of the South African Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Industries (AMD) association, but 30% still needs to be sourced from foreign defence OEMs (original equipment manufacturers). Delivering the keynote address on the second day of the inaugural AAD 2024 Conference, focusing on the South African defence industry, Ndlovu said the industry comprised more than 600 companies employing 20 000 people, capable of Level 1 (components systems) to Level 5 (product system) production of equipment and materiel across land, sea, air, cyber and space theatres of war. Currently the industry exports artillery systems, armoured personnel carriers, sensors, munitions, electronic warfare systems, missiles, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) services to more than 35 countries in Africa, as well as the European Union, the Middle East and North and South America. The industry also enjoys substantial foreign investment from defence OEMs like Thales, Saab, Rheinmetall, Hensoldt, Damen, Aselsan, Embraer, Airbus and Safran. The Special Operating Force described in the Defence Review needs to be capable of connecting forces for rapid reaction, be air-lifted, enjoy close air support and be able to be sea landed. It must also be able to perform Exclusive Economic Zone patrols with concomitant firepower, as well as have high mobility infantry with enhanced firepower, manoeuvre and protection as well as an enhanced military health capability.
Currently, the country has diffused supplier bases across all segments, ensuring that there is no risk to any project should one or other smaller supplier or partner fail, Ndlovu said.
In C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers [C4] Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance [ISR]|), South Africa has 14 level 4/5 suppliers and 89 level 3 supply partners, while in the landward segment, there are currently 25 level 4/5 armoured vehicle suppliers and 27 firepower and support suppliers with 84 level 3 armour vehicle partners and 59 level 3 fire power and support partners. In aviation there are 44 level 4/5 suppliers, and at level 3, 85 partners. The maritime sector has 13 level 4/5 vessel suppliers and 93 level 3 partners across the deep water vessel and mission systems and littoral vessel and mission system segments. Health, broken into field hospitals and ambulance solutions, has 9 level 4/5 providers and 160 level 3 partners. Some of these companies were proactive, developing solutions for the South African defence sector at their own cost, on spec, such as OTT’s Ratel SLEP project, which completely overhauls the venerable indigenously designed and developed Border War era infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) from the drive train up.
“This innovation has extended the life of the Ratel by another 30 years, at a drastically reduced cost,” Ndlovu said. The price of one of the much-delayed Project Hoefyster’s Badger vehicles could pay for the upgrading of five Ratel IFVs.
Another example was DCD Springbuck armoured vehicle, which Ndlovu said has been widely exported.
Armormax’s TAC-6 vehicle family – based on the Toyota Land Cruiser – is another example of South African defence ingenuity, creating vehicle solutions specifically for the African defence market that are simultaneously affordable, easy to maintain and yet technologically advanced.
Ndlovu also singled out Paramount’s development of the Mwari, the uniquely South African advanced high performance reconnaissance light aircraft with its interchangeable mission pods and the Rooivalk as further examples of South African ingenuity in the aviation space, while the importance of the N-Raven precision strike ammunition had come into even sharper relief following the global lessons from Ukraine and Gaza.
One of the key attributes of the South African defence industry, he said, was the fact that 75% of what was designed and made in the country is dual use, fit equally for the battlefield or for humanitarian missions and disaster relief.
The problem, however, that – with the exception of Denel – the balance of the industry is private and because of that new methods have to be found to encourage private public partnerships to ensure that the industry be paid for the work they do and that the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF’s) prime mission equipment gets maintained – like the South African Air Force’s (SAAF’s) Rooivalk attack helicopters currently deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Another issue was for the SANDF to follow international practice and become ambassadors for the local equipment that is made locally but exported to foreign markets.
