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09 Jan 25. Africa’s constantly evolving militant Islamist threat. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The threat from militant Islamist groups in Africa over the past decade has steadily grown—with almost three times the number of annual violent events (roughly 6,700) as in 2014. The reported 21,780 annual fatalities (for years ending 30 June) represent a 56 percent increase just from 2021. These topline figures obscure the great variability seen between and within each region over this time. This underscores the distinct local features—leadership and organizational structures, community and government responses, and external actors—that are driving this violence. A decade ago, the Lake Chad Basin was the focal point of the violent extremist threat, comprising 13,670 annual fatalities—67 percent of the reported fatalities across the continent. North Africa was second, with 3,650 fatalities. Today, annual deaths in the Lake Chad Basin have declined almost fourfold from that high-water mark (though still above 3,600) while North Africa has the least reported fatalities of any of the five active regions.
A decade ago, the Sahel was the region facing the fewest deaths linked to violent extremism. Today it is the region with the most, a distinction it has held for the past 3 years. The 11,200 deaths in the Sahel in 2024—a tripling since 2021—now represent over half of all reported fatalities across the continent. This does not include the roughly 2,430 civilian deaths attributed to the Sahelian militaries and Russian forces (ostensibly in the name of countering violent extremism)—which is more than the number of civilians killed by the theater’s militant Islamist groups.
Somalia has arguably faced the most consistently serious violent extremist threat on the continent over the past decade. It regularly experienced high, if not the highest, number of militant Islamist-linked violent events and fatalities. Today, the Sahel and Somalia account for over 80 percent of all violent extremist fatalities on the continent.
A decade ago, there were just four theaters of militant Islamist violence—Somalia and the Sahel joining the Lake Chad Basin and North Africa. At the end of 2017, a fifth region was added—with militant Islamist violence taking hold in northern Mozambique. This underscores that violent extremism in Africa is concentrated in specific regions—rather than being a uniform threat across the continent.
These dramatic fluctuations over the past decade underscore how dynamics can and do change across and within each of these theaters. Progress can be achieved—yet militant Islamist groups have demonstrated remarkable adaptability and resilience. This reinforces the importance of understanding the unique drivers and sustaining context-specific responses in each region.
Sahel
More than half of all annual (year ending June) reported fatalities (11,200) involving militant Islamist groups in Africa are in the Sahel. The Sahel has accounted for more fatalities than any other region on the continent since 2021.
Burkina Faso bears the majority of violent events (48 percent) and fatalities (62 percent) linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahelian theater.
The Sahelian theater has been experiencing an increasing number of attacks on civilians. For the last 3 years, the Sahel has accounted for more than half the reported attacks on civilians by militant Islamist groups in Africa.
The level of violence in the Sahel is likely even higher. Following the coups in Mali (2020 and 2021), Burkina Faso (two in 2022), and Niger (2023), there has been a concerted effort to muzzle domestic media and the international press. As a result, there is diminishing access to accurate information on violent events in the region.
Non-coincidentally, there has been an escalation of violence against civilians by the junta’s security forces and their paramilitary partners (including Russia’s Africa Corps, formerly the Wagner Group). The number of attacks against civilians by these security actors has increased 76 percent between 2022 and 2024 (from roughly 230 to 400 attacks). Over the last 3 years, an estimated 4,740 civilians have been killed by these forces.
The Sahelian military juntas and their militia allies have killed more civilians (2,430) in the past year than militant Islamist groups (2,050).
Other tangible evidence of the worsening security situation in the Sahel is seen in the rise in numbers of violent extremist attacks in the southern regions of Mali and Burkina Faso. The spillover from this escalation in the Sahelian countries is being felt in coastal West Africa where there have been over 500 violent extremist events in or within 50 km of their borders in the past 12 months. This compares to just over 50 such events in 2020. In 2024, violent extremist attacks in Benin and Togo comprised 7 percent of the reported violent events in this theater.
Ambushes of security forces in the Sahelian countries have also been on the rise in recent years. In 2021, there were 10 reported violent extremist attacks that resulted in 10 or more fatalities of members of the armed forces of Sahelian countries. By the end of 2024, this figure was projected to rise to 50.
It is now estimated that 60 percent of Burkina Faso’s territory is outside the control of the military. In Mali, the figure is 50 percent, with parts of central and southern Mali falling out of state control in recent years. In 2021, territory outside of state control was estimated at 40 percent for each country. In Burkina Faso, up to 75 towns and cities are besieged by militant Islamist groups cutting their populations off from essential supplies.
Due to the growing instability, the number of forcibly displaced people is also on the rise, including an estimated 3 m Burkinabe.
Somalia
Somalia is Africa’s most enduring theater of militant Islamist group activity having persisted for three decades. Today, Somalia accounts for roughly a third of all militant Islamist-related fatalities on the continent, making it the second most active theater (after the Sahel), which it has been for the past 3 years.
Fatalities in Somalia in recent years have been approaching record levels for this theater. The 6,590 reported fatalities in 2024 are more than double that of 2020.
This spike in fatalities is largely due to the government offensive against al Shabaab launched by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in 2022—and al Shabaab’s subsequent counter attacks—though these battles have diminished from their peak over the past year.
Virtually all the reported events and fatalities in this theater are linked to al Shabaab. The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) accounts for less than 1 percent of militant Islamist activity in Somalia and neighboring Kenya.