“The Mwari is a case in point. It is being sold to African markets, but no one in the SAAF has had the opportunity to fly it yet,” Ndlovu said. (Source: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/)
21 Jan 25. Colombia: State of Internal Commotion underscores security forces risks amid guerrilla violence. On 20 January, President Gustavo Petro declared a 90-day State of Internal Commotion and Economic Emergency in Catatumbo (Norte de Santander department) due to an escalation in guerrilla violence. The state of emergency grants the executive branch special powers to draft decrees and to allocate more resources to the security forces. Since 17 January, at least 80 people have died and 11,000 have been displaced by an intensification of violence perpetrated by armed guerrillas. The National Liberation Army (ELN) guerillas have targeted community leaders, demobilised guerillas and members of the 33rd Front armed guerrilla group. The ELN are likely attempting to increase their territorial control over key cocaine production and trafficking routes in Catatumbo. On 20 January, at least 20 people died in violent clashes between guerrillas in Calamar (Guaviare department). This state of emergency and the ongoing armed clashes underscore escalating attack, bystander safety, kidnapping, security forces and operational risks in the Guaviare and Norte de Santander departments. Additionally, we assess that sustained internal displacements will likely drive risks pertaining to the localised impacts of migration. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jan 25. Japan has no choice but to strengthen defence, foreign minister tells new Trump administration. Japan will continue to strengthen its defence capabilities given the security situation in East Asia, Japan’s foreign minister told his U.S. counterpart in a meeting on Tuesday, his spokesperson said. The return of U.S. President Donald Trump has prompted expectations that Washington may put more pressure on allies to further step up defence spending. Spurred by concerns about China’s growing military might and nuclear-armed North Korea, Tokyo is undertaking an historic defence build-up.
Japan’s Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya met with Trump’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz on Tuesday in Washington.
Iwaya told Rubio and Waltz that Japan had no choice but to continue increasing defense capabilities given the situation in East Asia, foreign ministry spokesperson Toshihiro Kitamura told a news conference in Washington. (Source: Reuters)
20 Jan 25. Colombia: Latest guerrilla violence points to elevated risk of attacks, kidnapping. Between 17 and 20 January, at least 80 people were killed and 8,000 others were displaced amid escalating armed guerrilla violence in Catatumbo region (Norte de Santander department). Additionally, on 17 January, President Gustavo Petro’s government suspended peace negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) armed group, accusing the guerrillas of war crimes. Since 17 January, the ELN has targeted community leaders and former members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The government also reported that the ELN attacked members of the Central General Staff (EMC) FARC dissident faction who are currently in peace negotiations with the government. The government will deploy approximately 300 more soldiers to combat the ELN and EMC in Catatumbo in the coming days. However, an EMC spokesperson stated that the group will retreat from the region. In the short term, risks pertaining to attacks, bystander safety, kidnapping and operational disruption will be significantly elevated in Catatumbo as the violence continues. We assess that the government will likely enact emergency measures locally, increasing supply chain and transit disruption risks. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jan 25. Pakistan: Security operation will likely mitigate against increasing communal tensions in Kurram. On 19 January, security officials announced that they launched an operation in Kurram district (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) following months of unrest. The announcement comes after an ambush against an aid convoy carrying food to displaced people. In all, ten individuals were killed during the attack. The district of approximately 60,000 people has experienced intermittent tribal clashes since 21 November 2024, when a group of armed men attacked a convoy of Shia passengers, killing 52. Despite a peace agreement between the Shia-majority and Sunni-minority communities, unrest has persisted in recent weeks in the town of Parachinar; main roads connecting the area to Peshawar have been blocked, causing medicine, food and fuel shortages, as well as an increase in casualties. The military will lead the operation and target specific militant hideouts, particularly in Bagan and adjacent areas, where militant activity has reportedly sought to undermine peace efforts. We assess that the operation and security force presence will likely help to mitigate against the risk of tensions between the two communities from escalating by preventing tribal clashes in the short term. However, if the security forces are not successful in limiting militant activity, the peace process will likely be protracted. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jan 25. RoK: Domestic unrest risks are elevated following impeachment extension, protest at court. At around 0300hrs (local time) on 19 January, the Seoul Western District Court extended the impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol’s detention for up to 20 days. Yoon was first detained on 14 January on charges of insurrection and abuse of power in connection with his short-lived declaration of martial law in December 2024. Shortly after the court’s decision, dozens of pro-Yoon supporters illegally entered the court in the capital Seoul and caused significant property damage. Around 1,400 police officers forced the rioters from the building; they also apprehended 90 participants. On 18 January, around 44,000 pro-Yoon supporters protested outside the court, where there were scuffles between protesters and the police. An anti-Yoon rally was also held in downtown Seoul. The police have heightened their security posture around the Seoul Detention Centre (Uiwang city, Gyeonggi province) where Yoon is detained, as well as at the Constitutional Court in Seoul, where his impeachment trial is being held. Large-scale rallies will highly likely persist as the impeachment trial and criminal proceedings take place. We also assess there is a realistic possibility of clashes between rival protesters and the police, driving unrest and bystander risks. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jan 25. Philippines, US Partner in Maritime Cooperative Activity in South China Sea. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the U.S. Navy conducted a bilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA) in the South China Sea, Jan. 17-18, 2025. MCAs demonstrate a collective commitment to strengthening regional and international cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific. This MCA is designed to emphasize our longstanding partnership between the two militaries in the maritime domain.
“Professional engagement with allies, partners, and friends in the region allows us to build upon our existing, strong relationships and continue to learn from each other,” said Rear Adm. Michael Wosje, commander, Carrier Strike Group 1 (CSG-1). “The U.S. and the Philippines are ironclad allies. As fellow maritime nations, we share the common goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific, assuring access to the seas.”
Each subsequent MCA builds upon the last, enabling added levels of complexity and interoperability which advance and strengthen combined capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures.
“Bilateral exercises in the region have grown in scale, scope and complexity, and we are proud to participate in combined operations that maintain stability in the region and reinforce deterrence,” said Capt. Matthew Thomas, commanding officer of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). “As the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 1, Carl Vinson is both excited and honored to conduct maritime exercises with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
MCAs are conducted in a manner that is consistent with international law and with due regard to the safety of navigation and the rights and interests of other states.
Participating units include the U.S. Navy Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group and a U.S. Navy P-8A assigned to Commander, Task Force 72, alongside Gregorio del Pilar-class offshore patrol vessel BRP Andrés Bonifacio (PS 17) and Jose Rizal-class guided-missile frigate BRP Antonio Luna (FF 151) from the Philippine Navy. CSG-1 consists of Carl Vinson, embarked staffs of CSG-1 and Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) one, Carrier Air Wing 2 (CVW-2), Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton (CG 59) and Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Sterett (DDG 104) and USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110). CVW-2 is composed of nine squadrons flying the F-35C Lightning II, F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, EA-18G Growler, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, CMV-22 Osprey and MH-60R/S Seahawks. The Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group is operating in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations. U.S. 7th Fleet is the U.S. Navy’s largest forward-deployed numbered fleet, and routinely interacts and operates with allies and partners in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific region. (Source: ASD Network)
17 Jan 25. No way back from US-China decoupling, warns GlobalData. The enduring trade war will have “no benefit to any technology companies at all.” Splintered US-China relations will finally shatter as the enduring trade war escalates. That is what the leading intelligence consultancy, GlobalData, anticipate in their Technology Predictions in 2025 as they help track the themes impacting companies across all sectors. Although Trump had pivoted the US against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in his first administration (2017-21), his successor Joe Biden continued to ride the same sentiment as the “pacing threat” unravelled further. Now it appears the policy will roll on indefinitely. American economic policy – directed by the inconsistent whims of President-elect Donald Trump when he is inaugurated on 20 January 2025 – will focus on deregulating industry and introducing flagship tax cuts, which will not see the light of day until 2026 at least, all to stimulate his country’s innovation. Trump is also set to hike up tariffs on foreign goods; however GlobalData analysts observe that this marks the point of no return:
“There will be no way back for US-China decoupling.” There is widespread “bipartisan support” in Washington for stringent measures against competing Chinese business interests. And this is reasonable since China’s companies tend to straddle the line between civil and military, thus threatening national security and the US military’s technological edge in the coming years.
Rivals exploit US industrial base
Through an ambiguous policy of Military-Civilian Fusion, or MCF, ostensibly civilian companies with a US presence that hail from the one-party state, are obliged to cooperate with PRC institutions, including its security and military services.
This is why, since Biden took office in 2021, the US Department of Defense (DoD) publish a blacklist of Chinese entities each year that they consider “military companies.” Notably, familiar tech brands such a Huawei and Tencent were identified as ‘fused’ companies earlier this month.
The US does struggle with its products getting into the wrong hands. Russia, a Eurasian rival, has similarly derived US-manufactured components from American companies for use in Russian weapons fired against Ukraine’s Armed Forces.
Findings from the Senate Armed Services Committee indicate that more than 40% of nearly 2,500 components analysed in Russian weapons on the Ukrainian battlefield were developed by four major US technology suppliers.
Global tech markets put defence at risk from 2025
“Amid rising technology nationalism, a major restructuring of supply chains is underway as friend-shoring initiatives take priority,” according to GlobalData’s strategic intelligence report on ‘Tech, Media, and Telecom Themes’.