A notable development in the Somalia theater in recent years is the increased use of drones and suicide bombings (i.e., remote violence), of which there were 640 incidents in the past year.
Fatalities linked to al Shabaab’s use of remote violence (including 17 suicide bombings), have more than doubled since 2020, to 1,950 deaths.
This theater has also seen a doubling in the number of violent events linked to al Shabaab in Kenya (to over 110 episodes and over 250 fatalities). Most of these are in the border areas. While these events represent just 5 percent of the total violent incidents in this theater, they are a reminder of the regional threat posed by al Shabaab.
Lake Chad Basin
Militant Islamist violence in the Lake Chad Basin (comprising northeast Nigeria and the borderlands of Cameroon, Niger, and Chad) has ebbed and flowed over the past decade. The past 2 years have seen an increase in violent events after a period of decline. However, annual fatalities linked to these events have remained relatively consistent, typically ranging from 3,500 to 3,800 deaths. This has made the Lake Chad Basin the third most lethal region from militant Islamist violence on the continent—accounting for 17 percent of all fatalities.
The persistence of the militant Islamist threat in the Lake Chad Basin points to the resilience and adaptability of Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA). A third group, Ansaru, comprises less than 1 percent of all reported violent events and fatalities in the theater.
A notable development in this theater in recent years is the geographic expansion of militant Islamist violence into Cameroon. This year marks the first time Cameroon comprised over 50 percent of the events linked to militant Islamists in the theater. These 720 violent episodes represent a nearly threefold increase from 2022. Reported fatalities in Cameroon (780) have likewise doubled over this timespan.
While Nigeria continues to bear the vast majority of militant Islamist-related deaths (72 percent), fatalities in Cameroon now represent 21 percent of the total in the theater.
The past year has also seen a spike in militant Islamist-linked fatalities in Chad (on track for 180 deaths by the end of 2024) after a sharp decline in the preceding years.
This shifting geographic pressure may reshape the regional security demands for this theater.
Recent years have also seen a surge in militant Islamist violence against civilians and remote violence in the region. Violence against civilians comprised 41 percent of events in the region—a higher percentage than any other theater. These 590 episodes marked a doubling in the number of targeted attacks on civilians compared to 2022. The attacks on civilians reveal the lack of popular support for Boko Haram and ISWA—and the militant groups’ willingness to use violence to intimidate local populations.
The increased attacks on civilians come as the Nigerian government has made significant gains against the extremists. Some 5,630 militant Islamist surrendered to Nigerian forces in 2024 adding to the tens of thousands who have laid down their arms since the government started an amnesty program for fighters in 2016.
Violence against civilians comprised 41 percent of events in the region—a higher percentage than any other theater.
The fight against violent extremists in Nigeria’s North East region parallels a growing threat to civilians from organized criminal gangs in the North West region. Commonly known as “bandits,” these groups have engaged in looting, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom for financial gain. In fact, violence from these armed gangs in the North West has killed more civilians than Boko Haram and ISWA between 2018 and 2023.
The persistence of the threat of these organized gangs increases the risk of cooperation with militant Islamist groups in the North East or with the violent extremists pushing down into southern Niger from the Sahel theater. Such convergence could dramatically amplify the security challenges for both theaters.
Mozambique
Violence from militant Islamist actors in northern Mozambique has fluctuated dramatically since this threat first emerged in 2017. After escalating rapidly through 2021, which saw 2,080 deaths linked to violent extremist activity, northern Mozambique saw a nearly sixfold decline in deaths over the next 3 years. This decline is linked with the arrival of Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Rwandan security forces in July 2021.
The past year has seen a rebounding of violent events and fatalities linked to the militant Islamists, however. The projected 250 events and 460 fatalities by the end of 2024 would represent a near doubling in violence over the previous year. This underscores the resiliency of these militant Islamist groups, which have moved inland from their previous concentration on the coast. It also highlights the importance of a sustained security and government presence to ensure these threats are permanently addressed.
Though SADC officially ended its mission in July 2024, Rwandan, South African, and Tanzanian forces have remained to assist in the stabilization efforts in this theater.
North Africa
The North African theater has seen a steady decline in violent events and fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups since 2015 when the region experienced over 3,650 related deaths. Further dramatic declines in recent years brought these fatality totals down to single digits.
This year marks the first year there were no violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in Egypt since 2010.
The 5 reported events over the past 12 months—4 in Algeria and 1 in Libya—were military operations targeting remnant members of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Islamic State in Libya (ISL). The steady decline in violence reflects a combination of factors, most notably the constant pressure from Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia—and the lack of popular support for the extremists.
In Libya, the United Nations believes ISL and al Qaeda still have fighters in the southern part of the country, though they appear to be focused on profiting from the illicit economy. This enduring threat underscores the importance of continued vigilance in this region.
Written by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies and republished with permission. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
09 Jan 25. EFF slams draft defence budgetary review reports, calls SANDF a collapsing entity. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have launched a scathing attack on the on the draft Budgetary Review and Recommendation Reports (BRRRs) concerning the Department of Defence, Department of Military Veterans, and Armscor, calling them “sanitized and manipulated” documents that obscure the true extent of the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF’s) collapse.
The EFF’s written response – presented to the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) on 23 October 2024 by Carl Niehaus, EFF permanent representative on the PCDMV – warns that adopting the reports in their current form would “constitute a grave misrepresentation to Parliament.”