The Indo-Pacific region has become a hotbed for these trade blocs.
Foremost among them, the trilateral AUKUS alliance, based upon the US and UK handing Australia the means to develop nuclear-powered submarines and Virginia-class boats in the interim, will flex even more in the coming years through its second pillar advancing military technologies such as hypersonics and uncrewed systems. Other nations such as Japan are working closely to advance their efforts as China threatens the sovereignty of its neighbours.
“The US-China trade war continues to escalate as the former closes more technology access routes and the latter retaliates in semiconductors and adjacent areas,” the report states.
It is worth noting too that defence industrial development may be curtailed by the scarcity of certain critical materials. GlobalData expects a temporary shortage of lithium-ion batteries, a key component for technologies across all sectors. Particularly as tensions in Congo and Russia develop.
One analyst noted that “it takes seven years to take a lithium mine online.”
Already in January 2025, the US is throwing its weight behind the underrated commodity: Army scientists have developed a new surface treatment that could lead to more efficient and longer-lasting batteries for military applications. The research team’s work focused on next-generation battery technology that the Army stated “goes beyond current lithium-ion capabilities.” Their approach includes applying an acidic solution to the battery’s metal electrode, followed by a controlled drying process that creates a specialised thin protective layer. (Source: army-technology.com)
20 Jan 25. Global conflicts doubled over the past five years; set to worsen in 2025. Global conflicts doubled over the past five years and are still rising, with one in eight people now exposed to conflict. 2025 is expected to see an increase in conflict levels, especially in the early part of the year, according to research by ACLED. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) organisation said it recorded nearly 200 000 violent incidents for 2024 — a 25% increase compared to 2023. Its updated 2024 Conflict Index (measuring deadliness, danger to civilians, geographic diffusion, and armed group fragmentation) revealed that Palestine is the most dangerous place in the world, with over 81% of its population exposed to conflict. Palestine, Myanmar, Syria, and Mexico hold the highest positions in the Index. ACLED data revealed that 81% of Palestine’s population is exposed to conflict, 35 000 fatalities are recorded in the past 12 months (over 50 000 since Hamas’ attack on 7 October 2023), and civilians remain under daily assault from bombings and incursions. On average, 52 conflict incidents occur in Palestinian territories per day. Because of Palestine’s — and specifically Gaza’s — level of violence compared to other conflicts and the lack of a ceasefire between combatants, it is very likely to continue being an intense conflict into 2025. While conflict increased by 25% globally, the sharpest increases in 2024 were recorded in Lebanon (958%), Russia (349%), and Israel (247%). At least 233 597 people were reportedly killed as a result of conflict in 2024, up 30% from 179 099 fatalities in 2023, ACLED data showed.
How much conflict is occurring in the world?
In the past five years, conflict levels have almost doubled. For 2020, ACLED said it recorded 104 371 conflict events; in 2024, for the same period, nearly 200 000.
Over 233 000 deaths is a conservative estimate of reported fatalities resulting from these events in the past year. This is largely due to three very large conflicts beginning or restarting during that time — Ukraine, Gaza, and Myanmar — coupled with continued violence in many other countries with high rates of conflict — including Sudan, Mexico, Yemen, and Sahel countries, and very few conflicts ending. Civilian exposure to violence, conflict incidents, and the number of armed groups involved in violence are proliferating, ACLED found. All forms of conflict events have increased, but bombings now represent over 90 000 events in 2024, are close to double the rate of battles, and triple the rate of direct violence against civilians. As states engage more with challengers domestically and internationally, warfare has become more sophisticated and widespread. Bombing and ‘remote violence’ nearly doubled as of 2022, growing by over 25% per annum since 2022.
Most protests are not included in the Index, but over 143 000 protests occurred in 2024, and major protest movements were linked to pro-Palestine agendas.
In 2024, over 3bn people across 70 countries went to the polls to vote in national elections, with many more casting their ballots to elect local representatives. Over a third of the countries where a national election was held in 2024 experienced at least one act of electoral violence, affecting authoritarian and unstable states as well as established democracies. Countries with elections in 2024 had — on average— a 63% increase in national political violence compared to over 21% increases across countries without elections. Increases in violence occur when governments or political opposition groups are willing to use violence to remain in power or seize it when they believe that the vote has been rigged. Political interests then arm militias and mobilize their supporters well before election day. Post-election, countries often return to their pre-election disorder rate, ACLED said.
“Yet, electoral violence is not overly effective: Election results in countries like India and Senegal — where incumbent governments lost their absolute majority and presidency despite widespread violence — suggest that violence does not stop democratic choice and change. But the patterns of conflict overall confirm that living in a democracy is not insurance against conflict. Most conflict is not occurring in ‘poor’ or ‘isolated’ autocratic states but in ‘partially free’ countries,” the organisation found.
Most conflict is also now occurring in middle-income countries, and it is growing more strongly in middle- and high-income countries. “In short, more development and democracy do not constrain violence. Conflict adapts to political circumstances, changing form and direction according to perpetrators’ agendas.”
Movement around the Index
Over the course of 2024, Lebanon rose significantly in the Index, entering into the ‘extreme’ list, whereas it previously had hosted ‘high’ levels of conflict. Libya and Peru have also become worse, both because of increases in fatalities as a result of political violence. Levels of violence overall declined in Yemen despite remaining a site of very high conflict levels. Yemen has decreased consistently year-on-year — from more than 10 000 in 2020 to just over 2 000 in 2024 — but its violence is expanding into new areas and against new competitors in the Red Sea.
The most violent places are experiencing quite different conflict types, ACLED found: From bombing campaigns across the Middle East, mob violence in India, a cartel civil war in Mexico, internal jihadi competition coupled with (formerly Wagner) mercenaries in the Sahel, Red Sea antagonisms, an inter-state stalemate in Ukraine, to Sudan’s violence upon civilians.
“Communities and governments can be equally and deeply challenged by multiple gangs that extort, build illicit economies, kill civilians, and destroy public space and politics, as they are by an established insurgent group with a hierarchical military structure and national political agenda. Each form of conflict is detrimental and widespread, resulting in a larger share of the global population being exposed to continued political violence,” ACLED stated.
The conflicts that proliferated in 2024 starkly demonstrate the differences between being in power and being in control. In the Sahel, governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are in power but hardly in control of the local areas: rather, jihadi groups, external mercenaries, and local arrangements create a chess board of control and competition. Governments in Myanmar, Mexico’s new president, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition are all running into the abyss of ‘control vs. power.’ The results are drastic increases in violence rates and more violent groups, while influence over how violence evolves and ends is elusive.
2025: What to expect
Recent levels of violence have been unprecedentedly high, with several ‘record breaking’ months in the past year. In the beginning of 2025, conflict event rates are expected to grow by 15% due to more bombings and battles, and result in approximately 20 000 reported fatalities per month, ACLED predicted.
“Throughout 2025, levels of violence are expected to remain very high relative to the recent historical norm, and an annual increase of 20% is likely. However, the places, contenders, and forms of increased conflict in 2025 could be drastically different than the pattern in 2024,” the organisation concluded.
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
20 Jan 25. Russia delivers military hardware to Mali. Russia has delivered over 100 military vehicles to Mali, including tanks, trucks, and infantry fighting vehicles.
It is suspected the shipment may have come from Syria following the departure of Russian troops after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
In November 2024, a coalition of Syrian rebels mounted several offensives with the intention of ousting Assad. On 8 December, as rebel troops first entered Damascus, Assad fled to Moscow and was granted political asylum by Russia, which subsequently began withdrawing large amounts of military hardware and troops from Syria, diverting some to Libya.
It appears Mali could be another recipient of this equipment: on 17 January, a convoy of over 100 vehicles arrived in Mali’s capital Bamako, where it was captured on video by local media company Cap Mali+. Half the vehicles in the convoy were trucks (including armoured Kamaz trucks and engineering vehicles) and the remainder included T-72B3M tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-82A 8×8 armoured personnel carriers, and Spartak, Linza, and Tiger 4×4 armoured personnel carriers. Also seen were three D-30 towed artillery pieces, two anti-aircraft cannons, and a couple of boats.
Frontelligence in its analysis of the convoy stated the vehicles were not sourced elsewhere and sold to Mali because they have Cyrillic text and Russian military markings. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said markings indicated the equipment had at one point been transported by rail – possibly in Russia.
“Today, Russia has deployed Wagner PMC [private military contractor] units in Mali, which became more active after the French military left the country in 2022. The French Armed Forces operated in Mali as part of Operations Serval and Barkhane from 2013 to 2022 and countered illegal military groups, including ISIS, which were trying to seize power,” the Ukrainian MoD said.