Stating, “this is a sanitised, and manipulated version, and as such it reflects the overall intention of this Report, namely to subvert the oversight work of the Portfolio Committee, and to mislead the National Assembly about the truly disastrous state that the SANDF in its totality is in.”
A dysfunctional SANDF
At the core of Niehaus’s criticism of the BRRRs is that the reports fail to adequately reflect and address the true state of the SANDF. Niehaus contends that the SANDF is failing to meet its constitutional mandate to “defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity, and its people…”
He goes on to state that budget cuts as well as oversight and governance failures have left the SANDF unable to perform its critical functions, something that Niehaus argues is not adequately reflected in the BRRRs for 2023/24.
Niehaus pointed to the Navy and Air Force’s inability to meet their operational hours targets due a combination of a general lack of resources and several procurement delays as well as a miss-appropriation of the resources currently at the SANDF’s disposal.
Armscor’s role in the SANDF’s dysfunction
Niehaus was particularly critical of the state-owned arms procurement agency Armscor’s seeming inability to adequately support the SANDF’s operational demands. Armscor has been confronted by several ongoing challenges in providing key services and capabilities to the SANDF, with poor management of facilities and delays in equipment acquisition undermining the SANDF’s ability to fulfil its duties.
Niehaus emphasized that Armscor’s failures to address the Navy and Air Force’s maintenance backlogs have left most of the naval and air fleets non-operational, undermining national security.
Stating “during oversight visits by the Portfolio Committee of Defence and Military Veterans many complaints from all four components of the SANDF were encountered by the Portfolio Committee. This included especially complaints by the SA Navy about the Armscor Dockyard that is for all purposes dysfunctional.”
Referring to the Dockyard, Niehaus said “it is evidently a crime scene, and it has directly resulted in the almost total inability of the SA Navy to have its fleet of vessels functional. A full Directorate of Priority Crime investigation is required. The EFF calls for such.”
The SA Air Force has complained that Armscor fails to empower it to have the required skills and equipment to get its mostly grounded fleet operational again. “The fact that the Oryx and Rooivalk helicopter fleet is mostly dysfunctional and grounded is a very serious problem, that can be directly laid at the door of Armscor due to constant delays and excuses to get the new contracts in place.”
Niehaus highlighted concerns related to repeated delays in delivering key defence projects such as the A-Darter missile programme as well as Project Hoefyster which is aimed at replacing the SANDF’s ageing fleet of Ratel infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), questioning whether Armscor can fulfil its commitments given “the consistent failure of Armscor to make good on undertakings, and to deliver on time.”
“We expressed our outrage with the fact the SANDF paid in advance more than R7 bn Rand to Denel, with Armscor being the facilitating agency, and yet five years later not a single armoured vehicle as envisaged by Project Hoefyster has been produced.”
Niehaus further slammed Armscor’s exploitation of intellectual property, saying there are not adequate measures in place to protect SANDF IP. “We remain concerned that private companies have benefitted from SANDF IP, without financial compensation, and even more disconcerting that this situation undermines our own national safety.”
Oversight failures and financial mismanagement
Niehaus was also particularly critical of the PCDMV for failing to hold the Department of Defence and its entities, including Armscor, accountable for their failings. Niehaus described the draft reports as “not a true reflection” of committee activities and accused the chairperson of allowing critical questions to go unanswered.
Moreover, Niehaus admonished the language used in the reports’ recommendations contending that the language used failed to accurately reflected the sentiments of the members the PCDMV.
Relatedly, Niehaus expressed serious concerns related to the manner in which the PCDMV is run by the Chairperson, Molefi David “Dakota” Legoete, and how this undermines the Committee’s ability to exercise effective oversight.
“Where very important, serious questions and concerns, that are raised by members of the Portfolio Committee, and specifically the EFF Permanent Representative of the Portfolio Committee are not followed up, and answers are not provided. More often than not the Representatives of the DOD who appear in front of the Portfolio Committee are not required, or insisted on, by the Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee to answer these critical questions and issues that are raised. We now see the disastrous consequences of this cavalier way of doing things, in this pathetic and totally unacceptable Report,” Niehaus contended.
A warning to Parliament
Niehaus repeatedly warned the Portfolio Committee that should the BRRR on the Department of Defence for 2023/24 be adopted in current form there would likely be serious consequences as the Committee would be neglecting its mandate.
“If the Portfolio Committee adopts this DRAFT Report in its current form, it will fail in its mandate. It will be guilty of TOTAL MISREPRESENTATION to the National Assembly, and thus misleading that august house,” Niehaus contended, adding that “misleading the National Assembly is a very serious and punishable offence.”