“Currently, the local indigenous population, supported by Western countries, is confronting Russian mercenaries and the pro-Russian Malian government. Most likely, the equipment will be distributed between the Wagner PMC units and government forces as part of strengthening the counteraction to paramilitary units in the country and terrorist organizations.”
Wagner (now known as Africa Corps) mercenaries have a patchy track record in engagements with militant groups such as JNIM (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin). In July, Russian forces lost dozens of operatives to an ambush near Tinzaouaten in Mali’s western region, after being attacked by CSP-DPA (Defence of the People of Azawad) and JNIM fighters. Subsequent attacks have left hundreds of Malians and at least half a dozen Russians dead. For instance, a November attack by JNIM killed half a dozen Wagner mercenaries.
Wagner has been present in Mali since late 2021 following a military coup, replacing French troops and international peacekeepers to help fight militants who have threatened communities in the central and northern regions for over a decade. Wagner has been accused of helping to carry out raids and drone strikes that have killed civilians, with Human Rights Watch accusing both Mali’s armed forces, supported by the Wagner Group, and Islamist armed groups of committing serious abuses against civilians. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
17 Jan 25. India: Security risks will remain elevated in Chhattisgarh state amid counterinsurgency operations. On 16 January, the security forces killed 12 Naxalite-Maoist insurgents in Bijapur district (Chhattisgarh state) during an operation involving District Reserve Guard (DRG) personnel. This comes amid increased efforts by the authorities to crack down on Naxalite militants. There were reportedly 81 attacks by Naxal-Maoist rebels in 2024 compared with 52 in 2023 and 59 in 2022. On 6 January, Naxalites blew up a vehicle in Bijapur using an IED, killing eight DRG officers and their civilian driver in one of the biggest assaults on the DRG in the last two years. Last year, India’s Interior Minister Amit Shah indicated that the government intends to eliminate the decades-long rebellion by March 2026. Although achieving this target may be challenging, the authorities have made significant progress in limiting Naxalite capacity. We assess that there will almost certainly be a heightened presence from the security forces and an increased intensity of counterinsurgency operations in Chhattisgarh over the coming months. This will likely lead to clashes between militants and DRG personnel, particularly in rural areas, driving safety risks for bystanders. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jan 25. Central African Republic: State visit to Russia highlights increasing stability, armed conflict risks. On 16 January, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra met with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a state visit to Russia. The meeting underscores Touadéra’s efforts to maintain warm bilateral relations and possibly secure additional Africa Corps deployments to the Central African Republic (CAR) before the 2025 presidential election. Touadéra will almost certainly seek re-election to a third consecutive term following constitutional reforms in 2023, increasing risks of armed conflict. Following Touadéra’s victory in the 2020 presidential poll, six formerly rival rebel groups formed the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) and launched an offensive to remove Touadéra from office. Although Touadéra successfully leveraged French, Russian and Rwandan support to repel the rebel offensive from the capital Bangui, the government’s territorial control remains limited, particularly in northern CAR. We assess that the upcoming elections will likely trigger a re-escalation of violence, exacerbating armed conflict risks. Following the CAR’s re-admission to the Kimberly Process in November, conflict re-escalation will increase supply chain exposure to conflict minerals, driving reputational and compliance concerns for extractive firms. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jan 25. RoK: Potential extended detention of president serves as flashpoint for further protests. Earlier on 17 January, South Korea’s Corruption Investigation Office (CIO) formally submitted a request for a 20-day detention warrant for impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol. On 14 January, Yoon was detained on a 48-hour warrant on charges of insurrection and abuse of power in connection with his short-lived declaration of martial law on 3 December. The Seoul Western District Court is scheduled to hold a hearing at 1400hrs (local time) on 18 January to decide whether to issue an arrest warrant. On the evening of 16 January, pro-Yoon rallies gathered outside the court, seeking to obstruct the submission of the new detention warrant by CIO personnel. The police dispersed around 200 demonstrators forming a human chain in front of the court building in the capital Seoul’s Mapo district. Protests were also reported outside the Seoul Detention Centre in Uiwang (Gyeonggi province, Seoul Metropolitan Area), where Yoon is detained. Security has been heightened in the court area ahead of tomorrow’s hearing. We assess that further protests by pro- and/or anti-Yoon groups in Seoul are highly likely if the warrant is approved or if he is released, though protests will likely remain mostly peaceful. (Source: Sibylline)
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