Niehaus’s rebuke of the draft BRRR highlights the broader challenges facing South Africa’s defence sector. Successive budget reductions, coupled with systemic governance issues coupled with little effective oversight, have left the SANDF struggling to maintain operational readiness. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
09 Jan 25. Armenia: EU accession bid will drive regional tensions, Russian destabilisation risks. On 9 January, the Armenian government approved a bill to initiate the country’s EU accession process. While the bill does not formally begin the process – which would require popular approval via a national referendum – it aims to formalise Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s efforts to launch the procedure. The government will likely seek to organise the referendum close to the 2026 parliamentary elections. The timing would enable Pashinyan to link his re-election campaign to the country’s EU bid, possibly boosting his chances of re-election. Pashinyan has been a long-standing advocate for closer ties with the EU, a position that aligns with his broader foreign policy goal of reducing Yerevan’s reliance on its traditional partner, Russia. Moscow will likely perceive the government’s ongoing efforts to pursue EU accession as a threat to its regional interests. We assess that the latest move will heighten regional tensions with Russia; a referendum on Armenia’s EU accession is highly likely to expose the country to elevated Russian destabilisation risks. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Jan 25. Afghanistan-India: High-level meeting underscores growing diplomatic, economic ties. On 8 January, acting Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi met with Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri in Dubai (UAE). This marks New Delhi’s highest-level diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan’s Taliban government since the group came to power in 2021. Misri emphasised India’s willingness to boost co-operation in development projects alongside ongoing humanitarian assistance programmes. Following the meeting, the Taliban called India a ‘significant regional and economic partner’. While India does not formally recognise the Taliban regime, it kept its ambassador in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s takeover. Furthermore, the Taliban’s worsening ties with Pakistan have provided India with an opportunity to expand its strategic influence in Afghanistan. In November 2024, an Indian delegation met with the Taliban in Afghanistan and discussed allowing Afghan businesses to use the India-operated Chabahar port (Iran). Earlier this week, India formally condemned Pakistan’s airstrikes in Paktika province (Afghanistan) last month. In the coming years, we assess that Afghanistan and India will likely enhance bilateral trade (particularly in mineral resources) and increase co-operation between their health sectors. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Jan 25. Chad: Attack in capital will drive security crackdown, highlights government stability risks. At approximately 1945hrs (local time) on 8 January, local media reported heavy gunfire outside the Presidential Palace in the capital N’Djamena. The government later stated that the security forces had repelled a ‘destabilisation attempt’ and killed 18 perpetrators. Although conditions in N’Djamena remain stable, the security forces will almost certainly maintain an elevated posture throughout the city in the coming days, particularly in the Djambel Bahr area. This will likely include the increased use of checkpoints and stop-and-search operations, elevating the risk of travel delays and staff exposure to petty corruption. The authorities have characterised the attack’s perpetrators as disaffected local youths and denied claims of a terror attack or coup attempt. However, President Mahamat Idriss Deby’s deepening relations with the UAE have exacerbated tensions with high-ranking ethnic-Zaghawa military officers in recent months. We assess there is a realistic possibility that the attack constituted an attempted coup, highlighting significant government stability risks. In the coming weeks, Deby will possibly pursue purges within the military’s leadership, further undermining the security forces’ capacity amid the ongoing withdrawal of French forces. The surveillance and repression of opposition-linked activity will also likely intensify, increasing detention risks for staff and broader human rights concerns. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Jan 25. Russia: Western sanctions, war will sustain long-term operational safety risks for aviation industry. On 7 January, a Boeing 737 operated by Russia’s UTair Airlines transiting from St Petersburg (Russia) to Samarkand (Uzbekistan) was forced to make an emergency landing at Moscow’s Vnukovo International Airport (VKO) due to a stabiliser malfunction. Earlier in January, two other aircraft operated by Russian airlines – a Boeing 737 and an Airbus A321neo – also encountered technical issues, resulting in emergency landings. Western sanctions imposed on Russia’s civilian aviation sector since the onset of the war in Ukraine have drastically restricted access to aircraft components, leading to a sharp rise in aviation malfunctions. These recent incidents occurred shortly after the crash of a civilian aircraft travelling from Azerbaijan to the Republic of Chechnya (Russia) in December 2024. This crash was likely caused by Russian air defences operating in Chechnya that likely mistook the aircraft for a Ukrainian drone. We assess that the ongoing war in Ukraine and Western sanctions will sustain long-term operational and safety risks for Russia’s civilian aviation sector. For further analysis of the impact of sanctions on Russia’s aviation sector. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Jan 25. Moldova: Further bomb scares are likely in coming months as part of Russian destabilisation efforts. On 7 January, the Moldovan Border Police and customs officials at Chi?in?u International Airport (RMO) identified an object resembling a toy car that contained ‘components of an explosive device’. The object was identified during an inspection of postal items. Law enforcement neutralised the suspicious object without endangering the airport’s operations, staff or passengers. The perpetrator and intended destination of the item remain unclear. Hoax bomb scares in Moldova, including at RMO, occur on a semi-regular basis; a false alarm was recorded at the airport on 25 December 2024. We assess that Russian and/or pro-Russia actors are highly likely to be responsible for the latest incident as part of broader efforts by the Kremlin to destabilise Moldova. Nevertheless, the fact that an explosive device was concealed within a toy indicates what we assess to be a growing will to escalate grey-zone bomb scares beyond hoax alarms. Similar incidents are likely in the coming months, though the Moldovan authorities will likely remain competent at identifying and suppressing such threats. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Jan 25. RoK: Further attempts to arrest president will drive localised protest, disruption risks. On 7 January, the Seoul Western District Court granted an extension to the warrant requested by the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) to arrest President Yoon Suk-yeol. The initial warrant expired on 6 January after the CIO’s failed attempt to arrest Yoon, who is also facing an impeachment trial. Yoon’s legal team claims that the warrant is ‘invalid’ and that it will only comply with a warrant issued by the Seoul Central District Court. The CIO and police are reportedly deliberating on when and how to make a second attempt at an arrest; no expiration date for the warrant’s extension has been disclosed. Yoon has continued to reside in the presidential residence in the Hannam-dong area of Yongsan district (Seoul), which has been reinforced with barbed wire and vehicles. Pro-Yoon protesters have also gathered near the residence in recent days, despite the freezing weather. Given that protests are typically larger at weekends, the authorities are more likely to attempt to arrest Yoon in the week. We assess that a further arrest attempt would drive the risk of clashes with protesters and/or the president’s security team, while sustaining localised transport disruption in the area. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Jan 25. Mali: Increasing jihadist activity in Kayes region underscores rising security, kidnapping risks. On 7 January, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) stated that it had repelled a large-scale terror attack in Nioro du Sahel (Kayes region) on 6 January. Although FAMa claims to have killed at least 30 militants during the attack, images circulating on social media indicate that the majority of casualties were likely civilians. The al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed responsibility for the attack, reflecting a broader uptick in the group’s regional activity. On 26 December 2024, JNIM militants kidnapped Thierno Amadou Hady Tall, a high-profile religious leader in Nioro du Sahel, due to his alleged government collaboration. In the coming weeks, we assess that JNIM will likely continue to expand and consolidate its presence in the northern Kayes, with attacks and FAMa counter-terrorism operations increasing security, bystander and human rights risks. The likelihood of ambushes targeting convoys will also increase, driving security and kidnapping risks for locally engaged staff, particularly during overland movement along the RN1 and RN3 highways. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Jan 25. Congo (DRC): Fighting around Saké will likely increase logistical, operational challenges for NGOs, On 7 January, fighting between the Rwandan-backed M23 and the Congolese army (FARDC) took place around Saké town (North Kivu province), which is located around 12.4 miles (20km) west of the provincial capital Goma. During the fighting, mortar fire, likely from M23 positions on Kihuli Hill on Saké’s northern outskirts, killed four civilians in the town. Intense fighting in Saké will likely disrupt what remains of the overland access (in DRC) to Goma via the N2 highway, increasing dependence on the Rwandan border crossing and exacerbating the risk of supply chain bottlenecks. While FARDC counter-offensives are ongoing, consistent M23 advances in recent months render the capture of Saké in the coming weeks and months a realistic possibility. In such an event, resultant blockages to the N2 highway would disrupt the delivery of aid and the evacuation of NGO staff to and from Goma. The M23 will possibly erect roadblocks, exacerbating logistical challenges and elevating the risk of shortages. We assess that further indiscriminate bombings and targeted attacks against civilians in Saké are likely, aggravating displacement risks. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Jan 25. Pakistan: Militant group’s warning will heighten risks of attacks against military-run businesses. On 6 January, news outlets reported that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has threatened to continue attacking the security forces and to expand its attacks to target the business interests of the military. According to a TTP statement, the group has pledged to target commercial enterprises run by the Pakistan military. Companies mentioned in the statement include Fauji Fertilizer Company, the Frontier Works Organisation and National Logistics Cell as well as military-run housing authorities and commercial banks, among others. The TTP also warned civilians to divest from military-run businesses and seek alternate sources of employment. The TTP statement comes amid an uptick in attacks by the group and escalating tensions between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban (which Pakistan has accused of providing a safe haven to the TTP). This development also follows recent air strikes by Pakistan inside Afghanistan, reportedly targeting TTP hideouts resulting in civilian casualties. We assess there is a heightened risk of attacks targeting businesses owned or associated with the military, including in major cities outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province where many of these businesses are located. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Jan 25. China-Taiwan: Fibre-optic cable incident underscores heightened undersea sabotage risks. Earlier on 7 January, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) claimed that a Chinese-owned Cameroon-flagged ship suspected of damaging an undersea communications cable had stopped transmitting its location on the high seas. On 3 January, the CGA intercepted the vessel for allegedly dragging its anchor over a fibre-optic cable off the coast of Yehliu (Wanli district) north-east of Taiwan but was unable to board it. Following the incident, Taiwan’s Chungwha Telecom announced minor latency issues when accessing websites in Japan and the US during peak hours; that said, most services were unaffected. The authorities aim to repair the cable by the end of January. Cable damaging efforts are likely grey zone strategy employed by China to cause disruption and undermine the authorities while stopping short of provoking conflict. We assess that undersea sabotage risks will highly likely remain elevated in Taiwan over the coming years as China maintains pressure on the island, though the majority of cases will likely not result in significant communication disruption. In the medium-to-long term, we assess that Taiwan will likely mitigate this risk by increasing investment in satellite communication. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Jan 25. Trudeau: “I have fought for this country, for you.” Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said he “fought for this country” over his nearly 10-year premiership, after he announced his resignation as the ruling Liberal party leader.
“Every morning I’ve woken up as prime minister, I have been inspired by the resilience, generosity and the determination of Canadians,” he told journalists on Monday. “I have fought for this country, for you.”
Trudeau listed his administration’s support for Ukraine and his policy during the Covid-19 pandemic, as being among his greatest achievements since he took power in 2015.
“We rallied to support each other through the pandemic … to stand strong with Ukraine, and our democracy, to fight climate change, and to get our economy ready for the future,” he added. “We are at a critical moment in the world.”
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said that he has “one regret” as he announced he intends to resign — and that is the country’s election process.
“If I have one regret, particularly as we approach this election — well, probably many regrets that I will think of,” Trudeau said. “But I do wish we’d been able to change the way we elect our governments in this country so that people could simply choose a second choice, or a third choice on the same ballot.”
Canadian parliament will be suspended while a new leader is chosen
From CNN’s Christian Edwards
Canadian Prime Minster Justin Trudeau has said that the country’s parliament will be suspended until March 24 while a new leader is chosen.
“Parliament has been paralyzed for months after what has been the longest session of a minority parliament in Canadian history,” he said.
“This morning, I advised the Governor General that we need a new session of parliament. She has granted this request, and the House will now be prorogued until March 24.” (Source: CNN)
06 Jan 25. Haiti: Deployment of small MSS contingent is unlikely to reduce risk of attacks in short term. On 3 January, 75 Guatemalan and eight Salvadorian military personnel arrived in Haiti to support the UN-backed Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission. The soldiers will support the 400 Kenyan police personnel leading the MSS in Haiti. In total, ten countries have promised around 3,100 soldiers for the MSS; Kenya has pledged at least 1,000. In October 2024, Kenyan President William Ruto promised to send the remaining 600 police officers to Haiti by January, though this has not occurred. Furthermore, reports allege that nearly 20 Kenyan police officers submitted their resignation due to pay delays. The MSS is slated to cost up to USD 600 m per year; so far, only USD 68 m of the USD 85 m pledged to the mission has been deposited into the UN trust fund. The deployment of Guatemalan and Salvadorian troops is highly unlikely to increase the MSS’ operational capacity significantly in the short-to-medium term. We assess that the underfunding and understaffing of the MSS will highly likely sustain its poor performance in combatting organised crime in the longer term (and therefore the risk of attacks). (Source: Sibylline)
06 Jan 25. Guinea: Anti-government protest will increase risks of crackdown, supply chain disruption. Later on 6 January, protesters associated with the opposition civil society coalition Forces Vives de Guinee (FVG) will gather in the capital Conakry to denounce the military government’s continued delays to the transition to civilian rule. The police in Conakry have subsequently announced a ban on the demonstration and the junta has reportedly mobilised special forces units amid concerns of substantial protest attendance. The police will likely employ heavy-handed techniques to disperse any protests that emerge in the coming hours; the use of tear gas, rubber bullets and (possibly) live ammunition will raise proximate security and bystander risks. The authorities will also possibly restrict access to internet services, disrupting communication with on-the-ground staff. In the coming days, the security forces will likely maintain an elevated posture in Conakry, increasing risks pertaining to travel, business operations and supply chain disruption, particularly through the Port of Conakry facility. Although interim President Mamady Doumbouya stated on 31 December 2024 that the junta would transition to civilian rule in 2025, we assess that further delays to the process will sustain the risk of protests and unrest in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Jan 25. Congo (DRC): M23 will likely make further gains in North Kivu province, increasing regional instability. On 5 January, the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group seized control of Masisi town (North Kivu province) from the Congolese army (FARDC) and affiliated forces. Masisi is the administrative hub for the Masisi territory; it is located along the R529 highway, west of the provincial capital Goma. The M23 has made consistent advances since an uptick in confrontations with FARDC in December 2024. It is simultaneously advancing north towards Lubero (North Kivu), which is located approximately 30 miles (50km) south of Butembo (North Kivu). The capture of Masisi will provide the M23 with a hub from where to consolidate control over mineral supply routes, and from where it is likely to advance along the R529 towards Walikale (North Kivu) and south towards South Kivu province. The M23 continues to display operational superiority over FARDC; as such, we assess the group will likely make further gains to the west and south of Masisi and north of Lubero, cutting off overland routes to Goma and Butembo and threatening supply chains. Increasing regional instability compounded by displacement will elevate attack and kidnap risks facing NGO staff in North Kivu. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Jan 25. Korean peninsula: Further North Korean weapons tests are possible in short term. On 6 January, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) claimed that North Korea launched a suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) into the Sea of Japan at around 1200hrs (local time). The JCS claimed it has shared the relevant information with Japan and the US. Japan’s defence ministry stated that the missile landed outside its economic exclusive zone (EEZ) and no damage to any ships or planes was reported. The launch was the first missile test for two months and comes amid US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Seoul (South Korea), where he met acting President Choi Sang-mok. The launch also took place in the backdrop of ongoing political instability in South Korea, where President Yoon Suk-yeol faces an impeachment trial as he continues to evade arrest in the presidential residence. We assess that further missile launches from Pyongyang in the coming weeks are a realistic possibility given said political instability in South Korea and the upcoming inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump on 20 January. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Jan 25. India raises profile as security partner for Africa. Over the last decade, India has emerged as a key security partner for nations across Africa with particular emphasis on terrorism, piracy and maritime domain awareness. Since 2015, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched his country’s Security and Growth for All in the Region policy, India has hosted hundreds of African leaders. Modi has sent cabinet ministers to every African country as part of the plan for building relations on the continent. Indian troops have also played key roles in United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa. India hosted its first India-Africa Army Chiefs Conclave in March 2023 along with its second Africa-India Field Training Exercise in Pune. Indian and African navies have taken part in 47 rounds of the Maritime Partnership Exercise in the western Indian Ocean.
“India’s collaboration with African navies extends beyond joint patrols to include extensive training and capacity-building initiatives,” Aritra Banerjee wrote recently for Military Africa.
India has helped establish defense academies in Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tanzania, along with a military war game center in Uganda. Trainers have visited Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
India has established monitoring stations in northern Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles to track maritime activity and boost security in the western Indian Ocean, including the Gulf of Aden and the Mozambique Channel. Africa’s eastern coastal waters lie within India’s security perimeter, which led India to deepen its relations with Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania as well.
Information collected from India’s African listening posts is processed at its Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region and, from there, shared with more than 60 partner nations and international organizations. India has invited its African partners to post their own officers at the regional center.
While Africa’s Indian Ocean coast plays a key role in African-Indian security relations, India has also extended its security reach to the Gulf of Guinea — a crucial shipping zone historically plagued by piracy. In the Gulf of Guinea, India has helped develop Air Force institutions in Ghana and a naval war college in Nigeria.
Since 2008, Indian Navy ships have escorted commercial shipping through both the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Aden at the eastern end of the Red Sea.
India’s relationship with some African nations extends deep into their past as British colonies. Africa is home to more than 3 m people of Indian descent who came to the continent during that period. Modern relations have their roots in the military training facility India opened in Ethiopia in 1956.
In the decades since, India as focused much of its effort in Africa on helping its partners develop self-sufficiency when it comes to maintaining equipment, dock facilities, boats, weapons, and aircraft. India provides its African partners with armored vehicles, combat helicopters and offshore patrol craft, along with other equipment.
Mauritius, Mozambique and Seychelles are among the top purchasers of Indian-made armaments.
“Given the compatibility between India and Africa’s military traditions, strategic doctrines, command structures and training protocols, defense and security cooperation are essential components of cooperation among all participants,” analyst Faareha Usmani wrote in 2023 for the Indian Council for World Affairs.
In March 2024, Ethiopia and India announced a new military training and defense development agreement. Overall, India’s work to enhance African military capacities is designed to benefit all countries sharing the western Indian Ocean, say observers.
“These efforts have enhanced the operational capabilities of African navies, enabling them to better address their maritime security challenges,” Banerjee wrote. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
06 Jan 25. Iran’s Shahid Bagheri Drone Carrier Begins Sea Trials. Analysis from November and December 2024 suggests that Iran’s Shahid Bagheri drone carrier has likely commenced its first sea trials, signaling a critical juncture in the country’s ongoing efforts to modernize its navy and expand its capabilities in asymmetric naval warfare. This development marks a key moment not only for Iran but also for the broader geopolitical landscape in the Persian Gulf and beyond. The Shahid Bagheri is designed to carry and deploy a range of unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs], including surveillance and reconnaissance drones, as well as more sophisticated strike drones. Among the most prominent UAVs are those from the Shahed family, which have already proven their effectiveness in both reconnaissance and precision strike missions in regional conflicts. Equipped with advanced command and control systems, the Shahid Bagheri can coordinate the operations of multiple UAVs simultaneously, allowing for greater operational flexibility and strategic depth. This makes the ship a key asset in Iran’s efforts to enhance its naval power in an increasingly contested region. In addition to reconnaissance and surveillance, the UAVs deployed by the Shahid Bagheri could also perform offensive operations, potentially launching precision strikes against high-value maritime or land-based targets. Such capabilities would allow Iran to project power far beyond its shores, enabling it to conduct operations with minimal risk to personnel and maximizing its ability to inflict damage on adversary forces. This would significantly enhance Iran’s ability to defend its territorial waters and extend its influence in maritime conflict zones. The Shahid Bagheri fits into a broader strategy by Iran to modernize and diversify its naval forces. Over the past decade, the country has increasingly focused on asymmetric naval tactics, including the development of smaller, fast-moving vessels and unconventional platforms. By integrating UAVs into its naval strategy, Iran is adding a crucial element to its already diverse fleet of assets. The ship’s relatively small size, combined with the versatility of drones, makes it a highly flexible asset, capable of operating in contested waters with less reliance on traditional large surface combatants or support infrastructure. The impact of the Shahid Bagheri on regional naval dynamics could be profound. The introduction of a drone carrier provides Iran with the ability to deploy UAVs for both reconnaissance and offensive operations in vital maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Oman. The potential for Iran to use these UAVs to gather intelligence, conduct surveillance, or even launch strikes without exposing personnel to direct danger would make it a formidable presence in the region, forcing regional powers to adapt their strategies. While the Shahid Bagheri is still undergoing sea trials, its existence and potential deployment represent a significant shift in how Iran plans to project its naval power. The ship’s ability to operate independently, with its fleet of drones, offers Iran the flexibility to extend its reach beyond its immediate maritime boundaries. This could lead to a rethinking of regional security strategies, as countries in the Gulf and the broader Middle East reassess how best to respond to this new capability.Despite its potential, the deployment of the Shahid Bagheri raises several operational and technological challenges for Iran. While the country has demonstrated impressive technical advancements in UAV development, the integration of drone operations into a naval context is an entirely new challenge.
The coordination of multiple UAVs from a single platform requires not only sophisticated communication systems but also reliable logistical support. The need for real-time data analysis and the capacity to make rapid decisions on drone deployment will demand a high level of coordination between Iran’s naval and air forces. The challenges are not limited to technical issues. The Shahid Bagheri will also have to contend with the broader operational requirements of maintaining a fleet of drones and ensuring their effectiveness in various maritime environments. While Iran has been investing in developing a more flexible and elusive naval force, the true test of the Shahid Bagheri will be how well it can integrate its UAV operations with existing naval assets, particularly in high-intensity conflict scenarios. How well Iran can establish robust communications networks and logistic chains for drone deployment in contested waters will be a key determinant in the success of the drone carrier. Furthermore, international reactions to the Shahid Bagheri and its potential deployment could escalate geopolitical tensions. The introduction of such a capability will undoubtedly attract attention from neighboring Gulf states, Western powers, and international organizations monitoring Iran’s military advancements. The growing capabilities of Iran’s naval forces, particularly with the advent of a drone carrier, could lead to new diplomatic initiatives aimed at limiting Iran’s military reach or imposing sanctions designed to curb its defense technology developments. The Shahid Bagheri is not only a technological advancement but also a part of a broader strategic shift by Iran. The country has long sought to modernize its military and make use of cutting-edge technologies to counteract the technological superiority of Western powers and regional adversaries.
In addition to the Shahid Bagheri, Iran has also been working on the development of new submarines, including the Fateh and Ghadir, which further complement its asymmetric warfare strategy. These developments demonstrate Iran’s desire to create a diversified, flexible naval force capable of responding to a range of threats in the region. Looking ahead, the Shahid Bagheri could play a key role in scenarios far beyond the Persian Gulf. The growing prevalence of drone warfare globally, especially among rising naval powers, suggests that the concept of drone carriers may become more common. The Shahid Bagheri could serve as a model for other countries seeking to extend their naval reach with cost-effective, scalable platforms that do not require the extensive support infrastructure of traditional aircraft carriers. In the future, Iran may leverage this technology to project power into other regions, such as the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, or even the Mediterranean, where its mobility would be an advantage in contested waters. Moreover, the relatively small size of the Shahid Bagheri compared to traditional aircraft carriers offers another advantage: mobility. This makes it easier for Iran to deploy the ship in areas where larger warships would be at a disadvantage. The ship’s limited need for support infrastructure and its ability to quickly relocate allow it to exert influence in distant regions with less logistical burden. This capability could give Iran a more agile and responsive naval presence, capable of rapidly adapting to changing geopolitical dynamics and conflicts. The development of the Shahid Bagheri is a significant milestone for Iran’s naval strategy. As drone warfare continues to evolve, this platform could offer Iran a more cost-effective and scalable way to extend its naval reach. As the system matures and Iran continues to develop its capabilities in drone warfare, we can expect further advancements in both military technology and Iran’s geopolitical influence. (Source: UAS VISION/Bulgarian Military)
03 Jan 25. Malaysia: Security will likely be heightened amid upcoming rally for imprisoned former prime minister. On 6 January, a solidarity rally will be held for former Prime Minister Najib Razak outside the Palace of Justice (Putrajaya) from 0900hrs (local time). The rally involves various political parties, including the opposition Islamist Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which is a member of the ruling alliance. Najib is currently serving a six-year prison sentence for corruption. Also on 6 January, the Court of Appeal (housed at the Palace of Justice) will hear Najib’s bid to be allowed to serve the rest of his sentence under house arrest. The rally is likely an attempt to pressure the court; however, the parties involved are also highly likely attempting to leverage the polarising Najib’s continued popularity within certain quarters to boost support from the Malay population. There is a realistic possibility thousands could attend the rally which will likely proceed peacefully. That said, the potential presence of anti-Najib protesters would increase the risk of scuffles. We assess that security will likely be heightened in the area, driving the risk of localised disruption. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Jan 25. RoK: Protests are likely in Seoul following unsuccessful arrest attempt of president. Earlier on 3 January, South Korea’s Corruption Investigation Office (CIO) halted its attempt to arrest President Yoon Suk-yeol at the presidential residence in the capital Seoul following a six-hour standoff with his security team. In the early hours of 3 January, around 30 investigators and 120 police officers were prevented from arresting Yoon from his residence by approximately 200 soldiers and security personnel from the Presidential Security Service (PSS). Scuffles were reported between the two sides. The CIO cited ‘concern for the safety of personnel’ in its decision to suspend its efforts to detain him. Following the withdrawal of CIO personnel, several thousand supporters of Yoon gathered near his residence. There is a realistic possibility that the authorities will deploy a larger force over the next two days to arrest Yoon. We assess that pro- and anti-Yoon protests are likely in Seoul over the coming days along with heightened security, particularly near the presidential residence in the Hannam-dong area of Yongsan district. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Jan 25. Sudan: Government advances in North Darfur state increase collateral, bystander risks for NGO staff. On 1 January, the government-allied Joint Forces of Darfur (JFD) announced the capture of al Maher (North Darfur state) from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The announcement comes after months of intense clashes in the area, including numerous Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) airstrikes targeting RSF positions. The capture of al Maher highlights increasing efforts from the SAF and allied groups to undermine the RSF’s control of territory in North Darfur by engaging militants in numerous and disparate rural areas; this approach has stretched RSF resources and increased pressure on the group’s capacity to defend strategic strongholds within the state. In the coming weeks, the JFD will likely continue engaging the RSF throughout North Darfur, particularly in strategic positions between al Maher and the state capital El Fasher (North Darfur). Intensifying clashes and SAF airstrikes will substantially increase security and bystander risks for NGO staff engaged in North Darfur. We assess that risks of looting, kidnapping and sexual violence will also increase, particularly during overland movement along the A5 and B26 highways. (Source: Sibylline)
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